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Bourgeois society replaces the relatively autonomous local communities characteristic of prior types of society by a division of labor which draws the disparate cultural and even national groupings which formerly existed into the same social and economic system. At the same time as it expands the range of human interdependence, the spread of bourgeois society sweeps away the particular cultural myths and traditions under which men have lived from the beginning of time. Ultimately, bourgeois society brings the whole of mankind, for the first time in history, within the purview of a single social order, and is genuinely “world-historical.”

Anthony Giddens explaining Karl Marx’s theory of capitalist development

If policies are altered, China can become the leader of all nations; if policies are not altered, she will become the servant of all nations.

Robert Hart, Inspector General of China’s Maritime Customs (1863–1911)

It is true that China still faces many problems, including the gap between the rich and the poor, and the continuing lack of human rights and democratization. But China is now the world’s second largest economy, and with increasing authoritarianism, it is exerting great political powers all over the world. When the capitalist world-system began to spread throughout the world about 450 years ago, first in the forms of merchant capitalism and colonialism, China faced a dilemma about whether and how to change. Gradually, China did change, and it has changed so much so that it is becoming one of the world’s superpowers; the concern now is whether a rising China will turn out to be peaceful or bellicose.

To understand this change and where it may lead, it is helpful for us to understand Macau first. Macau used to be the most important meeting place between the East and the West, and it played an instrumental role in China’s confrontation with the West, especially in the 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Since then, Macau has evolved into a place with its own political, economic, and social characteristics.
Thus the study of Macau history and society is not only a study of Macau itself, but also a study of China’s transformation in the past 450 years, and its possibilities in the future. At a time when Macau is becoming more and more like mainland China and Hong Kong is becoming more and more like Macau, what happens in Macau is indicative of what happens in Greater China in general. Hence the importance of Macau studies.

The Political Context in Which Macau Was Brought into Being

In reading China’s history in the early part of the last 450 years, from 1550 on, one cannot help but find that the Western powers, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the English, the French, and later the Americans, repeatedly wanted to establish trading ports in China and have formal relations. But repeatedly, the Chinese government turned down that kind of request or otherwise wanted to channel those relations into its tributary system with the surrounding countries. So if any other relations were eventually established with the West, they were often after wars and skirmishes between China and the Western powers. The trade war between China and the US at the time of writing seems to be doing the same thing.

Although China seemed to be reluctant to engage the outside world, especially the West, it had not always been the case. In the early years of the Western Han dynasty (206 B.C.E–25 C.E.), Panyu (Canton or Guangzhou now) was already a trading metropolis between China and Southeast Asia. In the Tang dynasty (618–907), Guangzhou, Quanzhou in Fujian, and Yangzhou on the Yangtze River had already become large trading ports. Foreign traders, mostly Indian, Arab, and Persian, regularly lived in settlements in Canton called *fanfang* (蕃坊). In the Song dynasty (960–1279), they were able to select their own *fanzhang* (蕃長), the community leader. The first Bureau of Trading Junks was established by the Tang dynasty in the 8th century, registering foreign ships and collecting duties and freight charges for the central government.

The Ming dynasty (1368–1644), especially in the Yongle emperor’s reign (1403–25), even sent seven maritime expeditions between 1405 and 1431, led by Zheng He (1371–1435), a eunuch. The fleet reached Southeast Asia, the west coast of India, the Persian Gulf, and the east coast of Africa. But these expeditions were discontinued because they turned out to be too expensive, involving 50 to 300 ships each time and as many as 27,000 men, and the emperor was too busy with the northern defenses. More importantly, the expeditions were meant to advance the tributary system rather than active international politics or commerce. So even though they might exchange goods and ambassadors with the countries they visited, the relationship was pretty limited. So the empire stopped such expeditions after 1433.
Soon after 1500, while the Ming dynasty lacked interest in maritime trade and turned largely inward-looking, as did the later Qing dynasty, the Western traders, armed and aggressive, came to the coast of China after undermining the Arab, Persian and Indian Muslim trading powers. Inevitably conflicts occurred. These conflicts made Macau possible, a Macau that was a window through which the Chinese and Westerners could interact with each other.

**Macau’s Intriguing Characteristics**

When describing Macau, words like these come to mind: “seedy,” “sleepy,” “thoughtful, amiable, gentle”; “ambiguity,” “indetermination,” “marginality,” “uncertainty,” a “riddle”; “the wickedest city of the Far East,” “a city of sin,” “the Monte Carlo of the East,” a “famous and wealthy city,” a “mass of contradictions,” a “rich and tightly knit community,” a “Catholic place,” “a city of culture,” a “bridge between China and Europe,” an “unpolished diamond.” Indeed, as Cremer points out, people tend to be uncertain about many things in Macau: its origins, historical significance, political status, culture, population, the languages spoken, and its economic situation and potential. Its geographical location seems to be the only fair certainty or that it is the gambling mecca of the world; all the other aspects of Macau are still matters of debate.

For example, how do we assess the economic history of Macau? If regular trade can be considered “normal,” there is also the coolie trade, the opium trade, and the gambling industry. These economic activities on which Macau has relied at one time or another certainly look morally ambiguous, or at least “marginal” vis-à-vis the “mainstream” trade of, say, silk and porcelain and tea. Somehow, the city has indeed existed “on the edges of nations, oceans, cultures, languages, economies, and civilizations.” It is sometimes viewed as “a city of sin,” and other times viewed as “a city of culture.” Or maybe it is really “a mass of contradictions.”

It is mostly a “Catholic place” for the Macanese, whom we will discuss in chapter 4, but not for the Chinese. It is a “rich and tightly knit community” for the Portuguese and Macanese, and for the upper classes of the Chinese, but not for most people in Macau, who are middle and lower-class Chinese. Is it the religiosity of the Portuguese and Macanese or the silence of the lower classes of the Chinese that makes Macau a “thoughtful, amiable, and gentle place”? Or is it really what some might claim to be the integration of Chinese and Portuguese cultures that has made Macau what it is now?

The question of Macau’s own personality, culture, and identity, that is, a Macauan identity, follows the same line of thought. Out of the integration of Chinese and Western cultures has grown a characteristic some label 和而不同，多元共生, i.e., a culture that has multiple components which have learned to live together without much killing of each other. Where Macau culture is concerned,
we are more likely to encounter some kind of propaganda rather than a rigorous
analysis—“more a mutual agreement to disagree than, properly speaking, a cross-
cultural dialogue.”19

However it does not mean that Macau culture cannot be defined or developed.
One of the aims of this book is precisely to explore the possible contents of that
culture and of a Macauan identity. We will set out to solve the “riddle” of Macau.20
If Macau is “an unpolished diamond,”21 we want to polish it and allow others to
appreciate it. If Macau can serve as a “bridge between China and Europe,”22 we want
to see how and whether Macau can become a city of “determination,” rather than
one of “indetermination,”23 a “city of culture,” rather than a “city of sin.”

