Chinese Indonesians in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Democratisation and Ethnic Minorities

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Contents

Preface vii

1. Contemplating the Role of the Ethnic Chinese: Ethnic Politics, Criminality, and Civil Society in Post-Suharto Indonesia 1

Part One: ‘Pariah’ Ethnic Minorities and Democratisation 23

2. A Short History of the Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia: Creating a ‘Pariah’ Class 25

3. Democratisation and Ethnic Minorities: A Look at Indonesia’s Democratisation and the Ethnic Chinese 40

Part Two: Civil Society, Business, and Politics: The Ambivalent Position of the Chinese in Post-Suharto Indonesia 61

4. Opening Up the Chinese Socio-cultural Sphere: The Ambivalence of Increasing Visibility 63

5. Local Ethnic Chinese Business 97

6. Electoral Politics and the Chinese in Post-Suharto Indonesia 120

7. Conclusion 168

Appendix I: List of Informants 171

Appendix II: Major Ethnic Chinese Organisations in Post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya 175

Appendix III: Chinese-Language Newspapers in Post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya 177

Appendix VI: Original Text of Letter in Koran Tempo (May 15, 2012)  181
Abbreviations and Glossary  190
Glossary of Personal Names  196
References  199
Index  232
In 2010, Sofyan Tan, a.k.a. Tan Kim Yang (陳金揚), a Chinese Indonesian social activist who had previously been a physician, made history in the city of Medan by becoming the first ethnic Chinese to run for mayor. Not a stranger to politics (having lost in the race for a seat in the North Sumatra regional representatives council [DPD, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah] in 2004), Tan was initially chosen by the incumbent mayor as his candidate for deputy mayor. Later, when the incumbent decided to choose someone else to be his running mate, Tan was nominated by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, a powerful party in Indonesia) and the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS, Partai Damai Sejahtera, a party led by Christians). He was paired with a Muslim woman, in the hopes that this cross-ethnic, cross-religious pairing would attract many voters. The race was an interesting one for what it shows us about the politics of ethnicity, money, criminality, and civil society associations as they affect the Chinese in post-Suharto Indonesia. Tan insisted that he would run an honest government if elected, making no promises of political favours to anyone who backed him. One of the main Chinese Indonesian civil society organisations, the Chinese Indonesian Social Association (PSMTI, Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia), backed Tan, but the other, the Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI, Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa), turned away from him, possibly due to his refusal to promise business contracts for their support. In fact, in the first round of the election, INTI openly supported a candidate (not the incumbent) who had been the regional leader of an influential youth/crime organisation in North Sumatra and who had many criminal ties, important for business in Medan city. Tan and his running mate unexpectedly defeated eight other candidate pairs in

*The names of informants in this chapter are pseudonyms except for the following public figure: Dédé Oetomo.
the first round by gaining the second-highest number of votes and thus ran against the incumbent in the second round. Afraid of Tan’s popularity with the poor, to whom he had given much support, the incumbent conducted a major smear campaign against him. Rumours were spread that Tan would turn Medan into a ‘Chinatown’ and build many Chinese temples instead of mosques. In addition, many Chinese voters were intimidated by rumours and mobile phone text messages that warned that, if Tan won the election, there would be riots against the Chinese. Consequently, it appeared that voters were scared off. Tan and his running mate lost in the second round of the race.

Tan’s story implies a paradox of Indonesia’s new democracy as well as of the position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians since the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. Although in Indonesia’s new democracy there has been an opening up of a more democratic and liberal political space, which has led to the emergence of competitive electoral politics in Indonesia, at the same time this democratic space has been marred by money politics and electoral smear campaigns. In this democratic space, the Chinese are free to participate in electoral politics and run for public office, but very few of them have been elected because the Chinese are still perceived as an alien minority by the pribumi (indigenous Indonesians). It is ironic that although Tan has made significant contributions to the indigenous population, he is still regarded as a Chinese by the indigenous majority. This reflects the ambivalent feelings of the pribumi towards the Chinese in Indonesia. But it is even more ironic that some businesspeople in INTI, who shared Tan’s ethnicity and who themselves are often deemed a target of bureaucratic extortion, preferred not to support Tan, who was relatively clean and was committed to end all sorts of corruption and bureaucratic abuse. Instead, they channelled their support to another candidate who could promise them business favours. In so doing, these Chinese perpetuated their ambivalent position in Indonesian society and to a certain extent helped shape the predatory characteristics of Indonesia’s new democracy.

This study looks at how the new political, business, and socio-cultural environment in post-Suharto Indonesia influences the actions of the Chinese minority, while examining how the Chinese display agency in reacting to and shaping this environment, which constrains and facilitates their actions. In this way, the Chinese contribute to the shaping of their continuing ambivalent position. In business, Chinese often resort to semi-legal and illegal means to safeguard their business and personal interests. Very few Chinese businesspeople refuse to become targets of extortion by power-holders and gangsters or choose to get themselves organised and protest against this extortion. From a socio-cultural perspective, Chinese Indonesians have established several ethnic-based voluntary associations that focus on promoting Chinese
culture and socialisation activities among the Chinese. These organisations have assisted local governments in establishing cultural and business connections with China, as well as promoting philanthropy. These organisations, although involved in many positive activities, contribute to the view that the Chinese are very insular and exclusive. There are Chinese community leaders and social activists who have reached out to the wider society by establishing non-ethnic-based socio-cultural organisations that focus on promoting cross-ethnic understanding and solidarity; however, such leaders and activists are rare. In electoral politics, some Chinese Indonesians have run for public office with the aim of bringing positive change for the people, but some have participated in electoral politics in order to safeguard their business and personal interests. In addition, some Chinese businesspeople have supported reform-minded electoral candidates without expecting any benefits in return, but some have sponsored politicians associated with predatory forces in order to get political favours for their businesses. Therefore, there are Chinese Indonesians who have acted as both agents of change and reform, while others have been involved in maintaining the status quo inherited from Suharto’s New Order regime. It is not surprising that the ambivalence of their position in post–New Order Indonesia has increased.

This study further argues that, under a democratic society where there is a lack of good governance promoting the rule of law, accountability, and transparency, the economically privileged ethnic minority deemed as an ‘outsider’ group as well as a target of extortion, and has not been fully accepted by the majority indigenous population, tends actively to resort to illegal and semi-legal means as well as opportunistic tactics to gain business and personal interests, and to make use of intra-ethnic linkages to safeguard their ethnic identity and culture.

This study adopts a combination of Anthony Giddens’s structure-agency theory as well as Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and field as a framework for examining the strategies and tactics that Chinese Indonesians adopt to safeguard their business and personal interests as well as their ethnic and cultural identities in the post-Suharto era. Both Giddens and Bourdieu perceive social actors as agents that actively respond to and shape their social structures. Giddens (1984) argues that our social reality is shaped by both social forces and active human agency. All people are knowledgeable about the conditions and consequences of their actions in their daily lives. Although people are not entirely free to choose their own actions—in other words, people do not have complete free will—they have agency. Therefore, Giddens sees social structures as both the medium and the outcome of actors’ actions.

As human beings, we do make choices, and we do not simply respond passively to events around us. The way forward in bridging the gap between
‘structural’ and ‘action’ approaches is to recognize that we \textit{actively make and remake} social structure during the course of our everyday activities. (Giddens 1989, 705, emphasis in the original)

Habitus, according to Bourdieu (1990a, 131), is a system of acquired dispositions through which people deal with the social world. Bourdieu (1990b) also notes that ‘as an acquired system of generative schemes, the habitus makes possible the free production of all the thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent in the condition of production’ (55). In other words, habitus is an orientation to individual action. The concept of field complements the idea of habitus. A field is a relatively autonomous arena within which people act strategically, depending on their habitus, to enhance their capital. Examples of fields include politics, religion, and philosophy (Bourdieu 1993, 72–74). Bourdieu considers the habitus the union of structures and agency: ‘habitus operates as a structuring structure able to selectively perceive and to transform the objective structure [field] according to its own structure while, at the same time, being re-structured, transformed in its makeup by the pressure of the objective structure’ (Bourdieu 2005, 46–47). In other words, habitus shapes the objective structure (field) but at the same time it is also shaped by the objective structure. This concept is parallel to Giddens’s structure-agency theory. One of the significant strengths of Bourdieu’s notion of habitus lies in its consideration of actors’ social positions in the study of habitus; this is never discussed in Giddens’s theory. Bourdieu (1984, 114; 1998, 6–8) argues that a person’s habitus is structured by his or her position within a social space, which is determined by his or her sociological characteristics in the form of volume and kinds of economic, cultural, and social capital possessed. Economic capital refers to material resources that can be turned into money or property rights. Cultural capital refers to non-material goods such as types of knowledge, skills and expertise, educational credentials, and aesthetic preferences acquired through upbringing and education that can be converted into economic capital. Social capital refers to networks of contacts that can be used to maintain or advance one’s social position (Bourdieu 1986).

According to Bourdieu (1993, 73), actors who are well endowed with capital and therefore enjoy privileged positions in a particular field tend to defend the status quo of the field in order to safeguard their capital, whereas those least endowed with capital and therefore occupy less advantaged positions within the field are inclined to challenge the status quo of the field via subversion strategies in order to enhance their capital and improve their social positions. This argument offers a valid explanation of why some Chinese businesspeople in the opening story of this chapter chose to support the mayoral candidate who could promise them business favours if elected and not Tan, who was committed to end all sorts of corruption
Contemplating the Role of the Ethnic Chinese

and bureaucratic abuse. However, Bourdieu’s argument cannot explain why, on the other hand, some actors who possess a lot of capital within a field choose to challenge the status quo through certain subversion strategies. For instance, in the 2010 mayoral election in Medan, there were also some wealthy Chinese businesspeople who decided to support Tan, even though he made no promises of political favours to anyone who supported him (I will elaborate more on this in Chapter 6). I argue that Giddens’s emphasis on actors’ free will within the constraints imposed by social structures is useful in explaining such actions:

Although . . . [social structures] might constrain what we do, they do not determine what we do. I could choose to live without using money, should I be firmly resolved to do so, even if it might prove very difficult to eke out an existence from day to day . . . The fact that I use the monetary system contributes in a minor, yet necessary, way to the very existence of that system. If everyone, or even the majority of people, at some point decided to avoid using money, the monetary system would dissolve. (Giddens 1989, 705)

Although the example used in Giddens’s quotes is extreme and unimaginable in the present day, it clearly shows that Giddens sees social structures as being both constraining and enabling to human actions. Social structures may constrain human actions but at the same time they also enable social actors to challenge the status quo. In other words, social actors have a choice to defend or challenge the status quo.

Hence, this is the theoretical framework for this study: social structures constrain and enable the actors’ actions. The actors’ actions are always oriented by their habitus, which is dependent on the volume and kinds of capital possessed. Those who are well endowed with capital in a social structure tend to defend the status quo of the structure in order to safeguard their capital and positions, whereas those least endowed with capital within the structure are inclined to challenge it via subversion strategies. However, the actors’ actions are also dependent on their free will within the constraints imposed by the social structure. They have a choice to defend or challenge the status quo of the social structure.

The Chinese Indonesians are an ethnic minority who play a crucial role in the Indonesian economy, but at the same time are still perceived by the indigenous majority as ‘outsiders’. While anti-Chinese sentiments among non-Chinese and the corrupt bureaucracy in the post–New Order era have constrained the Chinese from enjoying full civil rights and equality, these factors do not determine the Chinese people’s reactions. Chinese Indonesians have reacted to such circumstances in different ways. In the opening story of this chapter, for instance, Sofyan Tan chose to initiate and engage in endeavours that sought to alter indigenous Indonesians’ perceptions of the Chinese. He also ran for the mayorship and was committed to eliminating corruption.
and bureaucratic abuse. On the other hand, many wealthy Chinese businesspeople in Medan decided to support another candidate who could promise them business favours should he get elected. I argue that the position of Chinese Indonesians as a whole is increasingly ambivalent and more complex in the post–New Order era because Chinese Indonesians like Sofyan Tan who have been relentlessly working to rectify the racial stereotypes of Chinese among *pribumi* are fewer than those who continue to reinforce such stereotypes. It can be said that Chinese Indonesians like Tan are ‘a minority within a minority’. Thus following Giddens’s structure-agency theory and Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and field, this study considers Chinese Indonesians as social actors who, by taking actions within the constraints imposed by social structures on the one hand perpetuate their ambivalent position, but on the other hand may attempt to rectify it.

