Japanese Cinema Goes Global

Filmworkers’ Journeys

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Contents

Preface vii
Acknowledgements xi
Note on Romanization of Asian Names and Scripts xiii

Introduction 1

Chapter One: Japanese National Identity and “Banal” Cosmopolitalization 9
The Crisis of National Identity 9
The Formation of Different Types of Cosmopolitan Subjectivity 13

Chapter Two: Internationalization of Japanese Cinema — How Japan Was Different from the West and above Asia before Globalization 25
The Occupation, Japanese National Cinema and Industry 29
A New Set of Lies — Post-war National Subjectivity 35
Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism and Self-Orientalism 40
Technology and Japan’s Oriental-Orientalism in Asia 51
The Golden Age of the Hong Kong-Japanese Cinematic Interchange 60
The Emergence of Resistance Cosmopolitanism 67

Chapter Three: Globalization of Film Finance — The Actually Existing Cosmopolitanisms of Japanese Film Producers 75
Banal Cosmopolitanization and the Mini-Theatres 80
Globalizing Japanese Cinema — Reticent Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism 89
Contents

The Precarious Life of a Japanese Resistance Cosmopolitan in Europe 97
Japanese Alternative Cinema and Cosmopolitanism 103

Chapter Four: Global America? — American-Japanese Film 113
The Production of Shogun (1980) 120
The Japanese Line Producer of Shogun — Hiroaki Fujii 123
The Production of Lost in Translation (2003) 126
The Japanese Line Producer of Lost in Translation — Kiyoshi Inoue 129
Comparing the Two Films and the Two Japanese Line Producers 132
Remaking Global Hollywood — Synopticon Control of Locals 135

Chapter Five: Pan-Asian Cinema? — The Last of Japan-Centred Regional Cosmopolitanism 145
The Japan-Hong Kong Interaction since the Late 1980s 149
Working In-between Japan and Hong Kong 154
The Undercurrent of Japan-China Interaction 159
Hybrid Regionalism Practised by East Asian Film Students 164

Epilogue 171
Notes 175
List of Recorded Interviews 179
References 181
Index 197
This book investigates the ways in which inter/transnational filmmaking practices have been conducted in the Japanese film industry from the post-World War Two period to the present. By doing so, it provides an insight into the ways in which the Japanese film industry went for “global” after defeat in the war and, more importantly, through the prism of Japanese cinema, it aims to open up a broader understanding of the political, economic, and cultural dynamic at work in Japan’s relations with the US, European film cultures, and with the Asian film industries during this time.

Having been through the globalization of the last part of the twentieth century, how did our film culture change over that time and are we really becoming more cosmopolitan as a result of it? If so, what does it mean for national cinema, culture, and our sense of national belonging? My approach to these questions will follow the spirit of what David Held et al. called the transformationist view of globalization that follows from Anthony Giddens’ accentuated modernity thesis (1990; 1991), by which he sought to account for the transformative dynamics of globalization: in his theorization, globalization is seen as the spread of Western modernity.

Accounting for how globalization is changing societies and the lives of individuals across the world, Anthony Giddens famously stated that “modernity refers to modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards” (1990: 3) and that “modernity is inherently globalizing” (ibid.: 177). The spread of Western modernity is transforming the rest of the world, but it is mistaken to think of this process as a simple Westernization or a form cultural imperialism; because, according to him, today, the
process of globalization “is only partly Westernization. Globalization is becoming increasingly de-centered — not under the control of any group of nations, still less of the large corporations” (1999: 31). Held et al. expressed this perspective as follows:

At the heart of the transformationist thesis is a conviction that, at the dawn of a new millennium, globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and the world order. (1999: 7)

For Giddens and his fellow theorists such as Manuel Castells and Ulrich Beck, who are in agreement with this, contemporary processes of globalization are historically unprecedented such that governments, societies, and industries across the globe are having to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between international and domestic — external and internal — affairs (ibid.: 7). The import and export of goods and media texts, and crossing of national borders, became just another part of our everyday lives; now we live in a city where a myriad of otherness and foreign cultures exist side by side to our national culture; and we live in a world where we can find our national culture and people in any major cities across the globe.

The prevalence and normalization of such socio-cultural conditions, which Ulrich Beck called “banal cosmopolitanization” (2006: 10) is one of the most significant side effects of the economic globalization that is re-shaping individual subjectivity in the developed countries (he is mainly talking about European societies but I include Japan and rapidly developing East Asian countries). According to Beck, in the societies in which our everyday life is largely sustained by producing and consuming goods and symbols from and for many different and faraway parts of the world, being cosmopolitan becomes ordinary, if not compulsory. Furthermore, the awareness of this connectedness and mutual dependence should undermine hitherto “banal nationalism” (Billig, cited in Beck 2002: 28) giving a chance for a cosmopolitan perspective to develop. Potentially, banal cosmopolitanization enables individuals to recognize the otherness of others and gives them a disposition to interact with otherness positively. And, most significantly, banal cosmopolitanization is a social reality which could transform the subjectivity of the mass population in the age of globalization. Cosmopolitanism in
this sense is no longer just a philosophical and political ideal for the elite and educated to aspire to, but it is something actually existing as part of our social reality and as the practice of everyday life.

With the above theoretical framework in mind, this book studies experiences of globalization in and out of the Japanese film industry. Through case studies, I will attempt to show how different generations of Japanese filmmakers engaged and interacted with the structural opportunities and limitations posed by global forces, and how their subjectivity has been shaped by their transnational experiences and has changed as a result. On a theoretical level, I argue that the notion of empirical cosmopolitanization and cosmopolitanism provide a useful framework for understanding unintended consequences of economic globalization; but because these cosmopolitanisms in the real world are a by-product of the spread of neo-liberalistic ideologies, it is neither necessary nor helpful to think of “cosmopolitanism” as something rational and “good” in the traditional Kantian sense, and as the diametrical opposite of a sentimental and “bad nationalism”. Instead, I propose to think of both cosmopolitanism and nationalism as discursive constructions produced under different politico-economic conditions and power relations. Thus, it is important to examine each individual case of cosmopolitanism in its own context of subject production so that we gain a better understanding of their potential and limitation to be the driving force for the construction of more culturally diverse but nonetheless egalitarian social environments.

I shall start the empirical case study part of this research by examining, comparing and contrasting two well-known events in post-World War Two history that brought the Japanese film and media industry onto the world stage — the internationalization of Japanese cinema in the 1950s and the globalization of Japanese film finance in the 1990s.

When the film Rashomon (Akira Kurosawa, 1950) won the Golden Lion at the Venice film festival in 1951, just as the American Military Occupation was ending, it signalled both Japan’s return to the international community after the war, and triggered the internationalization of Japanese cinema. Just thirty-odd years later, on the eve of the end of the Cold War the acquisition by Japan’s electrical giant, Sony, of Columbia Pictures, heralded the globalization of Japanese film finance. In retrospect, this was an event that marked the beginning of the
conglomeration of media corporations and the era of a global culture industry — what Miller et al. have called *Global Hollywood* (2001). By juxtaposing these two historic events and the case studies of individual players who were involved in them, I will show why and how globalization in the 1990s was qualitatively a very different phenomenon for Japanese filmmakers and the Japanese film industry to the internationalization of the 1950s. In other words, I will be arguing that the process of globalization involved a historic rupture, and brought about new and unprecedented conditions for individuals in the Japanese film industry, which gave rise to a different type of cosmopolitan perspective.

