Collaborative Colonial Power
The Making of the Hong Kong Chinese

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Introduction:
Coloniality and Hong Kong Chineseness

British imperialist forces captured Hong Kong in 1842 and ruled the place as both a free port and a colony until recently. However, in both popular and academic discourses, people have almost forgotten Hong Kong’s status as a colonial entity. Liberal-modernist historiographies of Hong Kong usually tell a romanticized story about the growth of Hong Kong, characterizing it as a utopia of laissez-faire economics — a narrative that, highly sympathetic to colonial rule, embraces the depiction of Hong Kong as a “barren-rock-turned-capitalist paradise” (Endacott 1964; Woronoff 1980; Ngo 1999: 120). It is said that Hong Kong was a desolate island before the British came but that, thanks to the benevolent governance and good policy of the colonial state, the barren rock has been transformed into a capitalist metropolis. This liberal-modernist narrative peddles the Hong Kong success story and operates under the presumption that Hong Kong is an economic entity on its own. Screened out from this narrative are, first and foremost, the effects of more than 150 years of colonialism in Hong Kong, and this select screening of information renders Hong Kong colonialism nothing more than a set of liberal frameworks within which capitalism was able to flourish. Moreover, this same narrative treats the colonial state as, for the most part, a non-interventionist power: the British never exploited Hong Kong economically, and Hong Kong remained not an imperialist-dominated terrain but a neutral arena where both Western and Eastern cultures could intermingle.

Ironically, most of the Marxist historians, who, in the past two decades, have come from mainland China, and who are writing about Hong Kong’s pre-1997 history, also like to join the liberal-modernists in unreflectively attributing the growth of the colony to the free-market economy that flourished under British colonial rule. Rapidly churned out before 1997 as ideological justification of the moment of “return”, their writings are never hesitant in making the patriotic proclamation that Hong Kong had belonged to China since time immemorial. They rush to identify a few British misdeeds, criticizing some of the old racist
measures and praising mainland China’s contribution to Hong Kong (Yu and Liu 1994; Liu 1997). As their political task was only to legitimize the “return” of Hong Kong to China under the “one country, two systems” policy, their anti-British and pro-China assertions cannot go any further than a highly selective and superficial treatment of colonial history. What have turned out are examples of expedient eclecticism that have transplanted the liberal-modernist narrative of Hong Kong, flaunted in its apologetic defense for British colonialism, upon a positioned Chinese nationalistic frame.1

Drawing upon the same liberal-modernist framework, all these historical writings tell time and again almost the same miraculous success story of Hong Kong. Despite the interruptions of the Japanese occupation and of Chinese revolutions and civil wars, Hong Kong stands out as a model case of capitalist development, with its own formula for initiating the momentum of free-market growth (Endacott 1964; Miners 1981; Rabushka 1973, 1979).

Bringing Colonialism Back In

Despite the popularity of this Hong Kong success story, there is, however, little evidence lending support to the assertion that Hong Kong exhibited self-generating capitalistic growth animated by the sheer entrepreneurial spirit of a new China-based bourgeoisie (Choi, A.H. 1999). Nor does rigorous factual substantiation underlie any assertion that Hong Kong economic growth was autonomous, independent of regional political and economic formations. Getting beyond these unfounded assertions, recent revisionist historiography has shifted focus onto the important role of the colonial state, of its relationship with local society, and of the emergence of a regional economic network. Ngo Tak Wing and Alex Choi, for instance, argue against the widely held notion that Hong Kong was ruled by a neutral administrative state that upheld the principle of non-intervention (Ngo 1999; Choi 1999). They also question whether it is tenable to depict Hong Kong society as atomistic, its people as apathetic, and their mentality as functionally fit for bureaucratic colonial governance (e.g. Lau 1982). Put together, the revisionist historiographies of Hong Kong challenge these somewhat hackneyed perspectives and take the view that Hong Kong society cannot be understood independently of colonialism. The historiographies begin with the assumption that Hong Kong was a sui generis colonial city and then propose to conduct a thorough investigation of the colonial system. By treating colonialism as primarily a form of politically imposed rule, the historiographies highlight the active interventions of the colonial state and, in this regard, identify different strategies of rule for the maintaining of governance. For example, it has
been shown that, refusing repeated calls for industrial upgrades, the colonial state privileged pro-British trading and banking interests (Choi 1999; Ngo 1999); similarly, Munn regards the criminal justice system as a means by which the colonial state and the ruling Europeans could police the lower class Chinese inhabitants (Munn 1999, 2001). In short, the authors of these historiographies reflect on the colonial state, re-read Hong Kong’s past, and from it, reconstruct the changing political rationalities of British colonialism in Hong Kong. According to these revisionist historiographies, Hong Kong is less laissez-faire than it seems to be. Also, the British presence in Hong Kong was never guaranteed with harmony and success to the extent that can warrant placing it as an exceptional case within a long colonial history that featured brutal domination and fierce resistance.

While I very much agree with these attempts to revisit Hong Kong’s colonial past, particularly with regard to their contribution to found a critical intellectual project of Hong Kong studies in defiance of the hegemonic liberal-modernist story, I would also like to underscore the need to look further than revealing the political dimension of colonial rule. As a political critique of colonialism is premised on a narrow conception of power, which confines one’s attention to uncovering the changing strategies of colonial rule, it tends to treat colonial power as no more than an instrument for the willful domination of the colonizers over the colonized. What is missing is a perspective that can reveal how colonial power exists and operates as an impersonal force through a multiplicity of sites and channels, through which the impersonal forces may still linger in the absence of a discernable colonizer. Failing to conceive of colonial power as a network of relations, a political critique of colonialism may run the risk of perpetuating a monolithic, universal definition of colonialism that can account for neither related transformations nor spaces of possible resistance.

Malleable Coloniality and the Constitution of Chineseness

The urgent need to develop a critical intellectual project that can go beyond a mere political critique of colonialism is also prompted by the fact that narratives of their colonial pasts bear heavily upon how Hong Kong people’s self-identification and how the Chinese in Hong Kong conceive of their Chineseness. In the nineties, when everybody was taking an interest in observing the final chapter of British imperialism and the handover of Hong Kong’s sovereign power from Britain to China, the notion of Chineseness was thoroughly interrogated by the emergent cultural studies scholars. For example, informed by a diasporic perspective, Rey Chow tried to re-imagine the field of Chinese
studies (presumably, in America), saying that “Chineseness can no longer be held as a monolithic given tied to the mythic homeland but must rather be understood as a provisional, ‘open signifier’”. (Chow 1998b: 24) Conceiving Chineseness in its plural forms, which could only be re-evaluated in what she put as “the catachrestic modes of its signification”, Chow called for an investigation into the very forms of the historical construction of Chineseness. Echoing Chow, Ien Ang (1998) went one step further by pushing the limits of the diasporic paradigm in not just pluralizing Chineseness but in allowing the rejection of Chineseness as defining one’s ethnicity, arguing for a more contextualized assessment of the “differential politics of Chineseness”. Inspired by both Chow and Ang’s critiques of Chineseness, Hong Kong cultural studies, especially in its period of rapid emergence in the nineties, bolstered cultural criticisms of all kinds against looming Chinese nationalism. Criticizing the essentializing tendencies manifested in those Chinese nationalistic discourses, diasporic cultural studies passionately argue for a kind of post-colonial politics which can engage battles on two fronts: that is to say, they try to safeguard Hong Kong as a space for identification where both British colonialism and chauvinistic Chinese nationalisms can be held in check.

However, the limitations of diasporic critiques of Chineseness in offering a critical perspective for post-1997 cultural politics are also obvious. On the one hand, generally delegitimizing anti-colonial critiques done under the banner of Chinese nationalism may risk short-circuiting reflections on the colonial experiences Hong Kong has undergone. On the other hand, overstretching the methodological principle of anti-essentialism may also impede cultural resistances that attempt to affirm a distinct cultural identity for Hong Kong. For example, people may need to look beyond the diasporic anti-nativist critiques to find justification for the now growing interest in preserving Hong Kong’s heritage and collective memory. For, the ethics of unanchored cosmopolitanism, which is often embedded in the diasporic anti-nativism, contribute little to substantiate the wake of historical consciousness among Hong Kong citizens, let alone to lend support to the social efforts in defending against the globalist developmentalist ideology’s encroachment on local cultures and communities. Failing to offer a located intellectual project, the ambivalent posture of this type of “post-identity” politics is also attributed to its inability to offer a vantage point to critically retrieve or re-appraise Hong Kong’s colonial past. In short, what is missing from these cultural studies on Hong Kong is precisely a serious consideration of Hong Kong’s historical past in general, and colonialism in particular, which gave shape to the present self-representation and identity of Hong Kong Chinese.
Another difficulty, which prevents scholars from giving the colonial experiences of Hong Kong adequate and thorough treatment in their efforts to deconstruct Chineseness, involves their tendency to conceptualize national or sub-national identities as standing in opposition to colonialism. It is a kind of implicit binary framework onto which even the anti-nativist deconstructive efforts are still clinging. That is to say, even when Chineseness is interrogated by post-colonial critics, it is still treated as something dissociable from colonialism and colonial history. The methodological error involved here is that both nationalism and colonialism are taken out of the regional historical contexts in which they were indeed deeply interwoven. Hence, a genuinely critical post-colonial approach can only be possible if it can depart from the narrow “ethnic” conception of Chineseness, which takes Chinese as referring only to certain pre-existent belongingness. On the contrary, the continuous process of how Chinese identity was constantly disembedded and reintegrated, within the sites and channels where colonial power effectuated, creating mosaics of Hong Kong culture, has to be understood. To discern in every turn of these long processes how pervasive colonial power (either that of the British colonizers or that of other Western powers) can be is very important since it conditioned how Chinese identity has been received, perceived, and experienced. Because those interconnected forms of colonial power always functioned in establishing discursive and non-discursive possibilities and boundaries for different forms of Chinese subjectivity to be constituted and negotiated.

By simultaneously engaging with issues of the pervasiveness of colonial power and the contestable identity of Hong Kong Chinese, this book tries to go beyond either describing Hong Kong culture as of a hybrid kind or documenting the existence of collaboration already highlighted by some Hong Kong historians. Instead, in order to subvert the residual conceptual binarism in postcolonial cultural studies, the book attempts to give Hong Kong Chineseness and colonial history a proper treatment in which their interfacing will be laid bare. In this light, this book seizes upon collaboration as a key to found an extended analytical framework within which to grasp the power formation of Hong Kong. It is not to argue that Hong Kong is the only place where colonial rule relied on collaboration but the existence of pervasive collaborative relations is taken as providing a convenient but often-neglected access to understanding the irregularly shaped cultural landscapes of Hong Kong. This book will account for the large variety of interests and forces involved in order to show the mobility and the variability these colonial cultural forms (i.e. colonialities) manifested.

