## Contents

Acknowledgements vii

List of Contributors ix

Introduction: East Asian TV Dramas: Identifications, Sentiments and Effects 1
  *Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi*

### I Television Industry in East Asia 13

1. The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave 15
   *Doobo Shim*

2. Renting East Asian Popular Culture for Local Television: Regional Networks of Cultural Production 33
   *Tania Lim*

3. Mediating Nationalism and Modernity: The Transnationalization of Korean Dramas on Chinese (Satellite) TV 53
   *Lisa Leung*
## Contents

### II Transnational-Crosscultural Receptions of TV Dramas

4. Structure of Identification and Distancing in Watching East Asian Television Drama
   *Chua Beng Huat*

5. Re-Imagining a Cosmopolitan ‘Asian Us’: Korean Media Flows and Imaginaries of Asian Modern Femininities
   *Angel Lin and Avin Tong*

   *Yoshitaka Mori*

7. Touring ‘Dramatic Korea’: Japanese Women as Viewers of *Hanryu* Dramas and Tourists on *Hanryu* Tours
   *Yukie Hirata*

   *Dong-Hoo Lee*

### III Nationalistic Reactions

9. Mapping Out the Cultural Politics of “the Korean Wave” in Contemporary South Korea
   *Keehyeung Lee*

10. Rap(p)ing Korean Wave: National Identity in Question
    *Fang-chih Irene Yang*

11. Existing in the Age of Innocence: Pop Stars, Publics, and Politics in Asia
    *Eva Tsai*

12. When the Korean Wave Meets Resident Koreans in Japan: Intersections of the Transnational, the Postcolonial and the Multicultural
    *Koichi Iwabuchi*

Notes 265
References 279
Index 305
Contributors

CHUA Beng Huat is in charge of the Cultural Studies Research Cluster at the Asia Research Institute and Professor of Sociology, National University of Singapore. In the past few years, he has been actively engaged in collaborative work in the field of East Asian pop culture. He is founding co-executive editor of Inter-Asia Cultural Studies. His most recent book, as editor, is Election as Popular Culture in Asia (2007).

Yukie HIRATA is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology, Yonsei University, and teaches in the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies, Dokkyo University, Seoul.


Dong-Hoo LEE is an associate professor in the Department of Mass Communication at University of Incheon, Korea. She has published articles on transnational program adaptation and digital mobile culture in Korea.
Her research interests include media flow in the age of globalization, the cultural consequences of new communication technology, and medium theory.

Keehyeung LEE teaches in the School of Journalism and Communication at Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea. He specializes in media and cultural studies. His work includes ‘Beyond the fragments: Reflecting on communicational cultural studies in South Korea’ (2005); ‘Speak memory! Morae Sigye and the politics of social melodrama in contemporary South Korea’, Cultural Studies Critical Methodologies (2004).

Lisa Y. M. LEUNG is an assistant professor in the Department of Cultural Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. She has published journal articles on the localization of international women’s magazines, the globalisation of Chinese satellite TV, and gender and cross-cultural analysis of flows of media and cultural products across Asia, including several book chapters that examine transnational reception of Korean dramas.

Tania LIM received her PhD in Media and Communications from Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. She now works on media policy issues at the Media Development Authority of Singapore. Her research areas are the development of Asian film and television industries, new media and globalisation, youth media and consumerism.

Angel LIN is an associate professor in the Department of English and Communication, City University of Hong Kong. She works in the areas of critical discourse analysis, urban ethnography, critical pedagogy, feminist media studies and youth cultural studies.

Yoshitaka MŌRI is an associate professor of sociology and cultural studies at Tokyo National University of Fine Arts and Music. His research interests are postmodern culture, media, art, the city and transnationalism. His recent publications include Karutyuraruru Stadeizu Nyumon (The introduction to cultural studies, with Toshiya Ueno) 2000 and ‘Culture = politics: The emergence of new cultural forms of protest in the age of Freeter’, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies (2005).

Doobo SHIM is associate professor in the School of Culture and Communications at the Sungshin Women’s University, Seoul, Korea. His research interests include: the impact of globalization on Korean media
industry, dynamics of Asian media industries, and international communication theories. He has published in *Media Culture and Society*, *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, and *Prometheus*.

**Avin Hei Man TONG** is a research associate in the Faculty of Education, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. She received her MA in Communication from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. She has been researching topics in youth cultures, media audience studies and feminist cultural studies.

**Eva TSAI** is an assistant professor in the Graduate Institute of Mass Communication, National Taiwan Normal University. Her work has appeared in the anthology *Feeling Asian Modernities* (Hong Kong University Press, 2004), and journals such as *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture*, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, and *Japan Forum*. She is writing a book about the production of love by the East Asian cultural industries.

**Fang-chih Irene YANG** is associate professor at the Department of English in National Dong Hwa University, Taiwan. She has published articles on the localization of international women’s magazines in Taiwan, the production and reception of popular music, sexual politics in variety shows, politics of translating post-feminism from the West to Taiwan, and reception of Korean dramas in Taiwan.
Introduction

East Asian TV Dramas: Identifications, Sentiments and Effects

Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi

In an anthology published in 1995 with the title, ‘to be continued … Soap Operas around the world’ (Allen 1995), the only Asian country that rated an entry (Rofel 1995) was an analysis of the People Republic of China (PRC) TV’s drama, ‘Yearning’ (渴望, fifty episodes, 1990), a melodrama credited as marking ‘the maturity of soap opera as a full-blown Chinese genre’ (Lu 2001:215). The date of the production and screening of this melodrama shows us that the PRC is a very new entrant in this genre of media entertainment. Thus, the absence of analysis of this genre in other East Asia locations in a collection that claims to cover ‘soap operas around the world’ is at its most generous attributable to the ‘space limitation’ in a book and at worst, the lack of knowledge of the editor of soap operas in East Asia. The fact is TV soap operas or melodramas have been part of the staples of popular entertainment in East Asia since, at least, the early 1970s.

Take Singapore, for example, which did not have television until 1961. The now famous Hong Kong/Hollywood star, Chow Yun Fat, was introduced to the Singapore audience in the mid-1970s as the main character in the popular TV drama series, Man in the Net (网中人), imported from Hong Kong. At the scheduled hour of every week night, in all the neighbourhoods in the public housing estates, in which more than 85% of Singaporeans reside, the sounds from the television sets, turned in unison to the one and only Chinese language channel, would echo through the outdoor spaces that were devoid of people because all the residents were at home glued to the television sets, which were then often ‘shared’ with neighbours,
watching the latest instalment of *Man in the Net*. In the days of nascent industrialization, Singapore was both too poor in national economy and too small in domestic population and market to support a vibrant media industry; indeed, even today, the small domestic market remains an obstacle even though the wealth issue has been long solved.

