THE GREAT KANTŌ EARTHQUAKE
and the
CHIMERA of NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION in JAPAN

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The first seismic wave hit eastern Japan at two minutes to noon on Saturday, September 1, 1923. It toppled structures, crushed people, and unsettled everyone who survived. Within minutes, a second intense wave battered the already suffering region. This tremor killed scores more and triggered panic not seen before in Japan’s imperial capital. Over the next seventy-two hours, roughly two hundred major aftershocks and a series of diabolical conflagrations unleashed pandemonium, killed tens of thousands, and incinerated large swaths of Tokyo and Yokohama. Both cities had been transformed into scorched, broken, and almost unrecognizable wrecks. The smell of death and the groans of the seriously wounded, half-dead survivors amid the vanquished landscape led one anonymous chronicler to ask, “If this were not Hell, where would Hell be?”

When the fires extinguished themselves and people surveyed the landscape, even the earth looked wounded. The earthquake had ripped open great fissures in the land. At many points where seismic waves met human constructs, nature showed no mercy. Apart from destroying buildings, the earthquake buckled roads, collapsed bridges, twisted train tracks and

**INTRODUCTION**

We do not have to become pessimistic or disappointed. In a sense, what struck us was a baptism by fire. If the whole nation sees it this way and moves forward, there is no doubt that a new life will be born.

—Abe Isoo, 1923

Prior to the earthquake . . . people expected nothing from the nation and the mutual help across generations and the trust in local communities was beginning to crumble. But maybe the Japanese people could use the experience of this catastrophe to rebuild a society bound together by renewed trust.

—Azuma Hiroki, 2011
trafilines, snapped water and sewer pipes, and severed telegraph lines. Hidden beneath the waters of Sagami Bay, 60 kilometers south-southwest of Tokyo and at the earthquake’s epicenter, the sea floor fell by over 400 meters and triggered a series of tsunamis that inundated low-lying seaside communities. “Nature,” Buddhist lay spokesman Takashima Beihō wrote, “raged all at once, collapsing the pillars of the sky and snapping the axis of the earth.”

“The big city of Tokyo,” he lamented, “the largest in the Orient, at the zenith of its prosperity burned down and melted away over two days and three nights.” To those who had experienced Japan’s earthquake calamity, this was perhaps only a slight exaggeration.

The human tragedy was every bit as horrific to survivors as the desolate sights of the devastated capital. In less than three days, more than 100,000 people perished, often in violent, tragic ways. Almost immediately after the quake hit, thousands were crushed by falling objects or died in collapsed buildings. People were also trampled to death by the scores of panicked residents who clogged Tokyo’s streets attempting to flee. Individuals who escaped the initial chaos found themselves confronted—often trapped mercilessly—by encroaching fires that turned Tokyo into an inferno. Some victims suffocated as fires consumed vast quantities of oxygen from the air. More succumbed to burns produced by the intense heat and flames. Others drowned in rivers or were boiled alive in small ponds and canals that provided virtually no protection from the approach of Hell. However their lives were extinguished, all who died experienced a terror that was almost unimaginable just hours before.

Referred to initially as the Taishō shinsai (earthquake disaster of the Taishō era), or the Tokyo shinsai (Tokyo earthquake disaster), its name grew in stature as the totality of its devastation emerged. The 1923 disaster became, and would forever be known as, the Kantō daishinsai (Great Kantō Earthquake Disaster), one of the most deadly, costly, and destructive natural disasters of the twentieth century. This cataclysmic event, moral philosopher Shimamoto Ainosuke declared, “overturned” Japan’s “culture from its very foundation.” Owing to the government’s decision in 1960 to designate September 1 as Disaster Prevention Day, the anniversary of the Great Kantō Earthquake has become a day that all Japanese, not just Tokyoites, associate with natural disasters and preparedness.

Songwriter, street performer, and political activist Soeda Azenbō felt compelled to preserve the sights and sounds of the disaster he experienced through a ballad composed in 1923 entitled “Taishō daishinsai no
uta” (A song of the Taishō Great Earthquake). Soeda’s evocative lyrics relayed the horrors of Japan’s apocalyptic experience to countless people in the years after 1923. He wrote in part:

We heard roars near and far.
Fires spread to burn the sky.
The streets turned instantly into a veritable hell.
It was hell on earth, filled with cries and screams . . .

People died helplessly,
burned in the fire, going mad.
Parents called to their children; children called to their parents.
Looking for them in the fire and in the water . . .

Falling after being tormented by both fire and water;
Thrown to the river from a collapsing bridge;
And drowning, falling from a burning boat—
The number of people who perished was too numerous to count.

A whirlwind fanned the fierce fire.
There was nowhere to escape but a muddy pond.
They immersed their bodies, avoiding the flying sparks.
But it was no use.

So many are steamed to death,
Licked by the tongue of approaching flames.
Stepping over countless corpses,
People ran around, under the smoke and flames.

Those who barely escaped with their lives
had wounds too terrible to look at.
Poor souls, they are more dead than alive,
Breathing faintly in misery.

The survivors have neither food nor water
They sleep in the open, with only the clothes they happened to be wearing
Day after day, night after night.
They feel more dead than alive . . .
What a terrible force of evil!
With only one shock,
It destroyed the great city of Tokyo, Yokohama,
The Bōsō Peninsula, Izu, Sagami.

Humans took pride in their civilization
And enjoyed the luxurious dream life.
But it has been destroyed completely,
Ah, it has been destroyed with no trace left behind.⁵

In the course of three days, as Soeda described, Tokyo had become a fire-blackened, rubble-strewn, corpse-filled, stinking wasteland of a once vibrant city.

In that fateful autumn of 1923, economist Fukuda Tokuzō shared much of Soeda’s anguish at the destruction of Japan’s imperial capital. As a self-professed “proud Tokyoite,” Fukuda was distraught over the state of the metropolis he called home.⁶ Was anything, he asked, comparable to the tragedy Tokyo experienced? Initial comparisons between Tokyo’s catastrophe and the one that had struck San Francisco in April 1906—the last major urban earthquake disaster on the Pacific Rim of Fire—ended abruptly when the true scale of Japan’s calamity emerged.⁷ Fukuda believed that only the war that had ravaged the European continent less than ten years earlier provided an apt comparison with what Japan had recently experienced.

Fukuda felt more than just anguish at the destruction of large parts of Tokyo. He also harbored a sense of sanguinity. The German-trained academician knew that however great Tokyo had become, it was far from perfect on the eve of calamity. In the latter half of his life, Fukuda believed that Tokyo had failed to become a modern imperial capital (teito) as it grew but rather expanded in an almost arbitrary fashion as a “mere extension of Edo, the city built by the Tokugawa regime (1600–1868).” Fukuda complained that the narrow, winding streets and mazelike urban plan that had served the Tokugawa government well—a purpose-built defensive construction designed to restrict the movement of potential enemy armies into Edo—had done nothing but hinder the free and easy flow of people and commerce in modern Japan. Yet it had not been redesigned even as Tokyo’s population soared. Few parks or open spaces existed despite awareness that they could improve the quality of life for Tokyoites and serve as potential firebreaks in times of conflagration. Worst of all,
however, successive governments had done little to combat the proliferation of slum neighborhoods in eastern Tokyo or deal effectively with the causes of urban poverty. “Those cursed aspects of Tokyo,” Fukuda wrote, “were the center and origin of all cursed things about Japan.” Now they were gone, and in their place he hoped something better could be planned, created, and managed.

With the fiery destruction of much of eastern Tokyo, Fukuda thus felt a degree of jubilation at the prospect of a true, modern, imperial capital rising from the ashes of dead Tokyo. More than simply feeling ecstatic over the prospect of reconstruction, Fukuda proselytized to all Japanese that they must embrace the opportunity presented by the earthquake and reconstruct the nation. “Tokyo should not grieve that it has lost the remains of its old self,” Fukuda wrote in the popular journal Kaizō, but rather “establish it [reconstructed Tokyo] as the base of a restored Japan.” However deadly and destructive the disaster had been, it had done Japan a favor by purifying the capital through fire. He opined that the cleansing that Tokyo had experienced was similar to what the fire of London had accomplished in eradicating the black plague. Both were blessings in disguise rather than something to bemoan.

Fukuda hoped that the fires that burned Tokyo would serve as the beginning of a “mass purification ceremony for the nation.” It would only be a true blessing, however, if people were astute enough to comprehend it as a unique opportunity and to seize it. “The first task for the restoration of Japan,” Fukuda therefore argued, was to “help turn the fires that burnt Tokyo, Yokohama, Odawara, Yokosuka, and other cities into a fire that will burn the wreckage of old Japan and the old mentalities of the feudal era that prevails.” “Build a new Tokyo,” he wrote, “that could serve as a pathfinder and leader of a restored Japan.” More than this, Fukuda urged his readers to plan and construct “a city that could promote the reformation of the entire world.” “Tokyo,” he argued, had been made a “sacrifice of a Japan that had been following the wrong trajectory.” A new Tokyo could shepherd Japan on a course of national renewal. If Japan failed in this undertaking, however, the “deaths of those people will be [remembered] as a waste.”

