Underground Front

The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong

Second Edition

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## Contents

Abbreviations viii
Preface to the Second Edition x
Preface to the First Edition xi

Introduction: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong 1
1. Party Supremacy and Hong Kong 15
2. The Chinese Communist Party Tools of Co-optation and Persuasion 27
3. The Earliest History of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong: From 1920 to 1926 42
4. Purge, War, and Civil War: From 1927 to 1948 53
5. Hong Kong to the Chinese Communist Party: From 1949 to 1965 78
7. The Taking Back of Hong Kong: From 1977 to 1984 125
8. The Shaping of Post-Colonial Hong Kong: From 1983 to 1989 145
9. Passage to Reunification: From 1990 to 1997 171
10. Reunification, Patriotism, and Political Disorder: From 1997 to 2017 202

Appendix I: Survey of Public Opinion about the Chinese Communist Party 2007 245
Appendix II: The VIPs Invited to Witness the Signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration 251
Appendix III: Members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and Basic Law Consultative Committee 254
Appendix IV: Olympic Torch-Bearers 2008 258

Notes 263
Biographies 326
Bibliography 341
Chinese Publications 351
Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong

Writing about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Hong Kong used to be a much more sensitive subject than it is today. In the first edition of this book, it was noted that the CCP remained a subject to be avoided because its presence was still a “secret”, although one that everyone had known about for a very long time. Nowhere else in the world was there a political system where the ruling party remained an underground organisation as in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). Twenty years after the reunification, the party has become much more visible and visibly active in Hong Kong. There should no longer be any issue to openly discuss party history, structure, policies, and activities. The party also wants Hong Kong to understand its values and outlook, which needs open discussion.

The story of the CCP and Hong Kong was one of secrecy and contradiction that goes back even before the party was founded in 1921. As a result of nineteenth-century “unequal treaties” that forced the Qing government to cede and lease territories to Britain, Hong Kong was seen merely to be under temporary British administration and China would recover the lost territory “when the time was ripe”. The Kuomintang (KMT) had thought it would recover Hong Kong after World War II but could not. After 1949, the CCP was willing to wait a long time to resolve the question of Hong Kong because it served China’s purpose to continue to live with the contradiction of claiming sovereignty but tolerating British de facto control. The story of the CCP in Hong Kong is the tale of how the party dealt with that contradiction. From the time of the birth of the CCP, Hong Kong served as a very useful and fairly secure haven for party members and friends to stage revolutionary and political activities, including communications, propaganda, united front activities, fundraising and intelligence gathering. Hong Kong was also a good place for the Mainland in terms of trade, loans, investments, and gifts from compatriots.

The Hong Kong question was complex because it concerned both foreign and domestic policies that required careful consideration on many fronts. In taking back Hong Kong in 1997, the CCP created the concept of “one country, two systems” (initially meant for Taiwan) to allow the HKSAR room to be different. This solution was in fact characteristic of Chinese policy since the 1920s. On regaining formal sovereignty over Hong Kong, the CCP was willing to allow the HKSAR to retain
a “high degree of autonomy” for at least 50 years after 1997. In other words, the CCP sought to retain both sovereignty and the benefits arising from the status quo. However, having taken back sovereignty in 1997, the CCP also had to shoulder the responsibility of administration it entailed. The latter half of this story describes how that responsibility required the CCP to a great extent to accept capitalism and the Hong Kong way of doing things. However, while the party appreciates that Hong Kong needs to function differently from the Mainland, its basic instincts, which are Leninist in nature, make it difficult for the party apparatus not to over-extend its reach into the city’s public affairs. The sharpest point of departure between the party’s way and Hong Kong’s way arises from their different governing experience. Hong Kong’s colonial past, though authoritarian, was underpinned by the rule of law in the Western liberal tradition, whereas the Mainland’s experience stems from traditional authoritarian rule, and Leninism that gives the CCP supremacy.

From the party’s point of view, it can claim success for decolonising Hong Kong. After all, “pro-government forces” now dominate the political structure as a result of the party’s hard work in co-opting the Hong Kong elites and helping the patriotic camp to win elections so that a new political order emerged after 1997. There is a price to success however. The pro-government forces, a mixed bag, naturally want their interests to be protected, but the selfishness of some and the incompetence of others give the CCP multiple headaches. The CCP might even acknowledge in private that the pro-government forces are unruly and that Hong Kong has a dysfunctional political system dominated by corporatist vested interests that the people see as unfair. As the system was designed to give conservative forces dominance, the party should not be too surprised that the Hong Kong community continues to demand one-person-one-vote. The CCP had to rely on naked power to press home the message in 2004 through a constitutional interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC) that Hong Kong must be more patient in achieving universal suffrage. Nevertheless, by 2007, the party indicated that it could accept one-person-one-vote for the election of the chief executive in 2017 and for the Legislative Council possibly by 2020. The important opportunity for 2017 was unfortunately lost when legislators voted the proposal down in 2015 amidst much drama on the floor of the legislature, and against the backdrop of Hong Kong society having experienced a number of major mass movements.

The CCP was not unaware that the ground was shifting in Hong Kong. In 2007, the then General Secretary of the CCP, Hu Jintao, noted in his report to the 17th National Party Congress in respect of implementing the “one country, two systems” policy that it was a “major task the party faced in running the country”. To ensure the long-term prosperity and stability in Hong Kong and Macao, he noted the party was presented with a set of “new circumstances”, which indicates that at the very top of the power structure, governing Hong Kong well had become a test of the party’s governing capability.

The new challenge and situation was interpreted by the United Front Department to mean Hong Kong’s local problems and the many
Since the Reunification a high degree of autonomy has been successfully implemented through “one country two systems” . . . and “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong”. Furthering development and a harmonious society have become a consensus of different sectors in Hong Kong society . . . However, there are new situations and problems: “One Country, Two Systems” is a brand new topic. Capitalism is practiced in Hong Kong . . . while the Mainland mainly practices socialism. There is no precedent to deal with the relationship between the two. There is no previous experience that could be referred to. Hong Kong's economy is experiencing restructuring, and in addition, there are the impacts of incidents such as the Asian Financial Crisis and SARS. Hong Kong's economic, social and livelihood problems are inter-related and the interests involved are relatively complex. These are all the problems that need to be addressed to maintain Hong Kong's long-term stability. It is a test of our party's leadership and governing capacity.

The reference to the interrelated economic, social, and livelihood problems is a reference to the many conflicts among interest groups. In January 2008, an essay in the Central Party School's influential publication, Study Times, revealed that to meet the challenge the party created a second governing team of Mainland cadres and government officials to manage Hong Kong affairs. The essay by Cao Erbao, then head of research of the Liaison Office—the CCP office in Hong Kong, discussed the training and deployment of the team and said that it should carry out its work in Hong Kong openly as a legitimate team. That was an important signal. The CCP would have to “come out” in Hong Kong, even if not yet in name (Chapter 10).

Six Phases of the CCP Story

The story of the CCP in Hong Kong can be said to have six distinct phases since 1921, when the party was established on the Mainland.

The first phase begins in 1920 with the earliest Marxist publication started by three intellectuals. Marxism's initial attraction to them was that it seemed to offer specific ideas on how to address social problems. This phase runs from the early 1920s to 1949, when the party assumed power on the Mainland. This period includes dramatic strikes and boycotts, the story of the East River guerrillas during World War II, the spill over to Hong Kong of the bitter civil war fought between the KMT and CCP on the Mainland, and the close connection between party activities in Hong Kong and Guangdong. The CCP could have tried to take back Hong Kong after the war but it decided as a matter of strategy to leave it in British hands because it served party interests (Chapters 3 and 4).

The second phase covers the immediate period after the CCP assumed power in 1949 and up until the start of the Cultural Revolution. By the 1950s, the CCP had become Mao Zedong's party. He had turned Marxism into the ultimate political
truth. Ideology was enforced by mass political campaigns and non-believers were dealt with harshly. While land reform was imposed in Guangdong, Hong Kong became a sanctuary for those who managed to escape. This phase includes the impact of the Korean War on Hong Kong and a range of incidents that were a direct legacy of continuing conflicts between the KMT and CCP (Chapter 5).

The third phase is the decade of the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976. The 1967 riots were perpetrated by CCP members in Hong Kong. What was extraordinary was Zhou Enlai’s role in protecting Hong Kong to the best of his ability because he believed in the colony’s continuing usefulness to the CCP. His efforts were the signals to the British that the 1967 riots did not have Beijing’s full backing. By the end of the riots, the CCP’s apparatus in Hong Kong was almost completely destroyed with the Hong Kong community turning away from Marxism–Maoism totally (Chapter 6).

The fourth period covers the early part of the Deng Xiaoping era. Once China decided to take back Hong Kong at the end of 1981, it was vital for the CCP to work out how it was going to resume sovereignty and create its own post-colonial establishment. The party concluded the Sino-British Joint Declaration and began to draft a post-1997 constitution for Hong Kong called the Basic Law. A senior cadre, Xu Jiatun, was sent to plan for the resumption of sovereignty. He launched a new propaganda and united front campaign in Hong Kong that targeted the tycoons and economic elites so that they could be won over to the side of the CCP and away from the departing British (Chapters 7 and 8).

The fifth phase is the post-Tiananmen period, when the CCP faced many difficulties in reviving its credibility. The party thought the British might have second thoughts about giving up Hong Kong. In the final five years of colonial rule, the CCP had to deal with the last governor of Hong Kong whose push for modest democratic reform roused suspicion that the British wanted to make post-1997 politics hard to manage for the Chinese. The local party machinery went all out to counter that “sinner for a thousand years”—Chris Patten—although it had limited success in denting the governor’s popularity with the public (Chapter 9).

The last phase deals with the first two decades of the HKSAR. Hong Kong’s post-colonial establishment—a creation of the CCP—was based on a two-prong design: first, by packing tycoons, their children, and their nominees into a political structure dominated by voting blocks of vested interest to select the chief executive and to fill half the seats of the Legislative Council; and second, to beef-up a major pro-government political party—the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB)—as well as support patriotic groups and individuals to be politically active so that they could dominate the political structure. However, the CCP has given itself the unenviable task of mediating and perpetuating their various interests. Despite the dominance of the pro-government forces, the CCP apparatus in Hong Kong failed to save the first chief executive, Tung Chee Hwa (1997–2005), who resigned before completing his second term. His successor,
Donald Tsang (2005–2012), a career civil servant, was expected to do better but ended his term being even less popular than his predecessor. Worse, after he left office he was prosecuted and convicted of misconduct in public office for failure to disclose a conflict of interest. Leung Chun Ying (2012–2017), the third and least popular chief executive, became the focus of constant and intense bashing. The last chapter of this book covers the period from 1997 to 2017—the sixth phase, when the younger generations in Hong Kong created a new rhetoric of “localism” but some crossed the line of the CCP’s tolerance by calling for “self-determination” and “independence”.

Two Interwoven Issues

Dealing with capitalism

This first decade of post-1997 coincides with the start of a new century when the CCP stopped referring to itself as a “revolutionary party”\(^6\). Instead, it practises “capitalism under CCP leadership”.\(^7\) In the past, it was the party’s job to lead the revolution. Today, it is the party’s leadership that will bring about market reform. In other words, the words and policy goals have changed, but not the supreme status of the CCP in China. Indeed, the supremacy of the party remains a key regime value (Chapter 2).

Hong Kong’s electoral design may well have given the party comfort about how to manage capitalism on the Mainland. By managing the leading capitalists, the CCP could manage capitalism. It would involve tolerating exploitation for the sake of prosperity and stability, and balancing the vested interests of various groups. Hong Kong’s constitution, the Basic Law, was designed to embed vested interests into the electoral system through subsectors and functional constituencies.

From the early 1980s, CCP leaders had to focus on how socialist China could deal with capitalist Hong Kong. Deng Xiaoping promised that Hong Kong could continue to “race horses and go dancing” after 1997. He also stressed that as long as a person supported China regaining sovereignty over Hong Kong, it did not matter what kind of belief he or she held. Feudalism and even slavery could be tolerated. In other words, socialist China was prepared to tolerate even the worst exploitation in Hong Kong under its one country, two systems principle, and that the policy would not change for 50 years. Indeed, the CCP was ready to accept inequality on the Mainland too. Deng Xiaoping had said in the 1980s that in the early days of economic reform, some people could get rich first. Two decades later, the rich had to be integrated into the party.

In 2001, Jiang Zemin promoted the idea that the party must open its door to “new classes” signalling the end of Marxist class struggle. He championed the Three Represents ideology as one of the ruling theories of the CCP to legitimise the inclusion of capitalists and private entrepreneurs into the party.\(^8\) According
to official surveys, 33.9 percent of private entrepreneurs were party members in the mid-2000s; and a decade later, 40 percent of private entrepreneurs were party members. A probable reason why the percentage is so high is that when the state-owned enterprises were privatised in the earlier days, their leading managers and cadres frequently became the proprietors and senior executives of the repackaged corporations. In more recent times, entrepreneurs and young people join the party because it provides access and latent advantages. Thus, to an important extent, the CCP membership of the new business class reflects the CCP’s involvement in the creation of private enterprise. By 2014, the private sector produced at least two-thirds of China’s gross domestic product.

The Mainland’s wide wealth gap between urban and rural communities became a cause for concern. The Three Represents ideology is meant to strengthen the CCP’s authority and legitimacy. Party leaders probably believe that through the party system they can rein in the capitalists when necessary to ensure that they are not overly exploitative. Perhaps they also believe that since the party can manage almost anything with adequate planning why not capitalism and markets too? After all, there are now millions of party members working in the private sector. The CCP’s united front successes in Hong Kong might have resulted in its added confidence that capitalism can be managed via managing the capitalists. Indeed, as Xu Jiatun observed, capitalists’ political inclinations usually follow their business interests and so they can be brought under control by providing the right incentives or disincentives.

The rich and poor divide in Hong Kong is now among the widest in the world. Beijing’s attempt in the past to maintain prosperity may well have contributed to stretching the wealth gap. When the colonial administration sought to increase welfare spending in 1995, a deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office described it thus: “It’s like a Formula One car [referring to Hong Kong] which is going to crash and kill all six million people [what additional welfare would do].” Tung Chee Hwa blamed the colonial administration for having increased social spending and sought to downplay his own fiscal expansion in 1998. By 2012, Leung Chun Ying acknowledged the wide wealth gap and made fighting poverty a key plank of his administration.

Another complaint in Hong Kong, especially during the terms of office of Tung Chee Hwa and Donald Tsang, is “business—politics collusion”, which shows the public’s doubt over how the public interest can be safeguarded when economic vested interests are embedded into the political system. The choice to co-opt mainly rich businessmen to draft the Basic Law in the 1980s and into the post-reunification ruling establishment led to their interests being given political priority. Today, the CCP faces the same dilemma as the British. Without allowing the people of Hong Kong to choose their own local leaders, who else could be found to endorse and perpetuate the political system except the business elites? The CCP essentially
decided to retain the colonial system because it was a tried and tested way to maintain central control.

The HKSAR government perceived devising policy as balancing interests. When Donald Tsang ran for re-selection in 2007, his campaign materials made clear that: “I will encourage government officials to change their mindset, from that of policy formulator to that of interest coordinator.” In making policy, officials would coordinate “interests” above all else. Perhaps Tsang was influenced by Hu Jintao's statement at the 17th National Party Congress that there was a “new situation” in the maintenance of the long-term stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, as well as the United Front Department's explanation of what Hu Jintao meant. As noted earlier in this chapter, the party’s view of the “new situation” had to do with Hong Kong’s local problems and conflicting interests. The United Front Department's explanation may have inspired Tsang to focus on interest coordination. In this light, the general public was just one stakeholder among many. Moreover, Tsang put his government’s role of coordinating interests ahead of policy formulation. In other words, his administration’s policies were interests-dependent, and the interests were those entrenched in the Hong Kong political system. Therefore, having majority support among the key political stakeholders became the deciding consideration in the formulation of government policy. Taking an “interest coordination” approach might be considered politically pragmatic for the HKSAR government but it prevented better policies being made and in any event it did not make politics smoother for Donald Tsang. A new phenomenon arose post-2013 for Leung Chun Ying. The Legislative Council became mired in wide and extended filibustering, preventing government business from getting done. Governance could no longer be described as “efficient”—a positive aspect that Hong Kong had previously been able to assert.

Managing elections

Since the post-1997 political system in the HKSAR includes elections and the Basic Law states the “ultimate aim” is universal suffrage, there is no way for the CCP not to manage elections. Managing elections is about who gets elected. The outcome to date has been active management of the election of the chief executive and other elections. The party’s blueprint is to ensure the chief executive is a trusted person, and that pro-government forces make up the majority in local political bodies and “anti-China” elements will not get too far. The assumption is that the “patriots” embedded in the system will support the HKSAR government.

