The Asian Modern
Culture, Capitalist Development, Singapore

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“At first glance, Square Word Calligraphy appears to be nothing more unusual than Chinese characters, but in fact it is a new way of rendering English words in the format of a square so they resemble Chinese characters. Chinese viewers expect to be able to read Square Word Calligraphy but cannot. Western viewers, however are surprised to find they can read it. Delight erupts when meaning is unexpectedly revealed.”

— Britta Erickson, The Art of Xu Bing
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Introduction

What does the Asian modern of a ‘globalising East Asia’ — a phrase now both clichéd and yet still resonant — look like? In the discourses that have emerged over the past two decades, East Asia has become increasingly viewed as industrial, capitalist and urban — and committed to frenetic development. All the three elements mentioned contribute to what is almost a mantra to be intoned by those who wish to represent East Asian cultural dimensions. In 1999, the Paris-based, mainland Chinese curator Hou Hanru co-curated with Hans-Ulrich Obrist the touring arts-exhibition extravaganza that started in London’s Hayward Gallery called ‘Cities on the Move: Urban Chaos and Global Change — East Asian Art, Architecture and Films Now’. They proclaimed that:

A kind of mixture of liberal Capitalist [sic] market economy and Asian, post-totalitarian social control is being established as a new social order [in industrial-capitalist East Asia]. Culture, in such a context, is by nature hybrid, impure and contradictory. Accordingly, the new architectures and urban environment [sic] are being renovated and transformed into a sort of ‘Theme Park’ oriented cityscape. … [T]his [urban modernity] incarnates perfectly the image of the post-colonial and post-totalitarian modernization in the region: the impulsive and almost fanatical pursuit of economic and monetary power becomes the ultimate goal of development.¹

This type of breathless prose, proclaiming the latest version of the new — now available in East Asia — with a vocabulary drawn from postcolonial theory of the 1980s and postmodern and globalisation cultural theory of the 1990s, along with a hint of Asian one-upsman, though, is not always well received, or is
received ambivalently. The revival of aspects of postwar ‘modernisation’, a term that seemed superseded but is now updated to include the information industry and the warm reception of the globalised free market in former Third World regions, surprises cultural critic Fredric Jameson: ‘[Modernity] is in fact back in business all over the world, and virtually inescapable in political discussion from Latin America to China, not to mention the former Second World itself.’

The ‘developmental’ city-state of Singapore in many respects has contributed towards the now-established image of an Asian modern urban formation in which, it has become almost predictable to say, East meets West, and in which centre and periphery, old and new, are conjoined. Looking at one representative critical response to Singapore allows us to ponder why the East Asian modern could be perceived as an inauthentic modernity, or perhaps as a distorted form of modernity.

The year 1993 is a good place to start, for it was the year the World Bank released its report on the Little Tigers’ economic development, The East Asian Miracle. It was thus a year when Asian triumphalism seemed at least implicitly validated by that major international organisation. A Time article of that year on Singapore captures the image of success the People’s Action Party (PAP), which has ruled the city-state since 1959, wants for the country. The writer, though, suggests that Singapore’s Asian modern is a trifle sterile, that it is an inauthentic capitalist society. It begins by quoting Francis Fukuyama: ‘the “soft authoritarianism” of countries like Singapore “is the one potential competitor to Western liberal democracy, and its strength and legitimacy is growing daily”’. Significant (if backhanded) praise from the 1990s high-profile champion of the teleology of progress and liberty based on European Enlightenment thought — an intellectual heritage, as we will see, which the first-generation PAP leaders adapted for their own use. Singapore’s ‘legitimacy’, it is suggested, come from its technicist, narrow and therefore distorted understanding of modernisation: ‘Singapore Inc.’ is ‘the world’s busiest container port, the third largest oil-refining center, the major exporter of computer disk drives’, and ‘has attracted some 3,000 foreign companies with generous tax breaks, ultramodern telecommunications, an efficient airport, and tame labor unions’ (36–37). Despite such achievements, full universal progress and a complete modernity have not arrived in the city-state.

The photograph which straddles two pages of the article is apt, embodying as it does the writer’s physical description of Singapore as an inorganically evolved and thus incoherent urban space: ‘With low pollution, lush tropical greenery, a mix of modern skyscrapers and colonial-era buildings, the city resembles a clean and efficient theme park ...’ (36). The Padang — the city green with its playing fields — occupies the foreground of the photo and the Singapore Cricket Club the centre. On the right of the Padang (from back to front) are the
well-maintained Parliament, Supreme Court and City Hall buildings, present reminders of a former resplendent imperial authority now passed on to local people. Behind Parliament House and the Victoria Concert Hall (until 1979 the Victoria Memorial Hall) — in front of which stands a statue of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, harbinger of colonial modernity, advocate of free trade and the official English founder of Asian Singapore — lies the Singapore River, another reminder of the imperial commercial past: Singapore as entrepôt.

At the back of the photo is the central business district, with its skyscrapers — one of which is designed by the modernist, Chinese-American architect, I. M. Pei. It has been argued that out of an older, English-inspired commercial modernity has risen ‘the rebirth of the sort of interstitial centres characteristic of world trade in the Middle Ages. City states like Hong Kong and Singapore revive, extraterritorial “industrial zones” multiply inside technically sovereign nation-states like Hanseatic Steelyards ...’.  

*Time*’s critical transnational picture of modernity is in certain respects actually, though naturally more positively, enshrined in official representations of Singapore’s identity. The Ministry of Culture’s *Singapore 1984* yearbook is a good example of such representations. As ‘authentic’ Asian identities (apparently) have not dissipated (despite steady, post-independence socio-cultural engineering by the state), there is a cosmopolitanism to Singapore national identity: ‘the people have gradually acquired a distinct identity as Singaporeans while retaining their traditional cultures and lifestyles’. The religious incarnations of the people are even more complex: Chinese (either vernacular-, Mandarin- or English-speaking) who are Buddhist, Taoist or Christian, Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Zoroastrians, not to mention Malay-Muslims, ‘exist side by side under the protection of the Constitution of the Republic’.  

The multi-ethnic citizenry are a key reason for the PAP’s deracinated and deculturated version of modernity: this multicultural reality made it difficult to erect a clear-cut national culture. Being unable to adopt the more common ‘assumed isomorphism of space, place, and culture’, which often results in problems for those who may inhabit the borders of national boundaries, the PAP decided to make Singapore all ‘border’, as it were. It is true, as cultural anthropologist Akhil Gupta suggests, that: ‘The [postcolonial-nationalist] recognition that different ethnic groups, … communities and religions each have their own role to play in the national project undermines their difference at the same time that it homogenizes and incorporates them.’ However, in Singapore, this homogenising by the state is complicated by the fact that ‘ethnicity’ is a category which is harder to impose in a place composed of people each with their ‘own’ country — for example, Chinese, China; various Indians, India, Sri Lanka. The endgame of marshalling and defusing national differences is the
creation of a globally oriented community which will be able to transcend the purely national even while the modern nation-state category is complicatedly sustained for the purpose of developing the island as a whole.

The technicist orientation of Singapore hails from its history; it is a smaller-scale, Asianised version of the British Whigs’ ‘Our Island Story’, as the opening paragraph of the section marked ‘History’ in the yearbook infers:

The story of Singapore as a commercial centre began with its founding in 1819. It grew increasingly important from the 1860s with the coming of the steamship and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Singapore became the entrepôt centre of the region, a role enhanced by the development of the tin and rubber industries in the states of the Malay Peninsula (19).

The imperial past is not necessarily debasing, for it has led to the present export-oriented, industrial-capitalist developments. As for pre-colonial history and origins, on the whole ‘[l]ittle is known of the early history of Singapore’ (19).

The most space is devoted to Singapore’s struggle for self-rule (gained in 1959), the triumph over communism, the merger with Malaysia (1963) and the subsequent separation (1965). Details are given of the setting up of the powerful Economic Development Board and the first industrial estate in 1959, and of the inter-ethnic riots between Malays and Chinese in 1964. The history concludes with the 1970s, when ‘the thrust in economic strategy was to attract industries needing higher skills and to develop Singapore as a financial centre and as a regional centre for brain services’ (28). While there is validity to the claim that colonial history is essential to understanding the present urban-modern condition, the city-state is probably distinct among postcolonial societies in its valorisation of the colonial past as part of the telos of progress and freedom that results in the not-quite-democratic and sterile cultural inauthenticity ascribed to the island. Emancipation arrived — but not quite in a full-fledged manner.

Development therefore has resulted in a modern Anglo-Asian city-state that doesn’t seem quite part of Southeast Asia, though it certainly is not part of the advanced part of the West its political leadership admires. During the Cold War, Singapore was — and still remains — the most pro-West entity in the region. Benedict Anderson has acerbically described the city-state’s Southeast Asian status thus: ‘There was … the anomaly of the municipality of Singapore: formally multi-ethnic or multi-racial, but in effect a third Chinese national possibility, under the interminable regime of Lee Kuan-yew [sic] and his henchmen.’ Anderson’s annoyance centres on the political regime of the first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew: ‘Lee first became Chief Minister in 1957, thanks to the support of the then powerful organized Left[, who were then later suppressed].’
This sort of ambivalence towards the PAP government’s not-really-democratic and not-quite-authentic Asian modern by both the left and liberals in the West occurs with some regularity and actually reveals the complex if subordinate role that the city-state has played in the advancement of capitalism in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, it is a response to the strategies undertaken to become thoroughly modern, strategies in which socio-cultural engineering and selected parts of the West are used to create a ‘pragmatic’ Asian modern. Using Singapore as an indicative instance, this book concerns itself with the Asian modern’s relation to the advanced West and the links between them that are simultaneously affirmed, denied, sublimated and (mis-)recognised.

A ‘Revealing Distortion’

…the notion of an authentic culture as an autonomous internally coherent universe is no longer sustainable [in either the First or the Third Worlds,] except perhaps as a ‘useful fiction’ or as a revealing distortion.

Renato Rosaldo, Culture and Truth (1989)\textsuperscript{16}

The earlier economic development of Singapore had been a later part of the beginning of the postcolonial age on midnight, 14 August 1947, during which postcoloniality led to supposedly sovereign states under the industrial-capitalist world order. The PAP’s early vision of the modern and commitment to modernisation were part and parcel of a larger experience of decolonisation. The Second World modernity of the communist bloc did not appeal to Lee Kuan Yew and his co-leaders, but the call of First World modernity did.

The city-state specifically comes into its own during the ‘second epoch’ in the genealogy of postcolonial states, as the anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff describe it, from perhaps the 1980s onwards. This epoch has a more fluid, market-driven world coming about, one in which the state was held to be somewhat in crisis against supranational forces, and in which ‘liberty’ came to mean the right to assert ‘culture’ in the form of identities, subjectivities, ethnic differences and even localities.\textsuperscript{17} The city-state moved on from a Nehruvian commitment to industrial and technological modernity to the 1980s discourse on a New Asianism and Asian modernity inspired by the ‘unique Japan’ hypothesis on modernisation, and thus by the enormous success of ‘Japan as Number One’.\textsuperscript{18} Singapore’s ‘Asian values’ period of state formation, marked by a culturalist orientation that was a clear departure from the technicist 1960s–70s, was part of this second epoch of the post-Second World War ‘life’ of capital. Singapore thus participates in the 1980s–90s story of a burgeoning East Asian capitalism, which will then be the central period the book examines. These two
decades also set the stage for the re-emergence of the People’s Republic of China onto the regional and world stages.

The island, in effect, is a national project taking place in an offshore economy, and a particular formation integral to the free-trade regime. While small, it displays the tensions within and the cultural (il)logic(ality) of the present globalising modernity. Its smallness in fact offers a ‘test-tube’ intensity by which to consider the problematic of presumed non-Western or alternative modernities.