Fukuda was not alone in seeing opportunity embedded within Japan’s most deadly natural disaster in recorded history. He was joined by a constellation of political elites, social commentators, journalists, academics, and bureaucrats who saw an unparalleled chance to fashion the 1923 earthquake as Japan’s great national calamity. Once packaged as a
national tragedy, it could be used, these actors hoped, not only to advance a project for rebuilding Tokyo as a modern, imperial capital but also to implement a much larger and more complex program of national reconstruction. Individuals from across the political spectrum, from all class backgrounds, and from a gamut of professions embraced the notion that the civilization-upturning calamity could be manipulated artfully to secure a transformative Taishō restoration. “When on earth,” urban planner Anan Jō’ichi rhetorically asked, “will we have another great opportunity to construct a modern imperial capital to our heart’s content if we miss this one? Never!” Others argued that the social, political, ideological, and economic problems that had manifested themselves with intensity following the First World War—hedonism and decadence, extravagance and luxury mindedness, flippancy, frivolity, and laxness, political extremism, disunity, social agitation, inflation, and excess—could be not only arrested but also reversed through a project of national renewal. The earthquake “presented an unprecedented opportunity,” Privy Councillor Ichiki Kitokurō suggested, to embrace a true spiritual restoration and thus improve “all aspects of life.”

From the wrecked landscape of Tokyo, many assumed that the government faced a monumental set of tasks. Virtually all commentators knew that both the reconstruction of Tokyo and the project of national regeneration would require significant funds, united leadership, and a sympathetic populace willing to accept sacrifice. Leading light of the social reform movement Abe Isoo suggested that people across the nation would have to endure hardship, willingly accept personal sacrifices, and unite behind a Taishō restoration much like he suggested Japan rallied in 1868–1869 to support the new Meiji state. If reconstruction and restoration were successful, he and others predicted, the rewards would be enumerable. Shimamoto went so far as to predict that the catastrophe would forever be remembered as “the mother of all happiness” if a thorough reconstruction were carried out.

Could elites construct the regional disaster into a “national calamity,” and would people across Japan see it as such? How did people interpret, comprehend, or attempt to make sense of this disaster, and what did they believe it meant for Japan? Could Japan afford a revolutionary project that aimed to turn Tokyo into a modern imperial capital? More important, would people outside the capital support such an expensive undertaking? What voice would local citizens have in planning Tokyo’s rebirth, and would they embrace a radical reconstruction of the city they
called home? What did commentators mean by national reconstruction, and who would devise and implement this program? Could this disaster really be manipulated and turned into “the event” that compelled people to change their social behaviors and thus alter the overall trajectory of Japan’s future development? This book explores these and other questions related to the 1923 earthquake calamity. In doing so, it provides the first study in English or Japanese that details how elites interpreted, constructed, and packaged the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake and attempted to use it for larger political, ideological, social, and economic aims. It also explores how elites with competing visions for reconstruction and average citizens responded to the seemingly endless overtures for reconstruction and regeneration that emanated from the disaster zone between 1923 and 1930. Responses proved far more varied than many anticipated.

Rarely did the actuality of reconstruction match the starry-eyed dreams of the disaster opportunists. Reality, in fact, proved far less accommodating than most people imagined in September 1923. Plans for an expensive refashioning of Tokyo as an infrastructure-rich, high modernist dreamscape and the prescriptions made for reconstructing society ignited intense contestation from elites with competing visions. Likewise, plans for a radical makeover of Tokyo triggered resistance from landowners and spurred calls for a rapid return to normalcy. Both factors quelled grandiose reconstruction dreams conjured up by disaster opportunists.

Though Tokyo was rebuilt and the government celebrated its rebirth with a well-orchestrated series of commemorative services in 1930, the transformative urban, ideological, political, and social changes that many hoped the earthquake would facilitate remained as elusive and illusory as a mythical chimera. Amid the rubble and dislocation of Tokyo’s postdisaster landscape, it was easier and perhaps more comforting for people to remember what life was like before the calamity and to yearn for a return to normalcy than to affirm a radically different future, however inspiring, new, and modern it was made to seem. Rather than alter Japan’s trajectory in deep-seated ways, the Great Kantō Earthquake amplified many social, political, and economic trends that had already begun to define the increasingly contoured landscape of interwar Japan. Moreover, debates about reconstruction exacerbated many preexisting tensions within and between agencies and among various political actors in Japan. These two factors, along with the increasingly pluralistic nature of Japan’s polity,
meant that elites were unable to turn postdisaster reconstruction into a panacea for the afflictions, real or imagined, that they believed Japan suffered.

My findings have direct relevance for understanding today’s world as much as they are relevant for understanding interwar Japan. Politicians and bureaucratic elites across cultures and from diverse political systems regularly make opportunistic and idealistic calls for reconstruction and renewal following major natural disasters. Frequently they attempt to use these events for larger political and ideological ends. Postdisaster pronouncements and policies following the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), Hurricane Katrina (2005), the Sichuan earthquake (2008), the Haitian earthquake (2010), and the Tōhoku earthquake (2011) are just a few examples that support this assertion. Because bold reconstruction plans are often made without consulting citizens who are most affected by such undertakings, disaster victims frequently respond to such policies with ambivalence or, when they can in democratic societies, creative and sustained resistance. Moreover, competing bureaucratic elites with differing agendas likewise challenge and often limit public policy outcomes following catastrophic occurrences. Rarely is the optimism and opportunism that is unleashed by natural disasters translated into fundamental, lasting, and transformative changes in society. Japan’s experience calls into question the universality of claims that postdisaster utopias invariably emerge after calamitous occurrences, endure, and contribute to lasting transformations within society.15

In a broad scholarly context, my study complements the growing number of works that examine natural disasters and the reconstruction projects that follow. Anthropologists Anthony Oliver-Smith and Susanna Hoffman have been instrumental in establishing a number of theoretical frameworks that have enabled countless academics, students, and a wider popular audience to better understand natural disasters and their importance as objects of study.16 Disasters, they suggest, rest at the intersection where natural phenomena with destructive potential meet humans in their natural and built environments. The degree of environmental, physical, structural, social, political, and economic vulnerability that exists in a society struck by a natural hazard determines the level of destruction, dislocation, and loss that result. Truly understanding disasters thus requires us to have specialist knowledge about the “dramatic event” or natural hazard with destructive potential as well as the “total system” in which it took place. Disasters are thus demanding objects of study. “As
events and processes,” Oliver-Smith and Hoffman conclude, “disasters are totalizing phenomena, subsuming culture, society, and environment together.”

Any detailed study of disasters and the environments in which they take place thus uncovers much about a disaster-struck society. In short, disasters reveal. Educator Miura Tōsaku understood this concept in 1923 Japan. Writing in the education journal *Kyōiku jiron*, Miura suggested, “Disasters take away the falsehood and ostentation of human life and expose conspicuously the strengths and weaknesses of human nature.” Calamitous events do more than just reveal the best and worst characteristics of society, however. Disasters, as Oliver-Smith has suggested, “disclose . . . power structures, social arrangements, cultural values, and belief systems.” They provide an extraordinary window into society that gives students and scholars unique insights into human nature, cultural and social constructions, and the many key relationships—between humans, nature, the built environment, the state, and even the cosmos—that help define our existence. Historian Marc Bloch articulated this point nearly seventy years ago. “Just as the progress of a disease shows a doctor the secret life of a body,” he suggested, “the progress of a great calamity yields valuable information about the nature of a society.”

It is not just a catastrophic disaster “as event” and the immediate relief and recovery efforts that follow, however, that illuminate. Hoffman has demonstrated that longer-term reconstruction processes are just as revealing. She describes the process of reconstruction as a time when the complex webs of the world are spun again “thread by thread.” Disasters are often perceived of as providers of a new start and postdisaster landscapes are often characterized as blank slates awaiting rebirth. These desolate environments empower people—perhaps as a coping or survival mechanism triggered by incomprehensible devastation and loss—to assume that sweeping changes and the construction of something new, modern, and better is not only possible but destined. Blank slates, however, rarely exist. Survivors return to where their homes and businesses once stood and often seek to rebuild their lives as they once were. Discussions about what the “new society” will resemble, how it will be achieved, and who will create it often ignite arenas of contestation, foster resilience, and promote resistance to change. Each phenomenon was apparent in Tokyo between 1923 and 1930.

Given that disasters emanate from the nexus where a natural phenomenon with destructive potential intersects with humans, often in violent,
confronting, and reflection-compelling ways, they are valuable objects of study for people outside the disciplines of anthropology or sociology. Specifically, they are compelling topics for historians. This is particularly true since disasters are constructed “catastrophe events” and often result in the large amounts of public interest, media coverage, written records, reports, and visual materials for later consultation. Likewise, discussions and debates about reconstruction, organized resistance against plans forwarded by elites, remembrance and memorial activities, and commemoration services—all components of natural disasters and their aftermaths—create a rich and varied cache of source materials to examine.

Fortunately, numerous historians with diverse geographical expertise and chronological interest have begun to embrace the analysis of disasters. They have used catastrophic disasters and humans’ responses to these events not only to illuminate the disasters as events but also to analyze the societies in which they occurred. As a result, our knowledge of hurricanes in the Caribbean and Atlantic world; cyclones in the Philippines; earthquakes in South and North America, Europe, and Asia; floods on virtually every continent; and volcanic eruptions along the Pacific Rim of Fire has increased markedly. Historians of Japan have contributed to this burgeoning field with works by Alex Bates, Janet Borland, Greg Clancey, Greg Smits, Timothy Tsu, Gennifer Weisenfleld, and myself expanding our knowledge of earthquakes, typhoons, and floods. These have added to a number of works in Japanese that have highlighted the important role of natural disasters and reconstruction in Japan’s modern and early modern history. Remarkably, however, no one before now has written an in-depth, book-length analytical study of the 1923 earthquake in English.

