The British Presence in Macau, 1635–1793

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Introduction

The Marchandy also of Portugal
By divers lands turne into sale.
Portugalers with us have trouth in hand:
Whose Marchandy commeth much into England.
They ben our friends, with their commodities,
And wee English passen into their countrees.

“Libel of English policie, exhorting all England to keepe the sea”
[c.1436], in Richard Hakluyt, Voyages in Eight Volumes,
vol. 1, 1962, p. 178

This study sets out to present a history of the British presence, at first in the Indian Ocean, pursuing the Portuguese route, and later, in the Far East, in Macau, from 1635 to 1793, as also in Japan (Hirado) from 1613 to 1623, from where the English attempted unsuccessfully to set up direct trade links with China. The British presence in Macau stemmed from Elizabethan interest in Portuguese profit-making in the East Indies, and began with the arrival in 1635 of the first English vessel, the London, in Macau. I end my study with the year 1793, the date of the first British embassy to China led by Lord Macartney, which constituted Britain’s first, albeit diplomatically fruitless, attempt to institutionalise relations between the two countries. I therefore present the most representative episodes of the first two hundred years of the British presence in Macau, a presence which has left its mark, still visible today, on the humanised face of the city, notably in the ancient Protestant cemetery and chapel. In both Portuguese and Anglophone documents, mainly those of the nineteenth century, references were made to other British haunts in the city, notably the English Tavern (Hotel),

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the British Museum (the first museum to open its doors in China, 1829–1834, as I have recently shown)\(^2\) and the East India Company (EIC) Library.\(^3\) Even before the English started to send trading expeditions to Amoy and to Formosa, travelling to China meant putting in at the port of Macau, so these two latter place-names became synonymous by a synecdochical process. In fact, Thomas Naish’s 1731 report to London advises every vessel en route to Amoy to stop off in the enclave, putting in at Taipa for protection against typhoons and to take in supplies,\(^4\) hence testifying to the strategic value of the City of the Holy Name of God of Macau both for travellers and for British interests in the Far East.

References to Macau in the EIC Records (India Office Records-British Library, IOR) are relatively scant, since, as is known, the China Trade took place in Canton, the main destination for traders, who only lived in the Sino-Portuguese enclave because they were banned from living all year round in the Canton factories. References to episodes in the lives of the British and to their experience of Macau which I found in the IOR cover the periods between the trading seasons (March–September), when the supercargoes remained there. In turn, most English-language studies on the Western presence in Southern China study the British presence in Canton, relegating Macau to a secondary place,\(^5\) for the EIC’s supercargoes traded mainly in Canton and, as I have already stated, only resided in the enclave between trading seasons, with the city acting as a “means” to attain a commercial “end”. My study thus fills in what has hitherto been a historiographical “vacuum”. Over the many years of preparing for this study, previously published in Portuguese as *A Presença Inglesa e as Relações Anglo-Portuguesas em Macau (1635–1793)* (Lisbon, 2009), I published portions of the conclusions of this study in *A World of Euphemism: Representations of Macau in the Work of Austin Coates: City of Broken Promises as a Historical Novel and a Female Bildungsroman* (Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation/Foundation for Science and Technology, Lisbon, 2009) and in several articles in Portuguese and international journals. These have been listed in the bibliography which concludes the present volume.

Of the documents pertaining to the EIC to be found in the British Library, I consulted the India Office Records, collections R/10 and G/12 (China and Japan, some of the documents are duplicated in both collections). Volumes R/10/3–7 fill the vacuum of documentation in series G/12 for the period from
1754 to 1774. Most of the data contained in these volumes cover economic and trade concerns, that is, the arrival and departure of vessels, their cargoes and the transactions carried out in China. Sporadically, I found data pertaining to the British presence in Macau, including the conflicts between the supercargoes and the Portuguese authorities.

By cross-referencing an ample set of British, Portuguese and (translated) Chinese sources in the Overseas Historical Archive (Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino), the Macau Cultural and Scientific Centre, the Portuguese Library, the National Archive Institute/Torre do Tombo, and the Ajuda Library, in Lisbon, the India Office Records, the Public Record Office, the National Maritime Museum, the School of Oriental and African Studies, in London, and the Macau Historical Archive (Macau), a tri-dimensional image emerged of the British presence in that territory during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I cross-referenced data from European historical sources, with a special focus on the British, Portuguese and, although to a lesser extent, Chinese documents summarised and translated into Portuguese, English and French, opting to use present-day spelling with regard to the manuscripts and keeping the spelling used in the British published documents. The archive material I studied thus allow us to reconstitute both the first fruits of the China Trade and the ensuing growth of British influence in Macau—which became the centre of Chinese control over Westerners—and the relations of the EIC’s supercargoes with the Portuguese and Chinese authorities in the second half of the eighteenth century. Given that the trading system and *modus vivendi* of Westerners in Canton and in Macau remained relatively unchanged until the first Opium War and the subsequent founding of Hong Kong, I also consulted travel writing and journals of US and European residents produced in the first half of the nineteenth century, with a view to reconstructing certain dimensions of the day-to-day life of the foreign community residing in Macau.

The early voyages of the EIC to China were the first form of contact between the Macau Portuguese and the EIC’s supercargoes, a relation that was governed by trading interests, diplomatic measures taken locally and in Europe, and attempts to obtain financial gain. The study of the British presence in the enclave takes on special importance, for, besides Austin Coates’s comprehensive survey, *Macau and the British 1637–1842: Prelude to Kongkong* (1966)—whose
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sub-title points above all to the events leading up to the founding of the British colony—this is the first academic study exclusively devoted to the British presence in Macau and to the importance of the enclave for the EIC's China Trade. Coates's book proves to be a synthesis on the subject, lacking the critical frame that identifies the sources used, and merely presenting a general bibliography.

By comparing Western and Chinese sources and bibliography (the latter in translation), my research contributes to the study of the beginning and development of Anglo-Portuguese relations in the Far East, especially in Macau, up to 1793, the date of the first British embassy to China. The (failed) embassy, and its consequences, signalled a change in British attitudes to China, increasingly viewed as a stagnated nation in need of reform, with such trading pressure culminating in the Opium War. British descriptions and travel writing, such as George Anson’s, began to replace the image of China conveyed by the European Jesuits, which was called into question by such Protestant authors as Oliver Goldsmith, Samuel Johnson, Thomas Perch and John Barrow, who visited the imperial court and became familiar with its workings during the embassy.

It is not my aim to present a history of the EIC trade in China or of diplomatic relations between the Cantonese Mandarinate and overseas traders. Rather, I aim to study Anglo-Portuguese relations in Macau from 1635 until the end of the eighteenth century,6 and, within the scope of the extension to the Far East of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, to contribute towards altering the situation described, with a strong nationalistic flavour in 1961, by the Macanese historian, J. M. Braga:

Histories of this period have given little space to the importance and value of the help rendered to so many foreigners by Macau, for writers on this subject have gone exclusively to accounts by writers using British source material. [...] A Portuguese would like to feel that it might not be forgotten that if there had been no Macau or that if the community there had been less accommodating, although admittedly the Portuguese received benefits from the presence of the foreigners, neither John Henry Cox nor any other of the “interlopers” who contributed to breaking the E.I.C. monopoly, on behalf of the free-trade movement in Britain, would ever have had the opportunity of accomplishing what they did.7
The founding of Hong Kong after the first Opium War occurred after 141 years of British presence in Canton, and in Macau during the “summer residence”, between the trading seasons, when the Chinese authorities did not permit members of the EIC Select Committee to remain in mainland China. From the eighteenth century onward, the Luso-Chinese enclave gradually became the gateway for Western nations into China and also the spring-board for the lucrative trade which numerous European powers endeavoured to develop and maintain there. British social attitudes to the “Gem of the Orient” were expressed in EIC documents and in comments found in different authors’ travel writings which I used as sources to study the representation of Macau in Anglophone China Trade narratives written by male and female residents and visitors. In the main, British historical sources also present a Protestant clashing-gaze both of Macau’s familiar European ‘façade’ and exotic and oriental dimension. This being so, the Anglophone accounts differ from the Portuguese (Roman Catholic) view, while the dialogue between Chinese and Western sources, as well as descriptions of Eastern realities, should be interpreted in the light of the concept of ocularcentrism, a term coined by Grimshaw, to refer to “the relationship between vision and knowledge in Western discourse”.10

The voyages of the Company’s vessels to Macau—both the initially sporadic expeditions, decided by the English factories in the East, and the voyages organised in London—as well as the fruits of these expeditions, at first almost nil, testify to initial lack of interest and the succession of forward and backward movements in English trade in Southern China from the late 1630s, results which were also influenced by Portuguese interests and stratagems. As we shall see, business journeys and the continued EIC presence in the Macau-Canton circuit gave way to a degree of cultural exchange of which Chinese Pidgin English (CPE) is a symbol in China, its European “counterpart” being chinoiserie, for, after 1717, British trade in tea gradually overtook Portuguese might in the Guangdong province, and the presence of the supercargoes in the territory became essential for its economy due to the profits it generated.

As signalled by the titles of the seven parts of the Handbook of Urban Studies (2001) edited by Ronan Paddison, a city can be read in terms of its economy, environment, eclectic multitude, and organised polity, with this variety of dimensions demanding a pluri-disciplinary approach to that human space. If
urban studies advocate the need for cities to be interpreted through a multi-
disciplinary approach, the origin and history of Macau demand just such an
approach and a multinational gaze to fully understand the development and
importance of the multicultural territory which is the object of my study and
which was enriched over the centuries not only by its Chinese and Portuguese
communities, but also by the Japanese, African, Indian, British, North-American,
Armenian, French, and Swedish residents, among other nationalities.
The Convention of Goa signed between Goa and Surat aimed to face the growing Dutch power in the Far East, gradually opening the gateway to Macau for EIC vessels and those of private English traders. This alliance mirrored the problems with which the Estado da Índia had to concern itself in the face of its northern European rivals and the strategies Portugal adopted to deal with the situation. The English visited Macau when the Estado da Índia was beginning to contract, but, as we will see, the EIC only established itself in China in the early eighteenth century. From early on, the arrival of these rivals displeased the municipality of Macau, which tried to defend its privileged status with the Middle Kingdom and keep its trade competitors away; four years after the Convention was signed, these would facilitate the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan, jeopardising the survival of the City of the Holy Name of God of Macau. On the other hand, imperial vigilance over Macau hampered the city’s trade activity and its power, since the Chinese authorities viewed the enclave as part of China, under the authority of the emperor; and a perfect place where foreigners could be enclosed and controlled, as we shall see in chapter 6.

**The first ‘English’ vessel in Macau**

The Portugall, a watchfull eie and jealousie over us.

—“Henry Bornford at Surat to the Company, April 29, 1636”, in Sir William Foster, *The English Factories in India 1634–1636*, 1911, p. 227
After the signing of the Convention of Goa, a group of Englishmen, accompanied by the Portuguese factor Gaspar Gomes, and as proposed by the viceroy of Goa, Count Linhares, set sail from Goa on board the *London* in April 1635 and arrived in China on 23 July. The group was received in Macau with reluctance by the local oligarchy. Gomes had to ensure that the English sailors did not disturb the city’s peace, offend the residents during their religious ceremonies or drink to excess. At first, it was not the residents of Macau who made it difficult for the English to disembark; rather it was the Portuguese factors who had travelled on the vessel, with the two sides becoming locked in a struggle of interests which ended two weeks later when the EIC officials were authorised to settle on dry land. The viceroy of Goa had secretly forbidden the crew to land, as a result of which the English supercargo Henry Bornford advised his directors that, should they want him to carry out a second journey to China, he would sail not to Macau but to one of the other ports or islands in the Pearl River delta.

In February of that year, and writing to Philip II about the benefits of the Convention of Goa, Count Linhares had informed the king that there was a cargo of copper and iron in Macau “which could not be shipped because of the Dutch presence in the Straights [sic] of Singapore”. The viceroy had therefore chartered, from the president of the English factory in Surat, a vessel (the *London*) on which to carry these goods “because as they [English] are in no danger from the Dutch, they can bring them with great ease, and it does not cross my mind that the said English may divert this cargo, since, besides being men of their word, all their vessels will stand as security”. According to the viceroy, the English already knew the environs of Macau, given the countless voyages they had undertaken, including from Japan, together with their former allies, the Dutch. It was agreed that the English would not contact or trade with the Chinese, with Count Linhares defending his position thus:

my having agreed with this President that no English would land on Macau soil, and we would put in their vessel [...] a captain with fifty soldiers [...] according to my thought that the Chinamen are treacherous, and that they might want to raid their vessel [...] and, as for the cargo he much complimented me, and in fact it was agreed that I would name the price the vessel would pay to come here.
In turn, and contrary to what the viceroy had written to Philip II, the instructions issued by the English factory in Surat advised the crew of the London that some of them would be allowed to settle on dry land:

> to which purpose [they] shall take a house, and cohabite lovingly together. [...] And that no scandal may be given or taken in point of religion (wherein the nation is very tender) let your exercises and devotion be constant but private, without singing of psalms, which is nowhere permitted unto our nation in the King of Sapines dominions, except in ambassadors houses. Let our religion appear in our good conversation amongst men, which will best expresse us to be Reform’d Christians. Howsoever, let not your opinions disturb their practise, nor your curiosity to pry into their ceremonies distast them [...]. In briefe, doe not yourselves, nor permitt not any others to give, any offence in matters of religion; but, observing of daies and all other indifferent ordinances.6

The viceroy of Goa promised to pay the EIC 10% of the profits yielded by the voyage, the main aim of the former being to bring from Macau 5,000 quintais of copper, some iron and artillery pieces from Manuel Tavares Bocarro’s foundry.7 Surat warned the English officials travelling to Macau that the Portuguese might trick them, for which reason the former, when loading the vessel, should give priority to the goods likely to yield a profit; advice was further given on what goods to carry in the event of there being extra space on board, with a total ban on officials’ private trade.8

In parallel with trade disputes, from the outset religious differences between “Papists” and Protestants also marked Anglo-Portuguese relations in Macau, with the above advice anticipating the difficulties to which the different religious practices and beliefs would give rise between the two peoples in the enclave. These conflicts made themselves felt into the nineteenth century, since it was only in 1821 that the English were allowed to build a Protestant cemetery,9 and several bishops in Macau railed at the pernicious presence of the foreigners who corrupted the morals of the citizenry.10

Methwold’s instructions to Captain Willes further advised him that both conflicts between the English and the Portuguese, to which the signing of the Convention had put an end, and the personal interests of the Portuguese community, could bring to the boil adverse reactions on the part of the enclave’s
inhabitants towards the English during the “first visit of an English vessel”. Thus, mistrust and the clash of trading interests marked the first contacts between Macau traders and the EIC. Methwold thus informed the London’s captain:

At his arrival at Macau, the Captain is enjoined to conform to directions from the Portuguese governor, particularly in regard to persons sent ashore from the ship; and to avoid all occasions of giving offence: for it is to be apprehended, that as this is the first visit of an English ship there, under a friendly compact, soe fears and jealousies; grounded as the former Enmity between the two nations, may be entertained by the Portuguese.11

In May 1635, the viceroy Miguel de Noronha wrote to the captain-general of Macau, Manuel da Câmara de Noronha, and announced the truce with the old allies (Convention of Goa), sending a copy of the document describing “what is to be found in the truce, [that] this new friendship can bring great hope to the Estado, with it [...] the President has chartered this vessel, which carries 42 pieces of artillery, and has 200 men, he [William Methwold] says, fierce and brave”.12 The viceroy cordially recommended the English captain, also saying that it was important that “no Englishman has conversation with any Chinaman.”13 Six or eight Portuguese men should always remain on board the English ship to assist and guard the cargo. The ship’s captain should be cordially invited to dinner and welcomed by the captain-general, who should also supply him with provisions and show him the city. The instructions from Goa were minute, listed the measures to be taken by the Portuguese when interacting with the English crew, and several times re-iterated the need for the English to maintain a distance from the Chinese, for the former carried valuable goods with which to trade with Gaspar Gomes’s assistance.14 The EIC factors were to pay for the vessel’s measuring, and the petition to the Mandarin should be made in the name of the experienced Portuguese who accompanied the English officer.15 Communication between the native population and the newcomers should be avoided at all costs, and the London should return to Goa as soon as possible, “before the Chinamen can suspect anything, or any Macau Portuguese warn them [the Chinese]”.16 For his part, the captain-general of Macau informed the viceroy of Goa of the arrival of the London, of Gaspar Gomes’s performance,17 of the implementation of the various instructions of the Count Linhares regarding the peace treaty (Convention of Goa), and the “disguised” sojourn of the
vessel without raising Chinese suspicion, for the latter had been told that this “galleon of the Armada” had come to guard the remaining galleons awaiting it in Southern China, “because of the [...] European enemies.” The captain-general further described the “friendship”, the supply of provisions with which he received the English captain before taking him back to the vessel, which was guarded by trusty Portuguese men, as if replying point by point to his superior’s letter. Details as to the loading of the copper and artillery were also part of the long missive which proved to Goa that the enclave had carried out its duty.

The London, the first English vessel to anchor in Southern China, under the command of Matthew Willis, despite having been secretly chartered by the Portuguese, triggered clashes between the Mandarin authorities and the administration of Macau, which was forced to pay a fine to the former because of the unwanted presence of the “foreign” vessel, after its departure on 20 October for Goa, where it arrived in early February 1636. The English complained that they had been duped by the factor Gaspar Gomes “making things difficult for them”. In the meantime, the behaviour of the English supercargoes in Macau was less than professional, and in August 1636 Methwold mentioned the dubious accounting of the voyage by Abraham Aldington, who was found guilty of fraud given the inflated expenses of the crew’s stay in the enclave.