Given the rapid reconfiguration of power politics in the post-1997 era, I would consider that the stake is high concerning whether we can intellectually grasp such malleable but enduring colonialities. For it bears on whether we can avoid being trapped methodologically by an anti-imperialist logic, which often
operates in complicity with nation-state. Throughout this book, several guiding questions inform my investigation of Hong Kong’s coloniality:

Historically, how did this colonial-power formation come about? (Chapter 1)

What were the main cultural institutions involved in the power formation in the early colonial period? (Chapters 2, 3)

How did this power formation operate not just as a political superstructure that the British imperialist state imposed on the native Chinese but also as a site of cultural production collaboratively constituted by the British and the Chinese? (Chapters 3, 4)

How did this particular colonial formation interact with the emerging project(s) of Chinese nationalism and the Chinese nation-state(s)? (Chapters 4, 5)

How did this formation give rise to the configuration of Hong Kong as a new political and cultural entity? (Chapters 5, 6)

Finally, how did this configuration of culture and power continue to influence the self-understanding of the people living within the configuration — self-understanding that set the scene for cultural politics in Hong Kong right up to the eve of its return to China? (Chapter 7, 8)

Part I (Chapters 1 through 3) of the book focuses on the emergent formation of collaborative colonialism in the early colonial era: from the First Opium War (1840–1842) to the 1911 Republican Revolution. I will closely inspect cultural and educational institutions and their roles in the collaborative-power formation. Part II (Chapters 4 through 6) will deal with the cultural politics of Chineseness in Hong Kong throughout the Republican period, the Cold War, and the years leading up to 1997; I will examine different modes of Hong Kong’s in-between state to demonstrate the dynamics around the contested cultural and political constitution of Hong Kong Chineseness. Part III (Chapters 7 and 8) examines the ideological and cultural transformation that occurred prior to the sovereignty handover in 1997 and probes into the degree to which colonialism is still a lingering presence in Hong Kong. The conclusion will deal with the theorization of colonial power and reflects upon certain methodological issues involved.
A Victorian saying went like this: by acquiring Hong Kong, Great Britain had cut a notch in the body of China as a woodsman cuts a notch in a great oak he is presently going to fell. As a “notch,” Hong Kong, seized by the British navy in the First Opium War (1840–1842), has possessed a value that can never be measured in terms of territorial conquest. The British sought a place where they could establish an independent commercial and military base free from the bureaucratic Qing government and the Cohong system that restricted foreign trade to be conducted in Canton only. Hong Kong was chosen for its offshore location despite it being only a sparsely populated, geographically barren island. The goal of the British imperialists was to establish their own judicial system with which to govern the activities of their merchants, under the military protection of the British navy (Endacott 1964a, b, c; Norton-Kyshe 1971). It was out of these concerns that Britain was determined not to make Hong Kong just another Macau, the tiny peninsula that the Portuguese officially governed but which the Chinese government kept running as their own. In contrast, the British exercised truly colonial control over Hong Kong, which stood as a model for subsequent treaty ports.

The West’s defeat of China in the First Opium War dealt a heavy blow to the pride of the Qing Empire and to the Chinese gentry; the surging nationalist movements thereafter all considered the war a historic humiliation for China and insisted on claiming that the annexation was forced upon the Chinese by what they saw as an unequal treaty. There is no doubt that Britain accrued enormous benefits from its possession of this tiny treaty port; however, for more than a century after its cession as a war indemnity (at least until the 1980s), successive Chinese governments were equally reluctant to make the reclamation of Hong Kong a national priority. Therefore, although Chinese nationalist rhetoric always complained about “the loss of Hong Kong”, the Chinese had an important stake in Hong Kong too.
However, Chinese interests in Hong Kong have never been adequately theorized in the present dominant paradigm of Hong Kong studies, which seldom goes beyond describing the place’s peculiarity. Works of this trend always begin with the authors’ professed fascination with Hong Kong, a fascination that smacks of a certain exoticism and that usually concerns Hong Kong’s uninterrupted prosperity and protracted political stability; then, the political analyses will discuss the geo-strategic expediency of the place; the sociologists will rant about Chinese political apathy; the economists will make a big fuss about Hong Kong’s “nearly-perfect” market (e.g. Lau, S.K. 1982; King 1972; Rabushka 1979). These studies invariably assume Hong Kong to be a unique entity and try to unlock its presumed mystery. They share among themselves a tendency to abstract Hong Kong from its historical and spatial contexts, in particular its colonial milieu. They either treat Hong Kong colonial rule as an exception or turn colonialism into an entirely positive factor, if they do not totally neglect its presence. All in all, they propose a paradigm of Hong Kong exceptionalism and thus try to get around the serious theoretical challenges that require rigorous scholars to give Hong Kong colonialism its due regard. By treating the Hong Kong colonial government as exceptionally benign, or Hong Kong’s markets as exceptionally perfect, or Hong Kong Chinese as exceptionally acquiescent, these researchers have seldom probed into Hong Kong colonialism as colonialism. In short, these researchers treat Hong Kong colonialism as a mere historical contingency. Consequently, Ackbar Abbas’s (1997) characterization of Hong Kong culture as one of “reverse hallucination” — in the sense that onlookers are “not seeing what is there” — proves to be highly perceptive. Most of these scholarly works examine the colony while attempting to explain away Hong Kong’s colonialism.

The cost of such intellectual expediency is dire, I must say. In concrete terms, the exceptionalist paradigm always misses opportunities not only to take up Hong Kong particularities as contradictions inherent in its colonial rule, but also to take those alleged anomalies as epistemological challenges to the respective paradigms of the concerned disciplines. For example, few researchers therein would make use of Hong Kong as a vantage point from which they would examine either the theoretical and the empirical problems of colonial studies or, in terms of the whole Asian political economy, the hegemonic consensus between the colonizer and the colonized. Nor have these researchers thoroughly discussed the influences of this particular colonial formation on China and on Chinese nationalism.

However, recent exceptions to this trend are evident in the contributions made by scholars such as John Carroll (2005), Christopher Munn (2001), Hui Po-keung (1999), and Stephanie Po-yin Chung (1998), each of who follows a
unique path toward a revision of the Hong Kong studies paradigm. Some of these scholars raise attention to collaboration, a dimension relatively neglected in the aforementioned Hong Kong studies; for example, John Carroll (2005) highlights the collaboration between the British colonists and the Chinese elite, accounting therein for the rise of Hong Kong’s Chinese elite into a full-fledged bourgeoisie by the late nineteenth century; Christopher Munn (2001) also takes advantage of the angle of collaboration but stresses the coercive ways of colonial governance in the first three decades after cession. These scholars present and explore new materials and analytical concepts to redirect approaches to Hong Kong studies. Indeed, any interested scholars can mobilize new resources from the research that has been emerging since the late seventies, when studies began to draw attention to the historical emergence of an Asian regional economy. For example, migration studies have revealed the great significance of Southeast Asia’s rapidly developing coastal cities for the formation of a regional trading network that long pre-dated the Europeans’ arrival (Chang, P. 1991; Reid 1996; Mackie 1989; Brown 1994; Wang, G. 1981, 1991). These studies shed light on the development of Hong Kong and, it is reasonable to argue, open up new perspectives for the study of contemporary China (Steinberg 1987; Tate 1979). Glimpses of these new pictures will enable us to see that, before European expansion into the region, Chinese merchants (particularly those from the southern provinces like Amoy and Swatow) indeed occupied dominant economic positions. They actively participated in both tribute and private trade between China, Java, Siam, Malacca, and the Ryukyuan Kingdom. As sojourning merchants or settlers, they established close commercial relationships among these port cities and controlled the vast trade networks of South China, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia. Long before the Opium Wars, many coastal Chinese were already in close contact with Europeans as a result of the latter’s trading in commodities such as tea, porcelain, silk, and foodstuffs (e.g. Jansen 1992; Carroll 1997, 1999; Hui 1999). With commercial activities manifest in the coastal Chinese regional networks, in Southeast Asian economies, and in the European-dominated New World, a class of elite transnationals arose around Hong Kong and exercised considerable economic clout (Mackie 1989; Wang, G. 1981a, b, 1991; Uchida 1959).

Colonialism as Configured by the Local and the Regional

The rise of European power in the Southeast Asian region went hand in hand with the Europeans’ collaboration with the Chinese. The militarily stronger Europeans, who arrived in full force only in the late nineteenth century, soon
realized the importance of encouraging the regional trade that was firmly controlled by the Chinese. The Europeans had to rely on the Chinese business networks to expand economically and politically into the region, particularly as the European powers tended to destroy indigenous trading communities in the region (Hao 1970; Brown 1994; Reid 1990). According to Hui Po-keung’s account, the advantage of the Chinese over the latecomer Europeans lay in the former group’s ability to speak local languages as well as their familiarity with domestic customs and business practices. According to Hui, the Europeans chose Chinese merchants as collaborators because

The overseas Chinese ... were “lost children” of their imperial court and a marginal trading minority in Southeast Asia. Not only did they present no serious political or military threat, but also the colonial powers saw in them a means to deflect anger that might otherwise be directed against the colonial power, and to control anti-colonial movements centered in conquered peoples. While the loss of independence for indigenous states meant that indigenous traders lost military and political support for their trading activities, as well as access to key trading commodities such as pepper and weapons for long distance trade, the Chinese, by contrast, were regarded as suitable partners.

(Hui 1999: 32)

The overall effect of nineteenth-century European colonial expansion on this region was the inclusion of Chinese merchants in the newly arisen global networks; yet the dependence of the Europeans on the Chinese also helped boost the ability of some Chinese merchants to dominate intra-Asian trade, including trade with China’s hinterlands. The role of these Chinese collaborators became even more prominent as late-Qing imperial policy monopolized Chinese trade and restricted Chinese merchants’ trade with Europeans to a few coastal ports. Without the help of the Chinese collaborators, the Europeans would hardly have been able to reach China’s vast inland market. Among all the European competitors, the British distinguished themselves owing to their more effective and successful use of Chinese networks (Carroll 1997, 1999).

Robinson (1972) considers the Chinese-European collaborations as only part of a wider process that inaugurated an “external or informal stage of industrial imperialism,” in which “Ottoman rayahs, Levantine traders, Chinese Mandarins, Indian Brahmins and African chiefs” were gradually turned into Europeanized collaborators by “free trade and Christianity” (Robinson 1972: 126–130). He focuses on the collaborative systems between Europeans and non-Europeans in order to uncover the “non-European foundations of European imperialism,” which prepared for a distinct stage of Europe’s expansion. In short, identifying the existence of collaborative colonial formation can have
a significant theoretical effect on our understanding of the global history of imperialism and colonialism.