The Structure and the Themes of the Book

Chapter 1 discusses Macau in the shadow of China, how Macau came into being.
Beginning with the Portuguese maritime expansion and the earlier conflicts between
China and the West which made Macau possible, I will explore the origins by giving
a brief history of the establishment of Portuguese settlements.

Chapter 2 discusses political transformation, first looking at Macau and China
in international conflicts, including the conflicts between the Portuguese and the
Dutch, and among the Portuguese, British, and the Chinese, which culminated in
the First Opium War. Then I will consider the development of Macau’s political
system, including the Senado period and dual jurisdiction, the colonial period, and
the true Chinese period. We will see how different systems have worked, and look
closely at the issues of sovereignty and democratization.

Chapter 3 examines the economic lives of peoples in Macau—cannon build-
ing; trade in the 16th and 17th centuries; the trade in opium and coolies; the life
and work of pilots, compradors, slaves, coolies, servants, and prostitutes as well as
fishermen and fisherwomen. Moving on to more recent times, we will study the rise
of the modern Chinese working and capitalist classes, the growth of the gambling
industry, including the reasons and developments, and the repercussions for Macau’s
economic future.

Chapter 4 examines the way people have interacted with each other since the
West met the East in the 16th century. Emphasizing the significance of the Macanese
community, we will examine the tale of one city and two cities, the Macau model of
the clash and cooperation of civilizations, and how we might improve it.

Chapter 5 looks into the religious lives of people in Macau, whose existence
owes much to the Catholics’ desire to use it as a base to spread their religion to
the rest of Asia. Many inhabitants also have a religious life. In a place with some
660,000 people and an area of close to 32 as of 2018 square kilometers, there are
19 Christian churches and 34 Buddhist and folk religion temples, according to the
Encyclopedia of Macau (1999). We will reflect on the different religions represented
in Macau, Daoism, Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism, and other folk religion, as well as the relationship between church and state, the Controversy of Rites, and the contribution of the missionaries in the East-West cultural exchange.

Chapter 6 explores literature and the arts in Macau. Throughout history, Chinese and Portuguese have written poetry and stories in and about Macau, and depicted it in paintings and drawings. This chapter will echo the theme of the clash and integration of civilizations of the preceding chapters. Both chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that Macau’s culture is very rich indeed.

Chapter 7 examines ethnic and class stratification and politics, middle and post-secondary education, casino-related crime and deviance, and Macau’s civil society and public sphere. We emphasize the importance of the social and structural bases of these problems; the social responsibility of the government, the corporation, social organizations, and the individuals; and the importance of building a civil society and public sphere in Macau.

Looking to the future, chapter 8 questions the political, economic, cultural, and social identities of Macau. Can Macau become a “gaming” town rather than a “gambling” town? Is there a difference between the two? Can Macau become a model federal or confederal state of China? Is Macau going to be a model of social and ethnic harmony?

There are three major themes that run throughout the book. First, Macau and China are tied together in history, and we cannot understand one without understanding the other. Macau has always had plenty of autonomy and played important roles in China’s development. It has the potential to continue to do so. But as Macau is becoming more and more mainlandized, it is gradually losing that potential. This is a matter of success or failure of the “one country, two systems” principle and some hard thinking needs to be done and really hard efforts to be made to preserve Macau’s autonomy.

Second, this is a study of the clash and integration of civilizations and cultures, critically engaging Huntington’s theme of the clash of civilizations. I am arguing that Huntington has a point to make: it is indeed difficult for cultures and civilizations to integrate with one another. But it is a project that needs to be done, however difficult it is, if we want to prevent the world, China and Macau included, from degenerating into tribalism, authoritarianism, and dictatorship.

Third, there is a Macau model of clash and integration of civilizations and cultures characterized by a set of unique features and an attitude of “I don’t bother you and you don’t bother me.” But it is a problematic model. Much needs to be done in negotiating differences and building a new cultural, political, and economic identity of Macau. As Francis Fukuyama (2018), a student of Huntington, points out when discussing identity politics in today’s world, some larger and more integrative national identities have to be defined while taking into consideration different cultures and civilizations. That is what I am trying to do in this book.
The Difficulties of Studying Macau History and Society and Our Methodology

First, the further one goes back into history, the fewer records are available. Many things are lost or have not been recorded at all. The 12-3 Incident in 1966, for example, destroyed an estimated one third of the documents stored in the National Library in Macau. Second, even when there are records, they have been kept by the elites of society, who selected what to write and what to keep. That selection was constrained by the writers’ own class, gender, race, and other political statuses. For example, most of the earlier records are in Portuguese, and were written by the Catholic Church.

The earliest records, especially the Chinese records, tend to be few and sketchy. In the Chinese literature, for example, Pang Shangpeng 龐尚鵬 in 1564 discussed the earlier years of Macau, and the Annals of Guangdong (廣東通誌) in 1602 discussed how the Portuguese borrowed Macau to dry their goods. Both are, however, sketchy. The History of the Ming Dynasty—The Story of Portugal in Macau (明史・佛郎機傳), an official record finished in 1735, runs only about 2,500 words. Yin Guangren 印光任 and Zhang Rulin 張汝霖 wrote The Annals of Macau (Aomen Jilue or 澳門記略) in 1751, the first encyclopedic work of Macau, indicating the beginning of the study of Macau, but that was about 200 years after the Portuguese came to Macau.

The earliest records in the Portuguese language were by Fernão Mendes Pinto in both 1555 and 1614, where he described Macau as a wasteland before the Portuguese came. Later records became more detailed, and they recounted the relationship between the Portuguese and the Chinese officials as well as the geography, history, and society of Macau and China. But the earliest full study of Macau began with Anders Ljungstedt’s work in 1832, An Historical Sketch of the Portuguese Settlements in China, and it was in English. (Ljungstedt disputed the Portuguese claim that they had sovereignty over Macau, which somewhat embarrassed the colonial government.)

