Portugal, China and the Macau Negotiations, 1986–1999

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Introduction

This book examines how the Portuguese government negotiated the question of Macau’s retrocession with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 1980s and 1990s—primarily between 1986 and 1999. As negotiating partners interested in passive settlement, Portugal and China used Macau as a political showcase. In Portugal, the centre-right Social Democrat Party (PSD) in power (1985–1995), fierce opponent of the leftist Socialist Party (PS), was adamant to take advantage of the negotiations with the Chinese to leverage internal political support. The left’s disorganised decolonisation in Africa and subsequent withdrawal from East Timor was the catalyst for the PSD’s strategy. The 1974 Carnation Revolution, which marked the end of colonialism and authoritarian rule, was a bittersweet experience which the PSD sought to assuage. Meanwhile, the Chinese government saw Macau as part of a bigger plan for national reunification: a useful tool for summoning Taiwan to its “one country, two systems” formula.

Being a study of foreign policy set in a specific period, the focus is on inter-state relations during a negotiation process. The PRC’s more powerful position was influential and a determinant in Portugal’s behaviour and internal decision-making processes. The dynamics around the nature of the Sino-Portuguese negotiations on Macau’s reversion thus were framed asymmetrically along the lines of small versus big, weak versus strong.

Relations between states are idealised to be symmetric but influential asymmetries between the parties often occur. Studies on weak state-strong state negotiations, i.e. “negotiations in which the power resources and capabilities of the two actors are unequal” are relatively rare. Besides, traditional theories of power assume that “power implies benefits in international bargaining”, and that the stronger state wins over the weaker state. This is not always the case, as strength may be a matter of perception and power is situational. Power is not all in determining the outcome of negotiations: the weak negotiating with the strong may make some (even if minor) gain.
In theory a stronger power prevails over a weaker power but a weak power may obtain certain concessions from a great power. It was generally expected that Portugal would struggle to achieve key objectives in the negotiations over Macau’s reversion to China. This book argues that Portugal, a small and weak power, did manage to obtain some important concessions from the PRC. This demonstrates that small powers do have a certain influence on the outcome of negotiations and may obtain certain concessions from stronger powers. Then again the fact that Portugal has relatively little international influence does not mean that it is an insignificant state: it has privileged relations with Portuguese-speaking countries, for example. Moreover, the Chinese leadership, although expecting to be treated with the respect of a great power, always professed a belief in equality and fair play in negotiations.

This book argues that a weak power may obtain concessions from a strong power for two main reasons: the weaker power may have a veto power, and the stronger power may commit a faux pas. The Portuguese government had a veto that it could use during the negotiations with China—to threaten to abandon Macau and refuse to negotiate. If the Portuguese left Macau before the end of the negotiations and did not respect a date settled by the two countries, the Chinese Communist Party’s policy of national reunification would have been seriously damaged and the application of the “one country, two systems” model to Taiwan would have become more problematic. The PRC wanted to avoid this at all costs and therefore, would make concessions to the Portuguese government because of this potential veto. Moreover, China committed an error of judgment by underestimating Portugal. Due to differences in power between the two countries, the PRC was convinced that after the Hong Kong reversion, Macau would be an easy negotiation. The Portuguese government, however, did not concede some of its positions, pushing China to more intermediate decisions and to some concessions.

The outcome of the negotiations included two major concessions by the Chinese. The first was the date of the Macau handover. The PRC wanted it to be simultaneous with the Hong Kong handover, whereas Portugal preferred to keep Macau until the twenty-first century, possibly to 2007, the date of the 450th anniversary of the Portuguese presence in Macau. The Portuguese government could not get all it hoped for; the PRC had committed itself to getting Macau back before the end of the twentieth century. Portugal, nevertheless, achieved its ultimate aim. The Hong Kong and Macau handovers were two and a half years apart, not simultaneous. China made another concession over the nationality issue. The PRC agreed to respect Portuguese passports carried by the residents of Macau—albeit described as “Portuguese travel documents”.