As numerous historians and cultural theorists have pointed out, modern Japanese national identity was produced under the geopolitical condition of being both “centre and periphery” (Sugimoto 1999) through the Westernization and modernization process from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. For a long time, “Japan has been the only non-Western country that has achieved and even surpassed the level of economic and technological development attained by industrialized Western countries” (ibid.: 85). Contrary to the common belief that the defeat in the war changed Japan’s social structure and cultural value system radically, the fundamentals of national identity (especially the idea of Japan being “different from the West but above Asia”) was kept intact, if not reaffirmed, by the American Occupation policy, which preserved many pre-war institutions (cf., Dower 1999; Sakai 2007). The discourse of Japan’s cultural uniqueness and superiority over other Asian countries was ideologically encouraged in order to maintain the appearance of Western “democracy” in the East and Southeast Asia regions in the context of Cold War politics. The international recognition of Japanese national cinema — following the success of *Rashomon* — effectively re-established the Japanese film industry’s leading role in Asia and its privileged position as the only producer of the “alternative to Western aesthetic” with the Western technologies in the world dominated by the logic of “the West and the rest”. However, all this was to change in the process of economic globalization and consequent cosmopolitanization.

The core of the argument I will put forward through these case studies is that the process of globalization changed the material and discursive conditions that had underlined the essentialist discourse
of Japanese cultural uniqueness and identity. Now, as we enter the twenty-first century, it is important for Japan and others to recognize this change. I will show the ways in which numerous individuals in Japanese filmmaking communities are variously linked to transnational networks, and how they profess their cosmopolitan views and values in a world in which Japan is no longer the only exception of the Western universalism.

Chapter One maps out the theoretical terrain of the research and discusses cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanization. I shall explore the difference between the normative philosophical cosmopolitanism of the Kantian tradition and the contemporary approach to cosmopolitanism in the social sciences, which is variously referred to as “discrepant” (Clifford 1997, “actually existing” (Robbins 1998) or “really existing” (Beck 2006) cosmopolitanism.2

Then, I shall move on to develop distinctions between different types of “actually existing” cosmopolitan subjectivity by adopting Manuel Castells’ distinction between “three forms and origins of identity building” (2004: 7). Castells defines three different ways collective identities can be formed in relation to the dominant social power. Social actors can either legitimize or resist the dominant social power to form an identity or, alternatively, they can invent a new category to provide a third way. In Castells’ classification, these three forms of identity formation are named as Legitimizing, Resistance, and Project Identity. By following Castells, I shall develop concepts of Legitimizing, Resistance and Project Cosmopolitanism as tools to analyze how cosmopolitan subjectivity is formed in relation to the dominant national power and identity.

Chapters Two to Five are concerned with empirical research into the Japanese film industry. Chapter Two investigates Japan’s interaction with the West (mostly America) and Asia in the pre-globalization phase from 1945 to the 1970s. Through case studies of filmmakers, firstly, this chapter aims to demonstrate how the American Occupation and the post-war re-modernization process renewed and inscribed in Japan its own otherness against the West on the one hand, and a superiority complex over its Asian neighbours on the other. Encouraged by the international success of Rashomon, the producer of Daiei Co., Masaichi Nagata, initiated the formation of the “Federation of Motion Picture
Producers in South East Asia (FPA)” with the Hong Kong producer Run Run Shaw in 1953. Before the war, Nagata had attempted to organize the Federation of Film Producers of Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere under the Japanese colonial ruling. Because of this past, some film historians see FPA as the resurrection of Japan’s imperialist ambition. However, if we take a closer look we understand that the role played by FPA was far more than a ghost of Japanese imperialism. FPA was alive and involved with the Cold War politics of the time in an important way. The chapter deals with self-Orientalist strategies deployed by the “Legitimizing Cosmopolitan” filmmakers for internationalising Japanese cinema during this time; it deals with the transnational exchanges of filmmakers and technologies between the Hong Kong and Japanese film industries in the 1960’s, and the emergence of the “Resistance Cosmopolitanism” in the 1970s represented by filmmaker such as Nagisa Oshima and his French-produced Japanese crime of passion In the Realm of the Senses (Ai no korida, 1975).

Chapter Three examines how the “Globalization of Japanese film finance” in the last part of the twentieth century was very different from the “internationalization of Japanese cinema” in the 1950s. The actual phenomenon of “internationalization” for the film industry was winning more prizes in international film festivals and increasing film exports; thus, Japanese filmmakers attempted to achieve this end by throwing back their Oriental-to-be-looked-at-ness to the Western gaze articulating their national cultural differences. In contrast, the actual meaning of what was called Kokusaika (the Japanese configuration of economic globalization) of the mid-1980s to 1990s was the removal of Japan’s cultural barrier and further opening of the domestic market for foreign (mainly Western) goods and symbols. Thus many Japanese film producers in the “globalization” phase sought integration through direct financial investment in the film industries in the West, and as a result disarticulated their assertion of Japan’s purported cultural “uniqueness”. Massive cash injections from Japanese corporations to American and European film companies contributed to the global conglomeration of media industries and the emergence of Global Hollywood. Based on interviews with a new generation of Japanese film producers who started their careers after the demise of the Japanese studio production system, and who played key parts in the
process of the globalization of Japanese film finance, the case studies in this chapter aim to show how these Japanese filmmakers lived and experienced the economic globalization of the last part of the twentieth century and how they were shaped into different types of cosmopolitan subjects.

Chapter Four firstly investigates how globalization changed filmmakers’ attitudes towards cultural otherness through a comparative case study of two well-known Japanese–American co-productions, *Shogun* (1980) and *Lost In Translation* (Sophia Coppola, 2003). International co-production with Japan is notoriously difficult to manage because of the putative cultural differences. Many foreign film productions in Japan suffered severe so-called clash of cultures or civilization. *Shogun* derived from a bestselling American novel from the 1970s. It is based on a real historical character, William Adams or Anjin Miura (the Japanese name he adopted), an English navigator who was washed ashore on Japanese coast in 1600. The author of *Shogun*, James Clavell, was a survivor of the harshest Japanese prison camp in World War Two where only one out of fifteen prisoners survived. The film and TV versions of *Shogun* were shot entirely in Japan, led by Clavell himself as the executive producer. Over twenty years later, the director Sophia Coppola shot *Lost in Translation* in a trendy, cosmopolitan district of Tokyo. During the 1990s when Japan was in the middle of Kokusaika, Coppola spent her formative years in Tokyo while she was searching for a new direction as an artist after her acting career failed badly with her role in her father’s *The Godfather Part 3* (Francis Ford Coppola, 1990). According to Coppla herself, *Lost in Translation* was inspired by her experiences. This comparative case study is based on interviews with line producers of these two film productions. It highlights the fact that a radical transition of the discursive regime occurred between these two dates, whereby individuals in the Japanese filmmaking community shifted from thinking of themselves as “national” to being “transnational” or “cosmopolitan”.

In the latter part of this chapter, I will discuss a new technology of self-discipline used to regulate the cosmopolitan subject in the transnationalized culture industry through a case study of the remake of the Japanese horror film, *The Grudge 2* (2006). Zygmunt Bauman observed the rise of this new bio-political technology of the global age and
called it “Synopticon control” (1998). The expansion of Hollywood, and the inclusion of East Asian cinema as a source of inspiration and the industries as suppliers of filmmaking talents, provided opportunities for some Asian filmmakers to work globally; but at the same time, the transnationalization of the film industries created a new division between those considered to be “global” and “local”, and this situation could severely undermine filmmakers’ capacity to produce films with “nationally” specific meanings. This case study addresses the problems of working for global Hollywood and the bio-political production of cosmopolitan subjects in the “local” Japanese film industry.

Chapter Five investigates the changing dynamics of Asian regionalization and Asian filmmakers’ relationships to one another. First it focuses on Japan’s relationship with the Hong Kong film industry in the context of Japan’s so-called “return to Asia” (Iwabuchi 2002) during the 1990s, when Japanese media companies invested heavily in cultural production in Asia. After nearly twenty years of dormancy since the “Golden Age of Japan–Hong Kong Cinematic Interchange” (Yau 2003) in the 1960s, the balance of power has tipped and now their relationship is very different. Hong Kong filmmakers no longer look to Japan necessarily as a model of technical, economic, and creative advancement, a standard to which they aspire. Japan became more like a trove for ideas and semiotic resources for them; it is where they can find additional finances and a market they can exploit.