In the 19th and 20th century then, more historical studies of Macau were published, including Montalto de Jesus’s 1902 work Historic Macau, and de Jesus’s and J. M. Braga’s 1949 work, The Western Pioneers and Their Discovery of Macau. Austin Coates’s Macao and the British 1637–1842: Prelude to Hong Kong (1966) and his A Macao Narrative (1978) provide vivid pictures of Macau history and society. Works in Chinese include Zhou Jianglian’s 周景濂 《中葡外交史》 (The history of Chinese-Portuguese diplomatic relations) (1937), and Zhang Tianze’s 張天澤 “Sino-Portuguese Trade from 1514–1644,” a Ph.D. dissertation he wrote in Holland in 1934. The study of Macau flourished in the twentieth century, and even more so at the turn of the twenty-first century. Many of these later studies are also cited in this book.
However, as mentioned above, scholars are constrained by their own background limitations. What they see and record is bound to be biased to some degree. All written materials are but a glimpse of a certain part of history and society; it can never be a full record. Every work adds to our overall understanding. It is with this humble ambition that I write this book.

This book mainly uses the historical-comparative method along with the interpretive method, drawing upon existing studies, diaries, journals, newspaper articles, interviews, and statistics. It is a sociologist’s understanding of Macau’s historical development. Like a historian, I also tell a story. But I am using a sociological perspective, focusing on sociopolitical issues, especially the fate of the little people and the downtrodden, and an explanation of the influencing factors. I examine especially the historical circumstances and social interaction among contemporaneous players in explaining historical and contemporary events.

A Few Words on the Second Edition

In this edition, I have deleted some information which I think is either outdated or not as important now as before. Meanwhile, I have updated and added some information which I believe to be of interest. For example, chapter 7 on social issues and problems is overhauled. Some parts are deleted and new research findings are included regarding ethnic and class stratification and politics, middle and postsecondary education, and casino-related crime and deviance.

I have also corrected a few errors and clarified some places to make the reading smoother. Furthermore, I have added a few pictures and replaced others since I think these pictures or drawings are more illuminating and enlightening.

Equally important, in writing the second edition, I have benefited from three book reviews of the first edition: César Guillén Nuñez (2012), Richard Lois Edmonds (2011), and Chan Kwok Shing (2011). One of them says that this reads like a textbook. Indeed, my intention is to make it into a textbook as well as a research project that has a theme and a set of arguments. I have strengthened the good points they commented on and tried to overcome the shortcomings. I hope I am successful in most of these efforts. I hope the reader will like the new edition.

Conclusion

A study of Macau history and society goes beyond the city itself. As Margaret MacMillan, an accomplished historian, says, in a summary by Kennedy, “history’s ultimate utility does not lie in its predictive or even its explanatory value, but in its ability to teach humility, to nurture an appreciation of the limits on our capacity to see the past clearly or to know fully the historical determinants of our own brief passage in time.”29
Macau is an intriguing place, with many processes, complexities of development as well as implications for China’s evolution from a traditional society into a modern one. This study is not only about China’s modernization processes in the world-historical transformations but also has implications for the clash and integration of civilizations and cultures in today’s world, and for the humble limits of human capacities.

It is not an easy task to sort out all the intricacies, but the efforts are worth our while. The process itself is rewarding. Only through an exchange of ideas can we better understand the issues of our concern, individual or collective.
These days I have a U.S. passport and a Portuguese passport. I have a Hong Kong ID card and a Macau ID card. I have a Salvo-Conduto, which is a pass allowing Portuguese passport-holders to enter Hong Kong and stay for seven days. I have a yihng biht jing [認別證—a national ID card for Portuguese citizens, or Bilhete de Identidade de Cidadão Nacional], a U.S. Social Security card, a re-entry permit for Hong Kong, a re-entry permit for the U.S., a “home-returning” permit (回鄉證) for the mainland, four valid drivers’ licenses (Macau, Hong Kong, U.S., and Canada) and one expired one (Taiwan).

A middle-aged Macau Chinese businessman talking about some of his ID cards

In light of a Macauan identity, the above quote shows that a person may not want to be pinned down to a single place, and it is advantageous to have many identities. What is unique about Macau is its multiple identity, an identity similar to but also different from that of the mainland or Hong Kong. In this final chapter, we will discuss Macau’s national/cultural, political, and economic identities, especially the reconstruction of them.

Defining National and Political Identities

When people use the term “national identity,” they may mean either identification with a nation (民族), with a state (國家), and/or with a nation-state (民族國家). For Anderson, Smith, and others, the main characteristics of a nation are a relevant common history, shared cultural roots, pre-existing social networks, and a designated homeland. Culture is also very important for Gellner: he thinks that people are in the same nation “if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.” In addition, they have to recognize each other as belonging to
the same nation. Underlying these characteristics are what we call primordial and perennial ethnic bonds filled with feelings and emotions.⁵

National identity can also mean identification with a state. From a Weberian point of view, the state is an organization that makes the rules and regulations within a given territory and that has the sole right to use violence in the enforcement of its order.⁶ From a Marxian point of view, the state is a tool for one group of people to suppress other groups. From a traditional political science point of view, the state is composed of territory, people, government, and sovereignty.⁷ Each state has a political system, which can be democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian, that is, different ways of domination within a given territory.

A third kind of national identity is the identification with a nation-state. This could be a nation-state composed of only one’s own nation, or of multiple nationalities. Less than 10% of all the nations in the United Nations are single nation-states, and most are multiethnic. Thus, broadly speaking, a nation-state is “a state which the great majority of the citizens identify with to the extent of seeing it as their own” (italics original).⁸ One’s national identity would be with both the nation and the state, where the state can be composed either of mostly one’s own nation (單民族國家) or of multiple ethnicities (多民族國家).

In our discussion of national identity of the people in Macau, we will distinguish between these kinds of national identity: identification with a nation is national identity, and identification with a state is political identity. After the discussion of these two identities, we will see in what way new national (socio-cultural) and political identities might be built. Then we will discuss the economic identity of Macau. Finally, we will see whether a quasi nation-state, or city-state, defined as a political and cultural community where the national (socio-cultural) and the political are largely congruent, can be built. The characteristics of this community would distinguish Macau from other places in Greater China, i.e., mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan.⁹

National Identity in Macau

Clayton asked the middle-aged Macau Chinese businessman quoted above whether he would prefer Macau to remain under Portuguese sovereignty rather than return to the PRC. “Well,” the man replied with a smile:

I’m not in the position [to answer your question]. All I know is that if you forced me to choose between calling myself American, Portuguese or Chinese, I would say that I am American. And if you really forced me, if you held a gun to my head and forced me to choose between being Portuguese and being a citizen of the PRC, I would have to call myself Portuguese. Even though I have not the slightest relation with anything Portuguese—I don’t speak the language, I don’t like the people or the Portuguese character. But if you forced me, that’s the decision I would make.
You know the saying “ren ru fu zhong” (忍辱負重)—choosing the lesser of the two evils, there’s not much of a choice.10

First, the man wants to be flexible, to choose the identity that most benefits him under the circumstance. Second, he is Chinese, with historical and cultural roots in China, and related to the Chinese by blood, i.e., the primordial bonds we mentioned above. He apparently speaks Cantonese, and uses a Chinese saying in the statement. His Chinese cultural identity is reinforced by his claim that he does not have the slightest relation with anything Portuguese. Third, he does not want to identify with the political term “PRC,” which has vacillated between authoritarianism and dictatorship since the reform and opening. So politically he would rather identify with the United States or Portugal, which represents democracy.