What bothers a progressive critic like Benedict Anderson, one suspects, is the sort of quasi-authoritarian, petit-bourgeois and sometimes smug and priggish modernity that smoothed the path to economic success. The city-state stands for a very ordered, capitalist society that seems to have been rewarded, despite its repressive impulses. From this viewpoint, Singapore seems a distortion of the models of socio-economic development that it inherited from its British rulers, regardless of whether one prefers the social-democratic or the liberal variety. The ‘new’ model has come to stand for a dynamic and even iconic, if bland, multicultural utopianism adapted from and yet still dependent upon the West, but one in which both democratic impulses and cultural difference and historico-racialist ‘irrationalities’ were suppressed, homogenised or sanitised in the name of industrial-capitalist modernity’s pure truths.

In 1963, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz noted that ‘peoples of the new states are simultaneously animated by two powerful, thoroughly interdependent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives — ... a search for an identity ... [and] a demand for progress’. Singapore’s statist Asian modern by and large excluded — or suppressed — primordial sentiments and popular culture (folklore, ethnic cultures and traditions) from the nation-building process, and instead focused on making industrial-capitalist modernity the metanarrative that would frame Singapore’s national identity.

For some observers, the city-state’s modernity seems obvious: it represents a form of capitalism that, because it has landed on Asian soil, has run amok. Singapore is a whole society subjugated to the needs of capital. What happened to the other aspects of modern life such as literature, music and the visual arts, the achievements that we need to be cultured in the modern world, in fact of what we need to be deeply modern? Why did the PAP regime not value the high symbolic and aesthetic goods that represented one major part of the spectrum of human autonomy? (In 1968 Lee Kuan Yew, while addressing an audience at the then-University of Singapore, famously remarked: ‘Poetry is a luxury we cannot afford.’) The modernisation process does not diminish or suppress the role of the symbolic market beyond a degree (take, for instance, the romantic revolt against a narrow socio-economic modernisation in the very homeland of the Industrial Revolution).
The aesthetic home of the PAP state’s utopian impulses was not painting or literature — which cannot feed mouths — but building, the art we live in and do business in. Architecture in the form of extensive modernist public housing and a revamped downtown that reached towards the sky was the social art form that nobody could escape, and was needed if the new citizens of the city-state were to live well, materially. It was the people’s ethnic and traditional cultures that needed watching over — and the art of architecture was useful in the wish to rationally homogenise the nation.

If, as Néstor García Canclini has argued, that ‘the most-reiterated hypothesis in the literature on Latin American modernity … [is that they] have had an exuberant modernism with a deficient modernization’, then Singapore represents the near-opposite case, an exuberant socio-economic modernisation with a deficient cultural modernism — with, in fact, a deficient idea of ‘culture’, taken broadly. ‘Cultural policy’ in the island did not refer to aesthetic or high-cultural policies until 1980 or so.

Despite the apparent distortions of Western modernity, some would say the city-state still follows the simple determinations of capital. If so, would Singapore’s modernity then be a sort of twisted or discrepant extension, or an attempt at mimesis gone awry? Or perhaps — if one is take the claims seriously of both detractors and supporters of this position in both East Asia and the advanced industrial West — this distortion is the result of local/regional (that is, inherently Asian rather than indigenised or Asianised) capitalisms being shaped by ‘Asian’ cultures. In the process, supposedly alternative modernities — if not completely Other to Western modernities then significantly different from them — based on indigenous value systems, could be conceived as starting to challenge Western capitalism and worldwide US cultural hegemony, at least before the 1997 Asian economic crisis was triggered by the devaluation of the Thai baht.

In general, such views as discussed above on Singapore’s Asian modern suggesting that the city-state, along with the other Tiger and emerging Southeast Asian economies in the 1980s–90s asserting their own supposed brand of Asian modernities, whether claimed to be Confucian or Islamic, represent a distorted modernity in effect are a ‘useful fiction’ (to use Renato Rosaldo’s words from this section’s epigraph) that covers up or disavows the fact that capitalism is one phenomenon. At the same time, we also must also recognise that this ‘one-ness’ does not imply that capitalist modernity will be the same everywhere: it is neither monolithic nor unified.

We know capitalism is not quite the same even to itself in this (impossibly hypostasised) entity which we call the West. Given this, Singapore’s apparently distorted reflection of the selected parts of the Anglo-American West ‘inside’ it, then can be seen as a ‘revealing distortion’, to quote Rosaldo again, that
only iterates the fact that the hegemonic and metropolitan Euro-American powers can always define for the non-Western ‘Them’ what is supposed to be incoherent. Such differences, though, between ‘Western’ and ‘Asian’ capitalisms cannot be characterised as predominantly ‘ideological’, as something more than and different from the disagreements of stronger and weaker economic areas insisting on the importance of their disagreements. In the post-Cold War world of the 1980s–90s, the question that separated the established economic zones from the emergent economies was the question of attitudes towards cultural difference in the construction of capitalist practices: the established powers wanted to eliminate difference, and some emerging Asian economies thought it to their advantage to insist on it. The ‘conflict’ of those two decades, then, was at best a conflict over whether Asian capitalist societies could rise up in the hierarchy of capitalist societies. This is a conflict continued by China in the new century, as its politico-economic presence grows in East Asia.

**Culture and the Asian Modern**

I will argue that it is the *mixed attitudes* towards Singapore by those outside it, and, even more significantly, also the attitudes of those within the city-state towards the oftentimes hidden or unrecognised presence of the Anglo-American West, that are more telling of the Singapore’s developmental strategies. Its modernity contains complicated levels of assertion, recognition and misrecognition regarding the island-state’s relation to the West and to the immediate region and East Asia. This offshore hub of transnational cultural-capitalist flows is fashioned by the city-state’s leaders and yet is *already* fashioned by the capitalist powers.

The book’s first hypothesis is that during the 1960s, a period of political, ethnic and economic instability within and without the city-state, the PAP regime ‘used’ parts of the British (and later the American) West — taken as a neutral or indeed universal culture, even as culture was downplayed on the island — as the source of its postcolonial identity and state formation.

The second hypothesis follows from the first. This version of the West was used to *deteriorialise* — to further the loss of culture in relation to social and geographical territory — the various immigrant and local cultures as the means to create a society ready for the jump to export-oriented industrialisation. Such deterritorialisation was facilitated by the fact that the Chinese and Indian sections of the population, being immigrant stock, were already partially deterritorialised. An inconsistency in the construction of Western nationalism, connected as it was with the essentialising function of history in relation to primordial or historical identities for national identity, was a flaw in the Western politico-cultural legacy that the PAP thought avoidable.
However, capitalism itself is a cultural form, and for it to be embedded in ways amenable to multinational companies, more proletarians had to be formed out of farmers in the kampongs (Malay: villages), consumerism encouraged, and so forth. The enforced rationalising modernity was in keeping with the 1960s universalist teleological thinking, and the cultural logic of capital that underlay modernisation theory. One key policy initiative was a tremendous emphasis on the teaching of the English language — taught as a sort of technical language to make it culturally neutral — so as to link the new nation with the international economy. ‘Culture’, under the PAP, was (and is) conceived of as a residual category to be revamped instrumentally as part of the radical reconstruction of subjectivity itself for the economy. This policy perspective, not unexpectedly, entailed the assumption that the economy is not cultural.

As the city-state gained in confidence and came into a more market-driven period of international capitalist development, there was an actual (if also simultaneously cynical) attempt at reterritorialising the city-state; this was the ‘Asian’ and ‘Confucian’ values period of the city-state’s cultural and state formation from the 1980s to the mid-1990s. The problem here was the supposedly ‘natural’ relation of Singapore to a vague, pan-Asian ‘territory’, or, just as problematically, the non-physical and symbolic relation of Southeast Asian Singapore (even if primarily Sinic) to a Confucian identity. The idea of a Greater or a Cultural China, shored up by the then extremely influential work of philosopher Tu Wei-ming, floated around in the 1980s to the early 1990s.27 The linking of city-state to this imagined and inflated cultural entity did nothing to make non-Chinese Singaporeans feel comfortable. This phase represented an ongoing collusion with global capital that was also a resistance: it was yet another ‘space-making’ device that allowed the city-state to function more ably within the Euro-American hegemonic confines of global capitalism.28

Singapore in the 1980s importantly illustrates that the opportunities for national economies to participate in the emerging global economy may lead to the need to focus on alternative identity and political legitimacy in which the earlier commitment to cultural homogenisation as an inevitable concomitant of modernisation or industrialisation may be questioned. The 1980s–90s occupies the core of the book as it is when the conceptualisation of alternative Asian modernities becomes possible in Singapore and elsewhere in East Asia.

While ‘culture’ had returned in an odd official way, earlier rationalising imperatives had not disappeared. However, culture was now seen to be able to support economic development, unlike the 1960–70s, when ethnic or traditional cultures seemed retrograde. The re-ethnicising of the city-state and its insertion into the region ‘Asia’ through the Asian values discourse in reality reinforced a presumption of capitalism’s universal status by allowing the national state greater individual space to manoeuvre. Singapore’s Asian modern thus was fashioned
as much by the Anglo-American West, even as it attempted to manipulate that West for its own survival process. The oppositional quality of the discourse gave Singapore and all who used it an agenda to protect the more contentious practices (e.g., a less-democratic polity; suppressed trade union activities) that helped maintain their position within global capitalism. New opportunities in China from 1978 — as Deng Xiaoping instituted economic reforms — was another key reason for the PAP to stress the ‘Sinic’ qualities of New Asia’s capitalist identity; this was the romance of ‘network’ (guanxi) capitalism. Even high aesthetic culture was incorporated (admittedly slowly) as part of the state’s development agenda formally from 1989. While an Asian modernity was asserted, the state simultaneously supported a universal form of free-tradist and neo-liberal economics that became dominant after the USSR’s collapse. The point when Singapore transcended its Third World status in the 1980s was also when cultural distinctiveness was marshalled to sustain competitiveness.

However, in re-imag(in)ing Singapore, there also was an unexpected and significant authorisation of the arts (primarily in the theatre, but also in the visual arts and in film). The cultural production that resulted used this very authorisation to resist the government’s heavy-handed cultural planning. The results represent at least partial artistic relocalisations of life in the city (through a re-envisioning of daily life in the vast socialist-style public-housing estates) and in the older forms of culture (through the rethinking of the island’s multi-ethnic past), along with symbolic productions that were intercultural reterritorialisation of an ‘East Asia’, productions that countered the state’s version of East Asia. The contradictions in the formation of Singapore’s Asian modern, ironically yet fittingly, are expressed in the domains of aesthetic culture and its intersection with politics. The burst of high-cultural development in the face of a statist, petit-bourgeois philistinism indicates the point at which the culture of economy has turned upon itself and started to hollow out the plural cultural ‘reality’ that once was ‘Singapore’. This is the reason why the book examines both the culture of the state and the state of cultural production it helped foster, albeit accidentally, in return.

The artistic responses to remember and re-imagine ‘Asian’ identity in the face of the deliberate loss of cultural autochthony by the state is significant as they offer instances of what transpires when the attempt is made to make a small island-territory the tabula rasa upon which a ‘purer’ modernity could be erected. Political scientist Partha Chatterjee argues that the task for postcolonial societies is to trace in their mutually conditioned historicities the specific forms that have appeared in the domain defined by the hegemonic project of nationalist modernity and in the numerous fragmented resistances to that normalising project. But what if such non-nationally dominated cultural spaces are heavily weakened?
My final hypothesis is that Singapore is a case study of original authenticity being given up and of various versions of both the ‘West’ and ‘Asia’ being used to reterritorialise cultural space. It is clear that an authentic culture as an autonomous and internally coherent universe is no longer sustainable in either the advanced or the less-advanced worlds — except, perhaps, as a simple yardstick as to what possessing a modern culture truly means, with the implication that non-Western societies will never attain that standard.

The book is in two sections. The first looks at the deterritorialisation of local cultures, and how some artistic production attempted the ‘relocalisation’ of daily life in the city-state in the 1990s. The second section examines the attempt to reterritorialise Singapore in the name of ‘Asian values’, and the opportunities this offered for the artistic counter-reterritorialising of the country within the larger idea of East Asia. Both instances of non-statist cultural production do not function in the void: a symbiotic relationship to the state’s national-culturalist activity, one also in relation to the reality of the dominance of Western capital, is always present.