Japan’s relative decline and China’s rapid economic ascent has changed the dynamics of Asia’s regional cosmopolitanization dramatically. The latter part of the chapter explores the experiences of Japanese film students who study in China, and vice-versa, and speculates on future implications of this recently burgeoning cross-border practice. For young Japanese, the popular destination to go to study film has always been the US and going to China was somewhat unthinkable; but this changed when China’s premier film school, the Beijing Film Academy, opened its door to foreign students. These case studies illustrate the ways in which these film students are developing forms of hybrid regionalism in a world where Japan is no longer seen as so different from the West and certainly not above Asia.
Chapter One
Japanese National Identity and “Banal” Cosmopolitalization

A timeless global culture answers to no living needs and conjures no memories. If memory is central to identity, we can discern no global identity-in-the-making, nor aspirations for one, nor any collective amnesia to replace existing ‘deep’ cultures with a cosmopolitan ‘flat’ culture. (Smith 1995: 24)

One fundamental theoretical reason why the choice between cosmopolitanism and nationalism as alternative vehicles of universalism remains so contentious is that the putative thematic opposition between these terms has always been unstable … I suggest that this opposition is even more volatile today with the loosening of the hyphen between nation and state in globalization. (Cheah 1998: 22)

The Crisis of National Identity

In the past, Japan has made a historic opening to the outside world three times. Aoki Tamotsu (1999), an anthropologist who probed the transfiguration of Nihonjinron — a discourse around questions of the quintessential Japanese national character — suggests that each time Japan made an opening the Japanese were faced with a major identity crisis. The first occurred in the late nineteenth century during its first modernization process in the Meiji era following 250 years of seclusion. Awestruck by advanced Western technologies, and fearing Western imperialism, Japanese leaders at the time were determined to make themselves an imperial power in their own right. This led to the militarization of society and the wars that followed.
The second identity crisis came following defeat in World War Two and the subsequent US Military Occupation. However, as the country became economically more powerful from the 1950s through to the 1980s, the Japanese regained their confidence and this was reflected in the popularity of *Nihonjinron* in this period. The projects of *Nihonjinron* set out to explore the essential uniqueness of Japanese culture in relation to Western universalism without indicating any sense of “backwardness”. Aoki identified the period between 1964 and 1983 as years during which there was a focus on the “recognition of Japan’s positive uniqueness” (ibid.: 84). Chie Nakane’s (1972) study on Japanese collectivism and vertical society and Eshun Hamaguchi’s *Nihon rashisa no saihakken* (*Rediscovery of Japaneseness*, 1988) are exemplary works in this tradition. Added to these were books by foreigners like Ezra F. Vogal’s *Japan as Number One* (1979), which held up the Japanese system as a model for the US to follow. Together they urged Japanese, as well as Western, readers to accept Japan as an exception to Western universalism — a unique, singular instance of non-Western modernity, in the context of the Cold War power struggle between the West and East — a point I shall return to and explore more fully in Chapter Two.

Then, the third wave of opening, and the third identity crisis, overcame Japan when neo-liberal economic globalization — the so-called *Kokusai ka* (which literally translates as internationalization) — began to accelerate from the mid-1980s onwards. Aoki identifies this period from 1984 to the present day as the period of transition “from the unique to the universal” (1999: 134). Francis Fukuyama famously declared this process as encompassing “the end of history” (1992), in which there was no alternative to the American-led liberal democracy and free market economy. Within this way of thinking, the “essential cultural uniqueness of Japan” and the reclusive nature of the Japanese market were seen as major obstacles that have prevented foreign businesses from flourishing there. Hence the Japanese mentality needed to be transformed, and cultural barriers eliminated, should Japan desire to be part of the free trade democracy that was the universal principal of the global age.

In her book titled *Globalization of Japan*, political scientist Mayumi Itoh takes up a culturalist stance tinged with neo-liberal ideology, and asserts that “the sakoku (secluded nation) mentality constitutes the core
of Japan’s barriers to *Kokusaika* [internationalization]” (2000: 13). Hers was a typical contention of this third identity crisis:

The pervasive Japanese attitude of exclusiveness and parochialism stems from two powerful roots: (1) the country’s geographic isolation as an island nation; and (2) the Tokugawa Shogunate’s policy of seclusion (*sakoku*) from 1639 to 1868. That combination of natural and voluntary isolation created a uniquely homogeneous culture and parochial mentality. The *sakoku* mentality still lingers and underlies the modern Japanese way of thinking and behaving. (2000: 13)

Itoh traces the origin of what she calls *sakoku* (the reclusive nation) mentality to the first opening of Japan 150 years ago. She insists that the Japanese mentality has not really changed, or has only changed very superficially because these historic openings of the country did not occur voluntarily from within, but were imposed from the outside. For Itoh, Japan has never been the agent of its own history. Moreover, “the Japanese government has no such zeal for its own internationalization and is only reluctantly pursuing it due to external pressure”. She continues:

> While a superficial internationalization, or quantitative *kokusaika*, as exemplified by the glut of foreign goods in the daily life of the Japanese and the unprecedented number of Japanese tourists going abroad, has made certain progress, *kokoro no kokusaika* (internationalization of the mind), or qualitative *kokusaika*, has not taken root in the hearts of the Japanese. This is so despite the fact that former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone declared the creation of *kokusai kokka Nihon* (an internationalized Japan) at the Japanese Parliament in 1984. (2000: 180)

For Itoh, the changes taking place in the daily life of the Japanese (i.e. a significant increase in the consumption of foreign goods or travel abroad) cannot constitute a real change of Japanese subjectivity, because the “Japanese government is only reluctantly pursuing it [internationalization policy] due to external pressure” (ibid.). However, one problem with this view is that it equates government policy with national subjectivity, and does not recognize the pleasure the Japanese people took in consuming such foreign goods and symbols. It ignores the empirically well-documented enthusiasm of Japanese consumers
for foreign goods and symbols, or dismisses it as trivial. Therefore, it is unconvincing to say that this unprecedented intensification of the flow of goods and symbols across national boundaries during the third opening of Japan has had no significant effect on the constitution of Japanese subjectivity. I will return to this issue of the effects of Kokusaika in the 1980s and banal cosmopolitanization on Japanese national identity in Chapter Three.

Contrary to Itoh’s view that cosmopolitanization only occurs top down from government level, Ulrich Beck has argued that economic globalization is significantly altering the construction of society across the industrialized world. Globalization has given rise to a social condition which would shape the individual into a cosmopolitan subject through everyday practices — and he calls this process “banal” cosmopolitanization.

Beck stresses that the term “banal” cosmopolitanization signals that “existing forms of cosmopolitanism came into the world not as noble achievements that had been fought for and won with all the glittering moral authority of the enlightenment, but as profane deformations carrying the obscurity and anonymity of side effects” (2004: 135). In this post-enlightenment paradigm, we cannot assume that cosmopolitanism is automatically morally superior, good, or even rational in the Kantian tradition. Actually existing cosmopolitans include many different types of people who habitually cross national and cultural borders physically or virtually, developing a sense of multiple belongings to accommodate contradictions and rival ways of living within their own lifestyles. Cosmopolitanism here signals an empirical phenomenon that is shaping our social reality rather than pointing to an ethical and political ideal.