While providing new insight on the Great Kantō Earthquake as a calamitous event, my work also adds to the growing number of excellent studies on interwar Japan. Sheldon Garon has been instrumental in shaping the way a generation of historians have approached and understood state-society relations in Japan. His works, but most important Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life, illustrate how state officials nurtured a spirit of guided self-management or self-cultivation for the betterment of peoples’ lives and for the improvement of Japan’s overall economic, social, and political position. His findings, along with those from David Ambaras, Janet Borland, Sabine Früstrück, Sally Hastings,
Gregory Kasza, Mark Metzler, Kenneth Pyle, Dick Smethurst, Elise Tipton, and Sandra Wilson, have demonstrated how bureaucratic elites, working with citizen groups, neighborhood associations, and other government agencies, managed people—rather than browbeat or coerce them into compliance—for larger political, social, ideological, and economic aims and objectives.

Though I suggest that Tokyo and Japan were not transformed in revolutionary ways as many disaster opportunists had hoped, the Great Kantō Earthquake remains an event of extraordinary significance to historians. Foremost, the disaster and people’s responses to it reveal much about interwar Japanese society. On one level the disaster illustrated the abysmal state of disaster preparedness that existed in Tokyo prior to 1923, especially in relation to the vulnerabilities that defined this metropolis. Various levels of government proved themselves ill equipped to deal with the postdisaster chaos, confusion, panic, and anarchy that erupted. In stark contrast to events following the March 2011 tragedy, countless individuals exhibited a clear absence of rational calm mindedness, resolve, discipline, and humanity in 1923. This suggests that stoicism and courage in the face of catastrophic natural disasters are not innate characteristics of Japanese people but rather learned responses nurtured through years of training and education.

On another level the Great Kantō Earthquake illuminated the intense, almost palatable anxieties that a multitude of commentators and bureaucratic elites felt toward modernity and the state of society in 1923. From 1905 onward, but particularly after 1915, Japan underwent a series of profound changes that many elites perceived as disorienting, alienating, unhealthy, and ultimately threatening. Japan became more urban, densely populated, industrial, cosmopolitan, pluralistic, wealthy, and diverse. As these transformations took place, society became less cohesive, less well ordered, less stable, and more divisive. The process of modern development and the acceptance of urban, consumer-oriented modern culture posed unfamiliar challenges to Japanese people, their governing elites, and the nation’s built and natural environment. By 1923 a series of transformative waves unleashed by modernity had swept over Japan well before the seismic waves of destruction amplified the sense of anxiety, foreboding, and dislocation. Given perceptions surrounding the seemingly fragile nature of post–World War I Japanese society, it is not surprising that many concerned commentators imbued the Great Kantō Earthquake
with moral and political meaning. Still others attempted to use it to ad-
monish Japanese society and implied that the thoughts and actions of To-
kyoites had helped trigger a disaster of catastrophic proportions.

The earthquake disaster emerged as a unique, unprecedented, all-
encompassing event that enabled people to critique Japan’s state of mo-
dernity and its developmental trajectory. It likewise emboldened many
elites to devise and articulate numerous prescriptions they believed
could reorient Japan on a more responsible, wholesome, and ultimately
satisfactory course. Ironically, many of the prescriptions advanced by bu-
reaucratic elites to reorient society following the 1923 tragedy were per-
meated with the belief that the difficult task of national reconstruction
could be achieved by better harnessing technocratic modernity to mo-
bilize, persuade, and condition Japanese people. While some competing
elites argued for the adoption of more heavy-handed approaches, none
suggested that Japan should face, or could overcome, the challenges of
modernity by returning to some idyllic premodern past. Modernity, like
the earthquake itself, was viewed as both the scourge of society and the
elixir for rebuilding Tokyo and reconstructing the nation.

Regardless of prescriptions, however, not everyone endorsed even the
most moderate policies aimed at rebuilding Tokyo and reconstructing
the nation. In fact, unity of purpose or action was virtually nonexistent.
People responded to calls for rebuilding Tokyo and reconstructing the
nation with varying degrees of acceptance, vacillation, and resistance.
Such ambivalence further heightened elite-level anxieties and disquiet
about society’s resolve. Though certain actors from left, right, and cen-
ter perspectives argued for elites to flex their muscles and employ the
heavy hand of the state to capitalize on the catastrophe and “solve” the
perceived problems of the day through dramatic interventionist policies,
a sizable majority of governing elites in 1920s Japan resisted such calls
and instead championed more moderate and nuanced strategies. Official
longer-term responses to the Great Kantō Earthquake thus stand in stark
contrast to policies employed in the late 1930s and early 1940s. During
those tumultuous years, governing elites responded to multiple chal-
lenges and catastrophes, almost all of their own making, in a far more
heavy-handed manner that ran counter to many of Japan’s pragmatic and
pluralistic political precedents.
On March 24, 1930, more than a million Tokyoites participated in the opening act of what became a weeklong series of events held to celebrate Tokyo’s rebirth. Beginning just after sunrise, throngs of people gathered near the imperial palace hoping to position themselves for a glimpse of the Shōwa Emperor as he embarked on a well-choreographed inspection tour of new Tokyo. Still more well-wishers packed the 35-kilometer tour route to wave flags and shout “banzai” as the emperor’s maroon motorcade drove past. Wherever they could, people congregated at more than half a dozen locations where the imperial entourage stopped to inspect a site classified as a significant reconstruction accomplishment. Tokyo and its people were proud to celebrate and share what they had achieved since the bleak days of September 1923.

The route that the emperor took and the sites selected for inspection provide many clues as to what municipal authorities believed were the meritorious reconstruction successes. The emperor’s motorcade traversed the Sumida River over four of the six new bridges—Kototoi-bashi,
Kuramae-bashi, Kiyosu-bashi, and Eitai-bashi—heralded as great engineering achievements and exemplars of architectural modernity. The avenues selected for the motorcade included the widest, most magisterial new streets that Tokyo could offer any resident or visitor, including Shōwa dōri, Yasukuni dōri, Asakusa dōri, Kiyosumi dōri, Eitai dōri, and Hibiya dōri. The places where the emperor stopped were no less significant symbols of new Tokyo. He inspected Sumida Park, the largest new park constructed in the capital, and drove by three others including the Hamachō Park in Nihonbashi Ward and two parks in Fukagawa Ward. He also visited a modern, reinforced concrete hospital constructed in Tsukiji.

Three locations visited by the emperor, however, stood out in significance. To coincide with the moment the earthquake struck Tokyo, he made a personal inspection of the unfinished Taishō Earthquake Memorial Hall in Honjo Ward. After examining the building, charnel house, and grounds of the project site, he offered condolences to the spirits of the dead in a solemn, private ceremony. From death and remembrance he next turned to life and the future of Tokyo by visiting the newly constructed Chiyoda Primary School in Nihonbashi Ward. During his daylong tour, the emperor spent more time at the state-of-the-art school than at
any other location. He met with teachers and students and spent nearly an hour inspecting the three-story, reinforced concrete symbol of modernity. He took great interest in the exterior of the building, its classrooms, its public facilities, and a number of visual and material displays placed in its spacious auditorium.

Perhaps the most memorable sight of the day, however, was the view afforded the emperor from the bluff at Ueno Park directly beneath the statue of Saigō Takamori. From this vantage point, the emperor was given an unobstructed view of the reconstructed city. The scene before him in 1930 stood in stark contrast to the ruined city he saw from this very same location on September 15, 1923, when, as crown prince, he toured the city on horseback guarded by armed military personnel. Looking at the devastated city from Ueno Park just days following the calamity, he might have shared journalist Karl Padek’s opinion that the disaster might “remove Japan from the list of great powers for a decade.” Tokyo of 1923 looked as if it had been struck off the face of the planet by forces almost beyond comprehension. Given the contrast presented in 1930, it was clear that Tokyo had not just recovered but in many places looked modern, once again bustling, and, in a few places, even awe-inspiring.

The roughly ¥744 million that the City of Tokyo and the national government spent on reconstruction by 1930 had done much to improve the city’s infrastructure and its outward appearance. Roads in most places of the previously destroyed sections of the city were wider, straighter, and paved. Virtually all had been reconstructed with modern sidewalks. Land plots in much of eastern and central Tokyo had been rationalized, though by no means standardized. Many new government buildings, from schools to ministry offices, emerged from reconstruction as impressive, and in many cases imposing, symbols of authority, modernity, and seeming permanence. The city also gained modern water and sewer systems that, while virtually invisible and thus unheralded, were nevertheless significant accomplishments that benefited large numbers of residents.

If one examines how the reconstruction budget was spent, it is not surprising that rebuilt Tokyo looked more modern and rational and emerged as a more functional city. The lion’s share of spending had gone to pay for roads, canals, bridges, and the process of land readjustment. Specifically, ¥487,906,815 million was spent on these endeavors, equating to 66 percent of the total reconstruction budget (see tables 9.1–9.3).