The first chapter examines some of the key terms and contextual concerns within East Asia that frame the book. The second and third chapters analyse the immediate postcolonial creation of a state that was not-quite-a-nation. The narrative that finally became dominant was a Whiggish telos of economic development.

The third chapter also considers what, retrospectively, might be thought of as the prelude to the 1980s discursive construction of ‘Asian values’. We should not take at face value the differentiation between ‘East’ and ‘West’; it would be better to think through the values raised in the discourse, such as freedom, individualism and collectivism. How can a state have an idea of collectivism, given the neo-liberal emphasis on the free market? The Asian values discourse was a proleptic attempt to reflect upon the relationship between polity, ongoing state formation and economic growth that would later surface in Tony Blair’s and Anthony Giddens’s Third Way discourse, which proclaimed that the re-fashioning of social democracy by market-driven means was possible. In reassessing its earlier commitment to a homogenising modernity, the logic for the PAP management of ethnicity became revamped, resulting in the ‘re-ethnicising’/‘re-Asianising’ and thus the reterritorialising of the city-state.

The fourth chapter examines both the state’s extensive modernist housing programme and decontextualised urbanism as a major component of its socio-cultural engineering and the reaction it produced in the arts and, more specifically, in 1990s independent film. Film made an embryonic re-entry as art form after its demise as an industry in the 1960s. Eric Khoo’s *Twelve Storeys* (1997), for instance, depicts the social dysfunctionality of the city-state’s less-‘globalised’ citizens living in public housing slabs. Such films examined the
problematic and bizarre aspects of non-élite life and deployed the use of both Mandarin-Chinese and the officially suppressed Hokkien-Chinese. These films are attempts to re-assert and, indeed, reinvent ‘locality’ amid a state-projected, deterritorialised and happy-clappy modernity.

The fifth chapter examines the modifications in how ethnicity was managed from the 1980s. The earlier general, if deterritorialising, commitment to the West as universal civilisation was replaced by an identititarian and reterritorialising discourse on Asian values and modernity. These changes indicate that states are capable of managing culture as an instrument to maintain economic competitiveness; such culturalist reterritorialisation stood for an actual change in local cultural values.

The next chapter studies how theatre has dealt with the gap between the older utopia of autonomous creation that cultural and artistic modernism stood for and the reality of the suppression of the symbolic realm in the city-state. Theatre was the most dynamic contemporary art form that burgeoned in the 1980s. Against the virtual impossibility of constructing a different order, the late playwright and public intellectual Kuo Pao Kun and intercultural director Ong Ken Sen worked to extend cultural memory in the face of a culturally fragmenting economic development by envisioning a fractured Singapore-Asian humanism that countered the state’s version of ‘Asia’.

Finally, the epilogue thinks through how the end of the Cold War and the 1997 economic crisis has problematised the existing disciplinary modernisation that had delivered economic success. The Singapore government has hastened economic deregulation and now desires more autonomy and ‘creativity’ from its citizenry, manifesting a contradictory wish for what has been called in the city-state as ‘managed change’. The actual experience of modernity in the city-state seems to have exceeded and is starting to dislocate the policies of its earlier modernisation. This is an ‘epilogue’ rather than a conclusion as the casting about for new directions implies that the end of the Cold War has not resulted in a post-historical world. Watch this space as the first decade of the twenty-first century comes to an end.

Singapore remains a humourless morality lesson as an economic success story, as a paternalistic-pragmatic modernity, and as a managed and generally benign multicultural society (even if now complicated by the events of 9 September 2001\textsuperscript{23}) that created a measure of respect for ethnic and religious differences. It notably increased equity in socio-economic opportunities. As a consequence of the elevation of petit-bourgeois values, it also became a ‘cultural desert’ known abroad as a land of shopping centres. Historical amnesia — the inevitable by-product of modernisation — is prominent and surpasses, one suspects, the level of dehistoricisation in developed Euro-American societies. In many ways, this radical experiment
in modernising a small Asian locality into a sort of hyper-petit-bourgeois modernity is unique. As with Japan, beneath the assertions of the ‘unique Japan’ hypothesis of modernisation, parts of the West have become parts of Singapore’s ‘Asian-ness’.

The deployment of the ‘modern’ should be contextualised within the once-commanding dream of what the modern world should undergo: endless renovation. It is now hard to think that anyone could believe that the slate could be wiped clean. While critics consider the PAP state ‘conservative’ or even ‘reactionary’ for its illiberal capitalism, the way the ‘modern’ was adapted might be better described as ‘radical’. And so — contradictorily, in strict ideological terms — there developed a city-state that strongly supported the free market outside its borders while planning and the consistent interference in the realm of the private became hallmarks of PAP rule. The state effectively married social democracy’s penchant for planning with the belief in the free market.

Singapore is indicative, if not representative, of identity concerns at the city-state level trying to function as a nation-state when placed under pressure to survive and then flourish under the conditions of a burgeoning global economy, and to develop a national culture able to mobilise society towards the developmental goal of becoming a First-World society. The very lack of representativeness — its small population and lack of territory — helped rather than hindered this objective, and Singapore can be seen as a contained laboratory test-case of one postcolonial Asian struggle to be modern and economically successful as the Euro-American West is thought to be modern.
Notes

Introduction


2. Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present (London: Verso, 2002), 7. As Jameson notes, modernisation was itself not an innocent term as originally used, ‘for it was an active propaganda word during the Cold War, and constituted the principle US contribution to its various Third World allies and clients and even to Europe itself during the period of the Marshall Plan’ (ibid., 229, note 5).

3. The pioneering work on the idea of the ‘developmental’ includes: Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). The most pertinent scholarship for my purpose, though, is Manuel Castell’s ‘Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head: A Comparative Analysis of the State, Economy and Society in the Asian Pacific Rim’, in States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim, ed. Richard P. Appelbaum and Jeffrey Henderson (London: Sage Publications, 1992). In Castell’s usage, the developmental state is one which conceives its purpose as that of ensuring economic development, usually meaning high rates of accumulation and industrialisation. This state ‘establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote sustained development, understanding by development the steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to the international economy’ (55). The political élite must gain ideological hegemony, so that the developmental project also becomes, in the Gramscian sense, hegemonic — a project which key players in the nation adhere voluntarily. The state, however, must enjoy relative autonomy from the major social actors.

5. Jay Branegan, ‘Is Singapore a Model for the West?’ *Time*, 18 January 1993, 36. All further page references will be given within brackets in the main text.

6. ‘Modernity’ and ‘modern’ are terms that of course have contrasting and layered meanings. The central focus will be to see how the set of relations between modernism (critical or experimental cultural and symbolic practices), modernisation (the socio-economic and industrial creation of modernity) and tradition (or, in the case of the book’s second chapter, also the primordial), are transformed in the way modernity is mapped onto Singapore. Cf. Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991): ‘Modernity, like all other quasi-totalities we want to prise off from the continuous flow of being, becomes elusive: we discover that the concept is fraught with ambiguity, while its referent is opaque at the core and frayed at the edges’ (4). I use the term ‘modernity’ here as Bauman does: ‘I call “modernity” a historical period that began in Western Europe with a series of profound social-structural and intellectual transformations of the seventeenth-century and achieved its maturity: (1) as a cultural project — with the growth of Enlightenment; (2) as a socially accomplished form of life — with the growth of industrial (capitalist, and later communist) society’ (4, note 1). I also draw upon Marshall Berman’s *All that Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (1982; New York: Penguin, 1988) and Jürgen Habermas’ *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987) for some of the central distinctions between modernity as an historical stage, modernisation and modernism, and also from empirical studies on the unexpected relation between cultural and socio-economic modernisation in the non-Western world, especially Latin America (Néstor García Canclini, *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*, trans. Christopher L. Chiappari and Silvia L. López [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995]).

7. On 6 September 1999, a new parliament building opened next to the old building, which has been converted to become a performing arts centre; the Supreme Court and City Hall buildings are now slated to be converted into a new Asian art gallery by perhaps 2010.

8. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 175. Official discourse has played up such an impression of Singapore. A Singapore journalist interviewed the then-arts minister, George Yeo, and reported the following on Singapore’s ‘civic life’: ‘Singapore was like Venice, an Italian city which had always seen itself as Italian, although its people spoke their own dialect and the population never grew beyond 200,000 .... Singapore, Brigadier-General Yeo said, was defined by the way its people maintained a sense of unity while celebrating diversity’ (Koh Buck Song, ‘Culture Goes Regional’, *Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition*, 20 March 1993, 13).

9. Now called the Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, or MICA for short.

10. Ministry of Culture, *Singapore 1984* (Singapore: Information Division, Ministry of Culture, 1984), 4, 7. All further page references will be given within brackets in the main text.


13. It is not just the official publications which announce Singapore as the very remarkable triumph or fulfilment of colonial modernity as conceived in the free trade era of English
imperial history, a triumph which the English could not possibly have expected. Here is Singapore historian Edwin Lee: ‘The leitmotiv of Singapore’s history is free trade. Free trade is, first of all, an idea thrust forth by the British Industrial Revolution ... The trader in pursuit of his proper objective is the exemplar of what life on earth is all about. This idea, nurtured in the mind of Sir Stamford Raffles, was translated into reality on a strategic island, Singapore, which he founded as the entrepôt for British trade in Southeast Asia. The idea, once put into effect, succeeded beyond all expectations’ (‘The Colonial Legacy’, in Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, ed. Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley [Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1990], 39).

14. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer: ‘We are wholly convinced — and therein lies our petitio principii — that social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought. Nevertheless, we believe that we have just as clearly recognized that the notion of this very way of thinking, no less than the actual historic forms — the social institutions — with which it is interwoven, already contains the seed of the reversal universally apparent today’ (Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming [New York: Herder, 1972], xiii).

15. Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World (London: Verso, 1998), 15. Two of the facts are wrong: Lee’s title was ‘prime minister’. ‘Chief minister’ was used only from 1955 to 59, when the colony gained internal self-rule. He became prime minister only in 1959. Anderson also does not note that, by the late 1950s, Lee was also London’s clear choice as a post-independence prime minister.


20. As early as 1956, in the colonial legislative assembly, Lee used the word ‘primordial’ in relation to the gut issues that fueled the educational and identity concerns of the various ethnic groups: ‘I have used the word “primordial” once and it brought a rebuke from the Hon. Mr. [G. A. P.] Sutherland [a nominated assemblyman], but that was perhaps he does not understand these [socially incendiary and complicated] things’ (Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates 1, 12 April 1956, column 1910).

21. Ten years later, Lee’s position had not changed much — and this following 1978 quotation in retrospect warns us what was to come with the Asian values discourse: ‘Literature and heritage or tradition are different altogether. What is important for pupils in not literature, but a philosophy of life ... a value system’ (cited in Shirley Geok-lin Lim, ‘The English-Language Writer in Singapore’, in Singaporean Literature in English: A Critical Reader, ed. Mohammad A. Quayum and Peter Wicks [Serdang: Universiti Putra Malaysia Press, 2002], 37). Lee was very public on the need for a larger value system during this period of the late 1970s–1980s (see ‘Lee: Need for Value System’, Straits Times [Singapore], 5 June 1978).


23. The PAP state’s national philistinism has been noted even by sympathetic observers such as the late Michael Leifer: ‘Singapore is primarily about the business of business with its denizens more interested and accomplished in the art of karaoke than in the arts per se. Indeed, it is worth heeding the comment made by in 1976 by the head of the Department of
Philosophy in the University of Singapore that the concept of a global city had a pretentious ring, and that Singapore was not a centre from which new frontiers of knowledge would emanate. It was founded to be a trading centre “which is what it remains to this day”’ (Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability [London: Routledge, 2000], 14).