His case might be typical of many Macau Chinese if they were given a choice. In a 2005 survey done on the quality of life in Macau, researchers found that only 41.4% of the respondents identified with China, while 37.5% identified with Macau, 20.2% identified with both, and 1.2% with neither.11 The term “China” could refer to Chinese culture and history, or to Chinese politics, in which case it would mean the PRC. Culturally, over 95% of the people in Macau are Chinese. So according to our definition above, the “national identity” of over 95% of the people in Macau should be Chinese. There might be some Chinese who are almost entirely Americanized or Europeanized, but they are few. Others might identify to a certain extent with American or European cultures. The majority of the Chinese people in Macau can be said to identify with the Chinese culture and history to the greatest extent. So we can say that the national identity of the Macau Chinese is by and large Chinese, in spite of what the polls may say.

But the national identity of the Macanese would be different. In chapters 4, 5, and 6, we discussed the conflicted Macanese identity. They might feel Chinese—in addition to the mixed blood, they tend to speak Cantonese, although most of them do not write Chinese, and they follow some Chinese customs. But on the other hand, they tend to feel that they are Portuguese by culture and history. They mostly speak Portuguese and follow Portuguese customs. According to a 1998 survey, an overwhelming majority of Macanese thought that they were Portuguese all their lives, and should continue to be so after 1999. As one prominent Macanese woman commented,

In my case, I have no doubts that … I will be Portuguese after 1999. I could never manage, culturally, to feel that I am Chinese, even though I can understand the Chinese way of being and have no problem in accepting Chinese values. Since childhood I have been taught at home that I am Portuguese, and people will not abandon their values simply because Macau is no longer a territory under Portuguese administration.12
Some thought that to ask them to choose nationality after the handover was ridiculous. “Nationality, like race, is something that cannot be ‘chosen’; it is the basis for heritage, the truth behind culture, a fundamental and immutable building block of identity.” So even if the Macanese might feel conflicted sometimes, by and large the Macanese national identity is Portuguese, culturally and politically.

In sum, culturally and historically there should be no doubt that over 95% of the Macau population is by and large Chinese. The Macanese may experience some kind of ambiguity but they no doubt identify with Portuguese culture and history. For both groups, their political identity can be different from their cultural and historical identity.

State or Political Identity in Macau

State or political identity refers to the identification of a political system embodied by the state. For the most part of Macau’s history, the state political system in Macau was characterized by joint sovereignty and dual jurisdiction of Chinese and Portuguese control. As a result, just like the national identity, the Chinese largely identified with the Chinese state, although there seem to be some changes in contemporary times, while the Portuguese and Macanese have largely identified with the Portuguese state. Since there were no surveys done in the past, we base our judgment upon what we know from history.

As discussed in chapter 2, neither the Ming nor the Qing government of China ever gave up the total sovereignty of Macau to Portugal. The Portuguese government in Macau had been paying rent to the Chinese government for about 300 years until Amaral took power in Macau as its governor in 1846. (See Plate 8.1 for an example of the rent receipt.) In the first 300 years of Portuguese control of Macau, the Chinese affairs in Macau were managed mainly by the Chinese government stationed either in Wangxia (Mong Ha), Macau, or in Qianshan in what is now Zhuhai. The Macau Chinese identified with the Chinese government more than with the Portuguese, as can be seen from the various conflicts throughout history such as the assassination of Amaral in 1849, which we discussed in chapter 2.

Even after the signing of the Luso-Chinese Treaty of Friendship and Trade in 1887 when the Chinese government allowed the Portuguese “perpetual occupation and government,” there were border delineation issues that were never resolved. In the 20th century, this sense of belonging to China, first the Republic of China (ROC), and later the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the part of many Chinese people, especially for the business elites, was even stronger. One might recall the scene of the Portuguese governor presenting the signed agreement in 1967 to the Chinese elites under the portrait of Mao and the Chinese national flag. A pailou would be built by the Chinese in celebration of the Chinese national holiday in
Macau even during Macau’s relatively full colonial period in the 1960s. The fact that it was facing the Leal Senado has more than a symbolic meaning.

Part of this feeling of belonging may have to do with a dislike of the Portuguese government more than a fondness of the Chinese government. One of Clayton’s interviewees says, “I mean that I still believe the Portuguese are invaders. I still consider them to be invaders. Whether by force, militarily, or economically, politically, religiously, whatever—they are invaders. This is not their place, but they have stayed here for four hundred years.” Many Macau Chinese people’s enthusiastic welcome of the handover of Macau to China may be an indication of the same feeling. Here is Clayton’s description of a crowd watching the ceremony on television: “When the camera zeroed in for the first time on the soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army, a great cheer went up from the crowd. The first close-up of Jiang Zemin watching the soldiers elicited another long, loud cheer.” The Chinese in Macau for most of the 450 years of history were governed by a Chinese administration and they largely identified with the Chinese monarchy first, and then the ROC and PRC.

The Macau Chinese identification with the Chinese government and political system, however, was not uniform or consistent. There is no doubt that in contemporary times the Chinese identification with the Portuguese political system, which the MSAR has largely inherited, has also been extensive. That is why the 2005 survey found only 41.1% of the Chinese in Macau identifying with China—most likely in political terms, 37.5% with Macau, and 20.2% with multiple identities. In a pre-1999 survey, researchers found that only 0.5% of the respondents felt proud of the PRC’s socialist political system.

In other words, a majority of the Macau Chinese do not identify with the PRC. In 2012, the Macau Federation of Trade Unions published a survey on Macau citizens’ national identity. It showed that only 15.9% of the youths below 18 years old and 21% of the youths between 18 and 24 years old identified themselves as Chinese. This apparently refers to their political identity rather than cultural and historical identity. Most people in Macau have a Chinese national identity, but not necessarily a Chinese state and political identity; some may hold a Portuguese passport (see Plate 8.2 for a picture symbolizing the formal return of Macau to China). That is probably what the middle-aged Macau Chinese businessman meant when he said he did not want to identify with the PRC.