While the final budget was larger than the ¥468 million agreed upon in December 1923, it was still much less than many hoped. Numerous
Table 9.1 National government reconstruction expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPENDITURE ITEMS</th>
<th>COST (YEN)</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF OVERALL EXPENDITURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repair and improvement of trunk roads, including bridges</td>
<td>257,458,400</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair and improvement of canals and creeks</td>
<td>28,879,065</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy for construction of buildings in fire prevention zones</td>
<td>18,000,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of new parks</td>
<td>11,900,000</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land readjustment</td>
<td>8,750,000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>324,987,465</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 9.2 Two exemplars of New Tokyo: the wide avenue of Nihonbashi dōri in Ginza and the Kiyosu Bridge

Source: Postcard, author’s private collection.
individuals believed both in 1923 and 1930 that the government should have budgeted far more on what was described as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to transform Tokyo into a modern imperial metropolis that embodied and projected new values and promoted Japan’s position as a leader in East Asia. Horikiri Zenjirō, Tokyo’s mayor in 1930, was one such individual. While acknowledging many accomplishments associated with reconstruction at the city’s reconstruction festivities, he also stated publicly what many people felt privately but were too diplomatic to articulate: that much more could have been achieved. He evoked the memory of Gotō Shinpei, who died the previous year a broken man, compelling a large gathering of dignitaries to remember his spirit of optimism in the face of calamity. Horikiri then lamented that “the reconstruction plan that is to be completed today is much smaller than Mr. Gotō intended.”

Horikiri understood that most parts of western Tokyo that had escaped the postearthquake conflagrations experienced little change in relation to land plots and did not have their road networks altered, straightened, or widened in revolutionary ways during the seven-year reconstruction project. Moreover, Gotō’s dream of turning Tokyo into a greener city through the creation of extensive new parks and a well-integrated system of open space fire breaks withered. Tokyo of 1930 was not a brand new city that emerged from the ruins of its former self. Rather, it was a reconstructed city that possessed many of the same urban vulnerabilities that existed on the eve of calamity in August 1923. American military planners hoping to coerce submission through urban area bombing

### Table 9.2 Tokyo Prefecture reconstruction expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPENDITURE ITEMS</th>
<th>COST (YEN)</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF OVERALL EXPENDITURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repair and improvement of prefectural roads</td>
<td>18,754,036</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational facilities</td>
<td>3,250,000</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22,004,036</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

during the Second World War were aware of Tokyo’s vulnerabilities and specifically targeted areas that they knew had burned during the 1923 catastrophe: the results were equally devastating in March 1945. A wartime propaganda brochure (fig. 9.3) illustrates American awareness of Tokyo’s vulnerabilities.
Years later, on the sixtieth anniversary of the Great Kantō Earthquake, when the war was a somewhat distant, yet still painful, memory for many Tokyoites, the Shōwa Emperor discussed the firebombing of Tokyo. He stated: “Gotō Shinpei designed a massive reconstruction plan for Tokyo, a plan that if implemented, might have reduced considerably the wartime fires of 1945 in Tokyo. I now think that it was very unfortunate that Gotō’s plan was not put into action.” Many Tokyoites eventually shared the emperor’s sense of regret at what had failed to materialize between 1923 and 1930.

Though the municipal and national governments spent only a meager amount constructing parks and other open green spaces, they budgeted even less money on social welfare facilities. Dreams that a reconstructed, well-designed, and well-managed city could ameliorate the social ills and side effects of urban, industrial modernity proved wildly ambitious. Many of the social problems and disadvantaged areas that had existed before the earthquake returned almost as quickly as reconstruction commenced. None of these areas was highlighted during the 1930 celebrations. It is
just as instructive for historians today to examine which districts the emperor’s motorcade avoided in March 1930 because city officials did not want to tarnish the celebration. The emperor did not travel through what many considered to be the new or reemergent slum areas of eastern Fukagawa or Honjo. In fact, city officials were so worried that impoverished and unemployed people from the poorest areas of Tokyo might mar the 1930 celebrations that they decided to employ, albeit temporarily, virtually everyone who sought employment to assist with numerous aspects of the weeklong festivities, from street cleaning and garbage collection to decorating the city’s streets and sidewalks. Likewise, the emperor did not inspect a dance hall or café, though he had ample from which to select. Tokyo housed more dance halls, cafés, department stores, restaurants, cabarets, and movie theaters in 1930 than existed in 1922, much to the chagrin of bureaucratic elites and concerned social commentators who believed the popularity of such places were symptomatic of a spiritual degeneration of society. Not unsurprisingly, the emperor also did not visit the entertainment quarters of Asakusa or the licensed prostitution quarters of Yoshiwara or Susaki that reemerged and flourished in the seven years after 1923.

People who experience a megadisaster such as the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake and those who interpret and construct such occurrences often believe that a catastrophic event of this magnitude will change everything. The devastation caused, the intense reflection that follows, and eventual calls for unity, resolve, and sacrifice in the aftermath inveigle us to think that lasting change will result. We comfort ourselves with the notion that cities and societies will be rebuilt better than before and that people will change their thoughts and behaviors in the wake of a personal, local, or national calamity. Perhaps this is a human survival mechanism triggered when faced with catastrophic destruction and seemingly immeasurable loss. Perhaps it also betrays our faith in modernity and progress. Ian Buruma, professor of human rights at Bard College, endorsed wholeheartedly the disaster-as-agent-of-change interpretation in the wake of Japan’s most recent earthquake and tsunami calamity of 2011. He wrote, “Natural disasters have a way of changing everything, and not just in material terms.”

Rarely, however, if history serves as a judge, have disasters imparted change in societies, behaviors, or systems in such a sweeping manner. Many parts of the marginalized Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans are still a wreck after Hurricane Katrina battered the American Gulf Coast
in 2005. The collapse of numerous schools in Chengdu as a result of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake has not led to greater local-level political transparency or successful parent-led involvement in educational affairs but rather resulted in greater attempts to silence and suppress dissent. In tsunami-ravaged communities along Japan’s northeastern coast, such as Babanakayama and Ōfunato, attempts to resettle homes, communities, and villages to higher tracts of land have been plagued with difficulties and riddled with contestation since the March 11, 2011, disaster. “We should all be working together,” declared Yoshihiro Miura, a forty-six-year-old fisherman from Babanakayama. “But even in this little village, there’s this kind of wrangling. It’s just human nature.”

Anthropologists, social scientists, and historians who have examined disasters and the reconstruction processes that follow have found numerous instances in which the contestation, resistance, and resilience—not to mention competing visions of what should be reconstructed and how—replace the optimism and opportunism that often spring forth from devastated, postdisaster landscapes. Sometimes people defy authority and attempt to rebuild where and how their homes and lives existed prior to calamity. Whether in Babanakayama in 2011, Port-au-Prince in 2010, Banda-Aceh in 2004, or Fukagawa Ward in 1923, resilience and a desire to return to normalcy often trump or at least hinder grand plans of a revolutionary new future. Virtually always, competing visions over reconstruction plans provoke fierce resistance and political struggles. “Disasters,” as Susanna Hoffman reminds us, “set a critical stage bringing out and igniting arenas of contestation within a society.”

Apart from inspiring opportunism and unleashing contestation, disasters and the reconstruction processes that follow also reveal much about a society. As Hoffman provocatively asked, “When catastrophe upends a culture’s cards, are matters altered or merely disclosed?” Often they reveal far more than they ever alter. Perhaps this is their most important, utilitarian quality to historians and people who study disasters. Interconnections among politics, society, nature, ideology, economics, religion, and the built environment can be observed in the wake of catastrophe. Moreover, when one explores a disaster as more than just a cataclysmic event, examining it within the social, political, cultural, economic, and historical contexts in which it took place, one finds that it often amplifies preexisting concerns, trends, and patterns of behavior rather than transforming existing orders in radical ways. This was certainly true of Japan following the Great Kantō Earthquake.
What did the earthquake and the subsequent reconstruction projects reveal about interwar Japan? At the most basic human level, the land readjustment and reconstruction process illuminated the remarkable resilience of Tokyoites. Many residents returned to the locations of their former lives and began the challenging tasks of rebuilding their homes, often without government support or direction. When given a chance to voice their concerns and raise objections to plans that had been crafted by elites with little input from local residents, Tokyoites lobbied and petitioned local authorities with resolve. While residents were not able to fundamentally shape the overall plans for reconstruction, they found creative ways to voice opinions and utilized with aplomb all political and legal avenues open to them.

On a broader governmental level, the fractious debates over the scope and scale of reconstruction illustrated the unwillingness and inability of many elites and institutions to put differences aside at a moment of national emergency and to work together effectively. Individuals from different government agencies fought bitterly over what to reconstruct, how to rebuild, and, most important, how much to budget for reconstruction. Attempts to soothe disputes, tame jealousies, temper bureaucratic rivalries, and reach consensus under the aegis of numerous committees accomplished little: often they calcified disagreements and institutionalized antagonisms. Parliamentarians angered that they had not been consulted in reconstruction planning voiced outrage over the bureaucratic structures put in place to plan and implement reconstruction. They were joined by other elected elites representing constituents outside the disaster zone who believed that large monetary outlays directed toward the capital would endanger the economic vitality of the nation. Japan’s quasi-democratic polity comprised many diffuse groups who held only limited powers yet guarded them with ferocity. It thus proved slow, fractious, and weak in responding to the complex task of rebuilding Tokyo and reconstructing the nation. That Japan’s political system lacked an active and engaged arbiter of power more dominant than the other actors further complicated attempts to implement transformative policies after 1923.