Since then, Singapore has been receiving waves after waves of TV dramas from different parts of East Asia: Chinese period-costumed melodramas of long suffering but eventually triumphal daughters-in-law in wealthy, large and complicated extended families, came from Taiwan throughout the 1980s, followed in the 1990s by Japanese urban ‘trendy’ dramas of romances among young professionals dressed from head to toe in international designer togs, living in well appointed apartments and dining in upscale, especially Western, restaurants in the most trendy locations in the city of Tokyo. Each of the ‘trendy’ dramas series was a visual metaphor for capitalist-consumerist modernity. It is this consumerist modernity that is part of the fascination and captivates the audience of Japanese trendy dramas in the rest of East and Southeast Asia, especially those in the developing nations who aspire to improvements in their material life. Just as the popularity of the Japanese dramas waned, came the Korean TV dramas in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The flood of Korean pop culture — films, pop music and especially TV dramas — into the rest of East Asia came to be known very quickly as the ‘Korean Wave’ (韩流) by the PRC audience in 1997. By mid-2005, as one drama series was followed hot on the heels by another on TV broadcast, Korean TV dramas became part of the daily programming of many free-to-air and satellite television stations in East Asia and, thus part of the routine viewing habits of their respective audiences.

Singapore, as a media consumption location, thus suggests that there are potentially three sources of East Asian TV dramas in any East Asian locations: a historical stream of Chinese language(s) dramas in all the predominantly ethnic Chinese locations, including the PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, an island-nation with 75% ethnic Chinese population, and in the past decade and a half, Japanese and Korean TV dramas. Indeed, it is the arrival of the latter two in the rest of the region that provides the material basis for a discursive conceptualization of an ‘East Asian pop culture’ sphere with an integrated cultural economy.

**Uneven Flows and Exchanges**

The flows and exchanges within this East Asian pop culture sphere have been governed firstly by the disproportionate massive ethnic Chinese consumer
market relative to those of Japan and Korea. Texts of imported media programme are regularly dubbed and subtitled in Chinese script in Hong Kong and Taiwan for local broadcast but subsequently re-exported to other ethnic communities in the global Chinese diaspora and more recently to the PRC. It is this massive global ethnic Chinese consumer market that makes dubbing, translating and subtitling a potentially profitable investment. Consequently, the flows and exchanges of TV dramas have been very unequal within the region. Drama serials tend to flow from Japan and Korea into ethnic-Chinese locations, while only a trickle of the dramas from the latter locations enter the Korean or Japanese market; indeed, no Hong Kong TV drama has ever been screened on Japanese television to date.

Secondly, differences in domestic economic capacity and the history of the media industry have determining effects on the exporting and importing of TV dramas in a particular location. For example, as the wealthiest country in Asia, domestic consumers alone are able to support the Japanese TV drama industry, in spite of the high cost of production. This had lead to an initial reluctance to seek overseas markets. The popularity of Japanese TV dramas was initiated by illegal broadcasting through private satellite stations in places like Taiwan and underground private consumption in Korea. The popularity of Japanese TV dramas in the rest of East Asia came as a surprise to the producers and the additional profits serendipitous. It motivated the Japanese producers to produce dramas that consciously attempt to capture this overseas market. However, the drama series Romance 2000, also titled Love 2000, which was telecast simultaneously in Tokyo, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, was such an obvious failure that it might have put a stop to such experiments. With the additional difficulties of policing intellectual property copyrights, Japanese drama producers may be said to be returning to cultivating the domestic market, with the exception of some joint productions with Korea television stations since the late 1990s.

Thirdly, memories of colonization and wars have influenced the flows and exchanges of pop cultures within East Asia. With the PRC as the nation’s antagonist constantly on the political radar screen, Taiwanese youth have been favourably disposed to Japanese pop culture, and are colloquially known as ‘ha-ri-zu’ (哈日族) — ‘keen consumer of Japanese media and Japanese-style goods’ (Lee 2004: 144) — often to the chagrin of their parents and other elders who have bitter memories of the history of Japanese colonization of Taiwan. The same bitter history of Japanese colonization led South Korea to impose an official total ban on the import of all Japanese cultural products in 1945. This was not lifted until 1998 with the signing of the Joint Declaration of the New 21st Century Korea-Japan Partnership, when media products
flowed freely between the two nations. However, the official ban did not make Korea impermeable to Japanese pop culture; even the government-owned Korean Broadcasting Station was guilty of the illegal importation of Japanese pop culture. With a constant stream of underground importation, Japanese pop culture had been ‘copied’, ‘partially integrated’, ‘plagiarized’ and ‘reproduced’ into Korean products; so much so that Kim Hyun-mee suggests that ‘Japanese [pop] culture in Korea had already set its roots deep into the emotional structure of Koreans’ (2002:4) by the time of the Joint Declaration.

The aggregate result of the multiple determining factors on East Asian pop culture development, especially of TV dramas, is one of uneven and unequal flows and exchanges across national and cultural boundaries. First, there has been a historical stream of exchanges and flows within predominantly ethnic-Chinese areas, truncated by the 40 years of communist economic regime in the PRC, reconnected again after its economic marketization in 1978 and gaining vitality by the early 1990s when the film and television industry in the PRC were liberalized. Second, there has been the flow of Japanese TV dramas into the rest of the region without corresponding import of TV dramas from elsewhere until 2004 when the Korean TV drama series, Winter Sonata, was broadcast by NHK. And finally, since the late 1990s, the strong export and flow of Korean TV dramas into the rest of East Asia as part of the Korean Wave, which has the backing of the government as cultural export industry. We are concerned at this juncture with the latest of these developments, namely, the arrival of and respective local receptions of Korean TV dramas, as part of the larger ‘Korean Wave’ phenomenon, in the rest of East Asia.

**Korean TV Dramas**

The penetration of Korean TV dramas into East Asian markets in the late 1990s is the consequence of felicitous timing. The post-1997 Asian Financial Crisis that savaged the Korean national economy contributed to the stepping-up of the exporting of Korean pop culture as part of the national export industry. The same crisis had led television industries in the other affected East Asian economies to look for cheaper programmes than the relatively expensive Japanese dramas. The confluence of these two separate industry strategies led to the rapid importation and screening of Korean TV dramas in the rest of East Asia, except Japan, creating the so-called ‘Korean Wave’ in the region.
Take Singapore again as an example. In 1999, the tightly government controlled media sector, which has very severe restrictions on local and foreign ownership, opened a gap for a new free-to-air television station. This new station was owned by the local monopoly newspaper publisher, the Singapore Press Holdings (SPH). In 2001, it started operating with two channels, an English language Channel I and a Mandarin Channel U ( getParent for ‘excellence’). This was an uphill venture because the government-owned television station, with three free-to-air channels had already be in existence for more than thirty years and had well consolidated audience base. This was very quickly apparent, as the locally produced English language programmes on Channel I failed abjectly to establish an audience and was shut down within two years of its establishment, reducing the channel to broadcasting news and imported programmes from the US. It eventually shut down completely in 2004.