My purpose here is, however, much more self-consciously limited, for it concerns the features of the distinct regional and local power formation that resulted from collaboration in Hong Kong. Such a local perspective is important for Hong Kong studies because it will help put in place a series of new questions seldom raised. Crucial among them are questions concerning the usual images that Chinese nationalist historiographers present and that portray Chinese as occupying a subordinate position in the face of Western superiority. One adverse consequence of this victim narrative is its flip side: chauvinism. For example, China subsumes Hong Kong under the conventional East-West paradigm, from which the conventional modern Chinese nationalist historiographical tradition derives. Consequently, whatever happens to Hong Kong becomes simply a sideshow compared with China’s national-revival struggles. Such a China-centered narrative would affirm Hong Kong only as the margin and China only as the center and would, by neglecting the complex regional historical dynamics, perpetuate both the narrow political definition of colonialism and the barren focus on Hong Kong exceptionalism.

At any rate, the regional perspective can help to make a better sense of one crucial irony that Stephanie Po-yin Chung has succinctly described: “As a British colony, Hong Kong ironically had been “colonized” by settlers from South China” (Chung 1998: 21). The irony has to be understood in at least two senses: first, it was the colonization of Hong Kong that made possible the large-scale settlement of Chinese in Hong Kong; second, some Chinese were indeed active upholders of the British colonial enterprise. Yet, the fact that some Chinese benefited from British expansion might not be that surprising if we take a regional perspective to consider the long record of collaboration between Chinese and British powers all over Southeast Asia. The British conquest of native places, accompanied by a huge influx of Chinese settlers, had indeed become the normal pattern throughout the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century.

**Opium and Coolie; Building and Contracting**

During the massive rise in Britain’s opium sales to China, most Chinese merchants who joined the British in commercial affairs did so as opium traders (Beattie 1969; Trocki 1990, 1999; Brook and Wakabayashi 2000). During the war with China, the collaboration of Chinese merchants with the British ranged from supplying the British navy to spying for pro-British military purposes.
These collaborators played an important role in the Opium Wars — so much so that Captain Charles Elliot, the British superintendent of trade, argued that the British crown had an obligation to retain Hong Kong “as an act of justice and protection to the native population upon whom we have been so long dependent for assistance and supply” (CO 129/1, Elliot to Auckland, June 21, 1841, quoted in Carroll 1999).

Apart from trading in opium, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia actively supplied the British with labor for projects such as housing construction. According to Carroll, it was Chinese contractors, builders, and laborers who usually undertook, at that time, the major construction works in the European colonies. Right after the cession of Hong Kong, quite a number of Chinese flocked there to help the British literally build the new colony (Carroll 1999, 2005: Ch. 1; see also Smith 1985: 114–116). Although some British officials still perceived Hong Kong as a barren rock several years after the cession, Hong Kong experienced, with the help of the Chinese, a historic building boom during its first decade. Not only did the Chinese of the Canton region flock to Hong Kong to build a colony for the British, but some even returned from other Southeast Asian European colonies to help with the British colony’s coastal projects. After all, the returning migrants considered the coast their home country and earned their fortunes in Hong Kong as property speculators. According to Hui, this fast and highly opportunistic influx of Chinese labor and capital into Hong Kong was just one case among many that constituted the common pattern of overseas Chinese merchants’ movement into and out of China. These migrant Chinese merchants established residences in all of Southeast Asia’s important port cities and moved wherever European expansion led them (Hui 1999: 31). The few thousand original inhabitants of Hong Kong, who were scattered in a few villages on the island, might well have attached the label “intruders” to these droves of Chinese coming from elsewhere to help the British. Thus Lethbridge writes, “A new settlement of overseas Chinese had been created, which in many respects had more in common with any Chinese community in Southeast Asia than with imperial China itself” (Lethbridge 1978).

While collaboration between the Chinese and the British was driven by profit, for some overseas Chinese settlers, the prospect of material gain did not adequately explain their enthusiasm. These other settlers hoped to use the British occupation to reverse their fate as socially marginalized persons. For example, prominent among these collaborators were Loo Aqui and Kwok Acheong, well-known Chinese opium smugglers, and Tam Achoy, a contractor who came from Singapore, to where he had earlier migrated illegally. Loo and Kwok were both Tanka (boat people), a group that had long been outcast by the inland Han Chinese (Smith 1985). For more than a thousand years, the Tanka
had been treated as uncivilized people or sea pirates and had been discriminated against by the landed people (Ward 1954; Kani 1967; Hayes 1977; Hung 1997). Denied the same rights as landed people, they were prohibited from taking the civil service examination (*ke ju*), owning landed property and marrying inland inhabitants. As a floating population who were not self-sufficient, Tanka had to trade with landed Han people and to participate in all sort of legal and illegal trading and smuggling activities at sea. Together with other overseas Chinese merchants, they formed the backbone of the Chinese who collaborated with the British to colonize Hong Kong. Collaboration with the Westerners brought to them not only economic gain but also advancement in political and social status. In return for their help, the British granted them land, and they were able to speculate on property and became rich (Carroll 1999). To reverse their fate of political exclusion, some of those successful under the British rule assumed the function of leaders of the local gentry, equivalent to traditional literati. The difference, as I will later show, was only that, under British rule, they did not have to take the civil service examination and earn imperial degrees in order to acquire the status of Chinese gentry.

In the very first decades of this relationship, both Europeans and Chinese got rich through land speculation or opium trade, although it was not the British government’s original intention to make Hong Kong a new colony whose chief function would be to accommodate the infamous business. Government ministers in London tried to control, through legislated prohibitions or heavy duties, the export of opium from the island — at least until legal trade in opium was agreed to by the Qing government. Commonly bandied about by promoters of the Opium Wars and the new colony was the claim that, with the opening of a more general commerce with China, British merchants would quickly see their dependence on opium shift to a healthier preoccupation with developing British manufactures. However, for much of the remainder of the century, the shipment of opium to China continued to be a vital part of the colony’s economy (Trocki 1990, 1999; see also Brook and Wakabayashi 2000; Miners 1983). It is estimated that three-quarters of the entire Indian opium crop was passing through Hong Kong by the late 1840s (Munn 2000: 107); and Davis, the second governor of Hong Kong (1844–1848), reported soon after his arrival that almost every person possessed of capital who was not connected with government employment was employed in the opium trade. Munn describes the relationship between opium and Hong Kong as follows:

The opium trade and Hong Kong are so obviously intertwined that it is hardly possible to consider the early history of the colony without some reference to the drug: the colony was founded because of opium; it survived its difficult early years because of opium; its principal
merchants grew rich on opium; and its government subsisted on the high land rent and other revenue made possible by the opium trade. Early Chinese traders came to the colony to deal in opium; the drug became standard currency for remittances from Chinese living in Hong Kong to their native places on the mainland; pirated or disputed consignments of opium dominated many judicial proceedings; and opium balls cluttered the colony’s numerous pawnbrokers’ shops.

(Munn 2000: 107)

In fact, the continued growth of the opium trade in the 1840s actually held back the development of regular trade between England and China. Some people thought that the cession of Hong Kong would additionally benefit the British there by attracting trade previously carried out under Canton’s monopoly; however, the opening of several treaty ports at the same time along the China coast, ironically, rendered the new colony a less than ideal place for regular legal trade. Except as an opium depot or as a military base for the widely predicted second Sino-British war (1858–1860), Hong Kong had little to offer. If not for its role as a safe warehouse for the goods coming in from the illicit opium stations scattered along the coast, the British would have abandoned the colony before the end of the 1840s. The “poppy lords” did not allow any such abandonment to happen, as they always assumed that Hong Kong would be dedicated to the opium trade and had invested heavily in land and in buildings (Munn 2000: 107–8). The boom of the 1850s helped confirm Hong Kong’s status as the chief base for opium smuggling into China. By 1880, about 45 percent of opium flowing into China was smuggled through Hong Kong. This incarnation of the opium business lingered on for the rest of the nineteenth century and only ended in 1909 (Munn 1999).

What really pushed Hong Kong away from its status of being just an opium depot was the island’s reception of the second wave of Chinese immigrants driven by economic crises and wars. The so-called free trade that the West imposed on China led to the opening of treaty ports such as Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow, and Amoy, and its influence was deeply felt in southern China; Guangzhou (Canton) became the hardest-hit place (Hao 1986: 14–33; Tsai 1993:21; Ng 1983). The better-armed, swifter foreign vessels that entered the Chinese coastal trade drove many Cantonese junks out of business, and industrial products imported from foreign countries caused serious economic strain and dislocation among local handicraft industries (Feuerwerker 1969). Adding to the economic hardship was the Taiping Rebellion, which started in 1850 in neighboring Guangxi and rapidly spread to Guangdong and other southern provinces. The turmoil, which lasted for almost two decades, triggered an exodus of Cantonese; they fled the disorder on the Mainland for the relative order and security of Hong Kong. A
large surplus of labor was then available in the coastal regions; many of these potential laborers tried to immigrate to Southeast Asia, sometimes to join secret societies, bandit gangs, or pirate groups (Tsai 1993). The enormous pressure to emigrate from China created for Hong Kong not only a massive influx of population but also an opportunity to thrive on another business: coolie trade (Campbell 1923; Arensmeyer 1979; Sinn 1995; Yen 1985). James Legge (of the London Missionary Society) described the 1850s as the “turning point in the progress of Hong Kong” (Legge 1971). Between 1855 and 1900, almost 1.8 million Chinese emigrants embarked at the port of Hong Kong (Sinn 1995; Coolidge 1909; see also Tsai 1993). The high tide of colonial expansion in this period created a huge demand for contract laborers who would work on the large-scale rubber plantations and in the tin mines in Southeast Asia, on the construction of railroads in North America, and in the gold mines of North America and Australia. The Hong Kong economic base then broadened through the derived demand for transportation, shipbuilding and ship repairing; coolies’ remittances to their families in China also boosted Hong Kong’s financial sectors (Mei 1979; Tsai 1993: 26; Yen 1985). As a result, coolie trade, after the opium trade, became another mainstay of the early colonial Hong Kong economy.

Segregated Rule and the Formation of the Chinese Community

The official colonist rhetoric harped on the idea that Hong Kong should be “the great emporium of the China trade”; Governor John Bowring (1854–1859) vowed to make Hong Kong “a model of British good government.” Imagined by the colonists to be an Anglo-China, Hong Kong was supposed to play the role of “a living exhibition of European civilization, a meeting point between east and west, where the manners, institutions and technologies of both cultures would engage each other in a productive and beneficial way” (Munn, 2001: 2). However, the chaotic situations that arose during the colony’s first decade rendered the above political and cultural visions no more than empty words or colonialist clichés. One important factor that underlay the lack of a stable colonial project concerns Britain’s and the Qing government’s disagreement over the colony’s political status, particularly with regard to whether Qing officials in Hong Kong could exercise their power to the extent that Qing officials in Macau did (Ting 1989). The Qing government explored every means by which it could maintain its power over the Chinese population, and in the case of Hong Kong, such maintenance would symbolize the Qing Emperor’s sovereignty rights over the island. However, the British Colonial Office was firm in marking Hong Kong off from the Macau model, insisting on the Office’s claim to indivisible sovereignty
under which the British colonial government could exercise full administrative and judicial powers. Rounds of diplomatic tussles before and after the signing of the Treaty of Nanking (1842) left many controversial issues unresolved so that they sprang up time and again for more than a century. Yet all the British colonial governments generally maintained what Captain Elliot had proclaimed on February 2, 1841:

The natives of the island of Hong Kong and all natives of China thereto resorting, shall be governed according to the laws and customs of China; all British subjects and foreigners residing in, or resorting to, the island of Hong Kong, shall enjoy full security and protection, according to the principles and practice of British law.

