Merchants of War and Peace

British Knowledge of China in the Making of the Opium War

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The Opium War’s first shots were fired on 4 September 1839 by the British navy under orders from Captain Charles Elliot directed at three Qing imperial warships in Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong. With a desire to explain himself, Elliot reported the encounter to Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston:

I opened fire from the pinnace, the cutter, and the other vessel, upon the three junks. It was answered both from them and the battery, with a spirit not at all unexpected by me, for I have already had experience that the Chinese are much under-rated in that respect. After a fire of almost half-an-hour against this vastly superior force, we hauled off from the failure of our ammunition; for I already said, anticipating no serious results, we had not come in prepared for them.1

The confiscation in March that year by Commissioner Lin of opium smuggled into China by British merchants had created a tense atmosphere, and this partly explains why the underprepared Elliot fired at the Qing warships.

But was this really the first shot? Historians who have taken the exchange of fire as the war’s starting point have tended to argue that the opium smuggling trade was the cause and the confiscation the trigger.2 Another group of historians who argue that the war’s purpose was to defend British national honour or to expand British trade have dated the war’s starting point as June 1840, when British expedition troops arrived in Chinese waters.3

However, though a captain on the frontier may give the order and a soldier of an expeditionary force load and fire the cannon, a war does not necessarily start with military action. Given that this was the very first war between China and a European country, one may well ask where the idea came from of waging a war against a country that was more than 5,000 miles away and about which most Britons knew very little. Who made the decision and who was to benefit from the war? Perhaps more importantly, how did the decision makers justify the acts of aggression and violence?

The short answer is that Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston was the key politician behind the war decision made in a cabinet meeting on 1 October 1839. But how did Palmerston come to make the recommendation? He was yet to receive Elliot’s report
when the cabinet met that day, and prior to 1837 he had seen China as a faraway country of negligible interest. His idea of engaging with China through war came from a group of British merchants trading in the Chinese port of Canton.

Having sustained extensive contact with the Chinese and knowing Qing China far better than any other Europeans, British merchants in Canton in the decade prior to the Opium War fought a fierce war of words among themselves on the question of whether to ask their government to take military action against China. A group of them then went back to Britain in 1835 and again in 1839 to campaign publicly and to lobby politicians. These merchants made politicians in London see the benefits of military action; together they started the war.

To wage a war, one had first to justify it. The war did not begin with soldiers and captains, but with the merchants, and it commenced with a clash over British knowledge of China. This book documents the development of the war arguments in Canton and London, and charts how the merchants and politicians came to believe they had a just war on their hands.
1
Introduction

We say, and we say boldly: as History it will be matter of surprise and doubt, that England—the great—the powerful—jealous of her own honor and watchful of her national rights should thus, in the height of her power and greatness, have tamely submitted to wrong, to insult, to indignity, to oppression, from a government and a people, such as this, whom the earliest exhibition of force and firmness would have brought to reason and submission . . . ! We say without fear of contradiction: AS HISTORY IT WILL NOT BE BELIEVED.1

Thus concluded an editorial printed on 1 November 1831 in the English biweekly newspaper Canton Register. The Register was published in the Chinese port city of Canton (known in Chinese as Guangzhou) for the consumption of the foreign trading community there and those in other Asian ports. Its owner was the British—to be precise Scottish—merchant James Matheson. And it was one of the five English-language printing presses of the port.

Starting with the news that the British government in India was to send the warship HMS Challenger to China delivering a letter to the Canton authorities requesting redress for an ‘insult’ that happened in May that year, the editorial was implicit in advocating a war against China.

Just what was this ‘insult’ that so incensed the British community? In May, the Qing governor of Canton, Zhu Guizhen, came to the English Factory in the foreign trading quarters, known as the Thirteen Factories, he ordered the uncovering of a portrait on a wall in the main hall. Upon learning that it was a portrait of the British king George IV, Zhu then turned the back of his chair towards it. Zhu’s action was regarded by the British merchants trading in the port as an insult to the king and by extension to British national honour. They believed that an insult such as this merited war.

Belligerent language, such as ‘exhibition of force and firmness’, started to appear in the Register in 1830. By late 1834, arguments for a war against China were commonplace and could be found in most issues of the Register until history’s first war between China and a European country—the First Opium War—broke out in 1839.
This book is about the history of this war argument and about how the argument created a new British knowledge of China. The book brings into focus the role of private merchants (British traders in the East other than the staff of the East India Company [EIC]) and their interactions with the Qing government. I argue that the merchants’ new conception of China—a China to be engaged with through war—developed in Canton during the 1830s in their print-based public sphere and was primal in starting the war.

**Prime movers**

One driving force behind the war argument was the merchants’ confidence in the British Empire. In the early nineteenth century, the idea of Britain as a mighty nation was at its zenith as a result of its victory in the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 in particular and imperial expansion worldwide in general. The patriotic pride of the British community exemplified this imperial confidence. Waterloo Dinner, for instance, was held by the British private merchants in Canton in 1830, to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of the British victory. At the dinner party they ate, drank, sang, and toasted to British navy, the king, and the heroes of that battle.2

Believing Britain to be ‘the most powerful nation in the world’, some British private merchants considered China’s trade restrictions, which confined all European trade to the port of Canton, as an insult to Britain’s ‘national honour’.3 The advance of British rule in India and other places in Asia led the merchants to believe the British government would intervene in China to restore British national honour. There was an ‘imperial state of mind’ emerging in Canton.4

The merchants hoped that war would, more importantly, force the Chinese to the negotiating table and gain for the British unrestricted access to the Chinese market.5 The Register invited its readers to imagine the following: ‘How vast field would this Empire, under a freer system of intercourse afford for the consumption of the produce of British skill and industry!’6

Trade was considered a matter of national interest, as the British identified their country as a nation of trade as early as the fifteenth century.7 The doctrine of free trade, which was fast becoming the dominant political-economic ideology in Britain in the 1830s, gave this centuries-old trade argument new momentum. The private merchants of Canton greeted this with enthusiasm. They believed that a war to secure extensive trade privileges in China was in the British national interest and reflected the cold calculations of free trade: the more Britain traded with China, the richer the British would become.

The war discourse thus boiled down to two main arguments: expanding national interest and restoring national honour. The group of British private merchants who argued for war were known in the port as the Warlike party, and they used the
Register as their mouthpiece. Behind their rhetoric of national honour and national interest was the profit motive and the desire to trade in conditions under which the merchants believed themselves entitled by right of being British.

After the desire for war took root, the Warlike party went back to London in 1835 to lobby. They succeeded in 1839 in swaying the British government to act. This book considers the war argument initiated in Canton to be the key cause of the First Opium War. It was neither the infamous opium smuggling per se nor the defence of British national honour nor the cultural conflict between ‘progressive’ Britain and ‘backward’ China, which, as the main explanations of the war’s origin, have hitherto dominated the historiography. These narratives took the national honour argument for granted and marginalized the importance of the private merchants’ lobbying and the image of China they created through their public campaign for a war. By bringing the focus back to the process of war lobbying and the local dynamics of interactions in Canton where the war argument was first developed, this book attempts to show that the Warlike party was the driving force behind the war.

Before the 1830s, the British acquired their conceptual framework of China mainly through the writings of Jesuit missionaries from continental Europe, which depicted China as a peaceable country to be admired and imitated. The view of China that developed in the Canton port in the 1830s displaced the Jesuits’ imagined geography of the Peking court, where the Jesuits had served the Ming and Qing imperial governments between the late sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries. The contrast between the conceptualization of China by the Jesuits and the Canton British private merchants’ community resulted in a paradigm shift in British perceptions. The Warlike party accentuated a new British idea of China based on its argument for war and its need to justify the conflict both before and after. At the heart of their new vision was the idea that China was in isolation and had to be opened up by the British through war.

Nobody in London or in the West had the means in the 1830s to know China better than the private merchants in Canton. Not only were they—along with the Protestant missionaries and a few EIC staff—the major producers of British knowledge about China, but they comprised the only group of people at the time to have relatively accurate military intelligence of the Qing. Both James Matheson (1796–1878) and his business partner William Jardine (1784–1843)—the two leading figures of the Warlike party—traded in China for more than twenty years, longer than most EIC staff, and had superior knowledge of China’s eastern coast and military strength. They regularly sent ships up the coast to sell opium. Their ship captains engaged in skirmishes with Chinese water forces (shuishi), and accounts of such trips and their observations on the Chinese military were regularly published in the Register.
Palmerston (Henry John Temple, 1784–1865) at least four times and finally won his support in late 1839. They supplied him with a war strategy—the ‘Jardine plan’—and, crucially, with intelligence of the weakness of the Chinese military defences, suggesting that the war was easily winnable. This assessment, moreover, provided the government with an attractive solution to the domestic political crisis that the government was facing. Britain fought and won the First Opium War according to the plan supplied by the merchants, prompting Palmerston, famously, to express his thanks to William Jardine for the ‘assistance and information . . . so handsomely afforded’. The Treaty of Nanking, signed after the war in 1842, fulfilled in every clause the demands that the merchants had discussed extensively in their maritime public sphere in Canton.

Scholars have made note of Jardine’s war lobbying but regarded it solely as his personal position, marginal to the outbreak of war. Historical treatment of the merchants’ lobbying has been patchy. This book is the first full investigation of the First Opium War’s history in this context of how the Warlike party developed the war argument in the environment of Canton, produced new British knowledge of China, and lobbied successfully for the war. It shows that the new British knowledge of China was the result of a combination of the Warlike party members’ trading experiences in Canton, their faith in the ideology of free trade, their hopes for new trade relations, and their confidence in the expansionist British Empire. The making of the new British knowledge about China and the waging of the First Opium War were intrinsically and deeply intertwined. And considering that the new knowledge would become a frame of reference for learning about China that lasted until the 1970s, the history documented in this book is central to the understanding of Sino-Western historical encounters.

The story of the Warlike party captures only half of the history of the war’s origins. Another group of British private merchants in Canton, dubbed by their opponents the Pacific party, opposed the war. The Pacific party resolutely refrained from publishing polemic arguments against China in their newspaper, the Canton Press (1835–1844). The Press advocated peaceful engagement with China and saw the sovereign nation as within its rights to develop its own trade policies. They believed that the merchants should submit to the Canton regulations when trading in China. The justification for war—that is, their new knowledge of China—was particularly important to the Warlike party’s endeavour when facing opposition from the Pacific party. The Pacific merchants’ history—although limited in scope due to absence of archival materials—is told for the first time in this book.

In Britain, the anti-war campaign between 1839 and 1843 was even stronger. The London newspapers successfully gave the war its infamous name—the Opium War, which has been used ever since. From the anti-war movement’s perspective, the war
was not inevitable, as some scholars have argued. The history of this movement serves as a reminder that the war was wilfully mobilized, strongly opposed, and could have been stopped. Chapter 7 of this book is devoted to documenting, for the first time as well, the history of opposition to the war.

To drive home the history of the war’s origins, this book also re-examines the First Opium War in the Chinese context. It explains how the Canton one-port system of trade caused the Warlike party to believe there was no choice but to advocate a war.

The one-port system was established by the Qing Empire in the late 1750s to allow China's European trade to take place at the same time as addressing dynastic state security concerns. The Qing's chief enemies were domestic rebels, and the court feared above all the joining of forces between foreign forces and Chinese rebels in a quest to overthrow the dynasty, as had happened to every major Chinese dynasty. The Qing court's fear was exploited by the ‘Canton lobby’—a group of Canton merchants and Qing officials—who sought to monopolize China's European trade by winning imperial sanctions to protect Canton's privileges. The lobby succeeded in 1757. The result was the Canton one-port system of trade. After its establishment, the Qing dynasty enjoyed both the perceived state security and the revenue of port duties generated by the Canton monopoly. Officials in charge of the port also profited from their positions, and a few Chinese merchants earned tremendous wealth.

The Canton system that controlled the European trade determined how the Qing understood Europeans. Ideas, especially Confucian concepts, were drawn on to justify the trade monopoly and the confinement of Europeans to Canton, as a means to ideologically shore up the one-port system. It was the institution of the Canton one-port system—not China's 'all under heaven' (tianxia) ideology nor the tributary system, as scholars have wrongly argued, that dictated the Qing's relations with and knowledge of Europeans, especially the British.

A new system of Chinese knowledge about the Qing Empire's relations with Europeans originated in Canton—knowledge making became entangled in profit making on the Chinese side. And, disastrously, the Canton system spawned an institutional inertia which made it impossible for the Qing to adequately comprehend and respond to the fast-changing new global order in the century after the 1750s, during which the British Empire came to dominate the globalizing maritime world of the East.

Thus, this book documents how, in the setting of China's one-port system of trade in Canton, the Warlike party developed an argument for a war against China. With perseverance and the favourable development of events, they successfully persuaded the British state to wage the First Opium War. The Warlike party’s argument was opposed by the Pacific party in Canton, and their lobbying faced an anti-war movement in London. Before Britain could start a war, the Warlike party had to first fight a
war of words in both Canton and London’s print-based public spheres for justification and persuasion. The waging of the war dictated the making of British knowledge about China.

The Warlike party’s war

The First Opium War is a well-studied topic with various theories of its cause. To W. A. P. Martin, F. L. Hawks Pott, H. B. Morse, Gerald S. Graham, and John King Fairbank, the war originated from China’s lagging behind the progressive world. Thus, the war intended to open up this insular and benighted China. This theory falls squarely within the knowledge of China created by the Warlike party in Canton in the larger context of the binary of progressive West and backwardness of the rest—the modernistic argument. Their narration of history is one sided in favour of the modernist argument, reducing the history of the Opium War to a footnote of the narrative of the march of civilization, or modernization.