The Mandarin Channel U, on the other hand, was able to carve out and take away a significant segment of the local audience from its established rival through a strategy of half locally produced programmes and half imported programmes from Japan, Hong Kong (with TVB) and Korea. Parenthetically, it should be noted that this was a repeat of how STAR TV used Japanese trendy dramas as a means of establishing its audience base in Hong Kong, where the two existing local stations had already captured 90% of the audience on the island. The locally produced programmes were largely variety shows, which copied the format well established by Japan and Taiwan stations — high energy, rapid-fire commentaries from a team of programme hosts whose sole objective is to make fun of and embarrass the guests in the show. From the point of preparing to launch the new channel, the station had already bought a store of Korean TV dramas because the latter had by then proved popular in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The popularity of the Korean dramas in Singapore pushed the state-owned Channel 8 and the new Channel U into a bidding war for similar drama series, culminating in the highest price being paid of the serial, All In (2003), rumoured to be up to forty thousand Singapore dollars per episode. Such fierce competition for imported programmes, not restricted to Korean TV dramas, was cannibalizing the stations and led eventually to the merger of the state-owned and SPH-owned stations into a joint-stock monopoly in 2004. In 2005, Channel U reconfigured itself as the station that showcases ‘pan-East Asian’ pop culture, reflecting the stabilization of flows of East Asian pop culture throughout the region.

Perhaps the drama series that has the greatest impact on all the predominantly ethnic-Chinese locations in East Asia is Korea’s Dae Jang Geum
(大长今) — Jewel in the Palace (2003), which chronicles the rise and tribulations of the first female imperial physician in 16th-century Chosun Dynasty. The serial was first exported to Taiwan and was very well received. It was subsequently screened on TVB in Hong Kong to record breaking audience ratings. The Taiwan mandarin version was then bought by a provincial satellite station, Hunan Satellite Television, and broadcast at the national level in the PRC. In early 2006, it was broadcast on subscription-only cable television in Singapore. It was so popular that it was immediately rebroadcast after the completion of its first run and finally, a third broadcast was done on the above-mentioned free-to-air Channel U.

As a rule the Japanese and Korean TV dramas that cross national boundaries to the ethnic-Chinese predominant locations are of the contemporary urban romance genre. Historical period costumed dramas, of which many are produced in Japan and Korea, are not exported as the audiences in the latter locations may not have the prerequisite historical and cultural knowledge to sustain their interest in the usually longer series of historical dramas. Jewel in the Palace is thus an exception. In this case, the ‘close’ cultural affinity between the Chosun Dynasty and Chinese history was an important bridge to its success; for example, the written texts in the drama, from imperial edicts to recipes for food and medicine, were written in Chinese script. This facilitated ‘indigenization’ through dubbing and subtitling. Riding on this affinity, the Hong Kong television station took additional effort to ‘indigenize’ the series by, for example, providing brief explanations of the narrative before the broadcasting of each episode and, often giving the Chinese equivalent of the ingredients in the on-screen menu or medical prescriptions. Such local television station investments are central to the popular success of the series.

In Japan, undoubtedly the singular Korean TV drama that has had an immense impact on audiences is Winter Sonata, starring Bae Yong Jun in the male lead character. The series was first shown on NHK-owned cable television late at night in 2003 to boost its sagging ratings. Popular requests caused it to be shown again in early 2004. Then, on 3 April 2004, Bae Yong Jun arrived in Tokyo and was mobbed by 5,000 mostly middle-age fans who turned up to welcome him, instantly creating a media spectacle. Following which, NHK rebroadcast the series on a terrestrial station, again with record viewer ratings. The series propelled Bae into stardom in Japan, earning him the title ‘Yon-sama’ and ‘Lord (Prince) Yong’. NHK earned a phenomenal sum of money through tie-up products such as DVD sets and a novelized book. Beyond the television screen, Winter Sonata also spawned behavioural changes among its Japanese middle-aged female audiences including, among
other things, turning them into enthusiastic tourists to Korea, earning the latter a substantial amount of tourist dollars.

**Themes and Essays**

The success of Korean TV dramas in the rest of East Asia is evidenced by the fact that they are now part of the daily programming of many local television stations in both afternoon and evening schedules. Nevertheless, academically this pan-East Asian transnational pop culture phenomenon has yet to be submitted to a more systematic comparative analysis, both in terms of its reception and consumption in different locations, and in terms of a comparison with similar genre entertainment from other parts of East Asia. This is the background that motivates the analyses in this collection of essays from different locations in the region.

Section I examines the political economy and current state of play in the television industry in East Asia. Regional media production is promoted by national policy and South Korea is the best exemplar of this. Shim Doobo explores the rise of the ‘Korean Wave’ in the new millennium in terms of governmental and corporate support. He empirically examines government support, investments of chaebols (Korean conglomerates), and processes of capital accumulation in the media sector. The development is no linear evolution and the continuous efforts of the producers to improve their own production techniques should not be ignored, but the governmental promotional policy is undoubtedly a most prominent factor in the rapid growth of the Korean media industry, a development strategy that has now been taken up by other Asian states. The intensification and dynamic circulation of media cultures in East Asian markets is not restricted to expanding the export of cultural products from one location to the rest of the region, as exemplified by the Korean Wave. Coining the term, ‘renting strategies’, Tania Lim shows how media producers in East Asia mutually appropriate celebrities, icons, contents and program formats of East Asian pop culture for their own productions and co-productions in their bid to garner stronger positions in their respective TV territories and the regional TV marketplace. Transnational Asian popular media texts have been used by provincial/local media operators as a resource to compete successfully with the dominant national players. Leung charts how Hunan Satellite TV, a regional station in the PRC, succeeds in using Korean media — through its successful bid for one of the most popular Korean TV programs, *Dae Jang Geum* — as a vehicle to establish its footprint in the competitive national
TV media space. The station had to juggle with a multitude of forces — state, ideological, ethnic, and economic — at the national level, in order to assume a leading role among the various national, terrestrial and cable/satellite, broadcasters. The case of Hunan Satellite TV throws light on the dynamics that mediate the local with the national via the transnational, in an increasingly intensified ‘globality’ where the development of communication technologies and the rise of East Asian media flows enable ‘local’ or ‘regional’ players to escape subordination to the national center.

Thematically, the essays in Section II are concerned with transnational-crosscultural receptions of TV dramas in different locations across East Asia. The crisscrossing of national and cultural boundaries logically raises the question of how an audience watches/reads imported TV dramas within East Asia. Chua aims to answer this question by developing a comprehensive, relatively formal, conceptual framework for the analysis of pan-Asian, transnational pop culture consumption. At one level he examines the circulation and reception of media products in locations where an ethnic-Chinese population predominates, namely the PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. Within this ‘Pop Culture China’, Japanese and Korean films and TV programs are usually dubbed as a means of ‘domesticating’ the foreign. However, the ‘reduced’ foreignness is preserved in the visual elements as part of the desired viewing pleasure. Next, drawing on existing TV drama audience studies throughout East Asia, it can be demonstrated that audiences in the different locations read imported products along a linear temporality defined by capitalist-consumer modernity, specifically in terms of nostalgia for a ‘less-capitalist’ past where life was more vigorous or desire for a more consumerist future. Finally, the possible emergence of a pan-East Asian ‘community of consumers’ and its implication is examined.

Lin and Tong’s comparative analysis of the meaning-making activities of Hong Kong and Singaporean female audiences of Korean TV dramas found that these audiences are adept in using Korean dramas to construct and confirm their own multiple, at times conflicting, subjectivities, which seem to be rooted concurrently in ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, to negotiate everyday life tensions and dilemmas experienced in contemporary urban living, and to construct what they see as their distinctive ‘Asian’ modern femininities. These modes of consumption contrast with those of Japanese female audiences, whose responses are explored in the next two contributions in this section.