(Norton-Kyshe 1971: 4–6)

However, Elliot’s principle lacked operational details. During the first few years that the Treaty of Nanking awaited rectification by the British parliament, and while details had to be negotiated with the Chinese Government, Elliot’s principle was a matter of fierce debate among different quarters on the British side. Many people questioned the viability and the practicality of such an approach, which placed Hong Kong people into different categories. Some suggested that the official treatment of permanent Chinese residents should differ from the official treatment of temporary Chinese residents; others proposed that, if the Qing’s administrative or judicial power were to remain in place, as the Qing government had been insisting, Hong Kong should allow Chinese residents to choose whether to be a Chinese subject or a British subject; still others considered whether it was possible, in Hong Kong, to have Chinese magistrates who would handle jurisdictional matters concerning Chinese (Endacott 1964b: 27–35; Munn 1999: 47).

In 1844, Governor John Davis showed his determination to exert British sovereign rights over Hong Kong by refusing the attempts of Qing officials to intervene into certain criminal cases involving Chinese residents within Hong Kong. Yet he also tried to realize the indirect-rule principle by framing an ordinance whose scheme, modeled after traditional Chinese local policing, would have created unpaid and elected local Chinese “peace officers,” (Paouchong and Paouken) to assist police in maintaining peace and order (Endacott 1964a: 57). Davis’ successor, Samuel Bonham (1848–1854), in 1853 suggested setting up some kind of limited local Chinese self-government system by hiring paid peace officers (tepos) to settle civil disputes among the Chinese (Endacott 1964a: 84–85). Nevertheless, all these schemes for an institutional mechanism in which local Chinese could build up a certain degree of self-rule eventually failed. Munn observes that the British colonists in the early decades failed to establish stable
and serviceable political links with any leadership of the Chinese community comparable to what the British had practiced in Singapore (Munn 2001: 2). As a result, the colonial government generally left the Chinese community much to itself, although historians are wrong to generalize that period as paradigmatic of British indirect rule in Hong Kong. Munn argues that an overemphasis on the autonomy of the Chinese community masks the fact that the British officials were quite unable to govern the unruly Chinese community and, therefore, always resorted to direct and top-heavy governments through political and legal measures. A strong indicator of that coercive direct rule over Chinese natives was indeed the maintenance by the early colonial regime of one of the largest police forces in the British Empire.

The indirect-rule principle was not easily applicable in Hong Kong, as it was in other British colonies. In 1844, the Colonial Treasurer expressed his uneasiness about the dearth of “respectable” Chinese leaders in Hong Kong and attributed this dearth to the policy of the hostile Chinese Government. He wrote,

It is literally true that after three years and a half’s uninterrupted settlement there is not one respectable Chinese inhabitant on the island ... The policy of the Mandarins on the adjacent coast being to prevent all respectable Chinese from settling at Hong Kong; and in consequence of the hold they possess on their families and relatives this can be done most effectually. At the same time, I believe that they encourage and promote the deportation of every thief, pirate, and idle or worthless vagabond from the mainland to Hong Kong.... No Chinese of humbler class will ever bring their wives and children to the colony. The shopkeepers do not remain more than a few months on the island, when another set takes their place; there is, in fact, a continual shifting of a Bedouin sort of population, whose migratory, predatory, gambling, and dissolute habits utterly unfit them for continuous industry, and render them not only useless, but highly injurious subjects, in the attempt to form a colony.

(Endacott 1964c: 96–8, quoted in Smith 1985: 111)

Samuel Fearon, the Census and Registration Officer, worried much about internal law and order. He wrote in 1845,

The arrival of the British fleet in the harbour speedily attracted a considerable boat population, and the profits accruing from the supply of provisions and necessaries at once raised many from poverty and infamy to considerable wealth. The shelter and protection afforded by the presence of the fleet soon made our shores the resort of outlaws, opium smugglers, and indeed, of all persons who had rendered themselves obnoxious to the Chinese laws, and had the means of escaping hither. In course of time the demands for labour, for the public and other
works drew some thousands to the island, the majority of whom were Hakkas or gypsies; people whose habits, character and language mark them as a distinct race. Careless of the ties of home and of those moral obligations, the observance of which is deemed absolutely necessary to the preservation of the national integrity, uneasy under the restraint of law and unscrupulous of the means by which they live, they abandon without hesitation their hearths and household gods, their birthright and their father’s tombs, to wander, unrespected, whither gain may call them. The unsettled state of the Colony, and the vast amount of crime during its infancy afford abundant proof of the demoralizing effects of their presence.

(CO 129/12, 24 June, 1845, quoted in Smith 1985: 108)

Regardless of any bias or racial arrogance that characterizes these remarks, they seem to confirm what the Chinese authorities predicted in the *Canton Register* in 1841: that under British jurisdiction, the island would become even more popular with social outcasts; that “Hong Kong will be the resort and rendezvous of all the Chinese smugglers”; and that “Opium smoking shops and gambling-houses will soon spread; to those haunts will flock all the discontented and bad spirits of the empire” (Canton Register 23 February, 1841; quoted in Smith 1985: 107). In fact, apart from the international trade in opium and coolies, open gambling houses and brothels were the only local businesses that the “new rich” of Hong Kong were likely to establish. But the most important factor for this dearth of “respectable” Chinese leaders in Hong Kong concerns the fact that the majority of the Chinese population in Hong Kong then were male immigrants or sojourners attached to no local village. The British could not secure the cooperation of village elders simply because there were extremely few village elders in the colony. In fact, the immigrant population soon took over the native villages, thus rendering it difficult or useless for the colonial government to co-opt the traditional local leaders.

The (Self-)Making of the Colonial Hong Kong Chinese Elite

Hong Kong lacked a well-defined local Chinese community that possessed strong local leadership; in this absence, the British idea of dual administration soon evolved into a constitutionally centralized, but operationally self-limiting, governance. The colonial government kept almost autocratic power in the hands of the governor; Chinese residents were subject to crude coercive measures such as nightly curfew, elaborate registration schemes, and other surveillance and policing practices. Tensions between the Europeans and the Chinese were quite pronounced, especially in the mid-1850s, when a series of incidents led to the
Second Opium War (1856-1860). Ernst Johann Eitel, a missionary and secretary to the governor, wrote in the 1890s of an “unbridged chasm” between the Chinese and the Europeans (Eitel 1895). The effective segregation of the two communities from each other had a long-lasting impact on the colonial regime, one of which was its failure to devolve governmental power to the municipal level. For example, the central colonial government had to levy rates for police pay because any devolution of power on the part of local bodies would, according to conventional wisdom, easily trigger conflict between Europeans and Chinese. In this light, early colonial Hong Kong appears to have operated under an informal segregated rule rather than under conventional indirect rule.

However, the spatial separation of the two communities resulted from their mutually practiced segregation. The separation eventually created a new foundation for a more stable indirect rule, as a new type of collaborative relationship gradually took shape. Chinese war collaborators such as Tam Achoy and Loo Aqui rapidly amassed their wealth through opium trade and through the land granted by the British; a Chinese class of “new rich” gradually evolved, and its members were invariably interested in land and property speculation. Also, as the colonial government wanted to reserve the more valuable waterfront properties for the Europeans, the Chinese were encouraged to relocate in specified areas that were quite separate from the waterfront. The concentration of Chinese in the exclusive zone called “Chinatown” near Tai Ping Shan enabled local Chinese leadership to grow independent of British governmental processes (Evans 1970; Chan 1991). Former war collaborators gradually became local leaders because they were wealthy enough to donate money to notable charity services; moreover, the close association of these individuals with powerful secret societies conferred on them significant political clout among the Chinese.

One of the landmark events delineating leadership status in the Chinese community — one that also transformed the “unrespectable” Chinese to “respectability” — was the building, in 1847, of the Man Mo Temple by Loo and Tam; the place later functioned not only as a religious site but also as a social center from which the Chinese exercised a certain informal self-government (Lethbridge 1978: ch. 4; Ting 1989). Generally not regarded by the British as respectable persons, and regarded by the Qing government as traitors, the founders of the temple nevertheless formed the first generation of Hong Kong Chinese community leaders whose main political function was to mediate between the colonial government and the Chinese.² The temple also functioned as an unofficial link between the Hong Kong Chinese and the Canon authorities. As described by Eitel, Man Mo Temple “secretly controlled native affairs, acted as commercial arbitrators, arranged for the due reception of mandarins passing through the colony, [and] negotiated the sale of [Qing’s] official titles” (Eitel 1895: 282).
In traditional rural China, the elite, or gentry, usually served as intermediaries between the local people and governmental authorities; the government recruited them from the ranks of scholars, who normally obtained degrees from the imperial examination system. A person who excelled in the examination would receive an appointment to a government office, and such an appointment translated into the opportunity to accumulate economic wealth. As a member of the gentry remained a member of his village, local leaders and governmental bodies usually maintained close connections with each other. However, Hong Kong farmers had produced few, if any, scholars or literati; Hong Kong Chinese fishermen did not have kin ties with the gentry. Therefore, the colonial administration could not simply build relationships with the ordinary Chinese on the basis of an old gentry class. However, the economic growth of the 1850s and the 1860s for the opium trade and the coolie trade created favorable conditions for the emergence of this small group of Chinese elite, which comprised contractors, merchants, compradors, government servants, and Christian employees of missionary groups (Smith 1985). Mixing with the newly immigrated wealthy merchants from Canton, the gentry gradually transformed themselves into part of the new elite Chinese or, in John Carroll’s description, the first local bourgeoisie (Carroll 2005). Their emergence opened up the possibility that a new pattern of collaborative colonial relationships would take shape. After the mid-1860s, the legal system in Hong Kong functioned with fewer and less pronounced discriminatory measures among races; also, under the more “humanistic” governorship of Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell (1866–1872), a new partnership between the Chinese elite and the colonial authorities became possible. The landmark signifying the stabilization of indirect rule through these locally grown elite began with the establishment of Tung Wah Hospital. The new form of collaboration is nicely encapsulated in the title of Sinn’s book on this institution: *Power and Charity* (Sinn 1989).