On reaching Goa, the crew of the London refused to pay customs duties, just as they had done in Malacca, since they had bought their goods from Chinese residents of Macau and had not off-loaded them in India, as they intended to ship them on to England. The new viceroy of India, Pedro da Silva, informed the king of Portugal that he could do nothing, since the contract signed the previous year between Count Linhares and the English did not cover this eventuality, and the former had not informed the Council of his decision. However, the letter sent by Count Linhares to Philip III of Portugal before the London had even set sail pointed out the advantages of the “new truce” and of the customs duties “because the English were told that they had to pay duties on all the goods which they bring and take”. Manuel Ramos, the administrator of voyages to Japan and Crown agent in Macau, informed the viceroy that, when the English left Goa “they were already determined not to abide by the orders [of Count Linhares] to disembark [in Macau] only when the Captain-general would come for them”. The Portuguese factor confessed to have suffered
greatly in their company, for “they esteemed [him] very little”.27 In his letter of 30 October 1635, Manuel Ramos described the English as enemies, referring to their open attempts to communicate with the Chinese, as well as to the petition handed to the Mandarin when the vessel was measured, requesting a “port” in Chinese waters. The Portuguese were forced to avoid the rendition of the vessel, an infraction for which, later, they had to pay, as already mentioned, a substantial sum in the Canton fair. The Mandarinate ordered the Chinese inhabitants to leave the city and cut off the supply of food staples with a view to forcing the Portuguese authorities to pay the fine. This strategy to pressure the Portuguese was applied throughout the centuries, and is also mentioned by Courteen’s agents in 1637 when they describe the possibilities of future English trade with China. As described by Peter Mundy, Macau was a location to be avoided by those English traders wishing to set up in business in China, given the level of control exerted by the Chinese and by the Portuguese.28 In 1849 Henry Charles Sirr also mentioned the Chinese permission for the Portuguese to establish themselves in the peninsula of Macau as a strategy to control the foreigners: “The great enemy to be dreaded by the Portuguese would be famine, in the event of a war with the Chinese; for [...] the principal supplies come from the mainland”.29

After the London’s voyage, Manuel Ramos, the administrator of voyages to Japan, advised the viceroy of Goa to guard against monetary losses in Macau and to force the English to leave a deposit in Goa for the vessel’s rendition.30 Fully aware of the threat posed by the English vessels, the enclave at once joined forces with the Canton Mandarinate in order to repel the unwanted foreign presence. As Anders Ljungstedt concluded, right from the very beginning the Portuguese had perceived French and English interests in China as harmful to their trade.31

Henry Bornford, “the firste [Englishman] that negotiated [...] business in those parts”,32 affirms in his travel log that while his apparent objective was to assist the viceroy of India deal with the Dutch blockade, the underlying purpose of the EIC’s mission was to launch direct trade with China. He further states that this aim was only defeated by the fact that Chinese “superstitions” kept foreigners at bay, as was also the case of the Portuguese in the “iland of Machau”,33 who for their part were not allowed free entry into China. The supercargo concluded: “so far as the English could see, the averseness of the Chinese to intercourse with
The arrival of the English in Macau

foreigners is exaggerated by the Portuguese, who also abuse other nations to
the Chinese in order to keep the trade to themselves."34 The comments of the
man in charge of the London’s voyage to Macau regarding Portuguese attitudes,
including the comment I quote in the epigraph to this sub-chapter, constitute
the first English image about the city’s dwellers, based on actual visual contact
and interaction. From the beginning of the English presence in China, the
Portuguese carried out a two-pronged strategy of interests which operated on
two fronts and consisted of keeping other European nations away from China
and denigrating their image among the higher echelons of Canton’s provin-
cial administration. However, Bornford listed the goods which could be most
easily sold in Macau and reached the conclusion that, should peace between the
Portuguese and the English come to pass, the latter would gain a part of this
lucrative trade.35 For his part, Gaspar Gomes, back in Goa, described the voyage
to the new viceroy Pedro da Silva and stated that he had warned the English
that, under the instructions they had received, they could not trade in Macau.
Pedro da Silva was highly suspicious of this expedition and, in a report to Philip
III of Portugal, he paraphrased the factor’s account,36 stating that the English
did not wish to abide by this, but would rather have their own factory
where they would sell and buy whatever was to be had, and became great
friends with the local Chinamen, continuously giving them food and drink
[…], taking them many goods and silver, and that they wanted no more
than to be allowed to build two thatched houses outside the city and not
sturdy houses like those of the Portuguese, and that they would offer them
their goods cheaper by 30% and 40% than our prices, and as the Chinamen
did not allow them the goods which they requested, which will not be very
difficult because those people always seek out their goods in larger quanti-
ties, and as those which we buy from them are in little quantity because
of the lack of navigation and trade [due to the Dutch embargo in the
Malacca Straights] they will easily make friends with the English, in this
way harming this Estado [da Índia], especially when they [the English]
come with such greed to return to China, as Gaspar Gomes tells me, and
also here after they arrived I have heard that, even against our will, they
will send out two of their brigs during the monsoon, and will do this every
year.37
These accounts by Gaspar Gomes and by the new viceroy reflected the interest felt by the supercargoes in Surat to approach the Chinese to request authorisation to build a “thatched” and not permanent factory, as were the Portuguese buildings, outside the walls of Macau where they would compete with the city’s dwellers. Even before Gomes had arrived in Goa, Manuel Ramos had already warned the viceroy of the dangers of the return of the English and of trade with China and Japan passing into their hands, conveying similar facts to those which the factor would narrate in loco, as follows:

(1) the English “intent on continuing this trade”, requested Chinese authorisation to send two small vessels to Canton the following year and to build four “very small totally unfortified” houses “with no artillery”, unlike those of the Portuguese in Macau, undertaking to sell to the Chinese merchandise at half the price practised by the Portuguese,

(2) the English promised “other things that would benefit them, much to our detriment”, and tried to offer a Chinese man large annual payments to the Mandarins and to the emperor, making many other promises on this. Eventually, the Portuguese found out about the plan and convinced the man to take a Portuguese bribe to make him pretend to the English that he would go to Canton to intercede on their behalf,

(3) if the English did not reach Macau from Goa, they would do so from Surat, thus jeopardising Portuguese trade in the Far East.38

Pedro da Silva informed Philip III of the threat the English posed to the enclave’s trade and of Surat’s subversive intentions,39 although voyages to China were not yet part of the trading policies of the Company in London. However, many of the measures taken and much of the success of English trading in the East derived from decisions made and strategies mapped out by the local factories without the prior approval of the directors in London.

Gaspar Gomes’s account and Manuel Ramos’s missive prove that the Estado da Índia had feared English competition from the moment the first EIC vessel had been sent to Macau, even though this had been the Portuguese wish. Pedro da Silva informed the king that he had admitted to his Council, even before the vessel returned, “how much he felt and regretted, already foreseeing the damage that would befall this Estado from sending this vessel to China”,40 describing
how, after taking up his post, he had distanced himself from his predecessor’s actions and forced the *London* to stay outside the port of Goa to check its cargo and exact the customs duties owed to the Portuguese Crown. The viceroy also wrote to the captain-general of Macau about the major drawbacks of the *London’s* voyage and enjoined him both to make every effort to ensure that no other European nation was received in any other Chinese port, as also letting him know that this voyage had incurred his displeasure; no other English vessel, he further wrote, should be sent to China, nor should any favours be extended to third parties.\(^4^1\) Four years later, and fighting the Dutch blockade, the same viceroy, in the same type of move adopted by his predecessor with regard to the English, chartered a vessel from the first Danish East India Company, thus weakening the exclusive position of the English.\(^4^2\)

After the *London’s* return, relations between Pedro da Silva, who for three years did not pay the English for the chartering of the vessel, and Methwold became tense to the extent that the truce enshrined in the Convention of Goa came close to being suspended.\(^4^3\) For these same reasons, and having banned further English voyages to Macau,\(^4^4\) the viceroy was considered by Surat as being “irreconcilably adverse unto the English”.\(^4^5\) In the same year, Madras, which would become known as Fort St. George, was acquired by the English, and, because of the Dutch blockade, the viceroy of Goa again proposed to the English that they send two or three vessels to Macau. This support was turned down by Surat, which informed London of the upset expressed by Goa with regard to what it felt was Portugal’s abandoning of it, with the Portuguese even being prepared to become the subjects of a foreign king who would protect them from the Dutch. Surat also wrote of the need for English vessels to be sent to the East so as to profit from the advantageous wish expressed by the local Portuguese to cooperate in matters of trade: “wee believe they would readily subscribe to furnish you with pepper, cinamon, and as much freedome & security in some of their forts (if not the fort itself)”\(^4^6\). In 1636 Surat informed London that they wished to set up direct trade with China, for which London would have to obtain authorisation from Portugal, while the factory would pay the required taxes in Malacca.

The voyage of the *London* and the other Portuguese proposals to use English vessels occurred as a result of the interests and in the name of the Portuguese
in Goa. Therefore, this voyage cannot be considered the first English-driven mission to the Luso-Chinese enclave, especially as the EIC directors were unaware that Surat used its capital to send vessels to China, a practice which they later disapproved. London alerted Methwold to the danger of initiatives such as the chartering of the *London*, for the Dutch, should they find out that English vessels were carrying Portuguese munitions or goods, could easily take them in the Malacca Straights and confiscate the cargo, as they did in 1643 when they captured the *Bona Speranza*. This English vessel was chartered by the viceroy of Goa, João da Silva Telo e Meneses, Count Aveiras, from Sir William Courteen’s Commercial Association to transport Portuguese soldiers to Macau. The vessel was escorted by two other English ships (the *Lesser* and the *Greater William*), as a result of the difficulties posed by the Dutch blockade. As recorded by the viceroy in late 1643: “The English vessel [...] which had set sail for China is also presumed to have been detained in the same fortress of Malacca, having fought with the Dutch, in which fight the English captain having died [...], this leads us to believe that China must be suffering great hardship.”

Enmity and the initial fear of Anglo-Portuguese competition gradually gave way to cooperation as a strategy for the defence of both nations’ interests in the face of the Dutch threat in the East, and, thanks to the Convention of Goa, the Portuguese of Macau even started to travel to and from Lisbon via London on board EIC vessels, although peace between the two allies did not make them “the masters of everything.” After the massacre of Amboina and the Dutch expulsion of the English from the spice trade, the EIC joined forces with the Portuguese to confront Dutch might, and it was in this context that, as we have seen, the Convention of Goa was signed in 1635.

**The beginning of sporadic voyages to Macau and the role of the East India Company factories in the East**

Two years after the *London*’s voyage, a small English fleet sent by William Courteen’s Association arrived in Macau. This was indeed the first English expedition to arrive in China, the result of private initiative. Conflicts between the crew and the Portuguese and Chinese authorities showed, from the very start, that the English would spare no effort to share with the Portuguese the profits
of trade in Canton. During the fleet’s stay, one of the traders, Peter Mundy, came to write the first long description in English of the enclave, to which he added pictorial representations. Immediately following the arrival of the first English fleet, Macau defended its trade and economic interests and developed strategies on five fronts for the purpose, notably with the Mandarinate, with Lisbon, the viceroy of Goa, the English crew members, and also with the English king.

**John Weddell’s expedition and Peter Mundy’s diary (1637): The beginning of Anglo-Portuguese relations in Macau**

Following the Luso-English truce, the EIC was not alone in sending vessels to China, and in June 1637 four vessels of the fleet of Courteen’s Association, under the command of John Weddell, who had participated in the taking of Ormuz, anchored in the waters off Macau after passing through Goa, bringing on board a number of Malacca missionaries, as well as Peter Mundy, who during his stay in Macau wrote the illustrated diary to which I have already referred. In 1637 Courteen, together with Endymion Porter, succeeded in obtaining authorisation from Charles I to trade in the East Indies, momentarily upsetting the balance of the EIC monopoly until his Association was taken over by the EIC around 1649. For a number of years Courteen’s vessels had already been fighting against Portuguese supremacy in the Indian Ocean, which made Surat inform London that Courteen’s fleet was one of the hurdles standing in the way of success for the EIC’s business ventures, notably in Macau: “for Courteen’s ships came out expressly to take advantage of the Foundations which the Company, at a great cost, had laid for Intercourse with China, through the Portuguese settlements of Goa and Macau”. According to the same source, these circumstances were aggravated by the “jealousy” of the Portuguese in Goa, who tried to boycott the London’s enterprise—to which they themselves had invited the English—even evading payment of the charter involved. On the other hand, the powerful Dutch who confiscated Portuguese goods carried by English vessels hampered Anglo-Portuguese cooperation, which was only resumed when the Hind was chartered in 1644. This was the year in which the Banten factor proposed to London to set up direct trade with China, in the wake of the Portuguese and the Dutch, an activity which would, no doubt, be
successful. For his part, the Surat factor, Edward Knippe, hoped that, even if peace came about between the Portuguese and the Dutch, the former would charter vessels from him to sail to Macau, given the destruction of Portuguese vessels by Malabar pirates.

If we exclude the voyage of the London, (disguisedly) flying the Portuguese flag, Weddell’s voyage was the first entirely English trading expedition to the territory. For this reason, I will dwell especially on the sojourn of the independent traders, for Portuguese and English sources reveal not only the prejudices and the expectations but also the defensive and trading strategies both of the Macau Portuguese and of the English newcomers, who tried to achieve their aims at all costs. Patricia Drumond Borges Ferreira has studied this episode and states that Weddell’s crew members were the first Englishmen to reach Macau. However, and although we cannot be absolutely certain that William Carmichael actually visited the enclave—despite this being highly likely—and if we exclude the sojourn of Frobisher’s wife and servant (1620), the London was, in 1635, the first vessel to arrive in the city with an English crew on board.

In his report to the viceroy, the Macau captain-general Domingos da Câmara de Noronha described the arrival and sojourn of Weddell’s crew as “notably full of greed, and they already came from those parts with this intent, all hatched on the vessel London […], and they had brought with them the intention of also wanting to send some of their vessels to Japan,” further remarking on the difficulty of enforcing royal justice in the city and the Chinese ban on any visits to the English vessels. That is to say, each side’s initial mistrust marked relations between Weddell’s fleet and the Macau authorities, as had already been the case when the London put in at Macau.

While still on his way to China, Peter Mundy mentions two female pioneers, Richard Frobisher’s wife, Joan Frobisher, and their servant, and the first recorded visit by English women to Macau, around 1620, when the Unicorn was shipwrecked in what were viewed as enemy waters, since the English and the Portuguese were rivals in the East until 1635. On 7 September 1637, in response to Macau’s protest against the Luso-Chinese confrontations caused by the presence of the London in Macau, Weddell and Mundy both mention the conflicts to which the signing of the Convention of Goa had put an end, accusing the Portuguese with regard to the situation prior to 1635:
as it was not enough that you should close and forbid us your ports, but you also exerted every means to prevent us from holding commerce with other kingdoms. At last peace was sought for by you for two or three years, [...] and concluded in the city of Goa in December 1634 [10–01–1635] [...] the articles being confirmed by both parties, by which was conceded to us the free entry and trade of your ports.

Upon his arrival in the enclave, Mundy was invited to lunch at the Jesuit seminary, and throughout his stay, he wrote a detailed description of the city’s human and natural landscapes. The English and Portuguese documents gathered both by Sir Richard Carnac Temple and L. Anstey, and by Maria Manuela Sobral Blanco, as well as the Livros das Monções (Books of the Monsoons), present the trading interests which mark the beginning of Anglo-Portuguese relations in Macau and which would in essence hold true until the founding of Hong Kong. The English settlement in the Pearl River delta was from the outset viewed by the Portuguese authorities as a threat to the city’s trade and, as a result, to its very survival.

In the first letter sent by the city of Macau to the English king in July 1637, and in reply to the king’s letter brought by Weddell, Domingos de Noronha stated that he had received no notification from the viceroy regarding the Goa “contract” and, further to the letter he had received from the English fleet, he also advised Weddell that he had not been notified of the Anglo-Portuguese peace. However, as proved by Portuguese documents prior to this voyage, the conclusion must be drawn that this alleged lack of knowledge of the signing of the Convention of Goa is a fabrication, for, as already stated, and as early as 1635, Count Linhares had informed the captain-general, the latter having expressed thanks for the news. Once again, Domingos de Noronha strategically resorted to supposed ignorance of the peace so as not to lend support to the entry of trade competitors in China. While Macau refused to honour the Anglo-Portuguese “truce” agreement, with a view to defending local interests, the London became a recurring symbol of the problems which the English caused the Portuguese, with the captain-general offering to assist Weddell’s fleet only in circumstances of “urgent need”, as he was “limited [and without] orders from his superiors”, the king of Portugal and the viceroy of India:
Because when the vessel *London* came to this port, it brought particular orders from His Excellency Count Linhares, with a Portuguese Factor on board to take from here artillery and other cargo belonging to private traders, [...] it caused such losses to the city, and to its conservation with respect to the Chinamen, who are so worried that any other nation visits these parts that have thus made us suffer great losses, in the estates of the inhabitants of this land, because they depend greatly on them, this city which is in their land.

If the captain-general stated he was unaware of the signing of the Convention of Goa, he wrote about the fine that the city had paid to the Mandarins because of the visit of the *London*, which damaged the enclave’s economic interests. In a three-pronged strategy involving Weddell’s fleet, the Chinese authorities and the viceroy of Goa, Domingos Noronha wrote to the latter in December 1637, informing him that four English vessels had arrived in the enclave, and why he had banned any person from contacting the fleet and placed the city under guard and had sent provisions for the crew. This type of defensive measure continued down the centuries, as can be seen from the protest sent by Macau to the Mandarinate against the presence of a British warship off the coast of the peninsula in 1800.

Faced with the Chinese desire to contact the “red-haired barbarians”, Macau strategically informed the former of the unfriendly designs of the “newcomers”. The English eventually decided to visit Canton, which the Portuguese could only enter to take part in the city’s fair and trade directly with the Chinese. The enclave further feared that the fleet’s destination was Japan, that it would attack the Black Ship (*nau do trato*) and would manage to set up a factory in China next to Macau. Weddell forced his way to Canton, and the Portuguese conveyed their astonishment to the English Captain, stating that such an act would bring the crew “many misfortunes with the locals.” In the end, the Mandarins demanded that Macau pay for any damage caused by the English, since they had arrived in China as friends of the enclave, although the Portuguese had denied them any type of trade. The Chinese demanded that the English pay the customary taxes, and Weddell’s endeavour ended in failure, for which the captain blamed the Portuguese machinations. Irrespective of the truth of this statement, which up to a point corresponds to the facts, given that the Macau traders tried to defend their interests by every means, this argument would be used
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repeatedly by British historians to justify why the EIC established direct trade with Canton so late.  

Since Weddell's was the first entirely English fleet to arrive in Macau, it is interesting to note that, like the captain of the London, he discussed with the Chinese the possibility of paying them an annual fee, as the Portuguese did, and dividing Macau with the latter. The English desire to acquire a position and an establishment in China similar to that of their old European allies became immediately clear, this plan only coming to fruition after the Opium War, with the founding of Hong Kong.