24. García Canclini, Hybrid Cultures, 41.

25. Architect Tay Kheng Soon — a long-time and acute critic of the PAP government’s model of a deferential, pro-Western and bland modernity — claims that: ‘In the contest between [socio-economic] modernization and modernity [by which he refers to the project of fostering individuated and critical consciousness through the arts and other areas of symbolic creation] within the imperatives of [the emerging post-independence] political economy, the incipient modernity which sprouted in [colonial] Malaya was sadly truncated by the impossibility of managing ethnic imaginations without a strong referee. Ideas of the modern could not be consciously articulated but were lived through the vectors of language and ethnicity; and modernity being sequestered from consciousness was therefore ambivalent. But for a small strategic English-educated elite in Malaya, modernity could not be articulated at all. Thus, this group saw that a certain adherence to the principle of meritocracy applied to racial equality, fair play, the autonomy of reason, a critical spirit etc., could be made to work despite the passions of the times [in postwar Malaya and Singapore].’ The Chinese intelligentsia in Malaya and Singapore, Tay tells his readers, were starting to ‘develop an aesthetic of place in [their] growing output of works. … The tragedy is that [anti-communist] political events prevented the growth of this new sentiment and in the independence movement and post-independence ideological struggles for political dominance, the tragic fault lines were drawn in such a manner that a shared modernity was impossible’ (Tay Kheng Soon with Robbie B. H. Goh, ‘Reading the Southeast Asian City in the Context of Rapid Economic Growth’, in Theorizing the Southeast Asian City as Text, ed. Robbie B. H. Goh and Brenda S. A. Yeoh [Singapore: World Scientific, 2003], 21; 21–22).

Thus, there were incipient signs of cultural modernism on the island — but they had been mown down by the state by the late 1970s. (Also see William S. W. Lim, Asian New Urbanism [Singapore: Select Books, 1998].) I shall return to this issue in chapter 6.

26. It is possible to take the PAP state’s socio-cultural engineering itself as a particular critical symbolic act. This is the position taken by Singapore sociologist Kian-Woon Kwok and his co-author, Kee-Hong Low: ‘the opening chapter of Jacob Burkhartd’s The Civilization of Renaissance Italy (1958) is titled “The State as a Work of Art.” As rationalistic as the modernism of the Singapore state has been, it is also been culturally subversive, having the ambition of, on the one hand, working on the premise of a tabula rasa and, on the other hand, actively projecting the next necessary steps must be taken into a future that is already present’ (‘Cultural Policy and the City-State: Singapore and the “New Asian Renaissance”’, in Global Culture: Media, Arts, Policy, and Globalization, ed. Diana Crane, Nobuko Kawashima and Ken’ichi Kawasaki [New York: Routledge, 2002], 164–65).

Mini-Dragons (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). His work seemed to help generate a mini-publishing industry on the topic of East Asian and Confucian culture and modernity.

28. Or to put this another way, as anthropologist Aihwa Ong has: ‘In our desire to find definite breaks between ... the oppressive and the progressive, and the stable and the unstable, we sometimes overlook complicated accommodations, alliances, and creative tensions between the nation-state and mobile capital .... Attention to specific histories and geopolitical situations will reveal that such simple oppositions between transnational forces and the nation-state cannot be universally sustained’ (Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999], 16).

29. The 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights was one of the notable clashes between (the clichéd idea of) Western ‘individualism’ and (the equally clichéd idea of) Asian ‘collectivism’, as the UN Conference followed in the wake of the 1993 Bangkok Declaration signed by Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan and China. The central concern of this clash, as Jürgen Habermas describes it, was over ‘the [East Asian] political community [being] more traditionally integrated more by duties than by [Western-style] rights. The political ethic recognizes no individual rights, but only rights that are conferred on individuals.’ The real issue, however, Habermas feels, was about ‘the more or less “soft” authoritarianism that characterizes the dictatorships of developed nations. ... In reality, these [East Asian] governments do not defend individual rights at all, but rather a paternalistic care meant to allow them to restrict rights that in the West have been considered the most basic’ (The Postnational Constellation, trans. Max Pensky [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001], 123, 124–25).

30. Cf. Kwok and Low’s assertion regarding the role of the arts in the city-state: ‘But it is not the case that governments are the active purveyors and citizens the passive recipients of the effects of cultural policy. It is the spheres of the arts and social memory, in which such constructions [of the national body politic within a new globalised order] are being developed and contested by individuals — artists, cultural workers, intellectuals, citizens — that the tensions, dilemmas, and costs of modernity are explored and articulated’ (Cultural Policy, 165).


32. There were other related developments that year that complicated inter-ethnic relations. On 9 December 2001, the Singapore government arrested 15 men under the Internal Security Act, which allows detention without trial. The men were said to be members of the group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), some of whom had trained in al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan. They were apparently planning to attack the US and Israeli Embassies and British and Australian diplomatic buildings on the island. In August 2002, the city-state’s Internal Security Department arrested another 21 alleged members of the JI.

Chapter 1

1. For a series of broad critical views on the re-inventions of the cartographic and other identities in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1980s and the 1990s, with the rise of the East and Southeast Asian trading economies, see the essays in Arif Dirlik (ed.), What Is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).


7. Cf. Ian Buruma, “What Happened to the Asian Century?”, *New York Times*, 29 December 1999 <http://taiwansecurity.org/NYT/NYT-991229-Asian-Century.htm>. Buruma is rightly critical of the hubris that went into such claims to New Asia representing a new way to being modern, one in which democracy and individual rights would matter less in the face of ‘development rights’. However, the misfortunes of the emerging Southeast Asian economies of course is more than balanced by the increased economic presence of China, and some observers such as former Australian prime minister Paul Keating replace the Little Tigers, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand with China in their view of Asia — see Keating’s ‘The American Era is Over: The Asian Century is Dawning’, *The Age* (Melbourne), 16 October 2003 <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/10/15/1065917476292.html?from=storyrhs>. And so, the debate on the Rise of East Asia continues.


10. Coronil contends that ‘neoliberal globalization conjures up the image of an undifferentiated process without clearly demarcated geopolitical agents or target populations’ (TCG, 369). During the Asian economic crisis, when capital was fleeing Thailand after the baht was devalued in July 1997, it was hard of course to see who exactly ‘the geopolitical agents’ in the various financial institutions in the West who were doing this; but the International Monetary Fund, which subsequently entered into Indonesia and Thailand to demand restructuring in return for requested bailout loans, can hardly be considered an ‘undemarcated’ agent.


14. The ethnic composition of East and West Malaysia combined is approximately Malays (50 percent), who are largely Muslim; Chinese (23 percent); Indians (seven percent), largely Tamilians; indigenous people groups — e.g., Kadazan, Dusun, Iban (11 percent); and ‘Others’ (eight percent). Singapore’s ethnic composition is Chinese (78 percent); Malay (14 percent), also largely Muslim; Indian (seven percent), also largely Tamilians; and a category the state, like Malaysia, calls ‘Others’. It has been the question of the role of Malays and Malay culture in national life that led to what is called Separation in 1965.


19. Ibid., 261.

20. Ibid., 518.


22. In 1963, with the merger with British North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore into the Federation of Malaysia, Malaya became known as West Malaysia.


29. Dr. Mahathir stepped down as prime minister in December 2003, and was succeeded by Abdullah Badawi.

30. Cf. one journalistic European view of some nationalistic responses to the Petronas Centre: ‘The completion of Kuala Lumpur’s twin tower[s] ... is a development as humiliating as that suffered by the English cricket team on its annual rounds of self-abasement against the likes of Sri Lanka. Here, for once, is an authentic skyscraper outside America .... It is an act of economic and cultural humiliation [for the United States]’ (Deyan Sudjic, ‘Scaling the Heights of Human Madness’, Guardian Weekly, 10 March 1996, 23). Cesar Pelli, the architect behind the Twin Towers, and a reinventor of 1930s-style retro skyscrapers, not accidentally also was the designer of London’s tallest structure, the Canary Wharf, and
the World Financial Center in New York City. Even the important, neo-liberal magazine, the *Economist*, so much ideologically at one with transnational capitalism, was not certain how to regard Dr. Mahathir’s extravagant and ‘macho’ challenges. In 1996, a year before the crisis, Malaysia, along with Thailand and Indonesia, experienced slow export-oriented growth combined with ongoing current account deficits. Despite this situation, Malaysia did not seem likely to curb its deficit, given its drive for investment: ‘This is fine to a point .... But Dr. Mahathir’s plans go further. His monumental ambitions include a hydroelectric dam, a new administrative capital, the world’s tallest building and a “multi-media supercorridor” covering 750 square kilometres’ (‘South-East Asian Economies: States of Denial’, *Economist*, 10 August 1996, 57). The distaste at this postcolonial one-upsmanship is hidden under the self-righteous and seemingly disinterested rhetoric of financial rectitude. The Petronas Twin Towers were displaced by the opening of Taiwan’s Taipei 101 (*Taipei Yilingyi*) building in December 2004. From the ground to structural top, the Taipei 101 is 508 metres tall, beating Petronas’s 452 metres; arguably, the Taipei ‘triumph’ too is another version of postcolonial one-upsmanship.

31. Mahathir seems to share with Lee Kuan Yew — the latter is only a few years Mahathir’s senior — a paternalistic-masculinist, anti-imperial stance that is grounded no longer in the social-democratic language popular in the 1960s, but instead in the newer language of transnational capitalism. *Ecce Papa* in the brave, new transnational world.

32. See Anwar’s argument in *Time* that ‘Southeast Asian Muslims prefer to concentrate on the task of ensuring economic growth and eradicating poverty instead of amputating the limbs of thieves’ (Anwar Ibrahim, Viewpoint, *Time*, 12 September 1996, 24). The cover story for this issue is ‘The New Face of Islam: In Southeast Asia an Ancient Religion Eagerly Embraces the Modern World.’ Anwar later fell foul of Dr. Mahathir, and was sacked from the cabinet on 2 September 1998. He was charged for corruption and sodomy. In 1999, he was convicted on the former charge, and in 2000, on the latter. In 2004, the Federal Court overturned the sodomy conviction and Anwar was released from gaol, having completed his sentence for corruption, which had been reduced based on good behaviour.


34. Japanese reaction to the policy was mixed; see Lim Hua Sing, *Japan’s Role in ASEAN: Issues and Prospects* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1994), 1–26. Lim offers a detailed analysis of the general economic relationship between Japan and ASEAN from the 1980s to the book’s publication.


41. Shintaro Ishihara, ‘Oppressed by the West, Japan’s Return to Asia can Change Future’, *Straits Times* (Singapore), 21 January 1995, 32. In 1999, Ishihara ran on an independent platform and was elected governor of Tokyo.
42. The scholarship debating this position became quite profuse. A few examples are:
   - Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *The East Asia Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); and
44. Ibid., 92–101.
45. ‘PROTON’ stands for ‘Perusahaan Otomobil National’, or the National Automobile Industry. The fear of obsolescent cars was then at hand. On 3 November 1995, a joint venture agreement was signed in Paris between PROTON and Renault, the French motorcar manufacturer, to build Malaysia’s own truck.
47. ‘PROTON’ stands for ‘Perusahaan Otomobil National’, or the National Automobile Industry. The fear of obsolescent cars was then at hand. On 3 November 1995, a joint venture agreement was signed in Paris between PROTON and Renault, the French motorcar manufacturer, to build Malaysia’s own truck.
48. Gyan Prakash, ‘Introduction’, in *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacement*, ed. Prakash (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 9. Prakash’s specific meaning here is this: ‘The nationalist intellectual spoke of “unity in diversity”; they claimed that the colonized formed a nation in spite of social, regional, and ethnic differences. Such assertions were not merely polemical responses to the colonial rulers who resisted the nationalist demands; instead, they underscored the necessity of the stage of difference for the performance of the nation’s unity’ (9).
49. Tu’s work is often caricatured such that he becomes the spokesman for a (once-)triumphant Confucian-values-driven modernity in East Asia, though, in actuality, his work is more careful than that. Tu adopts an ‘alternative modernity’ position at a basic level not so
different from that of Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar’s (see the discussion at the start of this chapter): ‘The rise of industrial East Asia, at a minimum, has significantly complicated the Weberian picture of modernization as rationalization … Once we begin to acknowledge the compatibility of a market economy and an authoritarian [rather than liberal] state, recognize the centrality of family virtues to social solidarity, … and employ new conceptual apparatuses such as network capitalism to understand a different kind of economic dynamics, we are well on the way to an alternative vision of modernity’ (‘Introduction’, in Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons, ed. Tu [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996], 7). This alternative view of modernity though, is one in which he recognises that parts of the West have become an inherent part of East Asia: ‘Actually, since East Asian intellectuals have been devoted students of the modern West for several generations, the Enlightenment values, including human rights, have become an integral part of their own cultural heritage …. East Asian intellectuals, not to mention the English-speaking political elite, are more familiar with the life-orientation of the modern West than with any traditional Asian way of living’ (Tu Weiming, The Inaugural Wu Teh Yao Memorial Lectures 1995 [Singapore: UniPress, 1996], 27). The focus of his lecture was ‘A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights’.