### 1.1 Rethinking the Position of Ethnic Chinese Indonesians

According to Benedict Anderson (1998), who studied ethnicity in Southeast Asia from the perspective of constructivism, the ‘separateness’ of the Chinese from the indigenous majority in Indonesia is actually a result of Dutch colonial rule. In order to prevent the Chinese and indigenous people from combining forces to challenge them, the Dutch implemented a divide-and-rule policy that separated the Chinese from the indigenous population in the aspects of ‘legal status, required costuming and barbering, residence, possibility of travel, and so on’ (321). Furthermore, very few Chinese in Indonesia believe in Islam, which is the religious belief of most indigenous people (Ong 2008). Consequently, the Chinese became increasingly detached from the indigenous population.

In contrast with the Dutch, Spanish and American colonial authorities in the pre-independence Philippines and kings in Thailand encouraged the assimilation and intermarriage of the Chinese into indigenous societies. In addition, the Chinese minorities and the majority of indigenous populations in the Philippines and Thailand shared the same religious beliefs.¹ Thus, the Chinese in both countries have generally been well assimilated into indigenous populations and play an essential role not only in the economic development of their countries, but also in politics (Sidel 2008, 131; Skinner 1957; 1996; Akira 2008; Wickberg 1965; Carino 2004). There have been politicians with some Chinese ancestry who became members of parliament or prime ministers in Thailand or presidents in the Philippines (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005, 4; Suryadinata 1993a, 298–300; Hau 2014).

¹ Most of the Chinese in Thailand and the Philippines are respectively Buddhists and Roman Catholics.
In British Malaya (present-day Peninsular Malaysia), the colonial regime also introduced a divide-and-rule policy by encouraging the Malays, who formed the largest indigenous group, to remain in rural areas as peasants or to join the civil service, while the other two significant ethnic minority groups, i.e., the Chinese and Indians, were encouraged to work on tin mines and the plantation sector respectively (Dhillon 2009, 66–67; Liew 2003, 88). Moreover, just like their counterparts in Indonesia, very few Chinese in Malaya believe in Islam, which is the religious belief of the Malays (Tan 2000). Therefore, the Chinese in Malaya and later Malaysia are also generally perceived as an alien minority group by the indigenous majority and have been encountering various entry barriers into the civil service and public universities as well as in business activities, especially after the implementation in 1970 of the New Economic Policy (NEP), an affirmative action programme in favour of the indigenous majority (Thock 2005; Lee and Heng 2000, 208–9).2

However, the proportion of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia has always been much larger than that of their counterparts in Indonesia.3 Moreover, massive anti-Chinese violence has been fairly minimal in Malaysia and post-independence governments have never implemented assimilation policies to curtail Chinese culture, as happened during the New Order regime in Indonesia.4 Therefore, most Chinese in Malaysia still maintain Chinese languages and many Chinese customs. In addition, the Chinese in Malaysia have always been actively involved in politics. Since independence, there have been several Chinese members of parliament and a few cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, and state chief ministers (ketua menteri negeri) (Suryadinata 1993a, 300–303; Lee and Heng 2000; Cao 2005).5

Hence, it can be said that in comparison with ethnic Chinese in other Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia, the social and political positions of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are relatively vulnerable. It is therefore not surprising that research on ethnic Chinese in

2. The NEP was formulated after the breakout of interethnic riots between Chinese and Malays (the largest indigenous ethnic group in Malaysia) on May 13, 1969. For the background and factors behind the riots, see Kua (2007) and Comber (2009a).
3. When Malaya first achieved independence in 1957, the Chinese constituted 37.17% of the total population (Phang 2000, 96, Table 4.1). In 1970 (seven years after the formation of Malaysia, which comprised Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak), their share of the total population had declined to 35.51% (Phang 2000, 96, Table 4.1). Due to the slow-down in the population growth rate of the Chinese, their proportion further declined to 24.6% in 2010 (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2010). In Indonesia, the Chinese constituted about 2.03% of the total population in 1930 and their proportion declined to 1.2% in both 2000 and 2010 (Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar 2008, 20, 23, Table 2.1; Ananta et al. 2013, 14, Table 2).
4. The inter-ethnic riots between Chinese and Malays on May 13, 1969 represent the only incident of mass violence against the Chinese in Malaysia since independence.
5. However, to date, no Chinese Malaysian has ever become prime minister or deputy prime minister of Malaysia.
Indonesia over the last few decades has generally been sympathetic; academics tend to focus on their marginalised position, their experiences of being discriminated against as a minority, and their experiences as victims of ethnic violence.

However, I suggest that leading scholarly works in this field of study portray Chinese Indonesians as passive and powerless actors, as victims of prejudice and discrimination, unable to take independent action. The long history of anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia and the long-standing discriminatory policies of Suharto’s authoritarian regime against the Chinese are key reasons for this tendency in the field of study. For example, Leo Suryadinata’s (1992) and Charles A. Coppél’s (1983) studies focus on how the discriminatory policies of the pre–New Order and New Order regimes marginalised the Chinese minority politically, socially, and economically. They attribute the reasons behind such policies to the jealousy of pribumi against the Chinese, who play a dominant role in the Indonesian economy, and the perceptions that the Indonesian nation includes only indigenous Indonesian people. The Chinese minority is perceived as an alien minority; other minorities considered external to the Indonesian nation, such as Arabs and Indians, do not encounter as much suspicion or hostility from indigenous Indonesians because their numbers are relatively small compared to the Chinese. Hence, they are considered too few to cause political and social instability. In addition, unlike the Arabs, who are almost exclusively Muslim, very few Chinese are Muslim. Therefore, the Chinese do not tend to be associated with Islam; this tends to give them a double-minority status in the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation.

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6. In 2000, it was estimated that Chinese Indonesians constituted about 1.2% of the total Indonesian population (Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar 2008, 23, Table 2.1). At the same time, Arabs and Indians formed 0.043% and 0.017% respectively of the total Indonesian population (Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar 2008, 29). The figures, which are the latest data on the percentage of ethnic Chinese, Arabs, and Indians in the total Indonesian population, were calculated directly from the raw data of the 2000 population census, as the census includes only quantitative information on these ethnic minorities in some provinces. See also Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar (2008, 21).

7. In 2000, 98.27% of Arab Indonesians were Muslim. Conversely, only 5.41% of Chinese Indonesians were Muslim (Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar 2008, 30, Table 2.3).

8. In 2000, Muslims constituted 88.22% of the population in Indonesia, while Christians and Buddhists were 8.92% and 0.84% respectively (Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta 2003, 104, Table 4.1.1). Of the Chinese population, 35.09% were Christians and 53.82% Buddhists (Ananta, Arifin, and Bakhtiar 2008, 30, Table 2.3). In 2010, the percentages of Muslims and Buddhists had slightly decreased to 87.54 and 0.71 respectively, while Christians had increased to 9.87%. Of the Chinese, 42.80% were Christians and 49.06% Buddhists (Ananta et al. 2013, 21, Table 3). The figures for 2010 are the latest official figures on the religious composition of Indonesia and of Chinese Indonesians. However, to date, the official figures on Arab and Indian Indonesian populations as well as the religious composition of both ethnic groups in 2010 are not available.
Mona Lohanda (2002), in her study of the Chinese in colonial Java, argues that despite having lived in Java for generations the Chinese minority was still perceived as an outsider group that had ties with an external power, that is, the land of their ancestors. They were consequently marginalised politically by Dutch colonial rulers and excluded by indigenous Indonesian nationalists from the Indonesian nationalist movement. A recent study by Nobuto Yamamoto (2011) points out that, although *peranakan* Chinese journalists of Sino-Malay newspapers had played a pivotal role in the development of the Indonesian nationalist movement during the 1920s and 1930s, they were excluded from formal indigenous politics. No Indonesian political parties (with the exception of the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) accepted ethnic Chinese as members. Consequently, *peranakan* Chinese journalists were left out from accounts of Indonesian national history. In a similar way, Helen Pausacker (2005) examines the historical and contemporary involvement of the *peranakan* Chinese in Javanese *wayang* (shadow puppetry). The contributions of the Chinese politically and culturally, according to both authors, have been lost from the collective memory due to political factors and racism.

J. A. C. Mackie (1976) and Jemma Purdey (2005; 2006) look into events of violence against the ethnic Chinese and argue that the Chinese are always made scapegoats during economic crisis and political turbulence because of anti-Chinese sentiments among *pribumi*. In his study on the identity of ethnic Chinese in post-Suharto Jakarta, Hoon Chang-Yau (2008) points out that, although the relatively open and liberal environment after the overthrow of the New Order regime has allowed the Chinese openly to express their identity and organise themselves, they continue to occupy a vulnerable position in Indonesian society, as anti-Chinese sentiments are still alive among the *pribumi*. The Chinese have yet to be fully accepted by their *pribumi* counterparts, since many *pribumi* still have stereotypes of the Chinese based on essentialist assumptions of race, origin, and class. Chinese Indonesians are perceived as foreign descendants because they still practise Chinese culture that is different from indigenous cultures in the country. Moreover, they are still perceived by many *pribumi* as economically strong but exclusive and selfish (125–45). Thung Ju Lan (2009), in her article on the direct participation of Chinese Indonesians in electoral politics, makes a similar argument that not many Chinese electoral candidates have been elected into local, regional, or national parliaments because indigenous Indonesians have generally not yet been willing to accept Chinese Indonesians’ role in formal politics.

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9. *Peranakan* Chinese are acculturated Chinese who have little or no command of Chinese languages or dialects and practise culture and customs that are neither purely Chinese nor purely indigenous Indonesian. I will elaborate more on the origins of *peranakan* Chinese in Section 1.2 and Chapter 2.
The connection between violence and the unacceptability of the Chinese in formal politics is made explicit in Hui Yew-Foong’s (2011) ethno-historical study of the Chinese communities in West Kalimantan and their plight as political orphans. Hui reveals that the Chinese were seen as ‘signifiers of wealth’ (277) by the indigenous population and that they experienced harassment and extortion from local indigenous gangsters from time to time (275–76). During the 1999 anti-Madurese violence perpetrated by the indigenous Malays and Dayaks in Sambas District, West Kalimantan, the Chinese, although not targeted, nevertheless closed their shops; some placed food, drinks, and other supplies outside their doors for the Malays and Dayaks in order to safeguard their property from being looted (274–77).

According to Hui, the position of the Chinese in the province remains ambivalent even after the opening up of political space in the post–New Order era. The political freedom and political achievement of the Chinese in post–New Order West Kalimantan have been met with a backlash from local indigenous communities. In November 2007, a Chinese, Christiandy Sanjaya (黃漢山), paired with a Dayak, was elected as deputy governor of West Kalimantan during the gubernatorial election of November 2007. The Malays, another major indigenous group in West Kalimantan, were upset as ‘they had been denied representation in the highest offices of the province’ (299). In early December 2007, a dispute between a Chinese and a Malay over a purported accident in Pontianak turned violent; rioters attacked and vandalised properties owned by ethnic Chinese. Hui suggests that the riots may be traced back to the gubernatorial election that saw the victory of a Chinese candidate. Some Malays ‘are willing to resort to violence to express their displeasure with the Chinese for gaining political ascendancy at their expense’ (Hui 2011, 303). Later, nine Chinese community leaders in Pontianak issued a public apology in local newspapers to the Malay community. Hui saw the issuance of the public apology as an act to ‘appease the injured Malay community’ (302), which had experienced electoral defeat.