Glenn Melancon and Harry G. Gelber made the same mistake of taking Warlike party’s argument at face value. They contended that defending British national honour was the reason for war. This book deconstructs the national honour argument by showing that the motive behind the rhetoric was profit making and imperial confidence. Maurice Collis, Tan Chung, Hsin-pao Chang, Peter Ward Fay, Jack Beeching, Frank Sanello and W. Travis Hanes III, and Julia Lovell have stressed the role of the opium trade in starting the war. This book sees the opium trade, in line with the arguments of other scholars, as a trigger, not the war’s origin.

Other historians, like George Marion, Michael Greenberg, John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, Victor Purcell, D. C. M. Platt, and P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, have argued that the purpose of the war was to expand British trade. “Trade expansion’ was in actuality the Warlike party’s ‘national interest’. The change from trade as a national interest in 1830s Canton to the economic theory of trade expansion in the 1950s to 1980s represented a change from a first-person narrative to a third-person narrative. This book demonstrates that the war was started by the Warlike party out of their wish to expand trade rather than trade expansion itself. The agent—the Warlike part—that brought about the war vanished in the disinterested third-person narrative of economic expansion theory.

Recent scholarship examining the cause of the war has explored narratives more diverse than the viewpoints provided by the Warlike party of Canton. James Polachek has explained how the Qing Empire’s scholar-officials fought an ‘inner opium war’ in the Qing court during the 1830s over the policies of banning or legalizing the opium trade, which represented a proxy war and power struggle between two factions with different governance philosophies. Commissioner Lin (Lin Zexu, 1785–1850), who was dispatched to Canton to confiscate opium in early 1839, belonged to the
hardliners who wanted a stricter prohibition on opium trade. Their policy caused a crisis. This book will show how the hardliners’ policy played into the hands of the Warlike party in Canton and helped create the conditions for war.

Melancon’s findings on the role of late 1830s British party politics have been the most valuable discovery recently, though he did not make this point his main argument. He contended that the ruling party, the Whigs, were not in the majority and every policy decision was a tightrope walk that had to balance the demands of the opposition Tories, who were connected to the landed class, and the Radicals, who represented the interests of the new industrial cities in the north. The Whig government had been subject to and narrowly survived a motion of no confidence by the Tory opposition in 1838 and 1839. The vote of no confidence was getting closer to toppling the government. In this hostile political climate, the Whigs needed the Radicals’ support, and when the Radicals came to lobby for a war the government considered it convenient to oblige. These findings dovetail with this book’s major argument that the war idea started in Canton. The Radicals, who represented the interests of manufacturers in the north of England and who in turn were the Warlike party’s allies, together successfully lobbied to start the war. The political climate in London at the crucial moment eased the last mile of the Warlike party’s quest.

Viewed as a whole, the Opium War historiography proves that the war would not have happened without a combination of factors with coterminous timing. Although the victory of the moral hardliners in the Qing court was the force behind the opium confiscation, it took a fight between two political factions in London to turn the war argument first developed in Canton into a political decision of the British state. It was pure coincidence that the opium crisis occurred in Canton just as the political crisis in London was unfolding. The Warlike party and northern manufacturers had a shared British identity as ‘shopkeepers’ who desired trade expansion, and this on top of personal connections between the two groups contributed to the northern manufacturers’ decision to assist in lobbying for a war to open up the Chinese market. For the Radical MPs who supported their cause, lobbying for the war was a political obligation to their constituents, and it afforded a window of opportunity to punch above their weight.

A combination of factors on both the Chinese and British sides provided the necessary conditions but were not causes of the war. The Qing government did not want a war. The hardliners of the Chinese scholar-officials wanted to root out the opium trade and stop the resulting outflow of silver from the country. Their uncompromising stand against the opium traders set the conditions for the British to declare war. The British government in London did not plan to initiate an invasion of China. Rather, it was reactively responding to the crisis in Canton whipped up by the Warlike party, their merchant allies in Britain, and the Radicals in Parliament, although the British government did use the crisis to its advantage. Both the British and Chinese states
were engaged in power struggles at home that made them susceptible to becoming involved in a war. But the initiation came from neither of the two governments.

The origin of the war was provided by the Warlike party of Canton. Its members presented war arguments and lobbied for war, and their opium trade ultimately led to it. The war was fought on behalf of their interests, and it was won based on the intelligence they supplied. The treaty signed after the war addressed their demands in every clause. The Warlike party played its role at every turn. Its wishes, knowledge, initiative, and determination led to the war being waged. The rest of the conditions, coincidences, and accidents helped create the circumstances that led to the war.

With regard to the traditions of empire studies, this book makes a case that actors on the periphery greatly affected the fate of the metropolis and the empire. To the studies on British perception of China, this book shows how Canton became a key site for the production of British knowledge about China which proves to be decisive in Sino-Western relations.

Chapter previews

The British community in Canton was rather small in number, considering its role in history. There were 66 white British in 1833 and 86 in 1835. The end of the EIC monopoly in 1834 brought about an influx of ‘private merchants’ to China, and by 1837 the white British numbered 158, just over half of the Canton foreign community’s 307 members. The Parsee (Persian merchants of South Asia), who numbered 62 in 1837, were considered British subjects, and some were supporters of the Warlike party during the 1839 lobbying, but not in 1835. The third-biggest group in 1837 were the Americans, who numbered 44, followed by the Portuguese at 28. Those from other European nations like France and Prussia comprised single-digit numbers by the 1837 count. The British private merchants considered themselves learned people animated by Enlightenment ideals. They were multifaceted and achieved a great deal as individuals and as a community.

Chapter 2, ‘The Warlike and Pacific Parties’, explores how the British community in Canton used its newspapers to debate the subjects of China, Britain, and free trade. The Warlike party gradually settled on a new understanding of China centred on a war discourse, while the Pacific party condemned the arguments for war.

A third force was at play in the British maritime public sphere in Canton, an inadvertent participant that was neither anti-war nor pro-war: the Canton system, which is examined in detail in Chapter 3, ‘Breaking the Soft Border’. More than the physical border of the Thirteen Factories, the Canton system was mostly a ‘soft border’ made of a series of rules and regulations that constrained British merchants’ activities in China and restricted their interaction with Qing subjects. Soft borders here were figurative borderlines on the maritime frontier that cut through transnational networks
of information and interaction. By preventing interaction other than what was necessary for trade, the Qing believed that they had successfully prevented the possibility of foreigners joining forces with Chinese rebels. However, the Warlike party saw it as necessary to start a war to abolish the system that confined British trade expansion and was perceived in its very existence as an insult to the British Empire.

Chapter 4, ‘Intellectual Artillery’, explains how the Warlike party launched an informational war to penetrate the soft borders that constrained flows of information and interaction. Their efforts concentrated on the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China, with the objective of spreading knowledge about the European world to the Chinese. They prepared, as they termed it, ‘intellectual artillery’ in the form of Chinese-language publications, especially material related to world geography, to distribute among the Chinese to inform them of the extent of British power in the hope that it would lead China to ‘open up’ from the inside. In establishing the society, the Warlike party conceived the metaphor of a war of information, which contributed to the developing conceptualization of a literal war against China in the years before actual military action.

Chapter 5, ‘A War of Words over “Barbarian”’, assesses a decade-long debate that occurred within the British community in Canton over how best to translate the word *yi* (夷)—as either ‘barbarian’ or ‘stranger’. The dispute first raged in the Register for more than two years, beginning in 1828, and played a key role in igniting the war argument in 1830. The community agreed that it meant ‘barbarian’, representing a Chinese conception of foreigners as uncivilized savages. The translation was in wide circulation after the 1835 war lobbying campaign in London and formed an integral part of the pro-war argument. However, by 1837 the Canton community belatedly retracted their earlier translation, arguing that *yi* was best rendered into English as ‘stranger’.

On top of debating and deciding the meaning of a Chinese word, the Warlike party believed it had the right to petition both the Chinese and British governments to have its voice heard and to obtain the ‘justice’ it deserved. In this spirit, which seemed to be a product of Enlightenment but was actually imperialism, the party engaged the Chinese government and went to London to lobby for war in 1835 and 1839, as described in Chapter 6, ‘Reasoning Britain into a War’.

However, the Warlike party did not get its way entirely. Chapter 7, ‘The Regret of a Nation’, documents how the British public opposed the war. Christian morality empowered the anti-war movements in Britain as the protesters felt ashamed that the war, as they understood it, had been launched to force opium on the Chinese. Their view of the war would prevail in the second half of the nineteenth century. After 1860, British parliamentarians more often than not condemned the war, blaming it both for the disastrous Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) and the rising tide of Chinese nationalism, and many regretted that the Opium War was ever waged. The concluding chapter
theorizes how the Canton system and the First Opium War created different kind of ‘profit orders’ for the Chinese and the British and how the war represents a clash of the two orders.

In the Chinese setting of the 1830s’ Canton port, the British merchants argued over the question of Britain’s relations with China: to engage them with war or peace. The Warlike party’s case won out. Their war argument soon gave national importance to the opium crisis of 1839, played a central role in London’s political crisis of the fight between the Whigs and Tories, and then swayed Britain into taking military action.
With its historical complexities, a prime mover can be identified in the interactions between Britain and China in the Canton port during the years leading up to the Opium War: the British Warlike party’s wishes to wage a war and their ability to lobby for it. By coincidence that the opium confiscation of 1839 happened at the height of British domestic political fights between the Whig and Tory, it eased the way for the Warlike party to bring the British Empire’s military might to bear on the Qing Empire.

What the British merchants wanted by starting a war can be identified as to establish on the Chinese coasts a new ‘profit order’, which is defined as an economic regime through which the creation of political order and the making of knowledge become mutually reinforcing and that in turn gives rise to a discourse of justice in profit making for a particular group of people.

Before the war, a Chinese profit order—the Canton system—was at work in the port. The major interests taken care of by the system were the Qing ruling dynasty, the high officials, and Chinese merchants. Port functionaries such as customs officers who lived on imposing fees on the ships passing through their stations in the Pearl River were, too, participants of this profit order, though a minor one. Ideologically, the Canton system drew on Confucianism as its source of justification. Shrouding the Canton port, the Confucian-based knowledge system of the bureaucrats identified foreign merchants as the ungovernable strangers (yi) and justified the Canton one-port system’s trade monopoly and tight political control.

Empowered by the free trade ethos and imperial identity of being the most powerful nation in the world, the Warlike party envisioned a new profit order, in which Britons would trade in the way that they saw as being British entitled them and that they would dictate the terms of interaction instead of subject themselves to the Qing’s ways. Creating a narrative that China was in isolation and was to be engaged with through a war, that is, waging a war to open up China, the merchants initiated the demolition of the Chinese profit order, and out of the ruins of the war, a new maritime profit order—the treaty ports—was born, as they desired and according to their design. The clash of the war thus was a clash of two profit orders—including their respective political arrangements, economic gains, and knowledge systems.¹
Conclusions: Profit Orders of Canton

The Warlike party’s new knowledge of China

In signing the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the Canton Warlike party’s victory was not limited to persuading the British government to wage the war, winning the war, receiving compensation for opium confiscated, reclaiming debts owed by Hong merchants, and gaining the trade conditions they wanted; it also consisted in establishing the new paradigm of British knowledge on China by which the war was justified. China from now on was viewed from the Warlike party’s perspectives.

Even though the name Opium War sticks, history has not remembered the Pacific party’s image of China which painted the Qing officials according to their ability to govern and praised them for doing their duty, such as suppressing pirates. To the Pacific party, China was just another country and Canton another port, and the trade there was not particularly problematic. Their understanding was echoed in Britain by the leading free trade economist of the Ricardian School, John Ramsay McCulloch, who argued that, even with the Hong merchant system in place, for merchants, Canton was a port as free as Liverpool or New York. This Pacific party’s alternative image of China reveals the discursive nature of the Warlike party’s knowledge of China. Neither has historiography remembered what *The Spectator* and the *Northern Star* revealed: the smear campaigns led by the Warlike party and their supporters in London that changed the primary British perception of China from peaceable China to insular China.

What history remembers was the Warlike party’s negative representation of China. Because trade was confined to Canton, serving the Qing’s dynastic state security needs and not the Warlike party’s desire for ‘free trade’, the focus of history for more than a century was on ‘insular China’. But Qing China was by no means in isolation. During this period, it not only had intensive interactions with Asian countries, but China’s products, such as tea, were sold into the European markets, down to the village level, and were consumed by all walks of life in Britain. At the same time, Qing China was absorbing the impact of opium and the opium trade. By the early nineteenth century, every level of people’s lives in the Qing Empire was touched by the drug in some form. The worlds of the East and West were deeply connected by the two commodities—tea and opium, together with other luxury goods—and affected by the economic regimes to which they gave rise. Chinese and European worlds were deeply intertwined long before the war of 1842 that allegedly opened up the isolated China.

Behind the ‘isolation’ discourse was the fact that the Warlike party wanted to utilize other Chinese ports in addition to Canton and to have direct access—instead of through the Hongs—to the vast Chinese market. The merchants wanted the navy of the most powerful nation in the world to be the means to their ends of opening China up. Thus the term ‘opening up’ did not mean opening up a ‘closed China’ but meant in actuality employing British military power to expand and control trade.
History remembers the bureaucrats of Canton—especially the superintendent of customs (Hoppo)—to be corrupt. This negative image of the Qing officialdom produced circumstantial justification for the war. Being a prebendal system in which officials were supposed to find the financial solutions to support their offices and, at the same time, send the court a fixed amount of revenue, the Qing’s way was not designed for the British merchants’ needs. James Fichter has argued that the prebendal system of financing was subject to the emperor’s wishes and vulnerable to abuse, allowing much leeway for the official in charge to line his pockets and for foreign traders to evade the port charges. Fichter contends that this loosely managed system, in fact, favoured the foreign traders’ wishes to avoid the taxes and to carry on their illicit opium trade. The Warlike party on the one hand exploited the system for profits and on the other argued about its corruption. The Pacific party’s admission that, ‘deceive ourselves as we please, we are smugglers’ was an attack on this hypocrisy.