54. Anwar Ibrahim, ‘Towards Global Peace, Understanding’, New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), 14 March 1995. All the following quotations from Anwar come from this speech. Ogura Kazuo’s ‘A Call’ makes a similar if less obviously breathtaking argument: ‘It seems to me that it has now become necessary to cultivate the traditional spirit of Asia in order to answer some of the major history of Europe to be overcome…?’ (40). But of course, Ogura is not a major politician, and Japan does not have the particular history of ethnic tensions that Malaysia has; Singapore obviously has a similar history, given the common colonial and national histories until Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965.
55. Such an assertion shows us that the ‘legacy’ of Bandung as already weak in the year of its fortieth anniversary, 1995, the year that the ‘Islam and Confucianism’ dialogue was held. For a present assessment of Bandung’s legacy, see the essays in Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 6, no. 4 (December 2005), Special Issue on ‘Bandung/Third Worldism’.
57. ‘Asian Values: The Scourge of the West’, Economist, 22 April 1995, 24. Mahbubani served with the foreign service from 1971 to 2004. He had postings in Cambodia (where he served during the war in 1973–74), Malaysia and Washington DC; he also served two stints as Singapore ambassador to the UN, and was also president of the UN Security Council in January 2001 and May 2002. Since 2004, Mahbubani has been dean of the new Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, and is the author of Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust Between America and the World (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).
60. ‘Is Everyone Here?’, Asiaweek, 22 December 1993, 12.
Chapter 2


4. Akhil Gupta, ‘The Song of the Nonaligned World: Transnational Identities and the Reinscription of Late Capitalism’, *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no. 1 (February 1992): 63, 73. All further page references will be given within brackets in the main text. Gupta is interested in considering how the nation-state might becoming unstable as a ‘dominant organizational form’ (73) and how imagined transnational communities, such as the European Community or world-wide Islam, may indicate what is to come.

5. ‘Communalism’ in Singapore carries the same implications that Indian nationalists ascribed to that term: ‘Communalism was, in common with colonialism, the Other of nationalism, its opposite, its chief adversary, and hence a necessary part of the story of nation-building in India’ (Gyanendra Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial India* [Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990], 2–3).

6. For an account of the Malayan Emergency by one of the lead players in the event, see Chin Peng, as told to Ian Ward and Norma Mirafior, *My Side of History* (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003). Chin Peng was the Secretary General of the Malayan Communist Party during the period of the Malayan Emergency.

7. Malaysia and Singapore’s complex plural societies have been often commented upon; see, for example, K. J. Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965); and Karl von Vorys, *Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). The present Federation of Malaysia comprises peninsular or West Malaysia (formerly Malaya), Sabah (formerly British North Borneo) and Sarawak.

8. Singapore is 78 percent Chinese, 14 percent Malay and seven percent Indian; West Malaysia — the former Malaya — is 51 percent Malay, 33 percent Chinese and 11 percent Indian.

9. Officially, Singapore has four equal state languages (English, Malay, Mandarin-Chinese and Tamil), though English is the main language of bureaucracy and Malay is the ‘national language’ (*bahasa kebangsaan*) which was taught as a compulsory third language in schools until the late 1960s.


11. Cf. Etienne Balibar, ‘The Nation Form: History and Ideology’, in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Class, Nation: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1991): ‘The history of nations, beginning with our own [that is, France], is always already presented to us in the form of a narrative which attributes to these entities the continuity of a subject. The formation of the nation thus appears as the fulfilment of a “project” stretching across centuries, in which there are different stages and moments of coming to self-awareness, which the prejudices of the various historians will portray as more or less decisive ...’ (86). The postcolonial construction of Singapore ought to complicate what Balibar has to say of...
'younger' nations: 'The myth of origins and national continuity, which we can easily see being set in place in the contemporary history of the "young" nations (such as India or Algeria) which emerged with the end of colonialism ... is therefore an effective ideological form, in which the imaginary singularity of national formations is constructed daily, by moving from the present into the past' (87).

12. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 123.
15. Rajaratnam’s position as a racial minority in the country may partially account (his serious philosophical conviction aside) for his being steadfastly liberal and modern, in the nineteenth-century, British sense.
16. Cited in Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Donald Moore Press), 303. Josey’s book is my source for Lee’s speeches. All further page references to further quotations by Lee will be given within brackets in the main text.
17. Cf. Edwin Lee’s view on the imperial reinscription of the structure of Singapore consciousness: ‘One hundred and forty years or so of British rule have etched on the Singapore consciousness certain principles and values which have become part of the national ethos. Singapore today is a country ... where the prime minister sets the tone of public life as the colonial governor once did, where the rule of law prevails...’. (The Colonial Legacy’, in Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, ed. Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley [Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1990], 42). It sounds as if the prime minister was, say, Sir Alfred Milner of South Africa, in his ability to maintain so-called ‘irresponsible government’ (which, of course, Milner considered very responsible), answerable only to Whitehall, rather than the chief of a cabinet of ministers answerable to a parliament seen to be the representative of ‘the people’. One question would be: how is this particular structure of consciousness maintained in the postcolonial context? Another, more fundamental question would be: what exactly is a Singapore ‘consciousness’, given the complexity of the ethnic and culture positions in the country?
19. The British, however, still controlled defence and foreign policy even though Lee was called ‘prime minister’, and not ‘chief minister’, which was David Marshall’s equivocal title in Singapore before 1959.
20. Soon to be called the University of Singapore, and then in 1980 the National University of Singapore after it was combined with Nanyang University.
21. The Chinese form the majority of the English-educated groups.
22. This celebrates the gaining of self-rule; National Day is now celebrated on 9 August, the day Singapore was separated from Malaysia.
24. In December 1966, Lee tells a Tamil audience: ‘Three thousand years ago, there were no Anglo-Saxons because the Saxons had not yet gone over to Britain. One thousand years ago, they were still wearing animal skins. Your people in the Deccan had by then created a literature, and so had my ancestors in China’ (634).
Singapore: ‘The [educational] system we inherited from the British was lop-sided. Too much emphasis was laid on examination and the paper qualification. We were, therefore, rearing a whole generation of softies, who were clever, who wore spectacles, who were weak from want of enough exercise, enough sunshine, and with not enough guts in them. That was all right for a British colony, because the officers came from England, who had the necessary brawn and toughness. It was they who gave the orders and our people just executed them’ (497, emphases mine). The extremely examination-oriented educational system in Singapore, which garners an unbelievable number of ‘A’ grades in the Singapore-Cambridge General Certificate of Examination ‘Advanced’ Levels, that has since developed is extremely ironic in the light of this speech’s emphasis on a need for a Singaporean manliness.

26. The other parties are: the Malayan (later Malaysian) Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan (later Malaysian) Indian Congress (MIC).

27. All else apart, the PAP’s ability to realise this threat was slim, given the party’s poor performance on the mainland in the one general election they participated in.

28. It should be noted that the English-educated Chinese were also the minority Chinese group vis-à-vis the vernacular- and Mandarin-speaking Chinese groups.

29. See chapter 5. The question of Lee’s ‘Chineseness’ is a long-standing one; Alex Josey has a section in his Lee Kuan Yew entitled ‘How Much of a Chinese is Lee Kuan Yew?’ (623–45).


31. Straits Times (Singapore), 25 February 1990.


33. Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq (eds.), The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1987), 242. Chan and Obaid’s book is my source for Rajaratnam’s speeches. All further page references to further quotations by Rajaratnam will be given within brackets in the main text.

34. See Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought in the Colonial World.

35. See Hobsbawm, Nations.

36. See D. J. Enright, Memoirs of a Mendicant Professor (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969). Cf. Raymond Williams’s not dissimilar take on this regarding non-white British identity in British culture: ‘it is a serious misunderstanding ... to suppose that the problems of social identity are resolved by formal (merely legal) definitions. For unevenly and at times precariously, but always through long experience substantially, an effective awareness of social identity depends on actual and sustained social relationships’ (Towards 2000 [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983], 195). This prompts Paul Gilroy to ask, ‘how long is long enough [for a British minority] to become a genuine Brit?’ (There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation [1987; reissue, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991], 49).

37. The ‘iron framework’ of a ‘genuine era of world politics and world economics’ which he spoke of in 1966.

39. Goh Keng Swee, *The Economics of Modernization and Other Essays* (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1972), 32. Goh’s book is my source for his speeches. All further page references to further quotations by Goh will be given within brackets in the main text.
41. Representative examples of such thinking can be found in Julian Steward (ed.), *Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967).

**Chapter 3**

1. Rostow was an American academic who believed in developing societies’ capacity for ‘self-sustained growth’. He was an assistant to both Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, and had an influence on US foreign policy in the 1960s.
3. The Barisan Sosialis, or Socialist Front, was formed as a breakaway, or ejected, party in September 1961.
5. As noted, the PAP’s representation of national emergence also subscribes to the evolutionary developmental perspective of postwar American social-science paradigms, as manifested in the theories of Daniel Lerner and Walt Rostow. See Julian Steward (ed.), *Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967).
7. In Singapore’s particularist multi-ethnic society, the PAP state as the guarantor of freedoms gained would draw on existing institutions, such as the Emergency Regulations set out by the British, later transformed first into the 1955 Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, and thereafter the Internal Security Act, and restrict what it takes to be the most dangerous aspects of autonomous human action.
10. The text ‘PAP’s First ten years’ is reprinted in *The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches of S. Rajaratnam*, ed. Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1987), 64.

12. Hong, ‘Making the History’, 104. She is quoting from a speech by Rajaratnam given in 1968. This returns us to the general arguments that Lee, Rajaratnam and Dr. Goh Keng Swee made in the 1960s and 1970s relating to the need for a homogenised national culture, as has been examined in chapter 2.


14. As literary critic Philip Holden notes, ‘The “economic instrumental rationality” which underlies the first-generation PAP’s leadership of pragmatism has clear, and explicitly drawn connections with the colonial government rationality through which Raffles’ life is narratised. Raffles, in this narrative, founded a new order in a moment of crisis, a modern order which paradoxically permitted the operations of the natural forces of the market, and allowed individuals to subject themselves to the market’s discipline. Similarly, the post-independence PAP government justified interventionist policies through the argument that it was preparing the ground for the natural operations of the market’ (‘The Free Market’s Second Coming: Monumentising Raffles’, in Reading Culture: Textual Practices in Singapore, ed. Phyllis G. L. Chew and Anneliese Kramer-Dahl [Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1999], 93).

15. Hong reinforces this point: ‘Rajaratnam’s cosmopolitanism should be understood as a provocation to those he saw as advocating ethnic-based nationalisms in Singapore rather than as being the credo of a supra-national humanist, for his concern is unabashedly centred on Singapore as a nation and the politics that would ensure its survival’ (‘Making the History’, 106).