Although these works have documented important events and attitudes towards the Chinese in Indonesian history, they still ascribe a largely passive and powerless role to Chinese Indonesians. They scarcely touch on the active human agency of Chinese Indonesians in creating, deploying, or shaping their position in Indonesian society. Mary F. Somers’s PhD thesis (1965) on *peranakan* Chinese politics in the 1950s and Leo Suryadinata’s work (1981) on *peranakan* Chinese politics from the 1910s to the early 1940s are two of the few scholarly works that focus on the active role of Chinese Indonesians in shaping their political fortunes. To my knowledge, Marleen Dieleman and colleagues’ edited volume (2011) is the first scholarly work that claims to adopt Giddens’s structure-agency theory in examining how Chinese Indonesians have demonstrated active agency in shaping their destinies.
and crucial social trends in the country during periods of crisis and regime change. The work covers the role of Chinese Indonesians in dealing with issues of assimilation, identity, and civil rights. The contributors have made a compelling case that Chinese Indonesians have not merely been passive and powerless bystanders and victims in Indonesian history, but also active agents of change during periods of crisis. The paper by Patricia Tjiook-Liem, for example, examines the experience in early twentieth-century Batavia (present-day Jakarta) of a simple Chinese shopkeeper, Loe Joe Djin, who was found guilty of being an accessory to theft. During the Dutch colonial era, Europeans in the Indies were subject to a different legal system from that governing indigenous people and other Asians. The sentences inflicted on Asians were often arbitrary and harsher than those imposed upon Europeans; at the same time, appeal was impossible. Insisting he was innocent and that the sentence was unjust, Loe upon his release complained by telegram to the Chinese minister of foreign affairs in Beijing and to the Chinese ambassador in The Hague. His appeal prompted the Chinese government to pressure the Dutch to treat the Chinese as equals of the Europeans in the criminal administration of justice under Dutch law. Subsequently the system was changed; in minor criminal cases, Europeans and Asians were equated without distinction.\textsuperscript{10} Tjiook-Liem’s work demonstrates that Loe was not a passive and powerless victim of injustice. He displayed active agency in fighting against the unjust legal system and his action triggered a legal reform in the Indies.

There are some political economists who portray wealthy Chinese businesspeople as active agents of capitalism in New Order Indonesia. Richard Robison (1986; 1992) and Jamie Mackie (2003) depict how the highly patrimonial New Order regime co-opted a few ethnic Chinese capitalists into networks of patronage in which \textit{pribumi} politico-bureaucrats had dominant power. Although the Chinese capitalists were economically powerful, their marginalised ethnicity made them politically impotent and rendered them what Christian Chua (2008, following Riggs 1964, 189–93; 1966, 249–54) refers to as a ‘pariah business class’. Riggs created the concept of ‘pariah entrepreneurship’ to refer to Chinese businesspeople in his research in Thailand; these businesspeople were politically vulnerable and had to depend on politico-bureaucrats for patronage and privileged access to facilities. In return, the businesspeople contributed unofficial funds to the personal income of their protectors and patrons. Chua suggests that, in Suharto’s New Order, the Chinese played a similar game; in order to gain patronage and privileged access to licenses, contracts, and state bank credit, they established patron-client relations with politico-bureaucrats. This shows that Chinese capitalists

\textsuperscript{10} However, for serious criminal cases, Europeans and indigenous people as well as other Asians were still subject to different legal systems until the end of the Dutch colonial period (Fasseur 1994, 42–43).
played a significant role in forming the political-business oligarchy in New Order Indonesia.

In his work, Chua explores in detail the active role played by Chinese Indonesian big business in shaping its position and reinforcing stereotypes about the Chinese in the post–New Order era. His works (2005; 2008; 2009) examine the impact of political democratisation in post-Suharto Indonesia on Chinese Indonesian conglomerates and how these conglomerates managed to resist, influence, and even mould political reforms. All his works point out that, although the collapse of the New Order regime put an end to the highly centralised, predatory patronage networks that secured the dominance of Chinese conglomerates in the private sector, Chinese conglomerates were able to react and adapt to the post-authoritarian environment in six ways. First, in the process of bank restructuring carried out by the new government, Chinese tycoons tried to buy back their assets on sale through third parties or offshore companies. They did not encounter much competition since external investors were not enthusiastic about taking over the assets, due to the inscrutability of the actual composition of the companies and to the generally muddy business environment in Indonesia. Second, some Chinese business elites tried to infiltrate the new regulatory institutions by bringing in and supporting close or bribable people in order to influence the composition, orientation, and arbitration of the institutions. Third, Chinese tycoons established political connections with new and potential power-holders such as opposition leaders by contributing money to their political activities. Fourth, Chinese conglomerates resorted to financial coercion to keep the media favourable to them. Their tactics included bribes, lawsuits, intimidation of journalists, threats to withdraw advertising, and takeovers of media that were critical to Chinese big business. Fifth, Chinese tycoons bribed the new politico-bureaucrats to expedite the facilitation of business opportunities. Sixth, some Chinese big businesspeople hired thugs in the provinces outside Jakarta to intimidate local populations and politicians and subordinated them to private interests. Chua’s works show that Chinese conglomerates were able to survive in democratised Indonesia by resorting to various extra-legal tactics, because political democratisation in the post-Suharto era has yet to lead to the emergence of good governance emphasising transparency and the rule of law, although there is an increasing effort to enforce the rule of law. By actively adopting these corrupt tactics, Chinese tycoons played a crucial role in shaping and perpetuating the new corrupt, predatory political-business system. At the same time, the ongoing wealth accumulation, exploitation, and corruption by Chinese tycoons has reinforced stereotypes of the Chinese as corrupt and opportunistic. As Jemma Purdey (2009) in her review of Chua’s work (2008) rightly puts it,
Contemplating the Role of the Ethnic Chinese

Chua’s Chinese conglomerates play a very large and largely detrimental part (as they did during the New Order) in rendering futile any efforts to remove [the boundaries between ethnic Chinese and *pribumi* Indonesians] and alter the nation’s perceptions of the “ethnic Chinese”. (113)

Tsai Yen-Ling’s work (2008; 2011) on Chinese exclusivity and the asymmetrical relationship between ethnic Chinese and *pribumi* is another body of scholarly work that focuses on the active role of Chinese Indonesians in reproducing and perpetuating their ambivalent position in post-Suharto Indonesia. Based on her field research in Medan and Jakarta, Tsai notes that, after the anti-Chinese violence in May 1998, many Chinese thought that they could no longer depend on the state’s security apparatus. Thus, they chose to live in gated communities which were significantly more expensive than non-gated communities. Security guards, mostly *pribumi*, are employed to ensure the safety of the communities. Tsai points out that the more the Chinese choose to protect themselves by living in gated communities, the more they reinforce the *pribumi* perception of the Chinese as an exclusive ethnic minority. In addition, the more the Chinese rely on *pribumi* security guards for safety and protection, the more they reproduce the stereotypes of Chinese as wealthy and as the perfect target of extortion.

Scholarly works on ethnic Chinese Indonesians show that the historical development of ethnic relations and various policies of the different governments in Indonesia have constrained what Chinese have been able to do, but at the same time it is possible to see that the Chinese themselves have contributed to creating and reproducing their ambivalent position. This will be further explored in the chapters to come. At the same time, the changing political climate has both opened up possibilities and made the situation more complex for the ethnic Chinese. As will be explored further in the next chapters, I suggest that the Indonesian case can contribute to a more general understanding of the relationship between democratisation and ethnic minorities.

1.2 Scope of Research

What is the relationship between democratisation and ethnic minorities? It is hoped that this study will open up further questions about what the democratisation process means to minority populations, particularly when those minorities have the ambivalent position of being marginalised at the same time as having economic power—as stated above, a ‘pariah class’. This study looks into the increasingly ambivalent position of Chinese Indonesians in

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11. It should be noted that gated communities are not entirely new—they already existed before May 1998—but class-based residential patterns have certainly intensified after the May 1998 riots.
post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya by looking at the interconnectedness of business, electoral politics, and the revitalisation of the socio-cultural life of the Chinese in the post-Suharto era. Medan and Surabaya were selected as field sites for this study as both cities are economically and politically significant but also have some interesting contrasts in regard to their Chinese populations. These cities are the capitals of North Sumatra and East Java respectively, ‘the sites of vibrant urban and industrial centers’ (Hadiz 2004, 623). Medan is a historically important centre of plantation, manufacturing, and trade, while Surabaya is a vital port city which functions as a gateway to eastern Indonesia (Buiskool 2004, 1; Hadiz 2004, 623). According to City Population, an online atlas, Medan and Surabaya were the fifth- and second-largest cities in the country respectively in 2010 (2012). Both cities have a significant Chinese Indonesian population; according to the Indonesian Population Census of 2010, the concentration of the Chinese Indonesian population was 9.7% in Medan and 5.3% in Surabaya (cited in Fossati [2016, 8, Table 2]), figures which are much higher than the percentage (1.2%) of Chinese Indonesians in the total population of Indonesia (Ananta, Arifin and Bakhtiar 2008, 27, Table 2.2).

Medan and Surabaya are also, however, quite different in terms of their ethnic Chinese communities. It is widely observed that ethnic Chinese in Medan are less indigenised (at least in terms of their daily language use)—in other words, they are more totok compared to their counterparts in Java, where Surabaya is situated (Mabbett and Mabbett 1972, 9). The term ‘totok’ originally meant pure-blood Chinese who migrated to Indonesia more recently than the peranakan, i.e., acculturated Chinese who have little or no command of Chinese languages or dialects and who practise culture and customs that are neither purely Chinese nor purely indigenous Indonesian. Some peranakan Chinese are descendants of intermarriage between Chinese male immigrants and local indigenous women before mass Chinese immigration to Indonesia occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century. The totok-peranakan distinction began to emerge after mass Chinese immigration to Indonesia took place at the second half of the nineteenth century. In the 1950s and 1960s, the term ‘totok’ was used to refer to Chinese Indonesians who had a China-oriented upbringing and who had command of some Chinese languages or dialects (Suryadinata 1992, 2; Hoon 2008, 4–5, 190–91). Edward Aspinall and colleagues (2011) highlight that the Chinese population in Medan ‘is recognized as having a distinctive culture that largely survived the ban on public expressions of Chinese language and culture under the New Order government’ (32). They also point out that

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12. The data in City Population is based on the Indonesian Population Census of 2010, which is the most recent census of Indonesia.

13. I will elaborate more on the origins of totok and peranakan Chinese in Chapter 2.
most Chinese Indonesians in the city are Buddhists and they speak in their daily life Hokkien, a Chinese dialect originating from the southern part of Fujian Province in southern China (Aspinall, Dettman, and Warburton 2011, 32). According to surveys conducted by M. Rajab Lubis and Peter D. Weldon on languages usually spoken at home by ethnic Chinese in Medan and Surabaya respectively, 73% of ethnic Chinese respondents in Medan spoke a Chinese language at home, but only 22% of their counterparts in Surabaya use a Chinese language at home (Lubis 1995, 76; Weldon 1978, 270, Table 11). According to another survey conducted by RM. H. Subanindyo Hadiluwih on languages usually spoken by Chinese Indonesians in Medan, 51.92% of Chinese Indonesians in the city spoke a Chinese dialect (read Hokkien) in their workplace, 57.69% spoke a Chinese dialect with friends, and up to 90.38% spoke Hokkien or another Chinese language at home (Hadiluwih 1994, 97–98).