Since cosmopolitanism is no longer just a philosophical ideal or political utopianism, Beck calls for the experience of “cosmopolitanism” to be investigated sociologically as part of our empirical social reality. My intention here is to respond to Beck’s call by investigating the experiences of actually existing cosmopolitans in the Japanese filmmaking community.
The Formation of Different Types of Cosmopolitan Subjectivity

Following Beck and other theorists who engaged with debates about the recent revival of cosmopolitanism, I argue that globalization produces a cosmopolitan subjectivity, but also warn that actually existing cosmopolitanization does not necessarily lead the subject to ethically responsible cosmopolitan outlooks. Nevertheless, what these theorists have not discussed is whether only one type of cosmopolitan subjectivity would be produced or whether several different types have been taking shape. Nor have they examined whether, if plural types of cosmopolitan subjectivity were being produced, what the nature of their differences are and how one could be distinguished from the others. Another writer has, however, given a lead that enables this issue to be addressed.

In his book *The Power of Identity* (2004), Manuel Castells points out that “it is easy to agree on the fact that, from a sociological perspective, all identities are constructed. The real issue is how, from what, by whom and for what [?]” He further states:

> The construction of identities uses building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatus and religious revelations. But individuals, social groups, and societies process all these materials, and rearrange their meaning, according to social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social structure, and in their space/time framework. (2004: 7)

Castells emphasizes that “the social construction of identity always takes place in a context marked by power relations” (ibid.: 7–8) and the same thing is true for the construction of cosmopolitan subjectivity. My use of the term “subjectivity” is almost synonymous with Castells’ use of the term “identity” — the source of “meaning for the actors themselves, and by themselves, constructed through a process of individuation” (Giddens, cited in Castells 2004: 7). The reason I choose the term “subjectivity” over “identity” is that, to me, the term “identity” refers to the way the self is constructed through belonging to a group and accepting common ideals, as in the case of “national
identity”, whereas I use “subjectivity” to emphasize the importance of individual differentiation (which I see as the characteristic of “cosmopolitan subjectivity”) from the uniformity of a group. Otherwise, these two terms are interchangeable in my use here. What I am concerned with is the way in which an individual thinks about her/himself and constructs her/himself to make sense of his/her own life and achieve social recognition.

In this section, I shall propose three different types of actually existing cosmopolitanism defined by the different relationships the cosmopolitan subject constructs with the nationally dominant culture and power, and through which they interact with their social structure and reflexively construct their own selfhood. I base these ideal types of the cosmopolitan subject on Castells’ categorization of identities, which distinguishes three different forms and origins of identity building. These are:

1) Legitimizing identity: what is introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination vis-à-vis social actors (2004: 8).

2) Resistance identity: what is generated by those actors who are in positions/conditions which are devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating social institutions of society (ibid.).

3) Project identity: when social actors, on the basis of whatever cultural materials are available to them, build new identities that redefine their position in society and, by so doing, seek the transformation of the overall social structure (ibid.).

To put it succinctly, Legitimizing Identity is produced by the dominant institutions of society to legitimize and extend their power, whereas Resistance Identity is produced by marginalized groups to resist domination and make their life bearable. Project Identity can be developed out of either Legitimizing or Resistance Identity as a third way — it produces new, often hybrid, categories of identity and attempts to transform social relations.

Castells suggests that these different types of identity building processes lead to different outcomes in constituting society. Legitimizing
Identity “generates a civil society; that is, a set of organizations and institutions, as well as a series of structured and organized social actors, which reproduce, albeit sometimes in a conflictive manner, the identity that rationalizes the sources of structural domination” (2004: 8; italics in original). Most commonly, it is nation-states that function as the framework of this legitimization.

The second type of identity building, Resistance Identity, can, according to Castells, lead to the formation of communes, or communities, and this is probably the most important type of identity building tending to motivate social change. “It constructs forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography, or biology, making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance” (ibid.: 9). Castells describes the process of Resistance Identity building as “the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded” (ibid.; italics in original). Excluded groups build a defensive identity in terms of the dominant institutions/ideologies, reversing received value judgements while reinforcing their own boundaries. Again, most commonly, nation-states are the framework against which Resistance Identity is struggling.

Identity building based on Project Identity is a self-reflexive process, and “produces [a] subject” (Castells 2004: 10; italics in original). While Legitimizing and Resistance Identities are in a binary opposite relation and are mutually dependent, Project Identity is self-referential and has its own narrative structure. In my reading, Castells’ Project Identity is closely akin to Giddens’ theorization of “the self as a reflexive project” (1991). Here, being a “subject” means being capable of constructing one’s own narrative and identity, being capable of building a new and different life. According to Castells, Project Identity can be developed out of either Legitimizing or Resistance Identity, but at the present conjuncture it is more likely to develop out of Resistance Identity. For instance, new Project Identity can be formed “when feminism moves out of the trenches of resistance of women’s identity and women’s rights, to challenge patriarchalism, thus the patriarchal family, and thus the entire structure of production, reproduction, sexuality, and personality on which societies have been historically based” (2004: 8).

According to Giddens, one of most distinctive features of modernity is “an increased interconnection between two extremes of extentionality
and intentionality: globalizing influence on the one hand and personal disposition on the other” (1991: 1). In the post-traditional order, the more tradition loses its hold, and the more daily life is reconstituted in terms of the dialectical interplay of the local and the global, the more individuals are forced to negotiate lifestyle choices among a diversity of options (1991: 5). Constructing one’s own biography through reflexively organized life planning becomes a central feature of the structuring of self-identity; and for Giddens, this is an inevitable consequence of the global spread of modernity.

The process of constructing a Project Identity involves the production of new subjects, which transforms power and social relations. Here there is a convergence between Castells and Giddens. However, they differ as Giddens appears to assume that this transition towards reflexive modernity is more or less inevitable and automatic, while Castells argues that the process is far from automatic. This is because the globalized society in reality “is based on the systematic disjunction between the local and global for most individuals and social groups … Therefore, reflexive life-planning becomes impossible, except for the elite inhabiting the timeless space of flows of global networks and their ancillary locales” (2004: 11). In other words, Castells reminds us of the new social polarization and inequality that globalization creates along with its transformative potential. Thus Project Identity is more likely to develop out of communal resistances — out of Resistance Identity rather than Legitimizing Identity — and the analysis of the processes, conditions and outcomes of the transformations of communal resistance into transformative subjects is a crucial task of social science. I shall discuss the issue of the possible emergence of Project Identity further in Chapter Three when I look at cases within the Japanese film industry.

Using the above distinctions as defined by Castells, along with theories of reflexive modernization and the subject by Giddens, as a theoretical base, I propose three different ideal-types, or schematas, of cosmopolitan subjectivity. I call them Legitimizing, Resistance and Project Cosmopolitanism or Cosmopolitan Outlooks/Subjectivity.

“Cosmopolitanism” as I use the word here means the desire and propensity of individuals towards otherness, rather than referring to schools of thought or political principles. “Legitimizing
Cosmopolitanism” legitimizes and is legitimized by the national framework, while “Resistance Cosmopolitanism” resists this national framework in order to define itself. A Legitimizing Cosmopolitan desires to extend his/her national horizon across cosmopolitical fields, and thus is in an antagonistic relationship with foreign otherness, while a Resistance Cosmopolitan desires to form strategic alliances with foreign otherness in order to resist the nationally dominant culture and power. “Project Cosmopolitanism” subsumes self/other differences and conflicts by reflexively constructing its own narrative structure. In what follows, I shall illustrate what I mean by Legitimizing, Resistance and Project Cosmopolitanism using Japanese examples set within this particular historical context.

The Legitimizing Cosmopolitan Outlook is most typically observed amongst the Japanese social elites who were the driving force of post-war national re-building and its accompanying rapid economic development. Its presence is, however, not limited to this generation or class. Today, this type of cosmopolitan outlook has been popularized and is widespread across all strata of Japanese society.

Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism is basically an extension or enlargement of nationalism into the international arena. This does not mean Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism is necessarily insensitive to the otherness of others. However, in reality, this is often the case because it requires legitimization by the powerful nation-state. Additionally, despite their apparent zeal for Western technology and European high culture, Japanese Legitimizing Cosmopolitans have suffered a deep-seated anxiety about the loss of Japanese identity, and, historically, an unshakable inferiority complex towards the West.

A positive side of Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism is exemplified by those who espouse and legitimize the ideals of Japanese post-war democracy. Examples are the political thinker Maruyama Masao (1914–1996) or the Nobel Prize-winning author Oe Kenzaburo (b. 1935). These authors spread the message of pacifism to the world, drawing on the Japanese experiences of Hiroshima and the commitment to peace contained in Article Nine of the Japanese constitution. However, there is also a darker side to Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism because, it works with the same materials as nationalism.
On the other hand, the controversial author, playwright and an ultra-right wing activist Mishima Yukio (1925–1970) is a good, although certainly extreme, example of the other side of Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism. Mishima is probably the most widely read Japanese author of the twentieth century, due in part to his dramatic ritual suicide — by harakiri — in 1970. In the words of John Nathan — Mishima’s biographer — Mishima was a “true internationalist” (Nathan 1970:). He was an extensive traveller, spoke fluent English, read Latin and lived in a specially designed Rococo house in Tokyo, which was ostentatiously furnished with Greek statues and marble fountains. Yet, despite the fact that he was deeply into Western aesthetics and European high culture, and his life’s ambition was to achieve recognition in the West, he was a nationalist who contended: “If there were no Emperor, how would we have proof of our continuity? … Our society gets broader in space, but it ignores time. We have no bridge to relate us to the future anymore. The Emperor should be our source of glory” (Mishima, in Nathan, 1970).

Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism is a form of internationalism, which views nationalism and national identity as a precondition for expansion into the field of cosmopolitanism. I shall discuss its operation further in Chapter Two with a case study on Nagata Masaichi, the proponent of the post-war internationalization of Japanese cinema. Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism was the dominant mode of cosmopolitanism before globalization in the 1980s accelerated the lowering of national borders between cultural industries.

In contrast, Resistance Cosmopolitans define themselves against the dominant class and mainstream culture within Japan rather than against foreign otherness. Resistance Cosmopolitans are most commonly found among the generation who spent their formative years in the economic high growth era between the 1960s and 1970s. At this time the intense and rapid growth of the Japanese economy was underpinned by highly oppressive education and labour systems that were often described as “examination hell” and “corporate slavery” for the life of “economic animals”. By the mid-1970s, over 90 percent of the Japanese population considered themselves “middle class” according to various government statistics, and it was this ideology of a racially, culturally and financially homogeneous and classless national society
that sustained this highly oppressive but very efficient system throughout the era of high economic growth.

Resistance Cosmopolitanism surfaced in reaction to this internal homogenization when Japan achieved a high level of material wealth in a relatively short period of time. We can find many examples of Resistance Cosmopolitanism amongst independent filmmakers in the 1980s; such people tend to find emotional escape in, and a sense of shared alliance with, Western popular culture — music, films, fashion and so forth. Like American popular culture in the post-war British context, the impact of Western popular culture in Japan has the positive effect of providing modes of behaviour and cultural attitudes that could be used against the hegemony of traditional elites (c.f. Bennett 1985). For the generation of Japanese who did not have direct experience of the war and occupation, their relationship to the West was less antagonistic and less burdened with inferiority complexes than it had been in previous generations; thus, such an emotional and imaginary alliance with aspects of Western culture was perceived as emancipatory.

Resistance Cosmopolitanism surfaced in the Japanese filmmaking community as the mass production system of the major studios faltered and shifted towards a more flexibly-specialized system. In inverse proportion to the decline of the Japanese national film industry, low- and no-budget independent films flourished in the 1980s. The spirit of Resistance Cosmopolitanism of this era is exemplified by independent filmmaker Yamamoto Masashi (b. 1956), who took his first shoestring-budget 16 mm feature film *Yami no Carnival* (*Carnival in the Dark*, 1982) to the Forum section of the Berlin International Film Festival.

*Carnival in the Dark*, which follows the journey of a young single mother one night through the world of the Tokyo underground infested with repressed sexuality and violent fantasies, became an instant festival success and was circulated widely to European art cinemas (Okubo 2006). The film was a harbinger of such Japanese cult hits as *Gyakufunsha Kazoku* (*Crazy Family*, Sogo Ishii, 1984); *Akira* (Katsuhiro Otomo, 1988); and *Tesuo* (*The Iron Man*, Shinya Tsukamoto, 1989).

On his return from Europe, Yamamoto declared that he was an international filmmaker and his intention was to make films for international art-house audiences. He contended that a quality art film could reach a far bigger audience internationally than any domestically
produced commercial films produced by the major studios, which were consumed only domestically in Japan, and became aware of the international potential of Japanese cinema as an art-house form and the networks of independent filmmakers being forged through international film festivals outside of Japan (Asai interview 2006).³

Thereupon, Yamamoto made his next project Robinson no Niwa (Robinson’s Garden, 1987), in acute awareness of the Western gaze. For this film, Yamamoto imported the American independent filmmaker Tom DiCillo, who photographed Jim Jarmusch’s film Stranger than Paradise (1984), as his cinematographer. The story revolves around a young Japanese woman who runs a guesthouse and lives among foreign workers, travellers, drug dealers, junkies etc. in a seedy part of cosmopolitan Tokyo. One day, by accident, she discovers a “desert island” — a ruined building surrounded by green land — in the middle of this concrete metropolis. She moves into the “island” to live in nature like “Robinson Crusoe”; eventually she buries herself in it. In a conversation, Yamamoto said that he invited Tom DiCillo because he wanted to achieve an un-Japanese look and perspective for this story. However, he also admitted that he did not want to work with Japanese cinematographers because those who were trained in the Japanese film industry were too conservative for him. In an interview he gave to the Japanese media, Yamamoto proclaimed that “idiots have no boundaries” (Yomota 1999: 201). According to his philosophy, once middle-class pretensions are dropped, we are all the same human beings. Therefore, national boundaries and cultural differences are not at all the big deal they are usually made out to be by elites and by middle-class Japanese. Hence, for “idiots” like himself, and his fellow filmmakers, there is nothing which prevents him from going anywhere he wants, making whatever kind of film he wants and working with whomever he wants.

One of the most chaotic of the Japanese independent filmmakers, Yamamoto was born an only son to visually disabled parents. He was brought up as the only one in the family to “see things” (Yomota 1999: 194). His films are always driven by strong feelings against the Japanese elitist social order and middle class. They are infused by fantasies of transgression and chaos created by the socially dispossessed; punks, junkies, prostitutes and foreigners. Resistance Cosmopolitans
usually define themselves against the social order imposed by nationally dominant power and culture defensively but sometimes aggressively, and occasionally even self-destructively, as was the case with some Japanese independents in this period.

As Castells theorizes, Project Identity can develop from either Legitimizing or Resistance Identity but it is more likely to emerge from Resistance Identity in the present conjuncture because of the legitimization crisis in national society and its patriarchal conventions. Project Cosmopolitanism is distinct from Legitimizing or Resistance Cosmopolitanism in that the Project Cosmopolitan is reflexive and defines his/herself by his/her own narrative into which constitutive differences are subsumed. The Project Cosmopolitan actively constructs the self with the intention of transforming social relations, and s/he is highly aware of the constructedness of his/her own identities and the ways in which a life in reflexive modernity demands a multiplicity of identities. For this reason, for the Project Cosmopolitan, the constitutive difference of the self, the conflict between sameness and otherness, exists within rather than outside of the boundary of the self. Thus Project Cosmopolitanism is usually based on hybrid and hyphenated identities of one kind or another.