In like manner, the Hong merchants were understood by the Warlike party to be the official merchants; they being the go-betweens listened to the Qing officials’ primary concerns about state security instead of to the British merchants’ wishes. Therefore, the Nanking Treaty abolished the Hong, enabling the British merchants to trade with any Chinese merchant in the treaty ports. They were thus not subject to the indirect control of the Qing’s Canton system.

Following the Warlike party’s narrative of China, the image of China brought into focus was a China that was culturally anti-commercial. Confucianism was to blame because its doctrine placed the merchant class at the lowest level in society, behind the scholars, the peasants, and the artisans. This might be true in official rhetoric, but, in everyday reality, Qing Chinese society was highly commercialized. Although Chinese merchants’ wealth accumulation—as was that of the other three classes—was subject to the whim of officials and the court, but the merchants, in reality, did not have a low social status. They commonly used the money earned in business to fund their sons’ study for the Civil Service Examination. If the son passed, the family would then be associated with the scholar class. It was not uncommon that the two identities—merchant and official—were in one family. Again, the real issue for the Warlike party was that this peculiar Chinese political-economic system did not cater to their needs.

In the Warlike party’s image of China, the Qing’s tributary system came to the forefront in explaining the Chinese ‘all under heaven’ ideology, which accepted only tributary relationships with foreign countries. The Canton system, in fact, did not operate under the tributary system, which had, as a prerequisite, the payment of tribute in the court before coming to trade. Not a single merchant operating in Canton was subject to this ritual.

The failed Macartney and Amherst embassies of 1793 and 1816 to the Qing court that each had hoped to change the Canton monopoly, were seen by the Warlike party
as the ultimate examples of China's anti-commerce culture and the Chinese insular mindset at work as China rejected trading and diplomatic relations. The policy of non-interaction for the sake of dynastic state security and the entrenched profit order of Canton trade monopoly were actually the driving force behind the turning away of the embassies.

The Warlike party saw the restrictions of the Canton system as evidence of a closed China. But the system can be seen equally from the officials' perspective as Qing China's effort to keep trade open under the prohibitive political climate of the time—characterized by fear of domestic rebellion and the perceived threat of foreigners joining forces with rebels. Lastly, the notion that the Chinese called the British 'barbarian' was assumed to encapsulate the insular, arrogant Chinese mindset—this notion went into wide circulation after the Warlike party first made the connection in the early 1830s.

Contrary to what the Warlike party argued and history remembers, trade in Canton was actually largely free from governmental intervention. The tightly controlled elements were the interactions that had political implications, that is, those other than trading activities per se. Officials involved themselves very little in the trade, and neither did they regulate the market. At most, they forbade the exporting of gold and silver, limited the amount of silk foreigners could buy, and banned the import of opium. These did not affect the general trade structure in Canton, for not only the ban was limited in scope but also the prohibition policies were never properly implemented. The Warlike party failed to realize that trade and the market in Canton, in its actual operation, was not far from free trade, according to the argument of David Ricardo, as McCulloch had pointed out in his Dictionary.

The Warlike party's attacks on the Qing's profit order were first directed at its knowledge system starting in the early 1830s. The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China was a major affront while minor attacks—such as the 'Prize Essay' that spread free trade doctrines, Gützlaff's Chinese narrators who wrote of the utopian England, and missionaries' tract distribution that spread Christianity—also occurred. The war on knowledge and information waged by the merchants and missionaries took place before the military action of 1839 and was part of its formation.

In sum, the unfavourable historical images of China were first developed in the Canton British maritime public sphere by the Warlike party. Behind their desire to expand trade lay free trade discourse and the British imperial identity. Their public campaign for a war made their knowledge of China widespread, and their war victory changed British knowledge of China. The Warlike party's 'we' narrative become the narrative of historiography, and the Warlike party assumed the position of being the sovereign master in the history of the encounters.
The Qing Empire and the war

Deconstructing the Warlike party’s knowledge of China is not to argue that Qing China was an innocent party in starting the war. On the contrary, the Canton system was a profit order serving a particular group’s interests, and the Qing played a major part in bringing about the military confrontation of 1839. The Canton system was at the centre of the conflict, although it was not in the way the Warlike party described.

After having enjoyed a market-induced trade monopoly during the previous decades, the Canton lobby, in the years between 1755 and 1759, secured an imperially sanctioned trade monopoly. In the process they accentuated the dynastic maritime state security argument. But the state security consideration was not entirely an invention of the Canton lobby. Rather, they brought forward this question in an environment where European expansion in the East was growing, coupled with the Qing’s increasingly negative perception of the Europeans. Thus, interactions were, starting in the late 1750s, to be systematically regulated to prevent Europeans from learning about any aspect of the empire and, more importantly, to prevent Qing subjects from mingling with foreigners, lest its subjects and foreigners exchanged thoughts and ideas leading to rebellion.

As the Pacific party pointed out in 1837, this Canton system did work for the Qing: with India ‘now totally annihilated and merged in the British Empire we must not be astonished to find the Court at Peking resolved not to deviate from a line of policy which has been hitherto so eminently successful’. After the Battle of Plassey in 1757, the British East India Company for the sake of trade began its rule in Bengal, a control that would soon expand to most of India. Coincidentally, 1757 was the year the Qing state institutionalized the Canton system of controlling interactions between its subjects and Europeans.

The long and complex process of British rule in India can be traced back retrospectively even further to Thomas Roe’s (1581–1644) embassy to the Moghul Empire between 1615 and 1619, during which the British first obtained the right to establish a trading quarter in Surat. And two decades later the British would acquire rights from the Indian authorities in 1639 to build Fort St George (later developed into Madras) and, in 1690, Fort William (later to become Calcutta). Had the British come to China to request the same kind of rights during the second half of the seventeenth century, it would not have been impossible for them to acquire some form of privilege under the reign of the Kangxi emperor, especially in his early years on the throne. But this did not happen because China was yet to become the EIC’s major trading concern and the volume of tea trade was not as big and important to the EIC as it would be in the second half of the eighteenth century. The Dutch and Spanish, who had earlier requested a trading foothold from the Ming, were by this time relatively content with their China trade through Chinese sojourners in Batavia and Manila. Also, by the
early eighteenth century, the Spanish and Dutch maritime empires, along with the Portuguese, were weakening, while the British dominated the maritime trade of the East. And, above all, in China there were four ports opened after 1683, allowing Europeans to trade freely, to an extent. The incentive for the British to send an embassy to Kangxi’s court was minimal.

While the Moghul Empire was fast disintegrating, affording the EIC opportunity to develop its control over India, the Qing in the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth century had a strong bureaucracy to implement the policy of non-intercourse against the real and perceived threat of British expansion in the East, thus maintaining a Chinese profit order in Canton.

After a half century of operation, the state security procedure that the dynasty had built into its bureaucratic control in Canton came to be mechanical, while its justification via Confucian discourse had become the accepted wisdom among its bureaucrats. The Canton system as an institution grew rigid in the early nineteenth century: officials were not to be seen, while the Hong merchants were, in reality, part of the bureaucratic system in maintain a status quo.

This Canton system determined how the Qing understood foreigners. When Commissioner Lin arrived in Canton in 1839, among the first things he did was to collect information on the Westerners in order to implement opium prohibition. He was able to think and act outside of the conventional bureaucracy because he had been sent to Canton with a special mission, instead of a regular Canton appointment. He knew there was insufficient knowledge of Europeans for him to devise a sound policy. Though great, Lin’s efforts were in vain; he had little chance to properly understand the British, who were for years talking about war against China right on the doorstep of Canton, with not a single Chinese having a clue. The soft border, erected in the form of an information barrier, more than anything else prevented the Qing from learning the true British state of affairs. There was no proper context for Lin to comprehend the wishes of the British private merchants, let alone the domestic party politics of Britain. The publications of the SDUKC and other translated works could help Lin understand only the geography of the West and the characteristics of the British merchants in Canton, nothing beyond.

The success of the Canton system created an institutional inertia that allowed China to deal with Europeans only within the system. The bureaucrats did not want to know and deal with Europeans in any other way. In sharp contrast to the Qing’s disinterest and lack of understanding of the British, the British private merchants in the 1830s knew China well enough to devise a sound war plan to supply to the politicians in London, which was crucial in starting the war. The Qing’s policy of containment in the mid-eighteenth century stemmed from a shrewd understanding of internal and external threats to the dynasty’s state security, but it backfired; the soft border built up in the process ultimately increased the danger by blinding the Qing
bureaucrats to the external threat they faced. The Qing state’s control in the form of the Canton system was a knife that cut both ways: it enabled control of Europeans coming ashore but was, at the same time, the Qing’s undoing.

It would take another three decades and the Second Opium War, which brought foreign troops to the gates of the capital, Beijing, for Qing bureaucrats to grasp the military strength of Europeans and the necessity of reform, first in the military and economic spheres and then in the political system, in the last few years of the Qing dynasty at the turn of the twentieth century, even though the Canton system had been abolished in 1842. It took more than a half century to dislodge the institutional inertia created by the Canton system and to undo the knowledge of foreigners and China’s foreign relationships that the system produced. The institution of the Canton system—not the ‘all under heaven’ ideology or tributary system—made the Qing unable to comprehend the Europeans. And this Canton system of trade, political control, and knowledge making—a profit order—was the Qing’s contribution to the First Opium War.

Opium war and opium regimes

As Timothy Brook and other historians have argued, after the First Opium War, the unofficial opium imports into China expanded exponentially and gave rise to various opium regimes during the hundred years after 1842. Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist party, other warlords of the Republican China, colonial governments of British South East Asia, Chinese overseas underworld communities in South East Asia under British rule, and the Japanese colonial governments which thrived in the opium business in Chinese treaty ports and in their Taiwan colony were the major ‘opium regimes’ created. They relied on the illicit trade and production for revenue, which in turn were the source of their political power.7

The single biggest opium regime was the British Empire. After the First Opium War, the British India government depended more than ever on opium revenue for its day-to-day administration. James Hevia argued that, in order to keep it afloat, the British Empire became a ‘global drug cartel.’8 The world order created by opium trade in the East in this period was similar to the sugar trade that empowered an Atlantic world order involving the slave trade, the cotton trade, and the plantation economy.9

Before 1842, the opium trade did not contribute as much to the revenue of the British India government. The British Empire only acquired a ‘drug dependency’ in the second half of the nineteenth century.10 To be sure, the British government did not go to war in 1839 to defend the opium trade, although the demand for compensation for the opium destroyed by Commissioner Lin was part of the war agenda and the merchants who lobbied for waging the war were mostly opium traders. The
war became truly an opium war mostly in the conditions created after the war that enabled the spawning of the opium regimes. The opium regimes established after the war were linked up by the trade to become a gigantic global profit order, and the war made a significant contribution to its invention.

Similarly, but in a much small scale, the unofficial opium trade in the Chinese coasts before 1842 was part of the profit-making mechanism of the Qing ruling classes. While the court routinely issued prohibitions against the opium trade and the abuse of opium, local officials received bribes to turn a blind eye. The wealth gained from the opium trade was enjoyed not only by the lower officials directly involved but also by the high bureaucrats, as money travelled up, contributing to the paralysis of the Qing government.

British private merchants were not the only group of people who contributed to the political-economic order created by opium and the opium regimes. In addition to the Qing officials, as British private merchants rightly pointed out, Chinese smugglers carried out the last leg of the opium trade into Chinese markets. But this did not diminish the role played by the private merchants in creating this sub-trade order, an order of profits that loomed large in triggering the war. The Opium War thus created not only the legal trade of the treaty ports but also played a role in the making of the opium regimes—one replaced the Canton system and the other was a continuation of the opium smuggling trade at Lintin.

**The state and merchant**

Britain's closely woven state-merchant relationship in the China trade after 1839 was not new; the British state was predisposed to the merchant sector's mobilization. The trade-nation identity was well established as early as the mid-sixteenth century and partly explains the failure of the pacific Britons' efforts in stopping the war. As argued in Chapter 7, before and during the war, the anti-war groups in Britain were firm in their stand against opium smuggling; they saw the war as morally indefensible. But after the war was won, in the peace meetings of Dublin, for instance, even though the protestors were still outraged by the war and the opium trade, people were also overjoyed thinking about the trade prospects created by the peace treaty. When this elation combined with the free trade ideology, imperial expansion of trade through war was even less an issue for debate.

What the campaign and lobby for war, and later the war itself, did was to bring the discourse of the British free trade empire to bear on Britain's relations with China. In other words, the Warlike party successfully brought Britain's China trade into the orbit of the British imperial order, with the newly added vigour of free trade discourse. As Palmerston told the Earl of Auckland during the war, “The new markets in China will at no distant period give a most important extension to the range of our
foreign commerce. The British state power holders were, by now, actively helping the merchants’ search for wealth in China.

Once the floodgate was opened, China could be engaged in war; two more wars would be waged by Britain: the Second Opium War and the Boxer War of 1900, and several other wars by European countries. And after 1842 British representatives in China, in the capacity of consuls (and chargé d’affaires after 1861), worked closely with the British merchant community, catering to their needs in the China trade, although it was a relationship filled with contradictions and conflicts.

During the EIC days, the Court of Directors was able to mobilize the British state to send two embassies to China on behalf of the company to request formal state relations to safeguard trade. Albeit in a different form, what the British private merchants achieved in 1839 was a continuation of the EIC: the state and the merchant sectors worked hand in hand in creating a trade empire. Because of its informal relations with the state, in order to bring in the aid of the state for their aim of creating a new profit order, the private merchants had to develop new British knowledge of China. Conducting their public campaign for five years along with lobbying with the ministers, they took the relation to the level of war.