During my fieldwork in Medan, I also observed that most Chinese in Medan, including those who are very young, spoke Hokkien. There are also some Chinese who can speak Mandarin as well. This marks a sharp contrast to their Chinese counterparts in several places in Java such as Jakarta and Surabaya. I visited the Chinatowns in Jakarta (Glodok) and Surabaya (Kembang Jepun); the common language of communication in both places was Indonesian instead of Mandarin or any other Chinese language. The cultural differences between Chinese in Medan and Surabaya are probably due to two factors. The first factor has much to do with the inter-ethnic relationships between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians in these two cities. According to Judith Nagata (2003, 275), Medan has a long history of tensions between local Chinese and indigenous groups. The use of Chinese languages among Chinese in Medan creates a gulf between them and the indigenous Indonesians. The Chinese are also considered wealthier and often encounter opposition and antagonism from indigenous Indonesians, as in the words of an ethnic Chinese stuffed-toy distributor in Medan:

Many pribumi still think that ethnic Chinese are rich because they have stolen much wealth from pribumi. Some pribumi children even throw stones at any Chinese who pass in front of their houses because they are taught by their parents that the Chinese are bad. Many local Muslim pribumi often target ethnic Chinese as their scapegoat. If all Chinese have disappeared, I believe those Muslims would target local Batak Christians because of their different religious background. . . . I believe the stereotype of ethnic Chinese among pribumi will only disappear considerably after the older and middle generations of pribumi have passed away. (Interview with Susanto in Mandarin, August 4, 2010)

In fact, Medan was the site of the first violence against Chinese in May 1998 (Purdey 2006, 114). The situation is quite different in Surabaya;
according to an article in *Gatra* magazine (Trihusodo and Herawati 1998) and also mentioned in an interview with Dédé Oetomo (溫忠孝) (interview in English, December 24, 2010), an ethnic Chinese social activist in Surabaya, the Chinese in Surabaya generally maintain good relationships with indigenous Indonesians and did not encounter massive riots in May 1998. It was also alleged that the local ethnic Chinese business community in Surabaya was able to guarantee relative peace in the city by paying generously for local military protection, in contrast to many other major cities in Java such as Jakarta and Solo, where troops mysteriously disappeared when the anti-Chinese riots broke out (Dick 2003, 475). According to one informant in Surabaya, although initially violence against the Chinese did occur in the far north of the city where Chinatown is situated, it was immediately suppressed by the local armed forces and did not spread to other parts of the city (interview with Susana, in Mandarin, January 14, 2011).

The second factor is that Medan is very near to Malaysia (particularly Penang and Kedah) and Singapore, two neighbouring countries with ethnic Chinese communities that still maintain Chinese languages and many Chinese customs. Many Chinese in Medan have relatives or close friends in Malaysia and Singapore. The interaction between Chinese in Medan and those of Malaysia and Singapore exposes the former to cultural influence from the latter. As Cao Yunhua (2010) notes,

> Medan is near to Singapore, Penang, and Kuala Lumpur. It is separated only by the Straits of Melaka from these cities. It only takes 40 to 50 minutes to travel from Medan to these cities by flight. Such convenience in transportation has enabled the Chinese in Medan to have frequent interaction and to establish close relationships with the Chinese in Singapore, Penang and Kuala Lumpur. . . . In recent years, the Chinese in Medan like to send their children to these three cities to study. After graduation, many of them stay and work in these cities. (77, my translation from Chinese original)

### 1.3 Methods of Research

The original objective of my research was to analyse the political economy of ethnic Chinese businesses in Medan and Surabaya since the advent of democratisation and decentralisation in Indonesia. I intended to explore how ethnic Chinese businesspeople had adapted to the democratic environment that had emerged since 1998. Specifically, I intended to discover the issues involved in interactions between businesspeople and local government and political parties, and how these might have evolved in the decade since the

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14. For a detailed analysis of the different magnitudes of violence experienced by local Chinese communities in Medan, Surabaya, Solo, and Yogyakarta and the reasons behind the difference, see Panggabean and Smith (2011).
implementation of decentralisation as part of the democratisation process. I found this specific focus to be difficult for several reasons.

The first reason was due to problems in obtaining data that were essential for that specific research. The information on patrimonial relationships between Chinese businesspeople and power-holders was very essential; however, during my fieldwork in Indonesia, most of the businesspeople I interviewed were reluctant to talk about these relationships. Additionally, some Chinese businesspeople who were close to power-holders were unwilling to be interviewed and such information was generally not covered in the media. Therefore, to get such information I had to rely on other informants who knew those businesspeople or had some knowledge of patrimonial relationships involving Chinese businesspeople. In addition, I could not obtain more concrete information on local regulations concerning business activities, also essential to my research, due to problems of accessing the local bureaucracy. The local regulations are also not entirely available on the Internet. Therefore, I needed to rely on the media and individual interviews to get more information on local regulations. The data on patrimonial relationships involving Chinese businesspeople and local regulations concerning business activities that I received from individual interviews and the media were not sufficient in and of themselves for a book.

On the other hand, there has been a lack of in-depth research on Chinese Indonesian civil society groups and the participation of Chinese Indonesians in electoral politics in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya. According to my review of literature on ethnic Chinese Indonesians, there was (and still is) no scholarly work that has discussed the role of Chinese Indonesians in both of these aspects in detail. However, I believe that it is essential to understand the role of Chinese Indonesians with regard to politics and civil society in order to get a better picture of their position in the post-Suharto era. As it turns out, my informants in Medan and Surabaya were willing to share more information on these issues than they were about my original research topic. In addition, as I mentioned earlier, most scholarly works on Chinese Indonesians have ascribed a largely passive and powerless role to this minority in Indonesian history. These works do not give due credit to the active agency of Chinese Indonesians in creating, deploying, or shaping their position in Indonesian society. Therefore, I decided to focus on the active agency of Chinese Indonesians in responding to democratisation and shaping the democratisation process as well as their position in Indonesian society since the end of the Suharto regime, and to focus on the aspects of business, civil society, and politics since they are clearly interconnected in terms of the role Chinese Indonesians have been playing in the post-Suharto era.
The methods used in this research are library research, in-depth, semi-structured individual interviews, as well as participant observation. The fieldwork was conducted in Jakarta (June 2010 and May 2011), Medan (July 2010 to December 2010), and Surabaya (December 2010 to May 2011). Library research was conducted by consulting both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include statistical reports published by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS, Badan Pusat Statistik), news magazines published in Indonesia, and newspapers, both at national and local levels. The secondary sources include books, journals, and academic writings regarding the background of Chinese Indonesian communities in Medan and Surabaya; the changing political landscape in post-Suharto Indonesia; decentralisation policies; the associational life and the participation of Chinese Indonesians in formal politics in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya; Chinese-language newspapers established in Medan and Surabaya since the end of the New Order; and local Chinese business in Medan and Surabaya since the advent of democratisation and regional decentralisation. I also interviewed in both cities Chinese Indonesian businesspeople, leaders of local major ethnic Chinese organisations, persons in charge or staff of local Chinese-language newspapers, journalists, politicians, academics, and NGO activists (see Appendix I for a complete list of informants).15 The interviews were conducted in Mandarin, Hokkien, Indonesian, or English. All names of informants used in this study, except for public figures, are pseudonyms. In addition, I conducted participant observation to look into the ‘Chineseness’ of ethnic Chinese in Medan and Surabaya during my interactions with Chinese families in Medan and Surabaya.

1.4 Outline for the Book

I have divided the book into two parts. In the first part, I examine the construction of the Chinese minority in Indonesia as a type of ‘pariah class’ and query what effect democratisation has had on this construction. I do this through two chapters: Chapter 2, which explores the origins of the ambivalent position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, and Chapter 3, which looks at the marginalised position of ethnic minority ‘pariah classes’ and their role in democratisation processes. In this part, I suggest that the ambivalent position of the Chinese is not due only to the policies of colonial and post-colonial regimes and to prejudice among indigenous Indonesians, but also to the actions of the Chinese themselves. At the same time, I question the concepts of democracy, the democratisation process in post-Suharto Indonesia, its

15. I also conducted online follow-up interviews with one of my informants after my fieldwork in order to gather further relevant information.
impact on the state and society, and the role of Chinese Indonesians in the
democratisation process.

The second part, which consists of Chapters 4, 5, and 6, showcases
how the ambivalence of democratisation in post-Suharto Indonesia and the
response of Chinese Indonesians to such ambivalence have created an even
more paradoxical position for the Chinese.

The freedom for cultural expression opened up in the *reformasi* era has
led to the emergence of two different Chinese ethnic and cultural identities.
One emphasises the revival of Chinese culture and the bolstering of Chinese
ethnic identity, another focuses on the integration of Chinese Indonesians
into the wider Indonesian society. In Chapter 4, I look into the sociologi-
cal factors behind the emergence of these two different Chinese ethnic and
cultural identities, and examine how these two identities are manifested in
two different approaches towards opening up the Chinese socio-cultural
sphere in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya. Chinese Indonesians who
strongly support Chinese ethnic and cultural identities have made use of
the more liberal environment to establish Chinese-based organisations
and Chinese-language newspapers. In general, these organisations and
newspapers have made use of intra-ethnic linkages to safeguard Chinese
ethnic and cultural identities, thus contributing to multiculturalism in
post-Suharto Indonesia. The rise of China as an economic power has also
prompted leaders of some Chinese organisations to utilise their intra-ethnic
linkages and social networks in China to assist local governments in estab-
lishing cultural and business connections with China. Many indigenous
Indonesians, however, perceive that the active role of Chinese organisa-
tions in promoting Chinese culture indicates an insistence upon separate-
ness—this is one thing that has made the Chinese targets of dislike. At the
same time, there are Chinese Indonesians who favour the integration of the
Chinese into the wider Indonesian society and who have established non-
ethnic-based socio-cultural organisations to promote cross-ethnic under-
standing and solidarity. On the whole, however, the socio-cultural activities
and endeavours of Chinese organisations and Chinese-language newspa-
pers have reproduced and perpetuated stereotypes of the Chinese as insular,
exclusive, opportunistic, and oriented towards China instead of Indonesia. I
suggest that the education system of Indonesia could promote more people,
including Chinese Indonesians, to become actively involved in cross-ethnic
endeavours if schools introduce programmes and activities that promote
inter-ethnic understanding and solidarity.

The corrupt and muddy business environment of the post–New Order
era has influenced the ways Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in Medan
and Surabaya gain and safeguard their business interests, as well as deal
with illegal practices by government officials, police, and *preman* (gangsters/
thugs). In Chapter 5, I examine, against the background of these structural conditions, how Chinese Indonesian businesspeople tend to resort to various illegal or semi-legal means, such as giving in to the illegal requests of government officials, police, and preman; establishing collusion with local power-holders, heads of security forces, and youth/crime organisations; as well as exerting financial coercion on critical media to gain and protect their business and personal interests. These business practices in turn perpetuate and reproduce the corrupt and muddy business environment, as well as the predatory political-business system. They also reproduce and reinforce stereotypes of the Chinese as wealthy, corrupt, and opportunistic, the perfect targets of extortion. Although there are also Chinese businesspeople who refuse to be victims of extortion and choose to fight against these illegal practices, such businesspeople are rare. If one wishes to see more Chinese Indonesian businesspeople who refuse to be extorted and do not get involved in illegal and semi-legal practices, a better-enforced rule of law must be in place.

Chapter 6 focuses on the involvement of Chinese Indonesians in electoral politics in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya and how this intersects with their stereotypical position as businesspeople. On the one hand, the opening up of a democratic environment in post-Suharto Indonesia has prompted many Chinese Indonesians to get involved in electoral politics. Some of them become electoral candidates in order to push for reform and positive changes in Indonesia and reject approaches of support for their campaigns in return for political and business favours. On the other hand, there are those who become actively involved in politics with the aim of gaining political protection for their business instead of fighting for the interests of the general public. Ironically, they often have a higher chance of getting elected, because of the increased cost of campaigning in direct elections introduced during the democratisation process. Their own wealth, or the willingness to accept support from corrupt businesspeople, often Chinese, ensures enough funds to obtain party support and to bribe voters. In this way, Chinese businesspeople continue to establish corrupt and patrimonial relationships with aspiring politicians in exchange for political favours for their business. In addition, some Chinese who strongly support the re-emergence of cultural expression and Chinese ethnic identity are reluctant to support some reform-minded Chinese politicians, whom they deem as not ‘Chinese’ enough and not close to the Chinese community. This has led to the marginalisation of genuinely reform-minded politicians such as Sofyan Tan. It has also perpetuated the predatory characteristics of Indonesia’s new democracy and reinforced stereotypes of the Chinese as corrupt and opportunistic.