That is exactly why the Party-state is making a great effort in securing the Macau Chinese people’s loyalty by enticing the youths to attend higher education in mainland China, as we have discussed in chapter 7, and organize all kinds of activities for people from all walks of life in Macau to visit the mainland to be educated about what they believe to be the glorious history of the Party and the great achievements of the past 40 years. This way people in Macau will hopefully pledge their allegiance to the Chinese political state.
The state is successful to some extent but still, as a number of surveys find out, over 51% to 56% of the population continues to believe in universal suffrage. Dictatorship or authoritarianism is still a hard sell in Macau despite the continuing mainlandization. For many Chinese, their Portuguese passports become more than a “travel document,” different from what the Chinese government wanted to believe. In other words, they may not like the mainland Chinese government, but they probably do not deny that they are Chinese, unlike some in Taiwan. Their Chinese national identity is fairly clear, before or after the return of Macau to China, but their political identity is far from certain.

On the other hand, the Portuguese and the Macanese before 1999 were governed by a Portuguese administration and they identified with the Portuguese government. They generally would not identify with the Chinese monarchy, the ROC’s or the PRC’s dictatorship or authoritarianism. In fact, before the handover, they feared “that the Chinese government would consider the Macanese, by virtue of their Chinese ancestry and birth in a ‘Chinese territory,’ to be Chinese nationals, and thus subject to the same laws (read: the same restrictions on movement, religious activity, free speech, and so on) as any other Chinese citizen.” If they may be Chinese to some extent in terms of national identity, they were fairly certain that they did not want to become Chinese politically. As some Macanese explained:

It’s not that we don’t like the Chinese … After all, we all have Chinese blood, we are part of Chinese, too. It’s just that the communists have proven, time and again, that they can’t be trusted. They promise one thing and then turn around and do the opposite.

The reasons they consider themselves to be Chinese in some ways and not Chinese in other ways point to a difference between national and state/political identities.

Building a New National/Cultural Identity

Forming a new national/cultural identity requires that people increase the understanding of commonalities and appreciate each other’s differences while defining the new identity, and that they be creative as cultural entrepreneurs in forming this new identity. This is the new Macau model we have been talking about.

First, there is a need to understand the shared cultural and historical heritages. Macau has a long and rich history. While serving as a trading center in Asia before the 19th century, Macau was also the center for cultural exchange in the East. Macau has contributed to the production of what we may call the first group of Sinologists as well as Westernologists, or what we call today the experts in China and Western studies. They include Michele Ruggieri (1543–1607), Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), both Italian Jesuits; Philippe Couplet and Ferdinand Verbiest, both Belgian Jesuits; Joseph Bahr and Johann Adam Schall von Bell (1591–1666), both German Jesuits;
Thomas Pereira, a Portuguese Jesuit; and Robert Morrison, a British Protestant. (See chapter 5.) These missionaries and scholars introduced Western culture to China and Chinese culture to the West, including philosophy, religion, literature, and science.

Macau contributed to the production of these scholars because the latter tended to have studied Chinese in Macau, and most of them were, in fact, graduates of St. Paul’s College in Macau established in 1606, one of the first Western-style colleges in East Asia and certainly the first in China. Indeed, as we discussed in chapter 5, out of the 400 Jesuit missionaries in China during the Ming and Qing dynasties, 200 were graduates from this college. The college also trained about 40 Chinese missionaries, including the famous poet and painter, Wu Li. The first Western-style primary school was also established in Macau and it produced prominent figures in the cultural exchange between China and the West, such as Yung Wing and Huang Kuan.

Even though all of the above achievements seem to belong to the Portuguese, they would not have been possible without the participation and help of the Chinese. The Chinnery picture of two Chinese helping Morrison translate the Bible is more than symbolic of the cooperation between the two sides in the East-West cultural exchange. It is a source of pride in the cultural heritage.

In addition to producing scholars and officials of cultural exchange in its Western-style educational institutions, Macau as a cultural center has also witnessed the coexistence of Daoism, Buddhism, Christianity, and a number of other religions. Although interaction among the religions is limited, we do see occasional products of religious and cultural exchange. The façade of the Church of St. Paul, for example, embodies statues of the Virgin and saints, symbols of the Garden of Eden and the Crucifixion, angels and the devil, Portuguese sailing ship, on the one hand, and a Chinese dragon and a Japanese chrysanthemum, and a pious warning inscribed in Chinese on the other hand. The church itself is a work of Western, Japanese, and Chinese architects.

The emergence and existence of the Macanese community is probably the best example of such cultural integration. As explored in chapters 4 and 6, the Macanese are a result of interracial marriage, a form of social interaction.

Thus in terms of commonalities, Macau has the traditions of cultural exchange as embodied in Ricci, Morrison, Wu Li, and Yung Wing, of religious coexistence as embodied in the coexistence of St. Paul’s Cathedral and the Temple of Nezha, and of cultural integration as embodied in the Macanese. These form their common history. It is characterized by cosmopolitanism notwithstanding all the conflicts that have occasionally erupted in Macau’s long history. This is something that Macau needs to continue to cultivate, treasure, and expand.

Second, different ethnic groups and cultures may still have their own separate existence, but they need to appreciate each other’s differences. For example, the Chinese have their own social organizations, with predominantly Chinese members.
The Macanese/Portuguese have their organizations as well, such as Macau Home of Portuguese Association, Macau Club, Macanese Play Troupe, Macau Song and Dance Troupe, the Holy House of Mercy, the Oriental Foundation, the International Institute of Macau, and the Macanese Education Promotion Association. All these social organizations are supposed to protect the political, economic, and social interests of their members, preserve their cultural characteristics and properties, cooperate with other social organizations in Macau, and work with the governmental organizations over issues of their concern. But different organizations, especially from different ethnic groups, need to understand and appreciate each other’s meaning and significance and be able to work together on social issues and problems, as an effective civil society and public sphere require.

When discussing the future of the Macanese community, Brookshaw points out, “The preservation of their identity through cultural and solidarity associations wherever they have settled, would indicate that they, like the Goans or even migrant Portuguese, are capable of blending attachment to roots with a pragmatically cosmopolitan attitude.” Similarly, Macau needs to reconcile tradition with modernity, and market itself as a center of culture, capitalizing on its different character, such as a multicultural, borderland personality, and emphasizing its cosmopolitanism, rather than being characterized by some sort of universal and culturally amnesic homogeneity under the forces of modernity and globalization or even “mainlandization.” The latter is a real threat.

Third, there will have to be some cultural entrepreneurs from all groups, who understand the issues involved and have the skills to execute solutions. They should then be able to create a new national/cultural, cosmopolitan identity that is characteristic of Macau, a multiple national identity with different ethnic and cultural emphasis but still characterized by cosmopolitanism. It is a Macanauan national/cultural identity, sharing a relevant common history, cultural characteristics, social networks, and a designated homeland.