The earthquake disaster also revealed—and amplified in dramatic ways—elite-level concerns about the state of Japanese society at this agonizing moment of modern revelation. The capital-destroying calamity helped galvanize elite opinion behind the notion that Japan was mired in an era of acute moral decay and social degeneration. In the opinion of many commentators, Japanese people—particularly the emergent middle
classes of Japan’s expanding cities—had become too consumer oriented, wedded to luxuries, and wasteful. In the political sphere, they had become enamored of dangerous, if not ultimately subversive, ideologies. In the social sphere, many elites complained that people displayed flippancy and laxness, whereas before they had exhibited respect for authority and resolve not only in the face of adversity but also in everyday situations. Commentators suggested that urbanites had become bewitched by the temptations of a frivolous lifestyle and beguiled by the hollow allure of hedonistic pursuits. Numerous individuals who interpreted and constructed the earthquake calamity as an act of heavenly punishment to admonish Japanese society hoped that this disaster would serve as the event that would shake people loose from the clutches of regress. In a new Japan, society would again embody frugality, austerity, diligence, decorum, resolve, sacrifice, and restraint.

Many Japanese people, however, held different opinions on 1920s urban modernity. Rather than see it as a threat or as an insidious disease that weakened the nation, they often embraced it willingly and enjoyed much of what modernity had to offer. Tariffs on luxury items made only a small and short-lived dent in the overall consumption of consumer goods. Dance halls, coffee shops, and department stores proliferated in reconstructed Tokyo, much to the chagrin of disaster opportunists who wished to use the disaster to assist with moral regeneration. Social commentator, journalist, and philosopher Miyake Setsurei lamented that people had quickly lost sight of the earthquake’s meaning. In autumn 1923 he hoped that the Great Kantō Earthquake would be not only the event that led to a complete refashioning of Tokyo but also the crisis that triggered a social, moral, and ideological transformation of Japanese society. Later historians, he hoped, would divide Japan’s modern history with 1923 as a clear demarcation line akin to what the Meiji Restoration of 1868 had been for earlier generations. Neither happened. By 1924 Miyake worried that few meaningful changes, apart from a more rationally planned city, had emerged from the ruins of Tokyo. “This earthquake came too suddenly,” he declared, “and went very quickly, leaving us with only a dreamlike impression.”

Nose Yoritoshi was even more damning in his criticism of postdisaster society, writing that “danger past, gods forgotten” had become the touchstone phrase of reconstruction.

The political tensions that the reconstruction project exacerbated as well as the elite-level anxieties that the disaster amplified and people’s seeming unwillingness to embrace a moral reorientation elicited two
distinct responses. On the one hand, individuals from across the political spectrum, including socialist intellectual Yamakawa Hitoshi, General Ugaki Kazushige, and progressive Christian social reformer Abe Isoo, advocated the adoption of more heavy-handed, intrusive, top-down approaches to address the perceived regression of society and decline of the popular mind. They likewise implied that Japan needed a more unified polity in which fewer actors wielded more political power. No unanimity existed, however, within Japan’s burgeoning pluralistic polity to accept such authoritarian, high modernist prescriptions. Moreover, no one in Japan’s highly bureaucratic and politically diffuse governmental structure had the power to unite, let alone browbeat, elites with competing visions to accept radical reconstruction and political regeneration initiatives as well as political reorganization.

Far more elites embraced a moderate path. These individuals saw the potential for manifold rewards if government could harness technocratic modernity and tap into the ample reservoir of personal resilience exhibited by countless Tokyoites at the neighborhood level during reconstruction. Future conflict, Japanese elites understood, would require the mobilized efforts of civilians and the economy as much as the military. Home Ministry bureaucrats and City of Tokyo officials concluded that the government needed to find new and more effective ways to persuade, manage, organize, and mobilize urbanites. Imaginative suasion campaigns continued throughout the interwar period, but officials put increased emphasis on expanding the number of neighborhood associations (tonarigumi) and increasing their status and role in urban society. Between 1923 and 1927 more neighborhood associations were formed across Tokyo than at any other point in the capital’s history. Government officials hoped that neighborhood associations would serve as more than just conduits of authority downward, however. They envisaged that these organizations would play leading roles in assisting with the delivery of services, from firefighting to civil defense, and from street cleaning to organizing local festivals: in essence, neighborhood associations would forge and strengthen community bonds among individuals families as well as state-community ties. Moreover, Home Ministry bureaucrats hoped that neighborhood leaders could exert subtle social pressures to encourage the adoption of numerous ideological as well as economic regeneration campaigns ranging from renewed antiluxury drives to war bond purchase initiatives.
Commentators and political elites who reflected on the loss of governmental authority and the murderous violence committed in the aftermath of the 1923 earthquake argued that greater training and physical and moral discipline were required to keep order from evaporating in a future emergency situation. Many saw neighbor associations as key components in this undertaking as well. Educator Matsushita Senkichi wrote in 1924 that proper military drills and integrated physical and mental training in schools and society could help foster a “sense of loyalty, courage, service, devotion, and sacrifice” among practitioners. Once learned in school and reinforced at the neighborhood level, Matsushita claimed, military drills could lead to a “more orderly society” in which people embraced a “moderate and disciplined life.” Moreover, he concluded that future training would better prepare people to face and “persevere in any kind of hardship.” Only “daily training” and a focus on mental and physical “discipline” embedded at an early age and reinforced throughout life, Ugaki Kazushige concurred, would keep panic from sweeping the nation and order from evaporating in a future emergency contingency.

However successful these nascent urban-based neighborhood associations were, governing elites seemingly always wanted more from the people of Japan. This was particularly true after urbanities exhibited general ambivalence to the introduction of air raid and fire prevention drills across urban areas in the late 1920s. Beginning in 1928 and continuing throughout the interwar period, military officials working in conjunction with retired servicemen’s associations, youth groups and young men’s associations, neighborhood associations, and metropolitan governments sought to make people aware of the potential dangers of air attack and to prepare them for just such a contingency. These efforts took many forms, from the mundane publication of a journal entitled Bōkū (Air defense) and numerous pamphlets and posters to more extravagant air defense exercises and blackout drills. The first large-scale air raid drill was carried out in Osaka between July 5 and 7, 1928; more drills would later be held in Tokyo and other major cities across Japan. The events were choreographed to mimic future air raids—both night and daytime attacks. The army and navy each flew aircraft over sections of the city, dropped fake bombs to correspond with fixed explosions on the ground, and released smoke from canisters that represented poison gas. The Osaka government mobilized 139,764 officials to direct this three-day extravaganza, with the lion’s share of supporting officials (121,000) coming from youth group members.
It is nearly impossible to determine how urbanites really felt about these exercises, but what is possible to understand is how government officials perceived of their response. In a word, officials claimed that people were generally unenthusiastic. As one municipal official wrote, “In this international climate of disarmament, the prerequisite idea that the city will be subjected to air attack in the near future is somehow missing.” They lamented that the residents of Osaka were far more excited about and engaged with the seasonal fireworks display that took place at the end of July. Tokyo city officials realized this point as well. To counter what they predicted would be a similar lack of enthusiasm for air defense drills, they directed officials and volunteers who organized these yearly events to emphasize that fire prevention training had practical, nonmilitary efficacy: it could help, they argued, in case Japan was struck by another large earthquake. Drills, exercises, and mock air raids continued throughout the 1930s.

As perceived threats and concerns expanded from natural disasters and moral degeneration to encompass foreign enemies and what was packaged as a holy war against China after 1937, anxieties heightened about whether Japanese people could cope with and surmount a period of national emergency. Terada Torahiko, physicist at Tokyo University, reflected on the perceived state of emergency that existed in the late 1930s and conflated Japan’s postdisaster experience of 1923 with what the nation and the people faced in 1938: an extraordinary challenge that would require people to work together with resolve and discipline. Writing in his evocatively titled 1938 book, Tensai to kokubō (Natural disasters and national defense), he expressed concern that people had “forgotten what it was like when the last disaster occurred.” While disasters of the past caused local or regional devastation, the threat Japan now faced was on a national scale. He suggested, “at a deep layer of our national consciousness there is some vague, nightmare-like shadow of uneasiness lingering these days.” “Japan,” he continued, was situated at the “center of a whirlpool of uneasiness” and a country “surrounded by enemies.” It was therefore incumbent upon leaders to take more active steps to prepare society for the exigencies of a national emergency.

From 1937 onward, Japanese leaders implemented a number of laws aimed at preparing the economy and society for national economic and spiritual mobilization. Differing agencies within Japan’s polity gained new powers to better control manpower, resources, wages, prices, production, and distribution. Businesses, people, and elites with competing
views again met such elite-level overtures with responses that were far less enthusiastic than government officials hoped. People continued to purchase luxuries in quantities that were larger than governing elites believed healthy or necessary. Campaigns that encouraged thrift, diligence, frugality, sacrifice, temperance, and moderation became laws that restricted, then outlawed, luxuries and the sale of items deemed nonessential. Dance halls and other entertainment venues considered frivolous or harmful to national morale were closed in 1940, and increasing levels of conformity and sacrifice were demanded of Japan’s population. Attempts to unify Japan’s polity—launched concurrently with the adoption of ever increasing economic regulations—proved every bit as difficult to achieve. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, inaugurated in October 1940, did little to tame bureaucratic rivalries and political jealousies that had accumulated over the previous fifty years of Japan’s political and economic development. Japan’s economy, which was the smallest and most resource poor of all major combatants in World War II, remained, arguably, the least well organized and efficient.