The seventh chapter provides an analysis and summary of the active role of ethnic Chinese in reproducing and perpetuating their ambivalent position
as well as in shaping Indonesia’s political, business, and socio-cultural environment in the post-Suharto era. I also suggest that studying the Chinese in Indonesia may direct us to rethink the effect of democratisation on ethnic minorities and the role that those minorities may have in how transformative democratisation can be both for their situation and the betterment of the wider society. I conclude that effective enforcement of the rule of law as well as an education system that promotes inter-ethnic understanding and solidarity could promote more open- and reform-minded people, including those from resented, economically dominant minorities, such as the Chinese in Indonesia.
Conclusion

My stories of the various individuals who live and work in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya have attempted to illustrate the paradoxes of democratisation for ethnic minorities. As mentioned in Chapter 1, many scholars have reservations about considering democracy as a political system that necessarily guarantees minority rights. Some argue that democratisation tends to bring a backlash against minorities, especially those who play a dominant role in the economy. Some opine that democratisation may marginalise or even eliminate the culture of minorities. However, this study shows that such views appear to be too simplistic. As I discussed in the previous chapters, in the case of Indonesia, the Chinese minority has enjoyed certain positive outcomes of democratisation since the unravelling of the authoritarian regime. Most significantly, anti-Chinese violence has declined considerably and many discriminatory measures against the Chinese have been removed. The Chinese are allowed openly to express and celebrate their ethnic and cultural identities by establishing Chinese organisations and Chinese-language presses. They are also free to become involved in electoral politics and to run for public office. On the other hand, the Chinese minority is still perceived by many indigenous Indonesians as a wealthy, selfish, exclusive, corrupt, and opportunistic alien minority. They remain the perfect target of extortion and corruption by government officials, police, and preman. The increasing visibility of the Chinese in the socio-cultural sphere and politics has also resulted in suspicion and anger from indigenous Indonesians. From the perspective of constructivism, proposed by Anderson (1998), this is the outcome of the divide-and-rule policy of the Dutch colonial period and the stigmatisation of Chinese Indonesians as an economically dominant minority group by post-independence regimes, especially during Suharto’s rule. Therefore, it is more accurate to say that the situation of the Chinese minority has become increasingly ambivalent and more complex since the advent of democratisation in Indonesia.
This study has shown that the situation of minorities in a newly democratised society depends largely on how democratised the society has become, how well established the rule of law, and how the minorities respond to and shape the democratisation process. According to the typologies of Diamond (1999) and Haynes (2001), minority rights are only fully guaranteed under a ‘liberal’ or ‘full’ democracy that promotes individual freedom, public participation in the political process, and the rule and accountability of public officials to ordinary people. This means that if a society has not yet developed into a ‘liberal’ or ‘full’ democracy, the interests of minorities are not necessarily guaranteed. To date, Indonesia has not become a ‘liberal’ or ‘full’ democracy that truly safeguards the interests of minorities. On the one hand, a relatively democratic and liberal political environment has emerged; but on the other hand, the new political parties and institutions have generally been captured by old as well as some new predatory interests. Moreover, corruption and internal mismanagement have continued to plague state institutions.

In the foregoing, I have explored and shown, through a combination of Anthony Giddens’s structure-agency theory as well as Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and field, that Chinese Indonesians are by no means merely passive bystanders of the (incomplete) democratisation process in Indonesia and powerless victims of their increasingly ambivalent and complex position. Although the Chinese are constrained by various conditions, they have also played an active and dynamic role in responding to and shaping the new political, business, and socio-cultural environment in post-Suharto Indonesia. In the aspects of business and politics, due to the hassle of fighting back and also the fact that they have enough economic capital to pay bribes and extortion money, most Chinese prefer to give in to the illegal requests of government officials, police, and preman in order to prevent any further problems. Some Chinese businesspeople have willingly resorted to illegal practices to further their business interests. Some make use of their social capital to establish corrupt and patrimonial relationships with power-holders, heads of security forces, aspiring politicians, and youth/crime organisations who can promise them protection and other benefits for their business. Some become involved in politics and run for public office with the aim of gaining political protection for their business instead of fighting for the interests of the general public. In the socio-cultural aspect, due to their strong ethnic identity and their well-established social networks in China, many Chinese Indonesian organisation leaders strongly support not only Chinese cultural identity, but also continuing ties to China. All these factors have kept alive the general perception of Chinese Indonesians as corrupt, collusive, opportunistic, insular, and oriented toward China. At the same time, there are also Chinese Indonesians such as Sofyan Tan who
focus on the integration of Chinese Indonesians into the wider Indonesian society. They work relentlessly to rectify the negative perceptions of Chinese among indigenous Indonesians. They play an active role in initiating and engaging in cross-ethnic endeavours that promote inter-ethnic solidarity and understanding. However, these Chinese are fewer in number than those who continue to reinforce such negative perceptions. Moreover, they are often perceived as culturally not ‘Chinese’ enough by some Chinese with a strong ethnic identity, and therefore become a target of dislike among those Chinese. In this way, Chinese Indonesians as a whole have played a part in shaping the incomplete democratisation process as well as their increasingly ambivalent and more complex position in post-Suharto Indonesia.

It is hoped that the case studies in this book constitute a cutting-edge representation of Chinese Indonesian communities in the urban centres of post-Suharto Indonesia, primarily Medan and Surabaya, since both cities are large and have a relatively high percentage of ethnic Chinese. The dynamics of Chinese Indonesian communities in post-Suharto urban Indonesia is therefore apparent in this study.

In broader theoretical terms, this study argues that, in order to have a better understanding of the relationship between democratisation and minority rights, one cannot ignore the agency of the minorities themselves. The situation of minorities in a newly democratised society depends not only on the historical development of ethnic relations and the various policies of governments, but also how the minorities themselves respond to the democratisation process. With regard to the position of resented, economically dominant minorities, such as the Chinese in Indonesia, this study suggests it is only possible to see a significant improvement in their position if the majority of the minority plays an active role in fighting against corrupt practices in state institutions, initiating and engaging in cross-ethnic initiatives that seek to alter the negative perceptions against them, and supporting genuinely reform-minded politicians regardless of their ethnic identity. Otherwise, their position will only become increasingly ambivalent and more complex under democratisation.

To encourage more people from the resented, economically dominant minorities to refuse to be extorted, to refrain from engaging in illegal and semi-legal business practices, to actively engage in cross-ethnic endeavours, as well as to participate as reformers in politics, effective enforcement of the rule of law is certainly a prerequisite. In addition, the experience of YPSIM, the private school founded by Sofyan Tan that promotes integration among students from various ethnic-religious background (mentioned in Chapter 4), indicates that the education system could also promote more open- and reform-minded people if schools introduce programmes and activities that promote inter-ethnic understanding and solidarity. This would certainly bring a significant positive impact on democratisation in society.
Glossary of Personal Names

A Hie
Adi, Soetanto
Alim Husin
Alim Markus
Amin
Basri, Benny
Budiman, Arief, a.k.a. Soe Hok Djin
Chalim MZ. H., Abdul
Chandra, Tansri
Chen Yituan
Chin Kung, Master
Dharmanadi, Joko
Djuandi, Eddy
Ek Kiong
Firdaus, Sonny
Gatot, Suherman
Hanurakin, Arifli Harbianto
Haryanto
Hasan, Bob, a.k.a. The Kian Seng
Hasyim, a.k.a. Oei Kien Lim
Honggandhi, Hakim
Hu Jintao
Jahja, Junus, a.k.a. Lauw Chuan Tho
Janlie
Jonan, Ignasius
Kang Youwei
Karman, Hasan, a.k.a. Bong Sau Fan
Kurniadi, Henky
Kwik Kian Gie

Amin
王天喜
Adi, Soetanto
陳紀維
Alim Husin
林學善
Alim Markus
林文光
Amin
陳建銘
Basri, Benny
張保園
Budiman, Arief, a.k.a. Soe Hok Djin
史福仁
Chalim MZ. H., Abdul
李光霖
Chandra, Tansri
陳明宗
Chen Yituan
陳宜團
Chin Kung, Master
淨空法師
Dharmanadi, Joko
楊果奮
Djuandi, Eddy
莊欽華
Ek Kiong
黃弈強
Firdaus, Sonny
黃新榮
Gatot, Suherman
吳振雄
Hanurakin, Arifli Harbianto
韓明理
Haryanto
吳其生
Hasan, Bob, a.k.a. The Kian Seng
鄭建盛
Hasyim, a.k.a. Oei Kien Lim
黃建霖
Honggandhi, Hakim
關健康
Hu Jintao
胡錦濤
Jahja, Junus, a.k.a. Lauw Chuan Tho
劉全道
Janlie
饒潔莉
Jonan, Ignasius
楊賢靈
Kang Youwei
康有為
Karman, Hasan, a.k.a. Bong Sau Fan
黃少凡
Kurniadi, Henky
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<td>Purnama, Basuki Tjahaja, a.k.a. Tjoeng Wan Hok, ‘Ahok’</td>
<td>鍾萬學</td>
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<td>Purnomo, Nurdin, a.k.a. Wu Nengbin</td>
<td>吳能彬</td>
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<td>Rahardja, William</td>
<td>江國榮</td>
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<td>Rabarja, Bagus</td>
<td>張豪仁</td>
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<td>Riady, James</td>
<td>李白</td>
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<td>Riady, Mochtar, a.k.a. Lie Mo Tie</td>
<td>李文正</td>
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<td>Saiful, Benny</td>
<td>黃奮鵬</td>
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<td>Salim, Sudono, a.k.a. Liem Sioe Liong</td>
<td>林紹良</td>
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<td>Sanjaya, Christiandy</td>
<td>黃漢山</td>
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<td>Santoso, Eddy Gunawan</td>
<td>吳繼平</td>
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<td>Sindhunatha, K.</td>
<td>王宗海</td>
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<td>Soerjadjaja, William, a.k.a. Tjia Kian Liong</td>
<td>謝建隆</td>
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<td>Soetomo, Jos</td>
<td>江慶德</td>
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<td>Soka, M.</td>
<td>胡賜嘉</td>
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<td>Suhendra, Fajar</td>
<td>蘇用發</td>
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<td>Sukiran</td>
<td>蘇志忠</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sun Yat-sen</td>
<td>孫逸仙／孫中山</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surya, Johan Tedja</td>
<td>鄭文英</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suryadjaja G., Agoes</td>
<td>倪政煒</td>
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<td>Tan, Lily</td>
<td>陳俐篥</td>
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<td>陳玉蘭</td>
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<td>Tan, Sofyan, a.k.a. Tan Kim Yang</td>
<td>陳金揚</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanjung, Hakim</td>
<td>陳來金</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanudjaja, Harry</td>
<td>陳國樑</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tjandra, Minarto</td>
<td>潘偉民</td>
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<td>Tjongiran, Johan</td>
<td>章生榮</td>
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<td>Tshai, Frans</td>
<td>蔡華喜</td>
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<td>Wahidin, Indra</td>
<td>黃印華</td>
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<td>Wibisono, Christiano</td>
<td>黃建國</td>
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<td>Widjaja, Samas H.</td>
<td>黃三槐</td>
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<td>Widjaja, Sumandi</td>
<td>黃貴財</td>
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<td>Wijaya, Nyoto</td>
<td>楊富盛</td>
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<td>Winata, Tomy</td>
<td>郭說鋒</td>
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<td>Wongsodihardjo, Aliptojo</td>
<td>黃奮立</td>
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<td>Wonohadi, Elisawati</td>
<td>林進娘</td>
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<td>Yap Juk Lim</td>
<td>葉鬱林</td>
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<td>Yu Zhusheng</td>
<td>余竹生</td>
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<td>Zhong Maosen</td>
<td>鍾茂森</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhou Enlai</td>
<td>周恩來</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Index