On 6 September, Weddell wrote to the city and referred to the “most tedious” and threatening letters he had received from Macau and which led him to think that it regarded the English as none other than “despicable and worthy of no esteem”, re-iterating that, one way or another, he would be successful in gaining entry to the China trade. He went on to say that, according to the Portuguese themselves, Macau “is […] but a possession of His Majesty the King of China” and that in any event all he required for success was the authorisation of the king of Portugal. In effect, the following day the city again stated in a letter to Weddell: “we are not in the land of our King nor did we gain a place in this city by a fair war, rather we have it through the benevolence of the King of China and […] we depend on him not only in serious circumstances but also in the smallest matters of our government […] the sustaining of each day”. The letter also describes the level of control and pressure exerted by the Mandarins on the territory when the English fleet arrived, repeating “the very great troubles and losses” the Portuguese had previously undergone because of the visit of the London, irrespective of the fact that the vessel carried a Portuguese factor. This situation had arisen anew, though in a more serious way, for Weddell’s fleet had arrived without the authorisation of the king of Portugal or of the viceroy of India. The city’s governing body further feared that the repercussions of all the offences committed by the English would be felt by the enclave, upsetting the trade in which it had been engaged for over ninety years with the Chinese. This would run counter to the principles of the peace treaties signed between England and Portugal, which aimed to preserve both countries’ colonial possessions and interests.
The Senate met in October to respond to Weddell’s request to trade in order to make up for the costs of his voyage and decided to allow the Englishman to do so, as his requests were “of little consequence” and the goods to be traded would not harm the interests of the local traders. This would stop the fleet from attacking the Macau fleet returning from Japan, which was vital for the local economy. In December 1637 the city informed Charles I of the reasons and interests which had led the Portuguese to assist Weddell’s fleet in initiating trade relations with China. It also criticised the behaviour of the remaining English crew who, unlike Weddell, were discredited and accused of shamelessly squandering the monarch’s money. Macau affirmed it had helped the crew members like “true friends”, although, the latter being traders, it could not provide accommodation for them, nor allow them to set up a factory. This was not for want of friendship or the desire to do so, but because of five reasons, which were explained at length and which had already been put to Weddell:

1. to avoid Chinese “investigations” and problems such as those which had arisen in 1635 with the voyage of the London. The Portuguese had had to pay the Mandarinate many thousands of patacas and had been threatened with expulsion from Macau as traitors, since the native population believed the English, with their blue eyes, cast the “evil eye” and would invade the country. If the small London had caused such difficulties, four “so large” vessels would cause many more;
2. trade between England and China would destroy Macau completely, and this could not be done in the name of Anglo-Portuguese friendship, since the city made its living from trading with China, Japan, Manila and India. If the Chinese transferred this trade to English hands, it would mean the end of the territory. The Anglo-Portuguese peace and friendship accord had not been signed by either party with the aim of destroying, rather of preserving Portuguese dominions. Thus, Weddell’s fleet could sell wine and textiles to the Portuguese alone, for these goods were not sought by the Chinese;
3. the Portuguese were not in their own country or in land conquered by them, as was the case of India, where they were sovereign and the English were welcomed. Macau, although governed in the name of the
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Portuguese king, was located in the emperor’s land. He had authorised the Portuguese to settle there as a favour, and the latter had to rely solely on the provisions sold to them by the Chinese; if such provisions were denied, it would mean the ruin of the city. Likewise, the Portuguese were banned from trading with foreigners (a practice which did not please Macau either), so the English should not blame them but rather the restrictions placed on them by the Mandarins, to whom all were subject;

(4) the four-vessel fleet frightened the Chinese, leading them to fear an increase in the number of foreign vessels. It was also impossible for the Portuguese to secretly supply Weddell with the cargo he desired, without the Mandarinate’s knowledge;\(^92\)

(5) the Chinese did not allow other nations to trade in Macau, including the Spanish from Manila. This being so, neither the king of Portugal nor Charles I were in a position to decide which other nations could “endanger this trading post” and destroy Portuguese trade.\(^93\)

The document (fols. 222–227) summarises, from the Portuguese point of view, the advice given to the English and the events which made up this episode. Macau described the damage caused by the crew among the Mandarins when they visited Canton and accused the factor Nathaniel Mountney of deviating from Weddell’s diplomatic approach. The enclave even had to send five Portuguese to save the English traders under arrest in Canton.\(^94\) The captain-general of Macau appealed to the English king to preserve the enclave’s well-being. The latter would do everything in its power to assist his subjects, provided such assistance did not jeopardise its own situation; all these statements could be corroborated by the crew of the London. According to the Portuguese, authorisation for the English to trade in China did not depend on them but on the Chinese, who, even when stating that the English were welcome, would do everything to subject them to extortion and later remove them, since the inhabitants of Macau themselves were subjected to trickery. The city decided to help the English, provided they left and never again threatened its stability and trade with China and Japan, as well as its relations with the Mandarin authorities.\(^95\) The letter further summarised all the assistance rendered by Macau to the fleet and the traps laid by the Chinese. The Portuguese felt offended above
all by Nathaniel Mountney and they defined themselves as mediators between
the English and the Mandarins, but could not grant the English freedom of
movement in Macau, accusing them of behaving ungratefully and in ill-faith.
The episode of the London was referred to countless times, and Charles I was
reminded that the city’s decisions were based on prior experience and were in no
way designed to break the peace pact between the two European nations. This
argument was also used to keep away any type of competition from the city.

Weddell’s fleet left Macau in late 1637 after a prolonged stand-off with the
Portuguese and Canton authorities which made the London traders’ intentions
very clear. Thus began the long establishment of English interests on the Macau-
Canton circuit, a process which would pick up speed from the early eighteenth
century onward. Contravening the edict issued by the captain-general, the
departing English fleet carried several priests and Macau residents regarded as
“deceitful and traitors”, a decision which, according to the Portuguese, would
have highly negative results for the Estado da Índia, since these vessels also
carried concealed goods which did not pay customs duties. Macau’s defensive
strategy continued, and, three days after the departure of Weddell’s fleet, several
married men (casados), among whom the alderman Domingos Dias Espichel,
sent a letter to the viceroy which they titled “Reasons presently to be given about
the harms that will result if the English come to Macau”. In this document they
put forward the reasons why the English must not be allowed to enter China,
for they might easily engender among the Chinese “mistrust and suspicion
which will mean the complete ruin and perdition of this City” and of trade
with Japan:

if under peace and friendship, the English continued to send [ships] to
Macau, and if this city, by interest, engages in trade with them, even if
limited, this city and the whole of the Estado da Índia will be exposed to
great harms, as will happen if they bring silver. They will alter the goods
in such a way that what now can be bought for two, we will not be able to
find for four, and even the residents and therefore Your Majesty’s vassals
who come here to trade will not be able to take them [...]. If the English are
allowed security of trade among us, India will be lost, and they will become
masters of it, and the reason is clear, because if they take the goods that
we used to take, which we cannot now because of the impediment in the
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After Weddell’s departure, the Mandarins once again demanded that the Portuguese pay a fine of 80,000 taels. The arrival of the English thus brought about a change in the relations between Macau and the Chinese authorities. In 1638 the viceroy wrote to the king of Portugal and informed him of the presence of the fleet in Macau, of the Chinese attempt to set fire to it, and of the threat that the beginning of English trade posed to the city which was able to “rid itself” of the new-comers. In another letter of the same date, he again referred to the damage which the English vessels would add to that already caused by the Dutch, and the danger of the rivalry pushing up the price of Asian goods.

Since its founding, Macau had become a new type of problem for China. Given the city’s strategic geographical location, in the sixteenth century it had become a Portuguese walled city/peninsula that could easily be controlled by the Cantonese Mandarinate. The emperor had therefore chosen the territory as a trading centre and “pre-port” for Canton for all the foreigners who traded in his empire, as this made it easier to control the latter and keep them outside “[Chinese] law,” that is to say, foreigners had to be kept as far away as possible from Chinese civilisation. Hence, the importance of Macau for the Mandarinate. Even though Weddell’s fleet had entered China without imperial authorisation and had damaged the image of the English, some of the difficulties faced by the crew are included by Earl H. Pritchard in the list of factors which from the outset hampered Anglo-Chinese relations in Canton: cultural differences or clashes which engendered conflicts of opinion and attitudes between the two peoples: political organisation, religion, administrative framework, justice, and Chinese trade organisation, as well as intolerance on both sides.

These conflicts and sensitive areas were to remain in latent form especially until the Opium War, during which time the Portuguese authorities were compelled by circumstances and strategic requirements to adopt neutral policies which in essence sought to please the masters of the land, on whom their well-being and their continued presence in the delta of the Pearl River depended.
The beginning of sporadic voyages to Macau and the EIC's diplomatic strategies in the second half of the seventeenth century

The commodities of Macau come from the sea, and the entire city makes a living from it, there are no other stable goods than what the wind and the tides bring, if these fail, everything fails.

—Fr. Luís da Gama (15–12–1664), BA, cod. 49-IV-56, fl. 204

The taking of Hormuz (1622) was the first great blow dealt by the northern European rivals against the Estado da Índia. There followed, from 1640 onwards, a series of events which weakened the Portuguese presence in the Far East: the expulsion from Japan and the negative outcome of the embassy sent there in that year by Macau, the official divorce between Macau and Manila in 1644, after the end of the Iberian Union, and the taking of Malacca by the Dutch (1641), which distanced the enclave from the Indian traders and from the decision centres in Goa and Lisbon. The VOC continued to harm Portuguese interests in Canara (1652–1654), in Ceylon (1656) and in Malabar (1658–1663). In addition to the ruinous end of the Nagasaki trade, Macau faced the crisis brought about by the establishing of the Qing dynasty in China (1644), and the food shortages in the 1650s and 1660s. The Portuguese were aware of the impact of European competition on trade, essential as it was for the survival of the enclave, as shown by the epigraph to this sub-chapter. Faced with this situation, the city's traders therefore strengthened old markets in Makassar, Cambodia, Tonking, Cochinchina and Batavia, among other ports. On the other hand, as we will see, Macau's trade and economy suffered as a result of foreign competition in Canton throughout the eighteenth century. The growth in demand for Chinese products pushed up the prices of these, while the greater availability of goods imported from other Asian ports depressed the prices of the same, thereby reducing Portuguese profit margins.

At first sporadically and as a result of local decisions made by its factors in the East, the EIC attempted to establish itself in China especially through Portuguese Macau, often referred to as “the first land of China”. According to A. J. Sargent, during the fifty years after Weddell's visit, the Company made several attempts to set up trade in Canton, although without any results due to
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the competition and obstacles created by the Portuguese. This argument is also put forward by W. E. Soothill, Earl H. Pritchard and Sir William Foster, who summarise the presence of English vessels in Southern China and English resistance to those obstacles. D. K. Bassett asserts that, given the lack of documentary evidence, little is known of the policies followed by London before 1653 and that, therefore, Pritchard (Anglo-Chinese Relations, pp. 54–55) cannot have reached conclusive findings, for even during the seventeen years after 1653, EIC officials were only to be found in Cambodia and Siam. Bassett re-interprets the conclusions reached by Eames, Sargent and Pritchard with respect to the lack of attempts by the EIC to set up systematic trade contacts with China after the Massacre of Amboina. To previously presented factors, he adds Luso-Dutch competition, the absence of an English factory to the east of India, and the Company’s overall inactivity and lack of interest in trading with Canton while it developed increasingly intense activity in Java, Sumatra and Borneo. The first English voyages to Macau and to Manila, between 1635 and 1644, stemmed from the opportunities which Company officials grasped locally in the East, given the difficulties faced by Iberian traders because of the Dutch blockade. These were isolated attempts which do not mirror the EIC’s modus operandi as set out in London. In fact, Surat considered it to be of the greatest convenience to have a further two vessels built, given the trade benefits to be had in the Portuguese ports as a result of the Convention of Goa. In early 1639 the director of Goa’s Finance (Vedor da Fazenda de Goa) signed a contract with Andrew Cogan and John Wylde for another voyage to Macau, the latter being allowed to invest some capital in the city’s trade; the supercargoes alone would be authorised to disembark. Two years later, the president of the Banten factory informed Surat that Dutch fleets surrounded the Portuguese in Goa and Macau, hampering their movements and their trade, ending on this note: “the pore Portugall is like to rue it on every side this yeare”.

In 1657–1658 the EIC directors planned to set up a factory in Canton, albeit for a short period. This project was not followed through, perhaps because of the war with the Netherlands, the setting up of contacts and trade centres in Asia also being a matter of regional preference and not simply due to a lack of capital to invest. Even though the first undertakings did not represent a robust effort on the part of the Company to set up trade relations with China, they
marked the beginning of Anglo-Portuguese relations in Macau. They displayed trends, interests and patterns of rival interaction between each country’s traders, which, as stated by the king of Portugal in a letter to the viceroy a propos of Weddell’s visit, had to be reconciled by means of “agilities” and dissimulation, “for the terms to which things in general have been reduced oblige us to make peace with England”.

The start of the truce between the Portuguese and the Dutch in the East (1645–1652) freed the former from the need for English vessels, but Macau, “abandoned” by Lisbon, endured the consequences of the wars caused by the Manchu invasion. In early 1645 King João IV ordered Goa to hamper the English vessels’ room for manoeuvre, given the ease with which they already operated in the ports of the Portuguese Estado da Índia, a strategy which was developed especially during the administration of the viceroy Filipe de Mascarenhas and up to the Treaty of Westminster (10–06-1654), after which English trade in the Portuguese Asian ports was once again facilitated. Macau’s interests were thus defended subtly so as not to interfere in the kingdom’s European diplomatic strategies and in its interests, recently separated as it was from the Spanish Crown, and for which England was a strategic ally. These Portuguese priorities were far removed from the interests of the Portuguese and Macanese who lived and traded in Southern China.

In January 1643, in a letter from Surat to the EIC, Edward Knipe described the absence of trade between Macau and India in the preceding three years because of the Dutch blockade. He stated that these two Portuguese territories were in need of goods and advised London to grasp the opportunity by sending more vessels, since the Portuguese and the Dutch were at war, and the English could thus easily sail the Eastern seas. As regards the second (Luso-) English voyage to Macau, in August 1644 the Hind was sent to the enclave by Surat, together with the Seahorse, again without the knowledge of the directors in London. Contrary to what some authors have stated, this was not the first English vessel entirely at the service of the EIC to put in at the enclave; its purpose, after due authorisation from the viceroy of India, was (also) to conduct another English trading venture in China. Approximately five months before peace was signed between the Portuguese and the Dutch in India, Count Aveiras issued the Hind with a charter in March 1644, following the decision of
the Revenue Council (*Conselho de Fazenda*) for this vessel to carry from Macau all the surplus copper,\(^{121}\) giving Blackman, the captain of the *William*, instructions regarding the voyage, in accordance with the terms agreed under the old contract with the *London*.\(^{122}\) The arrival of three EIC vessels—the *William*, owned by Courteen’s Association, the *Seahorse*, and the *Hind*—in Macau in 1644, incurred Dutch displeasure, seeing as they did the English gain ever greater power and freedom of movement in the East. Basing herself on documents in the Goa Historical Archive,\(^{123}\) Maria Manuela Sobral Blanco asserts that the *Hind* and the *William* went to Macau at the behest of the Portuguese Crown to take on munitions and gunpowder in exchange for cinnamon.

Initially welcomed by the Macau Portuguese, the crew of the *Hind* quickly felt affronted by the Chinese because of the excessive sum they demanded after the vessel had been measured and which reduced the profits of the voyage.\(^{124}\) The president of the Surat factory, Francis Breton, described the state of the city, comparing it to the territory to which the *London* had sailed approximately ten years before, paying far lower taxes. What most surprised the *Hind*’s supercargo was the poverty which had had the city in its grip since trade with Japan came to an end:

> But that which rendered the voyage much less profitable then it might have proved is the extreme poverty of the place, not appearing the same it was at the London’s being there; rendered so by the loss of their former Trade to Japon and the Manillas [...]. And now lately (which makes them more miserable) China is wholly imbroided in wars. [...] which disturbances, with the Portuguese’s poverty, have left Macchaw destitute of all sorts of commod- ities, there not being to be bought in the city either silks raw, or wroght, China roots, other then what were old and rotten; nor indeed anything but China-ware, which is the bulk of the Hinds’ lading, the rest being brought in gold. Nor could any thing at all during the ships’ stay there be procured from Cantam.\(^{125}\)

Unlike the *Hind*, the *London* and Weddell’s fleet had visited Macau when it was thriving, before the Black Ship had stopped sailing, whereas the vessels which came later arrived in a city undergoing a deep socio-economic crisis due to the end of trade with Japan and to the starvation which ravaged the population in 1648. Nor were these circumstances favourable for English trade in Canton. In
the 1640s and 60s the Manchus invaded Southern China, making the city fight on several fronts to ensure its survival, since, after the end of the Portuguese-Spanish dual monarchy, it also found itself officially “divorced” from another trading partner, Manila. The state of disruption in the empire and piracy in the South China seas were known to the English, who therefore avoided these waters. The Manchu conquest, that is, the advent of the Qing dynasty, and the final taking of Canton in 1650, were also impediments to the development of English trade in China.

In London, the Company directors’ reaction on being apprised of the voyage of the *Hind*, which left Macau in November 1644, was even more adverse than that sparked by the voyage of the *London*. President Breton, on abandoning the project to set up EIC trading in Macau, was forced to justify his actions by declaring that he had pursued such a course in order to take advantage of the regional circumstances, comparing his initiative to Methwold’s during the *London*’s voyage:

> We must confesse it was a bould attempt of us to dispose of your shipping unto such remote parts as Maccaw and the Manielies without your especiall license, which we would willingly have attended and gladly have enjoyed for our warrant, but that delaies therin would have been dangerous, especially in that to Maccaw, the Dutch and Portugals being then upon a treaty of peace, which once concluded, we well knew that the Vice Roy (when the trade should be open to the Portugals themselves) could not dispense with ours or any other strangers voaging thither; which induced us to lay hold of the present opportunity, so fairly offered; whereunto we were encouraged by the confidence we had that a voyage thither for your proper accompt could not prove less advantagious then did the Londons fraughting voyage, wherwith you were yet well pleased. […] The ship returned in safety […] we doubt not but to render a satisfactory accompt therof. In the interim, you may please to take notice that we never expected a continued trade thither, nor were licensed for more then that voyage, which had we not then embraced, could not now be procured.

The *Hind*’s voyage was profitable, but was in the end an isolated attempt, and Surat decided not to undertake further voyages to China. Despite the signing of the Convention of Goa, conflicts between the English and the Portuguese continued, and the EIC complained in early 1647 about the heavy losses and
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offences caused by the Macau administration. The city was in a “depressed state” and its trade had stagnated because of the Manchu invasion, which explained why no English vessels were sent to China. In October 1650 Surat stated that China was in such a state of poverty and trade so reduced that “the Portuguese at Macau [were] sinking into poverty”.

English complaints about clashes with the Macau administration continued throughout the seventeenth century, notably in the 60s. On 28 October 1649 the EIC again complained, in patriotic terms, to the English Council of State about the violent enmity of the Portuguese in the East, summarising the Anglo-Portuguese naval stand-off since 1602 as follows:

They [EIC] were opposed by the Portuguese, who “pretended the sole title to that navigation, as well by discovery as donation”. [...] By the blessing of God, they not only made good their commerce in their several residences, but came off victorious in several signal fights against their determined enemies, the Portuguese, notwithstanding the incredible advantages possessed by the latter both in men and ships. After thirty years of hostility the Portuguese, finding by dear-bought experience that they could not prevail, and wearing of war, proposed peace, which was accepted and agreed upon in the year 1635.

The document criticised English interlopers such as Sir William Courteen, who invaded the EIC trading territory, competing against it to the advantage of the Portuguese enemies. This document went on to imply that, when the problems caused by the Portuguese rivals had ended, independent English traders arrived with charters issued by Charles I, and that these traders in no way contributed to the development of the nation’s trade.