**Philanthropy as Collaborative Institution**

Tung Wah Hospital was established in 1872; it was the core institution of the new form of collaborative colonialism. Its establishment was to address the Chinese needs for welfare and medical services. As many of the poor in early colonial Hong Kong were sojourners from mainland China, death on their journey to Hong Kong created a problem because traditional Chinese custom insisted on burial in one’s place of origin. In 1851, the colonial government granted a piece of land to the Chinese for them to house the ancestral tablets of those deceased who did not have families in Hong Kong. The frequent abuse of this unregulated
place by moribund Chinese prompted a subscription campaign that called for the establishment of a properly run Chinese hospital. The founding directors of the hospital were all prominent Chinese figures — mostly either compradors working for the European companies or merchants from guilds such as the Nam Pak Hong (Nam Pak Hong 1979). Some other directors were self-appointed Kaifong (street committee) leaders whom one analyst described as a group of “civic-minded, status-seeking and paternalistic citizens” (Lethbridge 1978). However, though set up initially as a philanthropic enterprise, the hospital’s functions were never purely medical. It dispensed Chinese justice as well as Chinese medicine, and was encouraged by the government to give advice on various government policies. As the institution developed, it also started to settle minor civic disputes, manage temples, and build schools; occasionally, it petitioned the government, calling for the redress of grievances. The colonial government, happy to see the directorate act in ways that helped manage the Chinese, even allowed the Registrar-General, who had been trained in the cadet service and equipped with a good knowledge of the Chinese language, to participate in their work — in short, the colonial government gave the hospital a quasi-official standing.

The hospital was indeed a bizarre and slightly odd version of the structure of gentry rule, the existence of which, in Hong Kong, was rather rudimentary at the time of the arrival of the British. Yet, it followed the previous exemplary hybrid organization, the District Watch Committee (founded in 1867) in mixing Chinese and British traditions. During Governor John Pope Hennessy’s rule (1877–1883), the influence and the authority of the hospital reached new heights: the directorate of the hospital began to act as though it had inherited the magisterial function of the traditional petty Mandarins. Moreover, the hospital’s unconstitutional status enabled the hospital to assert itself, culturally and politically, far beyond what the British had anticipated. Lethbridge records that “at the formal opening of the Hospital in 1872, the full committee, some 70 or 80 in number, were all dressed in the Mandarin costume, some even with peacock’s feathers attached to their buttons” (Lethbridge 1978: 61). Similarly, in 1878, during a visit by the governor, 300 influential native residents from all classes of the community were present, and some 50 or 60 of them were in Mandarin costumes, some of which sported blue buttons, some crystal, and some gold, while a few had the additional honor of wearing the peacock’s feather (Lethbridge 1978: 61). In the Qing dynasty, buttons and feathers on Mandarin costumes signified a detailed official ranking. It was difficult to tell whether those people wearing Mandarin costumes had acquired these signifiers in a regular way or an irregular way, or whether they wore them as sheer masquerade. Yet, the costumes were effective in signaling both to the colonial authority and to the local inhabitants that the
wearers were somehow endowed with an effective magisterial power within the Chinese community. Rather than display an alien colonial rule imposed on the Chinese, the presence of a British governor in such ceremonies only reinforced the perception of the continuity of sheer *imperial* power, whether British or Qing. Though authorized by no one to do so, the new Hong Kong Chinese elite was eager to play this role. Such highly ritualistic practices demonstrate that the hospital’s directorate, and thus the rising Hong Kong Chinese elite, were keen on imagining themselves to have gained social advancement in very Chinese terms under British colonial rule.

If the role of self-imagined gentry that this new elite played under the British legislation was merely symbolic and ritualistic, such gesture, however, facilitated their real attainment of status in China. In real terms, the directorate interested itself not only in the general welfare of the Chinese population within Hong Kong, but also in the neighboring Chinese provinces. The hospital’s active participation in activities that organized Hong Kong and overseas Chinese and that, for example, raised money for flood relief in China gradually earned the hospital some formal recognition from the Chinese emperor. Such activities also gave the hospital further access to formal bodies of power within the Chinese government. Zhang Zidong, the famous reformist official, at one stage made use of Tung Wah’s connections in order to reach, and to collect information from, the increasingly influential overseas Chinese communities. He sent instructions to the hospital in Hong Kong as if to a part of a Chinese administrative department (Sinn 1989: 137–149).

In the late 1890s, all this ostentatious display of political clout seemed to be sidestepping British sovereignty in Hong Kong, creating enmity on the part of the European community. This enmity erupted as a serious scandal, in which some Europeans accused the hospital of being a secret society and of subverting the colonial government, so the governor conducted a formal investigation to mollify the critics of the Chinese elite. Although the fairness of the investigation was in doubt, Tung Wah’s directorate was vindicated. And although the Hong Kong government retreated a bit in their recognition of Tung Wah’s special status after this event, the directorate continued to assume the role of Hong Kong’s gentry class (Sinn 1989: 150–156).

A person’s self-assumption of, and re-enactment of, the role of gentry, was significant in the Hong Kong context, as it simultaneously resurrected and turned around the cultural and political configuration of traditional Chinese local rule. Rather than gain their gentry status through exhibited excellence in Chinese classics, as was typical in the imperial examinations, this elite stratum manifested its ability to gain access to an imperial power representing not the Qing Emperor but the British Crown. British colonial officials, especially those
who were concerned with Chinese affairs, were content to see a body that could help attend to “Chinese” matters in “Chinese” ways. Although Governor Arthur Edward Kennedy (1872–1877) turned down the aggressive hospital directorate’s proposal for a Chinese Municipal Board that would function as a separate governing structure for Chinese, the hospital still attained an important status in advising the government concerning anything Chinese, and posed as the single Chinese voice under British colonial rule (Eitel 1895: 507).

The hospital directorate’s assumption of such a role as surrogate gentry reflected ingrained cultural aspirations as much as political calculations. Chinese officials had assigned the label traitor to many subsequently successful businessmen, either because they had left China at a time when the imperial government prohibited emigration or because they had helped the British in successive foreign intrusions. Now, however, these businessmen played the role of the gentry class and obtained recognition from both of the imperial powers. To compensate for their lack of cultural leadership (a lack that was evident in their unfamiliarity with traditionally praised excellence in Chinese classics), members of the new gentry class set themselves regular ritual observances identical to those of the literati-magistrates in imperial China: members of the new gentry attended the Man Mo Temple to participate in the spring and autumn sacrifices to Confucius. They also set up Confucius learning societies, built schools to teach Confucius’ teachings, and boasted that Confucian teaching gave them Chinese identity (Lethbridge 1978: ch. 3; Sinn 1989).

Fondness for Confucianism and a more general inclination toward traditionalism were phenomena particularly prominent in the late-nineteenth-century overseas Chinese community. Parallel cases could indeed be found in Southeast Asian colonies such as Penang and Singapore. This overseas Chinese traditionalism later found itself at odds with the more iconoclastic and revolutionary mood throughout mainland China at the turn of the century. However, in the 1870s, traditionalism, for this Hong Kong Chinese elite, was still significant in real terms: defense of the interests of the elite within a patriarchal system whose location was more and more influenced by Western ideas. This state of affairs leads us to the story of the Po Leung Kuk, a sister institution of Tung Wah Hospital.

**Patriarchy in Collaborative Colonialism**

When, in the New World, the widespread abolition of slavery came to fruition in the late nineteenth century, the demand for cheap labor there skyrocketed. This demand, in turn, spurred great demand for cheap labor from China. There
were only a few merchants in Hong Kong who did not have a hand in this profitable coolie trade. As mentioned before, the selling indentured labor was a core business that triggered early colonial Hong Kong’s economic development. The lucrative nature of the business, however, provoked abusive practices, such as kidnapping and the use of false premises to lure emigrants; it was reported that massive irregular forced emigration occurred all over the coastal regions of China. International pressures mounted to stop forced emigration, but the Qing government remained ineffective in regulating the emigration (Irck 1982; Yen 1985; Tsai 1993: ch. 4). Britain was also compelled to restrict the coolie trade among its colonies in order to stamp out kidnapping and other criminal practices therein. The Hong Kong Chinese elite were eager to exhibit their good intentions by helping the colonial government root out the illegal sale of human beings. Volunteering to expose cases of abuse in the emigration trade, the elite not only presented themselves as cooperative but took the initiative in such affairs, as well. Tung Wah Hospital soon shouldered the related responsibilities by employing two detectives who would report and stop crimes related to emigration; the hospital also the coordinated efforts, however limited in real terms, made by both the British government and the Chinese government.

As concerns about human rights gradually rose, international pressure was mounting and calls to prohibit servitude eventually came to include the sale of girls for prostitution. The inclusion of this particular trade in prohibited forms of servitude posed a significant threat to the Chinese patriarchal practice of buying girls from poor families and bringing them up as domestic servants: that is, the mui tsai system (Haslewood 1930). Hong Kong’s Chinese elite (most of whom were also Tung Wah directors) proposed the establishment of the Po Leung Kuk (Hong Kong Society for the Protection of Women and Children) to protect these victims from the rampant, abusive emigration trade. The elite asked for the authority to employ detectives, offer rewards for arrests, and return victims to their homes. However, with the exception of its protection services, including the very controversial practice of “marrying off” their clients, the Po Leung Kuk constituted an influential lobby that sought to ameliorate the impact of the new “sale-of-girls” ordinance. The society organized a series of London-bound petitions that opposed the ban on the mui tsai system (Smith 1981; Sinn 1989: 113–117). In short, the society defended Chinese custom, invoked Captain Elliot’s proclamation concerning segregated rule, and advocated legal exemptions for the wealthy who chose to practice mui tsai. The society put forward the argument of “cultural preservation,” interpreting mui tsai as a normal “social custom” that was far from being abusive. Refusing to admit that mui tsai is a form of child slavery, the society wanted only to distinguish legal sales from illegal sales. With their strong influence on some government officials and their well-entrenched
positions in Hong Kong’s power formation, the Po Leung Kuk held out against
the strong pressure of anti-mui tsai campaigners from Britain and Hong Kong
societies for decades (Smith 1981, 1995). It was only after many long and hard
struggles, which brought pressures to bear from the Colonial Office, the League
of Nations, Christian societies, missionaries on the ground, unionists, and
women activists, that the abolition of the mui tsai system came to pass in the
1920s.

The mui tsai struggles demonstrate very well the rather reactionary face of
indirect rule in Hong Kong, insofar as social reforms and the incessant quest
for progress were growing rapidly in China around the turn of the century.
Nevertheless, the conservatism of the colonial Chinese elite obtained protection
under the colonial system, even though campaigners’ efforts kept coming from
both the local society and the colonial home country. The complicity between
the Chinese and the British elements in the early collaborative colonial regime
would not have been possible without the help of certain individual governors
such as Kennedy and Hennessy, who favored the Chinese elite in exchange for
their support in matters such as fund-raising projects related or unrelated to
Hong Kong welfare. For example, Hennessy, an Irishman, was on very good
terms with Hong Kong’s Chinese businessmen, for they were particularly
more generous in contributing to the Irish Relief Fund than were Hong Kong’s
Europeans (Sinn 1989: 119). This close collaboration between the Chinese elite
and the localized British colonial officials in Hong Kong dominated both the
form of political power on the island and the ways to interpret Chinese cultural
values. The collaboration was a form of political power in which actors could
exploit charity work and charity institutions as a scaffold for the actors’ exercise
of social power in the name of cultural differences.