1955 Bandung Asian-African Conference, 30
A Hie, 184, 196
Aceh, 44n5, 54–55, 77–78, 85
‘Act No. 62 of the year 1958 Concerning Republic of Indonesia Citizenship’, 30
adat, 53, 54n13, 67, 190
Adi, Soetanto, 187, 196
Agung Cemara Realty, 116
Ahok, 46, 133, 133n13, 134, 197
Aizawa, Nobuhiro, 35
Akademi Akuntansi Surabaya, 138, 190
Al Washliyah, 116
All-Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals. See ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia)
Amin, 196
anti-Sinicism, 29
Anderson, Benedict, 6, 26. See also Anderson, Benedict R. O’G.
Anderson, Benedict R. O’G., 35. See also Anderson, Benedict
Ang Ching Peng. See Hartono
anti-Chinese violence, May 1998, 13, 56, 73, 88, 126, 142
Anto, J., 86–87
Arabs, in Indonesia, 8, 8n6, 26, 54
Arif, Rudi, 184
Arifin, Syamsul, 52, 150, 161
Armayanti, Nelly, 120, 151, 154–56, 160–61, 171
Armed Forces Sons’ and Daughters’ Communication Forum. See FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia)
Army Veterans’ Youth. See PPM (Pemuda Panca Marga)
Arrow Wars, 32n13
Artha Graha Group (GAG), 58, 58n18, 131, 191
Asia Foundation, 100
Asian International Friendship Foreign Language College. See STBA-PIA (Sekolah Tinggi Bahasa Asing Persahabatan Internasional Asia)
Aspinall, Edward, 14, 49–50, 53, 123
Asrie, Sigit Pramono, 154
assimilation policies, 7, 34–36, 70
assimilationists, 33, 35
Awey, Vinsensius, 189
Backman, Michael, 98–99
Bagan Siapi-Api, 29–30, 30n10
Bahasa Melajoe Tionghoa, 28, 190
Bali, 29n8
‘Bamboo Curtain’, 79n13
Banda Aceh, 77
Bandung, 29
Bangka, 34, 69
Bangka Belitung, 133n13
BAPERKI (Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia), 32–33, 191
Barth, Fredrik, 38, 88
Basri, Benny, 110, 113, 115, 196
Batak, 15, 99, 106n6
Batak Karo, 150, 154
Batavia, 11
Beijing, 11, 27, 92, 93n22, 181
Belitung, 34
Bell, Daniel A., 41
Bertrand, Jacques, 53–57
Besuki, 142
Binjai, 81
BMI (Banteng Muda Indonesia), 58, 190
Bong Sau Fan. See Karman, Hasan
Boxer Uprising, 27, 27n4, 32
British Malaya, 7, 69, 69n4; Chinese, 7; divide-and-rule policy, 7; Indians, 7; Malays, 7
Budianto, Fajar, 186
Budiman, Arief, 59, 59n20
Bugis, 29n8
Buiskool, Dirk A., 97, 171
bupati, 25
Cambodia, 77
Cao Yunhua, 74n9, 16
Caritas Switzerland, 86
Central Kalimantan, 54
Chabar Perniagaan / Perniagaan, 28
Chalim MZ. H., Abdul, 187, 196
ChanCT, 94
Chandra, Tansri, 78, 196
Changdao, 81
Chen Yituan, 179, 196
Chengdu, 81
Chin Kung, Master, 75, 196
China Harbour Engineering Company, 82
China News Agency, 80
China Overseas Exchange Association, 78
China Road and Bridge Corporation, 82
China State Construction Engineering Company, 83
Chinese dual citizenship, 29n7, 30
Chinese Indonesian Association. See INTI (Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa)
Chinese Indonesian Social Association. See PSMTI (Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia)
Chinese Language and Culture Education Foundation of China, 77
Chinese law of nationality, 1909, 28
Chinese Youth Irregulars. See LPT (Laskar Pemuda Tionghoa)
Chong Wu Ling, viii. See also Chong Wu Ling
Chong Wu Ling, viii. See also Chong Wu-Ling
Chow Li Ing. See Murdaya, Siti Hartati Cakra
Chua, Amy, 41–43, 55
Chua, Christian, 11–13, 37, 53, 131
Cipta Cakra Murdaya (CCM) Group, 131, 131n10, 190
Citizenship Act of 1946, 30
Citizenship Letter. See SBKRI (Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia)
Committee for the Monitoring of Regional Autonomy. See KPPOD (Komite Pemantau Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah)
Committee of Social Concern of Surabaya. See Kalimas (Komite Aliansi Kepedulian Masyarakat Surabaya)
Confucius, 28, 76
Confucius Institute Headquarters. See Hanban
constructivism, 6, 168
Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship. See BAPERKI (Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia)
Coppel, Charles A., 8, 98
Cordell, Karl, 41
Cornell University, 144
Corruption Eradication Commission. 
See KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi)

Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars. 
See MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia)

Crouch, Harold, 52

cukong, 36, 190

Davidson, Jamie S., 46, 67

Dawis, Aimee, 70
decentralisation, 17–18, 45–47, 50, 53–55, 99–100

Deli Serdang, 81, 115, 162

Democratic Party. See PD (Partai Demokrat)

DEPDAGRI (Departemen Dalam Negeri), 35, 190

Dewan Harian Daerah 45 Sumatera Utara, 84

Dharmanadi, Joko, 178, 196

Dharmasaputra, Karaniya, 59, 59n19

Di Zi Gui, 76

Diamond, Larry, 40–41, 46, 46n7, 60, 169

Dick, Howard, 47. See also Dick, Howard W.
Dick, Howard W., 115. See also Dick, Howard

Dieleman, Marleen, 10

Dipojuwono, Budi, 35n19

Diputro, Adhinata Wira, 188

Djawa Tengah, 28

Djuandi, Eddy, 65, 120, 155, 160, 171, 178, 196

D-onenews.com, 140

DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah), 1, 124–25, 148n27, 149–50, 190

DPRD 1 (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah 1), 125, 190

DPRD 2 (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah 2), 125, 190

DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), 109, 124–25, 190

Dutch colonial rule, 6, 9, 26; divide-and-rule policy, 23, 39, 168

Dutch East India Company (VOC), 26, 195

Dutch East Indies, 23, 26, 26n2, 27–29, 38, 69, 192

East Belitung, 133, 133n13


East Java Entrepreneur Charitable Foundation, 84, 108

East Java High Prosecution Office, 84

East Java Inter-Religious Harmony Association. See Ikatan Kerukunan Umat Beragama Jawa Timur

East Nusa Tenggara, 133

East Timor, 50, 54–55, 126, 141

Edwards, Bob, 48–49

Ek Kiong, 183, 196

Eldin, Dzulmi, 150

electoral democracy, 40–41, 46, 60

Elleman, Bruce A., 32n13

Elly, Karya, 183

Emerald Garden Hotel, 117

ethnic boundary, 38, 88

ethnic minorities, 13, 21, 23, 40–42, 53

Europeans, 11, 11n10, 26–27, 32n13

Export-Import Bank of China, 83

Fauzi, Gamawan, 44n5, 139

‘festivals of democracy’, 44

‘fifth column’, 30, 30n11, 35, 93

Firdaus, Sonny, 183–85

First Sino-Japanese War, 27

Fitryus, H. M., 161

FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia), 52, 101–2, 190

‘floating mass’, 43

Foley, Michael W., 48–49

FORDA UKM (Forum Daerah Usaha Kecil dan Menengah), 107, 171, 190

Foreign Orientals, 26

FORNAS UKM (Forum Nasional Usaha Kecil dan Menengah), 149–50, 191

Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama Surabaya, 140, 191

Freedman, Amy, 47

FUI (Forum Umat Islam), 117, 191

Fujian, 15, 32n13, 69, 191

full democracy, 46, 60, 169
GANDI (Gerakan Perjuangan Anti Diskriminasi), 89, 191
Gatot, Suherman, 183
Gatra, 16, 103, 131
GAYa Nusantara, 144–45, 191
Gemala Group, 131, 131n7
General Elections Commission. See KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum)
Gerindra (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya), 45, 126–27, 134, 134n16, 141, 164, 183, 185, 188–89, 191
Giblin, Susan, 70
Giddens, Anthony, 3, 5–6; structure-agency theory, vii, 3–4, 10, 66, 98, 118, 121, 169
Ginsburg, Tom, 42
Ginting, Nurlisa, 154
Glodok, 15
Glugur, 76, 78
GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia), 137, 137n18, 191
Go, Gunardi, 109n7
Golkar (Golongan Karya), 35n19, 35n20, 36–37, 44, 44n3, 45, 49, 102, 109, 121, 125, 127–28, 129n5, 131, 131n6, 132n12, 134, 143, 146, 150–52, 161, 183–84, 187–89, 191. See also Sekber Golkar (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya)
Gomez, Edmund Terence, 42
Govaars, Ming, 27–28
Great Indonesian Movement Party. See Gerindra (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya)
Guangdong, 32n13, 69, 71n6, 78, 81, 190–91, 194
Guangzhou, 82
Guided Democracy, 31, 51, 52n11
Gumelar, Agum, 131n6
Guoji Ribao, 35n18, 72, 92, 159, 177
Habibie, B. J., 38, 43–45, 72, 124, 141–42
Hadiluwih, RM. H. Subanindyo, 15
Hadiz, Vedi R., 47, 49, 72, 101, 104
Hainanese, 26, 191
Hakka, 26, 46, 71, 75, 133, 191
Hanban, 72, 77, 191
Handoko, Bambang, 186
Hanura (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat), 45, 126–27, 139–40, 164, 191
Hanurakin, Arifli Harbianto, 187, 196
Hao Bao, 173, 177
Harahap, Rahudman, 100, 150
Harian Analisa, 73n8, 177
Harian Indonesia, 70, 72
Harian Mandiri, 137
Harian Naga Surya, 73n8, 172, 177
Harian Nusantara, 80, 172, 174, 177
Harian Orbit, 62, 100, 113, 116
Harian Promosi Indonesia, 73n8, 173, 177
Hartimin, 178
Hartono, 183
Haryanto, 182, 184–85, 196
Harymurti, Bambang, 59
Hasan, Bob, 35n18, 57
Hasyim, 97, 120, 136–37, 162, 164, 171, 178, 184–85, 196
Haynes, Jeff, 40–41, 46, 60, 169
Haz, Hamzah, 122, 131n6
Heidhues, Mary Somers, 69. See also Somers, Mary F.
Hellmann, Olli, 125
Helvetia, 115–16
Henley, David, 67
Heryanto, Ariel, 72
Hidayat, Syarif, 130
Hokkien, 15, 26, 32, 158–59, 190–91, 194
Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 72
Hong Kong Society for Indonesian Studies, 80
Honggandhi, Hakim, 111, 111n9, 196
Honoris, Charles, 187
Hoon Chang-Yau, 9, 30, 35, 67, 70
Hu Jintao, 82, 196
Huashang Bao, 173, 177
Huang Kunzhang, 73n8
Hui Chew, 71, 71n6, 175
Hui Yew-Foong, 10, 38
Hukum adat, 67
Husodo, Siswono Yudo, 131n6
Hutasoit, Ruyandi, 126
Hwie Tiauw Ka Chinese Clan Association in Surabaya. See PHTKS (Perkumpulan Hwie Tiauw Ka Surabaya)
ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia), 38, 191
Ikatan Kerukunan Umat Beragama Jawa Timur, 140, 191
IKIP (Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan), 143, 191
Indar, Kholifah, 132
Indians, in Indonesia, 8, 8n6, 54
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), 130, 191
Indonesia Focus, 80
Indonesia Shang Bao, 72
Indonesian Anti-Discrimination Movement. See GANDI (Gerakan Perjuangan Anti Diskriminasi)
Indonesian Buddhists Association. See Walubi (Perwakilan Umat Buddha Indonesia)
Indonesian Chinese Entrepreneur Association. See PERPIT (Perhimpunan Pengusaha Tionghoa Indonesia)
Indonesian Chinese Entrepreneur Community. See PERMIT (Perhimpunan Masyarakat and Pengusaha Indonesia Tionghoa)
Indonesian Communist Party. See PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia)
Indonesian Democratic Devotion Party. See PKDI (Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia)
Indonesian Democratic Party. See PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia)
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. See PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan)
Indonesian Justice and Unity Party. See PKPI (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia)
Indonesian National Defense Institute. See LEMHANNAS RI (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional Republik Indonesia)
Indonesian National Party. See PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia)
Indonesian National Populist Fortress Party. See PNBK (Partai Nasional Benteng Kemerdekaan)
Indonesian National Students’ Movement. See GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia)
Indonesian nationalist movement, 9
Indonesian Red Cross, 84
Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party. See PBI (Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika)
Indonesian Young Bulls. See BMI (Banteng Muda Indonesia)
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), 82, 191
INSPIRASI (Institut Studi Persatuan Etnis dan Ras di Indonesia), 89, 191
Institute of Ethnic and Racial Unity Studies in Indonesia. See INSPIRASI (Institut Studi Persatuan Etnis dan Ras di Indonesia)
Institute of Teaching and Education. See IKIP (Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan)
integrated school (sekolah pembauran), 65, 86, 86n18, 89, 95, 148, 194
INTI (Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa), 1–2, 58, 63–64, 68, 69n3, 71, 75, 77, 81, 84, 111, 112n11, 147, 149, 153, 171–73, 175–76, 178–79, 191
IPK (Ikatan Pemuda Karya), 101–2, 104, 111, 191
Islamic University of North Sumatra, 148
Ismail, Nur Mahmud, 122
Jacobsen, Michael, 68n2
Jahja, Junus, 33, 158, 196
Jambon, 84
Janlie, 184–85, 196
Japanese, in the Dutch East Indies, 26–27
Java, 9, 14–16, 25, 26n2
Javanese wayang (shadow puppetry), 9
Jawa Pos, 130
Joint Fact-Finding Team (Joint Team), 43
Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups. See Sekber Golkar
Index