So far, the chief executive has been someone chosen by the CCP. In direct geographical elections to the Legislative Council, the results are mixed. The pro-democracy camp captured the majority of the votes even though the proportional voting system limited the number of seats it won. In functional elections, the pro-government camp has always dominated especially in the constituencies that provide for corporate voting. However, the Article 23 legislation on national
security, so important to the CCP, had to be withdrawn in 2003 under public protest. Instead, it led to the downfall of Tung Chee Hwa. Moreover, the HKSAR government does not feel it is able to practise executive-led government in the sense that it can always command enough votes in the legislature. The hodgepodge of groups that make up the pro-government coalition embodies a variety of interests that cannot be regarded as a majority party in power. Even bills that were unrelated to constitutional development failed—such as on copyright and medical council reform—due to extended filibustering in 2016. Despite the CCP’s hard work, Hong Kong became hard to govern. The proposal for the 2017 chief executive election by universal suffrage failed in 2015—but the CCP is probably not unhappy about that.

The New Political Order

A key part of taking back Hong Kong for the CCP was to build a new political order there with a set of regime values based on Beijing’s definition of “one country, two systems”. The new hegemony of beliefs and ideology had to be frequently repeated post-reunification. The people of Hong Kong seem to keep forgetting them. There are several features of this new ideology.

- Acceptance of China’s sovereignty over the HKSAR. The HKSAR is subordinate to Beijing, and a high degree of autonomy does not mean full autonomy.
- Implementation of the Basic Law, including respecting the fact that the HKSAR has an executive-led (not legislative-led) political system.
- Consideration of Beijing’s interests, views and concerns, especially as they relate to national security so as to prevent the HKSAR from being used as an anti-China base by “foreign forces”.
- The HKSAR is to be governed by “patriots” who share the regime values of the new political order.18

The chief supporters and advocates of the new political order are the business elites, rural interests, the old-time leftists, and others who have reoriented their beliefs and ideology towards China. The chief opposition consists of the pro-democracy politicians and advocates who are considered by the CCP to be steeped in Western political ideals, who want to bring full democracy to Hong Kong—a departure from how the Central Authorities see how one country, two systems should work.

The new political order and its values are rejected by the younger generations in Hong Kong. The unexpected Occupy and Umbrella Movements in 2014 galvanised the young and their Hong Kong-centric orientation (i.e., localism), which challenged not only the pro-government camp but also the traditional democrats. The young people of Hong Kong find the entire establishment outdated and disappointing. Worse, a poll in July 2016 showed one in five Hong Kong residents, especially those who were younger and better educated, preferred “independence” for Hong
For the CCP after 2047, the ugly head of an independent Hong Kong must be quashed (Chapter 10).

“Coming Out” Party

The CCP presence in Hong Kong under British rule was hidden behind a wholesale tea company during the war years, and then sheltered from 1946 behind the curtains of a news agency. Party members have revealed that when they joined the party in the past they were taken to Guangzhou to process the formalities for admission, which required the applicant to provide detailed background information. Members’ files were kept in a two-storey building at Xiaobei Huayuan (小北花園) in Guangzhou where CCP Hong Kong had an office. As part of the initiation process, a new member would attend briefings. It is unclear how someone from Hong Kong joins the CCP today but there must be some similarity to the process on the Mainland, where one has to apply and be recommended to join the party, disclose personal and family information, take courses and tests, be on probation for a period of time, and pledge to implement party decisions.

Is it finally time for the CCP to “come out” in Hong Kong? After all, Li Hou of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office in Beijing has already stated in 1986 that the CCP has always been in Hong Kong. Yet, the only times when the CCP and its operation was discussed at some length in public prior to 1997 were during two motion debates in 1995 and 1997 in the Hong Kong Legislative Council. An assemblage of what was said then provides a useful reminder of just how many of the political elites in Hong Kong knew about the existence of the CCP but most of them did not wish to consider whether the party should operate in the open or not after reunification.

[The] ruling party in China is the Communist Party which is represented by the Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong. Is there anyone who does not know that the Chinese Communist Party’s representative organ has already been existing in Hong Kong?

Will the CCP rule over Hong Kong? If it did, it would have to go through the process of election. (Allen Lee, Liberal Party, 1995; 1997)

I find it difficult to understand why such a motion has been moved . . . unless it is to create maximum worry among already worried Hong Kong residents, the vast majority of whom have already indicated clearly their wish to stay out of politics . . . If there is a communist cell in Hong Kong . . . it apparently has not caused any instability so far. . . . (Elsie Tu, 1995)

We all know that the existence of the Communist Party . . . in Hong Kong is the result of historical development . . . this motion . . . is not justified in terms of jurisprudence. (Philip Wong, 1995)

I feel that the local people are not that afraid of the CCP. (Tam Yiu Chung, DAB-FTU, 1995)
We believe that if the Chinese Communist Party continues to carry out covert activities in Hong Kong, the confidence of the people of Hong Kong will be consequently be undermined. (Frederick Fung, Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, 1995)

[the] operation of the Chinese Communist Party started long time ago and has existed for a long time. Hong Kong people all know the operation and the nature of the New China News Agency . . . All along, the Chinese Communist Party has been operating in the form of an underground party in Hong Kong and its activities are not conducted openly . . . After the handover in 1997, the activities of the Communist Party will increase rather than decrease. (Anthony Cheung, Democratic Party, 1997)

to hold discussion on this topic now will . . . only confuse the public. There is nothing to worry about. (Ip Kwok Him, DAB, 1997)

We also have Chinese Communist Party members in Hong Kong. Again, so what? (David Chu, Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, 1997)

In December 1996, Tung Chee Hwa was asked how he would handle the relationship with Xinhua Hong Kong—in other words the CCP—if he were selected to be the first chief executive. Tung sidestepped the question by saying that he understood many Hong Kong people worried that Xinhua Hong Kong would become the “king of kings” in Hong Kong in future but he did not believe it would happen because the Central Government would respect one country, two systems.

Rumours of who are party members among the post-1997 elites have been raised in Hong Kong from time to time. For example, an academic said in a seminar in Hong Kong in May 1997 that he believed there were four underground party members in Tung Chee Hwa’s then Executive Council. Another report noted that a political advisor to Tung was an active leftist student involved in the riots in 1967 and a party member. There was yet another report that claimed that the then Secretary for Justice, and a member in the Central Policy Unit, were also local CCP members. Questions were asked directly of Tsang Yok Sing, a founding member and former chairman of the DAB, and president of the Legislative Council (2008–2016), whether he was a party member. His answer is illuminating as to how the CCP likely sees its place in Hong Kong society:

In fact, since the founding of the DAB, I have been asked [whether I am a CCP member] many times . . . I can say frankly, I have never answered this question. The reason is, Hong Kong people’s attitude to the concept of the Communist Party is very negative. (South China Morning Post, 8 October 2008)

On being asked whether he was a CCP member: “I am so disappointed that you asked me about this. It is only a small issue. It is no big deal.” (South China Morning Post, 4 February 2009)

Indeed, Hong Kong people have known about the existence of the CCP in Hong Kong for a long time and are desensitised to the party’s involvement in local
politics probably because they know they must accept it. Part and parcel is the known fact that the nation is a one-party state. A survey conducted by the Hong Kong Transition Project in 2007 (see Appendix I) for the first edition of this book showed that there was 44 percent overall satisfaction with the Chinese government ruling China as a whole. Veteran NPC member Ng Hong Man’s assessment was that many Hong Kong people thought positively about the Chinese economy and China’s rising global status, but they disapproved of the widespread corruption and the lack of personal liberty and democracy on the Mainland. As regards the CCP and Hong Kong, 47.1 percent of the survey respondents believed the CCP understood Hong Kong people’s views while 41.2 percent did not think so. The rest were unable to offer a view. The responses also showed Hong Kong people knew the CCP influenced Hong Kong political affairs quite substantially:

**Concern about CCP interference in Hong Kong affairs:** 50.9 percent of the respondents said they were not worried about CCP interference in Hong Kong affairs, while 36.2 percent ranged from slightly worried to somewhat worried. There were 9.9 percent who were very worried, and 3.1 percent who did not know.

**CCP influence over HKSAR government:** 12.5 percent felt there was a great deal of interference, 39.1 percent felt the CCP was “somewhat” interfering, 20.2 percent thought interference was “not so much” while 7.2 percent thought there was no interference from the party; 18.3 percent were unable to express a view.

One aspect of the 2007 survey that deserves highlighting still is about party membership in Hong Kong. The majority of the respondents preferred not to know.

**CCP membership declaration:** On being asked whether CCP membership in Hong Kong should be declared, 36.1 percent of the respondents supported transparency and 2.8 percent thought declaration should be made in the future. However, 46.8 percent felt things should “continue as they are”—that is for party membership not to be declared. Of the remaining respondents, 1.5 percent thought the subject was “too sensitive”, while 12.7 percent did not know.

A survey in 2016 asked respondents on their level of trust in the Chinese government as part of a survey on Hong Kong’s political development. Answers were given on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 being no trust at all; 10 being having total trust; and 5 being so-so). The largest group was level 5 (22.5 percent), followed by level 0 (18.5 percent), with an overall mean of 4.36.

The CCP had obviously discussed how it should function in Hong Kong post-1997. Xu Jiatun, who was the head of the party in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1990, noted that:
After 1997, the leading organ of the Work Committee [i.e., CCP] should exist openly. But the grassroots organisations of the party should continue to play a secret role. Moreover the Work Committee should be separated from [Xinhua Hong Kong] and be renamed the Hong Kong Region Work Committee. It should be run openly. However, after the return of sovereignty over Hong Kong to China, it is unreasonable that the Communist Party, the ruling party of China, will still be an underground party in Hong Kong whose activities are regarded as unlawful. Since the DAB was formed, we can arrange for all or a large number of members of the underground party to join the DAB to preserve their roles as party members, and the DAB's platform will be their programme of action. All in all, this sensitive issue within the party and the society of Hong Kong must be discussed and resolved now, as 1997 is approaching.

Xu Jiatun's view was understandable—when Hong Kong would become Chinese territory, the ruling party should no longer demean itself by functioning as an underground party. Nevertheless, he envisaged grassroots organisations of the CCP would continue to play a secret role post-1997. If the party were to operate openly, but its grassroots bodies, such as trade unions, youth groups, and women's groups, would not reveal themselves as party organs, then in effect only some party members would acknowledge their party membership while allowing others to continue to hide it. Xu's views were prescient. It would prove to be the case (Chapter 10).

The underground nature of the CCP in Hong Kong arose out of complicated history. Prior to reunification it suited both the British and Chinese sides to keep a veil drawn over the existence of the CCP in Hong Kong. Hong Kong was British territory to the British and Chinese territory to the Chinese. The situation was made more difficult by the KMT and its past activities in the colony. Yet, Hong Kong was not torn apart by the longstanding conflicts between the KMT and CCP, and between China and the Western powers. Quiet accommodations were reached. Official silence on the part of the British about the CCP was one notable example of omissions that were considered necessary prior to 1997 in order to hold the colony together. The attempt to raise the subject for discussion in the Legislative Council in 1995 and 1997 ran into a complete stonewall from the colonial administration, and at the same time caused the leftist camp to go into almost hysterical overdrive. The veil of silence made it impossible, or at least extremely awkward, to say anything about the party in Hong Kong prior to 1997. However, this habit has extended beyond 1997 to the reunified HKSAR.

Omissions and evasions have taken a toll on public discourse. Perhaps it could be said in the past that to acknowledge and talk about the ideological contradictions running through Hong Kong in public was to revive them but with the colonial era having ended more than two decades ago, it cannot possibly still be so. On the Mainland, CCP leadership is pervasive. The party is embedded throughout the Chinese government structure and the management of state-owned enterprises, as
well as many other types of mass institutions, such as trade unions and universi-
ties. It should be entirely appropriate for Hong Kong people to openly discuss
party policies towards the HKSAR and how the party operates in Hong Kong. It is
no secret that the CCP carries out extensive propaganda and united front work in
Hong Kong, and that it has a large structure that is coordinated and led today by the
Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the HKSAR (Liaison Office).
It is well-organised, well-funded, and politically active, including in elections. The
people of Hong Kong know the CCP is there wielding considerable day-to-day
influence in the affairs of the HKSAR government.

The CCP releases figures from time to time on membership so we know there
are nearly 90 million members in total by 2016. However, since the party is an
underground organisation in Hong Kong, there is no authoritative information on
the number of party members there. In the mid-1980s, there were apparently about
6,000 members according to Xu Jiatun with about half being local members from
Hong Kong and the rest from the Mainland. According to other sources, figures in
the region of 15,000 and 28,000 had been suggested for the period around 1997.
Yet another estimate was that between 1983 and 1997, some 83,000 Mainland offi-
cials with changed names and false identities have entered Hong Kong as part of a
covert scheme to groom a political force in Hong Kong so as to promote Beijing's
long-term interests. The logic of creating this fifth column was described to have
emanated from Beijing’s “underlying fears, suspicion and distrust” (Chapter 9).
Whatever may be the true number of party members in Hong Kong, the number
is likely to be rather large by now. Perhaps this is why nearly 47 percent of the
respondents to the 2007 survey mentioned above preferred not to know: because
they realised they might find the truth disconcerting.

This is precisely the issue. Continuing to operate the CCP in Hong Kong in
secret can only cause unnecessary discomfort. Hong Kong people already accept the
CCP’s undoubted authority in leading the affairs of state. What Hong Kong people
want is the party’s willingness to enable Hong Kong to function with a high degree
of autonomy including being able to pursue and achieve the “ultimate aim” of uni-
versal suffrage provided for in the Basic Law. For nearly four decades now, Hong
Kong people have come to see the pursuit of greater democracy as an important way
to guarantee their freedoms, sustain open government, and underpin good govern-
ance. The executive-led system based on functional elections is not seen to be able
to deliver good governance. The essential issue between Hong Kong and Beijing lies
at the crux of how the party sees these goals can be achieved.

The CCP had promoted universal suffrage in its early days. However, its view
today is that democracy could spell the end of one-party rule and also throw China
into chaos, as politicians resort to social and ethnic divisions to mobilise votes.
Beyond losing elections, the party elites are biased against the working and peasant
classes, who would have a good chance to win power under the Western “bourgeois”
model of universal suffrage, but workers and peasants are considered unsuitable
to hold power because they are poorly educated. Matters are further complicated by the Mainland’s historical experience. On occasions when the CCP has allowed public discussion of its performance, the people’s negative reaction had been too uncomfortable to bear, such as during the Hundred Flowers Campaign, and the brief Democracy Wall period. Deng Xiaoping tried to rationalise the hostility to democracy on the grounds of the low educational standards of the nation—which he then applied to Hong Kong in a well-known speech.35

Chinese leaders do not regard liberal democracy as the path for China. In fact, they see their success since the 1980s as demonstration that authoritarian regimes can be effective in improving people’s lives and the CCP has earned performance legitimacy. They see the rise of China is a great unfolding drama led by the party, and that economic growth has to be coupled with active diplomacy to transform Chinese power and influence around the world. Hong Kong was extremely important to China in the 1980s and 1990s, when it was the crucial gateway for trade, capital, and investment but that dependency has dropped significantly. Today, CCP leaders feel they need to assert and repeat the party’s values and regime outlook in Hong Kong and to stamp out talk about self-determination and independence, lest such dangerous ideas stoke similar ones elsewhere in the country. They also wish to show their tolerance has limits. To the younger generations in Hong Kong, whose values are liberal, the party’s rhetoric and values are unattractive. They are dissatisfied with unfair politics. They hope for a sign that the political system can be revamped—so that there can be better policies for society to progress. As the vast majority of Hong Kong people accept Hong Kong is a part of the People’s Republic of China, and the noise of self-determination and independence will likely die down, the CCP will still have to face the question of the efficacy of the current political system that has entrenched certain vested interests and whether that can promote good governance, social equity, and a competitive economy in Hong Kong.
The first words uttered by the Chinese Communist Party's new representative in Hong Kong as he stepped off the train from Guangzhou were: “I am here for the reunification of the motherland.” Replacing Wang Kuang, Xu Jiatun arrived in Hong Kong on 30 June 1983, exactly fourteen years before the colony would become a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. In his role as the director of Xinhua Hong Kong, Xu was tasked with devising a strategy and an implementation plan for China to take back Hong Kong from the British. His time in Hong Kong shaped the early process for identifying the individuals and groups that would form the post-colonial political establishment. Beijing's position on recovering sovereignty over Hong Kong was based on certain assumptions about its understanding of Hong Kong's capitalist society, which continue to have an effect even today because the design of the post-1997 political system is based on them. Its united front strategy and tactics were likewise based on those assumptions.