17. Chua Beng Huat has noted the scepticism of both S. Rajaratnam and Dr. Goh Keng Swee to Lee Kuan Yew’s later stance on Asian values and economic success, especially given the latter’s position that the great Victorian values were the crucial values at hand (Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore [London: Routledge, 1995], 66). Also see Ray Langenbach, Performing the Singapore State, 1988–1995, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Sydney, 2003, 111–14.

18. The phrase itself is probably from Alfred, Lord Tennyson’s ‘Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington’, completed in time for the funeral on 18 November 1852, and was in that context more militaristic than Whiggish: ‘Not once or twice in our rough island-story / The path of duty was the way to glory.’ Cultural items can have strange lives.


21. Singapore: Facts and Figures 1967 (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 1967), 6 and 3 respectively. All page numbers hereafter will be given in brackets in the main text.


34. See C. V. Devan Nair (compiler and ed.), *Socialism that Works ... The Singapore Way* (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1976), for details of the clash. I will return to this clash at the end of the chapter.

35. These political-theoretical terms, as they were used from the late-nineteenth century to the First World War, were capitalised.


42. See ibid., 31.

43. We could take Brenda S. A. Yeoh’s *Contesting Space: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment in Colonial Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1996) as one subaltern historico-geographical study. Yeoh’s exception perhaps proves what might be
a rule. Two histories from the ‘bottom up’ have also been written by James F. Warren: *Rickshaw Coolie: A People's History of Singapore, 1880–1940* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986) and *Ah Ku and Karayuki-San: Prostitution in Singapore, 1870–1940* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1993). As Warren is non-Singaporean, this too seems to prove a possible rule.


45. The term ‘invented’ implies a sort of bad-faith articulation of political and other identities — but this implication of inauthenticity is at least partially the result of Hobsbawm’s antipathy towards certain aspects of nationalism.


47. See chapter 5.


49. Ibid., 262. Note that there is no reference to ‘East Asia’; instead, the larger identification, apart from Southeast Asia, is South Asia. In the process of gaining economic success, both critics and supporters of Singapore jointly have created a new cartographic concept — ‘East Asia’ — in order to make corporate sense of the Asian ‘miracles’.


51. Ibid., 142–43.

52. Ibid., 143.


54. Ibid., 84.


56. The intellectual heritage Goh saw himself part of, from a 1970 speech, is clearly stated: ‘If we are completely honest with ourselves, I think we can detect in contemporary Singapore a strange and striking similarity of intellectual climate with Victorian England, together with much of the hypocrisies and cruelties of that age’ (cited in Doshi, Coclanis, and Kwok 1999). It is within the context of such utterances that we can see his contribution to the reworking of both *laissez-faire*ism and state interventionism in relation to the global market forces.
Chapter 4


4. Rem Koolhaas, ‘Singapore Songlines: Portrait of a Potemkin Metropolis … or Thirty Years of Tabula Rasa’, in Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, Small, Medium, Large, Extra-Large, ed. Jennifer Sigler (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 1995), 1041. All subsequent page references will be given within brackets in the main text.

5. For more information on the OMA, see their website: <http://www.oma.nl/index.htm>.


8. Koolhaas is right about the state but simply wrong about high culture per se in Singapore — this is a matter of lack of knowledge. The Chinese-speaking intelligentsia and arts practitioners — in dramatic, literary, and in some cases visual-arts fields — from the earlier part of the twentieth century had a strong reformist and oftentimes leftist streak drawn from, to a large extent, the May Fourth Movement in China. By the late 1970s, most of such practices had either been repressed or eliminated. The problem is how you recall the ‘agony’ of modernity and modernity in a society where history has been rendered unimportant. While Singapore as a society with a fairly advanced economy may not be unique in having a memory ‘loss’, its cultural resources are also less well-endowed to deal with such problems. Of course, such difficulties are compounded by the non-native nature of these artistic practices — how was this Chinese-inflected modernism ‘part’ of colonial Malaya or Singapore? This question has yet to be fully addressed in the scholarship on the arts within the city-state.
9. While I think that Koolhaas, by and large, is correct, he is here of course making his point both generally and polemically. The ascendance of the PAP over the body of the island was gained more slowly, with many unplanned circumstances that aided them, such as the Separation from Malaysia — this freed the PAP from the need to answer to the federal government and gave them complete territorial control over the island. See Gamer, *Politics of Urban Development*, chapters 3 to 5, especially chapter 4, ‘Kallang: Dealing with Those Who Stood in the Way’.


12. Kasimir Malevich (1879–1935) was the founder of Suprematism, which stood for a pure geometric abstraction in painting. While his art tried to reach the purest form (the ‘White on White’ series of paintings of 1917–20 embodies well his abstract approach), he did make suggestions for a utopian architecture, which later influenced not only the Bauhaus but also, more generally, modernist architecture.

13. Pankaj Mishra, ‘Matter over Minds: For 500 Years East and West Have Exchanged Goods But Not Cultural Values’, *Guardian Weekly* (29 October–4 November 2004), 25. Mishra here is reviewing the ‘Encounters: The Meeting of Asia and Europe’ exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum, London, held during the closing months of 2004. He is a critic, novelist (*The Romantics* [2001]) and writer (*An End to Suffering: The Buddha in the World* [2004]) who has edited some of V. S. Naipaul’s writing — and therefore like Naipaul is interested in questions of culture, history and empire, though he is not a cultural reactionary.


17. The UN team consisted of Charles Abrams, Susumu Kobe and Otto Koenigsberger.


25. Elsewhere, Sardar opines that the conscious Asian fake — the fake brand-name clothes and video compact discs (VCDs) you can easily buy in either Kuala Lumpur or Bangkok — are the ‘genuine’ signs of identity, and not the counterfeit Asian modern
of Singapore: ‘Eventually, we all want to look in a mirror and see ourselves’ (ibid.). His preference is for Kuala Lumpur — Malaysia’s federal capital, and another former British colonial city — because he thinks that the multi-ethnic cultural synthesis there is both more disorienting and exciting; see Ziauddin Sardar, The Consumption of Kuala Lumpur (London: Reaktion Books, 2000).


27. Cf. Abidin Kusno, Beyond the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political Cultures in Indonesia (London: Routledge, 2000): “Westernization” or “Americanization” … may suggest … a destination, a process of arrival, by replication, at some imagined place called the “West”. But seen from the other [non-Western] side of the globe, … [i]t could point to a departure, an exit from something one wants to leave behind, which does not necessarily imply that one would then arrive at, or replicate, a particular place called the “West” (204).

28. Kuo’s role in the counter-reterritorialising of Singapore culture is addressed in chapter 6.


30. In 1989, Tang is quoted as saying that: ‘The main reason for being here [in Sembawang] is the isolation.’ The magazine writer’s response to this was: ‘The psychological context of the village is earthy, rudimentary, and free of the numerous and trivial distractions normally found in the city’ (Chia Ming Chien, ‘The Artists’ Village’, Man, April–May 1989, 33).


32. Kwok, Channels and Confluences, 141.

33. This is one Japanese curator’s assessment of that moment: ‘Like it or not, every country in Asia is baptized by Western modern art completely different from its traditional art. The common way by which each country accepted modern art was to depict their own unique theme (sceneries of the country, religious symbols) through the use of the materials, media (for example, oil and canvas) and styles (Cubism, Expressionism) of the Occident. In Singapore there are many works in such a manner. … To compromise traditional painting technique and modern art — this seems too facile a way to vivify the tradition of the people. … Just a half-baked mixture of the techniques of the West and the East will not be able to transcend either one of them. Also, in Singaporean art, it is not only the technique that is conservative but the content itself tends to be strongly so. There are scarcely any works that are suffused with message or based on social criticism. Such a conservative, luke-warm trend has been most dominant in the art scene of the 80s in Singapore [until the arrival of Tang Da Wu].’ Thereafter, ‘[t]he art scene of Singapore has rushed into the realm of contemporary art at the end of the 1980s. As a matter of fact, younger generation has begun to make their works in international styles without sticking to their ethnic tradition. … From the generation relying on the ethnic traditional culture to the generation not adhered to it, Singapore is now trying to make a change at a bound’ (Etsuko Tsuzuki, ‘Between Ethnic Culture and Intimidated Culture’, in Fukuoka Art Museum, Annual Artist Today — Fukuoka Annual V: Tang Da Wu, exhibition catalogue [Fukuoka: Fukuoka Art Museum, 1991], 7, 8, 9).

34. For more details on arts development in the 1990s, see C. J. W.-L. Wee, ‘Creating High Culture in the Globalized “Cultural Desert” of Singapore’, The Drama Review 47, no. 4
In the early hours of 1994, at an independent arts event, a 21-year-old performance artist presented a performance work in which he protested a police entrapment exercise undertaken against homosexual men. At one point, he had his back to the audience and cut off a bit of his pubic hair, though the audience could not see this. A picture of this — with the young man’s buttocks partially exposed — was on the front page of a tabloid, and the police were called in, amid a blaze of sensationalised press coverage. The controversy thereafter was extended to a forum theatre production by The Necessary Stage, which was said to be Marxist because of forum theatre’s connection with Augusto Boal. ‘Marxist’ is an old coded state term for ‘communist’ — though by 1994, such charges did not make sense anymore. Unscripted performance art and theatre work were then proscribed for many years, and some artists were brought to court. See Ray Langenbach, Performing the Singapore State, 1988–1995, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Western Sydney, Australia, 2003; and Lee Weng Choy, ‘Chronology of a Controversy’ and ‘A Review of Josef Ng’s Performance’, both in Looking at Culture, ed. Sanjay Krishna, Sharaad Kuttan, Lee Weng Choy, Leon Perrera and Jimmy Yap (Singapore: Artres Design & Communications, 1996). Looking at Culture initially was to be an issue of the National University of Singapore Society’s journal, Commentary. The Society panicked in the wake of the 1994 arts controversy, and stopped the publication process; the editors resigned and subsequently had the issue privately published.

36. Mee pok is a flat noodle, and this is a Hokkien-Chinese term.
42. Uhde and Ng Uhde, 127.
44. Eating Air. Kelvin Tong and Jasmine Ng (Singapore: Multi-Story Complex, 1999).
47. In Singapore’s case, it is a strongly resurgent presence from about the mid-1990s onwards, in form of both popular music and TV dramas. While the Japanese mass cultural presence was reasonably visible in the 1970s and the 1980s, it had become less visible by the early 1990s. (See Koichi Iwabuchi, Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002]; C. J. W.-L. Wee, ‘Buying Japan: Singapore, Japan and an “East Asian” Modernity’, Journal of Pacific Asia 4 [1997]: 21–46; and Leo Ching, ‘Globalizing the Regional, Regionalizing the Global: Mass Culture
and Asianism in the Age of Late Capital’, in Globalization, ed. Arjun Appadurai [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001].) However, this presence renewed itself with increased vigour by the mid-1990s. More recently, from about 2000 onwards, Korean popular music and, more significantly, TV dramas and films — Hallyu, or the so-called Korean Wave — have made inroads into the region at large. In return, though, J-pop has made surprisingly direct inroads into South Korea since the ban was lifted by Seoul on the entry of Japanese cultural products, despite anti-Japanese antipathy.


49. This is a cultural and mythicised imaginary now a little more familiar to the West through Lee Ang’s hit film, Crouching Tiger and Hidden Dragon (2000).

50. Much Japanese manga is translated into Chinese in locales such as Taipei, and then exported to places with noticeable Chinese populations such as Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. For an historiscised study of manga, see Sharon Kinsella, Adult Manga: Culture and Power in Contemporary Japanese Culture (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2000).

Chapter 5


3. Neo-Confucian champion Tu Wei-ming provocatively argued at the debate’s height that a socio-historical explanation of societies ‘predicated on the exclusive dichotomy of tradition and modernity [as societies are thought to be in the West] is no longer workable’ (‘The Rise of Industrial East Asia: The Role of Confucian Values’, Copenhagen Papers in East and Southeast Asian Studies 4 [1989]: 92). Tu seems to have since changed his mind; he surprised a Singapore audience in 1995 by saying that industrial East Asia’s rise embodied the worst aspects of the Enlightenment heritage of ‘growth, development and exploitation’: ‘Japan and the four mini-dragons [are] … characterised by mercantilism, commercialism and international competitiveness’ (quoted in ‘Democracy “Better for Confucian Ideals”’, Straits Times [Singapore], 22 March 1995, 22).