Jokowi. See Widodo, Joko
Jonan, Ignasius, 133, 196
Justice Party. See PK (Partai Keadilan)

Kajang, 76n12
Kalimantan, 25
Kalimas (Komite Aliansi Kepulauan Masyarakat Surabaya), 71, 89–90, 95, 176, 191
Kalla, Jusuf, 53, 131n6, 132n12
Kampung Ilmu (Knowledge Village), 84
Kang Youwei, 28
Kapal Api Group, 110
Kapitan Cina, 26, 192
Karman, Hasan, 133–34, 196
Karo, 81
Kedah, 16
Kie Hock Kweng, 184
King, Phil, 53
KKN, 47, 65, 192
KMP (Koalisi Merah Putih), 134n16, 192
Kompas, 33
Koran Tempo, 92, 181
KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi), 116, 192
KPPOD (Komite Pemantau Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah), 101, 192
KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum), 151, 192
Kristianto, Benjamin, 188
Kristianto, Benyamin. See Kristianto, Benjamin
Kuala Namu, 83
Kurnia, Indah, 187–88
Kurniadi, Henky, 172, 182, 187–88, 196
Kwik Kian Gie, 132, 196
Kwik Sam Ho, 183–84, 197
Kwong Wah Yit Poh, 177

Laksono, Antonius Iwan Dwi, 188
Lane, Maxwell, 48–49
Lautuperissa, Martius, 102
Lauw Chuan Tho. See Jahja, Junus
Law No. 2/1999, 44
Law No. 22/1999, 45
Law No. 25/1999, 45
Law No. 32/2004, 150n31
Law No. 12/2008, 124, 141
Lawin, Rusmin, 183, 185, 197
Lekatompessy, Simon, 136, 138–40, 163–64, 172, 182, 188
Lembata, 133, 13n14
Lembong, Thomas Trikash, 133
LEMHANAS RI (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional Republik Indonesia), 148, 192
Leo, Ardjan, 63, 76–79, 171, 178, 197
LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender), 142, 144, 145n23, 191–92
Li In Zhe, 92, 181
Li Peng, 82, 197
Li Po, 28
Li Zhuohui, 35n18
Lianhe Zaobao, 94
liberal democracy, 40–41, 48, 169
Lie Beng Giok. See Surjadinata, L. B. G.
Lie Giok Houw. See Sudjatmiko, Djoko
Lie Ling Piao, Alvin, 133, 197
Lie, Yenni Meilina, 185
Lie Mo Tie, 36, 197
Lie Po Yoe. See Dipojuwono, Budi
Liem Bian Khoen. See Wanandi, Sofyan
Liem Bian Kie. See Wanandi, Jusuf
Liem Ou Yen, 65, 172, 178, 197
Liem Sioe Liong, 36–37, 52, 68n2, 197
Lim Aho, 184
Lim Ping Tjen, 63, 172, 178–79, 197
Lintner, Bertil, 69
Lippo Group, 68n2, 131, 131n8
Lis, Arsyad, 116
Local Government Working Unit. See SKPD (Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah)
Loe Joe Djin, 11
Lohanda, Mona, 9, 26–27
LPT (Laskar Pemuda Tionghoa), 30n9, 192
Lubis, M. Rajab, 15
Lukita, Enggartiasto, 133, 197
Mackie, J. A. C., 9. See also Mackie, James
Mackie, Jamie, 11. See also Mackie, J. A. C.
Madura Island, 82
Madurese, 29n8, 104
Malari incident, 143, 143n21
Malaysia, 7; ethnic Chinese, 7, 7n3, 7n5; May 13, 1969 interethnic riots, 7n2,
7n4; New Economic Policy (NEP), 7, 7n2; Peninsular Malaysia, 7; state chief ministers (ketua menteri negeri), 7
Maluku, 25, 54–55, 138
Manan, Abdul, 59
Manchukou government, 28, 28n5, 32n13
Mandarin, 34, 67, 71–72, 76, 76n12, 77, 138, 145, 192
Maspion Group, 68n2, 81, 108, 109n7, 110, 132, 172, 179
Medan Angsapa Social Foundation. See Yasora Medan (Yayasan Sosial Angsapa Medan)
Medan, Anton, 52, 197
Medan Methodist University of Indonesia. See UMI Medan (Universitas Methodist Indonesia Medan)
Medan Zao Bao, 63, 173, 177
Mentawai Islands, 85
Mergonoto, Sudomo, 110, 197
Metro TV, 94
Mietzner, Marcus, 46, 50, 50n10, 130
Ministry of Home Affairs, Indonesia. See DEPDAGRI (Departemen Dalam Negeri)
MITSU-PSP (Perhimpunan Masyarakat Indonesia Tiongghoa Sumatera Utara – Peduli Sosial dan Pendidikan), 71, 77–79, 85, 171, 175, 178, 192
Moesa, Ali Maschan, 132
Moktar, Brilian, 120, 171, 184–85, 197
MPR (Majelis Mermusyawaratan Rakyat), 124, 192
Mudjiono, 132
Muhammadiyah, 45, 122
MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), 117, 156, 192
Mujianto, 115–16, 197
Muholland, Jeremy, 47
Mulia Group, 131, 131n9
Murdaya, Siti Hartarti Cakra, 131–32, 197
Muslim People’s Forum. See FUI (Forum Umat Islam)
Muzadi, Hasyim, 131n6
Nadapdap, Budiman P., 160
Nagata, Judith, 15, 86
Nan’an, 81
Nanchang University, 82
Nasution, A. H., 37, 51
National Awakening Party. See PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)
National Forum of Small and Medium Enterprises. See FORNAS UKM (Forum Nasional Usaha Kecil dan Menengah)
National Mandate Party. See PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional)
National People’s Concern Party. See PPRN (Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional)
Netherlands, 30
New Era College (NEC), 76n12, 192
New Indonesia Alliance Party. See Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru
New Indonesia Party of Struggle. See PPIB (Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru)
New York Times, 142
Nias, 77, 85
Njoto, Herlina Harsono, 188–89
North Sulawesi, 29n8, 30
Papua, 44n5, 54–55
‘pariah business class’, 11. See also ‘pariah class’
‘pariah class’, 13, 18, 23, 38. See also ‘pariah business class’
‘pariah entrepreneurship’, 11
‘pariah’ ethnic minorities, 61
Partai Perhimpunan Indoneisa Baru, 134n15, 189, 194
pass system, 26, 28–29
Pasuruan, 142–43
Pausacker, Helen, 9
‘PBBM’ (Pontianak, Bangka, Belitung, and Medan), 34n17
PBI (Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), 138, 186, 189, 192
PD (Partai Demokrat), 45, 50, 110, 115, 125–26, 127, 129, 131n6, 132, 132n12, 134, 141, 150, 182, 184, 188–89, 193
PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia), 35n20, 44, 45n6, 122, 136, 193
PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan), 1, 45, 45n6, 58, 101, 101n2, 121–22, 125, 125n3, 126, 128–29, 129n5, 131, 131n6, 132, 132n12, 134, 137, 149–51, 161, 164, 184–89, 193
PDS (Partai Damai Sejahtera), 1, 64, 125–26, 134, 138–41, 151–52, 152n32, 187–89, 193
Pelly, Usman, 103
Pemalang, 30n9
Pematangsiantar, 137
Penang, 16, 154
People’s Conscience Party. See Hanura (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat)
People’s Daily, 72
People’s Democratic Party. See PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik)
People’s Democratic Union. See PRD (Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik)
People’s Republic of China (PRC), 70, 83, 109n7
peranakan Chinese, 9, 9n9, 10, 14, 14n13, 28, 142, 193
Perhimpunan Keluarga Besar Wijaya Medan, 63
PERMIT (Perhimpunan Masyarakat and Pengusaha Indonesia Tonghooa), 71, 84, 172, 176, 179, 193
PERPIT (Perhimpunan Pengusaha Tionghoa Indonesia), 71, 81–82, 84, 172, 176, 179, 193

Persatuan Waria Kota Surabaya (PERWAKOS), 145, 193

Pewarta Soerabaia, 28

Phang Djun Phin. See Pangestu, Prajogo

Philippines, 6, 56; Chinese minorities, 6, 6n1, 7; student movements, 123

PHTKS (Perkumpulan Hwie Tiauw Ka Surabaya), 71, 75, 85, 173, 176, 179, 193

pilkada (pemilihan kepala daerah), 124, 124n2, 130, 161, 193. See also pilkadasung

pilkada langsung. See pilkadasung pilkadasung, 124n2

PK (Partai Keadilan), 121–22, 125, 193

PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), 45, 121–22, 125, 128–29, 129n5, 188, 193

PKDI (Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia), 172, 187–89, 193

PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia), 9, 33n14, 34n15, 44n3, 48, 123, 193

PKPI (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia), 182, 184–85, 187, 189, 193

PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), 45, 125–26, 128, 162, 186, 189, 193

PMTS (Paguyuban Masyarakat Tionghoa Surabaya), 71, 81–82, 84–85, 108, 172, 176, 179, 193

PNBK (Partai Nasional Benteng Kemerdekaan), 182, 189, 193

PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia), 136–37, 137n18, 142, 194

Poh An Tui. See Pao An Tui

political marketplace, 47

Polonia International Airport, 83

Pontianak, 10, 29, 34, 163

Poo, Murdaya Widyawimatra, 131, 132, 132n11, 133–34, 136, 186, 197

Poo Tjie Goan. See Poo, Murdaya Widyawimatra

Poso, 54

post-Suharto era, 3, 12, 14, 17, 21, 65–66, 73, 83, 93–96, 99, 102, 114, 166. See also reformasi era

PP (Pemuda Pancasila), 52, 64, 101, 102–3, 111, 153, 194

PPIB (Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru), 134, 134n15, 145, 172, 183–84, 187, 189, 194

PPM (Pemuda Panca Marga), 52, 194

PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), 35n20, 44, 121–22, 125, 131n6, 194

PPRN (Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional), 184, 189, 194

Prakasa, Alim, 109n7

Pranowo, Ganjar, 46

Prayogo, Hendi, 63, 197, 71, 89, 120, 145, 172, 178, 182

PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik), 122–23, 189, 194

PRD (Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik), 123, 194


‘preman state’, 53

premanism, 103

Presidential Decree No. 10, in 1959, 31

Presidential Instruction no. 14/1967, 68

pribumi, 2, 6, 8–9, 11, 13, 15, 29, 37–38, 65, 83, 85, 90, 120, 149–50, 156–58, 162, 194. See also indigenous Indonesians

Prijatno, Anton, 25, 35n19, 97, 109, 109n8, 110, 120, 146–47, 164, 172, 182, 186, 197

PRN (Partai Republika Nusantara), 184, 187, 189, 194

Prosperous Justice Party. See PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)

Prosperous Peace Party. See PDS

PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia), 143, 194

PSMTI (Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia), 1, 58, 68, 69n3, 71, 77, 81–82, 84–85, 114, 137, 145, 147, 149, 153, 155, 158–60, 171–72, 175–76, 178–79, 194