Introduction

The first chapter provides the political background for the Macau question. It begins with a discussion of Portuguese settlement in Macau from the sixteenth century until the establishment of Sino-Portuguese relations in 1979, noting that Macau was one of the obstacles that delayed the establishment of diplomatic relations between Portugal and the PRC. The 1979 agreement was very important as it established the principles for future negotiations: the two governments first defined their positions on Macau, agreeing to not unilaterally change the status quo and that the retrocession of Macau would only be settled through negotiation. We see that the Portuguese were very confused about how to deal with Macau—a small enclave without a sense of national identity—and did not develop a strategy for settlement of the question. When China put the Macau question on the table, Portuguese diplomats were confused and had no significant expertise on contemporary Macau, making it very difficult for the Portuguese government to delineate a coherent negotiating strategy.

The second chapter looks at the early period of the Sino-Portuguese negotiations for the settlement of the Macau question from 1986 to 1987. As previously noted, Macau’s reversion to mainland China was highly influenced by the process occurring in the neighbouring colony of Hong Kong. On the one hand, Portugal was concerned that Macau got comparable treatment to that of Hong Kong but on the other hand, Portugal argued that Hong Kong and Macau were completely different cases because China had accepted a Portuguese presence in Macau over centuries and there was no formal time for the return of any part of Macau to China as was the case with the New Territories of Hong Kong in 1997.

The most contentious issues of the negotiations were the setting of the date for the transfer of Portuguese administration to the PRC and the future nationality of Macau’s inhabitants. The Chinese government wanted a simultaneous handover for Hong Kong and Macau and would not accept a Macau transfer after the end of the twentieth century, whereas the Portuguese favoured a later date for the transfer as previously mentioned. The automatic imposition before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee of the end of the twentieth century as the date for reversion of the territory was a Chinese faux pas: knowing that China was under internal pressure to finish negotiations, Portugal put issues on the negotiating table that the Chinese had no time to manoeuvre against. A particularly problematic issue was the future nationality of Macau citizens holding Portuguese passports. The Portuguese government wanted them to have dual nationality whereas China wanted them to possess Chinese nationality only, as the Chinese Constitution does not recognise dual citizenship.
The next two chapters look at the Macau transition, which took place from the entry into force of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration in 1988 to the Macau handover in late 1999. The Portuguese domestic context and the activities of the two joint commissions created in accordance with the Joint Declaration, the Sino-Portuguese Joint Liaison Group (JLG) and the Land Group (LG), are described in Chapter Three along with the three major permanent issues of the transition period: the localisation of language, civil service, and the law. The localisation of the civil service consisted of replacing Portuguese functionaries with local staff. This could not be done without the use of the Chinese language (essentially spoken Cantonese) in the civil service and at the legislative and judicial levels, as most local staff did not have a good command of Portuguese. The localisation of the law consisted in transforming Portuguese laws that were in force into an officially and practically local form for Macau.

Chapter Four discusses some sensitive issues of the transition period: the inclusion/exclusion in the Macau Basic Law of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the construction of the Macau International Airport, and issues surrounding the future and the existing funds of the Orient Foundation. The Portuguese made several mistakes when negotiating these issues. They should have negotiated the extension of the covenants to Macau during the Joint Declaration negotiations, as the United Kingdom did with Hong Kong, instead of leaving the matter to be resolved in the transition period. In the case of the Orient Foundation, the delay in agreeing to discuss the issue in the JLG’s meetings and in taking a stand led to a hardening of the Chinese position and a loss of Portugal’s power. The Portuguese, however, were able to take advantage of reactions to the Tiananmen incident to better negotiate important concessions in the construction of the airport.

In sum, Portugal employed a low-key, non-confrontational strategy in the Macau negotiations, allowing China to control the pace of the talks. This consensual strategy was in part the result of Portugal’s domestic political context. Divisions amongst political leaders and poorly prepared negotiators resulted in a lack of resolve to get the best benefits for Macau and for Portugal. Diplomats were poorly trained as a result of the institutional organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the shortage of human resources does not allow a permanent specialization on specific issues or regions and a serious preparation before the start of a new post. Diplomats usually move to a completely different country just when they are gathering expertise on their post. The result was the
absence of experienced and prepared negotiators and the lack of a specialised department on Macau.