Postcolonialism can also shed some light on our study of the Macau story. Postcolonial theory asserts that Western knowledge and culture dominated the colonies in the past, and continue to dominate now. Orientalism, for example, viewed the West as rational and civilized, and the East as irrational, uncivilized, and lacking. This kind of thinking has become deeply rooted in the psyche of both the former colonizers and the colonized. The colonial discourse was, in fact, fractured, incomplete, contradictory, ambivalent, and undecided, as other postcolonial theorists point out. The West and the East were not binary distinctions. So the challenge for postcolonial theory is also our challenge, to produce alternative knowledge that will not reproduce the binary thinking of Orientalism. Rather, it will be characterized by cosmopolitanism.

A new Macauan identity is still in the making, facing the challenge of reconciling the differences in the Chinese and Portuguese identities into one Macauan identity.
identity without sacrificing one’s own ethnic identities, using their abundant historical heritages.34 Such a rich and complex cultural and social identity of Macau can provide precious lessons for today’s multicultural and multiethnic societies all over the world.

Building a New Political Identity in Macau

It seems that a majority of the people in Macau do not identify with the PRC political system. But within the constraints of the “one country, two systems” formula, there is still some room for Macau’s own political design although that room is being challenged in the Xi Jinping era.

In terms of the political system, Macau’s identity is not that clear, but it contains certain democratic elements. Since the 1970s, the Legislative Council became independent of the governor, and 6 of the 17 legislators were elected by the populace, 6 by functional constituencies, and 5 appointed by the governor. Since the return of Macau to China, the chief executive has also been elected, although he was elected by 300 to 400 representatives of functional constituencies only, not by the entire population. The number of popularly elected legislators has increased. Although Macau is not a full democracy yet, there has been more democracy than before.

At a youth meeting in Macau to commemorate the 55th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 2004, Bai Zhijian, the director of the Central Liaison’s Office in Macau, said that the number one historical mission of the young people in Macau is the building of democratic politics under the principle of “one country, two systems,” where people from different ethnicities, classes, beliefs, and cultures can express their opinions and be heard.35 He said that this system will be different from the one under the colonial rule, and different from China’s.

But 15 years later, the way to building a democratic polity is still not clear. As we discussed in chapter 2, Macau’s politics is moving away from democracy. Under such circumstances, can Macau still distinguish itself from the mainland? Can the “one country, two systems” principle survive? Can Macau build a civil society similar to that of Hong Kong, if not better?36 Can people in Macau eventually select their chief executive and their legislators through popular elections, i.e., universal suffrage notwithstanding the current setbacks in Hong Kong and Macau?

In chapter 2, we discussed Chief Executive Edmund Ho’s hope that he would clearly distinguish himself from the Portuguese administration. When commenting on the implementation of Article 23 in the Basic Law, he also said that he would not have to wait for Hong Kong to do something first. That, he did succeed at. But other than that, neither he nor his successor has done much to make Macau stand out. Even in the legislation of Article 23 Ho picked a much less urgent issue to legislate but left the urgent ones out. If anything, Macau is more and more like mainland China, and Hong Kong is more and more like Macau, politically. Government
officials believe that they should be more responsible to the central government than to the people in Macau since they are appointed by the former, not the latter. The executive branch would be hesitant to pass laws that would restrict their power and the power of the capitalist class, no matter whether it is about universal suffrage or lawmaking related to legislative check on government spending or the collective bargaining power of workers.

In the past 20 years, the relationship between the Legislative Assembly and the executive branch simply has deteriorated compared with the Portuguese Macau period. Susana Chou, the chair of the Legislative Assembly, complained when retiring from the position in 2009 that before the handover, both the executive branch and the legislative branch could introduce bills, but after the handover, the latter has almost no power to introduce bills. Even when they did, they would be turned down by the executive branch on various pretexts.\(^37\) That has not changed.

Many boast that Macau is a model of “one country, two systems.” But without universal suffrage for both the chief executive and the legislative assembly, and without a strong civil society and public sphere, it is a questionable example. Rather, by resisting democratization and freedom of speech, it is already lagging behind Hong Kong, far behind Taiwan, and setting a poor example for a virtual Chinese confederation.

Indeed, Macau could help build a federal or confederal state of China in the future, with Taiwan included, by correcting all these problems.\(^38\) With Macau and Hong Kong governed by Macau and Hong Kong people respectively and a high degree of autonomy, the “one country, two systems” formula is already resembling federalism, or even confederalism, since the two systems have vast differences in political arrangements, economic rules and regulations, and legal codes.\(^39\) Macau and Hong Kong also have a fair amount of international relations.\(^40\) But whether Macau can build a better political system within a virtual Chinese confederation is not clear. Politically Macau has yet to form a progressive identity.

What Macau has difficulty doing now contradicts its image in the past. In the 450 years of history, in addition to the role of cultural exchange, Macau also played a commendable political role. For example, both the Ming and Qing governments used Macau as a place for asylum for foreigners. Following the signing of the Nanjing Treaty in 1842, several foreign ministers even settled in Macau.\(^41\) For several centuries, Macau also took in those who were fleeing from religious and political persecution in China and Japan.\(^42\) At the end of the Qing dynasty, the reformers established their newspaper in Macau, Zhi Xin Bao (知新報), advocating Western culture and politics and calling for reforms in China. Zheng Guanying wrote his famous book “Warnings to the prosperous age” here in Macau. Both the families of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao took refuge in Macau when their reform failed. In the Nationalist Revolution, Sun Yat-sen and his comrades planned their movements in Macau and received various support in Macau.\(^43\)
During World War II, Macau provided a refuge to not only the mainlanders, but also Hong Kongers and Hong Kong Portuguese. Coates describes World War II as Macau’s “finest hour” because it gave help “to untold thousands of Hong Kong People reduced to destitution and starvation….” Over 40,000 people sought refuge in Macau—“The city was filled with refugees.” It hosted intellectuals supporting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including Fan Changjiang, Liang Shumin, Xia Yan, Jin Shan, Liang Zhonghua, who later went back to the mainland via Macau. Macau also provided medical assistance to the CCP army’s resistance against Japan and sanctuary for the Nationalists. There were in Macau representatives of both the Nationalists of the KMT and Wang Jingwei’s Nanjing government that cooperated with the Japanese in their occupation of China. Even in 1946 to 1948, the KMT exerted dominant influence over 30 social organizations in Macau. Although that influence was subsiding after the founding of the PRC, it did not completely disappear until 1966 when the 12-3 Incident changed the political landscape.