The departure of Wang Kuang, the former director of Xinhua Hong Kong, in the midst of the Sino-British negotiation in May 1983 was a surprise to the leftist camp. Whilst it was said that Wang was replaced for health reasons, it was more likely that he was felt to have lacked the right credentials to deal with the complex issues arising from British to Chinese rule.1 Wang was considered politically too conservative. Several of the top leaders had apparently thought Wang was “too left”.2 He was said to have disapproved of the establishment of the Special Economic Zones, and discouraged some infrastructure and philanthropic projects proposed by Hong Kong businessmen.3 Nevertheless, during his time, Xinhua Hong Kong had begun to reach out to important figures in Hong Kong as part of its united front plan. For example, Xinhua Hong Kong extended an invitation to Chung Sze Yuen who was the senior member of the Executive Council by then, Kan Yuet Keung who had retired from politics, and T. K. Ann, the industrialist, to join the CPPCC in early 1982. Chung and Kan turned down the offer but Ann accepted. In March 1983, Xinhua Hong Kong extended the offer once more to Chung and said the offer would remain open indefinitely.4 In addition, Xinhua Hong Kong was actively organising trips from the autumn of 1982 for businessmen to visit Beijing to meet top leaders.5
Xu Jiatun was the first secretary of the Jiangsu CCP, the top party cadre in the province. He was also a member of the CCP Central Committee, and thus a high-ranking official in the party hierarchy. While he had no Hong Kong or foreign affairs experience, he impressed Deng Xiaoping with his work in Jiangsu, which was why he was sought for the job in Hong Kong. To boost Xu’s political authority, the CCP upgraded CCP Hong Kong to a provincial rank organ putting it directly under the CCP Central Committee. Thus, CCP Hong Kong and the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office became units of equal rank within China’s political hierarchy. This lifted the importance of Xinhua Hong Kong to that of a first-rank, centrally controlled organisation. The head of the Hong Kong party organ enjoyed ministerial rank. Moreover, Xu’s seniority in the party meant that his position was on par with that of Ji Pengfei, who succeeded Liao Chengzhi as head of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office although, having been foreign minister (1972–1974), Ji had greater prestige.

Xu’s seniority gave him a lot of latitude to act as he saw fit. He reported directly to the CCP Central Committee or State Council depending on the subject and, where foreign affairs were involved, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be copied. This led to turf conflicts between Xu and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office. There would be many differences of opinion between Xinhua Hong Kong under Xu Jiatun and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office that sowed seeds of mutual distrust. After Xu Jiatun’s departure in 1990, Xinhua Hong Kong would be downgraded back to what it was prior to Xu’s arrival (Chapter 9). Xu disclosed that he had problems with Li Hou and Lu Ping at the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, as well as Zhou Nan (who would succeed Xu in the future) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Xu’s view, they were giving Beijing a carefully varnished view of Hong Kong, claiming that the public were impatient for reunification, when there was in fact plenty of scepticism. Perhaps to admit that Hong Kong people felt otherwise would be an admission that the united front had failed in their job. The question of accuracy of briefing about Hong Kong would continue to be a challenge even after reunification.

To reabsorb Hong Kong—and also Macao and Taiwan in due course—insisting on the acceptance of communism would not do. Thus, practically, reunification must allow Hong Kong’s capitalist system to continue. However, as Xu Jiatun observed, there was nothing in Marxist thinking that envisaged the practice of safeguarding a capitalist system over a long period of time under the leadership of a communist party. He acknowledged that the one country, two systems formula enshrined in the Sino-British Joint Declaration presented a brand new mission and a great challenge to the CCP, and it would require new thinking to get the job done. Moreover, the Four Cardinal Principles, as Deng Xiaoping had said, would not be applied to Hong Kong. As Hong Kong would not operate a communist system, it could not be run by communists. Thus, the implementation of one country, two systems required “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” and by definition, that meant an administration
run by the bourgeoisie, not the working class. The future government structure should therefore be dominated by the capitalist class.\textsuperscript{11} Interestingly, Xu Jiatun observed that cadres should therefore not be involved in running Hong Kong, but if a cadre (whose party identity was hidden) should take part in the administration of Hong Kong, he still had to implement non-communist policies, and even if the CCP should pass a contrary directive, he should refuse to execute it.\textsuperscript{12} Perhaps it was this belief that got him into trouble in 1989 (Chapter 9).

Xu Jiatun had access to the Sino-British negotiations from June 1983, after his appointment, but just before he arrived in Hong Kong. He would continue to be briefed on how the British shaped their position. He could see how the British would use the economic card and the public opinion card to their advantage. It was his duty to help counter them. However, upon taking office, he soon found that CCP Hong Kong did not have an overall strategy to cope with the return of sovereignty to the Mainland. By November 1983, Xu had set out a work plan, which was discussed at a specially held meeting in Shenzhen with members of CCP Hong Kong, as well as representatives from various party branches and groups. The plan had six aspects and would guide their work in the coming years:

1. The priority was to win the trust of Hong Kong people.
2. During the transitional period, China's strategy was both to struggle against, as well as to unify with Britain in order to ensure the return of a stable and prosperous Hong Kong to Chinese rule.
3. The Hong Kong CCP would rely on the working class and a widely based patriotic united front to implement its plan.
4. The Hong Kong CCP would publicise patriotism, and promote one country, two systems. Criticism of communism and positive publicity about capitalism would be allowed.
5. For the prosperity of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong CCP would make the British hongs stay, appease the local Chinese businessmen, unify overseas Chinese businesses, and strengthen Mainland-financed companies.
6. The Hong Kong CCP would reorganise the teams of cadres in Hong Kong to meet the new challenges.\textsuperscript{13}

A critical component of achieving the strategy required Xu Jiatun to rebuild the united front in Hong Kong and to extend it far and wide.

**Internal Reorganisation**

What was the legal status of Xinhua Hong Kong? Registered as a news organisation, it was an open secret that it was the front for the CCP in Hong Kong. Under Hong Kong law, any organised group was required to apply to the Registrar of Societies for registration. Exemption from registration might be granted by the Registrar to those societies that were established solely for charitable purposes. The law was
explicit that the Registrar may deny approval and registration of any group if the society was a branch or affiliate or connected with any organisation or groups of a political nature established outside Hong Kong. The CCP did not seek registration or exemption from registration from the Hong Kong government, and the Hong Kong authorities did not make a fuss, otherwise each would find the other’s position intolerable. On the one hand, why should the ruling party of China, which claimed sovereignty over Hong Kong, seek registration from an imperialist authority? On the other hand, why should the British have to accept formally the CCP’s operation in the colony? It was better to ignore the issue of legality of the CCP’s presence in Hong Kong altogether. It became the habit of all concerned not to speak about it at all. An interesting question was how the CCP’s activities were funded in Hong Kong prior to 1997. While party work in Hong Kong would have formed part of China’s national budget, it was likely that, because foreign exchange was involved, Xinhua Hong Kong received its funding from Mainland-controlled organisations in Hong Kong, such as the Hong Kong Branch of the Bank of China.14

During Xu Jiatun’s time in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1990, the number of staff at Xinhua grew from about 100 to about 400 people. Xu had wanted 600 people. However, his successor, Zhou Nan, did build the workforce within Xinhua Hong Kong to 600 people by the time of the transition (Chapter 9). Xu built up a structure that approximated the Hong Kong government’s key departments relating to economic affairs, finance, trade, air transport, education, culture, and sports as part of the takeover strategy, as well as restructuring Xinhua’s departments for united front and its related work (see Table 2).

When he took up his post, he found morale low among Hong Kong cadres. Many of them took part in the 1967 riots out of a sense of patriotism and anti-imperialism, but they were then criticised and had been feeling disgruntled ever since. Membership had not been growing. Xu could see that the party was not in good shape to take on the work needed to implement one country, two systems and a major reshuffle was necessary. He announced four transformations and got to work immediately: he would revolutionise, rejuvenate, specialise, and intellectualise Xinhua Hong Kong.15 Xu changed the name of the United Front Work Department to that of the Coordination Department. The term “united front” had a heavy communist-propagandist flavour, which he found put people off in Hong Kong. Xu also set up the Youth Work Leading Group and the Women Work Leading Group so as to target young people and women in Hong Kong as part of their united front efforts. Mostly importantly, the party set up three branches to launch work in the community on Hong Kong Island, in Kowloon Tong and in Shatin.16

As for intelligence work, Xu Jiatun unified it under the Security Department. Intelligence work was done in all sectors of the community, but there were possibly too many contacts and informants of low quality in Hong Kong. Mainland officials sent to manage intelligence work in Hong Kong were professionals mostly sent by the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of National Security. The task
of the personnel from Public Security was to take care of the security of Xinhua Hong Kong and other Mainland-owned institutions. A small number of them were also responsible for intelligence work. All those sent from National Security were involved in intelligence work. It was nevertheless agreed by the ministries that, after the merging of their operations, some particularly important “connections” (agents carrying out top secret missions) would still be directly controlled by them but the director of Xinhua Hong Kong would be kept informed. During Xu’s time, agents under the Security Department were able to provide important information related to the Sino-British negotiations and were twice commended by the Ministry of National Security and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

There were other intelligence personnel in Hong Kong, which were harder for Xu Jiatun to control. The Central Military Commission, which had intelligence personnel in Hong Kong, did not agree to merge their agents within the Xinhua’s new Security Department although it agreed to keep the director informed. Moreover, the national security departments of the coastal provinces, such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian, as well as military regions, such as the Guangzhou and Nanjing military regions, also had agents in Hong Kong. Thus, there were many intelligence agents in Hong Kong from a variety of Mainland units, who more often than not did not know each other nor were operating with the full knowledge of Xinhua Hong Kong. Xu Jiatun had also observed that agents were therefore not well managed.

More importantly, Xu calculated that the Hong Kong authorities knew who the key cadres were and what Xinhua Hong Kong did in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong authorities tapped Xinhua’s telephone calls around the clock and so could be assumed to know a lot about their activities. Whenever Xu had something important to report to Beijing, he would go to Shenzhen to make calls. Thus, on the one hand, cadres might as well be allowed to attend public occasions, although they would not use their party affiliation since the CCP was, and remains, an underground organisation in Hong Kong. On the other hand, it was necessary to “develop an absolutely secret new organisation” to undertake upper level work. Presumably this was done, although there is understandably no record of it.

Generally, Xu Jiatun appointed new and younger people, bringing the average age at Xinhua Hong Kong from 65 years down to 55 years. He requested high quality and experienced cadres for transfer from Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai, thereby changing the regional mix of Xinhua personnel, which used to be dominated by the Cantonese. He reduced the number of deputy directors from six to four. Xu promoted two local Hong Kong party cadres as assistant deputy directors. Xu Jiatun also separated the political functions and the news functions of Xinhua Hong Kong. He moved the news section from the Xinhua headquarters in Happy Valley to Sharp Street in Wan Chai. He introduced a degree of transparency to Xinhua Hong Kong. He allowed its organisational structure to be made public. In the past, since Xinhua Hong Kong was presented as a news agency, the personnel responsible for political work were all supposedly “journalists”. After Xu’s
arrival, the titles of the various departments were changed to correspond with their actual functions. The line-up at the most senior level of China’s presence in Hong Kong after reorganisation in 1986 was as follows:

- Director of Xinhua, and Secretary of CCP Hong Kong: Xu Jiatun.
- Deputy Director of Xinhua, and Vice-Secretary of CCP Hong Kong: Zheng Hua.
- Deputy Directors of CCP Hong Kong: Qiao Zhonghuai, Mao Junnian, Zhang Junsheng, and Pan Zengxi.
- Assistant Deputy Directors of CCP Hong Kong: Wang Rudeng and Chen Fengying.
- CCP Hong Kong member, CCP Macao Secretary, Director of Xinhua Macao: Zhou Ding.

### Table 2 The Bureaucracy of CCP Hong Kong

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<tr>
<th>Leading Small Groups</th>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Committees</th>
<th>Departments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Front Work</td>
<td>General Office</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Organisation (Personnel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan Work</td>
<td>Policy Research</td>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Work</td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Transport</td>
<td>Taiwan Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigation and</td>
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<td>Economic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research Work</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Work</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coordination (United Front)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s Work</td>
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<td>Propaganda</td>
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<td>Culture &amp; Education</td>
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<td>Arts &amp; Sports</td>
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<td>Youth &amp; Women</td>
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### A Special Kind of United Front Work

When Xu Jiatun first arrived at Hong Kong, he stated that he hoped to perform a bridging role between Beijing and Hong Kong and make Beijing’s policies accord with the practical situation of Hong Kong. Safeguarding capitalism for a long time became the foundation of united front work in Hong Kong.

Deng Xiaoping had said that the goal of united front work in Hong Kong was to get people to “love the motherland and Hong Kong”. It was not a prerequisite to “support socialism and the leadership of CCP” as practised on the Mainland. Deng further said that those cadres conducting united front work in Hong Kong had to be bold enough to make friends even with “right-wingers and spies”. In CCP-speak, “right-wingers” were those in the upper strata of society who were pro-British, pro-American, and pro-Taiwan. In other words, united front work in Hong Kong
must include the establishment, not just the party’s traditional targets of workers, intellectuals, teachers and students. That required a significant departure in ideological terms for the CCP, but oddly enough the CCP had never disdained the elites. Indeed, the party took their traditional targets for granted, and gave special attention and priority to cultivating the elites. Many businessmen would do well out of their Mainland connections.

Xu Jiatun’s major united front targets were the leading figures among the Hong Kong political elites. Xu and his deputies held regular meetings to exchange views with several executive councillors—Chung Sze Yuen, Lydia Dunn (who would succeed Chung as the senior member in 1988), and Lee Quo Wei (chairman of the Hang Seng Bank)—throughout the Sino-British negotiations. The first meeting took place on 15 August 1983 at a dinner hosted by the vice-chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. After that, regular secret rendezvous were organised until the Sino-British Joint Declaration was concluded after which meetings became less frequent. After each meeting, while Chung reported the discussion to the governor, Xu reported to Beijing. In the early days, the executive councillors suggested using a “company” approach to solve the Hong Kong problem. China should resume sovereignty and become like the chairman of a company’s board of directors, and retain Britain as the general manager to continue the day-to-day running of Hong Kong. In addition to smoothing communication between Beijing and Hong Kong, another function of these meetings was to assess acceptability and reaction to Beijing’s ideas prior to making them public. As commented by Chung Sze Yuen, Xu “wanted to test its rhetoric on us inside the room and broadcast the same on the outside through its media.” Another person Xu cultivated was legislator Maria Tam, who also proposed the same company solution as the executive councillors. Tam would turn out to be one of the most successful post-colonial elites as she was still relatively young at the time of reunification (Chapter 10).

The CCP’s contacts with senior Hong Kong government officials also became more frequent. There was an active campaign to cultivate civil servants close to retirement and those who had just retired, in case there might be a need to call upon their services in the future. Moreover, having them on-side, created a sense that people who could administer Hong Kong could be called upon by Beijing to serve should it be necessary. Former civil servants who had been actively cultivated included Li Kwan Ha, a former commissioner of police, and Nicky Chan, a former secretary for lands and works. Converts included Donald Liao, a former secretary for home affairs, and Wilfred Wong, a former deputy secretary in the former Civil Service Branch. Wong, like Maria Tam, was relatively young and could expect to be useful after 1997. There were also two High Court judges—Arthur Garcia and Benjamin Liu, an Appeal Court judge—Simon Li, and a chief justice—T. L. Yang, who were cultivated. Interestingly, Garcia, Li, and Yang thought they had a chance to become the first Chief Executive. Garcia briefly put his name forward in 1996 as a candidate, Li actually did but did not get the required number of nominations (a
minimum of 50 from among Selection Committee members) to get to the starting blocks, and Yang actually did get through to the selection, but lost to Tung Chee Hwa by a large margin. Tung invited Yang to sit on the Executive Council, which Yang accepted.