On the political side, the Portuguese took positions that limited the possibility for developing their own strategy for Macau upon China. The question over Macau’s future status was greatly complicated by conflicts in Portugal over responsibility for negotiating with China. Due to the double tutelage system, negotiators received from the government contradictory orders to those given by the president to the governor. Basically Lisbon tried to ensure that Macau’s treatment was not worse than that of Hong Kong. Despite this, Portugal managed to extract some concessions in the negotiation process based upon China’s worries about their international image and Taiwan. After the withdrawal, Portugal generally expunged Macau from its political agenda, unlike the UK, which retained a presence in Hong Kong after handover of the colony in 1997.
1

The Ambiguity over the Future of Macau

Long before the negotiations about the future of Macau started, a cloud of precariousness hovered for a number of centuries over Portugal’s presence in a small peninsula, offset by fluctuations in Chinese power. It was probably out of sheer short-sightedness that Portugal did not legitimise its presence in Macau, believing that the friendly relations it enjoyed with China would remain in the long run despite its fragile presence in the territory. In more recent times, a notion of historical shared sovereignty and the vaguely worded Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration of 1987 meant that Portugal and the PRC accepted the principle that both had jurisdictional rights in Macau. This scenario served to reinforce Portugal’s undetermined position in Macau.

The Portuguese established themselves in Macau during the sixteenth century and remained there for four centuries through shared sovereignty. From the first Portuguese settlement until the signature of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration in 1987, Portugal conformed to the rules imposed by China with a few exceptions. One occurred in 1783 when Portugal declared the right of sovereignty over Macau with both countries sharing equal sovereignty over the territory. Then in 1849, Governor Ferreira do Amaral succeeded imposing de facto Portuguese sovereignty over the territory, leaving China with limited powers. However, the 1862 Treaty of Friendship and Trade that appeared to shift the balance of power in Portugal’s favour faltered. It was never ratified. Macau legally was not considered Portuguese territory. Territorial legitimacy was based on a loose system of values, riding on interests of economic and political significance.

In 1887 the two countries signed the Lisbon Protocol and the Treaty of Friendship and Trade, giving Portugal the same privileges and immunities that a number of other foreign countries enjoyed within China. This remained the status until 1949, the year that marked the termination of diplomatic relations with establishment of the PRC. The Portuguese right-wing regime refused to recognise the legitimacy of the PRC. This
situation was bypassed through the establishment of unofficial channels bridged by Macau Chinese acting as de facto intermediaries. It was not until 1976 that the Portuguese Constitution and the *Estatuto Orgânico de Macau* (Macau Organic Law) made decisive changes to Macau’s legal status, defining it as territory under Portuguese administration. At the same time, China regained some of its powers of sovereignty over Macau. During the transition period (1988–1999) the two countries shared again a degree of sovereignty over Macau.

After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Portugal and China were bound by mutual interests that both enjoyed in Macau. For the Portuguese, Macau had symbolic meaning, strategically aligned to myths of imperial prominence and cultural largesse. Portuguese colonialism was sustained on these grounds. The status quo in Macau subsisted to pay lip service to Portugal’s past world-leading role. On the other hand, rational China, keen to keep the status quo in Macau at that time, sought to undermine Portugal’s administration of the enclave to facilitate its subservience to the PRC’s will.

Historically Macau served as a gateway of communication with the West; an important commercial hub serving as an outlet for Chinese goods and an invaluable source of foreign exchange. For example, during the Korean War (1950–1953) the PRC used Macau as a bridge to break the blockade imposed on it by the West. In fact, Macau was de jure administered by Portugal but de facto controlled by China, giving the impression that Portugal had nominal status vis-à-vis mainland China.

Decolonisation of the African possessions in 1974 resulted in Portugal’s political system undergoing significant change. By 1975 the new Portuguese regime had withdrawn entirely from Africa and East Timor, which had a bearing on how Portugal viewed its role in Macau: complacent and disinterested. In fact Portugal feared further embarrassment by keeping Macau, in the context of the decolonisation of its possessions in Africa. Portugal’s nonchalant attitude annoyed the PRC as it intended to maintain the status quo in Macau—reasoning based on a number of considerations including the safeguarding of Hong Kong’s stability and keeping both territories as pathways open to trade and contact with the West.