The Project Cosmopolitan subject is creative. Although the narrative of the self constructed by the Project Cosmopolitan subject is inevitably shaped by social norms and conditions, Project Cosmopolitans actively seek to transform the social structure from within. They negotiate with the dominant power by constantly monitoring and reconstructing their trajectory of the narrative of the self, so that mutual accommodation is possible, and by so doing they shape a new social reality — although admittedly often in unexpected ways. This is especially the case with some of the Korean-Japanese filmmakers I will discuss later. Therefore, unlike Resistance Cosmopolitans, Project Cosmopolitans are not necessarily antagonistic to existing national systems in obvious ways. Project Cosmopolitans are reflexive actors who actively work to interact and create their own social conditions, which in turn shape their agency through “unintended consequences” (Beck 2002).

Nevertheless, contrary to what Giddens assumed and as Castells indicated, the development of Project Identity as an agent of social change is far from automatic, and the likelihood of Project Cosmopolitanism
actually developing in any particular society is not guaranteed. As I shall show in Chapter Three with case studies of Japanese film producers, empirically speaking, either Legitimizing or Resistance Identity developing into a collective form of Project Identity is more the exception than the rule, even though each individual becomes highly reflexive in his or her own way in the process of globalization.

Having said this, however, there are rare examples of Project Cosmopolitanism that have actually developed in the Japanese film industry. For example, the production of the film Tsuki ha Dotchhi ni Deteiru (All Under the Moon, Sai Yoichi 1993), demonstrates the Project Cosmopolitanism of Korean-Japanese film producer Lee Bon-u and his collaborators. All Under the Moon is a romantic comedy about the life of a cynical Korean-Japanese cab driver (Kishitani Goro) who finds himself in bed with, then falling in love with, a newcomer to Japan, a Filipino bar hostess (Ruby Moreno). This scenario deconstructs the myth of Japan being a homogeneous society very successfully and with much humour. The film swept all the major Japanese film awards in 1993 and became the year’s biggest independent hit. It took in over 400 million yen at the box office with attendance figures reaching 350 thousand (Lee, cited in Maruyama 1998: 110).

All Under the Moon was made by a group of Korean-Japanese filmmakers — the author of the original novel (Yan Sogiru, b. 1936), director (Sai Yoichi, b. 1949), scriptwriter (Chong Wishin, b. 1957) and producer (Lee Bong-u, b. 1960). The production synopsis written by Lee, the producer, to attract investment for the project describes how:

This project has risen from our fundamental understanding of cinema, that is, cinema is a message at the same time as being a form of entertainment and an industry...We aspire to show the cry of the soul and the power of social minorities. However, this is not a ‘social problem film’, which prosecutes social injustice against ethnic minorities in Japan. On the contrary, this is a film with great entertainment value. (1994: 32)

Clearly for Lee et al., an aim of the project was to make an impact, culturally and commercially, while working within the structure of the mainstream Japanese film industry and remaining within the tastes of mainstream audiences. They did not simply seek to legitimize or resist existing structures. Instead, their aim was to carve out a space
for themselves in the heart of the Japanese national film industry and culture. The director, Sai, states: “I hate the term ‘Korean living in Japan’ (zainichi kankokujin), to begin with. I want them [his films] to be seen as Japanese films. After all, if an American appeared as the hero in a Japanese film, would you call it a zainichi American movie? Of course not” (1994, cited in Schilling 1999: 67). Both Lee and Sai make their way forward very carefully, so as not to be ghettoized as minority filmmakers. They have made sure they are there to stay on the central stage of Japanese national cinema. In a country in which cultural and ethnic homogeneity have been taken for granted for such a long time, their hybrid and hyphenated identity — as Korean-Japanese who are here to stay — problematizes the essentialist notion of national cinema and identity, and transforms the understanding of social relations between the Japanese and foreigners.

The transformation of images of Korea and Korean people in the Japanese media in the years following the film’s release was very unexpected for many commentators. After the success of *All Under the Moon*, Lee Bon-u and his company Cinequanon dedicated themselves to the distribution and screening of films from other Asian countries. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said that their work in the 1990s prepared the way for a major breakthrough of Korean cinema and culture in Japan in the early twenty-first century.

For an independently produced film, with a budget of about 140 million yen, *All Under the Moon* was a big commercial success grossing 400 million yen at the box office. However, because the film was distributed through one of the Japanese majors — Shochiku Youga kei — there was hardly any return to Lee’s production company. This was because theatres retained 50 percent of the gross income initially, and Shochiku, the distributor, then took off 60 percent of the remaining funds after deducting all distribution expenses — the exact amount of which is highly opaque. Lee’s company had to recover their advertising and production costs from what was left of the box office take, leaving very little income remaining from the theatrical release. Lee only managed to recover the production costs for *All Under the Moon* through consequent video and TV sales, despite the film being such a massive box office success (cited in Maruyama 1998: 110–1).
From this experience, Lee learnt that there is virtually no way for small independent productions to operate profitably and sustainably within the existing film exhibition and distribution structures, in which the oligopoly of the major studios controls the exhibition sector through their distribution syndicates. It became clear to Lee that if they were to survive as independent producers with a degree of autonomy, they needed to have their own cinemas (cf., Lee 2003).

From this point, Lee and his company Cinequanon focused on developing their own exhibition outlets. Lee opened a small two-screen cinema (132 + 129 seats) Cine Amuse East/West in Tokyo in 1995 as a joint venture with the music publisher Amuse Entertainment (Maruyama 1998: 111–2). Importantly, the screens in Cine Amuse East were dedicated not only to Japanese films but to Asian films in general. Following a boom in Hong Kong filmmaking in the mid-1990s, Cinequanon distributed many Chinese, Hong Kong and Korean films, and prepared the way for the major breakthrough of Korean films such as Swiri (Kang Je-Gyu, 1999) and JSA (Park Chan-Wook, 2000) in Japan.

The craze for Korean culture among millions of Japanese female fans in the 2000s, which was ignited by the Korean TV drama Winter Sonata (2002) and the leading actor Bae Yong-jun, would have been entirely unimaginable without the success of those earlier Korean feature films and the transformation of cultural conditions in the 1990s. The causal relationship between these developments in cinema and this wider cultural phenomenon of Koreanphilia is complex. Even more complicated is the relationship between this phenomenal Koreanphilia and the development of a new sense of anti-Korean nationalism in Japan as well as a new anti-Japanese nationalism in Korea (cf., Mouri 2004; Iwabuchi 2004).

Although the trajectory of globalization is contradictory and the transformation of social relations happens mainly through unintended consequences, the emergence of highly reflexive actors, such as these Korean-Japanese filmmakers, points to a new direction on the horizon. Cosmopolitanization of our social reality is without doubt in progress, even in a country like Japan where the hyphen between the nation and state is historically so tight that the homogeneity of the nation was upheld as a national characteristic in and of itself.
Notes

1. It is based on my PhD research for the Department of Media and Communications, Goldsmiths’ College, University of London.
2. In the book Cosmopolitan Vision (2006) Beck uses two terms, “actually existing cosmopolitanism” and “really existing cosmopolitanism”, interchangeably and I believe there is no difference between them. Here I mainly use the term “actually existing cosmopolitanism”.
3. Takashi Asai of Uplink Co, who is the subject of a case study in Chapter 3, line-produced Yamamoto’s Robinson’s Garden.
4. Hereafter, my use of the term “Southeast Asia” will include what we nowadays call “East Asian” countries such as Japan and Korea.
5. For these Western productions, usually Japanese film companies acted as mere local service providers, and rarely made financial and creative contributions.
6. There is also a reversed version in the French art film, written by Marguerite Duras and produced by Anatole Daumon, Hiroshima Mon Amour (Alain Resnais, 1959). The film had a female protagonist who spends a night with a Japanese male character adding a twist to the usual Orientalist storyline.
7. Later, FPA changed its name to Federation of Motion Picture Producers in the Asia Pacific.
8. Takashi Asai was interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka on 28 July, and 10 and 17 August 2006 in Tokyo.
9. Even within my limited personal experience, I have met a quite a few young Japanese women who came to study, or live, in London who mentioned a film viewing experience (particularly Derek Jarman) as the main factor which motivated them.
10. Satoru Iseki, interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, 26 August 2006 in Tokyo.
11. The synopsis of the film tells us that Shadow of China is about a “mysterious young tycoon, John Lone, [who] fights to seize control of Hong Kong — and to hide a past that could destroy him and the empire that he built” (New Line Home Video). The secret that John Lone fights to hide
is his “true” identity — he is biologically Japanese but was brought up as Chinese.