According to CCP Hong Kong’s analysis of class in Hong Kong, the community had three main strata—the big capitalists, middle class, and workers. All of them wanted to protect and promote their interests after 1997. The party concluded that:

The top political echelon of Hong Kong must adapt to its capitalist economic structure and class structure, so Hong Kong’s future political system will have the local patriotic capitalists as the main body, and ally with other classes to form a non-socialist political system. At present, Hong Kong has already witnessed many prominent industrialists, businessmen, professionals, and their organisations actively participating in local political activities, reflecting this trend.33

Thus it was essential for the party to cultivate the big capitalists. Beijing’s worry was not just over the potential for massive capital outflow and emigration from Hong Kong by these wealthy entrepreneurs, although they had legitimate reasons to be concerned. After all, Hong Kong provided two-thirds of total direct investments to the Mainland from 1979 to 1995. Beyond that, however, Chinese official analysis saw Hong Kong capitalism not just as a structure of competitive markets and institutions, but in terms of an economic and political system dominated by a small group of businessmen supported by pro-business government policies. Their research would have included the works of academics who have explained the success of colonial administration in terms of a process of “administrative absorption of politics by which the government co-opt[ed] the political forces, often represented by elite groups, into an administration decision-making body”.34 It may also be that they had viewed instances of mass, radical agitation—such as those times in the 1920s, 1950s and 1960s noted in Chapters 3, 5 and 6—as outcomes of overflowing patriotism and anti-imperialism rather than internally generated social discontent. They may have concluded that the workers’ movement was relatively weak in Hong Kong, and in any case, the CCP already controlled the FTU and thus could count of its support when necessary.35

It was thought that if the major capitalists could be convinced of China’s position, it would be less difficult to get the middle class to follow. Xu Jiatun noted that capitalists in Hong Kong could be grouped into factions, like the Guangdong, Shanghai and Fujian factions, and those with Southeast Asian backgrounds. The key targets were about a dozen of the top tycoons, including Pao Yue Kong, Li Ka Shing, Kwok Tak Sing, Run Run Shaw, and Cha Chi Min. Henry Fok could already be counted to be on-side in view of his longstanding connection to the Mainland, and was already a member of the CPPCC.

Xu perceived that a “businessman’s political inclination is normally linked to his business. He would side with whomever would support him.”36 Thus, it was useful
to nurture a group of patriotic businessmen. It would hit two birds with one stone. Bringing these capitalists on side would help China to deal with Britain’s economic card since the capitalists could keep the economy chugging along, and their support would also counter the British public opinion card that Hong Kong people preferred the status quo. When a number of Hong Kong’s prominent businessmen ran into financial trouble and sought Xu’s help, he was willing to find ways to support them. They would no doubt feel they owed China a debt in the future when a favour needed to be called in. Xu was not the first to go out of his way to do this in fact. It is a part of Hong Kong’s political lore that Beijing saved Tung Chee Hwa’s shipping company from bankruptcy in the mid-1980s through a capital injection through Henry Fok, and the Bank of China provided a credit line as well.37 Xu disclosed in his memoirs that he helped entrepreneur Fung King Hei for example when he had financial problems.38

As for the middle class, CCP Hong Kong’s analysis of this group was that its constituents had a strong impulse to advance and that they were more or less satisfied with the existing social ladder, although there were signs of demands for a democratic environment with equal opportunities. To bring the middle class on-side, Xu Jiatun sought to improve CCP Hong Kong’s policy toward left-wing organisation on the one hand and strengthen connections with civil society organisations on the other hand. New departments were set up at Xinhua Hong Kong to focus on united front work with the middle class with special emphasis on the science, technology, sports and cultural sectors. Moreover, teachers in middle and primary schools were to be targeted.

Xu Jiatun became a man to be seen around town and to be seen with. He sought the company of the rich, the famous, the infamous and entertainment stars. He attended many public and private functions, ranging from banquets, weddings, funerals to sports event and drama performances. He made speeches to business associations and at universities. He invited many guests to meals and friendly chats at the Xinhua Hong Kong office. He even attended the first anniversary celebration of Meeting Point, a new pro-democracy pressure group, which indicated that at the time, Xu was prepared to cultivate even pro-democracy activists in support of Hong Kong’s return to China. Looking back at the CCP’s united front history, such as noted in Chapter 4, of reaching out to as many people from all walks of life as possible, Xu was following in the party’s pragmatic tradition. It was from 1985 that the CCP became anxious about the timing and extent of democratic reform, and the united front became more circumspect about nurturing democracy activists.

Xu Jiatun was a popular figure among Hong Kong journalists because of his willingness to make comments. He even made one of the most popular television stars of the time, Lisa Wang Ming Chuen, a delegate to the 7th NPC in an attempt to win the support of the cultural sector—a classic united front tactic to unite with leading figures in the arts.39 A powerful tool that Xu had was the ability to organise trips to Beijing for those he wanted to cultivate, so that they could meet top Chinese
leaders, including Deng Xiaoping. These pilgrimages to the Chinese capital proved most effective. For the ambitious, there was nothing like being close to the seat of power and to think one could influence the thinking and actions of the leaders.

However, the strategy of co-opting capitalists and upper middle class people led to criticisms within the traditional leftist camp that old faithfuls and the lower classes were neglected. “Xu Jiatun put too much emphasis on the united front work in the upper and middle classes, but he neglected the grassroots. Xu seemed to have an illusion that the grassroots people would support him, which was not true. The problem of such practice was that, first, the elite-mass gap would be enlarged and second, the problem of confidence crisis could not be directly solved.” Some leftists further remarked that Xu “looked down” on those from grassroots level and under his leadership “the eyes of the Xinhua News Agency only looked at upper class and business sector”.

Xu Jiatun’s own writings indicated that he felt he needed to cultivate social contacts that the CCP did not have in Hong Kong, which required him to reach out to capitalists, entrepreneurs, middle-class professionals, and celebrities. Old-time leftists were unhappy that capitalists and the bourgeoisie would run Hong Kong. As such, Xu did not think that the existing cadres and supporters could deliver on the goal of safeguarding capitalism. Indeed, the left-wing unions in particular needed to be re-organised since they had become almost dormant after the 1967 riots. The unions should therefore stop pushing for the realisation of socialism and should work for the welfare of workers in Hong Kong instead, otherwise it would run counter to the need to safeguard capitalism. Where conflicts arose between workers and capitalists, the left-wing unions should adopt a policy that would be beneficial to both management and labour and seek a solution through consultation rather than resort to strikes. The left-wing labour unions could not be too happy about being put in such a straitjacket but they did not have much choice.

The party nurtured new and younger union leaders, such as Tam Yiu Chung and Chan Yuen Han in place of old ones. Tam would rise to become a legislator (1985–2016) and executive councillor (1997–2002), and Chan would become a member of the Legislative Council (1995–2008 and 2012–2016). Thus, when there was a taxi-driver strike in 1985, when strikers petitioned Xinhua Hong Kong, the strikers were urged to settle matters with the Hong Kong government. The Chinese did not want to be seen to be fomenting strikes, boycotts and riots, as the communists were seen to have done in 1922 with the Seamen’s Strike, in 1925–1926 with the Guangdong–Hong Kong Strike-Boycott and in particular during the 1956 and 1967 riots (see Chapters 3, 5, and 6). Xu Jiatun even attempted to unify the three factions of unions in Hong Kong—the those on the left, the right (pro-Taiwan) and those that were neither left nor right (referred to as “neutral”) but it did not work.

There were other voices emerging in Hong Kong that were of minor interest to Xinhua Hong Kong prior to the conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. These were not the voices of the then establishment representing business or the
British colonial authorities. These voices were mostly of Hong Kong Chinese who were born and raised in Hong Kong and strongly identified with Hong Kong as their home. They were on the whole better educated and some had lived overseas. They called for solid guarantees that a high degree of autonomy and Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong meant the post-1997 political system would be underpinned by a democratic system of free and fair elections. For example, Meeting Point—mentioned above—was one such group. Many of its former members would become politicians in the coming years.43 Another group was the Hong Kong Observers, a pressure group made up of young professionals. Some of their members would also become prominent politicians and opinion-shapers in the years to come.44 In 1982, they commissioned Hong Kong’s first detailed public opinion survey to ascertain the degree of concern over the future of Hong Kong, which neither the British nor the Chinese found to their liking. The Chinese did not want to hear that Hong Kong people had real concerns about Chinese rule and that keeping the status quo had majority support. The British did not want to know that Chinese sovereignty with real autonomy could nevertheless be acceptable.45 Neither the British nor the Chinese needed to pay much attention to these inconvenient voices after they struck their deal in September 1984.

With the formal signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in Beijing on 19 December 1984, Beijing invited 101 VIPs from Hong Kong to witness the event. The list was agreed upon after “cordial consultations” between China and Britain.46 The occasion was seen as a golden united front opportunity to cultivate important people, especially right-wingers and Hong Kong government officials. The list included senior Hong Kong civil servants, such as Nicky Chan and Anson Chan; British corporate leaders, such as Michael Miles of Swire & Sons and Michael Sandberg of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation; Chinese tycoons, such as Pao Yue Kong, Li Ka Shing, Lee Quo Wei, Francis Tien, Lee Shau Kee, Gordon Wu, Stanley Ho, Cha Chi Ming, and Henry Fok; Hong Kong political figures, such as Chung Sze Yuen, Selina Chow, Maria Tam, Roger Lobo, and Stephen Cheong; Justice Simon Li; actress Liza Wang Ming Chuen; Hong Kong professional and community leaders, such as Martin Lee, Szeto Wah, Elsie Elliot (Tu), Mak Hoi Wah, and Lau Wong Fat, as well as people in leftists circles, including Percy Chen, Yeung Kwong, Fei Yi Ming, and Tam Yiu Chung.

For a list of the VIPs from Hong Kong, see Appendix II.

Preparing for Resumption of Sovereignty

After the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed, Hong Kong entered into its transitional phase to Chinese rule. The most important task was to prevent any opposition to the resumption of sovereignty, and the second was to ensure Hong Kong continued to support the Mainland economically and financially. A third important task was to nurture a group of “status markers” who could populate the
post-1997 political system under Chinese rule. This would also be the group that would help to draft and provide views to the Basic Law drafting process. All of these tasks required continuous united front and propaganda work from the CCP to keep up confidence and to instil a belief that Hong Kong under Chinese rule would be even better than under British rule.

The status markers were familiar faces, as many of them were the same as those who had played a similar role under British rule. The need to preserve capitalism for half a century in post-1997 Hong Kong meant that some members of the business elites (from the families that owned banking, industrial, trading and real estate companies, together with the senior executives of major public companies, as well as leading professionals) would be chosen to help run Hong Kong. The drafting and consultation on the Basic Law involved most of the notable business and professional elites, making those processes a huge united front exercise the purpose of which was to give the post-1997 constitution a semblance of legitimacy.

The Sino-British Joint Declaration had served its purpose in embodying the political settlement on the question of Hong Kong. It would be referred to less and less, while the Basic Law would attempt to resolve the inherent contradictions between the Mainland, which operates a Leninist political system in which the supremacy of the CCP cannot be challenged, and Hong Kong’s capitalist system underpinned by a liberal tradition, the rule of law and an independent judiciary.

Ji Pengfei promised that the drafting process would include “collecting the opinions of Hong Kong people so that the opinion of the majority would be reflected”. Influential Hong Kong people from various walks of life would have to be formally co-opted into the drafting process. It would be through their endorsement of both the process and the outcome that Beijing could claim the Basic Law was acceptable to Hong Kong. Furthermore, the elaborate drafting and consultative process to produce the Basic Law was essential to show the people of Hong Kong—as well as the people of Macao and Taiwan—that Beijing meant what it said, that there would be one country, two systems, a high degree of autonomy and the local people ruling themselves.

The creation of the Basic Law had three aspects. Firstly, there was the drafting of the post-1997 constitution itself. Secondly, there was the putting together and management of a drafting committee. Thirdly, there was the appointment of a broader consultative committee to show the eventual constitution had wide support. The whole exercise, which lasted from 1985 to 1989, was a massive united front–propaganda challenge, where the Xinhua Hong Kong and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office played the most important roles. It was a highly controlled process, but there were many moments of drama, although at the end it was clear that real decision-making power was preserved in the CCP’s hands.
Basic Law drafting instructions and strategy

The purpose of the Basic Law was never to dovetail with the Sino-British Joint Declaration. It is an instrument for Beijing to exert sovereignty post-1997. The CCP's policy was that there should be no substantial democratic development in Hong Kong. The drafting instructions for the Basic Law could be seen from the utterances of Deng Xiaoping on 16 April 1987 listing the overriding principles in drafting the post-1997 constitution:

- The provisions should not be too detailed. The key was to put down the principles. This was the same attitude adopted on the Chinese side with the Sino-British Joint Declaration (Chapter 7).
- The Hong Kong post-1997 system should not be a complete Western system. The separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers was inappropriate. The future HKSAR system should be an executive-led system.
- Universal suffrage should not take place immediately. Even if warranted, it should be introduced gradually and step-by-step.
- The central authorities in Beijing should monitor the HKSAR but it would not need to interfere directly. The Hong Kong executive organ would intervene. Only if major disturbances broke out would military forces be used.49

Deng Xiaoping elaborated that the key to political success was to devise and keep to the right policies and direction and as long as a legislative body stayed on track, it would avoid wrangling and society would prosper.50

While Hong Kong appointees were given a role on the drafting body to create the Basic Law, and Hong Kong appointees made up a large consultative committee to provide views, the invisible, and sometimes not so invisible, hand of the CCP was always there to control the outcome. The process for organising the drafting of the Basic Law followed the classic CCP operation method to create the impression and semblance that something had wide support. Referred to as the “two ups, two downs” process, selected Hong Kong people would be involved in initial work on the Basic Law draft, which would be submitted to Beijing, and Beijing would then send it back to Hong Kong for further consultation. More work would then be done and resubmitted to Beijing for promulgation. The method is based on Mao Zedong’s idea of “from the masses to the masses”, which requires the party to operate by:

taking the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (… turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action.51

Basic Law Drafting Committee and Basic Law Consultative Committee

In June 1985, the creation of a Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) was announced in Beijing. As a working group of the NPC, the BLDC was appointed
by and reported to the national legislature. It had a total of 59 members, 36 from the Mainland and 23 from Hong Kong. The criteria for appointment were that the Mainland should be those who were familiar with Hong Kong, and some should be legal and constitutional experts, and the Hong Kong members should be patriotic, familiar with the situation of Hong Kong, and have professional knowledge of a particular sector. Xu Jiatun played a key role in deciding who from Hong Kong should be on the BLDC. In terms of selection of the Hong Kong members, it was supposed to reflect a balance of views, so as to “let people with different political inclinations fully reflect the views of the Hong Kong Chinese people.” A key purpose was to “balance the opinions and interests of different people, especially for the purpose of realising the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and the spirit of the future Basic Law while following the principle of involving a majority of the people, with the ultimate goal of bringing stability and with stability, prosperity”.

However, the key positions on the BLDC were also held by either Chinese officials or people Beijing trusted. The chairman of the BLDC was Ji Pengfei. There were 8 vice-chairmen: Xu Jiatun, Wang Han Bin (secretary general of the NPC), Hu Sheng (director, Party Research Centre of the CCP Central Committee), Fei Xiaotong (one of China’s most respected anthropologists and sociologists), T. K. Ann (an industrialist and member of the CPPCC), Pao Yue Kong (a shipping tycoon), Fei Yi Ming (publisher of Ta Kung Pao, member of the NPC and member of the Legal Commission under the SCNPC), and David K. P. Li (chairman of the Bank of East Asia). The appointment of Pao and Li as vice-chairmen, together with that of T. K. Ann, showed Beijing’s desire to form a political alliance with the capitalists. This deliberate strategy has been described as the “political absorption of economics”. Moreover, Ann and Pao represented the Shanghai and Li the Cantonese factions, two important business groups. All of the Hong Kong vice-chairmen were politically conservative, and therefore unlikely to object to Beijing’s ideas for Hong Kong’s future political arrangements.

In total, there were twelve tycoons among the Hong Kong members. Among the other Hong Kong appointees, besides pro-China figures, it could be seen that their appointments followed the classic united front formula of including a variety of sectors to show the BLDC represented many interests in Hong Kong. Those who represented the then establishment included two UMELCO members (Maria Tam and Wong Po Yan, a prominent businessman) and an Appeal Court Judge (Simon Li). The Chinese side had sounded out the Hong Kong government on their appointments. Other appointees included old faithfuls, such as the elderly Mok Ying Kwai (Chapter 5), the chairman of the Heung Yee Kuk (Lau Wong Fat); the vice-chancellors of two universities; a bishop to represent the religious sector; senior professionals; a left-wing trade unionist (Tam Yiu Chung), and even two liberal voices who had been calling for greater democracy (Martin Lee, a barrister and Szeto Wah, a teacher and head of the Professional Teachers Union). The inclusion of Lee and Szeto was in line with united front practice of offering membership
to a small number of vocal critics so that they could be controlled through rules of procedures.\textsuperscript{59} Lee and Szeto would become two of Hong Kong's most famous politicians after 1989. In 1984, Xu Jiatun even invited Szeto to join the CCP, likely because Szeto had wanted to join the party when he was young. The invitation was declined.\textsuperscript{60} Tam Yiu Chung and Lau Wong Fat would also enjoy longevity in Hong Kong politics—as legislators (both until 2016) and both had a stint as executive councillor. Of the thirty-six Mainland BLDC members, fifteen were officials concerned with various aspects of Mainland relations with Hong Kong, and eleven were legal specialists. With the number of Mainland members exceeding the number of Hong Kong members by a safe margin, Beijing had overwhelming numerical superiority on the committee. The members of the BLDC were divided into five sub-groups, each group focussing on one area of discussion.