4. ‘Some economies — notably Japan, Korea, and Taiwan … intervened in markets with industrial, trade, and financial sector policies. On balance, some of these interventions contributed to their extraordinary growth, but this was only possible because of highly unusual historical and institutional circumstances’ (World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy [New York: Oxford University Press, 1993], 366, emphasis mine).


11. Žižek, ‘Multiculturalism’: 46, 52.


17. For example, Geoffrey Benjamin, ‘The Cultural Logic of Singapore’s “Multiracialism”’, in *Singapore: Society in Transition*, ed. Riaz Hassan (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976); and David Brown, *The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 1994). The other causes usually adduced for seeing the political in ethnic terms are: the political consciousness of being Chinese in a largely Malay region; and the link between what the PAP called ‘Chinese chauvinism’ and leftist movements. Such concerns allowed the state to promote an internal crisis mentality — an ‘ideology of survival’ (Chan Heng Chee, *The Politics of Survival* [Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971]) — that helps maintain PAP political ‘indispensability’.


24. Ibid., 128.
25. Rajaratnam is also one member of the founding generation of the PAP who has steadfastly maintained his commitment to an ethnicity-blind multiracialism. One scholar observes: ‘As the [English-language] university base expanded, and English became more widely embraced, the fast-track passport status [of the English-speaking] was diluted, and with it, the Singaporean Singapore identity. It was probably no accident that Rajaratnam was the proponent of this because as a Ceylonese Tamil, he was the ... the beneficiary under the colonial era’ (private e-mail communication to the author).

26. Rajaratnam, Prophetic and the Political, 229.
27. Ibid., 231.
28. Ibid., 231.
32. The latter is not the primary focus; for detailed analysis of such resistance within Singapore society, see Brown, State and Ethnic Politics; Nirmala S. Purushotam, Negotiating Language, Constructing Difference: Disciplining Difference in Singapore (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1998); and Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995).
33. ‘Real Threat to Culture: It’s Not the End of Chinese Schools, but the Loss of Traditional Family Values, Says PM’, Straits Times (Singapore), 19 February 1984.
39. Chua Beng-Huat comments that the PAP first ‘racialized boundaries’ and subsequently homogenised the population ‘to arrive at a definition of Singapore as an “Asian” nation’; he also notes: ‘it is of strategic economical and political importance for Singapore to insert itself into a larger piece. Asia may not need Singapore, but Singapore needs Asia’ (‘Culture, Multiracialism and National Identity in Singapore’, in Trajectories: Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, ed. Kuan-Hsing Chen [London: Routledge, 1998], 198).
40. In 1980, Roderick MacFarquhar had used the term ‘post-Confucian challenge’ in the Economist magazine, and US academic Edwin O. Reischauer the expression ‘Sinic world’ in Foreign Affairs.
43. In January 1987, the Institute organised a major conference on ‘Confucian Ethics and the Modernization of Industrial Asia’, and in 1990, ‘Confucian Humanism and Modernization: The Institutional Imperatives’. As the rationale for its being ran out, it was changed into first the Institute of East Asian Political Economy and then the present East Asian Institute, which is a part of the National University of Singapore.


45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.


51. Quoted in Chia Poteik, ‘Lee Explains Need to Use Mandarin’, Straits Times (Singapore), 13 March 1978. All quotations from Lee in this paragraph are from Chia.

52. Ilsa Sharp, ‘Part of a Daring Experiment ... to Preserve that “Part of Ourselves” and to Imbibe the Best from the West’, Straits Times (Singapore), 2 December 1978. Both the quotations from Lee in this paragraph and all quotations from Lee in the next paragraph are from Sharp.


54. Lee Kuan Yew, ‘Make Time for Your Children’, Straits Times (Singapore), 19 February 1984. All quotations in this and the next four paragraphs are from this article.


56. The set of buildings in question were in Bugis, a downtown heritage district that is ‘today characterised as a sanitised tourist attraction with a complex history’; in the late nineteenth century, the area ‘was called Bu Ye Tian (Heaven without Night), … where itinerant hawkers enjoy[ed] a roaring business in the prosperous night market, and where entertainers and transvestites attract[ed] public audiences throughout the night till daybreak. … [The urban redevelopment that took place in this area is called] Bugis Junction[, which] formerly consisted of three city blocks surrounded by main roads and divided by four minor roads — Hylam, Malabar, Malay, and Bugis Streets. When these blocks were parcellated, tendered and subsequently sold, the U[urban] R[edev]elop[ment] A[uthority] stipulated that the development should conserve existing rows of shophouses on three minor roads in the district. During the design process, it was determined that a large parking space would be required. … In the end, the car park was located in a newly constructed basement, which required that the shophouses built on ground level be demolished. To retain the character of the original streets, these shophouses were subsequently reconstructed. Although all the facades of the shophouses were exhaustively documented and rebuilt, the buildings’
structure and interior arrangements were altered in order to accommodate new commercial programmes. The shopping malls tracing the original streets were covered with new glass roofs, and this became Singapore’s first air-conditioned shopping arcade [in 1994]’ (Tsuto Sakamoto, ‘Bugis: Everyday Presence/Representation of the Ideal’, *Singapore Architect* 212 [December 2001], 160, 160–61).


63. Ibid., 4.


**Chapter 6**


2. Ibid., 368.

3. Timothy Brennan, ‘Cosmo-Theory’, *South Atlantic Quarterly* 100, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 660, 661.


5. A note on the usage of Japanese and Chinese names in the article: by and large, I put the family name first, following the custom of both cultures. The exception will be when a writer is well-known by the inverted use of their names, or when their publications use the reverse order of names.


7. The following accusation was made public: ‘KUO PAO KUN, 37, was born in China and was arrested on March 17, 1976. At the time of his arrest, he was an Assistant Secretary of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. … His conversion to communist ideology was by self-indoctrination from the books he read in Australia. … He returned to Singapore in 1965 and set up a Performing Arts Studio to propagate leftist dance and drama. The Performing Arts Studio was renamed the Practice Theatre School …. He was inducted into the MPLL in August 1974, four months ahead of his wife, GOH LAY KUAN’ (‘The Faces of Subversion’, *Straits Times* [Singapore], 28 May 1976, 30).

8. The Chinese-language tradition in theatre in Malaysia and Singapore partook of the modern progressiveness of the May Fourth movement, and Kuo himself further was influenced by the Cultural Revolution and Bertolt Brecht, whose work he introduced to


12. The musical was written by a Singaporean playwright, Michael Chiang, with music and lyrics by the pop musician Dick Lee. The text of *Beauty World* can be found as part of Chiang’s collection, *Private Parts and Other Play Things: A Collection of Popular Singapore Comedies* (Singapore: Landmark Books, 1994).


15. Kuo Pao Kun, ‘Uprooted and Searching’, in *Drama, Culture and Empowerment: The IDEA Dialogues*, ed. John O’Toole and Kate Donelan (Brisbane: IDEA Publications, 1999), 167. Hereafter cited as UP. Further page references to this article will be given within brackets in the main text.


17. Intercultural critic Rustom Bharucha is critical of Kuo’s ‘Open Culture’, the ideal implicitly advanced in *Descendants*: ‘Instead of concentrating on the dynamics of creation, which is the area of his expertise, Kuo feels obliged to envisage a new genealogy for Singapore itself. … [T]he illusion of this task, which is more a conceptual burden, rests on assumptions of organicity, so that it is assumed that ‘other cultures are naturally rewarding for the body, mind, and spirit’; and more problematically, that it is the ‘natural trait of creative humankind’ to draw energy from new resources’ (*Consumed in Singapore: The Intercultural Spectacle of Lear*, Research Paper No. 21 [Singapore: Centre for Advanced Studies, National University of Singapore, 2000], 13). Kuo’s position on cultural-identity formation is also in striking contrast to political scientist Partha Chatterjee’s response to the same difficulty: ‘Now the task [for postcolonial societies] is to trace in their mutually conditioned historicities the specific forms that have appeared, on the one hand, in the domain defined by the hegemonic project of nationalist modernity, and on the other, in the...
numerous fragmented resistance to that normalizing project’ (The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993], 13). The difference that arises between Bharucha and Kuo is the result of the different locations the two artist-critics inhabit; it indicates that there should be no single or definite article to the following entity: ‘the postcolonial nation-state’. Instead, what we have are what anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff have called ‘a labile historical formation, a polythetic class of polities-in-motion’ (‘Naturing the Nation: Aliens, Apocalypse, and the Postcolonial State’, HAGAR: International Social Science Review 1, no. 1 [2000]: 12). In this regard, differing historical and local specificities are important.

18. Fredric Jameson famously writes, ‘Postmodernism is what you have when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good. It is a more fully human world than the older one, but one in which “culture” has become a veritable “second nature”’ (Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991], ix). But how does one describe a society such as Singapore, then, when ‘culture’ is not commodified with the same characteristics as the USA’s culture industry? Cf. Koichi Iwabuchi: ‘Unlike the postmodernity of the West, non-Western postmodernity cannot be conceived of as the subsequent stage of modernity rather, [sic] as [Frederick] Buell remarks, it “thrives on incomplete modernization, the result of modernization from the top down. Peripheral sites thus produce cultural situations in which distinct time frames (artificially) constructed by colonialism and Orientalism, and powerfully separated by developmentalism’s evolutionary narrative, circulate together”. Buell is apt to see the demise of a grand evolutionary narrative in a peripheral postmodernity which articulates “the clash of unevenly coded temporalities”, as well as the juxtaposition of many cultures. However this kind of view tends to underestimate the deeply uneven nature of global capitalist modernity. The “always already postmodern” situation of the non-Western periphery should not be celebrated uncritically, as it has been brought about and is still deeply affected by the legacies of colonialism and unequal power relations’ (Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002], 172).


22. There are signs that Ong is broadening his scope. He finished, in June 2002, an intercultural workshop and festival experiment called ‘In Transit: Transforming the Arts’ at the Haus der Kulturen der Welt. He thus is trying to expand beyond the intercultural staging of the New Asia; Ong says co-curator Johannes Odenthal and he want ‘Germans to engage with The Other, The Outsider, and the different biographical, ethnic and political backgrounds of their art production’ (Johannes Odenthal and Ong Keng Sen’, http://www.in-transit.de/content/eng/sites/pop_icurators.htm). This statement also carries the implication that the final destination of the New Asia is the journey into the old colonial heartland itself.


25. The Zheng He character functions in critical contrast to the (apparently happy) hybrid, diasporic subject of some postcolonial theorising; this subject is unrooted and seemingly unbound by the limitations of locality. See Pheng Cheah, ‘Given Culture: Rethinking Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism’, in *Cosmopolitics*, ed. Cheah and Robbins, for a critique of how metropolitan migrancy is treated within postcolonial cultural criticism.


29. What follows is an analysis based on Ong’s 1995 production.

30. There are similarities to Robert Wilson’s dreamscapes.

31. This clearly is an ironic reference to and comment on Lee Kuan Yew, prime minister from 1959 to 89, and his family — Lee’s older son, Lee Hsien Loong, was a deputy prime minister when the play was written. The younger Lee became the premier in 2004, after Goh Chok Tong retired and became ‘senior minister’.

32. These represent the four official languages of Singapore, and recall the ending of the day’s transmission on the old Radio Television Singapore and later the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, when four women would say ‘good-night’ in the four languages.

33. The potential bathos of the last line is offset by the accreted layers of meaning Kuo has built up in the text, and also by Ong’s visceral and dramatically visual staging of the last scene.

34. ‘First, and most important of all, Asia is not one, but many Asias. ... Some may argue that Europe is also made up of many different countries, but looking at religion for instance, we see immediately that Asia is much more heterogeneous’ (Ong Keng Sen, ‘Worlds Apart: Europe Still Not Ready for New Asia’, *Sunday Times* [Singapore], 3 May 1998).