In early 1647 the Macau Senate wrote to the king of Portugal, warning him of the danger, *vis-à-vis* the Chinese authorities, of Goa’s sending foreign vessels to the city, once again recalling the reprisals suffered as a result of the London’s visit. In that year, king João IV wrote to the viceroy and referred to the very great losses caused by the sending of two English vessels (the *Hind* and the *William*) to Macau in 1644 by Count Aveiras, because “of the great repugnance of the king of China that this nation passed through his land”, for which reason “similar vessels must not be sent to that city”.
In 1648, after the EIC’s fruitless first sporadic voyages to Macau, the Company directors asked Banten to advise them as to the possibility of sending a small vessel on a voyage to China. President Peniston advised against such a voyage because of the pirates that infested the South China seas and given the fact that the Portuguese in the impoverished city did not honour the Convention of Goa:

The experiment which you desire we should make with one of our small vessels for trade into China we are certainly informed, by those that know the present state and condition of that country very well, cannot be undertaken without the inevitable loss both of the ship, men and goods. [...] And how one of our feeble vessels would be able to defend themselves against such forces [pirates] is easy to be supposed. As for the Portugalls in Macau, they are little better than mere rebels against their Vice Roy in Goa, having lately murdered their Captain General [Diogo Docem] sent thither to them [1651]; and Macau itself so distracted among themselves that they are daily spilling one another’s blood. But put the case all these things were otherwise, we must needs say we are in a very poor condition to seek out new discoveries.137

The level of poverty in the city also influenced the English trading strategy, as mentioned by the Surat factor in 1637.138 In mid-1652, when the ten-year peace between the Portuguese and the Dutch had come to an end, conflicts flared up in the Malacca Straights, and the English were again viewed as allies by the Portuguese, an alliance which was reinforced by the start of the Anglo-Dutch war in that year. The Dutch attacked English vessels, paying special attention to those which might be carrying Portuguese goods between Goa and Macau, while the English regarded Cambodia as a territory where a factory might facilitate indirect trade with China.139

In 1655, one year after João IV and Oliver Cromwell signed the Treaty of Westminster,140 which granted English vessels greater freedom in Portuguese ports in the East141 with the exception of Macau, the viceroy of Goa Rodrigo Lobo da Silveira wrote about the now common English maritime traffic in Goa, the rituals carried out by the foreign vessels, and their disregard with respect to the Portuguese authorities’ demands, as well as the news and letters from Portugal carried by the English ships, stating that the captain of one of these vessels had heard in England that “during this monsoon sixteen Dutch vessels will come to this State [Portuguese Estado da Índia]”.142 This was a vital piece
of information for the defence of the territories under Portuguese rule and provides evidence of Luso-English cooperation in the East.

In November 1658 the Batavia factor informed London that two interloper vessels, the King Ferdinand and the Richard and Martha, had left Canton with no cargo and without paying custom duties, upon which the Mandarin authorities forced Macau to pay a heavy fine, as had happened twenty-three years earlier in the London case and later with Weddell’s fleet. The discouraging nature of these voyages led another vessel, the Welcome, not to sail for China as originally planned, but rather to a different destination. In the meantime, the factor appointed by the EIC to oversee trade with China never took up his post, the China Trade project thus being postponed yet again for several reasons. However, the Company had petitioned the Portuguese ambassador to London for a letter of recommendation to be handed to the governor of Macau. Diplomacy thus became one of the many strategies used by the institution, both in Europe and in the East, to undertake the first voyages to China. Already in 1661 Surat informed London that trade with China would yield profits, leading the directors to plan several voyages and investment in the tea trade, while the English factory in Macassar bought goods from Portuguese ship owners in Macau, albeit in small quantities.

Although in 1659 Surat advised London that trade with China would be neither profitable nor “free”, so that it would not be sending any vessels to China, five years later, and as proposed by the Company’s directors, it sent a vessel, the Surat, to the Luso-Chinese enclave. However, after the departure of the vessel, London forbade its recently appointed agent Quarles Browne to organise any voyages to China, preferring to see its officials apply their capital in existing factories. The Banten factor, John Hunter, had suggested the voyage of the Surat to Macau-Canton on finding out that a vast quantity of Chinese goods had accumulated there over a period of eight years because of the Dutch blockade. These could be bought lucratively, since the Portuguese did not dare transport them for fear of the Dutch. The Surat, captained by Robert Groste, left Banten in June 1664 and joined the vessel of the captain-general of Macau, Manuel Coelho da Silva, in July, shortly before he reached the enclave. The crew was advised that the scant trade in the city, virtually inactive for the preceding two years, was suffering the consequences of the Manchu invasion.
authorities attempted to make the *Surat* pay—by means of a 6% customs tax—for the losses incurred by the residents five years before when Macau had been visited by two English vessels (the *King Ferdinand* and the *Richard and Martha*). The enclave’s commercial situation was not very favourable as a result of two factors, the Dutch blockade and the difficulties brought about by the Manchu invasion of Southern China, and perhaps for these reasons, in the 1660s the EIC concerned itself mainly with re-starting trade with Japan and not so much with the China trade. The crew of the *Surat* was told by the captain-general not to leave the vessel until he had received orders from Canton for “free trade”, but the supercargoes concluded that the Portuguese were unable to do anything without the Mandarins’ orders and remained in Macau in the hope of being able to trade. The Portuguese promised to assist the English given the “near affinity of our two nations”, but the English only visited the city in August, rented a house and a warehouse in October, and negotiated with the Portuguese, albeit with great difficulty, for the house and the warehouse were placed under guard so as to prevent the crew from fleeing without paying the Chinese tonnage taxes, which would make the latter exact from Macau payment of yet another heavy fine. As had been the case before, the English crew proposed setting up a factory in the enclave, a proposal which was turned down by the Portuguese. In the meantime, the Chinese boarded the vessel to inspect the cargo, and the English responded that if they were not allowed to land and sell their goods, they would leave after carrying out some clandestine trade. The Portuguese benefited from trading with the English and had the warehouse under guard until November, when the English paid a deposit in goods and money.

The *Surat* put in at Taipa in such a way that the Chinese authorities did not detect its presence, for trade between foreign vessels and the city was banned, and on 12 December the crew left Macau, sailing to Banten. According to the factor at Surat, the voyage was not as profitable as had been hoped because of the obstacles placed in its way by the Chinese and the Portuguese in Macau, with the English factory seeking new trading opportunities. However, the urgent need arose for a special permit from the king of Portugal “for ye City of Macaw have writ to him, & ye Vice Roy of Goa, not to give any Strangers leave to [go] thither.” Once again, local wishes and the enclave’s interests departed from the principles of the Convention of Goa, and the English, faced with these
hurdles, opted for indirect trade conducted from other parts of China and from Eastern factories such as that at Ayutthaya in Siam (Thailand). All the while, the EIC attempted by diplomatic means to turn Macau into a strategic space for its crews and supercargoes. However, the factors described trade between Macau, Malacca, Makassar and Manila (1661–1664) and mentioned that the Portuguese would not allow an English factory to be set up in Macau. In September 1661 John South, writing from Siam, informed Surat that he was sending goods to Macau and was trading with the vessels of that city; nine years later the Macau ship Rosário arrived in Banten, carrying Fr. António Nunes in an ambassadorial capacity, the English presidencies having become cognizant of the difficulties which the Portuguese were facing in their attempts to develop trade, given the oppression exerted by the Manchus, which led them to trade clandestinely.

In the mid-1660s the new Chinese dynasty, in a strategy designed to consolidate its power, adopted heightened policies to control sea traffic and evacuate the coast, driving away possible rebels and weakening the coastal inhabitants, which led to a significant reduction in Macau’s sea-going fleet between 1663 and 1667, since the Chinese burnt and confiscated approximately thirteen of the city’s vessels. In 1679 an imperial edict decreed the opening up of trade between the enclave and Canton, and in 1681 and 1684 the territory’s trading activity and foreign trade in China were again authorised. Although trade had been opened up, the emperor retained maritime defence measures, notably restrictions on the number of vessels allowed to put to sea and the creation of customs houses to increase imperial revenues, especially in Macau; here the hopu was created (1684), with every vessel in Macau now paying taxes based on its tonnage, to the city’s “greater misery”. The opening up of Chinese trade in 1684 increased competition on the part of the Chinese traders and damaged Macau. Faced with the difficulty of keeping up its own trade, it was only natural that the then five prominent traders in the city, with seats in the Senate, should try to keep European competition away and, finding it impossible to do so, should charge a percentage of the foreign traders’ profits. The Portuguese thus became ever more dependent on cooperation with the Chinese and the foreign traders, notably the Armenians.
After Portugal and Spain signed their peace treaty in early 1668 with England’s support, in June of that year the EIC directors, in an endeavour to extend their trade to China and re-start trade in Japan, petitioned Sir Robert Southwell, envoy extraordinary to Portugal, to obtain the prince regent Dom Pedro’s authorisation for English vessels to put in at Portuguese ports and for his subjects in the East—especially in Macau—to extend friendly treatment to the English: “We look upon this liberty touching Maccaw, as a necessary help to a larded costly design we have in hand, and is likely to conduce more to the benefit of this kingdom than us the adventurers which design is the establishing a trade at China and Japan for the vent of our cloth and other Manufactures.” In early 1669 Southwell asked Dom Pedro to write to the viceroy of Goa requesting his subjects in the East, especially the governor of Macau, “libertie and freedome of commerce to the English [...] good usage [...] freedome of commerce and the libertie of residing”. This diplomatic measure on the part of the EIC may have been taken in response to requests such as those addressed to London by the president of the Surat factory, William Methwold, after the voyage of the London, attempting with Portugal’s involvement to obtain authorisation for the English to trade in the enclave. Following these English diplomatic moves in Lisbon, policies for the defence of the local interests in Macau also became the result of orders received from Lisbon. These very often contradicted English plans, since, in early 1669, a letter from the prince regent ordered the viceroy, João Nunes da Cunha, to ensure that all the captains of the Portuguese fortresses maintained “good correspondence and mutual friendship” with English crews in the ports of the Estado da Índia, except that of Macau, where the foreigners had to be barred from any trade:

because its preservation and trade depend on the favourable support from China, and because of the consequences which will follow as the King [emperor] does not wish to consent to such Trade, and because of the English, the Dutch will also want to use the same concession with which they will become absolute masters of trade in the South; however, if any English vessel sink in those seas, and has to put in at that port and needs some supply or help, you will order it so, which is due in the name of Brotherhood. But in no circumstance is it to be allowed to buy or sell any goods, for the damage that this may cause.
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The administration, the strategic importance and the status of Macau differed from those of the other Portuguese territories in Asia, and Dom Pedro drew the attention of Count São Vicente and of the governor of Macau to the danger posed by English and Dutch trade in China, although the political situation in Portugal since the Restoration demanded a two-pronged strategy: obtaining the assistance of Spain’s enemies in Europe and not antagonising them in the overseas territories, where their interests obviously ran counter to those of Portugal. The struggle in the overseas territories would not be possible, given the lack of resources, and would also weaken King João IV’s position in Europe. However, clashes between the VOC and the Portuguese in the East continued, and this was a situation with an inverse and a reverse: truce in Europe and fighting in the overseas territories.

As regards the exchange of information between the Estado da Índia and Lisbon, as also the latter’s awareness of the fears of Macau’s residents, it is worth remembering the statements presented by the Senate to Goa and Lisbon on the problems caused by Weddell’s fleet in 1637 and by other English vessels. While Dom Pedro wrote to the viceroy, the Portuguese secretary of state informed the English special ambassador Paul Methuen of the acts of piracy by English buccaneers which attacked vessels from Macau and sold their spoils in Bombay, urging the English government to take appropriate measures to prevent similar situations.

In Europe, English diplomacy and spying activity, as well as the sending of intelligence from Lisbon on the movements of Portuguese vessels became efficacious strategic measures in the EIC’s attempts to establish itself in the East. A year after the signing of the marriage contract of Catherine of Braganza and Charles II and of the new Anglo-Portuguese treaty in 1661—through which Portugal defended itself from Spain and the Dutch, and the English attempted to exploit the weakened state of the Portuguese in the East—Bombay, the so-called English gateway to India, was ceded by Afonso VI to Charles II as part of the Portuguese princess’s dowry. However, the transfer was only completed in 1665, the English king leasing the territory to the EIC in 1668.

As argued by D. K. Bassett, Bombay was the first true English “colony” in the East, since all the other factories were merely trading centres. The transfer of the port from the Portuguese led to the presence of an English warship for
the first time in the East when the Earl of Marlborough was sent to the island of Salsette for the formal hand-over of this dominion. A secret article appended to the 1661 treaty\textsuperscript{174} asserted that, from their base in Bombay, the English would lend military support to the Portuguese dominions in India against the Dutch. This never happened, for, although the latter signed a peace treaty with the Portuguese in that year,\textsuperscript{175} between then and early 1663 the VOC captured Kollam, Cranganore and Cochin, before the effects of the treaty made themselves felt in any actual way in the East. The EIC had been in possession of Madras since 1639 and in 1686 it founded Calcutta, but its base in Bombay allowed it to develop a strategic position on the coast of north-eastern India which was more secure than the factory at Surat, the city becoming a port of significant importance for English trade in the East, overtaking Goa as an economic centre in the second half of the eighteenth century.

\section*{Macau between Surat and Japan: The voyage of the Return}

EIC voyages to Macau were few until about 1675. In September 1673 the Return, captained by Simon Delboe, docked in the enclave seeking protection from the Dutch, and the crew remained in the city for about eight months. At this time it developed some trade, limited by the Portuguese, after spending time in Formosa and approximately two months in the bay of Nagasaki in a vain attempt to re-start English trade with Japan,\textsuperscript{176} from which the Portuguese were also barred, as we have already seen. Faced with the crisis which engulfed the enclave, its merchants tried to find alternatives to the old trading activity with Japan,\textsuperscript{177} and, after a meeting at the house of the captain-general of Macau, António Barbosa de Lobo, and having drawn up seven articles, they authorised the off-loading of the Return’s cargo for trade with the Portuguese alone and against cash payment.\textsuperscript{178} The seven articles, designed by the Portuguese to safeguard the vessel and crew and to carry on trade without Chinese retaliation, allowed the English to:

\hspace{1cm} bring their vessel to the false harbour [Taipa] where [...] it can have all its goods taken onto land, being first ... registered and inventoried. [...] Enough houses in which to store their goods will be rented and [...] the captain with six persons will live there [...], and five soldiers will be posted
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there as sentries [...] for the Chinamen not to disturb them [...], it is prudent that captain and the six persons who assist him should in any way leave the said houses, nor should they walk in the streets, because it is not public to the Chinamen that they are in this city, that they should not sell more than strictly necessary for their outlays and expenses [...], they should pay the percentages of two hundred taels [...] as the Portuguese dwellers do, [...] for anchorage of the vessel to the Mandarin of the White House.

The crew was kept under surveillance because of the “offences [...] costs and intranquility which this city has sometimes repeatedly suffered with this barbarian and tyrannical Tartar government, when other English vessels came to this port”180 selling some of their goods to pay off their expenses. However, British sources reveal that the Portuguese authorities initially barred Macau residents from visiting the English warehouse and buying goods there, under threat of being considered traitors and enemies of national interests.181

The letter written by the Return’s supercargoes to Surat described their arrival in the territory, the way it was governed, both locally and from Portugal, the crew’s first contacts prior even to the meeting of the Portuguese traders in the governor’s house and their initial decision: “The Portuguese at Macau are governed by six commissioners who represent the city and a captain general, who has the command over the Manillas for the King, and receives his orders through the viceroy of Goa, but at Macau neither the commissioners can act without the captain general, nor he without their concurrence”.182 From early on, this type of information about the policies and measures taken by the Portuguese with respect to the Chinese authorities interested the English, as we can see from the supercargoes’ descriptions of the growth of trade in Macau prompted by the Anglo-Dutch war of the early 1780s, the arrival/departure of Portuguese vessels, the prices of the goods carried, and, for example, the Portuguese embassy to Peking in 1752.183

The crew of the Return stated that the Portuguese had barred them from trading and they could only off-load their goods in order to safeguard them. These measures were designed to avoid difficulties with the Chinese of the type caused by earlier visits of English vessels:

the supercargoes of the Return sent Mr. Robinson ashore on the ship’s arrival, and the chief of the six commissioners sent us word, that we might
land our goods for their security if we desired it, and that the ship might
lie in the same road as the King of Portugal shipping did, but to admit
us to trade and sell our goods ashore, they could not, for they were under
the control of the Tartars or Chinese, who had prohibited trade with the
English as well as the Dutch at this place. They added that some of our
nation had been several times at Macau, for which the Portuguese authori-
ties had been brought into trouble by the tartars: wherefore they could not
admit us to trade.¹⁸⁴

To the argument of the fine paid by the city as a result of the London’s visit,
Macau’s traders now added the examples of Weddell’s fleet and that of the Hind,
recalling earlier, less pleasant episodes and incidents to justify their barring
English vessels from entering until the eighteenth century.¹⁸⁵

Macau’s reply displeased the crew, whose expectations with regard to re-start-
ing trade with Japan had already been dashed and who now feared the attacks
of their Dutch enemies on the seas. A second supercargo, Delboe, accompa-
nied by Grimaldi, the governor of Macau’s messenger, went ashore to renegoti-
ate with the authorities. This second contact, further to which the above cited
meeting at the home of the captain-general was organised, allowed the English
to dock in the “false harbour” of Taipa and off-load the goods registered and
stored in a godown (warehouse, cellar), guarded by five soldiers paid by the
crew. The account is a translation of the seven articles (presented above) from
the Portuguese source and describes the demands which the city presented to
the supercargoes because of the fines paid to the Chinese when English vessels
had visited the city in earlier times. The crew members admitted that they only
acquiesced to the Portuguese because of their fear of being attacked by the
Dutch should they put out to sea, adding that, with Lisbon’s authorisation, it
would be easy for the English to remain in Macau alongside the Portuguese.¹⁸⁶ In
November the English requested the freedom to trade, to which the Portuguese
replied that they should “in every matter adhere to what had been agreed”.¹⁸⁷
In May of the following year the crew requested permission to move the vessel
closer to the city to a position from which it might be protected by the city’s
forts from possible Dutch attacks, a request which was denied. Finally, in early
September 1674 the vessel left for India, not without first having attempted
to trade with the Chinese in Lampacau.¹⁸⁸ The Macau Portuguese were able
to extract some benefit from the expedition in that they forced the crew to
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negotiate in accordance with the city’s trading interests. Cross-referencing Portuguese and British sources regarding this episode, it is possible to arrive at conclusions differing from those of Patricia Drumond Borges Ferreira when she affirmed that Portuguese documents “do not refer to the case [of the Return] and English documents do not go into detail on the matter”.189

According to John Bruce,190 the incident which led the vessel to the territory gave rise to great speculation by the supercargoes concerned, for the latter counselled Bombay to negotiate with Goa on freedom of trade and the founding of a factory in Macau, where a considerable amount of EIC goods could be supplied to the Chinese in exchange for local products, easily saleable in India and in Europe. The author’s conclusion is that this incident is probably the origin of the EIC China Trade; however, the episode merely represents yet another of the initial attempts to trade with China, and one of the countless occasions when the English supercargoes gathered first-hand information on the business activities, the modus vivendi, modus operandi and the local interests of Macau, contributing, as had other previous voyages, to the permanent establishment of the EIC in the Pearl River Delta approximately twenty-seven years later. According to Bassett,191 it is following upon the failed attempts to re-establish direct trade with Japan and, later, in the conflicts in Tonkin that we must situate the turning-point of the Company’s interest towards maritime dealings with China. In the case of the Return, the ensuing trade was the result, not of a plan carefully laid out by the English, rather it came out of the desire to conduct some trade and of the crew members’ defending themselves from the Dutch peril in the seas of Asia. Macau thus operated as a familiar haven in the Far Eastern seas and an alternative location for trade with the Portuguese, when the latter permitted it.