Man Mo Temple signified the unruly period of early segregated rule;
however, quasi-official charity institutions such as the Po Leung Kuk and Tung
Wah Hospital were characteristic of the collaborative colonialism that took root
in colonial Hong Kong. These institutions, although eclipsed by colonialist pro-
active interventions of the twentieth century, laid down the basic parameters
according to which collaboration between the British colonizers and the Chinese
elite functioned. Shuttling along the frontier between two empires, the Hong
Kong Chinese elite affirmed for themselves a distinct identity by securing a
social and political status that had been unimaginable under past Chinese
rule and by consolidating a bi-culturalism based upon reified notions of both
Western and Chinese cultures. Carroll observes that the remarkable growth of
the elite translated into the gradual emergence of a full-fledged bourgeoisie of
Hong Kong (Carroll 2005, ch. 4).
However, I would like to qualify Carroll’s observation. There is little evidence that a Chinese bourgeoisie, possessing its own class consciousness, characterized Hong Kong’s social landscape at that time. The Hong Kong Chinese elite, in the late nineteenth century, chose to play the role of a surrogate gentry that mimicked the roles played by their counterparts in mainland China. David Faure (2003) also cautions against the substitution of the word *elite* for the word *gentry* as they carry overlapping but still distinct connotations respectively in British cultural contexts and in traditional Chinese cultural contexts. To Faure, if a gentry shares in its locality’s Chinese dynastic governmental power, then the gentry legitimated dynastic rule. In the case of Hong Kong, the relatively complex composition of the island’s elite made any such legitimation problematic, if indeed the legitimation was not merely an effect created by scholars who conflated the western conception of elite with the Chinese conception of gentry. I would also maintain that the imaginary resurrection of traditional social roles by Hong Kong’s Chinese elite, reveals a lot about the political culture and the legacies of this hybrid class in power. On the one hand, they rose to prominence because of their wealth; on the other hand, they sought official recognition from the colonizer, as mainland Chinese gentry did from the emperor. Such a re-enactment of the traditional gentry role could not have been possible without a particular colonial situation in which the colonizer, to facilitate its governance of the colonized, had to allow for the collaborative Chinese “re-invention of tradition”. The cultural implications of the Chinese re-invention of patriarchal institutions in the name of philanthropy are profound because Hong Kong, by consolidating the surrogate-gentry’s power to preserve cultural conservatism, divorced itself from the iconoclastic and progressive challenges of the modern Chinese nationalism represented by the May Fourth Movement (1919) in China.

The legacies of this collaborative colonial formation in Hong Kong can still be found in much later eras, not only in the city’s conspicuous lack of a politically progressive bourgeoisie but also in its weak civil society. There is no class project of the bourgeoisie leading the society in the course of social reforms. The elite is, instead, easily prone to collaboration or even to collusion with whatever government is in power. They behave as if they are always in need of seeking recognition from the previous imperial authority or colonial master. At any rate, Hong Kong’s powerful class of Chinese has never developed a political project that would lead to autonomy for that same class; in other words, the Hong Kong Chinese elite do not build their *social* power in civil society, an arena separate from or even in opposition to the ruling government. What contemporary Hong Kong has inherited from its colonial past may be Chinese tycoons rich in wealth; but they are not a strong bourgeoisie. They carry with them the
lingering patriarchic values, associated conservative ways of life and the tradition of making collusive relations between governmental power and “civil society” organizations. Because, in Hong Kong’s long colonial past, practices of collaboration always pre-conditioned the growth of Hong Kong’s bourgeoisie as much as for the civil institutions that usually embody the pervasiveness of colonial power. Therefore, what is at stake for the Hong Kong Chinese elite’s legacy of collaborative practices is not so much the close partnership between the Chinese ruling elite and the European ruling elite as the quasi-governmental nature of most civil institutions in Hong Kong.

Collaboration is a key that can take us to look beyond a spurious dichotomy between the colonizer and the colonized and to recognize in early colonial Hong Kong the agential power of the Chinese gentry-elite, but it would be a glaring error not to consider how they bore the colonial imprints. For it is in this early phase that we see how the development of an autonomous bourgeoisie, like it happened in Europe, was both facilitated and thwarted in Hong Kong because Hong Kong’s development of collaborative power was premised precisely on a colonial milieu. To get to the collaborative as well as to the colonial nature of the power formation, I would argue, is the key approach by which we can understand Hong Kong’s political culture then and now.
Notes

Introduction

1. For a thorough critique of the historical narrative of Hong Kong’s past produced by mainland Chinese writers, see Wong (2000) and the introduction of Munn (2001).

Chapter 1

1. In 1845, there were as many brothels as families: twenty-five families and twenty-six brothels. It was only by the end of the 1840s that the number of families had increased to one hundred and had overtaken the number of brothels (Smith 1985: 113).

2. Lethbridge alleges that before the Tung Wah Hospital was founded, the leaders among the Chinese were members of secret societies like the Triad groups (Lethbridge 1978: 54-5).

3. The cadet service was a regular training program that equipped the colonial administrators from the homeland with an understanding of the Chinese language and Chinese culture. For details, see Lethbridge (1978: ch. 2)

4. The purchase of a degree from the Qing authority was officially endorsed in late imperial China, and many overseas Chinese spent huge sums of money for such honors. This practice was especially common in Malaysia and Singapore. See Yen (1970).

Chapter 2

1. Robert Morrison, for example, was in the East India Company’s employ as a translator and later acted as the secretary for Lord Napier, the Commercial Consul of the British Government (Chan 1988: 435). His son, J. R. Morrison, was Chinese Secretary for Henry Pottinger, the first governor of Hong Kong (Endacott 1964: 43). He moved the Anglo-Chinese School originally established in Malacca to Hong Kong soon after it fell under British control. Rev. Karl Gutzlaff, who suggested a grant to village schools in 1845, worked for the Jardine Company on an opium clipper and later succeeded J. R. Morrison as Pottinger’s Chinese Secretary (Endacott 1962: 106–107). In addition, Gutzlaff was a secretary and interpreter for the British fleet and was present at many of the operations during the First Opium War (Lutz 1987).

2. The most prominent ones included the Anglo-Chinese College of the London Missionary Society, St. Paul’s College of the Anglicans, and Morrison Memorial School of the Morrison Education Society.
3. Tensions and conflicts over the state’s role in education existed between Anglicans and Nonconformists. The latter tried to squelch any possible influence from the Church of England, while the former refused to give up its control. For the controversies of church dominance and national education in England, see Best (1956); Curtis and Boultonwood (1966); Curtis (1967); Wardle (1976).

4. Christian missionaries had long recognized the absence of an institutionalized religion among the Chinese and had therefore considered them to be secularists who indulged in ancestor worship, a faith traceable to the long interpretative tradition of the Chinese classics. Christian missionaries in the sixteenth century soon found that the key persons holding the power of that interpretative tradition were the Chinese gentry, who not only were learned but also politically linked the emperor to the villagers. Therefore, most of those missionaries believed that if they converted China’s gentry class by applying religious interpretations to the Chinese classics that members of the Chinese gentry held dear, then the missionaries would greatly improve their ability to convert the whole of China. This approach remained almost unchanged until the nineteenth century, when the Qing Empire began to decline: whether or not they relied on the power of warships, more missionaries felt the need to preach directly to the people.

5. Wong Man Kong (1996) and Leung Yuen Sang (1983) record how the stories of the conversion and baptism of a few Chinese pupils at the Anglo-Chinese College drew attention in British society when James Legge brought the recent converts to England in person. The converts received substantial attention in newspapers and were even guests of Queen Victoria. However, after their return to Hong Kong, none of them remained a lasting promise for the Christian mission (Leung 1983: 55-9; Wong, M. K. 1996: 64–67).

6. This was contentious but had far-reaching consequences. One example is his famous translation of the word ‘God’ as Shangdi (Lord on High), who, he argued, was mentioned in the earliest parts of two Confucian canonical classics, the Book of Historical Documents (Shujing) and the Book of Poetry (Shijing) (Spelman 1969; Lee 1991: 160–74; Wong 1996: ch. 5). In 1852, this usage aroused a heated debate in theological circles; Legge’s opponents maintained that the term actually referred to a number of Daoist deities and would mislead Chinese readers of the Bible. Despite all the criticism in theological circles, Legge insisted that ancient China had featured imperial worship rites with monotheistic characteristics and that this translation was valuable because it could serve as a bridge between Chinese traditions and Christianity.

7. The label of ‘Leggism’ circulated after Legge elaborated his views to a group of Chinese at the 1877 Shanghai General Conference of Missionaries.

8. Interpretations of Legge’s “swinging” commitment to the evangelization of China and to a so-called secularist position are in evidence throughout writings concerning early Hong Kong education. See Ng (1984); Sweeting (1990); Wong (1996).

9. Legge’s reform met with great resistance in Governor Bowring’s era (1854–1859), but Governor H. Robinson, who soon succeeded him, favored Legge’s plan. With his support, Legge seized power away from the churchmen: the government established a new Board of Education that replaced the clergy-dominated Education Committee, and an Inspector of Schools was appointed with direct responsibility to the governor. No sooner had the missionary-favored Inspector Rev. Lobscheid tendered his resignation than the Department of Government Schools replaced the Board of Education. After such a full-scale shake-up, the Anglican Bishop was sidelined in the administrative structure, and the churchmen, who were in retreat, had to re-open their own missionary schools. Some historians attribute the reform to the young and energetic Governor Robinson; however, James Legge was the man behind all those important reforms (Ng 1984).
10. Stokes, in her study of Queen’s College, remarks that this kind of deprecatory rhetoric appeared frequently in the government reports on visits to village schools. She writes, Lest the English reader should smile too smugly at this description of Chinese village schools, it must be noted that a hundred odd years ago, in same schools and elsewhere, many English children did their rudimentary lessons in wretched, insanitary hovels, under teachers untrained and ignorant of all but the most elementary knowledge. Like Chinese children, they learnt their lessons by heart, often without any explanation being given. Learning by rote was, of course, the long-established tradition in China, and not only there. If little Sun Yat-sen at his first school in the village of Tsui Heng was beaten when he asked his teacher to explain the meaning of a passage in The Three Character Classics, he no doubt had his counterparts in England. (Stokes 1962: 8-9).

11. At the expense of coherence in Legge’s thought, Ng almost relies on the ad hoc explanation that Legge somehow “gave up the policy of propagating Christianity through letters” (Ng 1984: 40-41).

12. Girardot tries to characterize Edward Said’s positions on Orientalism as over-sweeping generalizations; Girardot contends that it is crucial to distinguish among different types of Orientalism and to question the extent to which the process of cross-cultural intercourse derives from some monolithic scheme of Western domination. He takes Legge and the Sinological Orientalism with which he is associated as proof of how certain elite Asian traditions could influence and even transgressively appropriate Western forms of Orientalism.