The BLDC's Secretariat was located in Beijing and made up of the officials who worked directly on Hong Kong affairs. The secretary-general was Li Hou, the deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, and the two deputy secretary-generals were Lu Ping and Mao Junnian, a deputy director of CCP Hong Kong. At the request of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, a special Research Department was set up within Xinhua Hong Kong to gather all the comments, models and recommendations on political systems and political development put forward by people in society. The materials would be considered by CCP Hong Kong, the Research Department would prepare reports for the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office and the BLDC. The Research Department's heads were Mao Junnian and Qiao Zhonghuai, both deputy directors of CCP Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{61}

At the first meeting of the BLDC on 1 July 1985 in Beijing, a plan was tabled by Ji Pengfei for a Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC) to be formed so that more people from Hong Kong could be involved. The more important BLDC was too small in size to accommodate all the prominent people in Hong Kong the united front wanted to cultivate. Twenty-five of the Hong Kong members of the BLDC formed a Sponsors' Committee to work on setting up the BLCC. The five BLDC vice-chairmen residing in Hong Kong, which included Xu Jiatun, were asked to take up the preparatory work for setting up the BLCC. Xinhua Hong Kong provided the necessary assistance. The Hong Kong BLDC members drafted the constitution of the BLCC, which would have one hundred and eighty members. Three of the tycoons on the committee provided the necessary funds to cover costs. The secretary of the BLCC was Mao Junnian, and T. K. Ann was the chairman. Mao was later replaced by Leung Chun Ying, a surveyor and obviously a young man who would go places in the future. The BLCC membership would be like a Who's Who list of VIPs in Hong Kong at the time with a handful of social activists.

Xu Jiatun had wanted to include senior British appointees to the Executive and Legislative Councils in the BLCC. Chung Sze Yuen, the most senior member of the Executive Council, and his counterpart in the Legislative Council, Lydia Dunn, were both approached since Xu had been cultivating relationship with them for
some time. They both turned down the invitation. Chung noted that: “Dunn and I agreed that since we were both senior advisors to the Hong Kong governor and were privy to sensitive documents, including papers pertaining to Sino-British relations, we might diminish our roles were we to join the BLCC . . . If there were any leak of classified information one day . . . the blame for that would rest with us and affect our public standing.”

Xu Jiatun and the party machinery controlled membership to the BLCC although there were supposedly three ways for the selection of its members: certain associations and groups could recommend their people to be appointed; BLDC members could appoint members; and individuals and groups could apply to be considered. The final body that emerged had people from nine major sectors of interests. Most of them were identified by the BLDC as “representative organisations” in those sectors that took on a similar ring to that of the functional constituencies created for the 1985 Legislative Council election. For such a large body, it was important to include a number of social activists who were calling for a faster pace of democratic reform—such as Lee Wing Tat and Frederick Fung, who would both have long careers as legislators—but their voices could easily be overwhelmed by the majority, who were much more conservative.

The BLCC came to life on 18 December 1985 and immediately got mired in controversies. Firstly, it came to light that a liberal-minded unionist, Lau Chin Shek...
of the Christian Industrial Committee, was initially nominated by a labour joint conference to stand for selection among labour representatives to the BLCC. But Xu Jiatun essentially rejected Lau on the ground that “quite a few businessmen in Hong Kong resented him” and that including Lau would make him more famous. This meant Lau would not have the FTU’s support. He realised he would not win and decided to pull out of the election instead, which prompted independent unions to withdraw from the process as well. This incident illustrated how ill-prepared Xu was to accept someone the business elites did not like, with the result that the CCP’s failed to co-opt the working class into the process. Secondly, the hidden hand of the CCP was revealed over the selection of key BLCC positions. The BLCC constitution provided for seven officers to be elected from a nineteen-member executive committee, who were in turn to be elected by members. In effect, BLDC members Xu Jiatun and David Li had already selected who the seven officers should be. At the election of the BLCC executive committee, BLDC member, Pao Yue Kong, showed up to chair the meeting although he had no authority to do so not being a BLCC member. Pao ignored procedures and proceeded to read out a list of nineteen names and then directed the gathered members to elect them with a round of applause. This kind of arrangement was commonplace on the Mainland but not in Hong Kong and led to complaints. Whilst another meeting was called to rectify the violation of procedures, the same nineteen members were chosen. The seven officers were likewise also “elected.”

A new organisation became the dominant group within the BLCC. The business and professional elites of the BLDC and the BLCC, led by Vincent Lo, formed the Business and Professional Group of the Basic Law Consultative Committee. The group came into existence initially in April 1986 with 57 members and later added another two members, and became known as The Group of 89. Subsequently, another group—the Group of 19—sprung to life. It was made up of more liberal-minded community representatives, social workers and professionals in the BLCC but this group, being small by comparison and without the resources that the business elites commanded, never enjoyed the influence that the Group of 89 had.

A full membership list of the BLDC and BLCC is available in Appendix III and the Biographies provide more information on BLDC and BLCC members.

“Election”: What It Did Not Mean

During much of the Sino-British negotiations, democracy was not a key issue. Preservation of the existing systems and way of life in Hong Kong was the priority, and that socialism would not be practised. Thus, it was important to ensure the HKSAR would be invested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, that the laws then in force would remain basically unchanged, the government would be composed of Hong Kong inhabitants and not sent from the Mainland, and rights and freedoms would be protected. It was the preservation of
the existing systems that China signed up to for the post-1997 regime. The tycoons and businessmen did not push for democracy, nor did members of the Executive and Legislative Councils insist on a fully representative system of government for the future. The voices from the community calling for democracy did not have to be taken too seriously into account. It was only after Britain made clear that there would be no continued British presence in Hong Kong beyond the Handover that the issue of democracy came to the fore. The British government expressed to the Chinese that a commitment to democratic reform was crucial in securing parliamentary support for the eventual settlement. The British felt that a promise that Hong Kong could look forward to democratic development would to a large extent fulfil their moral obligation to the people of the territory. Margaret Thatcher’s personal insistence on an elected legislature was crucial to prod the negotiations in that direction, since election was initially ignored by British and Hong Kong officials. The point they made to get Beijing to go along with it was that, while the Joint Declaration had already been initialled and then signed, it still had to be ratified by Parliament before it could come into effect.

Despite the importance of the subject to the six million people of Hong Kong, the parliamentary debate in the House of Commons on 5 December 1984 was poorly attended. An observer noted that only eight percent of the Members of Parliament bothered to show up and “even a good few of the forty-one MPs who had enjoyed trips to Hong Kong paid for by the Hong Kong Government saw no reason to return the courtesy.” On 11 December, the House of Lords debated the Hong Kong question. It was a better-attended affair than the insultingly sparse attendance at the House of Commons. Nevertheless, it was clear from the parliamentary debates that there was an understanding among the parliamentarians that introducing representative government in Hong Kong was part of the arrangements. Richard Luce, the minister of state in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1983–1985), told that House of Commons that Britain would “build up a firmly based, democratic administration in Hong Kong in the years between now and 1997”. Baroness Janet Young, the minister of state, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1983–1987), in the House of Lords, also stated on behalf of the British government that the planned democratic reform in Hong Kong was “entirely consistently with the provisions in the draft agreement which specified that the Legislature of the Hong Kong SAR shall be constituted by elections”.

The insertion of the phrase “constituted by elections” to describe the future Hong Kong legislature was one of the very last points that was agreed between Britain and China. A mere seven days before the draft Joint Declaration was submitted to both governments for approval, the British raised the question of Hong Kong internal governance and managed to insert in the post-1997 Legislative Council that it “shall be constituted by elections” and that the “executive authorities shall be accountable to the legislature”. However, details would be a matter for China to sort out in the Basic Law.
As to what “election” meant, it was understood by the British negotiators that it need not mean multiparty election by universal suffrage. The British accepted that “elections” might include indirect elections and election through a restricted franchise. To the Chinese, “election” definitely did not mean universal suffrage. Elections for CCP bodies are selections where the candidates are pre-selected or approved by the party hierarchy in numbers equal or almost equal to the posts available. Since all the candidates are acceptable to the party an election could then take place. The favoured method of selection under the communist system is in fact “consultation”, which in practice is the exercise of the party’s discretion to choose whom it thinks fit. The Sino-British Joint Declaration is a bicultural document whose words reflect the values, meanings and understandings of two very different political and legal systems. The first “election” of the executive committee of the BLCC noted above provided an example of the gulf of difference between the Mainland understanding of election and that understood in Hong Kong.

Green and White Papers

During the Sino-British negotiations, the Hong Kong government issued a Green Paper in July 1984 on representative government, which called for two months of public consultation on political reform “to develop progressively a system of government the authority of which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong, which is able to represent the view of the people of Hong Kong, and which is more directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong.” As it was published before China had agreed to the phrase “constituted by elections” to the post-Handover agreement, the paper was strong on principles and weak on details. When the White Paper was published in November, after agreement with China had been secured, more could be put forward. The plan was to restructure the Legislative Council through the creation of 12 seats for functional constituencies representing specific commercial and professional interests, and another 12 seats to be returned by an electoral college made up of local public bodies. The electoral college would become the Election Committee provided by the Basic Law, and the selection methods of that body would be functional in nature. In other words, functional elections underpinned much of the new electoral system.

Before functional constituencies were introduced in Hong Kong, the colonial government appointed people from various business and professional sectors to sit as unofficial members to the Legislative Council. It was thought that these people were capable of reflecting the views of the Hong Kong community and could contribute their “specialist knowledge and value expertise” to the legislature. The functional constituencies evolved this practice into a formal one using elected representatives, and the Basic Law would entrench this in the post-1997 political system.

As for direct election, the Hong Kong government undertook to conduct a review in 1987 because:
There was little evidence of support in public comment on the Green Paper for any move towards direct election in 1985. With few exceptions the bulk of the public response from all sources suggested a cautious approach with a gradual start by introducing a very small number of directly elected members in 1988 and building up to a significant number of directly elected members by 1997.\(^\text{75}\)

The CCP watched the events relating to the Green and White Papers closely and pondered what they meant. Their conclusion was the British wanted to establish a representative government in a bid to return the administration to the people of Hong Kong instead of to China, and to shift the Executive Council’s policy-making power to the Legislative Council, which was a fundamental change to the colony’s government structure—and, contrary to Deng Xiaoping’s drafting instructions for the Basic Law. In other words, Britain was attempting to make many changes in the next 13 years of British rule that would make governing difficult for the HKSAR government in the future. In the eyes of Chinese officials, the devious British were about to launch a “democracy card” to spoil things for China. It would divide Hong Kong opinion and nurture pro-British elements so that post-1997 Hong Kong would be ruled by British agents without the direct presence of the British. In order to stop the British from moving ahead further, in October 1985, Ji Pengfei called upon the British to alter the Hong Kong political system prior to 1997 only in ways that “converged” with the Basic Law. The need for convergence was elevated to a principle by Xu Jiatun a month later. According to Xu, Deng Xiaoping said to him that, if nothing was done in time, the British would have pushed ahead with the plan and Hong Kong “would be in chaos”.\(^\text{76}\)

The British would give in. By reaching an understanding with Beijing, the British would ensure there would be no major political reform until the Basic Law was promulgated in 1990, and in return, Beijing would allow the Legislative Council formed in 1995 to straddle the transition to 1999 if the method of its formation conformed to the Basic Law. This understanding was referred to as the “through train” arrangement.\(^\text{77}\)

Even though the British agreed to the principle of convergence in exchange for the through train, Xu Jiatun thought the British had played a “master stroke” by putting forth ideas of representative government because it had the effect of deepening “division and turmoil” in society. The middle class and grassroots were mobilising to take part in democratic politics. Their calls for democracy upset people in the capitalist class—whether Chinese or foreign, who were unready to participate in “the game of politics” and they also feared the “free lunch” and “high taxation” phenomena arising as democracy developed in Hong Kong. As Xu recounted, some of the capitalists and people in the upper strata of society thought they could rely on China to resist Hong Kong’s democratic trend. If the trend could not be resisted, then it was important to slow the pace down. Xu had attempted to use the Hong Kong and Macao International Investment Company to bring together most of the capitalists so that they could consider getting involved in competitive politics,
but there was no common wish to cooperate and the competitiveness among them within the BLDC and BLCC over the future political system was “fierce”, as could be seen from the various proposals emanating from groups of members within those bodies.\(^\text{78}\)

A former Xinhua Hong Kong deputy director, Huang Wenfang, thought Xu Jiatun was extremely conservative over the democratic process in Hong Kong. During the drafting of the Basic Law, Xu strongly opposed that idea that the number of directly elected seats in the legislature should exceed half. Xu feared that “one man, one vote” would make Beijing lose control of the situation in Hong Kong.\(^\text{79}\) As the top cadre in Hong Kong, Xu’s view on democracy had significant influence on Beijing, but whatever might have been his personal preference, he was most likely just following Deng Xiaoping’s broad instructions closely. Deng had clearly been worried that democracy would bring chaos.

On 26 September 1985, the Hong Kong Legislative Council saw its first indirect elections when twelve functional constituency seats were elected. The barrister, Martin Lee, was elected to represent the Legal Functional Constituency, launching one of Hong Kong’s most important political careers in the run-up to 1997. The Hong Kong government conducted another review in 1987 to assess whether an element of direct election should be introduced to the Legislative Council in 1988. The Green Paper published in May 1987 remains famous today for its design. It aimed to dampen earlier hopes that a number of directly elected seats would be introduced in the following year. The Hong Kong government set up a Survey Office to collect and collate public responses over a four-month period. The questions, options and sub-options put to Hong Kong people were confusing, leading to allegations that they were framed to obfuscate. The questionnaire was constructed in such a way that it was possible to say you were against direct election, but not possible to say unequivocally that you were in favour of them. The public was simply not given a clear choice for direct election in 1988.

Notably, in September 1987, the Group of 89 proposed that the future Chief Executive should be selected by an electoral college of 600 people made up mostly of business and professional circles. Their proposal also provided that, from 1992, the legislature should be expanded to 80 members with 25 members chosen by the electoral college, 25 members by functional constituencies, and 40 members by direct election.\(^\text{80}\) The Group of 19 proposed that the HKSAR Chief Executive should be nominated by the Legislative Council and elected by universal suffrage. As for election to the Legislative Council, this group proposed that a quarter of the members should be returned by an electoral college, a quarter by functional constituencies and half by direct election.\(^\text{81}\) These two groups represented the two ends of the spectrum within the BLCC.

The CCP Hong Kong mobilised left-wing organisations to express opposition to the introduction of direct election to ensure there would be many opposition voices. Organisations representing the capitalists’ interests also submitted views
to oppose implementing elections too quickly. Thus, the FTU and its 77 affiliated bodies, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and its 80-plus affiliated bodies were among those which got their networks to respond. The FTU asserted that "eating is more important than voting". Chinese enterprises also organised signature campaigns among their employees. It was also reported that the Bank of China arranged for its employees to watch a video, narrated by Ma Lik (who was then the vice-secretary general of the BLCC), explaining why the introduction of direct elections was a British conspiracy. Ma Lik would become a member of the Legislative Council. The Bank of China also prepared a printed pro-forma opposing letter for its employees to sign and send to the Survey Office. The pro-democracy camp likewise organised people to sign petitions through street campaigns.

The Survey Office released its findings in October 1987. The Survey Office did not distinguish between pre-printed forms used for submissions and individual submissions. This had the effect of over-representing those opposed to direct elections. Of 60,706 submissions against direct elections in 1988, 50,175 came from pre-printed forms and 22,722 of them were from united front organisations. Of the 35,129 submissions that favoured direct elections, only 1,313 were on pre-printed forms. Moreover, 220,000 signatures with names and identity card numbers were excluded from the table altogether. If these had been on pre-printed forms, they would have been counted and there was no logic to exclude them except to manipulate a result the government wanted.

The Hong Kong government concluded that there was overwhelming support for the introduction of direct elections to the Legislative Council, but not in 1988. Governor David Wilson (1987–1992) recalled events thus:

it was convenient for us [the British], in terms of handling the transition with China, that we did not have . . . overwhelming pressure from people in Hong Kong to move straight away into direct elections because we knew that doing that would be very difficult for the Chinese to accept.

There were in fact many non-government surveys conducted during that time showing there was majority support in Hong Kong for direct elections to be introduced in 1988. A poll conducted by Survey Research Hong Kong in July 1987 showed 54 percent in favour of direction election in 1988, with 16 percent opposed, 22 percent unsure and 8 percent with no opinion. Another telephone survey conducted by Market Decision Research in August found 41 percent wanted to see some element of direct election in 1988, 20 percent wanted more indirectly elected members, 15 percent wanted no change and 24 percent had no opinion.