PT Adhi Karya, 82

PT Central Business District (CBD), 115, 190

PT Ernuputra Terai, 115

PT Hutama Karya Persero, 83

PT Indo Palapa, 113

PT Jatimasindo, 116–17

PT Musi Hutan Persada, 131, 131n9

PT Waskita Karya, 82
Index

PTSUPBA (Panitia Tionghoa Sumatera Utara Peduli Bencana Alam), 77–78, 194

Purdey, Jemma, 9, 12, 38

Pure Land Learning College, 75

Purnama, Basuki Tjahaja, 46, 197, 133. See also Ahok

Purnama, Basuri Tjahaja, 133–34

Purnomo, Nurdin, 138, 197

Putnam, Robert D., 48; social capital, 48

Qing dynasty. See Manchu government

Rahardja, William, 63, 172, 178–79, 182, 197

Raharja, Bagus, 188, 197

Rais, Amien, 45, 122, 131n6

Rajan, Nalini, 41

Rasyid, Ryaas, 45

Raudhatul Islam Mosque, 117

Raweyai, Yorrys, 52

Red-and-White coalition. See KMP (Koalisi Merah Putih)

reformasi era, 19, 56, 58, 60, 64, 93, 102, 118, 130, 132. See also post-Suharto era

Regional Forum of Small and Medium Enterprises. See FORDA UKM (Forum Daerah Usaha Kecil dan Menengah)

regional representatives council. See DPD

Rela Warta, 73n8, 80–81, 113–14, 172, 177

Republic of China (Taiwan), 70

Republic of Indonesia Party. See PRN (Partai Republika Nusantara)

revenue farming, 26n2, 27

Riady, James, 68n2, 131, 197

Riady, Mochtar. See Lie Mo Tie

Riggs, Fred W., 11

Rinakit, Sukardi, 130

Rismaharini, Tri, 46, 138–39

Robison, Richard, 11, 47, 49

Round Table Agreement on Citizenship, 30

Rush, James R., 26n2

Rwanda, 41–42; Hutus, 42; Tutsis, 41–42

Ryter, Loren, 52

Saiful, Benny, 179, 197

Saiful, Benny, 179, 197

Salim, Sudono. See Liem Sioe Liong

Samosir, 81

Sanjaya, Christiandy, 10, 133–34, 163, 197

Santoso, Eddy Gunawan, 120, 140–42, 163, 172, 189, 198

SARA, 67

Sari Rejo, 115

Sasingko, Sundoro, 186

Sastra, Alim Mulia, 109n7

satgas parpol, 53, 194

Satgas PDI-P, 101

Satria, Alim, 109n7

SBKRI (Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia), 35, 194

Schulte Nordholt, Henk, 46

Sekber Golkar (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya), 44n3, 194

Setiono, Benny G., 29

Shah, Ajib, 64, 102, 111, 153, 154n35

Shah, Anuar, 97, 103, 171

Shandong, 82

Shanwei, 81

Sherlock, Stephen, 122

Shiraishi, Takashi, 29

Siang Hwee, 28, 69–70

Sidel, John T., 37–38, 56

Silalahi, Harry Tjan, 35n19

Simmel, Georg, 38–39

Sin Chew Jit Poh, 77

Sin Chew Media Corporation Berhad, 72, 77–78

Sin Po, 28, 28n6

Sindunatha, K., 33, 197

Singapore, 16, 69, 69n4, 70n5, 94, 106, 109n7

Singkawang, 34, 133–34

singkeh, 32, 194

Sishui Chenbao, 80, 174, 177

Sitepu, Bangkit, 102

Situmorang, Binsar, 111, 154n35

SIUP (Surat Izin Usaha Perdagangan), 100, 194

SKPD (Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah), 139, 194

SMERU Research Institute, 99

Socialist Party of Indonesia. See PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia)

Soe Hok Djin. See Budiman, Arief

Soe Po Sia, 28, 69–70
Soekarwo, 109, 132
Soenarjo, 132
Soerjadjaja, William. See Tjia Kian Liong
Soetomo, Jos, 114, 179, 197
SOGI (sexual orientation and gender identity), 146
Soka, M., 187, 197
Solo, 16, 16n14, 127–28
Somers, Mary F., 10. See also Heidhues, Mary Somers
South China Normal University, 78–79
South Korea, 123
Southeast Asia, 6–7, 25, 32n13, 41–42, 68n2, 69, 81, 84
Sri Lanka, 77
State University of Medan. See UNIMED (Universitas Negeri Medan)
State University of Surabaya, 82
STBA-PIA (Sekolah Tinggi Bahasa Asing Persahabatan Internasional Asia), 76, 76n12, 77–79, 96, 194
Subei Ribao, 173, 177
Subianto, Prabowo, 43n2, 45, 126, 132n12, 134n16, 141–42
Sudarto, 183
Sudjatmiko, Budiman, 123
Sudjatmiko, Djoko, 35n19
Suhendra, Fajar, 178, 197
Suheri, Indra, 117
Sukardi, Tamin, 115–16
Sukarno, 30–31, 45, 51, 93, 122, 136, 142–43
Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 45, 55, 57, 72, 122, 131n6, 132n12, 149
Sukarnoputri, Rachmawati, 136
Sukarnoputri, Sukmawati, 136
Sukiran, 183, 197
Sulawesi, 25, 55
Sultan Iskandar Muda Educational Foundation. See YPSIM (Yayasan Perguruan Sultan Iskandar Muda)
Sumatra, 25
Sun Yat-sen, 28, 197
Sundanese, 29n8
Sunggal, 86–88, 154
Sunur, Eliezer Yance, 133, 133n14, 134
Sunur, Eliezer Yantje. See Sunur, Eliezer Yance
Surabaya Academy of Accounting. See Akademi Akuntansi Surabaya
Surabaya Chinese Association. See PMTS (Paguyuban Masyarakat Tionghoa Surabaya)
Surabaya Inter-Religious Harmony Forum. See Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama Surabaya
Surabaya-Madura Bridge, 82
Surabaya Post, 141, 145
Surjadinata, L. B. G., 35n19
Surya, Johan Tedja, 187–88, 197
Suryadinata, Leo, 8, 10, 27–28, 32, 43, 68n2, 70, 123
Suryadjaja G., Agoes, 187–88, 197
Syamsudin, Amir, 132
Taiping Rebellion, 32, 32n12, 32n13
Tambun, Gayus, 106, 106n6
Tambun, Moses, 102
Tan Hok Liang. See Medan, Anton
Tan Kim Yang. See Tan, Sofyan
Tan, Lily, 183–85, 197
Tan, Mely G., 97–98, 171, 198
Tan, Sofyan, 1–2, 4–6, 20, 42, 56n16, 58, 63–66, 85–89, 95–97, 107, 111, 120, 137, 147–64, 166, 169–71, 182, 185, 198
Tan Toan Sin. See Syamsudin, Amir
Tanah Abang, 58
Tanaka, Kakuei, 143
Tangerang, 29
Tanak, Hakim, 178, 198
Tanudjaja, Harry, 172, 182, 186–87, 198
Tarigan. See Wong Chun Sen
Taufik, Ahmad, 59
tax farming. See revenue farming
Team of Ten (Tim Sepuluh), 45
Tempo, 58–59, 86, 88–89
Thailand, 6, 11, 56, 148; Chinese minorities, 6, 6n1, 7
The Act of Killing, 52
The Hague, 11
The International Daily. See Guoji Ribao
The Jakarta Globe, 103, 139
The Jakarta Post, 90, 117, 131
The Kian Seng. See Hasan, Bob
The Siauw Giap, 26
Thee Kian Wie, 31
Thompson, Mark R., 55–56
Thousand Islands, 133n13
Thung Ju Lan, 9
Tiburzi, Robert, 47
Tjan Kok Hui. See Tjandra, Djoko
Tjan Tjoen Hok. See Silalahi, Harry Tjan
Tjandra, Djoko, 131
Tjandra, Minarto, 188, 198
Tjia Kian Liong, 36, 197
Tjoeng Wan Hok. See Purnama, Basuki
Tjiook-Liem, Patricia, 11
Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan (THHK), 28, 69, 195
Tjongiran, Johan, 97, 106, 171, 183–84, 198
Tomsa, Dirk, 126–27
totok Chinese, 14, 31–32, 194–95
Tribun Medan, 79
Tsai Yen-Ling, 13
Tshai, Frans, 182, 198
Tumbelaka, Rosita, 186
Turner, Sarah, 56

uang keamanan (protection money), 103, 195
UD Logam Jawa, 109n7
UDA (University of Darma Agung), 137, 195
UMI Medan (Universitas Methodist Indonesia Medan), 86, 147–48, 195
UNIMED (Universitas Negeri Medan), 78, 151, 195
United Development Parties. See PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 99, 195
University of Airlangga, 144
University of North Sumatra. See USU (Universitas Sumatera Utara)
University of Surabaya, 146, 172, 186
USU (Universitas Sumatera Utara), 147, 147n26, 148, 195
Utomo, Fandi, 141
Utomo, Imam, 108
Utomo, Uton, 183

van Klinken, Gerry, 49, 130
Vivi A., Susilo, 188
VOC. See Dutch East India Company (VOC)

Wahid, Abdurrahman, 45, 57, 59, 72, 122–24
Wahid, Solahuddin, 131n6
Walubi (Perwakilan Umat Buddha Indonesia), 63, 195
Wanandi, Jusuf, 35n19, 36, 131
Wanandi, Sofjan, 131. See also Wanandi, Sofyan
Wanandi, Sofyan, 35n19, 98. See also Wanandi, Sofyan
Wardono, Tirto, 179
Waria, 145, 193, 195
Wasior, West Papua, 85
Waspada, 107, 113
Watson, C. W., 86
Weldon, Peter D., 15
Wen Wei Bo, 72
West Java, 31

West Kalimantan, 10, 33, 34n15, 69, 133, 163–64; 1999 anti-Madurese violence, 10, 54; 2017 gubernatorial election, 10, 163
West Sumatra, 85
Wibisono, Christianto, 120, 160, 171, 198
Widjaja, Dharwan. See Kwik Sam Ho
Widjaja, Samas H., 82, 97, 120, 145, 172, 182, 198
Widjaja, Sofyan, 183, 198
Widodo, Joko, 46, 126–27, 133n13
Widoyoko, J. Danang, 49
Wijaya, Nyoto, 187, 198
Wijaya, Tjia Susanto, 183
Wijaya, Vincent, 111
Williams, Lea E., 28
Wilson, Ian, 51
Winata, Tomy, 58–59, 131, 198
Wiranto, 43n2, 45, 126, 131n6, 132n12, 139–42
Wong Chun Sen, 185
Wongsodihardjo, Aliptojo, 179, 198
Wonohadi, Elisawati, 188, 198
Index

Work Service Youth Association. See IPK (Ikatan Pemuda Karya)
World Bank, 99
World Trade Organisation, 68n2
Wu Nengbin. See Purnomo, Nurdin
Wu, Rudy, 184
Wu Yiguang, 149

Xiamen, 82
Xin Bao, 28n6, 70
Xinhua News Agency, 80
Xun Bao, 79–80, 113, 173, 177
Xun Bao Youth, 80

Yamamoto, Nobuto, 9
Yap Juk Lim, 97, 107, 171, 198
Yasora Medan (Yayasan Sosial Angsapura Medan), 71, 77, 171, 173, 175, 178, 195
Yazhou Zhoukan, 159

Yeoh, Emile Kok-Kheng, 42
YPSIM (Yayasan Perguruan Sultan Iskandar Muda), 86–89, 170–71, 182, 185, 195
Yu Zhusheng, 94, 198
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 45, 50, 82, 103, 113–14, 126, 129, 131, 131n6, 132, 132n12, 134n16, 150, 161
Yugoslavia, 41; Croats, 41
Yunnan, 81–82
Yusuf, Saifullah, 132
Zein, Abdul Baqir, 30
Zhao Hong, 81
Zheng Bao Daily, 73n8, 177
Zhong Maosen, 75–76, 198
Zhou Enlai, 30, 198
zoning system, 26–29