Here, it needs to be stressed that the impact of Korean TV dramas on Japan merits special attention, not least because of the lingering importance of colonial/postcolonial relations between the two countries. The very
significant impacts of the Korean Wave in Japan are undoubtedly results of the entangled history of the two countries, Korea being colonized by Japan for close to four decades (1910–1945). The essays by Mori and Hirata analyze the impact of the Korean TV serial drama, *Winter Sonata*, in Japan. Each shows that the effects of Korean TV dramas on Japanese audiences are such that new cultural-political phenomena have emerged, which have a potential impact on the people-to-people relations between the two countries, beneath the continuing difficult international relations of the two nations.

Through interviews with middle-aged female fans of the drama and Yon-sama (Bae Yong Jun), which constitutes the predominant fan base in Japan, Mōri shows how the fans are actively involved in a various post-text cultural practices such as organizing fan meetings, learning Korean culture and language, and participating in *Winter Sonata* fan tours in Korea. Some of the audiences have even started to reconstruct postcolonial memories of the war between Japan and Korea. Although male-dominated social discourse in Japan easily dismisses the *Winter Sonata* and Yon-sama phenomena as a ‘trivial fad of unhappy women’, Mōri argues that the emergence of new cultural subjectivities of middle-aged housewives and their political possibilities should be taken seriously in their own right, in spite of having been marginalized or even ignored in a traditional political sense. This is precisely what Hirata has done in her empirical study of the Japanese women fans turned tourists who traveled to the shooting locations for *Winter Sonata*. The number of Japanese who traveled to Korea in 2004 grew by 35.5 percent compared with the previous year due to these women fans of Korean TV dramas. Based on fieldwork and interviews, Hirata elucidates the changes in the Japanese tourist’s view of Korea, which also testifies to the change in gender dynamics of Japanese tourists to Asia. Obviously, consumption of *Winter Sonata* has provided the Japanese women fans an opportune moment for the self-reflexive review of not just the state of their own lives and interpersonal relationships but also of Japan’s historical relationship with Korea.

While the rest of East Asia is watching Korean dramas, whose reception is discussed below, a significant segment of the domestic Korean audience at home is watching imported Japanese TV dramas. Lee Dong-Hoo studies ethnographically how young Korean women, from their late teens to early thirties, watched and related Japanese TV dramas to their daily lives. Constrained by conventional gender systems, these women react negatively to home-grown dramas and embrace the Japanese media products in building cultural capital for their own subjectivity formation. Lee examines, firstly, the ways in which the fans create or experience transnational consumption space, within which they negotiate their cultural or gender identities in an
age of globalization. Secondly, how their reception experiences have been hybridized as their self-reflexive reading becomes more inter-textual and inter-cultural, with an increasing propensity to select, compare and appropriate cultural products from various countries.

Section III covers the nationalistic reactions and negative ‘backlash’, which are at once political and ideological, that might be generated by massive cultural cross-border regional flows, of the Korean Wave. At home, critics point to the economic motivations and unbecoming nationalism behind the gleeful celebration of the ‘acceptance’ of Korean ‘culture’ by other Asians. Lee Keehyeung critically analyzes three competing positions on the Korean Wave in South Korea developed by the South Korean government, cultural producers and critical intellectuals; namely, neoliberalism, state-centric nationalism, culturalism cum post-colonialism. Reflecting on previous studies on the historical formations and trans-border flows of South Korean and Japanese popular cultures in Asia, Lee seeks to provide alternative, non-nationalist ways of envisioning the flow of South Korean popular culture across Asia so as to further inter-regional cultural understanding and dialogues. Elsewhere, the prominent presence of Korean pop culture begins to attract xenophobic reactions against a Korean ‘cultural imperialism’. For example, in Taiwan, the popularity of Korean dramas has been described by the mass media as an ‘invasion of Korean Wave’, a discursive construction that is embedded in economic and cultural nationalism, which are both predicated on the masculine conception of a nation. In contrast, there is another discourse that takes on a feminine form, addressing the question of how women consume Korean drama affectively, particularly that of the male body. This feminine discourse circulates in newspaper entertainment pages and fan websites that have women as its implicit reader/consumer. Yang critically interrogates these three public discourses on the Korean Wave from a feminist perspective. She suggests that the fan/women discourse functions as a ‘mode of containment’ that marginalizes women’s speech to ‘female complaint’. However, she argues that ‘complaint’ itself is both resistant and containment, self-expressive and self-confining and concludes with an attempt to re-read the fan discourse through Heidegger’s notion of ‘technology’ in the hope of transforming the existing public sphere which leaves women no place to speak. Picking up the thread of the politics of the national, Tsai explores the inter-Asia cultural space where different strands of nationalisms meet and compete to define, shape, and discipline the legitimacy of border-crossing pop stars. While many successful transnational celebrities in inter-Asia embody cosmopolitan mobility, limits to their fluid identity are exposed when unresolved historical tensions and new conditions of intra- and inter-national
cultural politics flare up. The stalled career of Aboriginal-Taiwanese diva A-mei is generally perceived as a casualty of the clash between Taiwanese and PRC nationalism. BoA, a young South Korean pop singer based in Japan, was recently compelled to pledge her patriotism during a territorial dispute between Korea and Japan. Tsai’s analysis highlights an emergent issue of how inter-Asia celebrities can become implicated in national identity battles, in an era where the intensification of transnational cultural flows seems bound to engender the nationalization of sentiments and politics.

However, how the *Winter Sonata* phenomenon has influenced, constructively or otherwise, the social positioning and recognition of resident Koreans in Japan, most of whom are the descendants of expatriates under Japanese colonial rule, remains a question and an issue. This issue is conceptualized and examined by Iwabuchi through the complexities of how transnational media flows of the Korean Wave intersect with postcolonial and multicultural issues in the Japanese local. He suggests that as the Korean Wave has significantly bettered the image of Korea, social recognition of resident Koreans has also improved. Nevertheless, in spite of this improved perception, a lack of understanding of the historically embedded experiences of resident Koreans remains, as the resident Koreans in Japan are often unproblematically associated with the culture and people of South Korea in such a way that postcolonial and multicultural issues are subsumed under the inter-national framework.

**Conclusion**

Using Korean TV dramas as an analytic vehicle, the essays in this volume collectively provide a multi-layered analysis of the emerging East Asian pop culture space in terms of intensifying production, marketing, circulation and consumption. By closely examining the political economy of the TV industry, audiences of the regional media flows in terms of gender subjectivity constructions, perceptions of colonial-postcolonial relationships and, nationalist responses to trans-national media culture exchanges, the essays highlight the multiple connectivities and socio-political implications of popular cultural flows and exchanges in East Asia. This series of contextually grounded analyses of the actual pop cultural circulation across national, cultural and geopolitical boundaries demonstrates the effects pop culture has on the imagination, meaning-making and meaning-changing and negotiation of difference — audience and their imagined regional counterparts, transnational fans and their ‘idols’ and even, postcolonial relations between the colonizer
and colonized — on their consumers. This volume, along with already published works of its contributors, demonstrates the presence of an East Asian pop culture that co-exists side by side with US domination in the global media industry. We hope that it offers to readers further empirical and conceptual insights into cultural globalization, which cannot be ascertained in existing US-centric analyses.
Notes

Introduction  East Asian TV Dramas

1. For further analysis of TV dramas in the PRC, see Sun (2002).
2. Comparative analyses of audience reception to Japanese trendy dramas in the rest of Asia can be found in K. Iwabuchi (2004).
3. I have attempted at best an outline in the conceptualization of this sphere in Chua (2004).
4. Interview with station public relations officer.