Before releasing the White Paper in February 1988, David Wilson visited Beijing in December 1987 to exchange views with the Chinese on political developments in Hong Kong. It was believed that he and Chinese officials reached an understanding as to the pace of the democratisation process in Hong Kong. When the White Paper was released afterwards, it stated that there would be 10 directly
elected members to be introduced to the 56-seat Legislative Council in 1991, which the Chinese had already announced they would allow. In other words, there would be no direct election in 1988.87

Despite the slowing down of the timetable for direct election to be introduced in Hong Kong, the fact that it would happen meant the formation of political parties was inevitable. Up until 1986, Beijing was not in favour of party formation in Hong Kong. Li Hou even threatened that the CCP would participate in Hong Kong if party politics emerged.88 However, from 1987 onwards, Beijing stopped publicly opposing the formation of political parties, which signalled the CCP had formed a new policy to deal with the onslaught of elections.

In April 1988, the BLDC released the first draft of the Basic Law for a five months’ consultation. There were many criticisms of the draft.89 On the issue of election to the Chief Executive and legislature, since there was no consensus among the drafters, various options were included as possible choices, including those of the Group of 89 and Group of 19 noted above. The formula proposed by the latter was the most democratic. T. S. Lo proposed splitting the legislature to create a bicameral system with the functional constituency members sitting in a second chamber (Chapter 9).

Looking at how the BLDC functioned, it was clear that the Mainland drafters’ key concerns had to do with ensuring the Basic Law reflected the full recognition of Chinese sovereignty, and having adequate mechanisms provided so that the Central People's Government could exercise control where necessary. For the Mainland, having sovereignty meant having control, and the levers of control must be built into the future constitution. The Hong Kong drafters had mixed and divided interests. Some were willing to go with whatever was the Mainland position, while others wanted to protect their economic interests through emphasising specific business sectors and ensuring their representation would be entrenched. The issue of the distribution of power after 1997 was thus the key issue. There was a strong belief among a significant contingent of the Hong Kong BLDC and BLCC members that prosperity and stability could only be ensured if power was retained in the hands of the economic and political elites. In the 1980s, the political elites were the top civil servants and their appointees to the Executive and Legislative Councils and to the most important government consultative bodies. A large number of these appointees were members of the economic elite, who together formed the club that supposedly ran Hong Kong so successfully. In other words, the majority of the BLDC and BLCC members believed that the post-reunification institutional framework should be based on the past distribution of power under colonial rule. The draft Basic Law provoked a substantial public response with approximately 73,000 submissions.

In November 1988, BLDC member and co-convenor of the working group on political development, Louis Cha, put forward a political model that he thought could be a compromise model. He did not try to resolve the differences embodied
in the various models over the pace and direction of democratisation. Instead, he tried to find a way that he thought could sustain Hong Kong’s way of life and could also be acceptable to Beijing. He called this compromise model the Mainstream Model. Cha’s idea was for directly elected members to be returned for 27 percent of the seats for the first term in 1997 to 1999, increasing to 50 percent by the third and fourth terms (2003 to 2007 and 2007 to 2011). A referendum might be held in 2011 to decide whether the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council should be elected by universal suffrage. This was the model that gained Beijing’s backing and was approved by the BLDC. The BLDC also endorsed an amendment raised by Hong Kong businessman Cha Chi Min, who promoted that the referendum would only be held if it were approved by the Chief Executive, two-thirds majority of the legislators, and the SCNPC; and the result of the referendum would be valid only if it had the support of 30 percent of registered voters. The Mainstream Model and the amendment became known as the Cha-Cha Model.90 They generated widespread criticism in Hong Kong. The gulf of difference between Beijing’s concerns and Hong Kong’s aspirations were too wide and confidence in Hong Kong was beginning to wane.91 Unbeknown to anyone at the time, the most severe blow to confidence was yet to come in a few months.

Tiananmen: 15 April to 4 June 1989

China faced many challenges in promoting economic reforms at breakneck speed. Dissatisfaction arising from economic liberalisation that led to inflation, lay-offs at state-owned enterprises and official corruption created widespread grievances. China’s intellectuals began to call for relaxation of social and political controls, as was happening under Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost in the Soviet Union.92 The mix of pressures in China developed into a massive eruption of discontent in 1989.

Tiananmen Square is a large open space in the centre of Beijing, just south of the Forbidden City, flanked by the Great Hall of the People on one side and the Museum of Revolutionary History on the other side. There are also the monument to the martyrs of the Revolution and the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall in the vicinity. It has been the most potent political site in the Chinese history of the twentieth century. This was where emperors used to live, where students protested during the May Fourth Movement in 1919, where the CCP announced that it assumed power in 1949, and where Mao Zedong watched as throngs of Red Guards gathered at the start of the Cultural Revolution.

The Square came alive unexpectedly in 1989 on 15 April with the death of Hu Yaobang from heart attack. He was looked upon favourably by the people for overseeing the rehabilitation of thousands of those persecuted during the Anti-Rightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution. He was seen by the people as having encouraged significant political reform, including refusing to take a tough line against a
period of student protests in 1986, for which he was made to resign as CCP general secretary (1980–1987) and make a self-criticism. Hu’s time was remembered as a period of experiment and liberalism. Upon hearing his death, large numbers of people, including many students, appeared at Tiananmen Square spontaneous to commemorate the former leader. More people showed up still on the succeeding days. Their mourning turned into protests and demands for greater democracy and less corruption. The protests spread to other big cities and for the next seven weeks, the people’s expressions of grievances touched almost every corner of China, with Hong Kong and the rest of the world watching with bated breath. What will happen?

On 22 April 1989, the Chinese government held an official ceremony to commemorate Hu Yaobang. Over 100,000 students assembled in Tiananmen Square. The students demanded a dialogue with the government, and after their demand was rejected, they started to boycott classes. On 26 April, the government used an editorial in the *People’s Daily* to denounce the protests as a form of “turmoil” attempting to “fundamentally refute the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system”. The editorial aroused a strong reaction from the people. On the following day, more than a million people demonstrated on the streets of Beijing. A meeting between party leaders and students on 29 April went badly, after which the students decided to organise a hunger strike on 13 May. The students received enormous support from Beijing residents, people from other Mainland cities, Hong Kong, as well as from overseas. On 18 May 1989, Premier Li Peng met the student leaders in the Great Hall of the People. He refused to acknowledge the protests were patriotic acts and not turmoil. On 20 May, Li Peng announced the imposition of martial law in Beijing.93 Troops were sent and by 4 June, and the government claimed to have put down a “counter-revolutionary rebellion”.

The dramatic and heart-breaking events of 4 June 1989 affected not only the Mainland but also touched the lives of the people of Hong Kong. Shortly after the protests started in April 1989, Hong Kong people from all walks of life started all kinds of activities to express their support for the students in Beijing. There were countless gatherings, signature campaigns, petitions and collection of donations for the students. The Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils too were swept up in the moment in May 1989. They agreed on a model for political reform that provided for direct elections for half of the seats in the Legislative Council by 1997 and all the seats by 2003, and for the Chief Executive of future HKSAR to be directly elected no later than 2003. The so-called OMELCO Consensus Model received widespread backing in Hong Kong but it would be rejected by the BLDC (Chapter 9).94

On the night of 20 May 1989, thousands assembled at Victoria Park in a strong tropical storm to protest the Chinese government’s imposing martial law in Beijing. The next day over a million people marched to support the student movement. Despite the large numbers, it was a peaceful and solemn event. People from all backgrounds, including those from the left joined the march. A group of civil
society activists formed the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China. People at Xinhua Hong Kong and Mainland-funded organisations also threw themselves into the marches on their own initiative. There was even a signature drive at Xinhua. After the imposition of martial law, the pro-Beijing Wen Wei Po in Hong Kong issued an editorial featuring only the phrase in large characters—“Deep Sorrow”.

Xu Jiatun, speaking in July 2007 remembered events thus:

The patriotic feelings of Hong Kong people reached a climax during the Tiananmen Square protest. Except for a small number of people who opposed the Communist Party, the overwhelming majority were patriotic. They wanted to see progress in their country. Pro-Beijing groups were under enormous pressure from their own members to support the students. I decided they could participate in the June 4–related protests under certain conditions. They should not make public speeches, call for the downfall of leaders and chant inappropriate slogans. At one point, some Chinese-funded enterprises expressed the wish to hold commemorative services on their premises for June 4 victims. I decided we should not stop their staff from doing so if they acted on their own, but senior executives should not take part.

The crackdown on 4 June 1989 changed Hong Kong, changed how Beijing looked at Hong Kong, changed Britain’s attitude, and marked a turning point in Hong Kong people's political consciousness.

People from all walks of life in Hong Kong were jittery about 1997. They were quick to associate the 4 June crackdown with their fate after 1997, and more and more people were keen to take part in the marches. The slogan “Today’s Beijing will be Tomorrow’s Hong Kong” expressed their frame of mind at a time when 1997 was drawing nearer.

Xu Jiatun, 1993
Notes

Introduction

1. For a summary of the contradiction, see Kevin P. Lane, Sovereignty and the Status Quo, pp. 5–9.
4. Ibid.
5. Subsequent to the publication of Cao Erbao’s essay, the Sing Tao Daily appeared to have been the only Hong Kong media organisation to have reported on it: 紀曉華，〈管治力量一分為二〉，《星島日報》, 1 February 2008. The next time the issue was publicly addressed was on 16 April 2009, Christine Loh, “One City, Two Teams”, South China Morning Post, before many more news and commentary pieces had begun to appear.
6. In 2002, at the 16th Party Congress, the CCP formally redefined its status as the “party in power” and no longer as a “revolutionary party”, which was how it had always described itself.
8. In 2002, the Chinese Constitution was amended to add in the ideology of the Three Represents.
10. Huang Yasheng’s central argument in Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics is that since the 1990s, the development model favoured rapid urban development, which in turn favoured creating massive state-owned enterprises and big foreign multinational corporations, leaving rural and private enterprise starved of funds that became a limit to their growth. By 2014, Nicholas Lardy concluded in Markets over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China that the private sector produced two-thirds of China’s GDP.
11. Since economic liberalisation in the late 1970s, China has grown astonishingly, raising 660 million people out of poverty but the fruits of the growth have not been widely shared


18. Lau Siu-kai has an expanded list of ten features, see “In Search of a New Political Order”, in Yue-man Yeung, *The First Decade*, pp. 140–41.


22. The debates were both raised by the author, when she was a member of the Legislative Council. The quotes are from the *Official Proceedings of the Legislative Council*, 26 April 1995, pp. 3317–46; and 5 March 1997, pp. 164–84.

23. Yu Kwok-chun asked Tung Chee Hwa, “If you became the Chief Executive of the HKSAR, what would your relationship be with Xinhua?” Tung replied, “Xinhua is one of the Central Authorities’ organisations in Hong Kong. Other than Xinhua, there will also be the PLA and Foreign Ministry in Hong Kong. I will communicate with them in this regard and will frequently stay in touch with them. For Xinhua’s scope of work, I think the Central Authorities will define it. I will surely communicate with them. I know the Chief Executive of the HKSAR is accountable to the Central People’s Government. I know that you and many other people would like to know if Hong Kong would have a ‘king of kings’ in the future. I know that Hong Kong will not have such a ‘king of kings’ because the Central Authorities, Hong Kong and everyone will definitely implement ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and a ‘high degree of autonomy’, as well as act according to the Basic Law”, *Wen Wei Po*, 27 November 1996.

24. The four rumoured underground CCP members were the DAB-FTU’s Tam Yiu Chung (譚耀宗), Leung Chun Ying (梁振英), Antony Leung (梁錦松), and the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance’s Chung Shui Ming (鍾瑞明); 《開放雜誌》, May 1997, p. 54.

25. 牛虻，〈從反英暴動到紅頂商人——左派社團「學友社」的一段歷史〉, 《開放雜誌》, February 1997, p. 50.
26. These two rumoured CCP members were Elsie Leung (梁愛詩), the then Secretary for Justice, and Tsang Tak Shing (曾德成), then a consultant to the Central Policy Unit and later the Secretary for Home Affairs; 童行,〈董建華身邊的港共名單〉, 《開放雜誌》, August 2003, p. 38.


31. 許家屯, 《許家屯香港回憶錄 (上、下冊)》 (香港:香港聯合出版社, 1993)。This is referenced from here on as Xu Jiatun, Memoirs, p. 470.

32. Xu Jiatun, Memoirs, p. 69.

33. In a footnote to “Beijing’s Fifth Column and the Transfer of Power in Hong Kong: 1993–1997”, in Robert Ash, Hong Kong in Transition, p. 129, Yin Qian noted that Jonathan Mirsky, East Asia editor of The Times (London), told him that the information leaked by a friend in the pre-Handover Special Branch indicated that there were 23,000–28,000 party members in Hong Kong. There he also quoted a smaller estimate from Willy Wo-lap Lam of about 15,000.

34. Ibid., pp. 113–14.


Chapter 1

1. In Vladimir Lenin's What Is to Be Done?, he argued that the people can only achieve revolutionary consciousness through a vanguard party made up of professional revolutionaries, practising democratic centralism, Collected Works, Vol. 5., pp. 347–530.

2. For a short description of the CCP’s basic structure, see Ching Cheong, “China's Administration over Hong Kong: The New China News Agency and the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office”, in Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming, The Other Hong Kong Report 1996, pp. 111–14.

3. Ibid., p. 113. The chart shows that at every administrative level, the party organs are placed slightly above the government ones.

4. Ibid., p. 114.

5. Ibid.

6. Since 1977, party congresses have occurred about every five years, where party delegates nationwide gather in Beijing to select a new term of the CCP Central Committee.

7. Alternate CCP Central Committee members do not have the right to vote on the final party decisions or resolutions at the plenary meetings and are lower in rank than full members. Only full members are selected into the Politburo.

8. The core cluster of departments includes the General Office and four departments—Organisation, Propaganda, United Front Work, and International Liaison. There are also
84. The use of the word “declaration” instead of “agreement” was significant. As China had never accepted the validity of the treaties ceding Hong Kong and Kowloon and leasing the New Territories, there was no need for the Chinese side to reach an agreement with the British on the exercise of sovereignty. Moreover, once China has exercised its sovereignty it would not need the British to agree to its policies.

85. Xiao Weiyun quotes Deng Xiaoping in One Country, Two Systems, p. 4. Xiao was a BLDC and senior Mainland legal expert and in his book, no explanation is given to the meaning of “dialectical materialism” and “historical materialism”. It seems politically important to link these longstanding Marxist terms to the “one country, two systems” concept, pp. 4–6.

86. John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 181.


88. John Swaine, a barrister, abstained.

89. Robert Cottrell provides a detail account of the negotiations in The End of Hong Kong. For a shorter account, see Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, pp. 218–224. For an atmospheric recount, see David Bonavia’s Hong Kong 1997. For a Chinese account, see Xu Jiatun, Memoirs, Chapter 3, on the negotiations.

Chapter 8

1. 李谷城, 《香港的新華社功能與角色》, see http://202.76.36.61/vol%2018/vol18Doc1_2.htm.
4. Chung Sze-yuen, Hong Kong’s Journey to Reunification, pp. 39–43.
5. Ibid., pp. 63–67.
7. Xu Jiatun’s Memoirs provided examples, such as disagreements over what Mainland enterprises in Hong Kong could and could not do, conduct of Sino-British relations, style in operating united front work in Hong Kong, etc. For a discussion, see Shiu-hing Sonny Lo, “The Chinese Communist Party Elite’s Conflicts over Hong Kong, 1983–1990”, China Transformation, pp. 6–8.
10. Xu Jiatun, Memoirs, p. 120.
11. Ibid., p. 141.
13. Ibid., pp. 64–65.
16. Ibid., p. 76.
17. Ibid., p. 55.
18. Ibid., p. 54. The Chinese military was divided into 7 military regions—Guangzhou, Nanjing, Chengdu, Jinan, Lanzhou, Beijing, and Shenyang.
19. Ibid., p. 54.
20. Ibid., p. 63.
22. Ibid., p. 223. Xu disclosed that Zhu Rongji, a future premier, had been identified as a possible transfer to Hong Kong, but the CCP Central Committee decided to make Zhu the mayor of Shanghai instead.
23. Xu Jiatun, Memoirs, p. 78.
24. The two local cadres were Wang Rudeng (王如登) and Chen Fengying (陈凤英). See 軒轅, 《新華社透視》, p. 52.
26. John P. Burns showed the structure which was adapted from Deng Feng, “Xianggang xinhua she—gongwei cai gang de waiyi”, Contemporary, No. 4, 16 December 1989, p. 19, in The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong, p. 754. The Security Department, which Xu Jiatun talked about in his Memoirs, has been included.
29. Chung Sze-yuen’s account of those meetings show the difficulties UMELCO members were put in vis-à-vis their loyalty, Hong Kong Journey to Reunification, pp. 95–97.
30. Ibid., pp. 96 and 139.
31. Ibid., p. 139.
35. For discussions about Beijing’s perception of what made Hong Kong economically successful, see Leo F. Goodstadt, “China and the Selection of Hong Kong’s Post-Colonial Political Elite”, China Quarterly, pp. 727–28; and Wai-kwok Wong, “Can Co-optation Win over the Hong Kong People? China’s United Front Work in Hong Kong Since 1984”, Issues & Studies, pp. 116–18.