Japan’s leaders understood that more sacrifices were needed from the populace and that institutional rivalries had to be put aside for their country to survive the greatest challenge of the twentieth century: total war. Regardless of this awareness, Japanese elites did a poor job securing both objectives. Catastrophes, whether natural, as was the case in 1923, or manmade, as Japan experienced between 1937 and 1945, were not as easy to manipulate and use to forge lasting, efficient, and popular new orders. While Japan’s prewar experience with modernity heightened anxieties and suggested to many the disappearance of old attitudes and behaviors that had enabled Japan to emerge as an independent nation state and imperial power, it also offered new opportunities. Many believed that well-managed technocratic modernity held out the tantalizing prospect that national reconstruction was attainable and that a new order could be fashioned from the ruins of catastrophe or from the clutches of a national emergency. Both beliefs were overly optimistic. Calls for sacrifice, renewal, and regeneration therefore continued unabated throughout the interwar and wartime periods in Japan. They were as prevalent, and became as quotidian, as the tremors that shook Japan’s seismically vulnerable archipelago. The attainment of national reconstruction, however, remained as illusive and illusory as a mythical chimera.
NOTES


INTRODUCTION

3. Ibid., 53.


7. The April 18, 1906, San Francisco earthquake and fires destroyed just over 12 million square meters of land, with an estimated loss of life at roughly 3,000. The September 1, 1923, Great Kantō Earthquake and fires destroyed just over 33 million square meters of land in Tokyo, with an estimated loss of life at just over 100,000.


10. Ibid., 13–14, 9, 4.

11. Anan Jō’ichi, “Toshi seikon to daieidan” (The reconstruction of the city and a resolute decision), Toshi kōron 6:11 (November 1923): 82.


1. Cataclysm


7. Osaka mainichi shinbun (English edition), September 6, 1923, 1.
12. Ibid., 73.
16. Koizumi Tomi, “Hifukushō seki sōnan no ki” (Meeting with a disaster at the site of the clothing depot), in Kaizōsha, Taishō daishinkasai shi, 13.
17. Only a small street separated the 67,000 square meter site of the Honjo Clothing Depot from a 40,000 square meter private garden owned by the Yasuda family. Those seeking refuge thus found 107,000 square meters of “empty land” on the eastern bank of the Sumida River.
21. Miyao Shunji, governor of Hokkaidō, reflected on how dismayed he was with earthquake refugees who settled in Hokkaidō and immediately began to spread rumors


24. Kang Tok-sang and Kum Pyong-dong, eds., *Kantō daishinsai to Chōsenjin* (Koreans and the Great Kantō Earthquake) (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1963), 73. Specific numbers are as follows: Tokyo Prefecture, 1593; Kanagawa Prefecture, 603; Gunma Prefecture, 469; Saitama Prefecture, 366; Chiba Prefecture, 336; and Tochigi Prefecture, 19.

25. References to Koreans were printed as XXX in Tanaka’s essay as many, though not all, were censored. Tanaka, “Shitai no nioi,” 74–76.

26. Ibid., 76.


34. Ibid., 15, 18.

35. Ibid., 17–22.


41. Ibid., 249; *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, April 3, 1924, 473.


43. *Hōchi shinbun*, September 5, 1923, 1; September 6, 1923, 2; September 7, 1923, 1.

44. As of July 31, 1923, the Köke ginkō had paid-up capital of ¥3 million, deposits of ¥3.8 million, and loans valued at ¥8.9 million. Bank details found in Takenobu, ed., *Japan Year Book, 1924–25*, 461.
45. *Hōchi shinbun*, September 13, 1923, 2.
46. Ibid., September 7 and 15, 1923, 2.
47. *Otaru shinbun*, September 2, 3, and 5, 1923, 1.
49. This column began in the September 8 edition of the *Fukuoka nichichi shinbun* in which it declared that as of 6 p.m. on September 6, 47,293 bodies had been collected.
52. For accounting purposes, families were defined as comprising at least a married couple but often included extended family members. See Tokyo Municipal Office, *The Reconstruction of Tokyo* (Tokyo: Tokyo Municipal Office, 1933), 9.
54. Out of Tokyo Prefecture’s overall population of 4 million, 1.55 million were classified as homeless in September 1923. Ibid.
59. Prior to the government’s loan intervention, five Japanese insurance companies covered policyholders to a total of 10 percent of any policy’s insured value. This figure equaled ¥3.4 million. Foreign insurance companies also paid policyholders a flat figure of 10 percent of total insured policy value, or roughly ¥2 million. See ibid., 485–86, 495–96.
61. The Tokyo Metropolitan Office lists the number of government and public offices that were destroyed by the disaster at 3,563. These include offices such as the Police Training Institute, Forestry Office, Central Meteorological Observatory, Tokyo Rice Exchange Office, Patent Office, Kyōbashi Revenue Office, Tobacco Monopoly Office, various telephone exchange offices, railway offices and stations, and numerous police and fire stations. See ibid., 18.
67. Ibid., 29.
2. AFTERMATH


2. Yamanashi replaced General Fukuda Masatarō as commander of the martial law headquarters on September 20, 1923. General Fukuda was forced to resign over Captain Amakasu Masahiko’s murder of the well-known anarchist Ōsugi Sakae, the radical feminist Itō Noe, and Ōsugi’s nephew while in military custody following the earthquake. Humphreys, *The Way of the Heavenly Sword*, 56–57.


4. Ibid., 473.


6. Ibid., 91–93.


11. This was the second time in Japan’s history that martial law had been declared in the capital. The first time occurred in September 1905 in response to the anti–Portsmouth Treaty riots that broke out in Hibiya following the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War.


14. Ibid.


17. Tasaki Kimitsukasa and Sakamoto Noboru, eds., *Kantō daishinsai seifu, rikukaigun kankei shiryō*, vol. 2: *Rikugun kankei shiryō* (Materials related to the army) (Tokyo:
Nihon keizai hyōronsha, 1997), 2:166–72. From September 2 until October 4, aircraft made 499 flights over Tokyo and Yokohama for reasons of reconnaissance, communication, leaflet dropping, and the transportation of journalists. Total flying time was 2,537 hours and 19 minutes. See Hirakata, Ōtake, and Matsuo, eds., *Seifu kaigenrei kankei shiryō*, 477–78.


22. A summary of these reports can be found in ibid., 104–5.


26. This figure includes forces drawn from fifty-nine infantry battalions, six cavalry regiments, six artillery regiments, seventeen engineer battalions, two railway regiments, two telecommunication regiments, one aviation battalion, one balloon unit, and one vehicle unit. Hirakata, Ōtake, and Matsuo, eds., *Seifu kaigenrei kankei shiryō*, 1:463–65.


29. Details related to the creation of the Emergency Earthquake Relief Bureau and its powers can be found in Kang and Kum, eds., *Kantō daishinsai to Chōsenjin*, 71–73.


34. Tokyoshi, ed., *Teito fukkōshaishi* (Celebrating the completion of the imperial capital reconstruction) (Tokyo: Tokyoshi, 1932), 571.

35. The following story is recounted in Nagata’s memoirs. Ibid., 575–76.


41. The articles specifically spelled out for requisition included foodstuffs; water; fuel, including oil, gasoline, charcoal, and firewood; houses; building materials; medicine; instruments of conveyance, including automobiles, ships, and railroad freight cars; electrical wiring; and labor. See ibid., 563–65.

42. Ibid., 563–64. Given that the average day laborer in Tokyo made just over ¥2 per day, a ¥3,000 fine was a sizable figure.


44. Miyao Shunji’s reflections are found in Tokyo Shisei Chōsakai, ed., *Teito fukkō hiroku*, 73–74.


47. Hirakata, Ōtake, and Matsuo, eds., *Seifu kaigenrei kankei shiryō*, 474, 481–82.


51. Ibid., 281–82.


55. Ibid., 644–46.


57. Ibid.


60. *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, September 6, 1923, 343.


63. Ibid., 32.


69. Osaka mainichi shinbun (English edition), September 26, 1923, 1.
70. Yasunari Jirō, “Barakku kara barakku e” (From one barrack to another), in Gendai-shi no kai, Kantō daishinsai: Dokyumento, 265, 270.
71. Osaka mainichi shinbun (English edition), September 27, 1923, 3.
74. The text of Imperial Ordinance 414, which related to laws governing temporary housing, can be found in Bureau of Social Affairs, The Great Earthquake of 1923 in Japan, 609–10.
75. Japan Weekly Chronicle, September 13, 1923, 371.
76. Ibid., September 20, 1923, 349.
77. Hirakata, Ōtake, and Matsuo, eds., Seifu kaigenrei kankei shiryō, 472–73.
84. Tsuchida Hiroshige, “Kantō daishinsai go no shimin sōdōin mondai ni tsuite: Osaka no jirei o chūshin ni” (Concerning the problems related to the mobilization of citizens after the Great Kantō Earthquake: The case of Osaka), Shigaku zasshi 106:12 (December 1997): 63–64.