Finally in 1979 a new leftist regime in Portugal re-established diplomatic relations with the PRC after a prolonged stalemate, by signing a secret agreement in which Portugal agreed to accept China’s sovereignty over Macau. This agreement, known as the *Acta Secreta* (Secret Memorandum), was signed simultaneously with the joint communiqué, establishing bilateral relations. In the *Acta Secreta*, Portugal accepted China’s view of Macau as “territory under Portuguese administration”. Portugal also gave China carte blanche to set an appropriate date for negotiations to settle the status of Macau.
Both Portugal and the PRC were aware that a negotiated settlement of Macau would have to happen eventually but for strategic, circumstantial and political reasons put it off. This state of denial would finally come to a halt with China’s growing international predominance beginning in the late 1970s, and the simultaneous decline of Portugal enhanced by a decolonisation experience in Africa and ensuing economic crisis at home. This situation carved deep wounds in the Portuguese and later underpinned Portugal’s modus operandi during the negotiation process of Macau. Portuguese negotiators knew that they were the weaker partner not just from a psychological perspective but also economically and politically, dampening their chances at a steadfast settlement, even though Portugal was determined to secure an honourable withdrawal from Macau.10

The Political Background to the “Macau Question”

The Chinese and Portuguese both hail back to historical greatness in constructing their world views. We need to learn how a degree of ambiguity came to exist around the status of the territory, beginning with the arrival of the Portuguese, and how this status was partially resolved in the late nineteenth century. We also must remember that the status of Macau remained unclear when compared to neighbouring Hong Kong vis-à-vis powers of administration conferred on the UK. Moreover, both Macau and Hong Kong were cases of retrocession, and not decolonization. Conceptually, by retrocession we mean situations in which the administering power withdraws but the enclave does not have the right to self-determination, while citizens of decolonized territories can decide upon their future through vote. This section will present other cases of retrocession experienced by China, providing an historical context to understand the case of Macau.

The year 1513 most likely marked the arrival of Portuguese sailors at the Zhu (Pearl) River estuary, and the beginning of a system of fruitful exchanges with the mainland. After a period of defiance faced by a Portuguese mission who aspired to meet the Chinese emperor, a meeting was eventually allowed. Occurring in Beijing in 1520, the meeting was doomed at the outset due to the emperor’s sense of indignation, arising from a letter written by the Portuguese king, interpreted as discourteous due to its assumption of equal treatment. According to the Chinese emperor, the Portuguese king could by no means be considered an “equal”. From his standpoint there could be no other authority superior than the emperor himself. In 1522, another attempt on the part of the Portuguese to establish relations with China failed. A number of attacks on the Portuguese fleet followed. The Portuguese king immediately
suspended official missions to China, even though on the ground the reality was different. Trade relations between Portuguese and Chinese merchants flourished unabated.\textsuperscript{11}

When the Ming dynasty cut off trade with Japan in 1523, the traffic of smuggled goods grew with Portuguese sailors acting as middlemen between Chinese and Japanese traders. The Portuguese acted as middlemen in most business interactions, where Chinese silk and Japanese copper and silver were concerned, which they sold interchangeably between the two countries. These transactions were highly lucrative for the Portuguese as well as Chinese and Japanese merchants. Chinese authorities turned a blind eye to this well-established illegal maritime trade.\textsuperscript{12}

At first, these commercial transactions occurred at sea, but with the permanent growing settlement of Portuguese merchants in a number of locations in the Zhu (Pearl) River delta, business exchanges moved inland, fostering trade and tenure. Due to its strategic position, Macau gradually gained favour with the Portuguese merchants who occupied the enclave. In 1553, the mandarin of Macau authorised the Portuguese to build provisory tents in order to facilitate business activities. Until then it was customary for the Portuguese to put up the tents only to secure temporary residence until merchants set sail at the end of every trading season between the months of November and May. From 1557 onwards the traders erected wooden and stone houses, instituting Portuguese permanent settlement in Macau.\textsuperscript{13} Macau evolved rapidly from a small community of traders to a politically organised society. By 1583, the enclave had a municipal government with a distinctive administrative model, the Senate Council, later called the Loyal Senate (\textit{Leal Senado}).\textsuperscript{14} Administratively Macau was organised differently from other Portuguese regions, in that the Senate did not pay \textit{foro do chão} (ground-rent) to the Portuguese king but to the local Chinese authorities. Apparently, since 1573 a number of inhabitants in Macau had resorted to the use of bribes to pay annual rent to Chinese officials, valued at 500 taels (Chinese silver weight) and custom duties, worth 20,000 taels.\textsuperscript{15}

In order to control its borders, China later built the \textit{Porta do Cerco} (Barrier Gate), a garrisoned wall along the isthmus, from where Chinese troops controlled the trans-border flow of people and goods.\textsuperscript{16} The annual payments of rent and all boundary delimitations showed both the Portuguese subsidiary position to the Ming dynasty and China’s tacit acceptance of Macau’s \textit{de facto} foreign occupation.