Chapter 1 The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave

1. I thank Richard Seow for this translation.
2. Won is the basic unit of currency in Korea, with US$1 roughly valued at 1,150 won in the early 2000s.
3. Yoon (2005), however, remarks that such unfair conventions have ameliorated in recent years.

Chapter 2 Renting East Asian Popular Culture for Local Television

1. I would like to thank Assistant Professor Lee Dong-Hoo of Incheon University, South Korea, Professor Koichi Iwabuchi of Waseda University, at Tokyo, and Professor Chua Beng-Huat, at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, for their invaluable assistance and insightful comments.

3. See November 2005 issue of Television Asia, in the section entitled ‘Rise and shine: Part 1’ when Television Asia conducted a brief survey among satellite operators such as BBC World, Star, AXN Asia, CNBC Asia, MTV Asia, National Geographic, and more, of the continuing rosy economic growth in Asia-based media growth as ‘multi-channel advertising sales are on the up and up’. Available at http://www.tvasia.com.sg/home?wid=150&func=viewSubmission&sid=388/ [accessed 12 Dec 2005].


7. Bourdieu 1984. He refers to these people as those in jobs that involve presentation and representation (sales, marketing, advertising, public relations, fashion, decoration and so forth) and in all the institutions providing symbolic goods and services’ (359).


11. See Hong Kong Film Archive newsletter for a seminar entitled ‘Another night in Hong Kong: Hong Kong–Japan film exchange in the 1950s and

12. There is an inter-mingling of Chinese and Korean history in the storyline of Musa that lends a creative license to this transnational co-production. See http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0275083/ [accessed 5 May 2005].

Chapter 3 Mediating Nationalism and Modernity

2. This is part of a research funded by Japan Foundation.
3. Hesmondhalgh, p. 179.
4. Ibid.
8. Ibid, p. 188.
10. Some of the regulations include strict categorization of TV programmes any cooperation with foreign TV units have to be permitted by the State Ministry of Broadcasting Films and Television.
13. See analyses of satellite TV in China, Harrison, p. 171, and Chan, p. 165.
14. The StarTV incident was the one when the authorities issued a ban in 1993 on reception of foreign satellite service, when Rupert Murdoch owned StarTV was beginning an aggressive profile in Chinese TV market. The ban also ensued a broader movement against westernization. Harrison, p. 173.
17. Ibid, p. 83.
18. Ibid, p. 89.
19. There is a convenient reference of ‘Hallyu’ to avian flu that they both spread across China like pandemic.
21. The popularity of several K-pop idols (H.O.T. in 1998, and BoA).
23. Other popular dramas include In Love with the Female Anchor, The Temptation of Eve, Glass Slippers.
24. Analysis of the preference of Korean TV dramas for different provinces
shows that various factors are at force in affecting consumption of Korean TV dramas: geographical location, the habit of the channels they consume and the genre of dramas. The audience in Canton is largely influenced by Hong Kong TV stations, while Beijing audience seem to be used to watching Korean dramas from CCTV. Shanghai audience, on the other hand, seem to be consumed with their own trendy channels (Zhang Jing Jing, ‘Cool Thinking over Korean Wave’, 2004).

25. According to the list of national Top 10 Korean dramas, Watch Again is the favourite of the audience in Beijing and Chengdu, Hotelier tops the list in Shanghai, Stairway to Heaven in Guangzhou, Wedding and Conspiracy in Wuhan (Zhang, 2004).


27. The peak ratings of Dae Jang Geum in Korea was 50%.

28. According to Ms Xiao, Programme Director of Hunan Satellite TV, it was during a corporate visit to Taiwan where the CEO of Hunan TV, Eoyang Chang Lin, discovered the huge popularity of Dae Jang Geum, then shown on TV8 in Taiwan, that he immediately made the offer to buy the drama’s broadcasting rights from Taiwan.


33. The discussion generated both on newspaper commentaries and online discussion websites are tremendous. Over 3000 websites can be found on one single search engine that discusses the drama.

34. Programmes such as 〈水着大长今〉talks about the period of Korean history featured in Dae Jang Geum.

35. 〈职场〉discusses office politics, 〈小宫女〉analyses the hierarchies involved in the Korean palace, 〈播客秀〉uses animated characters to explain about the drama. These dramas are shown before the viewing of Daejanggeum.

36. Please refer to the booklet 〈大长今〉published by Hunan TV.

37. Keane, p. 83.


39. A typical night’s performance would include comedians telling jokes, magic, and performers singing old tunes as well as popular songs.

40. Extracted from interviews with Ms Xiao and Ms Liu of Hunan TV station.


42. It was reported that having lost the battle over Dae Jang Geum, CCTV quickly bought another blockbuster from Taiwan, Mist in Imperial Capital 〈京华烟云〉.


44. Interview with Ms Chan, Programme Director of the Shanghai TV Station, 18 Nov 2003.
49. There is a lot of discussion on seeking for information about Korean history around Chosun Dynasty, political structure around that period, Korean cuisines, and herbal medicine in Korea. See various websites.
51. Zhang is producer of a few TV dramas that became household names: *My Life*, epic dramas such as *The Eloquent Ji Shao Lan* and *Kang Xi’s Personal Tours*.
53. Ibid.
64. *Youth Post (Shanghai)*, 16 Feb 2006.

Chapter 4  Structure of Identification and Distancing in Watching East Asian Television Drama

1. The unevenness has become a source of complaint among media practitioners in the P.R.C who see the popularity of Korean pop culture as a ‘cultural invasion’ (*The Sunday Times* 16 October 2005).
2. For greater detail on the idea of ‘dominant’ meaning and the ‘encoding-decoding’ process, see Morley (2003).
3. For a survey of these canonical texts on reception in Europe and America, see Brooker and Jermyn (2002).
4. There are interesting politics of language in this multi-Chinese lingual community that have been discussed in terms of the general issue of Chinese identity (Chun 1996; Ang 2001).
5. Cross-national joint productions of films among the East Asian locations have been on the increase in the past decade. However, unlike television programmes, films tend not to be dubbed, thus increasingly their ‘multi-
Asian-lingual’ character, including multi-accented Mandarin(s) in Chinese language films.

6. TV programs, on the other hand, are often broadcast in ‘dual sound’, so that the audience can choose between dubbed local-language and the original language with local language subtitles.

7. Before dubbing can take place, a translation of the given script has to be undertaken; this is followed by the ‘synchronization of the translated dialogue so that it matches the actors’ mouth movements and the other images as closely as possible’ (Martinez 2004: 4).

8. In addition to lip-synchrony, dubbing must also pay attention to ‘kinetic synchrony’ — synchrony with body movements on screen, and, ‘isochrony’, synchrony in timing of screen characters’ utterances (Varela 2004: 41).