Compared to the British state-merchant relationship, it was inconceivable that the Qing imperial state would go to war for trade expansion. In general, the Chinese merchants’ political—not social—status under the Confucian state ideology was low in regard to their ability to be involved directly in the political power sharing of the empire. China’s South East Asian trade, in which they first encountered the Europeans, was set in this context of a relatively weak, if not negative, state-merchant relationship. The Chinese coastal people’s trade to Nanyang (South East Asia) was subject to and periodically disrupted by the political climate of the court. Prohibitions on ships going to sea, on Chinese junk trading to Nanyang, and on Qing subjects travelling there were issued periodically. Even though the trade continued under these conditions, the prohibitions did limit and interrupt interactions. Wang Gungwu termed this situation, in contrast to the British, as ‘merchants without empire.’

When the Qianlong emperor, in 1741, read the report on the massacre of 1740, in which more than 10,000 Chinese had been killed in Batavia the year before, his comment was that they deserved to die for they had voluntarily left China proper—the cultured country. In comparison, the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and British merchants were helped by their respective states in their trade expansion in South East Asia, if the state itself was not the merchant, paving the way for later colonial control. The European maritime empires would have seen the massacre in Batavia as a just course for starting a war, but certainly the Qing did not. China was moving along a different track of economic-political establishment from that of the Europeans.

The Canton system was unique within the context of Qing merchant-state relations. It was, perhaps, the furthest the Chinese merchants could come to mobilizing
the Qing state in their desire to pursue wealth. The co-operation among local merchants, provincial officials, and court officials in the second half of the 1750s secured Canton’s monopoly in European trade. But this Qing state-merchant relation differed significantly from the EIC monopoly. For one thing, Hongs were heavily burdened by the dynastic state’s security directives and were at the mercy of the bureaucrats and the court. The state-merchant relationship in Canton was one of control and submission, including control of foreigners.

By 1755, after more than a century of empire-building in and from China proper after its first conquest in 1644, the Qing dynasty’s and the bureaucrats’ survival and prosperity were tightly bound together. From the imperial perspective, the Canton system assuaged the political security fears of the Manchurian and Chinese ruling classes and, at the same time, allowed them to extract profits from the Canton maritime trade. The coastal peoples outside of Canton, who had a long tradition and history of maritime trade, were shut out from earning profit from the European trade.

Putting the Chinese and British Empires side by side, the comparison is revealing. The Canton lobby’s desire for monopolizing the European trade together with the imperial state security fears shaped the formation of the Canton system on the Chinese side. Behind the Canton system and the Confucianist discourse were the interests of the Qing dynasty, its bureaucrats, and the Canton merchants. On the British side, the British imperial identity and the free trade doctrines shaped the Warlike party’s understanding of Chinese-British relations and a desire for starting a war—first knowledge and then military. Hidden in the Warlike party’s rhetoric of national interest and national honour was the profit-making agenda of the British merchants and politicians. Discourse was bonded to interests on both the Chinese and British sides.

The Canton system from 1757 for the next eighty-five years dictated China’s perception of and relations with the Europeans—in particular their knowledge of the British. The Warlike party in response to the restriction of the Canton system, and with free trade and imperial identity at the backdrop, produced a new knowledge about China, which became, for more than a century after 1842, the viewpoint in understanding China and China’s historical foreign relations.

Thus, this book reinterprets the First Opium War as follows: the British Empire, at a pivotal moment, adopted the Warlike party’s desire for profit as its major driving force to confront an entrenched profit order—the Canton system—that was propped up by the Qing Empire, which had a stake in it in terms of both profit and state security. Behind the interstate conflict were the Qing’s vested interests in the old profit order and the British interests to create a new profit order. Profit order was central to the Chinese-British encounter in Canton, which during the hundred years from the mid-eighteenth century was arguably the most dynamic wealth-creating port in the maritime trading world.
Notes

Prologue

1. *Correspondence Relating to China*, pp. 446–47.

Chapter One

3. ‘The most powerful nation in the world’ was an idea often found in the *Register*. For instance, see ‘To the Editor of the Canton Register’, 8:11 (17 Mar 1835). ‘National honour’ was also a term commonly used in the *Register*. For example, see 3:24 (4 Dec 1830), 4:13 (4 July 1831), 5:10 (18 July 1832), 6:18 (5 Dec 1833), 7:17 (29 Apr 1834), 8:11 (17 Mar 1835), and 9:6 (9 Feb 1836).
5. Other examples of major articles related to war arguments in the *Register* include 6:5 (13 Apr 1833), 7:50 (16 Dec 1834), 8:14 (7 Apr 1835), and 9:39 (27 Sept 1836).
11. For Matheson’s meeting with Palmerston, see *Register* 9:21 (24 May 1836). For Jardine’s, see PRO, FO 17/35 (26 and 27 Oct 1839); and JM, B6/10, L2240 and 2251.
12. Palmerston to J. A. Smith, Nov. 28, 1842, quoted from Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, p. 83.
13. Fay, Opium War, p. 193; Chang, Commissioner Lin, p. 191.
16. Turner, British Opium Policy, p. 84; Pott, Sketch of Chinese History, p. 134; Purcell, China, pp. 53–54. Melancon argued against it; see Britain’s China Policy, pp. 133–34.
17. The articles that best summarize this school’s thought are in the edited volume Fairbank (ed.), Chinese World Order.
19. Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals; Melancon, Britain’s China Policy.
20. Collis, Foreign Mud; Chang, Commissioner Lin, p. 15; Fay, Opium War, p. 193; Beeching, Chinese Opium Wars; Lovell, Opium War.
21. For instance, Hevia, ‘Opium, Empire, and Modern History’.
22. Marion, Bases and Empire, pp. 77–78; Greenberg, British Trade, p. 195; Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics, pp. 265–67; Purcell, China, p. 54; Cain and Hopkins, ‘Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas’.
24. Some key works redressing the relations between British imperial metropolis and periphery: Bayly, Imperial Meridian, and Empire and Information; and Wilson (ed.), New Imperial History.
25. For works on British perceptions of China, see for example, Kitson, Forging Romantic China; Poter, Ideographia and Chinese Taste; Hayot, Hypothetical Mandarin; Hillemann, Asian Empire and British Knowledge and Forman, China and the Victorian Imagination.
26. The 1835 figures are taken from ‘To the Editor of the Canton Press’, Press 1:6 (17 Oct 1835). Greenberg provided the 1834 figures; see British Trade, p. 185. The 1837 numbers can be found in Repository 5:9 (Jan 1837), p. 432. After 1837, the Repository provided a yearly census of Canton. In terms of sailors, the record in 1832 shows there were around 1,700 British sailors in twenty-five ships, 240 Americans in fifteen ships, and 50 Netherlanders with two ships. See Repository 1:6 (Oct 1832), p. 243.

Chapter Two

1. Press 1:21 (30 Jan 1836); Crito is a chapter of Dialogues of Plato on justice and injustice. The trader seemed to use this pseudonym to make a statement that the Warlike party in advocating the war did not do justice to China.
2. ‘To the Editor of the Canton Press’, Register 9:5 (2 Feb 1836).
4. Register 4:12 (18 June 1831).
5. Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 22–24.
6. For ships to Australia, see JM, B1/3, I28/1, I28/3, and K10; see also Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 94–96.
7. For an account of the agency system, see Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 144–52.
8. For cotton trade, see ibid., pp. 88–92.
Notes to pp. 13–17 165


11. Greenburg, British Trade; see pp. 84–86 for the post–Napoleonic era trade expansion, p. 142 for trade balance between 1829 and 1940.

12. Ibid.; see p. 13 for trading figures in 1830, p. 50 for opium constituting two-thirds of imports, p. 104 for opium as largest commodity.


14. For Daoguang’s anti-opium campaign of 1820, see QDWJSL-DG, juan 1, 10–12.


16. Register 7:5 (4 Feb 1834), italics in original.

17. For Jardine and Matheson, see Blake, Jardine Matheson, pp. 30–41; Keswick, Thistle and the Jade, p. 18.

18. Register, 8:21 (26 May 1835), also in Greenberg, British Trade, p. 94.


21. Markwick and Lane sub-rented the space from Charles Magniac; see JM, F14/1.

22. The information about Markwick & Lane is gathered from the Canton Register: for the books, see Register 8:1 (6 Jan 1835); for the post office, see Register 7:31 (5 Aug 1834); for the banquet held in the hotel, see Register 7:48 (2 Dec 1834); for the subscription list to the hospital, see Register 7:1 (7 Jan 1834); for Horsburgh’s chart, see Register 7:3 (21 Jan 1834); for public meeting, see Register 9:47 (22 Nov 1836); for Chamber of Commerce meetings, see Register 9:47 (22 Nov 1836), 9:48 (29 Nov 1836); for the Canton Register box, Register 8:28 (14 July 1835). For other issues related to the company, see Register 7:48 (2 Dec 1834), 7:3 (21 Jan 1834), 8:28 (14 July 1835), 9:47 (22 Nov 1836), and 9:48 (29 Nov 1836). Markwick & Lane advertised in the Register regularly, for instance, Register 2:10 (26 May 1829), 2:11 (2 June 1829), 3:6 (17 Mar 1830), 4:22 (15 Nov 1831), and 9:40 (4 Oct 1836). The Register was based at No. 3 Creek Hong, annual subscription fee twelve dollars; see Register supplement (17 Oct 1832).

23. For the Napier Affair, see Fay, Opium War, pp. 67–79; Beeching, Chinese Opium Wars, pp. 40–62; and Hunter, Fan Kwae, pp. 127–32. For the account of Lord Napier by the Canton foreign community, see the Canton Register issues between June and December.
1834. For the Chinese accounts of Napier and related edicts by the Qing authorities, see Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 2, pp. 1–34.


27. ‘To the King’s Most Excellent Majesty in Council’, *Register* 7:52 supplement (30 Dec 1834).


29. For research on Scottish celebration in India, see Buettner, ‘Haggis in the Raj’.


33. *Register* 1:10 (8 Mar 1828).

34. The *Hobart Town Courier*, 13 September 1828.

35. For newspaper publication of this period, see Barker, *Newspapers and English Society*.


39. JM, C5/2, p. 1.

40. *Indo Chinese Gleaner*, no. 3 (Feb 1818).


44. For British local newspapers in the making of British identity, see Colley, *Britons*, p. 41.


46. Ibid.

47. JM, B2/2, p. 44.


49. For English record of the quay incident, see *Register* 4:10 (13 May 1831, extra 26 May 1831), 4:11 (6 June 1831), 4:12 (18 June 1831), 4:13 (4 July 1831), 4:14 (15 July 1831); IOR, G/12/246, passim; a summary of the EIC account is in Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, pp. 278–92; quotation ‘To His Excellency the Governor, the Fooyuen, the Hoppo’, in Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, p. 301.


51. Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, pp. 283–84.

53. For the Register's discussion of women in Canton after this case, see 4:10 (13 May 1831), 4:13 (4 July 1831), 5:4 (16 Feb 1832), 5:5 (8 Mar 1832), 7:24 (17 June 1834), 7:50 (16 Dec 1834), 8:22 (2 June 1835).

54. For the Register's report on Xie's case, see 4:2 (17 Jan 1831), 4:10 (13 May 1831), Register extra (26 May 1831), 4:11 (6 June 1831), 4:14 (15 July 1831), 4:15 (2 Aug 1831).

55. For the Mrs Baynes incident, see JM/C4/1, pp. 59–60, 77, 159. For the EIC's record, see IOR, FO, G/12/244, passim; for Morse's summary, Chronicles, vol. 4, pp. 278–92. For the Chinese record, see Liang, Yue Haiguan zhi, juan 27, pp. 1–15; and QDWJSL-DG, juan 4, p. 40. For Guo's summary, Jindai Zhongguo shi, pp. 406–29.

56. For the new regulations, see QDWJSL-DG, juan 4, pp. 40–42.

57. For petition against the new regulations, see PRO, FO1048/31/43-48.


59. 'British Subjects in China: To the Editor of the Canton Register', Register 4:13 (4 July 1831).

60. 'To the Editor', Register 4:14 (15 July 1831).

61. 'To the Editor of the Canton Gazette', Register 4:15 (2 Aug 1831).


63. 'China', Singapore Chronicle and Commercial Register, 3 November 1831. These Singapore Chronicle and Bengal Hurkaru reports were quoted by the Register; see Register 4:10 (13 May 1831), and 6:5 (13 Apr 1833). For discussion in London of the incident, see, for example, The Times, 15 March, 12 April, 31 October, and 10 November 1831; and Bell's Weekly Messenger, no. 1858 (13 Nov 1831).

64. Brown, Board of Trade and Free Trade.

65. Schonhardt-Bailey, Rise of Free Trade, vol. 1, p. 12; Cain and Hopkins, 'Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas'.

66. Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 175–84. For the rise of the Manchester merchants, see Philips, East India Company, pp. 276–98; and Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade. For how free trade affected British perception of China, see Tsao, 'Representing China to the British Public in the Age of Free Trade'.

67. Grant's praise of the Register was in his bill to Parliament concerning the EIC Charter; see Register 6:19 and 20 (26 Dec 1833).

68. 'Free Trade with China', Register 7:25 (24 June 1834); 'Free Trade to All the Ports of the Chinese Empire' Register 7:48 (2 Dec 1834); 'Free Trade to All the Ports of the Chinese Empire', Register 7:50 (16 Dec 1834).

69. Register 7:17 (29 Apr 1834).

70. Register 7:39 (30 Sept 1834), italics added.

71. Register 7:39 (30 Sept 1834), italics in original.

72. Other issues of the Register that directly talked about free trade: 1:31 (9 Aug 1828), 7:25 (24 June 1834), 7:26 (17 June 1834), 7:26 (1 July 1834), 7:27 (8 July 1834), 7:29 (22 July 1834), 7:30 (29 July 1834), 7:48 (2 Dec 1834), 8:2 (13 Jan 1835), 8:19 (12 May 1835), 9:49 (6 Dec 1836), 7:25 (24 June 1834), 7:50 (16 Dec 1834).