The last English voyages to Macau in the seventeenth century

The EIC’s first voyages yielded reduced profits, but after its charters were renewed by Oliver Cromwell in 1657 and King Charles II in 1661, the activity of the English interlopers in the East was weakened, Dutch competition was controlled by the Navigation Acts,192 and Portuguese hostility was controlled through trade and diplomatic accords such as that which marked the marriage of Catherine of Bragança to Charles II. Under these accords, Bombay and Tangier
were ceded to the English, while the role of the English factories in India was strengthened, a context which allowed the EIC to take a different view of trade with China and contributed towards making Britain the greatest maritime and colonial power from the middle of the following century onward.

In 1681, the directors considered the establishment of trade with China as “desirable” and “profitable”, for Canton silk was better than that of Amoy, and English products were more easily sold in Canton. However, two doubts persisted: obtaining a Chinese permit for the Banten factory to trade in Canton which would guarantee the security of the vessels, and the possibility that sending vessels to the Pearl River delta might offend the Chinese in Amoy. The EIC already traded with the latter, and trading in Canton might jeopardise established commercial interests.193 According to a EIC letter to Banten (1680) considering the treatment meted out by the Chinese to the Dutch in other parts of China, the Company regarded with some suspicion and reservations the invitation extended by the viceroy of Canton for the English to set up a factory there.194 Precisely the following year, the Company decided to send a vessel to Canton and advised Banten that if the Manchus invaded Amoy, the factors should find alternative ports, notably Macau and Lampacau.

From that year onward, vessels from Banten carried a supercargo—who together with the captain, formed a “joint council”—who was not allowed to reside in Canton and returned with the vessel.195 Although it had attempted to set up a factory in Canton in 1673, 1682–1683196 and 1689, it was only after 1699 that the EIC tried to develop the China trade in a systematic manner.197 Up to that time, its vessels had sailed sporadically from Banten to Amoy and Formosa,198 ports where continental Chinese products were to be found and where the supercargoes bought silk, china and pearls, among other goods. While Macau attempted to overcome its economic crisis, in 1670 the EIC factor in Banten, Henry Dacres, managed to obtain authorisation to trade in Formosa and later in Amoy, both under the control of Cheng King until 1683199 and 1680 (respectively), when the Manchu troops took these ports. In 1685 the Chinese emperor opened his ports to foreign vessels. The appearance of a new EIC in 1698 increased rival activity between the two companies,200 with the older-established one concentrating its trade in Amoy and the recently formed in Canton, where in 1699 its vessel, the Macclesfield, arrived. In 1709, the two
arrival Companies, the “old” one created in 1600, and the “new” founded in 1687, merged into a single entity, the New East India Company.

The trading activity of the EIC factories in the different macro-regions of China did not achieve the desired results, and, after several voyages planned by local factors such as Henry Dacres, in 1683 the Company decided to attempt to establish itself near Canton, sending the Tywan and the China Merchant. The crews of the two ships were prevented from trading by the Chinese and the Portuguese and were driven away from the city. Agents of the Eastern factories, such as Dacres in Banten, were pivotal in the turning-point in Company policy with regard to China, as they made decisions based on local reality and experience. Expansion of trade to China in the years 1675–1682 thus derived from initiatives taken by these traders, the London directors only learning such decisions sometimes a year after the event. Isolated attempts to set up trade in China did not achieve any immediate results, since self-sufficient China closed itself to the outside, and the Portuguese continued to defend their interests at all cost. This was the case of the voyages of the Carolina in 1683 and the Loyal Adventure in 1684, which were attempts to begin trade relations with China both through Macau and Lampacau. In the meantime, the crews on the initial voyages gathered information of use for future expeditions, notably on how long English vessels could remain off the coast of Macau with a view to obtaining goods from Canton, the supercargoes on board the Loyal Merchant reaching the conclusion that private trade had to be controlled to prevent the prices of Chinese products from rising. On the other hand, and according to the EIC supercargoes, the establishment of the English in China was hampered by the Portuguese, who advised the Mandarins that Macau was in danger and requested that they expel foreign vessels from the city; this they did by ordering the English to dock at outlying islands, where Chinese traders would go to negotiate.

The crew of the Carolina left London in 1682 charged with founding a factory in Canton, aiming to avoid Macau should the Portuguese hinder their dealings with the Chinese; they would try their luck in other ports on the Chinese coast such as Taipa Quebrada—where the Chinese would meet them—or even the alternative ports of Amoy and Formosa. In the second decade of the eighteenth century, the supercargoes held their preference for docking at “Typa
Quebrada harbour (which was a safe place for a ship to ride in near Macau, and yet out of the power of the Portuguese or Chinese)” where the Carolina arrived in June 1683. The English were received by the governor, who stated he had been informed that the crew was Dutch, hence foes, and added that he could not authorise any type of trade unless he was so instructed by the viceroy of Goa, under pain of arrest and execution, Macau not having enough goods to allow for transactions, given the tight control of the Mandarinate, under whose orders almost every aspect of the city lay. According to the Chinese officials who visited the vessel, the Portuguese governor had warned Canton of a Dutch presence in Taipa, requesting that warships be sent to expel them. The Chinese authorities accepted the evidence that the crew members were English but told them of the emperor’s displeasure with regard to Dutch and English trade with the king of Formosa, as this activity allowed the latter to acquire the munitions with which he fought against China. The Mandarinate ordered the Carolina to leave, and the vessel left Macau in July 1683. It carried the message that no European nation should attempt to establish itself in China, for the Portuguese had bought exclusive rights to foreign trade and had informed the emperor that the English and Dutch were helping the king of Formosa against him. For its part, the Delight, sent by London in January 1683 to join the Carolina, was given the same message by the Chinese when it reached the vicinity of Macau in mid-1684, the crew concluding after six days that any trade in the enclave would be impossible. They therefore sailed to Amoy once again viewed as an alternative for direct trade with China. Whereas the previous trade endeavours had come as a result of the Banten agents, the EIC’s attention shifted definitively from Japan to China between 1674 and 1684, given the impossibility of re-starting trade with the archipelago, and not as the outcome of a pre-existing plan on the part of the Company. In 1684 Fort St. George concluded that English trade in Lampacau had become ever more difficult, for the “Portugueez of Macoa had prevailed with the Tartars to prohibit all Trade aboute the Pampacoa islands.” Indeed, in 1682 and 1685 the Macau Senate, as an institution comprising traders with commercial interests, informed King Pedro II of the harms of foreign competition, and in early 1686 the king banned foreign vessels from the city while the English factors in Madras had been attempting since 1684 to invite Chinese traders to set up residence there.
In September 1689, a year after the fruitless voyage of the *Rebecca* and the *James* from Madras to Macau, the master of the *Defence*, William Heath, contributed, as had Weddell, towards maintaining the negative image of the English in China, until more direct contacts and the Chinese traders’ commercial interests made it fade. This is the first major incident in the history of the English presence in Macau. In 1689 the Chinese demanded that the crew of the *Defence*, sent to Canton by the Madras presidency, hand over the vessel’s mast, an order which Heath refused, sending a group of sailors to the island of Taipa to recover it by force. The English, some of whom had taken up quarters in the Forte da Guia in Macau, were stoned by the native population, responded by opening fire and ended by killing one Chinese man. A Chinese vessel and some of the island’s inhabitants opened fire on the English and arrested some of the men who had remained behind. Heath decided to leave the enclave in May 1690 and left a sum of money with a Chinese man to ransom the captive crew members.

Since the end of the 1680s to the 1750s, the Portuguese traders of Macau had had close dealings with the English country traders, especially in Madras, to where they sailed annually, and in 1712, the year which saw EIC supercargoes’ private trade again banned, the Macau Senate wrote to Edward Harrison, the newly arrived governor of Madras, welcoming him and advising him that vessels of the inhabitants of this city who go to that port have always been very well accepted there, both on account of the mystical friendship which exists between the crown of Portugal and that of England and the good correspondence which has existed up to now between this city and that [...], we hope [...] to receive greater demonstrations of accord for in the same way [...] Your Excellency will have them guaranteed for anything you please.

The city foregrounded the principles of the old alliance governing Anglo-Portuguese relations, including in the East, thus also defending the interests of Portuguese traders in the British Asian ports, while the English defended their priorities in attempting trade with China via the enclave. In 1739 English traders from Madras mentioned the Portuguese trade competition and justified such trade on the basis of its longevity and of its profits; this activity was therefore also to the advantage of the EIC itself, with the Company directors...
employing Portuguese traders to supply tea to Madras, as they already did to the VOC in Batavia.²²²

An anonymous description of Macau in the 1600s (c.1693) mentions the increase in the Protestant presence in the second half of the seventeenth century, as well as the Portuguese attempts to keep the foreigners away from the city, where only the Portuguese were allowed to buy property:

how the Macanese proceed with the Batavians and the English, and their trade with China: The City of the Holy Name of God [of Macau] does not permit any of the vessels of the English and Batavian Heretics to enter the port of Macau, although some of the Chinese Magistrates requested it, and such permission might bring not inconsiderable temporal gain. For this reason, the vessels of the Heretics stay at anchor for some months in the Islands closest to Macau, there facing the great danger of the region's terrible storms. In that time, the Macau Senate, despite allowing some of them to visit the City occasionally, nevertheless, rarely allows them to stay overnight. [...] And there were very few English vessels which sheltered there, from the year 1626 to 1692.²²³

The revenues derived from the English presence in impoverished Macau became essential to its economy. As we will now see, this presence increased from the beginning of the eighteenth century, for the Chinese authorities only allowed foreign traders to remain in Canton during the “trading seasons” (September–March),²²⁴ and so the EIC officials, and later European trading agents and interlopers settled in Macau for the rest of the year. The enclave became a strategic territory for the Chinese authorities in terms of regulating the presence of the “barbarians” and benefiting from their trade, their control over the city growing ever more stringent. Macau’s own survival depended on respecting the will of the Mandarinate, and the city’s submission to Chinese wishes was a constant feature in its history, which the English referred to in their attempts to turn the weight of Chinese power to their own advantage with a view to legitimising their presence and trade in a place administered by the Portuguese. The English also knew that if they took Macau by force the Mandarins would order the closing of the Barrier Gate (Porta do Cerco) and starve them to death, forcing them to leave the city.
Conclusions

At the end of the eighteenth century, Britain took on the role of a mighty power in the East; the British role and status in Macau at that point were very different from those of a hundred years before when the EIC set itself up in China. The foreign population and trade ultimately became essential for Macau’s economy, but the local and religious authorities accused the British of constituting—through their higher standard of living than that of the Portuguese—a trade and moral threat, of driving upward the prices of the city’s products, of keeping prostitution active and of introducing a taste for excessive luxury in private and public life. If on the one hand, local economic interests depended on British investment in the city, through the letting and purchasing of houses and vessels, as well as loans, the Macau Senate also wished to control foreign activity and competition, aims which were difficult to reconcile. On the other hand, from 1700 onward the Portuguese could do nothing against the designs of the Chinese authorities and Canton traders, who increasingly encouraged the setting up of trade relations with other European partners.

The British and North-Americans, the two largest foreign communities in Macau from the end of the 1700s until the first Opium War, had a representative social impact on life in the enclave, from fashion to cultural customs, and further contributed to the accumulation of wealth and to the intense cultural activity in Macau, a multi-ethnic enclave since the Portuguese had founded it. In addition, as a geographical-cultural referent, Macau served as a backdrop to countless fictional adventures in British literature,¹ a phenomenon closely linked both to the development of the EIC China Trade, whose picturesque and exotic dimension attracted British writers and painters,² and to the founding of Hong Kong. If
the members of the Anglophone communities influenced the *modus vivendi* and progress in the Portuguese-rulled territory, the latter played a pivotal role in these English-speaking communities’ trade and cultural relations with China, a status acknowledged by Alexander Michie in 1900, when he listed some of the pioneering “glories” of Macau within the framework of Sino-Western relations:

the influence of Macau on the history of foreign relations with China extended much beyond the sphere of mere commercial interests. For three hundred years it was for foreigners the gate of the Chinese empire, and all influences, good and bad, which came from without were infiltrated through that narrow opening, which served as the medium through which China was revealed to the world. It was in Macau that the first lighthouse was erected, a symbol of the illuminating mission of foreigners in China. It was there also that the first printing-press was set up, employing movable type instead of the stereotype wooden blocks used by the Chinese. From that press was issued Morrison’s famous Dictionary, and for a long series of years the *Chinese Repository* […] conducted chiefly by English and American missionaries. The first foreign hospital in China was opened at Macau, and there vaccination was first practiced. It was from Macau that the father of China missions, Matteo Ricci, started on his adventurous journey […] in the sixteenth century […]. The little Portuguese settlement has therefore played no mean part in the changes which have taken place in the great empire of China. […] St Francis Xavier […], […] Camões, who in a grotto formed of granite blocks tumbled together by nature, almost washed by the sea, sat and wrote the Portuguese epic “The Lusiad”.

If the trading population of the “diminute settlement” initially wished to hamper foreign infiltration in the China Trade, such a design became impossible in the face of the interests of both the Chinese traders and those of the enclave’s population who profited from the seasonal presence, in the case of the EIC supercargoes, and annually, in the case of private traders and their families; the English-speaking residents did not, however, often mix with the Portuguese.

Macau was the Western gateway into China for British traders and supercargoes and their only permanent residence there until the early 1840s. In the late 1700s it was also a base where independent traders could set up in trade and compete with the EIC’s monopoly until 1833. The City of the Holy Name of God of Macau thus played a basic and unique role in every phase of British trade
in Southern China, from the arrival of the *London*, chartered by the viceroy of Goa from the EIC in 1635, through the permanent establishment of the supercargoes to the arrival of the interlopers and independent merchants who upset the Company’s monopoly. This inconvenient situation for the EIC was similar to that of the Portuguese when faced with the arrival of their northern-European rivals in the *Estado da Índia* in the early seventeenth century and which marked the beginning of the period of downsizing and decline of the Portuguese empire in the East.

If British interests in the enclave never fully came to fruition, notably the occupation of the city, this must be attributed to the geographical and political situation of Macau and to the vigilance of the Portuguese and especially the Chinese authorities. In August 1842, to mark the end of the Opium War and nine years after the cessation of the EIC monopoly, the British—“a community in search of a colony”\(^9\) in China during a century and a half—signed the Treaty of Nanking. The British had demanded the cession of Hong Kong, a “Macau of their own” where they could trade without third party restrictions. The founding of the new colony and the opening of the five Chinese ports, following upon the entry and establishment of the British in China through Macau and Canton,\(^{10}\) transformed the Western foreigner’s way of life in China and in the Sino-Portuguese enclave;\(^{11}\) hence the designation of Old China Trade for the historical period up to 1842. After the founding of the British colony, the presence of the “red-haired devils” in China changed, becoming not exclusively commercial but also administrative. This led to greater British proximity to Chinese culture and to a new image of Macau, no longer seen as a commercial hub, but increasingly as a place for leisure, convalescence and tourism for Hong Kong residents and visitors. The Sino-Portuguese enclave rapidly lost much of its economic and political strategic importance in regional and international terms as Hong Kong rapidly became the leading trading city in the Pearl River delta.

The Anglo-Portuguese alliance, as shown, gradually extended to the Far East, and relations between the two Western allies regarding trade and imperial interests in China were marked by diplomacy between the two European kingdoms, by the clash of interests of local traders, and also by both the “Portuguese and Imperial Laws”;\(^{12}\) with the Macau Senate and governor finding themselves
compelled to negotiate and justify their actions to Canton and Lisbon as regards the British presence in China, while Macau fought for its own survival on the maritime fringe of the province of Guangdong. The oldest alliance in the Western world was also influenced by the policies of the Chinese administration, with whom the Portuguese were forced to negotiate, often using Chinese law to defend their own status in the Pearl River delta vis-à-vis the British. The Protestant interests and presence contributed to the formation of the historical and socio-cultural identity of Macau, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century. The city operated as a decompression chamber for the Westerners who travelled to China and for the Chinese travelling to the West, giving rise to the multiplicity of contexts in which Portuguese, Chinese and British encounters, interactions and conflicts took place.
Notes

Introduction

1. The Macau English Tavern/Hotel was strategically located in the Praia Grande during the 1830s and was owned by two former East India Company supercargoes—Richard Markwick (1791–1836) and Edward Lane (d. 1831)—who established a firm called Markwick and Lane. It was also called the “Beach Hotel” in Anglophone sources and “English Tavern” in both Anglophone and Portuguese documents [B. L. Ball, Rambles in Eastern Asia, 1856, pp. 409–410; Harriett Low, Lights and Shadows of a Macao Life, 2002, pp. 104, 568; and Jin Guoping and Wu Zhiliang (eds.), Correspondência Oficial Trocada Entre as Autoridades de Cantão e os Procuradores do Senado: Fundo das Chapas Sínicas em Português (1749–1847), vol. 8, 2000, pp. 30, 37].


3. The EIC Library of Macau and Canton was maintained between 1806 and 1834.

4. British Library, India Office Records (IOR), G/12/32 (1731), fl. 15.

5. Paul Van Dyke’s seminal The Canton Trade, 2005, pp. 35–48, 77, 119–167, is the only study that devotes more than a few paragraphs to the importance of Macau in the context of the China Trade.
6. The Chinese considered the Portuguese “Macau barbarians”, long since established in the enclave and easily controllable due to their “fixed residence” [cf. “Memorial of Qi Ying” (1845), in António Vasconcelos de Saldanha and Jin Guoping (eds.), Para a Vista do Imperador: Memoriais da Dinastia Qing, 2000, p. 96], but they were differentiated from all other Europeans who stayed there temporarily. I use the term “foreigner” from the Portuguese, and also English, point of view in Macau, to designate residents who are neither Portuguese nor Chinese as described in Portuguese and English sources in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, given that the territory was jointly administered by the Portuguese governor, the Senate, the Chinese Mandarin of the White House and the Tongzhi magistrate. Chinese Macau answered in juridical terms to the zongdu (viceroy of Canton), who delegated competences to the Mandarins of Xiangshan and Qianshan (the White House Mandarin) to resolve the problems of the Chinese population and communicate with the Senate. Only important issues would reach Canton. The English supercargoes (1777–1778) called themselves “foreigners” in Macau (G/12/62, fl. 27), affirming at an audience with the governor (1786): “as we are strangers in your city” (G/12/84, fl. 58, see also G/12/59, fl. 41, G/12/62, fl. 27, G/12/86, fl. 17). The Mandarinate, due to linguistic barriers and logistical questions, delegated jurisdiction over all foreigners in the enclave to the Portuguese, and in 1832 Anders Ljungstedt (An Historical Sketch of the Portuguese Settlement in China, 1992, p. 21) considered the foreigners to be an autonomous group in Macau (Portuguese vassals, Chinese and foreigners), finding the British community subordinate to the Portuguese authorities.