9. For its popularity in PRC, see Lisa Leung’s chapter in this collection. In Singapore, the series was first screened on cable television. It was so popular that it was re-broadcast immediately after the series ended. It was subsequently screened a third time on a free-to-air channel.

10. Significantly, many in Singapore prefer the Cantonese to the Mandarin version because of ‘greater authenticity’ effect of colloquial expressions, rather than the relative ‘stiffness’ of the Mandarin version.

11. In recent years, Japanese TV stations have been broadcasting PRC produced ‘wuxia’ anime series, dubbed in Japanese. These Japanese versions are then re-exported to Singapore, a component of Pop Culture China, rather than the original Mandarin version.

12. An interesting comparison is with the popularity of Dae Jang Geum among mainland Chinese audiences, which exceeds that of the locally produced large-scale period drama Emperor of the Han Dynasty; according to one commentator, the former series ‘resonates with modern viewers’ (The Sunday Times 16 October 2005), implying the latter does not because it is presumably too historical.

13. See the chapter by Yukie Hirata in this volume.

14. For a very quick summary of the different theories of audience reception, see Eldridge, Kitzinger and Williams (1997: 125–133).

15. For an excellent discussion of the complex history of modern Japan with the rest of Asia see Sun Ke (2000).

16. See Iwabuchi’s chapter in this volume.

17. As Thomas observes, there are also Vietnamese who see consumerism driven capitalist modernization as ‘cultural contamination’ and destruction of wholesome local cultural practices. Ambivalence towards capitalist consumerism is pervasive in all developing societies, not limited to Vietnamese (Chua 2000: 12–16).

18. Ko’s emphasis on youth audiences possibly arose from a generational gap in the reception of Japanese TV dramas in Taiwan. Older Taiwanese, particularly the intellectuals, harking back to the history of the Japanese colonization of Taiwan, are wary of yet another ‘invasion’ of Japanese imperialism.
19. The researcher adds her commentary which reinforces the sense of ‘we are all human’ (Leung 2004: 94–95).
21. ‘The version of R’s Chinese subtitling of Pride was extremely popular in the Hong Kong newsgroup through its online circulation by means of BitTorrent. As I learned from R, the marketing of another version of Pride produced by a Taiwanese-based leading pirated-Japanese-VCD company seems to be threatened, because R’s version has already been so widely circulated among Chinese fans through the Internet’ (Hu 2003: 178).
23. The ideas of the newspaper as ‘imagined geography’ and ‘occasional community of consumers’ are elaborated in another essay (Chua 2006).

Chapter 5  Re-Imagining a Cosmopolitan ‘Asian Us’

1. This chapter is based on a research project funded by a Strategic Research Grant (2004–05) awarded to Angel Lin by the City University of Hong Kong. The authors are also indebted to Professor Chua Beng-huat for his many useful critical comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
2. Hong Kong Statistic Department, 2002.
4. Hong Kong Statistic Department, 2002.

Chapter 6  Winter Sonata and Cultural Practices of Active Fans in Japan

1. The essay is based on part of a Japanese publication of my own in the book: Nisshiki Hanryu, where nine scholars contributed essays on trans-Asian popular culture, in particular, the Korean wave. See Mori (ed.) (2004), Nisshiki Hanryu: Winter Sonata and the current situation of popular culture in Japan and Korea (Japanese-style Korean Wave), Tokyo: Serica Shobo. By the term ‘nisshiki hanryu’, I propose the existence of the process of hybridization between trans-Asian countries, by focusing on consumer activity.
2. Zainichi are those who have North and South Korean nationality and who
live in Japan. Most of them moved (or were forced to move) to Japan in the colonial period and stay after the war. The number of Zainichi was 2,100,000 at the end of the war and is now about 600,000 because some went back to Korea while others were naturalized in Japan.

3. For detailed discussions on the 2002 World Cup by Japanese and Korean cultural studies scholars, see the themed issue of Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, ‘Beyond FIFA’s World Cup: Shared event, different experiences’, (2004)5(1).

4. The basic data comes from NHK’s website, http://www.nhk.or.jp/.


6. Here I would deliberately call even 70 year-old-women middle-aged, because they looked much younger than I had expected and I am hesitant to call them ‘old ladies’.


10. The 38th Parallel North is a national boundary through the middle of Demilitarized Zone between South and North Korea made in 1953. This is often seen as a symbol of national division in Korea.

Chapter 7 Touring ‘Dramatic Korea’

1. This article is based on and revised by Yukie Hirata on her 2004 chapter, “Manazasu monotoshiteno Nihon Josei Kan(kou)kyaku-Fuyuno Sonata Rokechimeguri ni Miru Transunashonaru na Tekusuto Dokkai”, in Yoshitaka Mouri (ed.), Nissiki Hanryu-Fuyuno Sonata to Nikkan Taisyubunka no Genzai (Japanese style Korean Wave: Winter Sonata and the current situation of popular culture in Japan and Korea), Tokyo: Serica Syobo.

2. According to a research by NHK, above 90% of people who participated in the research knew the Korean drama, Winter Sonata by September 2004 (Mitsuya, 2004).

3. Thirty women participants of the Winter Sonata tour and women who planned to visit Korea were interviewed from May to August 2004. (The women were in their 20s to 70s.) And fieldwork that included participation in local tours and individual tours was conducted several times. In addition to that, I interviewed 15 women (including 5 women who were interviewed in 2004) in 2005.

5. It was also linked to the “critical gaze for modern Japan and subsequent efforts to change themselves”, suggested by Iwabuchi (2001).


8. There are many Korean dramas, such as The Stairway to Heaven, The Beautiful Days, that embed sub-themes of secrecy of parentage and family relationships, with love relationships as the main theme.

9. Ironically, the ‘family-centered thinking’ based on Confucian concepts of the Japanese women over 40 is a frequent target of Korean feminists.


**Chapter 10 Rap(p)ing Korean Wave**

1. This is the concert version, in the original lyrics, it is “F*** your mother’s c***, f*** your mother’s c***, F*** Clon, F*** H.O.T.” Clon and H.O.T. are two popular Korean bands in Taiwan.

2. This term is used by Shan Li (1998). She characterized the contemporary music scene in Taiwan as “the dominance of individuality and the dwindling of pop music.” The term “alternative mainstream” also echoes many music critics’ sentiments on Taiwan’s lack of authentic rock music or on Wu Bai’s selling out of rock for commercial success. This view is expressed in Chang Chao-wei’s “Rethinking Rock Music” published in Milan Kun E-paper, June, 2000.

3. Rather than specifically debating about scatology as the essence of Taiwanese culture, this Tai-ke debate takes this as its premise. This shared understanding can be partially traced to the previous public debate on the LP (testicle) event. Many critics see scatology, especially the use of male sexual organs in the public sphere, as an expression of grassroots/local culture — something that needs to be acknowledged and redeemed, not debased. See Wei (2004) and Yang and Fan (2004).

4. Here I offer an example of a female fan’s confession of her encounter with Bae. “I am so lucky, really lucky! As a fan of Yong-yang [Bae’s nickname], I have finally realized my dream to have close bodily contact with him, chat with him, and shake hands with him, and most significantly, exchange eye contact with him!!!!! … [The moment I see him], my heart pumps from putung putung to bang bang bang … even my brain tells me to calm down, but I can’t control my feelings. My brain becomes completely blank … until I see his familiar warm smile on TV … . He smiles at me, just like Joon-sang in Winter Sonata … .” (“Blog Guide for Yong-yang Guest Room”).