13. For example, Karl Gutzlaff, Chief Secretary from 1842 to 1851, was both a linguist and a translator; Governor John Davis (1844-1848) was a famous scholar of Chinese studies. For more, see Endacott (1962).

14. Also, R. G. Milne employed “Sinim” as a scriptural basis that would justify the Christian mission’s participation in the British imperial project in China. He stated, Do we now wait for China? No! China waits for us! Providence, by commerce, has given us access to no fewer than five ports of that magnificent nation, and by conquest has facilitated our entrance among its inhabitants, as bearers of celestial light, as apostles of good tidings. (Milne 1843: 3; Wong 1996: 38).


Chapter 3

1. Cecil even said, “I should think two ideas will probably fill your University — number one, China for the Chinese and death to the foreigner, number two the equality of man and its two developments socialism and anarchism... The worst that could happen to you is that you will be called intolerant, while to foster a crowd of bomb-throwing patriots in your midst will be extremely unpleasant” (Mellor 1992: 113).

2. Indirect Rule is the most debated concept in the study of European colonialism in Africa. Lord Hailey distinguishes between indirect rule as an “administrative device,” a “political doctrine,” and “religious dogma” (Hailey 1939). Although there are many different versions of indirect rule and divergent evaluations, scholars agree that Lugard was the one who gave the concept its clearest definition and that he was the most influential propagator of the concept and its associated practices. Although most of the colonial studies on indirect rule focus on how its principles and practices affected colonial rule in Africa, there is a burgeoning interest in Southeast Asian and Pacific studies, which explores the effects of the indirect-rule doctrine. See e.g. Emerson (1964); Lawson (1996); Kershaw (2001).
interest lies not in engaging in the political science debate as to whether or not indirect rule
is detrimental to the colonized. Rather, I take indirect rule as a concept integral to the power
formation of collaborative colonialism, which spread its effects well beyond Lugard’s era
of governance. Also, I try in this chapter to pinpoint the pedagogical dimension of indirect
rule.

3. Tellingly, the negotiations for the abdication of the Emperor were carried out between
Wu Tingfang and Tang Shaoyi; the former represented the Emperor and the later the
Republicans. Yet, the two men were English-educated Cantonese elite from Hong Kong
(Chung 1998: 43).

Chapter 4

1. The inflow of returned-migrant capital during the last decade of the nineteenth century
was prompted by the exclusion policy of the United States and Australia (Pomerantz-
Zhang 1984).

2. Although the Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898 failed, the Qing court was forced to adopt
most of the recommended measures proposed by the reformists. In 1904, the government
not only abolished the Imperial Civil Service Examination but introduced a new commercial
law code, as well.

3. The Siyi men were also active culturally. For example, they financed and organized the first
Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association and the first Christian church. Located next to
the Tung Wah Hospital, the YMCA symbolized a parallel Chinese political and economic
force coming from the overseas Chinese community. They developed a heated rivalry with
the original Chinese-elite establishment in Hong Kong (Smith 1985).

4. For example, Choa’s detailed biography of Ho Kai takes as its main concern Ho’s
contribution to colonial governance, and especially to medical affairs, in Hong Kong
(Choa 1981). Lo sings the praises of Sun Yat-sen and Ho Kai but glosses over their mutual
interactions concerning ideas (Lo 1961). Chiu’s doctoral study dwells on some documents
but mentions nothing about Ho Kai’s more controversial position regarding the Open Door
policy of China (Chiu 1968). Xu’s recent book is merely an exposition on the facets of Ho
Kai’s political ideas and praises Ho as a pioneer of the conception of people’s rights (Xu
1992). Finally, Schiffrin’s seminal study of Sun Yat-sen uncovers very important records
concerning the interaction between Ho Kai and Sun Yat-sen, yet does not touch on Ho Kai’s
ideas and thought (Schiffrin 1968). All of these works constitute a rich and invaluable body
of research on Ho Kai but paint highly fragmentary portraits of this person.

5. Because Hu co-authored or translated many of Ho’s essays, readers nowadays cannot
easily separate Ho’s thoughts from Hu’s and often treat them as one.

6. For an evaluation of Duara’s Rescuing History from the Nation (1995), please consult the
essays in a related symposium published in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 29,
no. 4. See especially Bulag (1997); Fitzgerald (1997); Lie (1997).

7. A recent study of Liang Qichao by Tang Xiaobing also illustrates how Liang pioneered
the adoption of an Enlightenment mode of history-writing (Tang 1996). Representing the
tendency to treat history as a weapon for nationalist politics, Liang was perhaps the first
to see how history concerns the mobilization of people’s full consciousness and, thus, of
people as modern subjects. To underline the political urgency of writing national history,
he argued that traditional Chinese historiography failed to tell the story of how the nation
came into its own being and that this historiography instead divided national unity into
monarchical reigns, an approach that neglects the evolutionary development of the people-nation (Liang 1901, 1902). Liang called for a “revolution in historiography,” and this call found echoes in the next few decades from modern historians such as Fu Sinian (1928), Lei Haizong (1936), and Wang Jingwei (1905) who subscribed, respectively, to a wide range of different political persuasions.

8. History-writing has long been diverse with regard to style, orientation, and approaches to traditional classic texts. The moulding of Chinese pasts into this Enlightenment mode was not without difficulty. Such exercises generated various problems and dissent by remoulding the huge archives of Chinese history. In the whole Republican period, Gu Jiegang came closest to challenging the project of National History by revealing that there were indeed a number of alternative and concealed traditions in Chinese historical culture (Schneider, L. 1971). Obviously, such a project would necessarily involve a more thorough re-examination of how historians have mobilized different meticulous crafts to reconfigure the huge archives of ancient Chinese historical writings, fitting them into the project of a unified Chinese *national* history. For a general review of the problem related to modern Chinese historiography, please see Crossley (1997). See also the special issue of *History and Theory*, vol. 35, no. 4, especially Dirlik (1996); Schneider, A. (1996). In Dirlik (1996), the author extends his critique of the Orientalism that is found in modern Chinese historiography. Philip C. C. Huang defends empiricism against the methodological critique of Sinology represented by cultural studies. See Huang (1998).

9. At the level of real politics, there is a worrying tendency in Hong Kong to vindicate people who are “saving the nation in crooked ways” (*qu xian jiu guo*). Such a tendency endorses stretching the definition of “patriotism” according to no standard. A saying goes like this in Hong Kong: “Even the mafia can be patriotic.” The quotable remark came from a Chinese official before 1997 and was popularized by the movie *Election 2* directed by Johnnie To (2006).

10. I consider it a matter of historiographical paradigms rather than of personal political inclinations that Tsai Jungfang, in his highly readable Chinese book *Xianggang ren zhi Xianggang shi* (Tsai 2001), makes a laudable critique of the pro-PRC “patriotic historiography,” although his oxymoronic treatment of Ho Kai remains.

11. For the complexity of the Boxer Rebellion, see Esherick (1987).

12. Only Choa’s (1981) biography of Ho Kai quotes his open letter to John Bull at length; yet many of the crucial statements I have cited here are still missing.

13. For critiques of Bhabha, see Parry (1987); Loomba (1991); Ahmad (1992); Parry (1994). Ahmad’s hostile polemic attacks Bhabha’s “exorbitation of discourse.” Robert Young defends Bhabha on the grounds that Bhabha’s focus on “the discursive construction of [neo]colonialism does not seek to replace or exclude other forms of analysis” (Young 1995).

14. Another example is Wu Tingfang. His pursuit of a barrister title at Lincoln’s Inn in London was not only a personal reaction to the racial discrimination he experienced as a court interpreter but also coincidental upon an active recruitment exercise of Western legal experts by the reformist officials Kuo Sungtao and Liu Hsihung. He turned down the recruitment offers after bargaining hard over the salary. His colonial career as the first appointed Chinese member in the Legislative Council started in 1877 and coincided with a speculative craze in land purchases in which Wu joined. The sudden collapse of the land speculation in 1882 left Wu deeply in debt, and he once again turned to Li Hongzhang (Shin 1976).
Chapter 5

1. For the history and the evolution of the KMT, see Friedman (1974).

2. The naming of Zhongguo has been a topic of debate in modern China. For a review of the different perspectives held respectively by reformists and by revolutionaries, one may refer to Wang, E. (1977); Shen (1997).

3. In response to the massacre of demonstrators at the Shanghai Concession, by British police officers, the radical forces within the KMT, including the newly emerging CCP, organized nation-wide waves of protests and boycotts. A general strike broke out, in which workers from both Hong Kong and Canton joined. The strikes lasted for more than a year and were hugely successful in demonstrating the power of the poorer masses when mobilized (Chung, L.C. 1969; Chan, M.K. 1975; Chan, Lau K.C. 1990; Yu and Liu 1995: ch. 6). However, the strike aggravated the conflicts between the left and right wings of the KMT, and this ultimately led to the Party Purification Movement (Chan, Lau K.C. 1999: ch. 4, 5).

4. According to the perspective of KMT official history, Chen Jiongming was no more than a feudal warlord. Official histories of both the KMT and the CCP all point to the Canton merchant strike and insurrection of 1924 as Chen’s betrayal of Sun, which led him to break completely with the old political approach and, thus, start a mass revolution. However, such a verdict has been contested rigorously by some new interpretations based on newly found historical documents. See Hsieh (1962); Chen, D. and Gao (1997).

5. Ma Jianzhong was the first scholar to attempt to describe the Chinese language by using the grammatical concepts of Latin (Ma 1898). After the May Fourth Movement in 1911, great interest in using baihua emerged. Li Jinxi’s Xin zhu guo yu wen fa (New Grammar of the National Language) was highly influential (Li, Jinxi 1924). Linguist Zhao Yuanren was also a significant contributor to the baihua movement.


7. He was irritated most by Clementi’s appropriation of a nationalist poem, written originally for the Republican Revolutionaries’ struggle against the Manchus, a struggle that reminds the reader of the greatness of the Han people and Han culture (Abbas 1997: 112–116).

8. Xu Dishan, a famous Chinese writer who was chair of the Chinese Department of the University of Hong Kong from 1935 to 1941, distinguished between two types of Chinese education in Hong Kong: one was huaren education, which followed the British system; the other was huaqiao education, which followed the Republic of China’s system (Xu, D. 1939).

9. The stray-child image is vividly exemplified by Wen Yiduo’s poem “The Song for the Seven Children,” in which Hong Kong, Kowloon, Macao, Canton Bay, Taiwan, Dalian, and Vladivostok are all depicted as lost children weeping for their return to their mother’s fold.

10. For the pro-CCP leftists, the politically correct naming of Hong Kong Chinese is tongbao; the KMT government holding power in Taiwan after 1949 officially awarded the name qiaobao to Hong Kong Chinese.