3. COMMUNICATION
3. Ibid., September 8, 1923, 1.
5. Ibid., September 5, 1923, 2.
6. Ibid., September 2, 1923, 1; Osaka mainichi shinbun, September 2, 1923, 1.
7. Osaka mainichi shinbun, September–10. These films were also advertised in this paper’s English editions.
8. Ibid., September 13, 1923, 1.
10. Ibid. (English edition), October 6, 1923, 1.
11. Tokyo nichi nichi shinbun, September 6, 1923, 1.
19. *Yomiuri shinbun*, October 8, 1923, 2. Given that many Koreans were held in so-called protective custody following the disaster, this story seems fanciful.
20. Ibid., October 19, 1923, 2.
23. The stories were published in Monbushō futsū gakumukyoku, ed., *Shinsai ni kansuru kyōiku shiryō* (Education materials related to the earthquake), 3 vols. (Tokyo: Monbushō, 1923).
25. *Kyoto hinode*, October 11 and 12, 1923. Kurushima’s tour was detailed in newspapers across Japan. See *Osaka mainichi shinbun*, October 6, 1923.
31. Ibid., November 15, 1923, 659.
46. *Hōchi shinbun*, September 10, 1923, 2; September 20 and 28, 1923, 1; *Tokyo nichī nichī shinbun*, September 20, 1923, 1.
47. Soeda Asenbō, “Taishō daishinsai no uta,” 212.
61. Okutani Fumitomo, “Kantō no daisaigai wa ikanaru shin’i ka” (In what ways was the Great Kantō disaster divine will?), *Michi no tomo* 401 (November 5, 1923): 10–11.
4. ADMONISHMENT


13. Imamura would be shunned from mainstream Japanese seismology, in part due to publication of a 1905 article in the popular journal *Taiyō* in which he suggested that Tokyo was due for a major earthquake, which would likely be followed by a series of catastrophic fires. For a discussion on the Ōmori-Imamura rift that developed in the early part of the twentieth century, see ibid., 217–20.


18. Shitennō Nobutaka, “Kōkū hōmen yori kantaru teito no seishin teki fukkō ou ronzu” (Discussing the spiritual reconstruction of the imperial capital from the viewpoint of aviation), Chihō gyōsei 32:1 (January 1924): 34.


21. Excerpts from Okutani’s lecture tour are contained in the Michi no tomo publication. Many of the quotations above were taken from an October 8 lecture in Köchi Prefecture.


33. Ibid., 163–64.
44. Okutani, “Kantō no daisaigai wa ikanaru shin’i ka,” 15–16.
45. These retailers were also located in the Ginza district. Horie, “Tokyoshi no saigai to keizaiteki fukkōan,” 50–51.
46. Horie, “Tokyoshi no saigai to keizaiteki fukkōan, 51–52. The tale of the Heike documents a struggle between two clans for the control of Japan at the end of the Heian period. A central theme of this epic is the Buddhist law of impermanence (*mujō*). The tale suggests that the Taira clan sowed the seeds of their own demise through arrogance, hubris, and pride.
47. Fukasaku Yasubumi, “Kokumin seishin sakkō no goshōsho o haishite” (Having the honour of receiving the imperial rescript concerning the encouragement of national spirit), *Tōa no hikari* 19:11 (November 1924): 4–8.
49. Ibid., 111–12.
52. Fukasaku “Kokumin seishin sakkō no goshōsho o haishite,” 5–6.
64. Ibid., 8. The stylistic errors and grammatical inconsistencies are repeated as they appear. The publishers claimed that this book, written by a Japanese, was a more authentic travel guide of Japan than those published by Westerners. They highlight in the preface that they had thought of giving the manuscript to an editor to correct but decided that revision would have destroyed much of its quaint charm.
65. *Tokyo nichi nichi shinbun*, September 24, 1923, 2; *Osaka mainichi shinbun*, September 27, 1923, 1.
68. Okutani, “Kantō no daiai ga ikanaru shin'i ka,” 15.
71. Yazaki, *Social Change and the City in Japan*, 419, 390.
75. Ōkawa, *Chōki keizai tōkei*, 8:135–36. The figures are adjusted, with 1912 as a base of 100.
76. The amount of money spent on food in 1912 was ¥2.642 billion, while the 1920 figure stood at ¥7.299 billion. The amount for 1922 was ¥7.029 billion.
77. Ibid., 8:244–45. Yazaki listed Asakusa as an area known for home industries that specialized in *geta* making. See Yazaki, *Social Change and the City in Japan*, 457–59. One hundred sen equaled ¥1.
78. Ōkawa, *Chōki keizai tōkei*, 8:244–245.
79. Ibid., 6:250–51.

5. OPTIMISM


12. Yazaki, Social Change and the City in Japan, 449–51. The “most notorious indigent communities” were also named, including Kanda-misaki-chō, Shibashi-shin’ami-chō, Asakusa-tamahime-chō, Fukagawa-tomioka-chō, Kyōbashi-hatchōbori-chō, and Yotsuya-samegahashi.

13. Ibid., 450; Tokyoshi, ed., Tokyo no shinai no saimin ni kansuru chōsa, 186.

14. For a discussion of the problems associated with Tokyo’s slums, see Kikuchi Shinzō, “Teito fukkō to shakai seisaku” (The reconstruction project of the imperial capital and social policy), Shakai seisaku jihō 10:38 (October 1923): 211–12; and Abe Isoo, “Teito no kensetsu to sōzōteki seishin” (The construction of the imperial capital and the creative spirit), Kaizō 5:11 (November 1923): 65–67.


31. A detailed budgetary chart of Gotō’s ¥800 million plan is found in Nihon tōkei fukyūkai, ed., Teito fukkō jigyō taikan, chap. 9, inserted between pp. 14 and 15. A discussion of this plan can be found in Tsurumi, Gotō Shinpei, 4:245–52; and Murata Mikihiro, Tokyoshi no kaizō (Reconstruction of Tokyo) (Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1922). Murata’s book is a detailed history of this ¥800 million plan and the responses to it. Published before the Great Kantō Earthquake hit, with the provocative title Reconstruction of Tokyo, the author laments that Gotō’s plan was rejected and details how and why Tokyo must be renovated or reconstructed to become more modern and livable.
32. Murataka, Tokyoshi no kaizō, 128–29. Tokyo city officials were more precise. They claimed that only 1.7 percent of Tokyo was park space in 1923. Tokyo Municipal Office, The Reconstruction of Tokyo, 288.
34. Ibid., 249–52, 267–85.
38. Ibid., 23–25.
39. Ibid., 16.
41. Ibid., 60, 67–70.
42. Kikuchi Shinzō, “Teito fukkō to shakai seisaku” (The reconstruction project of the imperial capital and social policy), Shakai seisaku jihō 10:38 (October 1923): 207–14; Kikuchi Shinzō, Toshi keikaku to dōro gyōsei (Urban planning and road administration) (Tokyo: Sūbundō shuppan, 1928).
46. Kobashi Ichita, “Teito fukkō to toshi keikaku no shēsin” (Reconstruction of the imperial capital and the spirit of city planning), Toshi kōron 6:11 (November 1923): 30, 31.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 32–33.
52. Ibid., 37, 33, 36.
53. Ibid., 36–37, 38.
54. Tsurumi, Gotō Shinpei, 4:625–47; Gotō Shinpei, “Teito fukkō ron” (Discussions concerning the imperial capital reconstruction), Toshi kōron 6:11 (November 1923): 5–8;


57. Ibid., 14.


60. Takashima, “Shin Tokyo no kensetsu to Tokyokko no iki,” 53.

61. Ibid., 56–57.


64. Charles Beard, Biiado hakushi Tokyo fukkō ni kansuru iken (Opinions on the reconstruction of Tokyo by Beard) (Tokyo: Tokyo shisei chōsakai, 1924), 1–2.


67. Prime Minister Yamamoto Gonnohyōe was a retired admiral while Gotō was president of the Boy Scouts of Japan Association. The mural is discussed in Weisenfeld, “Imaging Calamity,” 28.


69. The Jiji shinpō, however, did ask its readers in 1924 to share their ideas and desires as to the style and type of city they hoped would be reconstructed. See Jiji shinpōsha, ed., Atarashii Tokyo to kenchiku no hanshi (Discussions on new Tokyo and architecture) (Tokyo: Jiji shinpōsha, 1924); cited in Sand, House and Home in Modern Japan, 207.

6. CONTESTATION


2. Tsurumi, Gotō Shinpei, 4:737–42.

3. Ibid., 589–93.

4. Ibid., 593–94.

5. Ibid., 592, 597–98.


7. Ibid., 264.


15. Tokyo shisei chōsakai, eds., *Teito fukkō hiroku*, 266.


27. Ikeda, “Teito fukkō no yurai to hōsei,” 650–52.


36. Ikeda, “Teito fukkō no yurai to hōsei,” 641–42. This organization is also described in Nakamura Akira, “Shinsai fukkō no seijigaku” (The political science of earthquake reconstruction), *Seikei ronsō* 51:3–4 (April 1982): 64–75.
37. Gotô Shinpei wrote in November before Yamamoto convened the Shingikai that he viewed it as a “necessary organization” that could help “shape a nonpolitical party alliance when promoting the reconstruction of the central city of politics, economy, and culture.” See Gotô Shinpei, “Teito fukkôron,” Toshi kôron 6:11 (November 1923): 3.