5. Heidegger defines standing reserve as: “Everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering” (1997: 17).
6. This interview was conducted in the summer of 2004. It was part of the Inter-Asia research project on the consumption of Korean dramas in Taiwan sponsored by the Korean Women’s Institute of Development. This interviewee is a 35 year-old housewife whose main job is to take care of her mother-in-law and her children.

Chapter 11 Existing in the Age of Innocence

1. This research was made possible with a collaborative funding from NHK under the project title: “Publicness of TV Broadcasting in East Asia” from April 2005–March 2006. An earlier draft was presented at the workshop, “East Asian Pop Culture: Transnational Japanese and Korean TV Dramas,” organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, on December 8–9 2005. I would like to thank Rong-Yu (Alice) Chi, Kai-Lang (Philip) Roh, Jing-He (Michael) Chuang, and Jing-Hui Feng for their research assistance during different stages of the project. I thank the fans of Chang Hui-mei in China and in Taiwan for their hospitality and time for communication. I also thank the Taiwanese fans of Song Seung-heon for their sharing of experiences. A note about the title: Though the paper I delivered at the workshop in Singapore was meant to be “Exiting the Age of Innocence,” a typo on my part resulted in an inadvertent title, “Existing [in] the Age of Innocence.” The workshop participants brought to my attention that “existing” makes more sense than “exiting” particularly when the paper challenges the “innocence” of “popular culture” and the “offensiveness” of “national politics.” I thank the workshop participants for this pivotal insight. Without the opportunity to attend the workshop and the intellectual stimulation from the participants, I simply could not carry out the inter-referential ambition in this chapter. For that I especially thank Chua Beng-huat, Kuan-hsing Chen, Iwabuchi Kōichi and Shin Hyun-joon. I am solely responsible for any argument flaws, inaccuracies, and other problems in this work.

2. This is a question of perspectives. It is unpopular for those who feel stars should be left alone by politicians. But even those who see this ideal division — like Chang’s fans — expressed ambivalence. In reality, many entertainers have used political opportunities (e.g., election) to boost their careers or launch new political careers.

3. In 2002, she led a protest on behalf of the Tao residents on Lan Yu (Orchid Island), an island 49 miles off Taiwan’s eastern shore that has become a permanent storage site of nuclear waste from the mainland (Taiwan). Interestingly, one of the first things she did when she became a legislator was to sing the ROC anthem in front of the Presidential Office Building on New Year’s day. Later on, she became critical of the Taiwanese aborigines’
compulsion to sing the ROC anthem (Tong 2005; Wang 2002; Lu 2002). Another famous entertainer-turned-legislator is Ko Jun-hisung, a veteran actor well known for playing patriotic roles in films like 823 Battle (1986).

4. See, for instance, Chen Tsung-yi’s magazine story (2004a; 2004b) about the gutsy Western stars who stood up against the human rights problem in China. The story is followed by his reporting of Chang Hui-mei’s inability to call herself a Taiwanese while being interviewed on PRC’s CCTV interview. But even the few examples that get recalled converge with Taiwan’s larger political, that is, anti-communist and pro-American stance. John Wayne’s anti-Native American stance was never mentioned by the Taiwanese as a problem.

5. Rock ’n’ roll, alternative, and hip-hop music all have been acknowledged for their potential to challenge the political status quo. In contrast, popular music frequently receives “sell-out” dirty looks from more politicized musical performances. Shortly after Chang’s Beijing concert in 2004, Taiwanese music critic Ho Tung-hong (2005) praised in an editorial American singer Michelle Shocked for standing up against a big promotional budget and Bush’s politics. In the same piece Ho pointed out that Chang has never intervened in public affairs of the aborigines. While I agree with his position that Chang’s performance in China cannot escape a political connotation, the criticism displays an attitude that denounces popular music for not being political enough (or at all).

6. I believe this is more of a rhetorical than real expectation to begin with.

7. Daren could mean grown-ups or adults. But it also refers to public officials or people holding important government positions in ancient China, including making a plea.

8. Drawing on Japanese historian Mizoguchi Yuzo’s proposition of “China as a method,” Chen suggests that Asia as method is a contemporary response to the inadequacy of nation-states. This “inter-Asia” project is linked up via heterogeneous movements and does not aim to prove Asia as different or unique from the West. It problematizes the northeast domination on the discourse of Asia and encourages diverse historical interpretations of the different linkages toward the making of new subjectivity (Chen 2005a, pp. 200–201).


10. An example I have in mind is the distance between Japanophiles in Taiwan and the critical dialogues between Taiwan and Japan’s leftist critics.

11. Even after she retired from public performances, she would still entertain the troops.

12. “Loving Taiwan” was originally invented as an election language aimed to mobilize the pan-green constituencies in Taiwan. The charge against Chang also needs to be situated in the so-called Hsu Wen-Long effect. Hsu, a rich
industrialist known for his outward support of Taiwanese independence, released an open letter in March 2004 in which he renounced the pro-Taiwan independence position as well as issued approval of China’s Anti-Secession Law. The change of position of this long-time DPP benefactor (even a character in Kobayashi Yoshinori’s political manga, Taiwan Ron) shocked the pan-green leadership and revealed the political predicaments of taishang [Taiwanese business professionals] in China. An editorial in Business Weekly linked Chang to Hsu with the headline: “Don’t Worry A-mei, but please take care, Hsu Wen-Long” (Ho 2004, p. 18).

13. For example, even though Mizoguchi Yuzo, a Japanese historian of Chinese intellectual history, would like to respond to the question of Japanese wartime responsibility to the Chinese, it was simply impossible because there has been no discussion on historical memory in China “at any level” (Chen 2002b, p. 242).

14. In fact, she felt it strange that I would be so cautious about getting political opinions from the fans. She asked “why sensitive? I don’t care about that. We’ve got the freedom of speech. I am not afraid of being taken away, by the police.”

15. I speak as a woman whose high school experience in the US in the early 1990s acquainted me with many male parachute kids who left Taiwan before they turned 16. For some of them, avoiding military was at least part of the deal — if not the goal — for studying abroad. Also as a re-patriated Taiwanese in the early 2000s, I find it difficult to overlook the de-militarizing tendency in military service and the re-militarizing desire in the national defense budget. Currently the length of military service for Taiwanese men is one year and four months. I thank Shin Hyun-joon and Jungbong Choi for sharing experiences and views on Korean military and masculinity.

16. His part was eventually replaced by Yeon Jung Hoon.

17. Other implicated celebrities included actor Jang Hyuk, Han Jae-sok, and more than fifty former and acting baseball players (The Korea Times 5 Sep 2004; 6 Sep 2004).

18. The Military Manpower Administration (MMA) of South Korea does seem to have more work to do to maintain the hegemony of militarized masculinity. Since March 2005, it updated its communication platform and started to facilitate online applications for conscripts abroad (Jung 2005). It has also been answering questions in English from abroad concerning qualifications, rights, and procedures through its user-friendly English website since 2004. Still, the patriotic bond in conscription can be fragile. Before the revised dual citizenship law went into effect on 1 June 2005, immigration offices were swarmed by applications renouncing their Korean nationality (Kim 2005; Seo 2005).