8. G/12/89 (1788), fl. 203.

9. Weng Eang Cheong, The Hong Merchants of Canton, 1997, p. 109, summarises the history of the Select Committee referring to the measures taken by the East India Company to establish a council of supercargoes that would remain in China during the trading seasons. In 1778, a small select committee was established with a president, three or four supercargoes and other employees, or “supercargoes below the select committee” [G/12/71 (1780–1781), fl. 59] to facilitate decision making. This administrative structure became the permanent representative body of the EIC in China until the end of the Company’s monopoly in 1833–1834 (G/12/20, fls. 377–379v; Hosea B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China 1635–1834, vol. 2, 1926, pp. 38–49).


Chapter 1  Anglo-Portuguese conflicts and the founding of the East India Company

11. As we shall see, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was used as an argument by successive governors of Macau and Goa viceroys to the benefit and favourable treatment of English in the city [Arquivos de Macau (AM), 3rd series, vol. 10, n. 5, November 1968, p. 241].


Chapter 2  The voyage east: The beginning of Anglo-Portuguese relations in the East Indies


8. Regarding the Anglo-Portuguese conflicts in Bantam and Surat, see Frederick Charles Danvers, The Portuguese in India: Being a History of the Rise and Decline of

10. On the imprisoning of Englishmen in Goa and their transportation to Lisbon, see the Public Records Office (P.R.O.), SP 89/3, fls. 132–134, SP 89/3, fl. 144.


15. This chapter and the following summarise the Portuguese and English presences in Japan (1613–1623) and particularly the attempt by the EIC to establish direct trade with China from the archipelago, thus avoiding any Portuguese interference. On Anglo-Portuguese relations in Japan during the Hirado period, see Ludwig Riess, “History of the English Factory at Hirado (1613–1622)”, **Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan**, vol. 26, 1898, pp. 1–114; and Derek Massarella, **A World Elsewhere: Europe’s Encounter with Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries**, 1990, pp. 58–328.


23. Literally “the ginger men”, north Europeans with a physical appearance differing to the Portuguese.
32. G/12/9, fls. 1–2, 13–44.
33. M. Paske-Smith, *Western Barbarians in Japan*, pp. 29–35, defines three periods for English trading activities in Japan: first period (1613–1616): easy trade due to the privileges granted by the Japanese authorities; second period (1617–1619): period of Dutch attacks during which no English ship reached Japan (unless seized by the Dutch); third period: the Anglo-Dutch alliance, the formation of the Defence Fleet (1620), and the joint attacks on Iberian interests in Japan until 1622, when London decided to close the Hirado factory.
37. In his correspondence to London in 1621, Richard Cocks, *Diary of Richard Cocks*, vol. 2, 1899, p. 333, reports: “I am afeard that their [Dutch] attempt against Amacon will cause both them and us to be driven out of Japon […]. Yet our China frendes still tell us we may have trade into China”.

Notes to pp. 15–18
38. Referred to in EIC documentation by his Christian name “Andrea Dittis” and as “China Captain”.
41. English sources refer to him as Captain Whaw or Whow (Farrington, *The English Factory*, doc. 267).
42. Anthony Farrington, *The English Factory in Japan*, vol. 1, p. 381.
44. English sources refer to him as Captain Whaw or Whow (Farrington, *The English Factory*, doc. 267).
56. AHU, *Macau*, box 8, doc. 6, AN/TT, *Coleção de São Vicente*, cod. 19, doc. 156, and Frei Álvaro do Rosário, “Ataque dos Holandeses a Macau em 1622”, *Boletim"


59. AN/TT, S. Vicente Collection, cod. 19, doc. 154.


61. The ship’s log contains an extensive account of all the problems raised by the Japanese authorities to ensure that the crew of the Return left Japan, with one such reason being the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and the English king taking Catharine of Bragança as his bride [Engelbert Kaempfer, The History of Japan, vol. 3, 1906, pp. 342–357; G/12/16 (1614–1703), fls. 60–66].


64. G/12/59, fl. 123.


66. In a letter to the viceroy of India, Phillip II referred to the articles, especially the ninth, of the Anglo–Portuguese peace treaty of 1604, strengthened by that of 1630 [Júlio Firmino Biker (ed.), Coleção de Tratados e Concertos de Pazes que o Estado da Índia Portuguesa Fez, book 1, 1995, p. 262, book 2, pp. 37–38].

67. G/12/10, fls. 67–80, Júlio Firmino Biker (ed.), Coleção de Tratados, pp. 239–261. The thirty-four articles of the 1630 treaty sought to improve ties of friendship between the two nations, strengthen the free trade and protect their Asian domains against the Dutch (chs. 1–4, 7–8, 11–12).

68. The proposal was initially conveyed to Goa by two Jesuit informers loyal to the viceroy who were in Surat, António Pereira and Paulo Reimão [National Library of Portugal, Fundo Geral, cod. 7640; see also Sir William Foster (ed.), The English Factories in India 1630–1633, pp. 220–22]. In August 1633, Joseph Hopkinson and the Council of Surat informed Father Paulo Reimão that once Portugal and England joined forces “we would be lords of all India and neither Moor nor Dutch
would be able to withstand” [Panduronga S. Pissurlencar, Assentos do Conselho do Estado, vol. 1 (1618–1633), 1953, p. 481].


74. The “Relação Breve, Geral das Principaes Couzas que Sucederão em a India o Anno de 1633”, National Library of Portugal, Fundo Geral, cod. 7640, p. 60, lists the advantages of the peace agreement to be signed with England, especially the increase in trade and customs duties, as well as the weakening of the Dutch enemies.

75. Letter from the viceroy (1636) on the ceasefire with the English stating that it should be maintained due to the “many enemies” and the difficult situation faced by the Portuguese empire (AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 33, pp. 247–247v).


80. On the context leading to the Anglo-Portuguese entente cordiale against the VOC in the seventeenth century, see G. R. Crone, The Discovery of the East, 1972, pp. 120–147, and Marcus P. M. Vink, “The Entente Cordiale: The Dutch East India Company and the Portuguese Shipping through the Straits of Malacca, 1641–1663”, Revista de Cultura, vol. 1, nn. 13–14, 1991, pp. 289–309. The latter author states that the Dutch in Batavia were preparing for possible joint attacks from their Portuguese and English enemies. The study concludes that the Anglo-Portuguese entente cordiale was harmful in the long term to the Portuguese as while the English
did weaken the Dutch naval blockades and transport Portuguese goods, but they were not able to protect Portuguese possessions in Asia.


Chapter 3 The arrival of the English in Macau

1. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 33, fl. 248, book 44, fls. 426–427, book 45, fls. 350–351, and Sir William Foster (ed.), The English Factories in India 1634–1636, pp. 103–104, 150, 177–178, 189–190, 226–230, which details under “Consultation Held in Surat”, pp. 102–103: “an English ship ‘should be sent from Goa to Macau in China for freight goods […]. The voviação in itslfie was generally approved […] were it but to experience the trade in those parts, which hath ever bene desired” (my emphasis; see G/12/1, fl. 24).
4. Arquivo Histórico de Goa (AHG), Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa (FUP), Livro dos Segredos, no. 1, fls. 6–7.
7. G/12/10, fls. 81–84.
9. In 1794, Aeneas Anderson (A Narrative of the British Embassy to China, 1795, p. 392), visited Macau as part of the first English embassy to China and criticised the Catholics of Macau for obliging the English who passed away in China to be buried outside of the city alongside the Chinese as “the papists have particular places of internment for those who depart this life in the faith of their church”.
11. G/12/10, fl. 81.
12. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 34, fls. 64v–65. On the “intent” of the voyage and Manuel Bocarro’s artillery to be transported to Goa, see the instructions given to Manuel Ramos, administrator of the Japan voyage, which mentioned the peace with the English “in conformity with the peace that his majesty made with their King” (fls. 72–72v).
13. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, fl. 63v.
14. This idea was repeated at the end of the letter (AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 34, fl. 66) and in the instructions given to Manuel Ramos (fl. 73 and book 35, fl. 263).
15. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 34, fl. 64, book 35, fl. 263.
16. Counsel given both in the letter sent to the captain-general of Macau and in another one addressed to Manuel Ramos, dated May 3, 1635 (fl. 73v).
20. For details of the vessel’s route from Downs, via Surat, to Macau, see Anthony Farrington, East India Company Ships, 1600–1833, 1999, p. 386.
27. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 33, fl. 253. In another letter Manuel Ramos lists some of the Portuguese passengers carried to and from Macau (fls. 259v–260).
30. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 33, fl. 261.
36. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 33, fl. 248.
37. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 33, fl. 248.
40. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 33, fl. 248.
41. AHG, FUP, Livro dos Segredos, n. 1, fl. 11. Nevertheless, in 1639 Pedro da Silva told William Fromlin, Methwold’s successor, that he would send someone to discuss with him the charters agreed both for Malacca and China (fl. 30).
42. In May 1639, Pedro da Silva warned the Danish traders that they could only negotiate with China after permission from the captain-general of Macau (AHG, FUP, Livro dos Segredos, fls. 31, 31v, 33).

43. AHG, FUP, Livro dos Segredos, fl. 583, n. 399.


45. G/12/1, fl. 58. Pedro da Silva informed Surat that Portuguese ports would not trade with English vessels and that these were only authorised to anchor for shelter or to take on supplies (Sir William Foster, The English Factories in India 1634–1636, pp. 152, 159). In another English document dated 1639, António Teles de Meneses, the governor of India who succeeded Pedro da Silva, was considered friendlier towards English interests (G/12/1, fl. 59).

46. G/12/1, fl. 60, and G/12/10, fls. 82–84.

47. Ethel Bruce Sainsbury and William Foster (eds.), A Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company 1635–1639, 1907, pp. 120–121.

48. In December 1635, Charles I granted a charter establishing the William Courteen Association, which was the first main competitor of the EIC in Asia. The interloping company owned by the London merchant Sir William Courteen (1600–1649) held the right to trade for five years at any Asian port in which there was no EIC factory already established. The Association was poorly managed and collapsed around 1649, but before that it sent several ships to Portuguese ports in Asia, including Macau, as we shall see.


50. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 48, fl. 287v, book 50, fl. 124v. On the several Portuguese chartering of English ships, see Maria Manuela Sobral Blanco, “O Estado Português da Índia”, pp. 552, 585 (footnotes 418–421), 586 (footnotes 422–424), which summarises this Portuguese strategy to outflank the Dutch blockade. The author states that in 1644 the vessels Hind, from Swahili (Surat factory), and William, to which I shall later refer to, belonging respectively to the EIC and the Courteen Association, went to Macau in the service of the Portuguese Crown with munitions and gunpowder, which would be exchanged for cinnamon.

51. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 33, fl. 249.

52. G/12/68, fl. 6; G/12/89, fl. 65; R/10/6, fl. 192; Ethel Bruce Sainsbury and William Foster (eds.), A Calendar of the Court Minutes Etc. of the East India Company 1640–1643, 1909, p. 151; and Sir William Foster (ed.), The English Factories in India 1642–1645, 1913, p. 36.


55. G/12/10, fl. 66.

56. G/12/10, fl. 89.

57. G/12/10, fl. 90. See fols. 91–92 for an example of a charter contract for English vessels to sail between Goa, Malacca and Macau (1639), with point 6 stipulating one of the obligations of the ship: “To bring from Macau, on account of Royal Goods, as Ballast, 3000 Quintals weight, namely in copper, ordnance, or shot. If a second vessel proceed, she was also to bring as much artillery, copper, and shot, with other goods on account of individual merchants as she can. To be paid for as those brought on ship London were". Point 9 sets out that the safe place for the boat to anchor in China will be established by Macau, on the order of the viceroy. The following point warned that the possible unruly behaviour of the crew, “not accustomed to the country”, may lead to a violent response from the Chinese, therefore only the factors should disembark. Point 11 forbids the crew from carrying any passengers besides those stipulated prior to departure, “according to the amity which ought to subsist between both nations”.

58. G/12/10, fl. 98.


60. Regarding this episode, I make particular use of the Portuguese sources, given that the English sources were already considered in the aforementioned studies (see G/12/12 fols. 9–75, G/12/16, fols. 1–33).


64. Peter Mundy, *Travels*, vol. 3, pp. 141–142. See also G/40/1, fols. 32, 60. Frobisher’s servant ended up staying in Macau and marrying a Portuguese man. On the later complaints presented by the widow of Frobisher to the EIC in 1626 regarding her stay in Macau, see W. Nôel Sainsbury (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China and Persia, 1625–1629*, 1884, doc. 369, p. 256.


73. See the consultations of the Senate (1645) and of the Overseas Council (1647) on the prohibition of English vessels entering the enclave even when in the service of Portugal (AHU, Macau, box 1, doc. 48).

74. An idea repeated, as well as the argument over the losses caused by the London’s visit to Macau, in a long letter from the city to Weddell, saying that the English come to “trade [...]”, something that [the Portuguese] could not allow [...] out of great respect and for being on the land of the king of China, a person so conscientious guarding his lands” (AN/TT, *Livros das Monções*, book 43, fl. 268).

75. AN/TT, *Livros das Monções*, book 41, fl. 201; see also G/12/1, fl. 30.

76. PRO, FO 233/189, fl. 37.

77. The way in which the Mandarin referred to the English on their arrival in Canton (AN/TT, *Livros das Monções*, book 43, fl. 261) and which may also be translated as “ginger barbarians”.


79. See the long letter that the captain-general of Macau wrote to the king of England three days prior to the fleet’s departure on 24 December, detailing the release of six Englishmen imprisoned in Canton during their visit, as well as the courtesy with which the Portuguese received the subjects of Charles I (AN/TT, *Livros das Monções*, book 41, fls. 220–227).


89. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 41, fls. 213–213v.
91. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 41, fls. 220v–221.
92. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 41, fl. 221.
93. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 41, fl. 221v.
95. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 43, fl. 220.
96. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 43, fl. 265 and G/12/1, fls. 30–58.
100. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 43, fl. 264v.
103. Jorge Manuel Flores, "Macau e o Comércio da Baía de Cantão (Séculos XVI e XVII)", in Artur Teodoro de Matos and Luís Filipe F. Reis Thomaz (dir.), As Relaçóes entre a Índia Portuguesa, a Ásia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente, 1993, pp. 21–48.
114. AN/TT, Livros das Monções, book 50, fls. 120–122.
116. AHU, Cartas Régias, n. 208, fls. 46 and 104 (see Maria Manuela Sobral Blanco, “O Estado Português da Índia”, vol. 1, p. 544).
117. G/12/1, fl. 61.
124. G/12/1, fls. 62–63, G/12/19, fls. 103–104.
125. G/12/1, fls. 62–63, and G/12/10, fl. 104.
128. Sir William Foster (ed.), *The English Factories in India: 1646–1650*, 1914, pp. 8–9; and G/12/10, fl. 106, my emphasis.
129. G/12/10, fl. 111.
130. Ethel Bruce Sainsbury and William Foster (eds.), *A Calendar of the Court Minutes Etc. of the East India Company 1644–1649*, 1912, p. 188.
131. G/12/10, fls. 113–114.
132. G/12/10, fl. 114.
133. R/10/5 (1761–1769), fl. 42.
137. G/12/1, fl. 63.
138. G/12/1, fl. 64: “The Trade of China is so much declined, by reason of the Portugalls poverty and troubles in that vast kingdom”.
139. G/12/1, fl. 64.
141. At war with Spain, Portugal signed the Treaty of Peace and Alliance with England in Westminster (10–06–1654). Its twenty-eight articles mainly favoured English trade, while the EIC directors hoped that Cromwell obtained Bombay or Bassein through a diplomatic treaty.
143. G/12/1, fl. 65, G/12/10, fls. 121–121, 124.
Notes to pp. 53–57

144. G/12/10, fls. 133, 135.
145. See G/12/10, fls. 127–128.
146. G/12/10, fl. 134.
147. G/12/10, fls. 137–140.
148. G/12/1, fl. 66.
149. G/12/10, fl. 141 and G/12/13, fl. 76.
150. G/12/1, fl. 70.
151. G/12/1, fls. 68–78.
152. G/12/10, fl. 142.
153. G/12/1, fl. 78 and G/12/10, fl. 142.
154. G/12/1, fl. 75
155. G/12/1, fls. 66a, 68–77.
156. G/12/1, fl. 78.
158. AHU, Macau, box 2, doc. 5.
159. AHU, Macau, box 2, docs. 5 and 9.
161. PRO, SP 89/9, fl. 77, G/12/13, fls. 89–90.
162. PRO, SP 89/9, fl. 186v, SP 89/10, fl. 28.
164. BA, Ms. Av. 54-X-19, n. 19, PRO, SP/89/10, fl. 10.
167. PRO, SP 89/17, fl. 339.
168. PRO, SP 89/3, fl. 187, SP 89/12, fl. 32, SP 89/28, fls. 47, 105, SP 89/31, fl. 200, SP 89/50, fl. 82, SP 89/67, fl. 120, and SP 89/80, fl. 40.
170. PRO, SP 89/4, fl. 177.


176. G/12/1, fls. 144–147, G/12/10, fls. 161–163, G/12/13, fl. 288, G/12/16, fls. 60–66, and G/12/2, fl. 153.


181. G/12/1, fl. 146.

182. G/12/10, fls. 161–162.

183. G/12/19, fl. 209, G/12/51, fl. 31, G/12/14, fls. 1–40, 161–179.

184. G/12/57, fl. 162.


186. G/12/10, fls. 162–163.


188. G/12/1, fl. 148.


192. On the legislative measures that granted British vessels the monopoly of Britain’s colonial trade, as a measure against Dutch competition, in 1650 (forbidding foreign ships to trade in British dominions), in 1651 (goods from British colonies could only be transported by British vessels, and their crews needed to be 75% British), and in 1660 (when the Navigation Act decreed that some “colonial” commodities could only be transported to England), see Larry Sawers, “The Navigation Acts Revisited”, Economic History Review, 2nd series, vol. 40, 1992, pp. 262–284.

193. G/12/2, fl. 247.

194. G/12/2, fl. 232.

195. G/12/2, fls. 249–250.

196. G/12/2, fls. 254, 281.

198. On the British voyages to Amoy, Tonkin and Formosa, and trade in those locations sometimes with the help of Portuguese interpreters, see G/12/1, ffs. 79–82, 88–135, G/12/2, ffs. 172–245, 251–298, G/12/3, 4, G/12/16 (1614–1703), ffs. 90–277, G/12/17 (1672–1697); and Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles*, vol. 1, pp. 44–65, 127–134, 220–229.

199. G/12/3, ffs. 324–325, and G/12/11, fl. 36.

200. G/12/6, ffs. 823–824.

201. Roderich Ptak, “Early Sino-Portuguese Relations up to the Foundation of Macau”, *Mare Liberum*, n. 4, December 1992, pp. 293–294, reminds us that China was a market that did not function as a whole, being composed of macro-regions, as proved by the establishment of the Portuguese in Sanchuan and Lampacau before Macau.


204. G/12/2, fl. 301.


206. G/12/3, (1682), fl. 307, G/12/13, ffs. 122, 134. Taipa Quebrada was an anchorage in Taipa island that at the time was formed by two small islands, Taipa Grande (or Taipa Quebrada), and Taipa Pequena, initially separated by a narrow channel.