73. 'Free Trade to China', Courier 1 (28 July 1831); 'War with China', Courier 7 (8 Sept 1831). The shared position did not prevent the fight between the two editors of the newspapers. While the quarrels with the Chinese went on, the Courier's proprietor William Wightman
Wood and the Register's editor Arthur S. Keating (1807–1838) exchanged aggressive articles in the two newspapers in addition to trading abusive letters and personal verbal abuse. The conflict between them resulted in a challenge of a duel, but it had more to do with the American 'travelling spinster' Harriet Low Hillard, one of the few eligible ladies of the foreign community in China, who lived in Macao and occasionally under disguise ventured to Lintin and Canton. For the fight between the Courier and the Register, see, for instance, Courier 1:28 (9 Feb 1832), 1:29 (16 Feb 1832); and Register 5:3 (2 Feb 1832), 6:12 (5 Aug 1833); for the duel, see Hillard, Lights and Shadows, pp. 320–22; and Hunter, Fan Kwae, p. 112.

75. For instance, Press 1:40 (11 June 1836).
76. Register 4:10 (13 May 1831).
77. Ibid.
78. Register 4:12 (18 June 1831).
79. For the book ordered, see JM, B6/10, L638; see also Greenberg, British Trade, p. 74n1; and Le Pichon (ed.), China Trade and Empire, p. 163.
80. Zhiguo zhi yong dalüe [A sketch on the practicalities of policymaking] contains twenty-one pages in double leaves. The publication date is said to be 1839 (Lutz, Opening China, p. 339) or 1840 (Oxford Bodleian Library [OBL] Online Catalogue). Karl Gützlaff is attributed by both Lutz and OBL to be the author. But the preface of the book states that it was by Ma Lixun 馬禮遜. (It could be Robert Morrison or his son John Robert Morrison. John used both his own and his father's Chinese names after Robert's death.) Robert Morrison died in 1834, and the preface does not say or suggest that this is a posthumous publication. If it was the father, it could in fact have been published before 1834. Further information is necessary for the exact date of publication and the author to be determined.
82. Zhiguo, p. 16a. The original Chinese read, ‘但將農、匠、商一均振興，無不利國益民矣’.
86. See Aihanzhe (eds.), Dongxiyang kao, 'Maoyi' [Trade], pp. 314–16; ‘Xun xindi’ [Searching for newland], pp. 394–95; and ‘Gongbanya’ [The East India Companies], pp. 418–20.
88. Ibid., pp. 8a–13a; for the term sanshang, see p. 11a.
89. For missionaries' Chinese publications of this period, see Hanan, 'The Missionary Novels of Nineteenth-Century China'; for their geohistorical and Christian publications, see Barnett and Fairbank eds., Christianity in China.
90. *Maoyi tongzhi* was quoted fourteen times by Wei Yuan (see Xiong, *Xixuedongjian*, p. 120). I will explain more about Wei Yuan and his books in Chapter 4.

91. For the book ordered, see JM, B6/10, L638; see also Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, p. 163.

92. McCulloch, *Dictionary*, p. 233, italics in original. This passage was reprinted and then repudiated in the *Register* 8:1 (6 Jan 1835).


94. *Register* 4:10 (13 May 1831); Collie, *Chinese Classical Work*.

95. Collie, *Chinese Classical Work*, vol. 1, pp. 78–79. Chin Seang (Chen Xiang); Heu Hing (Xu Xing), or Heu Tsze (Xu Zi). Tsze (Zi) was a suffix of respect; Prince Tang (Tengwengong).

96. *Zhiguo*, pp. 2b–3a and 7a–7b; and *Maoyi tongzhi*, pp. 2b–3a and 55b; Aihanzhe (eds.), *Dongxiyang kao*, p. 314.


98. For the petition see PRO, FO 1048/30/5; and *Register Supplement* (18 Dec 1830) and 4:2 (17 Jan 1831); more details in Chapter 6.

99. For the *Press* leaving a space, see *Press* 1:46 (23 July 1836).

100. For the *Register*’s suggestion concerning Howqua, see *Register* 9:30 (26 July 1836).

101. For reports of the incident, see *Register* 8:49, supplement (8 Dec 1835); and *Press* 1:15 (19 Dec 1835).

102. See *Register* 6:5 (13 Apr 1833), 7:46 (18 Nov 1834), 8:1 (6 Jan 1835), 8:10 (10 Mar 1835), 8:28 (14 July 1835).

103. JM, C5/2, pp. 1–3.

104. *Calcutta Courier* (7 Nov 1835), quoted from *Register* 9:10 (8 Mar 1836). For another example of the *Calcutta Courier*’s disagreement on the war position with the *Register*, see *Register* 8:21 (26 May 1836).

105. It seems the *Press* had certain American connections, but thus far I have not been able to find evidence.

106. Franklin, *Account of the Supremest Court*.


108. For Governor-General Lu Kun, see *Press* 1:4 (3 Oct 1835); for the piracy issue, *Press* 1:16 (26 Dec 1835).

109. For comments on Elliot, see *Press* 3:16 (23 Dec 1837).


111. Ibid., italics in original.

112. For the circulation of the *Register* and *Press*, see *Repository* 5:4 (Aug 1836), p. 159.

113. ‘Canton Petition to the King,’ ‘To the Editor of the Canton Press,’ and ‘Petition,’ in *Press* 1:6 (17 Oct 1835). For the *Register*’s version of the analysis of the petitioners, see ‘In the Last Number of the Canton Press,’ *Canton Register* 8:42 (20 Oct 1835); and ‘Petition to the King in Council,’ *Canton Register* 9:28 (12 July 1836). For the *Register*’s analysis of other newspapers, see ‘Petition of British Subjects at Canton,’ ‘In Our Columns,’ and ‘Dear Mr. Editor,’ *Register* 8:5 (3 Feb 1835); ‘Petition to the King in Council,’ *Register* 8:22 (2 June 1835); ‘Why Do the Heathen Rage, and the People Imagine a Vain Thing,’ and ‘Dear Mr. Editor,’ *Register* 8:10 (10 Mar 1835). The number of signatures on the petition in the *Register* was ninety-one, and that which Matheson presented in London had eighty-eight signatures; see Matheson, *Present Position and Prospects*.

115. Ibid.
120. The pamphlet: *Facts Relating to Chinese Commerce*. See *Register*, 3:20 (2 Oct 1830) for the reaction of the Americans. For the Americans in Canton in this period, see Downs, *Golden Ghetto*; for the case of Francis Terranova, see Chen, 'Strangled by the Chinese and Kept “Alive” by the British'.
122. For Jardine’s letter, see *Register* 3:20 (2 Oct 1830), 3:21 (16 Oct 1830); also Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 73.

Chapter Three

1. For a comprehensive study of the Factories, see Farris, ‘Thirteen Factories of Canton’.
2. For the interaction between Chinese merchants and staff of the EIC, see PRO, FO 1048 and FO 233/189; and IOR, G/12 and R/10. For a first-hand account of the Canton system, see Hunter, *Fan Kwae*. Morse’s work was seminal in understanding the Canton system; see *International Relations*, pp. 63–93. For the daily transactions of the Canton system, see van Dyke, *Canton Trade*.
4. For the Manchu identity and rule in China, see Crossley, *Translucent Mirror*; Elliot, *Manchu Way*; and Rawski, *Last Emperors*. For Qing expansion, see Perdue, *China Marches West*.
5. The following account of what happened between 1755 and 1759 is based mainly on Chinese records, including archives newly published by the First Historical Archive Beijing and fragment EIC records of these years. For previous study, see, for instance, Farmer, ‘James Flint versus the Canton Interest’; Morse, *International Relations*, p. 67; van Dyke, *Canton Trade*, p. 14; Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 1, pp. 568–88; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, pp. 99–102.
6. For the clearing of the coast, see Wang, *Ming Qing haijiang*, pp. 141–53; for the significance of clearing the coast, see van de Ven, ‘The Onrush of Modern Globalization in China’, pp. 170–73.
8. Cheong, *Mandarins and Merchants*, pp. 8 and 11. The exact locations of the ports changed from time to time but were in the vicinity. See Huang, *Dongnan sisheng haiguan*, pp. 23–39.
10. For the advantages of Canton port, see van Dyke, *Canton Trade*, pp. 13–17.
11. ‘Qianlong, 20/5/16 (25 July 1755)’, and others in *SLXK*, pp. 354 and 357.
12. ‘Qianlong, 20/5/16 (25 July 1755)’, *SLXK*, vol. 10, sent to Ningbo, pp. 354 and 356.
13. Ibid., p. 357.
17. The original ‘prohibition’ document seems not to have survived, but it was quoted in this memorial: ‘Qianlong, 21/r09/10 (2 Nov 1756)’, in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, p. 1286.
18. N-SGDZBZG, No. 701001110, the original Chinese read, ‘周人驥革職效力軍臺乾隆21年’ . Zhou was in the same year reinstalled and appointed as governor of Guangdong. The reappointment was likely announced before he reached the post station; see A-NGDKDA, No. 054778-001, original Chinese read, ‘題謝皇上恩命署理廣東巡撫’.
26. ‘Qianlong, 22/08/08 (20 Sep 1757)’, ‘Qianlong, 22/10/22 (3 Dec 1757)’, and ‘Qianlong 22/10/22 (3 Dec 1757)’, in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, pp. 1629–35 and 1636–44. It seems rather puzzling that the two memorials were presented by Yang on the same day on the same topic with minor differences, and they both belonged to the category of ‘red vermillion memorial’. The emperor commented on the first, agreeing that the livelihoods of the Cantonese should be taken care of (p. 1635), while he wrote on the second one that the ministers should discuss and report back (p. 1644). Also, the second one has more details of how Yang arrived at Ningbo.
34. ‘Qianlong, 24/09/04 (24 Oct 1759)’, in SLXK, vol. 4, pp. 117–25. The irony is that Flint paid a bribe of 5,000 liang for the petition on corruption to be presented. See Morse, *International Relations*, vol. 1, pp. 301–5.
40. This confirms what Paul van Dyke has argued: the Canton system of trade can be traced back to 1700 as the starting point; see *Canton Trade*, p. xiv.
41. For the tea trade, see Wills, ‘European Consumption of Asian Production in the 17th and 18th centuries’, p. 144; for the tea trade of this period in general, see Mui and Mui, *Management of Monopoly*.

42. For the Jesuit’s mission, see Brockey, *Journey to the East*.

43. For Kangxi learning mathematics, see Wang, *Kangxi huangdi*, pp. 41–44. The instruments can now be seen in the Palace Museum in Beijing, which I visited in September 2007.

44. ‘Kangxi, 27/07/57 (23/08/1718)’, in *KXCHWZPZZHB*, vol. 8, p. 268. The original Chinese read, ‘西洋來人內若有各樣學問或行醫者必著速送至京中’.


48. *Mingshi* 明史 [History of the Ming], juan 323, On Lüsong (Luzon), in A-HJQWZLK.

49. ‘Qianlong, 07/02/03 (3 March 1737)’, in *SLXK*, vol. 22, pp. 803–4.


51. For the persecution, see Laamann, *Christian Heretics*.


53. Cao, ‘Qingdai Guangdong tizhi’.

54. For the rebellion of this period, see Naquin, *Millenarian Rebellion and Shantung Rebellion*; Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies*; and Wang, *White Lotus Rebels*.

55. John King Fairbank exemplified this argument in *Trade and Diplomacy*, p. 52.

56. See Chapter 5.


58. See Chapter 6.

59. For the revision, see ‘Jiaqing, 20/04/14 (02 June 1809)’, in *QDWJSL-JQ*, vol. 3, pp. 9a–10b.

60. For the memorial, see Liang (ed.), *Yue hai guan zhi*, juan 29, pp. 19–27. For English translations of the regulations, see the *Canton Register* 4:11 (6 June 1831); and Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, pp. 293–301.

61. For Lu Kun’s revision, see Liang (ed.), *Yue hai guan zhi*, juan 29, pp. 28a–36a.


63. The commissioner of customs belonged to the Board of Revenue but the revenue was controlled by the Imperial Household Office (*neiwufu*), as was the appointment; thus, it ended up that most often Manchus were appointed to the lucrative post. See Huang, *Dongnan sisheng hai guan*, pp. 40–95; for the duties of the commissioners, see Chen, *In solvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants*, pp. 24–29.

64. For a general introduction to the Qing bureaucracy, see Metzger, *Internal Organization of Ch‘ing Bureaucracy*.


66. For the Hong merchants, see van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao*; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*; Morse, *Gilds of China*; Liang, *Guangdong shisanhang*.