11. In the same vein, although I have characterized the conflict between wenyan and baihua in Hong Kong as a simple binary opposition, a closer examination of the matter will reveal that to describe the relationship in terms of the degree to which baihua was to replace wenyan is only possible within the narrow confines of a modernist-nationalist evolutionary discourse. In reality, the hegemonic status of this newly reformed Chinese language was not stabilized until after the CCP took over China.
12. The belief in the close relationship between spoken language, national consciousness, and nationalism was extremely prominent in the May Fourth Movement; yet it was hardly a specifically Chinese phenomenon. Many recent researchers on nationalism have already pointed to linguistic nationalism as a widely circulated perception particularly influential in non-European places. In China, it was commonly believed that vernacularism was integral to nationalism and that the source of this model was Europe. The validity of this perception, particularly in European cases, is challenged by Hobsbawm (1990). However, as argued by Anderson (1983), regardless of whether such a perception of linguistic nationalism represented a European experience, it still served as a model that the late followers of European nationalism pirated. See Anderson (1991: ch. 5).

13. The most prominent popular writer in Hong Kong in the 1930s and the 1940s was Jie Ke (1900–1983).

14. In the mid-1930s and the early 1940s, whenever the gap between the supposed national language (guoyu) and the different local languages received mention, many writers simply referred to the ongoing new-language movement, in which different regional and local languages were formalised. The writers bet on the success of these local movements in attempting to break away from the constraints of baihua. In the late 1930s, there were active campaigns to promote the Latinization of local languages. Similarly, there was a movement to promote Esperanto, with some towns even holding street parades in which thousands of participants promoted the international language (Di 1937). However, for various reasons, the movements for new regional languages and for Latinization did not achieve concrete results.

15. In Britain and Europe from the 1920s onward, both the left and the right issued common criticisms of newly emergent forms of popular culture. Leavis (1930), Ortega y Gasset (1932), and Eliot (1962) were among the most influential in developing a thesis later called “the decline of culture” (see Swingewood (1977).For criticisms of this thesis, see also Huyssen (1986), and Petro (1987)) and what contemporary cultural studies calls the “culture and civilization” tradition, traceable to writers like Matthew Arnold (1869) and Nietzsche. According to this thesis, the development of popular culture is responsible for the decline of the more organic communal or folk cultures that preceded the spread of industrialization. Chinese intellectuals in the 1930s were obviously influenced by such elitist criticism, as writers such as Eliot and Nietzsche were widely read. However, the attack on Cantonese popular culture had little to do with people’s nostalgia for the folkloric; rather, the attack reflected a process of internal othering, which developed according to the political ideals of the May Fourth Movement’s new Chinese national subjectivity. Leftist criticisms particularly singled out the colonial — read as yang mu (slavish mentality) — and feudal characteristics of Cantonese movies. As a whole, it was not the commodity form of these popular cultural products that aroused criticism but the ideological content, which critics associated with their regional origins. For example, the non-Chinese lifestyle of Hong Kong kids and the personal background of Chinese directors returned from the United States were frequently highlighted as problems of Cantonese movies. See, for example, Chen, C. Y. (1999).

16. That this was only alleged to have been the model cannot be overemphasized (Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 1991).

17. “Tongshaan” loosely refers to Fujian and Guangdong provinces, from which most of the Chinese emigrants came. Overseas Chinese communities use the term widely to refer to the homeland. The concept of China (Zhongguo) appeared only near the very end of the Qing...
The most important left-wing cultural institutions include the Wen Hui Pao, Da Gong Pao, Joint Publishing Company, and the Commercial Press.

Journals or magazines supported by You Lian included Zu Guo (Homeland), which targeted general readers interested in politics; Ren Ren Wen Xue (Everybody’s Literature), which concerned literature; Da Xue Sheng Huo (University Life), for college students; and Er Tong Le Yuan (Child’s Paradise), for children.

For political and diplomatic reasons, Chinese schools in Southeast Asian countries were reluctant to use textbooks published by the Republican (ROC) government in Taiwan. Textbooks published by a Hong Kong-based publisher could avoid sensitive issues.

For example, Taiwan writer Chen Yingzhen has been well known for his strong criticism against what he terms “cultural colonialism.” He focuses on the institutional and ideological dependency of Taiwan intellectuals. See http://www.china-tide.org.tw/leftcurrent/currentpaper/change.htm; see also Dan (1998) for an analysis of the analogous situation of cultural colonialism in mainland China since the 1980s.

Overseas Chinese remittances to the Mainland were then China’s major source of foreign exchange because of the embargo that the US imposed on China after the Korean War.

Shum Yat Fei was a student of Neo-Confucianist scholar Mou Zongsan, although, in the mid-1960s, Shum was also an enthusiast of socialism. He remains a very prolific columnist in Hong Kong newspapers.

To a certain extent, diasporic Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong had no clearer political agenda than its united opposition to the Taiwan independence movement. In both the 1960s and the 1970s, the issue aroused great concern in Hong Kong’s young intellectuals both from the left and the right. See e.g. Panku Editorial (1970).

In 1958, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Zhang Junmai, and Xu Fuguan co-signed a monumental declaration, Wei Zhong guo wen hua jing gao shi jie ren shi xuan yan (A Declaration for Chinese Culture to All People of the World) in which the signatories point out several elements of Eastern wisdom from which Western culture should learn (T’ang 1974: 172–188).

New Asia College was founded in 1950, when Tang Junyi, Qian Mu, Zhang Pijie, and others immigrated to Hong Kong. The KMT government in Taiwan funded the college for the following four years before the Yale-in-China Foundation and the Ford Foundation became its chief funding sources in 1954. In 1963, New Asia College, United College, and Chung Chi College became the constituent colleges of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. They were integrated under a federal structure, by which each college had a high degree of autonomy. However, the colonial government retracted its promise to respect this autonomy and forced the installation of a central administration system, which drew protests and criticisms from members of the colleges. New Asia responded strongly to this move toward centralization: some members of its directorate resigned in protest of the plan (SUNACUHK 1974).
10. The co-signed declaration affirms the goal of building a democratic country (T’ang 1974: 125–192). Mou Zongsan’s work Zheng dao yu zhi dao (The Political Way and the Governing Way) reflected an important attempt to inject Confucian thought into the establishing of a modern Western political system in China (Mou 1961).

11. SUNA stands for Student Union of New Asia College.

12. The Lifestyle Innovation Movement was launched first as an activity for readers in the Panku magazine Panku New Year. See the special report in Panku (1968: vol. 11).

13. During postwar Hong Kong’s first two decades, student publications, including newspapers run by the student unions, commanded wide social recognition as more than mere campus publications; they were sold through commercial distribution channels, and their content was often reported or quoted by other mass media.

14. Details of these debates can be found in Ip (1997: 26).

**Chapter 7**

1. The connections between the 1967 riots and pro-CCP forces in Hong Kong have long been a sensitive issue and have therefore been one of the least researched. For exceptions, see Leung, K. K. (2001); Cheung, K. W. (2000).

2. A certain sociological humor circulated to explain the emergence of radical students after, but not during, the 1967 riots: a sizeable population of children of the Chinese elite class went abroad to study, as they were frightened by the political riots of 1967. Their absence left room for students of non-elite backgrounds to gain entrance to Hong Kong’s schools. Hostels at HKU — which Lugard had originally intended to be instruments for “character formation,” to stamp out the germs of native student radicalism (see Chapter 3) — turned out, quite ironically, to be a hotbed of nationalist aspirations (Deng 1990). At CUHK, the unbalanced treatment of the two educational systems provided additional political impetus to the students’ decision to turn frustration into politicized energy.

3. The unpopulated Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are located between Japan and Taiwan. Some Chinese records lend support to the claim that the Diaoyus had been recorded in Chinese official documents and on maps as far back as the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the Qing government ceded Taiwan to Japan. Some fifty years later, China regained Taiwan and its surrounding islands, after the defeat of Japan in WWII. However, in a treaty between Japan and the United States, the Diaoyus were demarcated as the southernmost tip of Japan’s Ryukyu Archipelago rather than as outlying islands of Taiwan. The islands then fell under U.S. military control. Washington signed another treaty with Tokyo in 1971 returning the Ryukyu Archipelago to Japan. The Diaoyus were included therein.

4. *She hui pai* here does not mean “socialist” in the sense that the latter term carries in the West; therefore, because “liberal democrat” signifies local social concerns, liberal democrats are “social-ist”.

5. The CCP did not want to see a radical Hong Kong because Hong Kong served as one of China’s outlets to the outside world. Hong Kong also earned huge sums of foreign exchange for China. However, the widely accepted excuse for the CCP’s attitude was couched in Maoist language: Hong Kong should not be destabilized because “socialist imperialist” (USSR) infiltration was immanent. In attacking the Trotskyist students, the guo cui pai unrelentingly accused them of being spies for the USSR.

6. “Bao Yiming” is Bao Cuoshi’s pen name.
7. For example, student leaders Ying Chan et al. (1968), in a rejoinder to Bao’s essay, criticized the Panku Fair (discussed above) for its lack of a mass-movement spirit. They referred to the then newly published *Israeli Society*, by sociologist Eisenstadt, and declared that we should all feel ashamed (Eisenstadt 1967). Bao also, in another article, attempted at length to substantiate his point about mass mobilization by referring to the Jewish Zionist movement (Bao, Y.M. 1968).

8. Capitalizing on such records of patriotic pasts, many of these ex-radicals have now become core members of the SAR ruling bloc.

9. People are apt to regard the transfer-of-sovereignty process as recolonization, and nowhere is this aptness more evident than in the Preparatory Working Committee’s (PWC) proposal to restore a number of previous laws amended under the Bill of Rights. The aim of this move was to ensure that the new SAR Government retains the extensive state powers enjoyed by the previous colonial authority.

10. The Chinese “united front” co-optation policy is more extensive than the British one. The Chinese authorities have used appointments to positions like Hong Kong Affairs Advisor and District Affairs Advisor to co-opt loyalists. Prominent in number among those co-opted elite are those who used to serve the colonial government. Local critics ridicule them as “worn-out batteries.”

Chapter 8

1. Even after the handover, Hong Kong people are still considered ‘foreign’ in cultural and economic, and perhaps more so in political, terms.

2. In Florida, a Splendid China, a copy of the ethnicity theme park in Shenzhen, also opened in 1993. It is also owned and run by the CTII.

Conclusion

1. The only exception I have noticed is perhaps Edward Said’s article, “Collaboration, Independence, and Liberation”, in his book *Culture and Imperialism* (Said 1993).

2. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher interpret the rise of modern Japan as the history of a successful collaboration in “translating the forces of western expansion into terms of indigenous politics”, whereas “the collaborative mechanism in China worked superficially” (Robinson 1972: 127). Apart from Robinson and Gallagher, Osterhammel (1997) and Brook (2005) also take considerable interest in putting in focus the role of collaboration in the history of colonialism.
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