207. G/12/26, fss. 3–3v.

208. G/12/2, fl. 314.

209. G/12/2, ffs. 311–320.


211. G/12/2, ffs. 326–349.


214. AHU, *Macau*, box 2, docs. 3 and 5.


Chapter 4  The beginning of regular East India Company trade with China

4. Frei José de Jesus Maria, *Ásia Sínica e Japónica*, vol. 2, pp. 231.
8. G/12/5, fl. 647.
9. G/12/5, fl. 651.
10. The term “hopu” designated both the Chinese customs house that received taxes from foreign ships, and the superintendent of the Chinese maritime custom who supervised trade and received custom’s taxes in Macau, since 1684, as well as in Canton (see Count Lapérouse, *Voyage de Lapérouse*, 1970, p. 207; António Feliciano M. Pereira, *As Alfândegas Chinesas de Macau*, 1870; and Weng Eang Cheong, *The Hong Merchants of Canton*, pp. 193–213, 230–233).
11. G/12/5, fl. 654.
14. Necessary permit for any ship arriving at Macau (G/12/76, fl. 21).
15. G/12/6, fls. 785–804.
16. On the British activity, namely Catchpole’s, in Chusan, Amoy and Pulo Condor (1699–1759), see G/12/6, fls. 793–921; G/12/14, G/12/16, G/12/17, G/12/16, fls. 267–277.
17. G/12/6, fls. 845–851.
Notes to pp. 71–74

18. G/12/6 (1699–1700), fls. 821–877.
20. Macau was, from an early stage, origin and destiny of correspondence between British residents and Western ships approaching China, so that the crews’ arrivals could be prepared [G/12/32 (1731), fl. 16].
22. G/12/78 (1783–1784), fl. 29.
23. G/12/82 (1785–1786), fl. 21; and Jin Guoping and Wú Zhiliang (eds.), *Correspondência Oficial*, vol. 1, docs. 228–229.
25. G/12/27, fl. 7; G/12/28, fls. 7, 53; G/12/29, fls. 17–18; G/12/90, fl. 7.
27. G/12/40, fl. 75; G/12/41, fl. 45 (1735–1737).
29. G/12/27, fl. 19; G/12/86, fl. 10.
30. G/12/25, fl. 3; G/12/27, fls. 30 and 57; G/12/29, fl. 73; G/12/44, fl. 58; G/12/50, fl. 4: the sentence “arrived at Macau and went ashore for advices/intelligence” is recurrent in the EIC documentation.
32. G/12/33, fl. 51; G/12/58, fl. 9; G/12/59, fl. 90; G/12/89, fl. 85; G/12/105, fls. 73, 79; G/12/112, fl. 18.
33. G/12/76 (1782–1783), fl. 91.
34. G/12/19, fl. 187; G/12/66, fl. 17.
37. R/10/13 (1783), fls. 154–155.
41. Practice that lasts throughout the eighteenth century; see AHU, *Macau*, box 14, doc. 16.
42. *AM*, 3rd series, vol. 6, n. 1, 1966, pp. 41, 44.
43. *AM*, 3rd series, n. 3, September 1966, p. 120.
Chapter 5  The gradual growth of the British presence in Macau in the early eighteenth century

1. Cf. Alexander Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies*, pp. 116–125. In 1702, the EIC sent two ships to Canton, the *Fleet* that anchored in Macau in August together with the *Halifax*. The crews immediately travelled to Canton to discuss the prices of merchandise with their Chinese partners (G/12/6, fls. 875–880; G/12/7, fls. 1093–1094; G/12/16, fl. 41).


7. G/12/6 (1615–1703), fls. 868–869. According to the “Abstract Letter Diary” of Commander Burges and John Hillar, chief-supercargo of the fleet’s frigate, the vessels arrived at Macau on 26 August 1702. After a few days in Macau, and desiring to buy silk, the crew travelled to Canton and, in within days, contacted the most important Chinese traders. The French embassy led by the Jesuit priest Bouvet in 1698 also spent little time in Macau before leaving for Canton (cf. Gio Ghirardini, *Relation du Voyage Fait à la Chine sur le Vaisseau l’ Amphitrite, en l’ Année 1689, 1700*, p. 68).

8. G/12/8, fl. 1415.

9. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, vol. 1, 1910, pp. 51–53, 64. In June 1727, and according to the crew of the *Prince Augustus*, the ancient Ton Hunqua hong or warehouse is already known as “English factory” (G/12/26, fl. 4).

11. In 1717–1718 the *Carnarvon* stayed in Macau and its crew tried to find out if they could go up to Canton (G/12/8, fl. 1349). The ship’s diary (fls. 1349–1352) lists the nine articles that the British insisted on seeing respected by the Chinese: (1) free trade with any Chinese; (2) freedom to employ Chinese; unruly British are not judged by the Chinese authorities but by the EIC; (3) freedom to buy provisions for the factory and the ships; (4) the end of tax payment for goods consumed in the factory; (5) freedom to camp and restore ships; (6, 7) and for the supercargoes and their luggage to go through customs without being searched; (8, 9) the hopu should defend the British from popular violence and from the growing demands of the Mandarinate, and should be rigorous when measuring the ships.

12. G/12/26 (1726–1728), fl. 1; G/12/8 (1723), fl. 1402.


14. In 1792 the hopu demanded a British ship anchor near Macau to enter the Pearl River delta to be measured, otherwise it should continue its voyage [R/10/20, fl. 171; see Jin Guoping and Wu Zhiliang (eds.), *Correspondência Oficial*, vol. 2, docs. 183 and 184, pp. 314–315, 316–317].

15. G/12/8, fl. 1429.


Chapter 6  Macau as a centre for Chinese control over the European “barbarians”


2. The EIC documentation describes a few episodes dealing with Sino-Portuguese relations. In 1785 the supercargoes informed London that a Chinese who had hidden Catholic missionaries in China ran away to a convent in Macau. The Mandarins demanded that the city deliver him, but Macau refused to do so and the hong merchants were heavily fined (G/12/79, part 2, fl. 174).

4. G/12/11, fls. 57–58. Weng Eang Cheong, *The Hong Merchants of Canton*, pp. 12–13, reinterprets Morse, Cordier and Pritchard’s conclusions, and defends that the formation of the co-hong in the beginning of the eighteenth century was the official Chinese reaction to the growing of the foreign trade in Canton.

5. Each of the hongs does business individually but the group is responsible for all the questions related to the safety of the foreign crews in China, and that is why they are called “security merchants” (see Ann Bolbach White, “The Hong Merchants of Canton”, 1967; and Anthony Kuo-tung Ch’en, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1834*, 1990).


7. G/12/30–31, and the Diary of James Naish, who in 1730–1731 became the first supercargo to stay in China all year long to do business (G/12/21, fls. B-29; G/12/32).

8. G/12/8, fl. 1402.

9. G/12/8, fl. 1415, doc. repeated in G/12/21, fl. 38.

10. G/12/8, fl. 1421. The document mentions the case of Governor Cristóvão de Severim Melo, considered a tyrant by the Senate. He is deposed and substituted by his predecessor António da Silva Telê e Meneses in 1723.


**Chapter 7  The visit of the Centurion**

1. G/12/11, fls. 82–89.


4. Boyle Somerville, *Commodore Anson’s Voyage into the South Seas and around the World*, 1934, p. 194. Macau was, once more, a place where crews could rest and gather information about China for their own immediate use and to be published in Great Britain.


6. In late 1742 the supercargoes also informed London that they had advised the commodore to try to obtain permission from the Chinese authorities through the Macau Senate [cf. Glyndwr Williams (ed.), *Documents*, p. 145].

7. For a description of Sumarez’s stay in Macau, the initial negotiations with the governor, and their anchorage in Taipa with the help of a Portuguese pilot sent by the city, see Boyle Somerville, *Commodore Anson’s Voyage*, pp. 198–199.


9. In December 1742 Anson writes to James Naish: “the Portuguese have not the least power” [Glyndwr Williams (ed.), *Documents*, pp. 152–153].


13. According to Christopher Loyd, “Introduction”, in Philip Sumarez, *Log of the Centurion Based on the Original Papers of Captain Philip Sumarez*, 1973, p. 10, the work was not written by Walter, but by Benjamin Robins, professional pamphleteer who was supervised by Anson.

14. Cf. Austin Coates, *Macau and the British*, p. 54. In 1742 Philip Sumarez (*Log*, p. 203), Anson’s first lieutenant, said that the governor of Macau did not have any power to solve the problems related to the presence of the Centurion and was a puppet in the hands of the Chinese.


17. On the reasons of the Portuguese permanent stay in Macau (a tacit agreement between Portuguese and Chinese for the benefit of both: payment of rent, military power in Macau), see Tcheong-Ü-Lâm and Ian-Kuong-Iâm, *Ou-Mun Kei-Leok*, pp.
Notes to pp. 86–88


Chapter 8  British relations and conflicts with the Portuguese and Chinese authorities in the second half of the eighteenth century

1. AHU, Macau, box 21, doc. 18.


3. Earl H. Pritchard, Britain and the China Trade, p. 126; James Bromley Eames, The English in China, 1974, p. 78. See also William Milburn, Oriental Commerce, vol. 1, 1813, pp. xlv–xlvi. Due to economic interests and conflicts in Europe, the British tried to avoid European commercial competition in China, and in 1781 they threatened the Chinese that if they found Dutch junks they would take them, while the Select Committee suspected that the latter traded tea using Macau ships (R/10/11, fls. 93–94, 109). A year later the supercargoes listed as their possible China Trade rivals the Swedish, the Danes and the Portuguese (R/10/12, fl. 149; G/12/76, fl. 135), and described the movement of Portuguese and other European ships [R/10/10 (1779–1780), fl. 163 and part 2, fl. 159; R/10/11 (1780–1781), fls. 100–111; R/10/12 (1782), fl. 109; R/10/13 (1783), fl. 25; R/10/14 (1784–1785), fls. 4, 15, 26; R/10/17 (1788–1789), fl. 71; R/10/18 (1789–1790), part 2, fl. 3; R/10/19 (1791), fl. 8; G/12/32 (1731), fls. 2, 13; and G/12/72 (1781), fl. 32].

4. Earl H. Pritchard, Britain and the China Trade, p. 118, considers the period between 1750 and 1800 to be so important that he calls it “the crucial years in early Anglo-Chinese relations”, characterized by the strong trade growth and by the peaceful efforts to open China to the Western trade, especially through (the failed) Lord Macartney’s embassy. Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, pp. 10–29, 161–167 shows that, although the foreign traders are restricted to Canton in 1757, the China Trade system was formed around 1720 and remained unchanged until 1842.

5. AHU, Macau, box 63, doc. 33


8. Alain Peyrefitte, *Un Choc de Cultures*, p. lxxxv. In 1760 a British vessel anchored in Taipa, recruited several Portuguese from Macau, and its crew got involved in several conflicts, namely the kidnapping of slaves owned by Macau residents. The Senate asked the judge to investigate if any resident of Macau was passing information about the city on to the British. Espionage was therefore implicit in the request, and this practice favoured the British and made the defence of the city’s interests harder (*AM*, 3rd series, vol. 7, n. 5, May 1967, pp. 256–257).

9. For a contemporary description of the British factory and the Chinese surveillance in Canton, see the anonymous narrative *A Voyage to the East Indies in 1747 and 1748*, 1762, pp. 223–225.


16. R/10/5 (1761–1769), fl. 59; R/10/11 (1780–1781), fl. 200.

17. R/10/5, (1761–1769), fols. 41–42, 47–49, 56, 61, 85, 107; R/10/6 (1763–1769), fols. 71–72v., 81v.–82v.; R/10/13 (1783), fl. 191; G/12/79 (1784–1785), part 3 (1785), fl. 46; *AM*, 3rd series, vol. 7, n. 1, 1961, p. 150 (British supercargoes borrowed money from the Jesuits).

18. R/10/10 (1779–1780), part 1, fols. 21–55, part 2, fols. 14–216; G/12/18 (1753–1787), fols. 91–112; G/12/68 (1779–1780), fols. 4–200; G/12/70 (1780), fols. 57, 61, 91, 102–103; G/12/91 (1787–1792), part 2.

19. G/12/68 (1779–1780), fols. 135–141, doc. also copied in G/12/70, fols. 73–81.
20. The headquarters of the EIC was formed by four houses on the Praia Grande, close to the Governor’s Palace, which stretched up the hill towards the church of São Lourenço [see George Chinnery’s painting (1836) in Patrick Conner, George Chinnery 1774–1852: Artist of India and the China Coast, 1993, p. 189, plate 118].


23. G/12/58, fl. 11.


25. G/12/59, fls. 26–43; G/12/60, doc. 13.

26. AM, 3rd series, vol. 17, n. 1, January 1972, p. 35. In 1783, the Select Committee got involved in a legal dispute with Simão Vicente de Araújo Rosa, a prominent Senate member and owner of the Casa Garden, then rented to the EIC. The Macanese raised the rent and disrespected the contracted signed years before. The supercargoes won the case in court and were able to stay until the end of the date defined by the contract. The judge praised the “the respectable society which [...] the Select Committee] compose[d] in th[at] part of the world [...] and the firm alliance observed between their Britannic and most faithful majesties” (R/10/13, fls. 179–181; G/12/77, fls. 123–126). The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance was therefore an argument for a good relationship used by the Portuguese and British in Macau throughout the centuries, as we can see from another dispute between the Committee and the governor after Samuel Peach was physically attacked by the guards [R/10/16 (1787–1788), fls. 15, 22; G/12/86, fls. 15–16]. The supercargoes complained to the viceroy of Goa, who replied that “the good friendship that happily subsists between both our Nations requires that amongst their subjects dissentions of any kind should not happen” and said that the governor, unlike the Senate, did not have any civil or criminal jurisdiction [fl. 83; see R/10/17 (1788–1789), fls. 82–84].

27. AHU, Macau, box 17, doc. 66, fl. 4.

28. AHU, Macau, box 21, doc. 37, fl. 4.

29. AHU, Macau, box 21, doc. 37, fl. 3.


33. AHU, Macau, box 20, doc. 36.


36. Jin Guoping and Wu Zhiliang (eds.), Correspondência Oficial, vol. 1, doc. 143. Macau negotiated locally with the Chinese authorities, while Lisbon, respecting the ancient Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, allowed the entry and stay of British traders in the Portuguese colonies, as was the case with the ratification of the treaty between Queen Maria I and King George III in 1793 [José Ferreira Borges de Castro (org.), Coleção dos Tratados, vol. 4, 1857, pp. 18–25].

37. The Macau lorce was a hybrid sailing vessel having a Chinese junk rig on a Portuguese (European) hull; it was faster than the normal Chinese junk because of its hull style.


39. The Commutation Act (20–08–1784) safeguarded the British tea trade profits by lowering the taxes paid by British importers, putting an end to the smuggling of tea carried out by foreign merchants [Patrick Tuck, “Introduction: Sir George Thomas Staunton and the Failure of the Amherst Embassy of 1816”, in Patrick Tuck (ed.), Britain and the China Trade 1635–1842, vol. 10, 2000, p. x]. The amount of tea sold in Great Britain doubled in the 1780s (see Earl H. Pritchard, Britain and the China Trade, pp. 212–220).


41. G/12/18, fls. 43–54.

42. The behaviour of the supercargoes also affected Sino-Portuguese relations. In September 1781 the governor of Macau informed the president of the Select Committee that the Mandarinate had ordered him to arrest some British supercargoes but he had ignored the order (G/12/72, fl. 105).

43. R/10/11 (1780–1781), part 2, fl. 109; G/12/19, fls. 181–185, 188–204, 219–228, 253–274; and G/12/72 (1781), fl. 32.

44. R/10/11, part 2, fl. 109; and G/12/72, fls. 87–90, 97–98, 104, 138–139.

45. AM, 3rd series, vol. 16, n. 4, October 1971, p. 246; AHU, Macau, box 14, docs. 10, 11.

46. R/10/11 (1780–1781), part 2, fl. 110. McClary was released in July and took a Dutch ship in Whampoa. The Committee visited Macau and was criticised by the Mandarinate, who demanded McClary’s imprisonment. The latter also took Chinese junks (G/12/76, 1782–1783, part 2, fl. 198), leading the Portuguese and
Dutch to complain to the British presidency of Fort William [G/12/77 (1783), fls. 87–88]. The supercargoes criticised McClary’s behaviour (fls. 113–129), and the latter intended to attack Macau ships to punish the Senate for forcing him to compensate the owners of the ships he had already stolen (G/12/73, fls. 3–4). In 1786 the problems caused by independent traders made George Smith suggest that the president of the Select Committee should also be nominated British consul so that he could control all country ships (G/12/19, fls. 173–183). In that same year, the EIC published its regulations concerning the control of independent traders in China (G/12/20, fls. 429–33). On the repercussions of MacClary’s piracy in Macau and in Fort William, see G/12/77 (1783), fls. 92–94, 97, B. A. Saletore (ed.), *Fort William-India House Correspondences*, vol. 9: 1782–85, 1959, pp. 362–363, 390, 396, pp. 76, 480–481, and *AM*, 3rd series, vol. 10, n. 6, Dec. 1968, p. 293.


49. R/10/11, fls. 57–58; G/12/76, fls. 64–65; R/10/11, fls. 58–59; G/12/76, fls. 57–69, 111–113, 158–159; R/10/12, fls. 25, 29; and R/10/13, fl. 2. In 1782 the governor wrote to the Committee on behalf of Simão da Rosa and António Botelho, requesting that the Committee complained to the Bengal Council so that nothing could disturb the harmony between the two allied European nations (R/10/12, fls. 60–63). Fort St. George told the governor of Macau that the British would do all that they could to punish and stop McClary (fls. 113–119).


51. R/10/14, fls. 90–107; R/10/15, fl. 38; G/12/11, fls. 136–141a; G/12/18, fls. 49–83 (also copied in G/12/20, fls. 413–427v); and G/12/79, fls. 102–103, 118–156, 169–172.

52. When visiting Macau in January 1787 Count Lapérouse mentioned this incident but did not identify it, presenting it as an example of the difficulties that the foreign traders faced due to the Chinese impositions (Count Lapérouse, *Voyage de Lapérouse*, pp. 201–202).


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Notes to pp. 93–97

54. E. J. Eitel, *Europe in China: The History of Hong Kong from the Beginning to the Year 1882*, 1895, wrongly identifies the first English woman to visit Macau as Mrs. McClannon, but, as I said before, the pioneers were the maid and wife of Richard Frobisher, in 1620.


59. G/12/49, fl. 7.


61. G/12/11, fls. 100–112.


63. The Committee sent literary works to London and founded the already mentioned library of the British factory (British Library) in 1806. When the EIC ended its activity in China, the library had 4,000 volumes.

64. The foreigners’ daily life in ships and at home depended to a great extent on the action of the comprador, the “bicultural middleman” between Chinese and Westerners (see Yen-Ping Hao, *The Compradore in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West*, 1970, pp. 1–77, 154–223).


Chapter 9  The “scramble for the use of Macau”

1. Expression used by J. M. Braga, “A Seller of ‘Sing-Songs’”, p. 85, when he mentions the clash of interests between the EIC, the country traders and the interlopers regarding the use of Macau as a support platform for the China Trade.