69. For instance, Liang (ed.), *Yue hai guan zhi*, juan 29, pp. 28–36.

71. For linguists, see van Dyke, *Canton Trade*, pp. 77–94.
72. For compradors, see van Dyke, *Canton Trade*, pp. 51–76.
74. For the system, see Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 1, pp. 331–77; and van Dyke, *Canton Trade*.
75. Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 1, p. viii. For the change in 1786, see IOR, R/10/33 (Court’s letter of 24 March 1786); for a general narrative of the history of early Canton trade, see IOR, G/12/20, pp. 377–80.
76. For tea trade figures and credit flow in Canton, see Chen, *Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants*, pp. 44–53.
77. For the amount of port revenue sent to the court between 1684 and 1844, see Huang, *Dongnan sisheng hai guan*, pp. 419–82.
78. For examples, see ‘Proclamations’, *Register* 4:19 (1 Oct 1831).
79. ‘Hukoukao yi’ 戶口考一 [Part one of household registration], *Qingchao wenxian tongkao*.
80. For the 1744 case, see Liang, *Yue haiguan zhi*, juan 28, pp. 2–3; for the 1809 case, see SLXK, vol. 3, pp. 56–57 and 104–6. Seeking guarantors was a significant feature in every aspect of the foreign trade in the Qing period, even the construction of oceangoing ships; see Guo, ‘Qingdai qianqi haiwai maoyi guanli’.
81. Zhang, ‘Cong Hezhou shibian kan Qianlong chao minbian’.
83. The foreigners knew the *baojia*, but they did not seem to link it to the Canton system. E. C. Bridgman mentioned this system in ‘Notices of China’, *Repository* 2:1 (May 1834): 18.
84. For an English record of the appointment of a French consul to Canton, see IOR, G/12/66, p. 190.
89. Song in 1793 had accompanied halfway the embassy’s journey south to Canton. In 1811, when Song arrived in Canton as governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi and learned that Staunton was in the Thirteen Factories, they renewed their friendship. The EIC capitalized on this friendship to solve a dispute at the time. Three years later the court intervened that terminated the friendship. For Staunton’s communication and exchange of gifts with Song between 1811 and 1814, see PRO, FO 1048/11/18-24, FO 1048/11/26, FO 1048/11/35, FO 1048/12/1, FO 1048/12/2, FO 1048/12/8, FO 1048/14/54, and FO 1048/14/66; and IOR, G/12/20, pp. 298–99.
90. This letter to the governor is recorded in the proceedings of Parliament in London; see ‘Extract from Mr. C. Grant’s Speech June 13th’, in *Register* 6:19 & 20 (26 Dec 1833), italics added. The speech shows that Parliament at this point held Qing China in great respect.
91. ‘Last Letter from the Honourable Company’s Chief at Macao to the Viceroy’, *Register* 7:18 (6 May 1834).
92. ‘Election of a Chief’, Register 7:44 (4 Nov 1834). The translation was by the Register, hence ‘Barbarian Eye’ for yimu.

93. PRO, FO 82/2462. One of the memorials was translated into English and published in the Register, entitled ‘Postscript [sic] to a Dispatch from the Governor of Canton to the Emperor’, Register 10:5 (24 Jan 1837).

94. Register 10:18 (2 May 1837).

95. PRO, FO 682/2462/47, and FO 682/2462/52. The case was also published in the Canton Press 3:3 (23 Sept 1837).

96. For stopping trade during the Napier Affair, see Hunter, Fan Kwae, pp. 127–32; for another three occasions of stopping trade, see Register 3:25 (18 Dec 1830), 4:1 (3 Jan 1831), 7:1 (7 Jan 1834).


98. Examples of punishment of Chinese in order to force the foreigners to cooperate: in the Flint incident, Register 3:17 (25 Aug 1830); in the case of an American petition, Register 1:20 (7 May 1828); for Western women in Canton, Register 3:23 (15 Nov 1830), and 4:13 (4 July 1831); in the Napier Affair, Register 7:33 (19 Aug 1834); in other cases, Register 8:11 (17 Mar 1835), 9:47 (22 Nov 1836), 8:2 (13 Jan 1835), and 6:13 and 14 (16 Sept 1833).


100. For examples of the British merchants stopping trade, see during 1813–1814: Greenberg, British Trade, p. 52. During 1829–1830: Register 3:2 (19 Jan 1830), 3:3 (3 Feb 1830), 3:4 (15 Feb 1830), 3:7 (29 Mar 1830), and 5:1 (2 Jan 1832); also Greenberg, British Trade, p. 43; Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, p. 20; Guo, Jindai Zhongguo shi, vol. 1, p. 503. During April 1839, see Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, p. 79.

101. For the first meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, see Register 7:33 (19 Aug 1834).


104. Examples of communication between the General Chamber of Commerce and Hong merchants: *Press* 4:13 (1 Dec 1838), 4:14 (8 Dec 1838), 4:15 (15 Dec 1838), 4:16 (22 Dec 1838), 4:17 (27 Dec 1838).

105. *Press* 3:19 (13 Jan 1837); see also *Press* 4:13 (1 Dec 1838) for a letter concerning another plea from the Hong merchants to the chamber.

106. 'Remarks on the 'Trade of Canton [by Frederick Pigou, Esq. 1754.],' *Register* 8:10 (10 Mar 1835), italics in original.


110. 'Free Trade to All the Ports of the Chinese Empire,' *Register* 7:25 (24 June 1834).

111. 'Instructions to LT.COL. Cathcart, Whitehall, Nov 30th, 1787', in Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 2, p. 164.


113. For the English text, see *Register* 5:10 (18 July 1832); the original Chinese read, ‘夫英國朝廷既經有了這多大地方何得復渴開新地乎其所尚者特為養護英民享平安納福而已’; see Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 1, p. 619.

114. For the Chinese letters that the British received during the journey, see Xu (ed.), *Da zhong ji*.

115. 'Daoguang 12/07/02 (28 July 1832)', *SLXK*, vol. 13, p. 471.

116. 'Daoguang 12/06/01 (28 June 1832)', in *SLXK*, pp. 397–98.

117. 'LE Governor & c to the Hong Merchants,' *Register* 1:39 (15 Nov 1828).

118. Ibid.

119. For the forbidding of books and learning Chinese, see *SLXK*, vol. 10, pp. 361–63; for the Chinese teacher killed, see Hunter, *Fan Kwae*, p. 37.

120. Su, *Zhongguo Kaimen*; for Morrison' Chinese teachers, see pp. 43–64; for the Chinese books he brought with him, see p. 123.

121. 'Neumann, Karl Friedrich', *Encyclopædia Britannica* (1911).


**Chapter Four**

1. ‘Proceedings Relative to the Formation of a Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China’, in *PRO, FO 17/ 89*; also partly in *Chinese Repository* 3:8 (Dec 1834), pp. 378–84, italics added. A version of this chapter has been published in *Modern Asian Studies*, see Chen, ‘An Information War Waged by Merchants and Missionaries at Canton.’
2. For the modernization argument of the SDUKC, which I will not repeat here, see Rubinstein, ‘Propagating the Democratic Gospel’; Drake, ‘E. C. Bridgman’s Portrayal of the West’; and Lazich, ‘Diffusion of Useful Knowledge’.


4. Hillemann argued that the changing perceptions of China on the British side around this time made war against China imaginable; see Asian Empire and British Knowledge, pp. 104–5.


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


12. Ibid.


14. ‘Chinese Monthly Magazine’, Register 7:15 (15 Apr 1834). Greenberg quoted this from the Jardine Matheson Archives, but he did not note the source, because he read uncatalogued documents. Further research is needed to determine Gützlaff’s source of funds.


18. Ibid., italics in original.

19. For the SDUK, see Smith, Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge.


22. For the circulation of the Penny Magazine, see Secord, Victorian Sensation, p. 68; and Bennett, ‘Editorial Character and Readership of the Penny Magazine’.

23. For Brougham, see Lobban, ‘Brougham, Henry Peter’.


25. Register 7:49 (9 Dec 1834).

26. For the regulations of the society, see Register 7:49 (9 Dec 1834).


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.


34. Ibid., pp. 400.

35. Ibid., pp. 400–401.
36. Ibid.
37. See Xiong, *Xixue dongjian*, p. 171.
42. The term ‘devils’ originated in the context of European pirates on the south China coast during the early years of the encounter between China and the West; see Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 96–107.
45. For the English version of the Napier’s placard, see ‘Interesting to the Chinese Merchants’, *Register* 7:35 (2 Sept 1834).
48. ‘First Report’.
50. For Edwin Steven’s account of the voyage to Fuji, see *Repository* 4:2 (June 1835), pp. 82–96. Steven mentioned only Christian books, but when the *Register* complained about the Canton authorities searching for those Chinese who assisted in the writing and printing of the tracts, it alluded to the distribution of the magazine, see ‘Freedom of Press in China’, *Register* 8:38 (22 Sept 1835).
53. For the personal distribution of Bridgman’s book, see Lazich, *E. C. Bridgman*, pp. 144 and 154; for Bridgman’s revision of the treatise, see Xiong, *Xixue dongjian*, pp. 117–18.
55. For political factionalism, see Polachek, *Inner Opium War*, pp. 125–35.
59. For Xu Jiyu (Hsu Chi-yu), see Drake, *China Charts the World*.
60. Murray Rubinstein explains the society as part of the activities initiated by the foreign community in China to ‘overturn its tradition and become a modern, industrial, Christian nation state’, seeing SDUKC as one of the earliest attempts to bring the fruits of modernity into China. See Rubinstein, ‘Propagating the Democratic Gospel’, p. 258.
61. Drake, ‘E. C. Bridgman’s Portrayal of the West’; Lazich, ‘Diffusion of Useful Knowledge’, p. 316; also Lazich, *E. C. Bridgman*, p. 120.
63. ‘To the King’s Most Excellent Majesty in Council’, in Matheson, *Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China*. 
Chapter Five

1. ‘To the King’s Most Excellent Majesty in Council’, in Matheson, Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China, p. 131, italics added.
2. Liu, Clash of Empires, Chapter 2; Fang, ‘Yi, Yang, Xi, Wai and Other Terms’.
5. PRO, FO 1048/14/73. The original Chinese read, ‘似有輕侮之意’; ‘外國統稱’.
6. Lydia Liu argued that the British started translating yi as ‘barbarians’ instead of as ‘foreigners’ in around 1832 and believed that Gützlaff played a major role in it (Liu, Clash of Empires, pp. 41–42). This chapter reveals that the yi issue started in 1814, and Gützlaff’s confrontation with Chinese authorities in 1832 was the end product of the public debate in the Canton Register that took place during 1828 and 1829.
9. ‘Translation of the Petition from the Gentry Balliffs & Co. of Mongha Village, to the Kwanmanfoo, against the New Road’, and ‘Decision of the Kwanmanfoo on the Mongha Gentry’, both in Register 1:17 (26 Apr 1828).
The system of romanization is different from modern pinyin: yi (Ee); rong (Jung), man (Maan), and di (Teih).

12. Ibid. The Original Chinese read, '孟子／離婁下，孟子曰：舜生於諸馮，遷於負夏，卒於鳴條，東夷之人也；文王生於岐周，卒於畢郢，西夷之人也。地之相去也千有餘里，世之相後也，千有餘歲，得志行乎中國，若合符節，先聖後聖，其揆一也'.

13. 'Epithets Applied to Foreigners'.

14. The sentences paraphrased by Z is not Confucius’s but comes from The Great Learning (Liji 禮記 / Daxue 大學). The original Chinese read, '唯仁人放流之進諸四夷不與同中國'.

15. 'Epithets Applied to Foreigners'.

16. Ibid.

17. Register 2: 21 (18 Nov 1829), italics in original.

18. Matheson, Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China, pp. 15, 17, 21, and 73.

19. For study of the voyage, see Guo, Jindai Zhongguo shi, pp. 605–6; Su, Ma Lixun, pp. 113–30; and Liu, Clash of Empires, pp. 40–46.

20. Xu (ed.), Da zhong ji, pp. 48–50. Wu's official title in Chinese: 欽命江南蘇松太兵備道監督海關. Liu named Wu as admiral (Clash of Empire, p. 43), which is not accurate for this was a civil post.


22. Xu (ed.), Da zhong ji, pp. 53–54. Lindsay and Gützlaff, Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China, p. 68. Lydia Liu put the book quoted from as ‘Great Qing Code' (Clash of Empires, p. 43). This is not how the Da Qing Huidian (Ta-tsing hyway-teen) is usually translated. The Great Qing Code usually refers to the Da Qing Luli.

23. For the Chinese petition that quotes this passage, see Xu (ed.), Da zhong ji, p. 54. This English translation is from Lindsay and Gützlaff, Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China, pp. 68–69. Lydia Liu used passage in John Francis Davies's translation (Clash of Empires, p. 44), which is identical to the translation in the Canton Register; see 'OI Barbaroi', Register 6:12 (5 Aug 1833). Liu's argument that the translation of buzhi as 'misrule' 'turns Su Shi's words into perfect gibberish, if not a verbal monstrosity', is applicable only to the Register's and Davies's text, not to Lindsay’s and to the 1832 confrontation. The complexity of the issue is wanting in Liu's argument.


25. Liu, Clash of Empires, p. 44.


27. For the edicts, see SLXK, pp. 212–15; for the Canton newspaper's report on this, see Register, 5:10 (18 July 1832), 5:13 (3 Sept 1832), 6:2 (24 Jan 1833), 6:3 (16 Feb 1833), 6:4 (20 Mar 1833), 6:8 (31 May 1833), 6:19 and 20 (26 Dec 1833), 7:9 (4 Mar 1834), 7:10 (11 Mar 1834), 7:14 (8 Apr 1834), 8:35 (1 Sept 1835).

28. For the Chinese people's reaction, see Xu (ed.), Da zhong ji.

29. Liu, Clash of Empires, pp. 34 and 69.

30. For examples of 'semi-barbarous', see Register, 5:13 (3 Sept 1832), and 5:15 (3 Oct 1832); for 'barbarian', see Register 9:1 (5 Jan 1836), and 9:35 (30 Aug 1836).