Indeed, Macau’s politically helpful role in the development of events in China throughout its history is more than commendable. The reason why the CCP government did not want to take Macau back after the founding of the PRC is that Macau did serve a function to break the economic blockade of China by the Western powers. “Macao became a passageway for enormous amounts of products that were indispensable for the survival of Mao’s regime: petrol, metals, cars, chemical products, etc. These were purchased by the PRC’s representative in the Territory, the Nam Kwong Consortium.” One of those important products was gold, which China needed to purchase on the international markets. Mr. Ho Yin had the monopoly in dealing gold in Macau, which partly explains his exceptional relationship with the CCP. (Ho Yin was Edmund Ho’s father.) So Mao himself said that they were not in a hurry to solve the problems of Hong Kong and Macau, especially because they could use these territories to develop foreign relations and foreign trade. And the PRC policy was to “make long term plans [with Hong Kong and Macau] and make the best use of them”.

Macau could certainly do better than it does now politically. It has refused entry of democracy activities, writers, journalists, and academics whom the government thinks are threatening its rule or the rule of the mainland government. But it does not have to. Instead, it should strive to be a model “province” of Greater China in its openness, tolerance, and democratization. Idealistic as it may sound, Macau could stand out as a positive model as long as it can truly utilize its tradition and make wise transformations. Macau could be famous for its culture and politics, not just for its gambling industry.
Building a New Economic Identity in Macau

As we discussed in chapters 3 and 7, Macau is known for being a gambling city; gambling contributes to about 80% of the city’s revenues. But the gaming industry can vastly improve itself in responsible gaming and Macau's service sector can expand to include more tourist attractions.

Responsible Gambling and Corporate Social Responsibility

Blaszczynski et al. define responsible gambling as “policies and practices designed to prevent and reduce potential harms associated with gambling; these policies and practices often incorporate a diverse range of interventions designed to promote consumer protection, community/consumer awareness and education, and access to efficacious treatment.” As it is practiced now, its main target is individuals who have a gambling problem, and the gambling operator’s responsibility is to properly inform the gamblers about the risks. Similarly, Victorian Gaming Machine Industry says that responsible gaming is for the industry to offer products and services in a way that facilitates customers’ ability to enjoy gaming and for each person to exercise a rational and sensible choice while playing.

But as we argued in chapter 7, while it is the gambler’s own action, gaming providers have to exercise “a duty of care” and take reasonable and necessary steps in preventing problem gambling. They “must not knowingly exploit or take advantage of any player, in particular, vulnerable individuals manifesting characteristics associated with gambling-related problems.” In order for the player to make rational choices, gambling providers must inform the player of the probabilities and likelihood of winning, and payout schedules. Their advertising and promotional activities should present no misleading information or misrepresentation of the likelihood of winning. Above all, they should do much more intervention.

Others have also discussed how casino operators may interact with the community. Pitcher, for example, discusses what they do with community interest groups, including 1) high profile sponsorships of theater, music, ballet, entertainment and sporting events; 2) ongoing fund-raising for many charities in the city; 3) funds for problem gambling handled by an independent trust, used by local treatment providers; and 4) promotion of sensible gambling by working closely with local problem gambling treatment providers and offering to pay for the first consultation of problem customers.

Responsible gambling is dealing with the relationship between the corporation and the customer and community, but ideally it would fulfill the requirements as set forth by the principles of corporate social responsibility (CSR), which answer to all the seven stakeholders. As we discussed in chapter 3, they are shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, competitors, government, and civil society organizations.
Shareholders: These are the investing companies and individuals. Casinos are supposed to make money for them, and in Macau, they do. In fact Macau has surpassed Las Vegas in its gambling earnings. They were doing very well in this regard even in times of financial difficulties in 2008/09.

Employees: Casinos are supposed to provide fair pay, decent benefits, good working conditions (e.g., non-smoking environment), problem gambling prevention programs, 24-hour hot-lines for help, etc. Macau casinos pay better than most other industries and provide more decent benefits and working conditions, especially after the liberalization of the gaming industry, and there is now some competition in attracting employees. The casinos in Macau have problem gambling prevention programs for their employees but their effectiveness is questionable, as we discussed in chapter 7.

Customers: As we discussed in chapter 7, casinos in Macau have programs that help gamblers to prevent problem gambling, but they are not effective. Gamblers are yet to be informed of the likelihood of winning and losing and helped with problem gambling. Some casinos do donate money to social organizations that help prevent problem gambling or treating problem gamblers. But first of all, such help centers are too few in Macau. Second, they can help only a very small number of addicted gamblers. Third, most of the problem gamblers are from the mainland, and help is almost not available to them. Fourth, most importantly there are no effective intervention programs as those discussed in chapter 7. Casinos have a long way to go in fulfilling their obligations to the gamblers while taking money from their pockets.

Suppliers: Casinos are supposed to make sure that suppliers are following the supplier codes of conduct, whether these are contractors building casinos for them, or suppliers of human labor, gaming machines, or food, and make sure that no human rights violations are involved in the supply chain. When construction workers for casino companies complain that they do not get their pay in time, or when mainland workers are still charged a fee every month by the employment agencies, casino companies have an obligation to help redress these issues. But they do not seem to care about them because they are not directly involved in their contractors’ business. CSR requires, however, that they should be concerned and take action of some kind.

Competitors: How to cooperate while competing with other companies within the industry is another challenge for casinos. Casino operators in Macau have established their own business association but it does not really function. Rather, it should regulate their practices such as how much commission they will give to the middlemen and women who bring in VIP customers. More
importantly, the association should research and coordinate their gambling prevention and intervention programs. Whether the association will do all of these things remains to be seen, but it is something they have to do as socially responsible companies. The government should step in if the casinos do not do them.

The government: Are casinos maintaining a professional relationship with the government, with little or no corrupt practices, or are they colluding with corrupt officials for their own gain? We discussed these in chapter 3 and the picture is not nice. The lack of transparency in the relationship between the casinos and the government makes one doubt whether casinos play a positive role in building a clean and responsible government.

Community interest groups or the community as a whole: Casinos need to maintain cordial relationships with the community, to be responsive to their complaints, and to have concrete measures to help improve the quality of life in the community. One of the difficulties that arises from the development of the casino industry is the traffic jams. As responsible corporations, casinos need to be engaging the community in finding ways to solve this and other problems.

Only when casinos have done the above can we consider Macau’s gaming industry as an exemplar of success in responsible gambling. Macau will then have an admirable new economic identity as far as gaming is concerned. That of course is not enough, hence the following expansions of the service sector to build a city of culture and a world destination of tourism and recreation (世界旅遊休閑中心).