12. Miramax initially turned down *The Crying Game*, though later they picked up the film for distribution (Yoshizaki interview 2006)


14. The public support for film production had been nominal in Japan historically. Although some help becomes available when the government adopted the so-called “Cool Japan” policy in the early twenty-first century, financial support for film production remains scarce.

15. It is worth noting here that the surge of Japanese yen power coincided with the shift of cultural policy and reduction of public funding of arts in Britain. Thus, many British artists and filmmakers were looking to Japan for alternative sources of finance.

16. The first Tokyo International Film Festival was held from 31 May to 9 June 1985 and aimed to be the “Cannes Film Festival of the East” (Watabe 1987: 90). Michiyo Yoshizaki was in charge of organizing the competition juries and guests and so forth while Masato Hara was one of the masterminds behind the organization of the festival as a whole (Yoshizaki interview 2007).

17. Jurmusch’s *Stranger Than Paradise* was a phenomenal success in the minitheatres (Otaka and Inaba, 1989: 43), and Japan became the single most important market for New York independents — Jurmusch’s *Mystery Train* (1989), *Night on Earth* (1991), *Dead Man* (1995), and *Ghost Dog: The Way of the Samurai* (1999) were all financed by JVC entertainment.


19. Average studio features cost approximately 60 million yen and independent films cost approximately 20 million yen in the late 1970s (Fujii interview 2005).


21. The interpreter, Jun Mori, used to work in my production office in London and we chatted a lot about Fujii.

22. Fujii is known for his close friendship with the controversial writer Yukio Mishima. After Mishima’s death, Fujii became in charge of looking after the film rights of all Mishima novels for his estate. However, according to Fukushima (the line producer of *The Grudge 2* who was close to Fujii) this does not mean Fujii shared Mishima’s political views. Fujii was also close to the progressive left-wing writer Kobo Abe — the author of *Suna no onna* (*The Woman in the Dune*); *Tanin no kao* (*The Face of Another*) amongst others (Fukushima interview 2006).
23. Toho Studio, where Shogun was shot, was the site of the fiercest labour struggles in post-war history, but its labour union was weakened considerably by the 1970s (Sato 1995b: 189–205).

24. Masaichi Nagata’s Daiei, where Fujii was the head of script development, went bankrupt in 1971. Since then, Fujii has produced films through his independent production company and occasionally freelanced.


26. Inoue worked on Hentai kazoku aniki no yomesan (Abnormal Family, Masayuki Suo, 1983) as an assistant director; Masayuki Suo later directed Shall We Dance? (1996). Inoue worked on numerous low-budget exploitation films in the 1980s before he went to the US. After the collapse of the Japanese studio production system in the 1970s, these sex exploitation films were one of only few places where young filmmakers could gain working experience.

27. Nevertheless, the production budget of Lost in Translation, that is $4 million, does not really qualify to be called “low budget” for the Japanese standard.

28. For example, based on my own experience, an average rate of pay for a first assistant director in the early 2000s in the US was about US$650 for ten hours a day, whereas in Japan, ¥30,000 (approximately US$250) would buy a very experienced first assistant director for a flat day, which normally means over 14 hours.

29. Satoshi Fukushima interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, on 11 August 2006 in Tokyo. His contract did not allow Satoshi Fukushima to tell me actual numbers from the budget. However, he did not deny these “estimated” and “alleged” numbers.


31. I interviewed the Japanese line producer of The Grudge 2, Satoshi Fukushima, on 11 August 2006, and the cinematographer Katsumi Yanagijima on 6 August 2006. Although Fukushima was not allowed to disclose the actual budget figures to me by his contract, he did not deny these estimations.

32. Akira Morishige, interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, 2 August 2006 in Tokyo. According to Morishige, Toho paid 900 million yen (approximately US$7.5 million) for the Japanese rights and Toho Film received 90 million yen for line-producing the Japanese parts. Although he was not officially informed about the budget total, he estimated that the Japanese sales alone probably covered the total production costs.

33. Kaoru Nakamura interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, 3 August 2006 in Tokyo.

34. Although Chua Lam’s observation that Japan had stopped being a model to follow for Hong Kong filmmakers was true in general, Japanese
technological superiority was still evident in some areas, and this was widely acknowledged. Therefore, the provision of superior technologies and finance still remained a feature of Japan-centred regional cosmopolitanism in the late 1980s.

35. Shu Kei frequented Japan especially after producing the documentary film *Sunless Days* (1990). The film explored the impact of the Tiananmen Square incident on the Chinese community. According to Nakamura, Shu Kei feared prosecution by the Chinese authorities and remained in Japan for a long time.

37. Thomas Tang interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, 10 August 2006 in Tokyo.
38. Takuji Ushiyama interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, 17 August 2006 in his Tokyo Office.
39. Ren Shujian interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, 12 and 25 August 2006 in Tokyo. *Tampopo no saigetsu* (*Dandelion*, 2003) was his graduation project from Nihon Eiga Gakkou (the Japan Film School). The film was screened at the Yamagata International Documentary Film Festival in 2003.
41. The film *Yasukuni* was produced with a grant from Japan’s Agency for Cultural Affairs. The furore surrounding the film earned harassment and death threats from ultraconservatives, and three cinemas that originally planned to show the film cancelled screenings.
42. Shinji Aoyama directed his graduation film from the Beijing Film Academy, *A Day in Beijing* (2006), and Yukari Nishiyama directed her graduation film from the Central Academy of Drama, *Fifth June, Sunday, Cloudy* (2006).
43. There is an interesting study about the Americanization of post-war Japan by the sociologist Shunya Yoshimi. He documented the various ways in which washing machines, refrigerators, and television sets were introduced to the Japanese home as symbols of the American lifestyle and democracy (1999: 160).
Index

abunasa 84, 99
advanced liberalism 116
Ai no korida 6, 69, 70, 71, 72, 104
Akutagawa, Ryunosuke 90, 157
All Under the Moon 22, 23
America’s Japan 37, 38, 58, 59
Amuse Inc 155, 156, 158
Anderson, Joseph and Donald Richie 25, 27, 31, 41, 42, 44, 45, 50, 54
Aoki, Tamotsu 9, 10, 38
Asai, Takashi 20, 79, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111
Asianization of Hollywood 140, 147
Bauman, Zygmunt 7, 138, 139
Banal cosmopolitanization(sm) 2, 9, 12, 76, 79, 80, 116, 129, 133, 171, 172
Banal nationalism 2, 171
Beck, Ulrich 2, 5, 12, 13, 21, 76, 81, 116, 135, 171, 172
Beijing Film Academy, the 8, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169
Bill Kong 147, 154, 161
Bourdieu, Pierre 52

Cannes Film Festival 28, 42, 53, 57, 64, 66, 69, 109
Castells, Manuel 2, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, 41, 90, 110, 111, 172
CCD 30, 41