31. A portion of this section has been published in an article; see Chen, 'Chinese Narrator and Western Barbarians'.
32. For Gützlaff's manifesto, see Register 6:10 (15 July 1833).
33. Aihanzhe (ed.), Dongxiyang kao: ‘Zhí wài ji fū 子外寄父 [A son abroad to his father], p. 111; ‘Zhí wài fēng gu shū 婪外奉姑書’ (A nephew abroad to his aunt), p. 201; ‘Ru wài ji pengyou shū 儒外寄朋友書 [A scholar abroad to his friend], p. 221; ‘Zhí wài fēng shu shū 侄外奉叔書 [A nephew abroad to his uncle], pp. 241, 251, 360, 371, 396, 408, and 421; ‘Shu da zhi 叔答侄 [The uncle’s reply to the nephew], pp. 251 and 360. Gützlaff, E. C. Bridgman, W. H. Medhurst, and John Morrison were all involved in editing this magazine; see Huang Shijian, introduction to Aihanzhe (ed.), Dongxiyang kao, pp. 9–14.
34. ‘Zhí wài ji fū’, in Aihanzhe (ed.), Dongxiyang kao, p. 111. The writing was unconventional, and my rendering attempts to piece together the possible meanings. The original Chinese read, ‘男向來視諸夷國當小洲，到那國之時，名稱百路，看地方之寬，城邑之美，百姓之盛，市頭之鬧，色沮言塞，暗想至中國因聞夷人如餓鬼貧賤，甚實堪憫，不期而登岸巡遊，城名叫麗瑪，到處矚眺，細看決疑，屋有順便，衢有澗長，使知五倫學問最淵，生齒日繁，農商相資，工賈相讓，且此地之官員推廣立教，使民知禮義。’
35. For the general situation in Peru after its independence, see Bonilla, ‘Peru and Bolivia from Independence to the War of the Pacific; for the economic situation of this period, see Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano.
37. For Dickens’s childhood, see Forsters, Life of Charles Dickens, pp. 23–37.
38. Gützlaff, Dayingguo, pp. 3–4. The original text in Chinese was written incoherently. The translation here tries to patch together the meaning from the context instead of following the original word by word. Gützlaff uses abundant idiomatic expressions from traditional popular fiction without knowing exactly what they mean. The whole book very often repeatedly quoted idioms that fit the context oddly, rendering the whole narration rather peculiar. The original Chinese read, ‘就問其紅毛人為夷，不知有國家帝君乎，已聞知夷猶禽獸，非知五倫之理，若鳥飛獸走，寓穴掘土，任意食草穀，男女亂媾，上無神，下無君也。葉生含笑道，已而已而，恁般說話，令人把老先生冥頑不靈，雖然本國無地理之文，無外國之史，卻看駐廣州的外客，一定露出其國之體面，若論物藝手段，只閱其甲板。尚然不知漢文，卻有本話詩書文章。’
39. Matheson, Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China, pp. 7, 15, and 17; capitals in original.
40. Lindsay, Letter to Lord Palmerston on British Relations with China, p. 9.
43. Staunton, Remarks on the British Relations with China, pp. 35–38; Morning Herald, 4 April 1836; The Times, 4 April 1836; Asiatic Journal, March, April, and May 1835.
44. Register 8:39 (29 Sept 1835).
45. Repository 4:5 (Oct 1835); also in Register 8:44 (3 Nov 1835).
47. Register 8:40 (6 Oct 1835).
58. This section is a preliminary survey of the use of the words. It would be worthwhile to conduct a statistical analysis using Digital humanities methods, but until the digitization of the edicts and memorials is complete, this project would need a team and funding to go through all the existing edicts and memorials from this period manually.
59. ‘Kangxi, 18/02/49 (03/17/1710)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 2, p. 760; and ‘Kangxi, 07/09/1710 (14/17/1710)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 3, pp. 5–6.
60. ‘Kangxi, 02/06/47 (19/07/1706)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 2, p. 63; ‘Kangxi [1715] (undated)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 6, p. 108; ‘Kangxi, 02/04/54 (04/05/1715)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 6, pp. 121–25.
61. ‘Kangxi, [1715] (undated)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 6, p. 108. ‘Kangxi, 02/06/47 (07/19/1708)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 2, p. 63; *KXZP*, vol. 6, p. 108; ‘Kangxi, 02/04/54 (04/05/1715)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 6, pp. 121–25. The original Kangxi words read, ‘西洋人到中國將三百年未見有不好處若是無大關從寬亦可’.
62. The term *yangchuan* 洋船 (ocean ships) was also used to designate ships in the domestic coastal trade, as well as the ships engaged in the junk trade with South East Asia in this period, meaning ‘ocean-going ships’. This would answer the question of why the Hong merchants were called *yangshang* 洋商. For the use of *yangchuan* to mean ‘domestic ocean-going ship’, see, for instance, ‘YZZP, Y 07/09/03 (12/10/1725)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 5, pp. 99–100 and 243. *Yangshang* was used to designate this group of Chinese merchants as far back as the Ming dynasty. Before the 1750s, European merchants were named mainly *xiyangren*. It was not, as Lydia Liu has argued, that a need to distinguish led to the Hong merchants being named *yangshang* (ocean merchants) while the Western merchants acquired the name *yishang* 夷商 (*yi* merchants); see Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 35–36. *Yi* became the main word for Europeans started in the 1750s. The linguistic distinction before the 1750s was between *yang* (ocean going) and *xi* (western), not between *yang* and *yi*, and after the 1750s between *hangshang* 行商 and *yishang*.
63. For *yangchuan* 洋船, see ‘Kangxi, 10/08/55 (09/25/1716)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 7, p. 356; for *xiyangzi* 西洋字, see ‘Kangxi, 15/06/59 (19/07/1720)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 703; for *xiyangwujian* 西洋物件, see ‘Kangxi, 16/09/55 (30/10/1716)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 7, p. 441; for *xiyangfalan* 西洋法蘭, see ‘Kangxi, 28/09/55 (11/11/1716)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 7, p. 451; for *yangbu* 洋布, see ‘Kangxi, 16/06/60 (29/07/1721)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 822.
64. For *xiyangdaren* 西洋大人 and *xiyangjiaohuawang* 西洋教化王, see ‘Kangxi, 27/07/57 (23/08/1718)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 268.
65. ‘Yongzheng, 12/02/04 (15/03/1726)’, in *YZZP*, vol. 5, p. 610.
66. ‘Kangxi, 09/01/58 (21/03/1717)’, in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 382.
67. For *chuanjiao xiyangren* 傳教西洋人, see ‘Yongzheng, 29/10/02 (14/12/1724)’, in GZDYZC, vol. 13, pp. 392–93.

68. For instance, *yichuan* 彝舡, see ‘Kangxi 27/07/57 (23/08/1718)’, in KXZP, vol. 8, p. 268; for *yiren* 彝人 and *yuanyi* 遠彝, see ‘Kangxi, 09/01/58 (21/03/1717)’, in KXZP, vol. 8, p. 38; for *yichuan* 彥船, see ‘Yongzheng, 28/06/03 (06/08/1725)’, in SLXK, p. 132; for *yi* 彝商, see ‘Kangxi, 10/04/59/16/05/1720’ in KXZP, vol. 8, p. 668; for *yimu* 彝目 (headmen), see ‘Kangxi, 15/05/58/02/07/1719’, in KXZP, vol. 8, p. 489.

69. For the last instance of the 彝yi, see ‘Qianlong, 11/05/20 (20/06/1755)’, in SLXK, p. 190.

70. Liu has documented how the Chinese people on the street called Europeans ‘devil’ in the decades after China was defeated in the First Opium War and other wars; see *Clash of Empires*, pp. 99–107.

71. See Hunter, Fan Kwae.

72. For *xiyang yiren*, see, for example, *D-QZQQXYTZJ*, pp. 78–80, 85, 88, 91, 121, 160, 163, 166, 172, 236, 254, 364, and 384; for ‘the uncultured of afar’, see SLXK, vol. 10, p. 354.

73. For *yuannren* 遠人, see ‘Kangxi, 11/07/61 (22/08/1722)’, in KXZP, vol. 8, p. 912; for *waigouzhiren* 外國之人, see ‘Yongzheng, 29/10/02 (14/12/1724)’, in GZDYZC, vol. 13, p. 393; for *fanke* 番客, see ‘Kangxi, 10/08/55 (25/09/1716)’, in KXZP, vol. 8, p. 356; for *fanbo* 番舶, see ‘Kangxi, 12/08/58 (25/09/1719)’; for *fanchuan* 番船, see ‘Yongzheng, 20/04/04 (21/05/1726)’, in GZDYZC, vol. 5, p. 828; for *xiyangchuan* 西洋船 and *yangchuan* 洋船, see ‘Yongzheng, 20/04/04 (21/05/1726)’, in GZDYZC, vol. 5, p. 828; for *yangchuan* 洋船, see ‘Kangxi 10/08/55 (25/09/1716)’, in KXZP, vol. 8, p. 356.

74. PRO, FO 1048/17/54.

75. ‘Qianlong, 11/10/20 (01/12/1755)’, in SLXK, pp. 227–28.

76. ‘Qianlong, 15/11/20 (04/01/1756)’, in SLXK, pp. 228–29.

77. For Flint incident–related memorials and edicts, see SLXK, pp. 50–53, 62–68, 86–88, 107, and 164.

78. ‘Qianlong, 25/10/24 (14/12/1759)’, in SLXK, pp. 165–66.

79. For the Macartney-related memorials and court edicts, see Diyi Lishi Dang’anguan (ed.), *Yingshi Magaerni*.

80. For a narrative of the case, see Wood, ‘England, China and the Napoleonic Wars’; and Chapter 6 of this book.

81. For the memorials, see *QDWJSL-JQ*, passim.

82. ‘Qianlong, 25/10/24 (14/12/1759)’, in SLXK, p. 166. See also ‘Qianlong, 24/09/33 (04/11/1768)’, in SLXK, pp. 225–26; and ‘Qianlong, 21/02/34 (28/03/1769)’, in SLXK, p. 469.

83. Fang, ‘Yi, Yang, Xi, Wai and Other Terms’.


85. *Yi* (彝) is now used as the name for an ethnic minority people from the south-west of China in the Yunnan region.

86. For examples, A-NGDKDA, 033544, 033617, 033720, 034133, 034511, 034532, 034540, 034659, 034723, 034814, 035055, 035854, and 201475.

87. A-NGDKDA, 039773-001 (1627), 035776-001 (1655).

88. For other examples of the Ming’s using of the second yi to name Europeans, see A-NGDKDA, 201523-001 (the Dutch), 201859-001 (the Dutch), 035749-001 (the Dutch), 034563-001, 03861, 034739, 033943, 201513, 201673. For other examples of the Qing’s
use of the first yi, see A-NGDKDA, 038203, 037031, 150407, 03977, 037869, 038193, 132193, 119954, 277586, 074467, 072455, 149894, and 075790.

89. For examples, A-NGDKDA, 013033, 070473, 013939, 016268, 020536, 050961, 052242, 070478, and 194596.

90. For studies of Zeng Jing's case, see Spence, Treason by the Book, and Liu, Clash of Empires, pp. 83–87.

91. Liu, Clash of Empires, pp. 85–86.

92. For the edict, see A-NGDKDA, 127538, Qing Shilu, Yongzheng, juan 130, pp. 21–23. The original Chinese read, ‘窮鄉僻壤咸使聞知’ and ‘將此等字樣空白及更換者照大不敬律治罪’. Lydia Liu saw the changes simply as a response to the Zeng Jing case (Crash of Empires, p. 85), but in fact this practice started in the early Qing.


95. Lin, Lin Wenzhong gong riji, p. 442.


98. For the dinners, see Hunter, Bits of Old China, pp. 7–12.

99. For their luxurious items, see the advertisements in Canton English newspapers, especially from Markwick & Lane, who supplied the Canton foreign community with daily goods. For instance, in Register 2:10 (26 May 1829), 2:11 (2 June 1829), 3:6 (17 Mar 1830), 4:22 (15 Nov 1831), and 9:40 (4 Oct 1836).


101. For instances of the report on horse racing, see Register 2:11 (2 June 1829), 3:12 (15 June 1830), 4:6 (17 Mar 1831), 4:8 (2 Apr 1831), 4:8 (2 Apr 1831), and 8:19 (12 May 1835).

102. See Chapter 6.

Chapter Six

1. Fay, Opium War, pp. 67–79; Chang, Commissioner Lin, pp. 51–62; Beeching, Chinese Opium Wars, pp. 40–62.

2. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, p. 36.

3. For the 1820 anti-opium campaign, see QDWJSL-DG, juan 1, pp. 10–11.

4. For the debt issue, see Morse, Chronicles, vol. 2, pp. 44–49; Pritchard, Crucial Years, pp. 199–212; Chen, Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, pp. 24–29 and 192–211; Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 20–21; quotation from Morse, Chronicles, vol. 2, p. 44.

5. IOR, G/12/19, pp. 39–46; R/10/8, pp. 38 and 124; G/12/65 and G/12/66, throughout. ‘Captain Panton’s Memorial to the Viceroy’, quoted from Pritchard, Crucial Years, p. 207.

6. The fund was the origin of the idea of modern deposit insurance. See Grant, Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking.
7. *Register* 4:1 (3 Jan 1831); see also Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 177.
8. For the petition and reply, see *Register* 2:21 (18 Nov 1829).
9. For the incidents, see Chapter 3.
10. For the petition, see *Register* supplement (18 Dec 1830) and 4:2 (17 Jan 1831).
12. *Register* 4:21 (1 Nov 1831); see introduction.
13. For the dispatch of the man-of-war from India, see *Courier* 1:21 (15 Dec 1831), 1:22 (22 Dec 1831), 1:23 (29 Dec 1831), 1:24 (5 Jan 1832), 1:25 (12 Jan 1832), 1:26 (19 Jan 1832), 1:29 (16 Feb 1832), 1:30 (23 Feb 1832); and *Register* 4:21 (1 Nov 1831), 4:24 (19 Dec 1831), 5:1 (2 Jan 1832), 5:2 (16 Jan 1832), 5:3 (2 Feb 1832). For a summary of the exchange, see Morse, *Chronicle*, vol. 4, pp. 286–91.
15. ‘Right of Petition’, *Register* 8:2 (13 Jan 1835).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., italics in original.
18. Ibid.
20. For Batavia, see Blusse, *Strange Company, Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*.
30. For archival records of the 1802 expedition, see IOR, G/12/195, pp. 208–45. For a narrative of the two cases, see Wood, ‘England, China and the Napoleonic Wars’; and Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 2, pp. 357–88. The two Portuguese missionaries were Alexander de Govea (1787–1807) and Joseph-Bernard d’Almeida (1728–1805). For the Chinese records of their petition, see PRO, FO 233/189, pp. 168–69.
31. IOR, G/12/195, pp. 246–47, and R/10/32; PRO, FO 233/189, p. 15.
34. *Register* 4:21 (1 Nov 1831), 4:22 (15 Nov 1831), and 4:23 (1 Dec 1831).
35. For the petition, see *Third Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons*, p. 526. See also *Register* supplement (18 Dec 1830), and 4:2 (17 Jan 1831). The texts of the
two were slightly different. The quotation is from the Third Report because it is clearer. My thanks to Grace Spampinato for pointing out the difference to me.