35. The following discussion is drawn from the notes that I made during the conference. For Ong’s earlier position on the need for cultural memory practice in the theatre, see Ong Keng Sen, ‘A Theatre of Memory: Reconnection, Regeneration, Rediscovery through Experimentation with Traditional Arts’, paper presented at the Singapore Heritage Society’s Conference on ‘Our Place in Time: Heritage in Singapore’, Substation arts centre, Singapore, 17–18 September 1994.

36. Cf. TheatreWorks’ informational write-up on the 1998 Programme: ‘The Flying Circus Project with its unique, multi-cultural Asian identity, is an expression of Asian dynamism. It is progressive, sophisticated — a space where tradition and modernity, East and West meet and intermingle comfortably. It aims to negotiate the many Asian communities and ultimately, the international community in order to better appreciate this New Asia’. For a recent analysis of the Flying Circus Project, see Helena Grehan, ‘Questioning the

37. In 1997, Lear also appeared in Osaka and Fukuoka. In 1999, apart from Singapore, it proceeded to Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Australia, and thence to Germany and Denmark.


41. The analysis pertains to the 1999 Singapore production, though that was broadly similar to the 1997 Japanese production.

42. Bharucha, Consumed in Singapore, 21.


44. Bharucha, Consumed in Singapore, 42.

45. Lee Weng Choy’s position, as discussed by Bharucha in Consumed in Singapore, 24. Lee is an art critic and presently an artistic co-director of the independent Substation arts centre, Singapore.


57. For one example of the exhibitions JFAC has undertaken, see Furuichi Yasuko and Nakamoto Kazumi (eds.), Asian Modernism: Diverse Developments in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (Tokyo: Japan Foundation Asia Center, [1995]); for one example of the fora
on Asian art JFAC has undertaken, see Furuichi Yasuko (ed.) and Hoashi Aki (assistant ed.), Symposium: Asian Contemporary Art Reconsidered (Tokyo: Japan Foundation Asia Center, 1998). The Asia Center, unfortunately, was closed by the Japan Foundation in 2004, following a revamp of the Foundation’s development priorities.


59. Ibid., 2.


63. Hata, ‘Children Who Kill Their Fathers’.


65. It is worthwhile citing Rey Chow at this juncture, though the quotation is taken out of its original context: ‘In an era in which the critique of the West has not only possible but mandatory, where does this critique leave those ethnic peoples whose entry into culture is, precisely because of the history of Western imperialism, already “Westernized”? ’ (Woman and Chinese Modernity [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991], xi).

Epilogue


2. Lisa Rofel, Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China after Socialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 12.


4. Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 178. For Ong, Singapore is a representative if ‘emerging site of globality’ in Southeast Asia; in the region, she adds, ‘we find an innovative use of neoliberal logic at three registers: the transformation of links between internal and external spaces, the orchestration of knowledge flows, and the linking of knowledge and entitlements. First, a site like Singapore redefines itself not within an established urban system but in relation to an emerging network of symbiotic flows. Second, by pulling together elements from disparate sites, the hub intertwines its future with that of global
organizations. Third, network participants — technologies, firms, and experts — set new norms of innovation and flexibility for citizens. At stake is the fabrication of a niche of technoethical diversity is the reorganization of society and of citizens’ (178, 179).


6. Talks collapsed at the Seattle meeting in December 1999. As one journalist succinctly puts it, ‘The basic gripes of the developing world is that, when it comes to trade, the West says one thing and does another. While protecting its own vulnerable sectors from competition, it demands that southern countries open up theirs’ (Charlotte Denny, ‘Qatar Could See a First-Class Beef’, Guardian Weekly, 19–25 April 2001, 10).


10. Michel Foucault has animated a fair amount of significant critical cultural analyses since the late 1980s, especially (but not only) in the emerging area of an anthropology of modernity. As anthropologist of China Lisa Rofel observes: ‘For Foucault, modernity ushers in a novel regime of disciplinarity. Far from offering a mode of greater individual freedom and progress, this regime signals an ever more thorough form of domination’ (Other Modernities, 11). She contends that work such as Paul Rabinow’s French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), which ‘scrupulously follows Foucault’, also ‘assumes the universality of Foucault’s vision of modernity and the heterogeneity of its effects, while ignoring the larger (neo)colonial world and relations of marginalization that might indicate dissident interpretations’ (Other Modernities, note 11, 287). Rofel’s own critical stance — one that still incorporates a Foucauldian dimension — is that: ‘Modernity is ... fissured with paradox and incompleteness, not simply because all categories implode on their own unstable differences but because of distinctive social histories within a global imperialism’ (ibid., 15). This is a position that I broadly agree with, and the ongoing presence of the ‘monarch’ I indicate is part of the city-state’s distinctive social history within this ‘global imperialism’.

11. In August 2004, Lee Hsien Loong, Lee Kuan Yew’s oldest son, became the third prime minister in post-independence history. Retiring Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong was appointed the ‘senior minister’, replacing the senior Lee, and Lee Kuan Yew was appointed to the newly created position, the ‘minister mentor’. These are both cabinet-level appointments.


13. Low, Political Economy of a City-State.


15. For a general discussion of Southeast Asian authoritarian capitalist development, see Richard Robinson, Kevin Hewison and Garry Rodan, ‘Political Power in Industrialising Capitalist Societies: Theoretical Approaches’, in Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism,
Democracy and Capitalism, ed. Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison and Garry Rodan (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993). The authors observe: ‘Where capitalist growth is vigorous and where the national economy becomes increasingly integrated with the world economy, ... pressure [for the state to be less interventionist] becomes more difficult for regimes to resist. ... [T]he new relationship between market capitalism and the state requires mechanisms of accountability inimical to the most authoritarian regimes, with Singapore’s notable exception’ (29). The term ‘authoritarian’ suggests a category of state brutality that Singapore does not quite fit into — it is here that perhaps we can see how ‘government’, ‘governmentality’ and, indeed, Gramscian ‘hegemony’ all simultaneously operate in the city-state.


18. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 247. The authors also suggest that with the new Information Economy, ‘the disciplinary system has become obsolete and must be left behind. Capital must accomplish a negative mirroring and an inversion of the new quality of [immaterial] labor power; it must adjust itself so as to be able to command once again. We suspect that for this reason the industrial and political forces that have relied most heavily and with the most intelligence on the extreme modernization of the disciplinary model (such as the major elements of Japanese and East Asian capital) are the ones that will suffer most severely in this passage’ (276). I will return to this question in the next section.


21. See, for example, Ben Doliveen, ‘Less Than a Lion’s Share’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 November 1998, 46–47, for one viewpoint of this.


26. ‘Q. If You Were Starting to Build Up a Nation, What Would be the Challenge?’

28. The state has since increasingly financed and supported the research development of the biomedical sciences. The science hub in the Buena Vista area has become called ‘Biopolis’. The undergraduate study of the biological sciences has also been boosted at the two major local universities, the National University of Singapore and the Nanyang Technological University.


30. There have been some gestures that globalisation could have been be more carefully undertaken during the period leading up to the crisis — from no less than Lee Kuan Yew. Lee said in a talk to the US Council of Foreign Relations in New York City in 1998 that the liberalisation of capital accounts, now seen in hindsight, should have been calibrated to match the level of sophistication of the various banking supervisory systems and banking laws (Lee Siew Hwa, ‘Liberalisation of Capital Accounts Left Economies Exposed, Says S[senior] M[inister]’, Straits Times Interactive, 22 October 1998, <http://www.straitstimes.asia1.com/pages/wrld14_1022.html>.


34. Cf. University of Michigan’s Linda Lim: ‘The role of the state in business has become at best unnecessary and at worst dysfunctional. It has warped the development of the private sector. For a bright young person, the system has been totally biased against entrepreneurship’ (quoted in William Mellor, ‘The Risks of Playing It Safe’, Asiaweek, 4 May 2001). DBS Bank — already the leader in Southeast Asia — purchased Hong Kong’s Dao Heng Bank in April 2001 for over US$5 billion, making DBS Hong Kong’s fourth biggest lender and thrusting it into competition with global heavyweights such as the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. In March of the same year, SingTel announced that it had bought Australia’s number two telecommunication company, Cable & Wireless Optus for US$9 billion. Both purchases, however, were considered overpriced and the stock value of both companies fell. This, then, is the cost to be paid for the modest and — the government hopes — only an initial expansion of the island’s ‘global reach’ into the region. The SingTel deal itself followed two high-profile flops. The GLC, then run by Lee Kuan Yew’s younger son, Lee Hsien Yang, failed in its attempts to buy Hongkong Telecom in early 2000 and then, shortly thereafter, Malaysia’s Time Engineering. The connection of the PAP to GLCs is a major image problem for them, whether fairly or otherwise, when it comes to the purchase of companies sensitive to a country’s economy or security. Cf. Patrick Smith, ‘Singapore
Companies Pay High Entry Fees’, Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April 2001: ‘Singapore’s blue chips tend to draw their guiding executives from the same pool that feeds the bureaucracy. … These executives may be having a trouble distinguishing between a policy (imposed from the outside) and a corporate strategy (developed within).’

35. ‘The Brain Game: Can Creativity Be Created — and Will This Quest Threaten Social Order? Asia Needs to Encourage Innovation in Order to Be Competitive, Asia Magazine, 19–21 December 1997, 10.


38. Asia observers note how Singapore remains resistant to regional democratic urges: ‘For a region in which everyone is supposed to be more interested in making money than playing politics, Asia is showing a remarkable burst of political activity. … Singapore’s latest event[ however,] seemed to belong to the old Asian kind when its new president, S. R. Nathan, made his maiden speech to parliament. Press coverage was not exactly critical: “People will be at the heart of government policy in the Singapore of the next millennium,” is how the Straits Times began a faithful echo of Nathan’s “bold vision”. But at least his policy address (written by the prime minister’s office) endorsed the need for more “robust” discussions of important issues’ (John Gittings, ‘Inside Asia: China Still Out of Step as Asians Stumble Towards Democracy’, Guardian Weekly, 14–20 October 1999, 6).


40. Quoted in Assis Shameen and Alejandro Reyes, ibid.


42. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, in The New Shape of World Politics, ed. Fareed Zakaria (New York: Norton, 1997), 1; the essay first appeared in The National Interest issue of summer 1989. It needs to be added that the Cold War was not only thought of as being ideological — there were many variants as to what the participants at different points thought it was; the simple point here, though, is that whatever the Cold War may have been, the year 1989 afforded the opportunity for the announcement of the ending of ideological conflict.


45. Michaels, Shape of the Signifier, 31.

46. Cf. Peter J. Taylor, D. R. F. Walker and J. V. Beaverstock: ‘Although [Hong Kong and Singapore] … are [business] centers for their own regions, Northeast and Southeast Asia respectively, when no division is made (for instance as in Asian or Asia-Pacific office designations) Hong Kong edges out Singapore only by 3 to 2 [firms] for the larger regional responsibility. It should be noted when [premier world city] Tokyo appears as a regional headquarters [though “superior” to the other two cities], its region is limited to Japan; this city seems not to have developed responsibilities beyond its own state’ (‘Firms and Their
Global Service Networks’, in Global Networks, Linked Cities, ed. Saskia Sassen [New York: Routledge, 2002], 102). The authors categorise Singapore as part of an ‘alpha world city’ band, though at a level within the band just under that occupied by London, Paris, Tokyo and New York. Chicago, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Los Angeles and Milan occupy the same level as Singapore within that premium band.

47. Formerly the ministry of information and the arts (MITA).


53. See chapter 4, note 34.

54. Mark W. Rectanus, Culture Incorporated: Museums, Artists, and Corporate Sponsorships (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 7. While arts censorship still is exercised in Singapore, the state seems willing to allow a little more latitude for ‘critical reflection’, if not quite ‘subversion’, as part of a more ‘relaxed’ image.


59. Ibid., 11, 15.


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