38. The shorthand notes and minutes of the Shingikai’s meetings can be found at the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research (Tokyo shisei chôsakai) archives in Hibiya, Tokyo (hereafter abbreviated as TIMR). See TIMR Folder TIMR-OB447 Teito fukkô shingikai sokkiroku, November 24, a.m. meeting, 1–6. These handwritten minutes are not paginated but are broken down into sections: a.m. and p.m. meetings on November 24 and the final meeting on November 27. When the minutes are cited in the following section, I list page numbers for ease of referencing and use a.m. and p.m. to distinguish between the meetings. No formal minutes akin to these exist for the two special committee (tokubetsu iinkai) meetings of the Shingikai held on November 25 and 26. Detailed transcripts, however, are contained in Fukkô chôsa kyôkai, ed., Teito fukkôshi (A history of the imperial capital reconstruction), 3 vols. (Tokyo: Kôbundô, 1930), 1:183–203.

39. The draft budget is contained in Tsurumi, Gotô Shinpei, 4:653–54, while Gotô’s and Miyao’s orations are contained in TIMR-OB447, Teito fukkô sokkiroku, November 24, a.m. meeting, 1–6.

40. TIMR-OB447, Teito fukkô sokkiroku, November 24, a.m. meeting, 6–19.


42. Tsurumi, Gotô Shinpei, 4:659

43. Tokyo shisei chôsakai, eds., Teito fukkô hiroku, 283–84; Tsurumi, Gotô Shinpei, 4:663–64.

44. TIMR-OB447, Teito fukkô sokkiroku, November 24, a.m. meeting, 67–70.

45. The text of Gotô’s response can be found in ibid., p.m. meeting, 1–19; Tsurumi, Gotô Shinpei, 4:667–71.

46. Tokyo shisei chôsakai, eds., Teito fukkô hiroku, 292.

47. TIMR-OB447, Teito fukkô sokkiroku, November 24, p.m. meeting, 3–4; Tsurumi, Gotô Shinpei, 4:667–68.


49. Fukkô chôsa kyôkai, eds., Teito fukkôshi, 1:185.

50. Tsurumi, Gotô Shinpei, 4:674–75.

51. TIMR-OB447, Teito fukkô sokkiroku, November 24, p.m. meeting, 19–26.

52. Ibid., 39–40, for Itô; 40–61 for Egi; 75–76 for Aoki; 76–82 for Takahashi; and 82–83 for Katô.

53. Fukkô chôsa kyôkai, eds., Teito fukkôshi, 1:183–84. The breakdown of outstanding loans, their year of issue, the amount borrowed, interest payable, and final year of redemption is found in Takenobu, ed., The Japan Year Book, 1924–25, 488–90.


55. TIMR-OB447, Teito fukkô sokkiroku, November 24, p.m. meeting; Nakamura, “Shinsai fukkô no seijigaku,” 64–67.
56. Anan Jōichi, “Teito fukkō shingikai” (The Imperial Capital Reconstruction deliberative committee), Toshi kōron 6:12 (December 1923): 96–98.
57. Fukuoka, Tokyo no fukkō keikaku, 166.
59. TIMR-OB447, Teito fukkō sokkiroku, November, p.m. meeting, 83–87.
60. Fukuoka, Tokyo no fukkō keikaku, 166.
62. Fukuoka, Tokyo no fukkō keikaku, 166.
67. The tale of the forty-seven rōnin is an embellished historical account documenting the exploits of forty-seven samurai left masterless after their daimyō, Asano Naganori, was forced to commit ritual suicide for assaulting a court official named Kira Yoshinaka. For two years, the forty-seven rōnin plotted and eventually took revenge by killing Kira. Afterward, they committed suicide.
70. DNTG, 14:1442–45.
71. Ibid., 1444.
74. DNTG, 14:1441.
75. Ibid., 1492–96.
76. Ibid., 1478–79.
78. DNTG, 14:1450–52.
83. Ibid., 701–8.
85. Ibid., 200–201. Tagawa’s plans for Tokyo are contained in Tagawa Daikichirō, Tsukuru beki Tokyo (The Tokyo that should be built) (Tokyo: Hatano Jūtarō, 1923).
89. Ibid., 730.
90. The draft dissolution proposal is quoted in ibid., 734–35.
91. Japan Weekly Chronicle, January 10, 1924, 49.
92. Tsurumi, Gotō Shinpei, 4:737–42.

7. REGENERATION

2. Ambaras, Bad Youth, 4–5.
5. For the text of the rescript and commentary on it, see Yamada, Kokumin seishin sakkō ni kansuru shōshō gikai, 80–86. This is a reprint of the first edition published in 1923 with an expanded section on the importance of the rescript given the state of emergency that the author believed existed in Japan in 1933.
6. Ibid., 80–84.
7. Ibid., 84–85.
8. Ibid., 48–49.
9. The text of these speeches can be found in ibid., 48–58. On November 17 Okano sent his message to every school principal and headmaster in Japan.
12. Ibid., 13–19.
15. Ibid., 174–75.
16. Ibid., 175–76.
17. Ibid., 180–82.
22. Ibid., 57–59.
23. Ibid., 59–61.
25. Abe Isoo, “Shinsai ni ataeta kokuminteki jikaku” (Self-awakening of the nation as a result of the earthquake), Chihō gyōsei 31:12 (December 1923): 20.
27. Ōkawa, ed., Chōki keizai tōkei, 6: 222–223.
31. Ibid., 22–23.
38. Yamato, April 10, 1924; Japan Weekly Chronicle, April 14, 1924.
40. The tariff bill was reproduced word for word in ibid., July 24, 1924, 122–23.
42. Ibid., July 17, 1924, 29.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 28.
45. Ibid., 25.
46. Ibid., 31.
53. Ibid., 6–9.
54. Ibid., 10–14.
55. Ibid., 15.
57. Horie Ki’ichi’s statement was reprinted from the journal *Chūō kōron* in the *Japan Weekly Chronicle,* October 23, 1924, 561.
58. Ibid., November 20, 1924, 673.
59. Ibid., October 23, 1924, 561–62.
60. Statistics Bureau, ed., *Historical Statistics of Japan,* 3:182. All statistics in this paragraph related to postal savings come from this source.
65. *Jiji manga* 228, August 31, 1925; Weisenfeld, “Imaging Calamity,” 125.

8. READING

7. Ikeda Hiroshi, “Teito fukkō to tokubetsu toshi keikaku hō” (Imperial capital reconstruction and the special urban planning law), *Toshi kōron* 7:3 (March 1924): 2–10; a condensed English translation of this law is found in Bureau of Social Affairs, *The


9. The most thorough explanation of the land readjustment system can be found in Sano Toshikata, “Kukaku seiri an no seiritsu made” (Toward the establishment of plans for the land readjustment), in Teito tochi kukaku seiri ni tsuite (Concerning land readjustment in the imperial capital), ed. Gotō Shinpei, 27–36 (Tokyo: Kōseikai, 1924).

10. The source for this map is Takeuchi Rokuzō, “Kukaku seiri no sekkei narabi ni shikō” (The design and implementation of land readjustment), in ibid., 41.


12. Ibid., 1477–78.

13. Ibid., 1480–82.


25. Ibid., 828, 1437

26. Ibid., 883–84.

27. Ibid., 884.


29. Ibid., 887–88.

30. Ibid., 888.

31. Ibid., 1288–89.

32. Ibid., 1422–29, 1318.

33. Ibid., 1318–19.

34. Ibid., 1321–22.

35. Ibid., 1323.

36. Ibid., 916–18.

37. Ibid., 928–29.

38. Ibid., 926–27.

39. Bureau of Social Affairs, The Great Earthquake of 1923 in Japan, 275–77. Statistics in this and the following paragraph are taken from this source.

40. Principle 5 of the “principles in the planning of roads and streets and the construction of bridges” adopted by the Home Ministry and the Tokyo municipal government stated that the government’s aim was “to adopt, as far as possible, those road lines which were already determined and approved in the old scheme of town plan-
ning." Principle 10 suggested that, “in widening or constructing auxiliary roads with a width of 22 meters or less, little regard need be taken of slight irregularities or curves. As far as possible the existing roads and ways should be utilized for the purpose.” Ibid., 201.

42. Ibid., charts on p. 10.
44. Two other projects funded entirely by the municipal government were also clearly successful in that they were vast improvements on what stood before 1923 and improved the quality of life for Tokyo’s residents: primary schools and the city’s sewage treatment system. For a detailed discussion of the reconstructed primary schools, see Borland, “Rebuilding Schools and Society after the Great Kantō Earthquake, 1923–1930.”


49. Ibid., 217–18.
51. Ibid., 95.
52. Ibid., 96–97.
56. Ibid., April 3, 1926, 15.
58. Ibid., 103–4.
59. Ibid., 104.
60. *Trans-Pacific*, November 12, 1927, 12.
62. Ibid., 105–6, 109–12.

9. CONCLUSION

1. A detailed foldout map of the imperial inspection tour is included in Tokyoshi, ed., *Teito fukkōsaishi*.
10. Ibid., 310.
15. Hastings, Neighborhood and Nation in Tokyo, 72–79.
21. Ibid., 74–75.
24. Havens, Valley of Darkness, 18–19.
Abe Isoo, 1, 6, 137–138, 154–155, 170–173, 238–241, 292, 312; compares the Great Kantō Earthquake and the challenges of reconstruction to war, 113; describes the entertainment quarters of Tokyo as the “dark side of civilization,” and a “monster” 117, 154; visions for new Tokyo that emphasized pedestrian promenades, 171–172; prescriptions for spiritual reconstruction, 238–240; program of diligence, thrift, and frugality, 239–240; advocates the abolition of licensed prostitution as part of a program for spiritual renewal, 240–241


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