5. On the opium smuggling system between Bengal and other places and Canton carried out by the country traders, also through Macau (due to the fact that the supercargoes had been forbidden to smuggle opium), see David Edward Owen, *British Opium Policy in China and India*, 1934, pp. 1–54; D. Eyles, “The Abolition of the East India Company’s Monopoly 1833”, PhD thesis, 1955, pp. 4–6; and P. J. Marshall, “Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean Before 1800”, in Om Prakash (ed.), *An Expanding World*, pp. 258–262.
12. Regarding the mutual interests and opium smuggling operations of both Portuguese and British (which even involved two governors bribed by the EIC), see António M. Martins do Vale, *Os Portugueses em Macau (1750–1800)*, pp. 207–209, 211.


19. G/12/86, fl. 11 (1787). Cheominant was released two days later and promised to leave Macau.


21. On the powers of the ouvidoria (judge), extinct in 1740 because of the Senate’s pressure, and reinstated in 1784, see António M. Martins do Vale, Os Portugueses em Macau, pp. 15–19.


23. Manuel Múrias (ed.), Instruções para o Bispo de Pequim, p. 56.

24. In the 1790s three British traders created their own company in Macau and used the name of a poor resident to whom they paid so that they could own ships and borrow money from the Senate (António M. Martins do Vale, Os Portugueses em Macau, p. 210).

26. G/12/77 (1783), fl. 85. The Senate was aware of the strategy used by the British who bought the drug in Bengal before the arrival of the Macau ships, many of which were rented by the British (*AM*, 3rd series, vol. 17, n. 3, March 1972, pp. 161–165). In 1746, the British finished their business in Madras before the Macau ships arrived to trade (*Records of St. George: Diary and Consultation Book of 1746*, 1931, p. 79), and the crew of the latter informed the British about the current trade situation in China (*Records of St. George: Letters to Fort St. George 1682*, vol. 2, 1916, p. 135).

27. AHU, *Macau*, box 17, doc. 26 (1786), fl. 3: “most of the trade is done by the English [...] and the Macau ships have nowhere else to go because the English are everywhere, and sponsored by the governor of Macau”. The Portuguese Law forbade the governors to trade, and Bernardo Aleixo de Lemos e Faria was condemned in Goa (1789: cx. 18, docs. 21, 45).

28. G/12/76 (1782–1783), part 2, fl. 205.


30. G/12/103 (1792–1793), fls. 70–71, 74, 80–81, 84–85.

31. According to the EIC records, in 1783 James Henry Cox and John Reid, chief of the “Imperial Company”, were the only British residents in Canton, and the EIC had no power over them (G/12/77, fl. 81). In 1786 only two independent traders, John Henry Cox and John M. Intyre, lived in Macau (R/10/15, fl. 14). After helping the supercargoes on a voluntary basis, Intyre was nominated agent of the EIC in that city in 1785, where he assisted the crews of arriving ships and the Canton factory (G/12/79, part 2, fls. 6–7; G/12/89, fl. 9; G/12/98, fl. 2).

32. R/10/15 (1786–1787), fl. 14; G/12/101, fls. 9–10; G/12/103, fl. 10.


Notes to pp. 103–107

38. AHU, Macau, box 21, doc. 18.
40. AHU, Macau, box 24, doc. 13.
41. AHU, Macau, box 23, doc. 24.
42. In April 1840, during the Opium War, Charles Elliot came up with a plan to occupy Macau and use it as a strategic British point during the conflicts with China (Montalto Jesus, Historic Macao, 1902, pp. 255–260; W. Zhiliang, Segredos, pp. 145–147; and A. G. Dias, Macau e a I Guerra do Ópio, pp. 17–58).
43. Expression used in a letter sent by the Macau judge to Lisbon, in February 1840 (A. G. Dias, Macau, p. 170).

Chapter 10 “Guests and old allies”

1. Expression used by the Senate’s procurator in a chop sent to the Mandarinate (1813), mentioning the British presence in Macau [Jin Guoping and Wu Zhiliang (eds.), Correspondência Oficial, vol. 5, doc. 109, p. 189].
2. G/12/86, fl. 147; G/12/88, fls. 60, 62, 66; G/12/89, fl. 9; G/12/96, fl. 5; G/12/101, fl. 5; G/12/103, fls. 5, 10; G/12/105, fls. 14, 44; G/12/108, fl. 38.
3. G/12/11, fl. 128; G/12/64, fl. 137.
4. R/10/11, part 2, fls. 30–41, 82–83; G/12/20, fls. 300–309; G/12/72, fl. 5; G/12/73, fls. 3–4; G/12/79, fls. 119–125.
6. R/10/7 (1769–1775), section “1671”, fls. 31–33. The EIC forbade opium trade in its vessels in 1771 (fl. 37).
7. G/12/11, fl. 125.
8. G/12/11, fls. 132–134. In 1782 and also six years after, the EIC defined the powers of the supercargoes over the British independent traders and their ships in China (fls. 155–157, and G/12/19, fl. 155).
9. G/12/77, fl. 82.
10. G/12/65, fl. 59.
11. R/10/11, fl. 100.
13. R/10/11, fls. 88–90, my emphasis.
14. On the two British failed attempts to occupy Macau in 1802 and 1808, see Joaquim Martins de Carvalho, A Nossa Alliada!, 1883, pp. 40–63; AHU,


17. R/10/10, part 2, fl. 193; R/10/11, 1780–1781, part 2, fls. 193–194; R/10/14, fls. 31, 193–194. In 1785 the instructions from London to the Canton Committee forbade the transportation of slaves in EIC vessels (G/12/79, part 2, fls. 59–60).

18. R/10/11, fls. 118–121; G/12/19, fls. 231–252.

19. R/10/11, fls. 106–107, text repeated in other letters (fls. 113–114, 159–160; G/12/73, fls. 58–69, 104). See also G/12/19, fls. 121–150. The letter stated that Macau, although under the power of Goa, really depended on the good will of the Chinese, and so Lisbon, ashamed of the situation, preferred to forget the enclave, ignoring many of its issues (fl. 108). In 1797, Daniel Paine, returning to London from Sydney, visited Macau and criticised the Portuguese, “a despicable set of beings”, for obeying the Mandarinate and for making the supercargoes’ lives harder (“Diary as Kept in a Voyage to Port Jackson, New South Wales, a Short Residence on that Settlement, and Passage to China”, fl. 27).


21. R/10/12, fl. 23; G/12/73, fl. 36.


23. R/10/18, fl. 38.

24. G/12/19, fl. 277.

25. António M. Martins do Vale, Os Portugueses em Macau, p. 56.


27. R/10/15, fls. 51–53, 173–175, 218, 234–237; G/12/82, part 3, fls. 5, 139–141; and G/12/84, fls. 1, 31–85.

28. R/10/15, fl. 31.

29. R/10/15, fl. 35.

30. R/10/15, fl. 37.

32. R/10/15, fls. 34 and 38.
33. R/10/15, fl. 38.
34. G/12/86, fls. 38–41, 109–110, 276.
35. G/12/84, fl. 106.
37. G/12/84, fl. 60.
38. G/12/86, fl. 41.
39. G/12/86, fl. 15.
41. Samuel Shaw, *The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, the First American Consul at Canton*, 1968, p. 239.
42. Samuel Shaw, *The Journals*, p. 240; and G/12/86, fl. 16.
45. G/12/86, fl. 18.
47. G/12/86, fl. 21.
49. G/12/88, fl. 67.
51. In 1747–1748 a British traveller also described the city as almost deserted and no longer under Portuguese rule, being governed by the Chinese (Anonymous, *A Voyage to the East Indies in 1747 and 1748*, 1762, p. 197), an image that suited the British and that was echoed in English literature, namely in Daniel Defoe’s novel *The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe*, 1969, p. 368: “Macau, a town once in possession of the Portuguese, and where still a great many European families resided”.
52. G/12/19, fls. 209–211; and Morse, *The Chronicles*, vol. 2, p. 68.
53. AHU, *Macau*, box 11, doc. 25, and box 8, doc. 8 (1775).
54. G/12/86, fl. 11.
Chapter 11  The importance of Macau for the British China trade

1.  G/12/77, fl. 88: “We are concerned to observe the differences which have subsisted between the Honourable Company’s Supra cargoes and the Portuguese Government at Macau. As a good understanding between you, is so material to the success of the Company’s Concerns in China, and so necessary to your own ease, and welfare, we have transmitted copies of the papers which we received from you to our resident in Goa, with directions to lay them before the Governor General of that place for the interposition of his controlling power to secure a proper attention to your privileges and to bring about a perfect reconciliation between you”.

2.  Thomas Gilbert, Voyage from New South Wales to Canton, in the Year 1788, 1789, p. 81.


5.  Jin Guoping and Wu Zhiliang (eds.), Correspondência Oficial, vol. 4, doc. 38, p. 69; see also docs. 30, 39, 43.

6.  R/10/6, fls. 163–165v.

7.  AHU, Macau, box 7, docs. 17, 27–28.


11.  G/12/84, fl. 107 (1787).


13.  G/12/89, fl. 204.

14.  G/12/105, fls. 74, 116–117, 120; G/12/108, fl. 59; AHU, Macau, box 12, doc. 33.

15.  R/10/13, fl. 239; G/12/70, fl. 125.


17.  AHU, Macau, box 19, doc. 36.

18.  G/12/92, fl. 457, repeated on fls. 499–507.


20.  G/12/110, fl. 57.

Chapter 12  Lord Macartney’s embassy to China, 1792–1794


2. On the preparation of the first British embassy to China, the relations with the Portuguese in Beijing, and its stay in Macau, see R/10/20, fls. 63–78, 126–130, 248–265; G/12/11, fls. 8–9; G/12/20, fls. 20–34v, 40–217v; G/12/91; G/12/92; G/12/93, fls. 191–217, 240–252, 264–270, 287–290; G/12/112, fl. 4; Earl H. Pritchard, Britain and the China Trade, pp. 199–212; Alain Peyrefitte, Un Choc de Cultures; Nigel Cameron, Barbarians and Mandarins, 1993, pp. 288–316; and Jin Guoping and Wu Zhiliang (eds.), Correspondência Oficial, vol. 2, docs. 36, 41, 51.


4. G/12/18, fls. 55–79; G/12/20, fls. 17–39, 104–222, 551–569; G/12/90.

5. G/12/18, fls. 2, 108–124. In May of that same year the British trader David Scott informed the EIC that the Portuguese did not take any advantage out of Macau, which would be an important acquisition for the British in case they bought it from their old European allies (cf. Vincent T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire 1763–1793, vol. 2, 1964, p. 535).


8. The EIC wanted the ambassador to convince the emperor to grant them an island in the Pearl River delta where they would establish their factory, “in imitation of the settlement enjoyed by the Portuguese at Macau” (G/12/20, fl. 355).

9. G/12/11, fls. 160–188.

10. G/12/20, fl. 369v.


12. Before the embassy arrived in Macau news about the diplomatic mission reached the enclave through Portuguese ships coming from Bengal (R/10/20, fl. 116).

13. Sir George Staunton, An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China, vol. 2, 1798, pp. 384–390, describes the embassy’s stay in Macau, the enclave’s location, government, defences, religions, and its wealth, once produced by trade and still visible in the architecture. Other descriptions of the embassy, like the ones written by Aeneas Anderson, Samuel Holmes, John Barrow, and Sir Henry Ellis, arouse the curiosity of the British regarding China. The mission is also a scientific exploratory voyage, and many engravings of
China were produced, published and sold by artists such as Thomas Hickey and William Alexander.


17. Aeneas Anderson, *A Narrative*, pp. 389–392, describes the ambassador’s arrival, his visit to the governor of Macau’s home, his stay at the Casa Garden, Macau’s geographical location and the city in general, the EIC buildings, as well as the forts, and the “papists”, and Chinese local administration bodies, correcting imprecisions of previous authors, including the fact that Macau is not an island, but a peninsula [see Daniel Paine, “Diary”, fl. 25v (1797), and Richard Walter, *A Voyage*, p. 465].

18. James Drummond was born in 1767 and went out to Canton in the EIC’s service at an early age. He became president of the Select Committee in 1802.

19. On the failure of the embassy, see AHU, *Macau*, box 20, doc. 2, which describes the voyage from London and states “that the Embassy accomplished nothing” [fl. 2; see box 42, doc. 7, box 43, doc. 27, and BA, *Ms. Av.* 54-XIII-7, n. 4].

20. In 1845, Reverend George Newham Wright, bishop of Cloyne, described Macau in a similar way: "So slight is Portuguese tenure or little at Macau, that the Chinese maintain here, in neighbourship with this despised race of foreigner, one of the most remarkable, most venerated, and really gracefull buildings in the empire, dedicated to the worship of Fo. [...] Macau occupies a position rather of beauty than strength" (*China Illustrated*, 1845, vol. 1, p. 66, and vol. 2, p. 27).


22. To request a piece of land to trade and afterwards conquer the whole country or kingdom/colony.

23. AHU, *Maço José das Torres*, VI, sheaf 540, fls. 1–3.

24. Souza e Faro governed Macau between 29 July 1790 and July 1793.

25. AHU, *Macau*, box 19, doc. 36, fl. 1 (22–12-1792). The British embassy’s aim is to request the emperor to grant the EIC some land on the island of Zhousan and in Canton, as well as the abolition or reduction of taxes paid by the British between Macau and Canton. These requests were denied by the emperor (Cranmer-Byng, “Lord Macartney’s Embassy to Peking in 1793. From Official Chinese Documents”, *Journal of Oriental Studies*, vol. 4, nn. 1–2, 1957–1958, p. 173).
26. AHU, Macau, box 32, doc. 39.

27. John Barrow, *Travels in China*, pp. 18–19. I used this work’s second edition, rather than the first edition published in 1804, in order to use the comments about Macau added in 1806 which reveal the attitudes and the intentions (already filtered) of the British regarding their military occupation of Macau in 1802.

28. In 1798 Great Britain, at war with France, planned occupations of strategic locations such as the Cape of Good Hope, Goa, and Macau, but the governor of Goa rejected the military support offered by the British (see A. da Silva Rego, “Os Ingleses em Goa. 1799–1813”, *Estudos Políticos e Sociais*, vol. 3, n. 1, 1965, pp. 23–48).

29. AHU, Macau, box 22, doc. 39, fl. 1: in January 1802 the governor of Goa, Veiga Cabral, orders Macau to accept the British military help: “as a consequence of the strong Alliance which fortunately subsists between our Majesty and the British one, so it is indispensable to protect all Portuguese possessions in Asia against the French enemy of both nations” (see the letter written by Captain Gerald Osborn, who, in 1802, warned the Macau Government that the French were preparing to take the city and offered military support).

30. See the warning sent by the Portuguese to the Chinese authorities about the British behaviour in India in AHU, Maço José das Torres, VI, sheaf n. 540, fls. 1–3.


33. This accusation was repeated in 1809 by viceroy Han Feng, who praised the peaceful Portuguese and mentioned the despise that the British showed towards the residents and the authorities of Macau [“Memorial de Han Feng”, in António Vasconcelos de Saldanha and Jin Guoping (eds.), *Para a Vista do Imperador*, pp. 33–39].

34. António Vasconcelos de Saldanha and Jin Guoping (eds.), *Correspondência Oficial*, p. 30. These ideas are repeated in “Lu Kun’s Memorial” (1835) [António Vasconcelos de Saldanha and Jin Guoping (eds.), *Para a Vista do Imperador*, pp. 62–65, 67–68]; which states, on page 58: “The barbarians from several nations who reside there [Macau] are obedient and respect the law. Only the British barbarians are astute and arrogant”.


36. “Lu Kun’s Memorial” (1835), p. 68, describes the Chinese strategy regarding the defence of the coast with the help of the Portuguese: “by giving the Macau barbarians what they want, we please them, controlling the British barbarians and demanding respect from them; that is the yiyizhiyi policy” [using barbarians against barbarians].
37. The British Ultimatum (11–01–1890) was an ultimatum by the British government delivered to Portugal, forcing the retreat of Portuguese troops in the area between the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, a territory claimed by Portugal and included in its Pink Map, which clashed with British aspirations to build a Cape to Cairo railway to link its colonies from the North to the South of Africa (see Maria Teresa Pinto Coelho, Apocalipse e Regeneração. O Ultimatum e a Mitologia da Pátria na Literatura Finisecular, 1996).

38. José de Arriaga, A Inglaterra, Portugal e as Suas Colónias, 1882, p. 69, and Joaquim Martins de Carvalho, A Nossa Aliada!, p. 19.


40. Gomes Freire d’Andrade, A Dominação Inglesa em Portugal: O Que É e de que nos Tem Servido a Aliança da Inglaterra, 1883, pp. 140–141, 144, 206.

41. Staunton writes “Considerations upon the China Trade” (1813) and meets the viceroy of Canton before the second British embassy to China (G/12/20, fls. 444–488). On the second embassy, see G/12/196; G/12/197; G/12/198; Jin Guoping and Wu Zhiliang (eds.), Correspondência Oficial, vol. 5, docs. 158–160, 161, 165–166; AHU, Macau, box 40, docs. 20, 38; box 41, doc. 13; box 42, docs. 7, 9–10; and box 43, doc. 27.

42. On Macau’s neutral position during the Opium War, see Alfredo Gomes Dias, Macau e a I Guerra do Ópio, 1993; and Sob o Signo da Transição: Macau no Século XIX, 1998.


Conclusion


3. Guia Lighthouse (1865), the oldest Western lighthouse on the China coast.


8. Expression used by Michie, *The English Man in China during the Victorian Era*, p. 291, referring to Macau, which he also describes as “the quiet old city” (pp. 295, 291–92) when presenting the strategic importance of the city for the British: “Other competitors also began to appear and to assert their right to participate in the trade of the Far East, and Macau became the hostelry for merchants of all nations [...]. Chief among these guests were the Dutch and English East India Companies, both of which maintained establishments at Macau for some two hundred years. The English Company had made use of Macau anchorage first under a treaty with the viceroy of Goa, and subsequently under Cromwell’s treaty with the Portuguese Government in 1654, which permitted English ships to enter all the
ports in the Portugueses Indies. Before the close of the seventeenth century ships were despatched direct from England to Macau.”


10. Several Histories of Hong Kong (E. J. Eitel, Europe in China, pp. 1–8) deal with the British use of Macau until 1841, a period that has been seen as the “prelude” to the British colony (Austin Coates, Prelude to Hong Kong: Macau and the British, 1966).

11. Several Chinese sources mention the exodus of many Anglophone traders and firms from Macau to Hong Kong, a phenomenon that impoverished the economical and international status of the Sino-Portuguese enclave [“Qi Ying’s Memorial” (18450, “Yi Xin’s Memorial” (1868), and “Zhang Zhidong’s Memorial” (1887), in António Vasconcelos de Saldanha and Jin Guoping (eds.), Para a Vista do Imperador, pp. 96–97, 130 and 142, respectively].

12. Expression used by the Macau Senate in the chop sent to the Mandarinate in 1809 [Jin Guoping and Wu Zhiliang (eds.), Correspondência Oficial, vol. 4, doc. 122, p. 247].
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