Central Academy of Drama, the 166, 168
Chanbara 30, 31, 41
Changi prison camp 121
Chow, Rey 28, 49, 50
Chua, Lam 64, 151, 152, 156
CIE 30, 31, 41
Cinema Square Tokyu 83
Cinequanon 23, 24, 178
Cine Switch 85, 86
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 160, 161
CMPE 31
Clavell, James 7, 115, 118, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 132, 133
clash of cultures, the 7, 122, 130
Cocteau, Jean 53, 55
Coppola, Sofia 7, 115, 117, 118, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133
cultural distinctions 44, 118, 119, 133
Cultural Imperialism 1, 51, 76, 89
Daiei 5, 26, 28, 33, 40, 42, 43, 46, 55, 59, 61, 62, 63, 65, 69, 119, 123, 141, 177
Dauman, Anatole 69, 70, 104
different from the West, but above Asia 4, 25, 28
Dower, John 4, 30, 36, 37, 38, 39
Eastman Color 53, 55, 59
Embracing Defeat 30, 36

Fashionsei 84
Federation of Motion Picture Producers in South East Asia (FPA) 6, 56, 57, 175
fetish of the white man 99, 166
flying gees style (model) 149, 169
Fujii, Hiroaki 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 133, 134, 141, 142, 176, 177
Fukushima, Satoshi 120, 136, 141, 142, 143, 176, 177
General MacArthur 30, 36, 37, 38, 39, 124
Giddens, Anthony 1, 2, 13, 15, 16, 21, 87
Global Hollywood 4, 6, 8, 75, 114, 115, 116, 117, 135, 136, 143
Global structures of common difference 52, 63
Golden Age of Japan-Hong Kong Cinematic Exchange 8, 29, 60, 62, 66, 151
Grudge 2, the 7, 113, 116, 117, 119, 120, 136, 137, 138, 141, 142, 176
Hara, Masato 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 98, 100, 102, 111, 176
Harootunian, Harry 36, 37, 38, 58
Held, David 1
Herald Ace 79, 81, 82, 83, 85, 93
High, Peter 34
Hirano, Kyoko 31, 32, 33, 41
Hiroshima Mon Amour 69, 123, 175
Hong Kong Noir 154
Hybrid Regionalism 8, 149, 162, 164, 170
Ichise, Takashi 116, 136, 137, 149, 152, 153, 154

Inoue, Kiyoshi 118, 119, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 141, 142, 177
Inoue, Umetsugu 64, 65, 66
Iseki, Satoru 79, 88, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 102, 111, 158, 160, 162
Itami, Mansaku 34, 35
Iwabuchi, Koichi 8, 24, 26, 28, 145, 146, 147, 150, 151, 154, 157, 187
Japan-centred regional cosmopolitanism 145, 149, 169
Japan’s Japan 38
J-Horrors 116, 136, 140
Jarmusch, Jim 20, 72, 107
Jigokumon 28, 45, 53, 54, 55, 62, 63, 123
Kantian 3, 5, 12
Katzenstein, J. Peter 148, 149, 158, 162
Kawakita, Nagamasa 47, 48, 49, 50
Kelsky, Karen 80, 82, 85, 99, 166
Kido, Shiro 43, 66
Kinugasa, Teinosuke 28, 54, 55
Kokusaika 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 77, 78, 81, 82, 93, 96, 99, 107, 108, 110, 121, 126, 129, 162
Koushukei 69
Kurosawa, Akira 3, 25, 32, 33, 34, 42, 75, 79, 88, 90, 93, 106
Lee, Bon-u 22, 23, 24, 79, 178
Legitimizing cosmopolitan(ism) 5, 6, 16, 17, 18, 21, 28, 29, 40, 41, 44, 47, 48, 59, 60, 61, 77, 78, 79, 89, 102, 103, 117
Legitimizing identity 5, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 92, 103, 111
Li Han Hsiang 63, 64
Li, Ying 167
Lone, John 92, 93, 94, 95, 175
Lost in Translation 7, 113, 115, 117, 118, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 141, 142

Madam Butterfly 27, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 157

Marx, Karl 117

Matsushita 75, 89, 145

Midori kawa, Michio 43, 45, 54, 55

mini-theatre 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 99, 108, 110

Mishima, Yukio 18, 154, 176

Mizoguchi, Kenji 56, 61, 62

Mori, Iwao 43, 48, 49, 50

Morishige, Akira 148, 155, 156, 157, 158, 177

Mr. Baseball 129, 130, 131

Nagata, Masaichi 5, 6, 18, 26, 28, 29, 33, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 65, 69, 90, 103, 119, 123, 177

Nakamura, Kaoru 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 177, 178

New International Division of Cultural Labour (NICL) 113

Nihonjinron 9, 10, 38

Nikkatsu 65, 155

Nippon Film Development and Finance (NDF) 79, 96, 97, 98

Nishimoto, Tadashi 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 150, 152

No Regrets for My Youth 32, 34

Orientalism 26, 28, 40, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 56

Oriental Orientalism(list) 28, 51, 56, 63, 157

Oshima, Nagisa 6, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 88, 93, 104, 171

Pan-Asian Cinema 145, 146, 147, 149, 158, 160

Panopticon 138, 139

PIA film festival 107

Princess Yang Kwei-fei 61, 62, 63, 66

Project cosmopolitan(ism) 5, 16, 17, 21, 22, 41, 111, 172

Project identity 5, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 110, 111

project of the self 87

Rashomon 3, 4, 5, 25, 26, 28, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 54, 56, 90, 123

Rayns, Tony 78, 103, 105, 106, 107

Recentering Globalization 146

reflexive modernity 16, 21

reflexivity 110, 111

Ren, Shujian 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 178

Remaking 7, 116, 119, 135, 136, 141

Resistance cosmopolitan(ism) 5, 6, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 41, 67, 70, 77, 78, 80, 97, 101, 102, 104, 110, 111, 117, 162

Resistance identity 5, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 87, 88, 110, 111

revival of Japanese cinema, the 161

Robinson’s Garden 20, 79, 105, 107, 175

Sai, Yoichi 22

Said, Edward 46, 49, 50

Self-Orientalism(t) 6, 26, 28, 40, 41, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54

Shadow of China 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 175

Shanghai Film Studios 163, 164

Shaw Brothers 29, 56, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 150, 151, 152

Shaw, Run Run 6, 29, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63

Shimizu, Takashi 136, 137

Shin Toho 63, 65

Shochiku 23, 42, 43, 46, 50, 54, 66, 68

Shochiku New Wave 67
Shogun 7, 11, 113, 115, 117, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 132, 133, 134, 136, 142, 177
side effects 2, 12, 76, 81, 111, 116, 172
Sklair, Leslie 116, 117
Sony 3, 75, 97, 138, 145, 179
South East Asian Film Festival 29, 56, 59, 61, 63
Stramigioli, Giuliana 41, 42
Synopticon control 8, 135, 138, 139
Tang, Thomas 163, 164, 165, 166, 170, 178, 179
tankan road show 84
Terayama, Shuji 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 154
Thomas, Jeremy 88, 97, 98
to-be-looked-at-ness 6, 28, 49, 90
Toho 27, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 161
Toho Film 148
Toho Studio 86, 121, 125, 136, 141, 142, 177
Tohokushinsha 121
Tokyo international film festival 80, 107, 108, 158, 176
Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) 116, 117, 135, 136
Uplink 79, 104, 108, 110
Ushiyama, Takuji 163, 164, 178
Venice Film Festival 3, 25, 41, 42, 62
Wakon Yosai 53
Wasurerareta Kougun 68, 69
Wilk, Richard 52, 55, 63
Yamamoto, Masashi 19, 20, 105, 106
Yamamoto, Mataichiro 89, 91, 92
Yanagijima, Katsumi 119, 120, 136, 137, 138, 140, 143, 177
Yanagimachi, Mitsuo 89, 92, 93, 94, 95
Yasukuni 167, 168
Yoshizaki, Michiyo 79, 85, 88, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 111, 176
Yunbogi no nikki 68
Zainichi 23, 69