36. ‘Chinese Islands’, Register, 10:1 (3 Jan 1837), 10:2 (10 Jan 1837), and 10:3 (17 Jan 1837).

37. Ibid. The other fifteen islands they reviewed were Haenan, Formosa, Loo Choo, Hong Kong, Namao, Tangsoa, Kinmun, Heamun, Nan-jih, Haetan, Taechoo, Chusan, Tinghae, Tsung-ming, Yun-tae Shan, Shan-tung, Quelpaert, and Bonin.

38. Lindsay, Letter to Lord Palmerston on British Relations with China, pp. 7–8. For an earlier discussion in Canton on taking possession of an island, see, for instance, ‘Commerce with China’, Register 6:4 (20 Mar 1833).

39. Register 7:51 (30 Dec 1834) and 8:2 (13 Jan 1835).

40. See Chapter 3.


42. Greenberg, British Trade, p. 213.


44. Fay, Opium War, pp. 324–38.


46. Lindsay, advertisement, in Lindsay and Gützlaff, Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China. Lindsay called them northern because they were north to Canton.

47. Hsü, ‘Secret Mission of the Lord Amherst on the China Coast, 1832’.

48. For Captain John Rees’s opium-selling trips, see JM, MS JM/C13 (June 1839–Nov 1840, Letters to the China coast); for Gützlaff’s account, see Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China, p. 159. See also Lindsay and Gützlaff, Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China, p. 100. For a general account about Rees, see Greenberg, British Trade, p. 141.


50. Ibid., pp. 190–91.


52. Ibid. See also Hsü, ‘Secret Mission of the Lord Amherst’, p. 248; for Gützlaff’s account of Ma, see Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China, p. 213.

53. Lindsay, Letter to Palmerston on British Relations with China, p. 4.

54. Lindsay, Letter to Palmerston on British Relations with China, p. 13.

55. Morse, International Relations, p. 262.

56. Martin, China, vol. 2, p. 82.

57. Register 7:52 supplement (30 Dec 1834).

58. ‘What Steps Should the Expected Strength from England Take?’ Register 8:14 (7 Apr 1835).

59. For the so-called Jardine Plan, see Chang, Commissioner Lin, pp. 191–95; Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, pp. 82–83; Fay, Opium War, pp. 190–95; and Beeching, Chinese Opium Wars, pp. 104–7.


61. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, p. 105.

62. Register 8:8 (25 Feb 1835).

63. Ibid.
64. For the Glasgow, Liverpool, and Manchester petitions, see Matheson, *Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China*, pp. 121–28. See also Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 553–69. For Liverpool’s petition, see also *Register* 9:46 (15 Nov 1836); and *Press* 2:11 (19 Nov 1836).

65. Matheson, *Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China*, p. 1. For the authorship of this pamphlet, see Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, p. 292n32, italics in original.

66. Gordon, *Address to the People of Great Britain*. Gordon’s pamphlet was published by the same publishers as Matheson’s: Smith, Elder & Co., which was Matheson’s stationary supplier in London. The pamphlet was authored by A visitor to China; the *Register* points out that it was written by George Gordon; see *Register* 9:33 (16 Aug 1836). George Gordon went to China to find out the secret of tea planting and processing. Gordon’s tea trips in 1834 and 1835 to Fujian Province were aboard the opium-selling ship of Jardine, Matheson & Co.; he was accompanied by two missionaries, Gützlaff and Stevens. For Gordon’s tea trips, see Fay, *Opium War*, p. 205.


69. Melancon, *Britain’s China Policy*, p. 41. The *Press* stated that the petition was ‘under the shield of Lady Napier to be presented to the king’, *Press* 1:1 (12 Sept 1835).

70. *Register* 9:21 (24 May 1836). The content of this article matches fully to the historical circumstances. Given the proud nature of Matheson, it would be beneath him to lie about the meeting. Thus I believe this record can be read as a faithful copy of the conversation that took place. Matheson was dubbed as C.R. (Canton Resident). Matheson probably met Palmerston around 1 August; see JM, B1/10, f. 18. For Matheson’s campaign in London, see also Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, p. 30.


72. Melancon, ‘Peaceful Intentions’. For Napier’s personal belligerent attitude, see Melancon, *Britain’s China Policy*, p. 35.


75. Fay, *Opium War*, p. 189.


77. Fay, *Opium War*, p. 192. For the East India and China Association’s petition to Palmerston, see Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 393–95.


79. JM, B6/10, L2240; see also Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 386–87. For the East India and China Association’s petition to Palmerston, see Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 393–95.


82. For Bridgman’s comment, see Repository 9:2 (May 1841), p. 296. See also Fay, Opium War, p. 210; Lindsay, Is the War with China a Just One?

83. Warren, Opium Question; Lindsay, Is the War with China a Just One?; Slade, Narrative of the Late Proceedings and Events in China; A Resident in China, Rupture with China.

84. For Jardine’s letter to Palmerston, see PRO, FO 17/35 (26, 27 October 1839). For Jardine meeting Palmerston, see JM, B6/10, L2240 and 2251. See also Le Pichon (ed.), China Trade and Empire, pp. 386–68 and 410–12; Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, p. 102; Greenberg, British Trade, pp. 168, 170, and 191–95; Beeching, Chinese Opium Wars, p. 108; Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, pp. 82–83.

85. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, p. 83. See also Chang, Commissioner Lin, p. 194; Greenberg, British Trade, p. 214; Le Pichon (ed.), China Trade and Empire, pp. 43–44n107 and 407n164.

86. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, p. 102.

87. Ibid., p. 105.


90. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, Chapters 8 and 9.

91. For Hevia’s discussion, see ‘Opium, Empire, and Modern History’, pp. 308–11. Hevia argued that the national honour argument might be plausible but it should not be taken as the major reason of the war.


93. Melancon, Britain’s China Policy, Chapters 8 and 9.

94. Ibid., p. 88.

95. Ibid, pp. 88 and 139.

96. Ibid., pp. 88–95.

97. Ibid., p. 105.

98. Fay, Opium War, p. 194; Le Pichon (ed.), China Trade and Empire, pp. 390 and 477.

99. Correspondence Relating to China.

100. House of Commons Debates, Hansard, vol. 53, pp. 669–949; See also ‘House of Commons’, The Times (8, 9, 10 Apr 1840).


102. Report from the Select Committee on the Trade with China, p. iii.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid., p. 111; Sussex Advertiser, 18 May 1840.

105. Report from the Select Committee on the Trade with China, pp. 1–36.

106. Tsang, Modern History of Hong Kong, p. 17.

107. For the treaties, see Inspector General of Customs, Treaties, Conventions, pp. 351–403.

108. For the extraterritoriality issue, see Cassel, Grounds of Judgment.

109. Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, pp. 750–51.

110. For Palmerston’s foreign policy, see ibid.

Chapter Seven

1. The only scholar who mentions in passing the anti-war movements is Melancon, in Britain’s China Policy, pp. 117–18.
4. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
16. *The Morning Post*, 10 April 1840; *London Standard*, 10 April 1840; *Morning Chronicle*, 11 April 1840; *Northern Liberator*, 11 April 1840; *Staffordshire Gazette and County Standard*, 11 April 1840; and *The Spectator*, 11 April 1840.
20. Ibid., p. 8.
24. Ibid.
25. *The Times*, 25 April 1840; *The Morning Chronicle*, 25 April 1840; *The Morning Post*, 25 April 1840; *The Examiner*, 26 April 1840; *Caledonian Mercury*, 27 April, 1840; *Dublin Evening Mail*, 27 April 1840; *Taunton Courier*, 29 April 1840; *London Standard*, 30 April 1840; *Fife Herald*, 30 April 1840; *Bradford Observer*, 30 April 1840; *Bath Chronicle and Weekly Gazette*, 30 April 1840; *Essex Standard*, 1 May 1840; *Western Times*, 2 May 1840; *The Northern Star and Leeds General Advertiser*, 2 May 1840; *Northern Star*, 2 May 1840; *Bucks Herald*, 2 May 1840; *Sheffield Independent*, 2 May 1840; *Yorkshire Gazette*, 2 May 1840; *Leeds Mercury*, 2 May 1840; *Caledonian Mercury*, 2 May 1840; *Leamington Spa Courier*, 2 May 1840; *Birmingham Journal*, 2 May 1840; *Carlisle Journal*, 2 May 1840; *Westmorland Gazette*, 9 May 1840. Soon after the meeting in Freemasons’ Hall, Earl Stanhope, in the capacity of the chairman the Total Abstinence Society of Cupar, presented his society’s petition against the war to the House of Lords, which was also published by a number of newspapers. See *London Standard*, 12 and 13 May 1840; *Morning Chronicle*, 12 May 1840; *The Morning Post*, 12 May 1840; *The Morning Post*, 13 May 1840; *Leamington Spa Courier*, 16 May 1840; *Leicester Journal*, 22 May 1840; *Blackburn Standard*, 20 May 1840; *Fife Herald*, 14 May 1840; *Chelmsford Chronicle*, 15 May 1840; *London Standard*, 16 May 1840.
Notes to pp. 132–139


27. A Resident in China, Rupture with China, p. 27.

28. London Standard, 1 January 1840 (quoted from the Morning Herald, which means it was published in the last days of 1839). This is the earliest record of the designation ‘opium war’ that I have found. It is possible that there were earlier uses of the name in the London print media.

29. The pamphlet was entitled Outlines of China, Historical, Commercial, Literary, Political and was first published as articles in The Atlas. The quotation is from Monthly Chronicle, vol. 6 (1840), p. 118; and is in The Asiatic Journal 32 (1840), p. 285.


31. The Spectator, 28 March 1840.

32. The Times, 25 April and 1 May 1840.

33. ‘War with China,’ Hansard, Deb, 7 April 1840, vol. 53, p. 716.

34. The Morning Post, 23 May 1840.

35. Leeds Times, 23 May 1840.

36. Sussex Advertiser, 11 October 1841.


38. Freeman’s Journal (Dublin), 2 December 1842, italics added.

39. The Spectator, 2 May 1840.

40. Ibid. The opium compensation issue has been argued most effectively by Peter W. Fay; see Opium War, pp. 192–95.


42. The Spectator, 2 May 1840.

43. Edmonds, Origin and Progress of the War, p. 12. See also Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, p. 129.

44. The Morning Post, 25 April 1840.

45. Freeman’s Journal, 2 December 1842.

46. Hereford Times, 3 December 1842.


49. The Morning Post, 25 April 1840.

50. St. André, ‘Sight and Sound’, p. 70.

51. For works on Jesuit mission activities, see Brockey, Journey to the East. For their perception of China and its spread in Europe, see Mungello, Curious Land. For British perceptions of China, see Marshall and Williams, Great Map of Mankind; and Markley, Far East and the English Imagination.

52. Register 7:25 (24 June 1834), italics in original.

53. These perceptions are frequently printed in the Canton Register; see, for instance, Register 3:24 (4 Dec 1830), 3:25 (18 Dec 1830), 5:15 (3 Oct 1832), 9:1 (5 Jan 1836).

54. Register 7:17 (29 Apr 1834).
60. The Catholic churchmen in the Philippines and Mexico also debated whether a war with China was a ‘just war’ given China’s refusal to convert to Christianity and trade, and its punishment of Chinese converts. See Spence, *Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci*, p. 44.
63. Staunton, *Remarks on the British Relations with China*.
64. Bingham, *Narrative of the Expedition to China*, p. 2; *Bucks Herald*, 12 November 1842.
66. *Overland Friend of China*, 23 August 1852. The author of this supplement according to Thoms was Medhurst. For John Frances Davis and Keying (Qiying 脷英)’s exchange on this, see PRO, FO 682/1979/92. See also Thoms, *The Emperor of China v. the Queen of England*, p. 32; Harris, ‘Medhurst, Sir Walter Henry (1822–1885)’.
68. Thoms, *Remarks on Rendering the Chinese Word Man ‘Barbarian’*.
69. Ibid., p. 21. Dilip Basu (in ‘Chinese Xenology and the Opium War’) accepted Thoms’s incorrect assumption, and Lydia Liu in turn, based on Dilip Basu’s research, assumed, though cautiously, that there were no complaints about the word yi or yimu before the Napier Affair (Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 48–49). In fact, there were several confrontations before 1834, as shown in Chapter 5 of this book.
70. Inspector General of Customs (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States*, p. 419.
71. For Ferrand, see Ward, W. B. *Ferrand*.
72. For Ferrand, see *Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper*, 16 January 1853; see also *A Letter to the Duchess of Sutherland and Ladies of England*.
90. ‘China, Address for Papers’, House of Commons Debates, 19 February 1861; Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate*.
100. For the relations between Opium War and Chinese nationalism, see Lovell, *Opium War*, pp. 292–332.

**Chapter Eight**

1. Fairbank has studied the transformation from Canton system to treaty ports, but he did not take into account the role of knowledge making. Thus he identified it as a modernization process of opening up the closed China; see *Trade and Diplomacy*, p. 5.
3. The seminal argument on Hoppo was in Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy*, pp. 49–50.
9. Ibid., pp. 311–12.
10. Ibid., p. 311.
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