To Build a City of Culture and a World Class Destination of Tourism and Recreation

In December 2008 the National Committee on Development and Reform (國家發展和改革委員會) issued an outline on the development of the Pearl River Delta from 2008 to 2020, and subsequently in June, the State Council passed an outline for the development of Hengqin, inviting Macau to join in the project. According to the national development outline, Macau will be built into a world destination of tourism and recreation. These new developments should provide an opportunity for Macau to evolve into a city of culture rather than a city of sin.

We might be able to envision some things that Macau can do, and they should all be part of Macau’s cultural and tourist industry. For example, among other things, Macau can have:

A museum that features Macau’s history and society, the history of Macau’s role in the cultural exchange between the East and the West, the history of the relationship between Macau and other world powers and between Macau and
mainland China, the emergence and development of the Macanese, as well as the ups and downs of Macau's economic development.

A museum on gambling, featuring Macau's gambling history as well as the probability of winning and losing on the part of the casinos and the gamblers respectively. There should be hands-on game playing facilities to demonstrate the probability of winning and losing. There should also be presentations of problem gambling stories, on international best practices of problem gambling prevention and intervention, and on casino-related crimes and deviance.

A tourist route that includes the restored ancient government houses, shipyards, hotels, pawnshops, prisons, casinos, etc. This should give people a physical impression of the history of Macau's politics, economics, culture, and society. 59

A tourist route that features all kinds of streets that exhibit Macau history. Examples include those that represent trade and industrial development (Avenida Infante D. Henrique 殷皇子大馬路, Ruo do Chunabeiro 燒灰爐街, Ruo das Estalagens 草堆街, Rua da Felicidade 福隆新街), and military and political development (the Portuguese boarder gate 關閘拱門, streets and places named after Amaral and Mesquita, the street where the ancient Chinese customs house was 關前正街, and Estrada da Vitoria or Victory Road 得勝大馬路), etc. 60

Religious tourism that will feature Macau's churches and temples, including a “tourist route” that will connect them and with their histories explained to tourists.

In its MICE (Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, Events) industry, Macau can hold conventions that feature religion—to bring different religions together—cultural exchanges, post-colonial development, etc., in addition to gaming and other commercial meetings. 61

Manufacturing and selling of tourist gifts based on Macau’s history, culture, and society.

These are in addition to the food festivals, music festivals, sports festivals, fireworks festivals, film festivals, car races (Macau Grand Prix), various trade fairs, as well as other traditional Chinese and Western festivals. They would be in addition to what Zhuhai would build in Hengqin, such as theme parks and golf courses. In fact, the tourist industry from the neighboring areas like Zhuhai and Hong Kong should be able to complement each other, each with its own features unique to the city.

In 2005, the UNESCO placed Macau's historic sites on its World Heritage List. There has been a momentum to do something about Macau's history and culture, but people seem uncertain as to what. In fact, many have long called for developing a tourist industry. João Manuel Costa Antunes 安楝樑, the former director of
Macau Government Tourism Office, states that the most valuable heritage that the Portuguese have left in Macau is the people, i.e., the Macanese. Maria Helena de Senna Fernandes 文綺華, the current director of the Tourism Office, hopes that the Portuguese language, social organizations, food, etc. will be preserved; otherwise, Macau would lose its characteristics. But it is also a challenge to put the maintenance and preservation of Macanese culture in practical terms and to make it part of the tourist industry.

Most importantly, developing more cultural integration does not mean just playing Portuguese folk songs with Chinese instruments, as Manuel Goncalves points out. It is not only about cultural transformation and cultural reconstruction, as claimed by Jin Guoping and Wu Zhiliang, but also about cultural presentation. That presentation should also feature the Chinese historical heritages, including the restoration of some ancient government houses, shipyards, hotels, pawnshops, prisons, and casinos.

This cultural industry needs also the support of other development, including the improvement in human and physical environment. If Macau is going to be more and more like mainland China politically, i.e., more authoritarian and less democratic (see Figure 8.1), and if the public transportation continues to be as bad as it is now, with too many impolite bus drivers and errant taxi drivers, Macau will not be able to do what we have suggested above to attract tourists, and the so-called world destination of tourism and recreation center will only remain a dream. An emphasis on economic progress should not overshadow the importance of culture. Building a Macuan identity is a holistic project.

Macau’s economic identity can be much more than just gambling. There are more attractions that can be built along the lines of cultural and religious tourism.

Figure 8.1
A pailou built in front of Leal Senado in Macau to celebrate the Chinese national holiday in the 1960s, courtesy of Macao Daily, September 25, 2004.
Economically, Macau can be known for its cultural sophistications as well as its socially responsible gambling fortifications. Only then can we say that Macau has an admirable economic identity.

Conclusions: “A City of Sin” Competing with “a City of Culture”

Before the handover of Macau to China, the Portuguese Macau government had already begun to develop cultural tourism. The idea was that cultural tourism would “provide a corrective to the economic overdependence on gambling, … [and] a corrective to the overwhelming image that the territory’s association with gambling had generated in the international media: the image of Macau as a ‘cultural desert’ (文化沙漠), a stepping stone for a highly mobile and materialistic population, a haven for vice-mongers, smugglers, and illiterates, a city built on and characterized by criminality, decadence, and corruption.” So the challenge was, and still is, to make a “city of sin” into a “city of culture.”

Indeed, it is up to the people in Macau to build a Macauan identity in which they can take pride. This identity has national, political, cultural, social and economic aspects. And neither of the aspects can stand alone; they complement each other. This identity is similar to a nation-state identity, similar to a Chinese or a Portuguese identity, but it is a multinational identity, the improved Macau model of cosmopolitanism. To build such an identity can help Macau “to recapture certain of its near half-millennium luster as gate-way to China and as bridge between east and west, not only in commerce, but also in the flow of ideas and technology.”

We will end by quoting W. H. Auden, an English poet, whose poem below may give us some insights. Written in 1938 during his visit to Macau, it is about the reconciliation of the differences and contradictions in Macau, about a Macauan identity. The poem may be sarcastic, but the issues it raises, and other issues we have discussed in this chapter, require our careful study if we want to build a Macauan identity that can again put Macau on the map of the world.

A weed from Catholic Europe, it took root
Between the yellow mountains and the sea,
And bore these gay stone houses like a fruit
And grew in China imperceptibly.

Rococo images of Saint and Saviour
Promise her gamblers fortunes when they die;
Churches beside the brothels testify
That faith can pardon natural behaviour.

This city of indulgence need not fear
The major sins by which the heart is killed,
And governments and men are torn to pieces:
Religious clock will strike; the childish vices
Will safeguard the low virtues of the child
And nothing serious can happen here.

Rather than “nothing serious can happen here,” it is more a matter of the right and appropriate actions taking place.
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