19. To protect the identities of the fans, the name and URL of the fan website which I drew from substantially for researching this chapter will not be
used. I collected postings of discussions during the critical two-month period from 16 September to 16 October 2004.


21. There was evidence that Song’s Korean fans were in close contact with fans in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan. They called for help to vote on internet polls, encouraged them to write to Song’s management company GM Entertainment, broadcasting station MBC, and MMA. Messages expressing gratitude in Korean were also translated into Chinese.

22. In addition to observing a Taiwanese fan site (see note 19), I also collected past postings from a large Chinese fan site. The quote was posted on 23 September 2004 by fan X14 as part of a letter addressed to the Korean authorities. Accessed on 28 Oct 2005.


24. The event was staged in the sense that not only were reporters informed and played a part in this sentimental media event, some audience members from Japan were also invited by a television station to observe the send-off. Interestingly, there did not seem to be a fan group in the send-off troupe representing PRC fans, which likely indicated the presence of certain economic or other cultural barriers.

25. A1 did find it to be a success, for the publicity went beyond the circle of the fans.

26. Peters writes: “Too often, ‘communication’ misleads us from the task of building worlds together. It invites us into a world of unions without politics, understandings without language, and souls without bodies, only to make politics, language, and bodies reappear as obstacles rather than blessings” (1999, pp. 30–31).


28. Of the 54 postings, 30 were addressed by different individuals to the Korean government authorities stated in the solicitation. The rest were supplementary comments, reactions to the call, and encouragement.

29. Right from the start, a fan with a science background called for help from the more literary-inclined “sisters.” Some of the high-flying language by the fan included describing Autumn Fairytale’s effect on the Chinese cultural market as an “atomic bomb” (X20).

30. A fan quickly remarked in between letters that “To fight for all possibility, I have done all I could to praise the Koreans. Sigh … I don’t know what else to say … Bless you!” (X18).

31. Shiri, South Korea’s blockbuster film in 1999, refers to a species of fish that lives in the waters between North and South Korea.
Chapter 12 When the Korean Wave Meets Resident Koreans in Japan

1. For a detailed analysis of the Hong Kong boom in Japan in the 1990s, please see chapter 5 of Iwabuchi (2002).
3. The uniforms are modeled after the traditional Korean costumes and the female students’ Korean origins are easily recognizable by the uniform.
A Hundred Million Stars from Heaven 165
A Star in My Heart 177
Affect 225–227, 232, 241
All about Eve 244
All In 5, 7
A-mei 217, 223, 227, 228, 229
see Chang Hui-mei
April Snow 154
Autumn Fairytale 217, 220
Asian Financial Crisis 4
Asian values discourse, 91, 98, 114, 117, 119–121, 121–124
Bae Yong Jun 6, 9, 128–132, 145, 149, 152, 177–178, 248
celebrities 217–242
transnational 10
see pop stars
chaebol 7
Chage and Aska 250–251
Chen Shui-Bian 223, 225
Choi Ji Woo 145
Chow Yung Fat 1
Chunchon 152
cloning 58, 59, 62, 69
Cold War 222, 224, 232–234
colonialism 85, 138
Japanese 244, 249–251, 252–254, 256, 260
community of consumers 84–88
Confucian 17
Confucianism 99, 106, 115, 120
social order 106
consumer modernity 8
consumption
mode of 8
transnational 9, 158
cosmopolitan 10
aesthetics 100
creative industries 179
cultural,
agent 132
capital 9
deficit 68
diplomacy 182
in Japan 250–252
economics 182
imperialism 9
intra-East Asia traffic 245, 246, 249–249
modernity 188
politics 83, 94, 99, 105
proximity 83, 94, 99, 105
theft 65
regional production network 34, 30–40, 51
dubbing 76–78
emotional, realism 102, 187
structure 225, 226, 230, 241, 242
ethics, sexuality 91, 93, 99
exoticism 79
fandom 160
fans, of Chang Hui-Mei 224, 226–232
of Song Seung-Heon 235–240
feminine, female complaint 192–3, 212–3, 215
feminist 9, 106, 123
feminization 147–148
Fuji TV 257, 261
gender 218
citizenship 232
hierarchy 101
imagery 165, 167
relations 91, 92, 112
role 105, 106, 110, 120
stereotypes 118
globalization 15, 38, 44, 191, 197–200, 205, 207
glocalization 44, 46
GO 255, 261
Ha-ri-zu 2
Hollywood 17, 31
Hunan Satellite Station 6, 7, 8, 55, 59–62, 64, 68–69
intertextuality 134–135, 162
Jang Dong-Cun 219
Kao Jin Su-Mei 219
kisaeng tours 145
Korean Broadcasting Station (KBS) 4
Korean cinema 16, capital 39
industry 17, 19–21
spectacles 47
Korea, conscription 218, 232–234, 235, 237, 239
Korean National Tourism Organization (KNTO) 147, 150
Military Manpower Administration (MMS) 221, 234–236, 238–239
Ministry of Culture and Tourism 240
Ministry of Justice 234
Korean tourism, feminization 147–148
Korea-Japan FIFA World Cup 251
Lee Hoi-Change 233
Love of May 242
Lu, Annette 221
masculinity 167, 171
media, liberalization 15, 23, 25
pilgrimage 164, 171
Men in the Net 1
multicultural 11
Subjectless multiculturalism 253–254, 259
Index 307

nationalism 223, 234
national loyalty 218, 223, 236, 240
NHK 4, 6, 130, 133, 245
nostalgia 80, 144, 244–252

patriotism 218, 224, 226, 234, 241
patriotic entertainer 224–225
patriotic protestors 217
pop stars 217–242
politcization 219–220, 228
popular culture 15, 16, 25, 26, 9–31
capital 164
East Asian 50
Hong Kong 244–249, 254
K-pop 129
public(s) 218, 220, 222, 223, 230, 233
Vietnamese 253–254, 259
Pop Culture China 73–76
postcolonial 8, 10, 11, 73
pyeoin 164

Sad Love Story 220–221, 232, 235, 236, 241
scatology 191, 204–207, 213, 215
Singapore Press Holding 5
Summer Scent 220
soft power 179
STAR TV 5
State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) 57
subject formation 9

flexible 165
positions 121
subjectivities 114, 124

Taiwan 223–232
aboriginal (aborigine) 219, 223, 225, 227, 229, 230
cross-strait politics 218, 220, 224, 225
Tai-ke 202, 204–208
technology 192, 214–215
information communication (ICT) 157, 163
television, format 45
industry 24
Japanese drama fans 161
Teng, Teresa 224
Tokyo Bayscape 257–263

US 12

Westernization 74, 103, 105, 115, 117, 122
Witch Conditions 165
Winter Sonata 4, 6, 9, 11, 15, 127–141, 176–177, 181, 244–252, 261
tours 148–154

xenophobia 85

Yasukuni Shrine 219
Yoo Seung-Jun 233, 236
zainichi 127, 243–244, 252–264