38. Xu Jiatun, *Memoirs*, p. 131. Xu Jiatun said Fung King Hei contacted him when he had financial problems and Xu arranged meetings with the Bank of China and others to help. After Fung died, Xu noted China still assisted his son.


40. Interview with Yeung Yiu Chung (楊耀忠) dated 30 May 2002, see Wan Kwok Fai, “Beijing's United Front Policy Toward Hong Kong”, p. 54.

41. 盧育儀 and 鍾仕梅 said that “整個新華社的眼睛不是向下望而是看著上層和工商界”, 〈統戰工作有功，錯在重資輕勞〉, 《當代雜誌》, 13 January 1990, p. 14. Xu Jiatun said he did not neglect the old leftists, and that he reassessed the definition of “working class” in Hong Kong, *Memoirs*, Chapters 4 and 5.


43. Meeting Point was formed in 1983. It was the first group in Hong Kong that formally considered itself to be a political party. In 1990, it merged with the United Democrats to become the Democratic Party. Meeting Point member, Anthony Cheung, became the Secretary for Transport and Housing (2012–2017). Other new groups that focused on Hong Kong's future included New Hong Kong Society, Hong Kong Prospect Institute, and Hong Kong Belongers' Association.


45. For a record of the Hong Kong Observers Poll, see *Pressure Points*, pp. 196–209. For a discussion about the Hong Kong Observers, see Christine Loh, *Being Here*, pp. 171–85.

46. The Hong Kong government released a list of names of 101 invited guests and the newspapers also published a list of names. There appeared to have been a total of 102 invitees. Appendix II provides all the names that appeared from both lists. See also Press release, Government Information Service, 16 December 1984. There were in fact discrepancies between the government's press release and the names from newspapers. There may have been more than 101 invitees. Appendix II shows 102 names, which included the 101 names in the press release and another name that appeared in newspapers at the time.

47. The term “status marker” was used by Leo F. Goodstadt in “China and the Selection of Hong Kong's Post-Colonial Elite”, *China Quarterly*, p. 722.

48. Ching Cheong noted that the BLDC would seek and collect Hong Kong people's views widely and that there would be quite a number of Hong Kong people in the BLDC, “廣泛地徵求和收集香港人的意見並反映大多數人的民意”, 〈基本法起草委員會將包括多名港人〉, *Wen Wei Po*, 11 March 1985.

49. Deng Xiaoping's speech at a meeting with Member of the BLDC in Beijing on 16 April 1987, *Deng Xiaoping on 'One Country, Two Systems*', pp. 67–78. See also Xu Jiatun's comments on the overriding drafting principles set out by Deng Xiaoping, *Memoirs*, Chapter 6.

50. Ibid.

52. Ching Cheong noted that “起草委員會的內地成員，應包括一些比較熟悉香港的人士，一些主管港澳工作的以及一些法律界人士，特別是制憲專家……香港地區人選則應具備愛祖國，愛香港，熟悉香港情況，並且在某個領域具有專業知識，同時又能採取「持平態度」的人士來出任”，〈基本法起草委員會怎樣產生？〉, *Wen Wei Po*, 12 April 1985.


54. Ching Cheong et al defined “balance” as “所謂「持平」，就是能平衡各方意見和利益的人。持平的主張就是要能符合中英聯合聲明和將來基本法的精神，符合大多數人參與的原則。只有持平才能有穩定，有穩定才能有繁榮”，〈基本法起草委員會怎樣產生？〉, *Wen Wei Po*, 12 April 1985. The importance of “balance” is derived from three factors: (1) Hong Kong is a diverse society with complicated class relationships and a wide range of business sectors. To maintain such a society along with its diversity, it requires an attitude that encourages the participation of all the different parties (大家認為香港是一個多元化的社會，無論是階級關係，行業類別都是十分複雜的，因為要維持這樣一個社會的性質不變，就必須讓各方都有參與的機會，此其一) ; (2) there is a common political goal of maintaining stability and prosperity in Hong Kong, and under this premise, people with various political inclinations should cooperate; “balance” is exactly to remain open to all different political inclinations (大家都有一個共同的政治目標，就是保持香港的繁榮的穩定，在這個大前提下，各種政治傾向的人都應互相合作，持平就是要能夠對各種政治傾向的兼容並蓄，此其二) ; (3) along with the changes in Hong Kong as 1997 approaches, people’s political inclinations would change and at an increasing pace; “balance” is to avoid dwelling in the past, and instead, cater to the circumstances today and in the future (隨著香港形勢的變化，人們的政治傾向也在不斷的變化中，而且距九七年越近，這種變化就越大，因此，不應去追究某人在過去歷史上曾抱有甚麼態度，更重要的是看今天和以後的態度，此其三) 。

55. T. K. Ann was a member of the national CPPCC’s Standing Committee.


57. Up until 1985, UMELOCO stood for the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council. At the time, the legislature only had appointed members and civil servant appointees were referred as the official members, thus UMELOCO was used to distinguish between the official and unofficial members.


59. Xu noted in his *Memoirs* that including Martin Lee would be preferable to excluding him as it would be easier to control him within the BLDC’s confidential working structure than outside it, p. 157.

60. Staff reporters, “Xu Jiatun: The Communist Cadres Who Reached Out to All Sectors in Hong Kong”, *South China Morning Post*, 29 June 2016. Szeto revealed in his autobiography, *Yangtze River Flows Eastward*, that he had wanted to join the party in his youth. He was a co-founder of the Hok Yau Club in 1949 (a left-leaning student group) and joined the New Democracy Youth League in September 1949 (which subsequently was renamed the Communist Youth League in 1957).
63. Adapted from Ma Ngok, *Political Development in Hong Kong*, p. 41.
70. Basic Law, Annex I (I), and see Jonathan Dimbleby, *The Last Governor*, p. 52.
72. There are other phrases that also show the difference in understanding between the British and Chinese. For example, the meaning of the right of “final adjudication” vested in the HKSAR does not mean the HKSAR has the ultimate power to interpret the Basic Law, which in fact rests with the SCNPC.
74. Functional constituencies and the functional electoral system are extensively discussed in Christine Loh and Civic Exchange, *Functional Constituencies*.
77. Steve Tsang, *Hong Kong*, p. 126.
79. 黃文放, 《解讀北京思維》, pp. 98–99.
81. Mark Roberti, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p. 177.
82. 何立, 〈直選民意大結算〉, 《九十年代》, October 1987, p. 40.
83. Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong*, pp. 294–95.
84. David Wilson, interview, 19 September 2003.
85. For a short summary of the events of that period, see Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong*, pp. 284–98.
86. 胡泰然, 〈白皮書跳不出北京的框框〉, 《九十年代》, January 1988, p. 44.
87. Steve Tsang, *Hong Kong*, p. 128.
89. For a summary of the criticisms, see Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong*, pp. 301–5.
Chapter 9

1. The *zhuada fangxiao* strategy was first used in relations to reforming the state-owned enterprises but was then also applied to the CCP strategy in Hong Kong to gain control of the major things so that it could tolerate minor ones, Willy Wo-lap Lam, "Beijing’s Hong Kong Policy in the First Year of the Transition", in Chris Yeung, *Hong Kong China*, p. 25.

2. Private communication from a former senior Hong Kong official in 2006.


4. *Xinhua News Agency News Bulletin*, 22 June 1989. The term “subversive base” carries the same meaning as an “anti-communist front” or “anti-China front”.

5. Other top leaders included Hu Qili (胡啟立 1929), another member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, who was also removed because he abstained from voting in favour of the imposition of martial law. He was rehabilitated and became the deputy minister of Machine-Building and Electronics Industry in 1991. Wan Li (萬里 1916), the chairman of the NPC, was temporarily under house arrest immediately upon his return from a visit to the North America during which he expressed sympathy towards the student demonstrations.

6. The challenge required a new orientation in foreign policy terms. Beijing expressed it using 28 characters: “Watch and analyse calmly; secure our positions; act with confidence; conceal our capacities; keep a low profile; do not lead; make contributions.”

7. Xu Jiatun’s memoirs talked about the importance to the CCP of getting people to accept invitations to visit Beijing, and his efforts to invite Hong Kong guests to Beijing particularly to meet Li Peng, *Memoirs*, pp. 425–26.

8. 高繼標，《香港最後一個政治貴族：羅德丞政海浮沉錄》，pp. 40–41.

9. Nevertheless, there was little evidence of the Hong Kong tycoons and taipans pulling sizable investments from either the Mainland or Hong Kong post-Tiananmen. It may have been that new investments were slowed temporarily.


11. Xu’s *Memoirs* noted that he was criticised by the party, and evidence of his faults would likely have included the events noted here. For an account of the Tiananmen crackdown, see Alvin Y. So, *Hong Kong’s Embattled Democracy*, pp. 156–61.
Biographies

Abbreviations

BLCC  Basic Law Consultative Committee
BLDC  Basic Law Drafting Committee
BPA   Business and Professional Alliance for Hong Kong
CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
DP    Democratic Party
ExCo  Hong Kong Executive Council
FTU   Federation of Trade Unions
HKAA  Hong Kong Affairs Advisor
HKMAO Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office
HKPA  Hong Kong Progressive Alliance
LegCo Hong Kong Legislative Council
LP    Liberal Party
NPC   National People’s Congress
PC    Preparatory Committee
PL    Provisional Legislature 1996–1998
PWC   Preliminary Working Committee
SC    Selection Committee 1996–1997
4th   NPC and CPPCC 1975–1978
5th   NPC and CPPCC 1978–1983
6th   NPC and CPPCC 1983–1988
7th   NPC and CPPCC 1988–1993
8th   NPC and CPPCC 1993–1997
9th   NPC and CPPCC 1998–2002
10th  NPC and CPPCC 2003–2007
11th  NPC and CPPCC 2008–2012
12th  NPC and CPPCC 2013–2018

Mainland Leaders and Officials

Chen Yi (陳毅 1901–1972). Veteran revolutionary; also served as China’s Foreign Minister.
Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平 1904–1997). Paramount leader of the post-Mao era and chief architect of “one country, two systems”.


Jia Qinglin (賈慶林 b. 1940). Politburo member.


Jiang Zemin (江澤民 b. 1926). Became the top leader after the Tiananmen crackdown.

Li Changchun (李長春 b. 1944). Politburo member.


Li Qiang (李克強 b. 1955). Politburo Standing Committee 18th Party Congress.


Peng Zhen (彭真 1902–1997). Veteran revolutionary, who fell out of favour with Mao Zedong in 1966 but was rehabilitated by Deng Xiaoping and was Chairman of the 6th NPC (1983–1988).


Qiao Xiaoyang (乔曉陽 b. 1945). PC, Deputy Secretary SCNPC and Chairman of the NPC’s Law Committee.

Tao Zhu (陶鑄 1908–1969). Replaced Fang Fang as the Director of the Provincial Land Reform Committee of the party in Guangdong in 1952. Tao’s assistant was Zhao Ziyang.

Wang Hanbin (王漢斌 b. 1925). 6th to 8th SCNPC, Secretary General of the NPC, and BLDC Vice-Chairman.


Xi Jinping (習近平 b. 1953). Vice-President in 2008; took over from Zeng Qinghong on Hong Kong matters at the Politburo before becoming General Secretary in 2012 and President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2013.
Ye Jianying (葉劍英 1897–1986). A Hakka and veteran soldier and military hero; first Party Secretary of Guangdong and held many high offices, including Chairman of the 5th NPC (1978–1983).

Yu Zhengsheng (俞正聲 b. 1945). Politburo member and Chairman of the CPPCC from 2013.

Zeng Qinghong (曾慶紅 b. 1939). Politburo member, Vice-President 2003–2008, and oversaw Hong Kong affairs.

Zhang Dejiang (張德江 b. 1946). Politburo member since 2012 with responsibility for Hong Kong affairs, and Chairman of SCNPC of the 12th NPC.


Zhao Ziyang (趙紫陽 1919–2005). General Secretary of the CCP and signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration. He was put under house arrest from 1989 until he died.

Zhou Enlai (周恩來 1898–1976). Foreign Minister 1949–1958 and first Premier of the PRC. He played a unique and vital role in defining Hong Kong policy and relations throughout his career.

Xinhua Hong Kong/Liaison Office, HKMAO, and Mainland officials stationed in the HKSAR

Directors, Xinhua Hong Kong (renamed Liaison Office after 2000) (in chronological order)


Huang Zuomei (黃作梅 1916–1955). Second Director of Xinhua Hong Kong. Also known as Raymond Wong, he was the interpreter and director of international relations for the East River Column and thus a CCP-British go-between. He was invited by the British government to join the victory parade in London in May 1946 and was awarded a medal by King George VI and an MBE. He died when the Kashmir Princess crashed in 1955.


Zhou Nan (周南 b. 1927). Sixth Director of Xinhua Hong Kong 1990–1997, previously served as Vice-Foreign Minister, and Ambassador to the UN. He headed the Chinese negotiation team on the Hong Kong's transfers of sovereignty, and BLDC.

Jiang Enzhu (姜恩柱 b. 1938). Seventh Director of Xinhua, he oversaw the transition to the Liaison Office 1997–2002. A former Vice-Foreign Minister, a member of the Sino-British negotiations team, and Ambassador to Britain 1995–1997, PWC, Deputy Director of the PC.

Gao Siren (高祀仁 b. 1944). Eighth Director of Xinhua, 2002–2009. Headed various party posts in Guangdong before becoming a Deputy Director of Xinhua from 1999 then transferring to the Liaison Office.
Peng Qinghua (彭清華 b. 1957). Ninth Director of Xinhua, 2009–2012. Before becoming Director, he was a Deputy Director of the Liaison Office from 2003.

Zhang Xiaoming (張曉明 b. 1963). Tenth Director 2012–2017. Before becoming Director, he was a Deputy Director of HKMAO.

Wang Zhimin (王志民 b. 1957). Eleventh Director appointed in 2017. He had worked as a deputy director on youth affairs before taking up the directorship of Macao’s Liaison Office.

Other officials at Xinhua Hong Kong (renamed Liaison Office after 2000)

Cao Erbao 呂二寶
Chen Daming 陳達明
He Zhiming 何志明
Huang Shimin 黃施民
Huang Wenfang 黃文放
Huang Zhizhao 黃智超
Li Gang 李剛
Li Guikang 黎桂康
Li Jusheng 李菊生
Liang Shangyuan 梁上菀
Luo Keming 羅克明
Mao Junnian 毛鈞年, Deputy Secretary BLDC.
Pan Zengxi 潘曾錫
Qi Feng 祁烽
Qiao Zhonghuai 喬宗淮, son of Qiao Guanhua.
Wang Fengchao 王鳳超
Wang Rudeng 王如登
Wang Zhenmin 王振民, became head of legal department in 2014; former Dean of Tsinghua University's law school.
Zeng Guoxiong 鄭國雄
Zhang Junsheng 張浚生
Zheng Hua 鄭華
Zhou Ding 周鼎, CCP Macao Secretary, Director of Xinhua Macao.
Zhu Manping 朱曼平
Zou Zhekai 趙哲開

Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (see also Mainland Leaders and Officials)

Chen Zuoer (陳佐洱 b. 1942). Deputy Director, retired in 2008.
Li Hou (李後 b. 1923). Secretary General HKMAO, Secretary to BLDC, and Deputy Director HKMAO.
Pan Shengzhou (潘盛洲 b. 1957). Deputy Director since June 2017.

Others

Lu Xinhua (呂新華). Second Commissioner of China’s Foreign Ministry in the HKSAR.
Ma Yuzhen (馬毓真). Seasoned diplomat and first Commissioner of China’s Foreign Ministry in the HKSAR.
Wang Jitang (王繼堂). Third Commander of the Hong Kong Garrison.
Xiong Ziren (熊自仁). First Commander of the Hong Kong Garrison.
Zheng Yi (鄭義). Vice-chairman of the Preliminary Working Committee.

East River Guerrillas and Agents

Cai Guoliang (蔡國樑). Leader of the Hong Kong–Kowloon Independent Brigade.
Chen Daming (陳達明). A guerrilla who went on to do party work in Beijing and then transferred to Xinhua Hong Kong as Deputy Director in 1982.
Fang Fang (方方 1904–1971). Directed guerrilla activities on the Mainland from Hong Kong during the civil war up until 1949 and became a Vice-Chairman of the CCP in Guangdong with responsibility for land reform. He was detained in 1966 during the Cultural Revolution, tortured and died in 1971.
Huang Zuomei (黃作梅 1916–1955). Became second Director of Xinhua Hong Kong, see above.
Li Cheng. A guerrilla agent during the Japanese occupation.
Liang Weilin (梁威林 1911–2008). A guerrilla leader who became the longest serving head of Xinhua Hong Kong (see above).
Tan Gan. A guerrilla who then worked for Xinhua Hong Kong as an editor.
Ya Wen. She observed boat movements in the harbour during the Japanese occupation.
Yang Qi (楊奇). A guerrilla who was purged in the 1950s but then transferred to Xinhua Hong Kong to head the regular news section. In 1982, he became the Secretary General at Xinhua Hong Kong before taking over as Publisher of Ta Kung Pao in 1984.

Colonial Governors of Hong Kong

(In chronological order)
Reginald Stubbs (1919–1925)
Cecil Clementi (1925–1930)
Mark Young (1941 and 1946–1947)
Alexander Grantham (1947–1957)
Robert Black (1958–1964)
David Trench (1964–1971)
Murray MacLehose (1971–1982)
Chris Patten (1992–1997)

British Officials and Politicians

Percy Cradock (1923–2005). Charge d'Affaires Beijing 1966–1969. From 1978 to 1984 he was the Ambassador to China, where he opened and led the negotiations on the Hong Kong. From 1984 to 1992 he was the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Adviser.

Hong Kong and Macao Chief Executives

Carrie Lam (林鄭月娥 b. 1957). Civil servant. Former Chief Secretary before becoming the Fourth Chief Executive of Hong Kong in 2017.
Leung Chun Ying (梁振英 b. 1954). Surveyor. HKAA, Secretary-General BLCC, PWC, PL, ExCo 1997–2012, 10th and 11th CPPCCs. Third Chief Executive of Hong Kong (2012–2017), and made a Vice-Chairman of the 12th CPPCC in March 2017.
Donald Tsang (曾蔭權 b. 1944). Civil servant. Former Financial Secretary and Chief Secretary before becoming Chief Executive of Hong Kong (2005–2012).
Tung Chee Hwa (董建華 b. 1937). Shipping tycoon. HKAA, BLCC, ExCo 1992–1996, 8th CPPCC, and PC. First Chief Executive of Hong Kong (1997–2005) and a Vice-Chairman of 11th and 12th CPPCC.

**Hong Kong Tycoons**

Sally Aw (胡仙 b. 1932). Former owner of Sing Tao Publishing. 8th CPPCC. 
Cha Chi Min (查濟民 1916–2007). BLDC, HKAA, PWC, PC, and SC. 
Payson Cha (查懋聲 b. 1943). Son of Cha Chi Min. SC and 9th to 11th CPPCC. His former wife, Veronica Cha (查伍小貞), served on BLCC. 
Bernard Chan (陳智思 b. 1965). Son of Robin Chan, who served on 7th to 10th NPCs, PWC and PC, LegCo 1998–2008, ExCo 2012 to present, and 11th and 12 NPCs. 
Chan Wing Kee (陳永棋 b. 1947). BLCC, HKAA, PWC, PC, SC, 8th and 9th NPCs, 10th to 12th CPPCCs, and Standing Committee of the 11th and 12th CPPCCs. 
Henry Cheng (鄭家純 b. 1946). Son of Cheng Yu Tung, chairman of New World Development Ltd., 11th and 12th CPPCCs, and Standing Committee of 11th and 12th CPPCCs. 
Cheng Yu Tung (鄭裕彤 1925–2016). New World Development Ltd., BLCC, HKAA, PWC, PC, and SC. 
Deacon Chiu (邱德根 1925–2017). Far East Group and former ATV chairman; 9th CPPCC. 
Henry Fok (霍英東 1923–2006). BLDC, HKAA, PWC, PC, and SC. Served several NPC and CPPCC terms including his last, the 10th CPPCC when he was a Vice-Chairman. 
Fung King Hei (馮景禧 1922–1985). Xu Jiatun disclosed that when Fung had financial problems, he made arrangements for Mainland institutions to help him. 
Charles Ho (何柱國 b. 1949). Chairman of Sing Tao News Corporation. 9th to 12th CPPCCs. 
Stanley Ho (何鴻燊 b. 1921). Shun Tak Holdings Ltd. and Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau with many businesses related to gambling in Macao. BLCC, SC, and 9th and 10th CPPCCs. 
Jimmy Lai (黎智英 b. 1948). Founder of Next Media (includes Apple Daily, considered “unfriendly” by the CCP). 
Lee Shau Kee (李兆基 b. 1928). Henderson Land Development Co. Ltd. HKAA. 
Li Ka Shing (李嘉誠 b. 1928). Founder of Cheung Kong Holdings, BLDC, HKAA, PWC, PC, and SC.

Richard Li (李澤楷 b. 1966). Younger son of Li Ka Shing, CPPCC of Beijing since 2000.

Victor Li (李澤鉅 b. 1964). Elder son of Li Ka Shing, HKAA, 9th to 12th CPPCCs.

Lim Por Yen (林百欣 1914–2005). Lai Sun Group, and at one time the largest shareholder of ATV. HKAA.

Vincent Lo (羅康瑞 b. 1948). Shui On Holdings Ltd., BLCC, HKAA, PWC, PC, SC, and 9th to 12th CPPCCs.

Ma Ching Kwan (馬澄坤). Oriental Press Group, 10th to 11th CPPCCs.

Pao Yue Kong (包玉剛 1918–1991). Shipping tycoon, BLDC Vice-Chairman.

Run Run Shaw (邵逸夫 1907–2014). Shaw Brothers and founder of TVB, HKAA, and SC.


Tsang Hin Chi (曾憲梓 b. 1934). Industrialist, BLCC, HKAA, PWC, PC, SC, and 7th and 10th NPCs.

Peter Woo (吳光正 b. 1946). Son-in-law of Pao Yue Kong and chairman of Wharf Holdings and Wheelock and Co. BLCC, HKAA, and 9th to 12th CPPCCs, Standing Committee member. Ran for selection as the first Chief Executive.


Hong Kong Officials, Judges, Executive Councillors, and Legislators

Jack Cater (1922–2006). Secretary for Defence; became the Deputy Colonial Secretary (Special Duties) to tackle the 1967 riots. Chief Secretary 1978–1981.


Chow Shouson (周壽臣 1861–1959). Major political figure of his time. ExCo and a close adviser to the Hong Kong government during the strike-boycott in 1925–1926 working with Robert Kotewall.

Chow Tse-ming (周梓銘). In 1955, Chow Tse-ming was the janitor who worked on the aeroplane Kashmir Princess. He was thought to have planted a bomb on the airplane, which exploded in mid-air killing Huang Zuomei and others who were on board. He is believed to have disappeared to Taiwan.


Lydia Dunn (鄧蓮如 b. 1940). Senior executive with the Swire Group, and the senior member of ExCo under David Wilson and Chris Patten. She left Hong Kong after 1997 to live in London.

Rita Fan (范徐麗泰 b. 1942). ExCo under David Wilson but was not reappointed by Chris Patten. She resigned her appointed seat in LegCo and established close ties with China serving on the 9th and 10th NPCs. She served on the PL, then was elected via the Election Committee before standing for direct election in 2004. LegCo President from 2000 to 2008. She did not seek re-election, but became a Vice-Chairperson of 11th to 12th NPCs.

Joseph Fok (霍兆剛 b. 1962). Court of Appeal judge.


Arthur Garcia (賈施雅 b. 1924). High Court judge.


Robert Kotewall (羅旭和 1849–1949). Worked closely with Chow Shouson during the strike-boycott of 1925–1926 to advise the Hong Kong government. He was appointed to ExCo in 1936 when Chow stepped down.
Jeffrey Lam (林健鋒 b. 1951). Businessman. Formerly LP, BPA, LegCo 2004 to present, ExCo 2012 to present.


Fanny Law (羅范椒芬 b. 1953). Permanent Secretary, Education and Manpower Bureau until 2007. ExCo 2012 to present. Member of 11th to 12th NPC.


Andrew Li (李國能 b. 1948). A reporter during the 1967 riots, who became a barrister and then Chief Justice of the HKSAR, 1997–2010.


Benjamin Liu (廖子明 b. 1931): High Court judge.


Siu Sin Por (邵善波 b. 1949). HKAA, Deputy Secretary General PC, SC, Head of Central Policy Unit 2012–2017, and several CPPCCs.


Michael Tien (田北辰 b. 1950). Son of Francis Tien. Resigned from LP, joined New People’s Party but resigned in 2017 and created Roundtable, LegCo 2012 to present, 11th to 12th NPCs.

Tsang Lai Yu (曾勵予). Sister of Tsang Yok Sing and Tsang Tak Shing, was jailed for a month for participating in the riots in 1967.


Wilfred Wong (王英偉 b. 1952). Former Deputy Secretary, Civil Service Branch and Managing Director of Shui On Holdings Ltd. Member of BLCC, PWC, PC, 9th to 11th NPCs


Others

Louis Cha (查良鏞 b. 1924). Famous author, founder, and former publisher of Ming Pao. BLDC, BLCC, PC.

Chen Duxiu (陳獨秀 1879–1942). An intellectual and founder of the CCP.

Chen Jianping (陳建平). Known to be Lu Ping’s protégé and a former correspondent of Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po stationed in Beijing. A medium-level cadre, Chen acted as liaison between Tung Chee Hwa and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office. He stayed on to serve Donald Tsang, promoted to be Senior Special Assistant by C. Y. Leung, and continues to serve Carrie Lam.

Chen Jiongming (陳炯明 1878–1933). The head of the Guangdong administration and a rival of Sun Yat-sen.

Percy Chen (陳丕士 1901–1989). In 1947, he established a private law practice in Hong Kong as a barrister. In 1956, he founded the Marco Polo Club. He was invited to witness the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. Member of the 6th CPPCC.

Cheng Wing Kin (鄭永健). Convicted for offering bribes to District Council election candidates in 2915.

Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石 1887–1975). When Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, Chiang took control of the KMT and became the overall leader of the Republic of China in 1928. He lost the civil war to the CCP and escaped to Taiwan.

Horace Chin Wan Kan (陳雲根 b. 1961). Also known as Chin Wan (陳雲). Author of various works advocating localism.

Ching Cheong (程翔 b. 1949). Vice-editorial manager of Wen Wei Po. After 4 June 1989, Ching resigned in protest and, with others, founded Commentary. In 1996, he joined the Straits Times. In 2005, he was detained on the Mainland charged with spying for Taiwan and sentenced to imprisonment for five years. He was released on 5 February 2008.


Alex Chow (李大釗 b. 1990). Student activist.


Fei Yiming (費彝民 1908–1988). Publisher of Ta Kung Pao. BLDC Vice-Chairman and 2nd to 5th CPPCCs and 5th to 7th NPCs.

Fu Qi (傅奇). Famous movie star turned director and producer.

Franklin Charles Gimson (1890–1975). Colonial administrator, who briefly served as the Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong before the surrender to the Japanese on 25 December 1941. He established a short-lived provisional government after the liberation of Hong Kong.

Gu Zhenghong (顧正紅 1905–1925). A worker and CCP member who was killed on 15 May 1925 in Shanghai that sparked riots.

Gu Zhuoheng (谷卓恒). Chairman of Sing Pao Media Enterprises.

Cecil Harcourt (1892–1959). Rear Admiral. He received the surrender from the Japanese after the war.

He Xiangning (何香凝 1872–1972). A KMT official who broke with the nationalists and formed the KMT Revolutionary Committee in Hong Kong.

Hsueh Ping (薛平). A reporter at Xinhua News Agency sentenced to imprisonment during the 1967 riots.
Hu Sheng (胡繩 1918–2000). Director, Party Research Centre of the CCP Central Committee, and BLDC Vice-Chairman.

Jiang Zaizhong (姜在忠). Head of Ta Kung Wen Wai Media Group.

Lt. Donald W. Kerr. Member of the US Air Force, who was rescued after his aeroplane was shot down in 1944 in Hong Kong.


Wellington Koo (顧維鈞 1887–1985). Member of the Chinese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. He was subsequently the Chinese Ambassador to Britain.

Lam Bun (林彬 1930–1967). A radio talk show host who was assassinated by a death squad of leftists in 1967.

Lam Wing Kee, Lee Bo, and other booksellers (林榮基 and 李波). The five staff of Mighty Current Publishing who went missing included Gui Minhai (桂民海), Lui Bo (呂波), and Cheung Jiping (張志平).


Baggio Leung Chung Hang (梁頌恆 b. 1986). Youngspiration candidate who won a seat to LegCo in 2016 but failed to take his oath.

Li Dazhao (李大釗 1888–1927). Founder of the CCP with Chen Duxiu.

Li Jichen (李濟深 1885–1959). A KMT high-ranking military official who broke with the nationalists and formed the KMT Revolutionary Committee in Hong Kong. He was appointed to the SCNPC in 1954.

Li Weimen (林偉民 1887–1927). A union leader who became a CCP member in the 1920s.

Li Zisong (李子誦). Former chief editor of Wen Wei Po in Hong Kong.

Lian Guan (連貫 1906–1991). A CCP leader in Hong Kong during the 1940s and the Secretary of the Eighth Route Army’s party branch office in Hong Kong.

Liao Zhongkai (廖仲愷 1877–1925). A Hakka and the KMT’s finance chief. He provided the CCP with considerable funds to support the Hong Kong strikers in Guangzhou during the strike-boycott of 1925–1926. Father of Liao Chengzhi and grandfather of Liao Hui.

Lin Junwei (林君蔚). School inspector with the Education Department, who together with Zhang Rendao (張仁道), a graduate of the well-known high school, Queen’s College, and Li Yibao (李義保), a primary school teacher, founded Zhenshanmei Magazine (真善美雜誌) in 1920.

Ling Wanyan (凌宏仁). Headmaster of the left-wing Sai Kung Public School in the 1960s.

Liu Bocheng (劉伯承 1892–1986). Together with Deng Xiaoping, they gave an order to blockade the Yangtze, intending to hold the Amethyst at bay.

Liu Changle (劉長樂 b. 1951). Chairman of Phoenix Satellite Television Holdings Ltd. who, together with Chan Wing Kee, invested in ATV.

Lo Man Tuen (盧文端 b. 1948). DAB, Vice-Chairman of CPPCC’S foreign affairs sub-committee.

Henry Luk (陸海安). Editor of the right-wing newspaper Chun Pao (真報) during the 1960s.

Mak Hoi Wah (麥海華). Social activist and BLCC.

Mok Ying Kwai (莫應溎 1901–1997). Businessman from a prominent comprador family who became a committed CCP supporter and was appointed to the BLDC.
Ng Hong Man (吳康民 b. 1926). NPC from 4th NPC, BLCC, and HKAA.
Lt. Col. Lindsay Ride (1898–1977). With the help of Francis Lee Yiu Piu, who made arrangements with the guerrillas, Ride established the British Army Aid Group (BAAG) in South China to help escapees and to smuggle medicines into the POW camps in Hong Kong.

Shi Hu (石慧). A famous “leftist” movie star in the 1960s.

Song Jiaoren (宋教仁 1882–1913). An anti-Qing revolutionary and a founder of the KMT together with Sun Yat-sen. He was assassinated.

Song Qingling (宋慶齡 1893–1981). Wife of Sun Yat-sen. She formed the Defend China League (保衛中國同盟) in Hong Kong in June 1938 and was quite successful in rallying support for the resistance.

Su Zhaozheng (蘇兆徵 1885–1929). A union leader who became a CCP member in the 1920s.


Sun Yat-Sen (孫中山 1866–1925). Founder of the KMT and considered father of the revolution by both the KMT and CCP.

Benny Tai (戴耀廷 b. 1964). Legal scholar who came up with the idea of Occupy Central with Love and Peace in 2013.

Tang Bingda (湯秉達). A key committee member of the Anti-Persecution Committee.
Edward Tyrer. Hong Kong’s Police Commissioner who was replaced in July 1967.
Liza Wang (汪明荃 b. 1947). Singer and entertainer. Member of the 7th to 11th CPPCCs.
Wong Jo Fun. Principal of Chung Wah Middle School who was arrested and detained during the 1967 riots.

Xi Yang (席揚). Reporter for Ming Pao who was convicted of trafficking financial state secrets in 1993. A banker, Tian Ye, was convicted of passing financial state secrets to Xi Yang.
Yau Wai Ching (游蕙禎 b. 1991). Youngspiration candidate who won a seat to LegCo in 2016 but failed to take her oath.

Yeung Kwong (楊光). FTU leader and chairman of Hong Kong–Kowloon All Sectors Anti-Persecution Committee.

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