In 1688, the Chinese built a customhouse in Macau. This structure was intended to limit the powers of the Portuguese governor in the enclave.\textsuperscript{17} Throughout this period, Portuguese settlers were recognised as informal residents but were not considered legal permanent residents
by the Ming dynasty. This situation persisted until 1783. At that time, the Portuguese administration began to find the non-permanent status of the Portuguese in the enclave objectionable. This sentiment deepened after apparent Chinese overtures in Macau. In counter-defence the Providências Régias (Regal Providences) claimed that the Portuguese had equal or a greater stake in the sovereignty of Macau. This was done to reinforce Portugal’s jurisdiction in the territory and hopefully immobilise Chinese advances. The governor used his position of authority in the Senate to reinforce his powers and to push Chinese advances back. Later in 1822, Macau was given the status of constituent of Portuguese territory under the Portuguese Constitution.

From the second half of the nineteenth century, foreign powers with interests in China pressurised the two sides to clarify Macau’s political standing. China and Portugal, facing international decline at the time, were particularly impressionable to these external demands. The first “opium war” (1839–1842) broke China’s unprecedented isolation, setting the tone for negotiations with foreign countries. On the back of the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) and the cession of Hong Kong to the British Crown, China’s grip was loosened in Hong Kong, facilitating the way for Governor Ferreira do Amaral to declare Portugal’s de facto sovereignty over Macau in 1849. With this declaration, the Chinese mandarin of Macau lost important functions and later abandoned the enclave. Subsequently, Macau was declared a free port. The customhouse of 1688, which was for the Portuguese a symbol of China’s disparate predominance in the area, was abolished.

In 1862, Portugal signed the first Treaty of Friendship and Trade with China, an unprecedented attempt to moderate political tensions between the two sides through the promotion of financial and economic aspects of their relationship. The Treaty also defined Macau’s political and juridical statute, although it did not mention the issue of Portuguese sovereignty. Moreover, China did not ratify it. For the Portuguese, having a non-ratified treaty represented a kind of “blessing in disguise”. Without an official endorsement, the Portuguese could buy time to explore other options and prepare a more favourable alternative agreement. Pushed by Britain, China negotiated with Portugal Macau’s cooperation to control the smuggling of opium in the region. Portugal interpreted this as a relaxation of China’s grip on the enclave. In the face of this apparent weakness, Portugal launched new demands on China to push it into a new treaty where recognition of Portugal’s limited sovereignty over Macau would be sought.

China recognised the “perpetual occupation and government of Macau and its dependencies by Portugal” in Article 2 of the Lisbon Protocol of March 1887 and reiterated it in Article 2 of the Treaty of
Friendship and Trade signed in Beijing in December 1887 and finally ratified in April 1888. Portugal also stood to win from a number of privileges conferred on countries to which mainland China gave preferential treatment. But the definition of Macau’s borders remained unresolved.23

The beginning of the twentieth century marked a new dawn for Portugal and China, with the establishment of republican regimes in both countries. The Portuguese Republic was founded in 1910, while the Republic of China followed one year later. This new dawn also brought with it changes in the context of their relations over Macau. A growing nationalist movement in China voiced disapproval over the 1887 Treaty of Friendship and Trade, questioning its validity. This served to strengthen the original position that the mandarins in Beijing and Guangzhou had on the issue of Macau’s sovereignty, stating vehemently that Macau was Chinese territory under Portuguese occupation.24

These contentions manifested themselves in the unresolved topic of Macau’s borders. From China’s perspective Portugal’s extraterritorial ambitions had to be abated whilst Portugal, intent on sustaining the status quo, had concerns about enhancing its position in the territory.25 After the 1928 Treaty of Nanjing, abolishing Portuguese consular jurisdiction in Chinese territory, it looked as if China had at last the upper hand in Macau. China believed that it was closer than ever to realising its aims for Macau.26

From the 1920s through the 1930s, after a prolonged period of granting territory to foreign powers, China enjoyed renewed confidence with the retrocession of some of these concessions. A number of “unequal treaties”27 to which China had been subjected in the past compelled it to lease a significant number of territorial concessions to Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan as well as other countries, enabling them to enjoy privileged positions in China.28 Britain led the pack in number and influence. During the First World War, the UK had added the Crown colony of Hong Kong, as well as concessions in Xiamen, Jinjiang, Jiujiang, Hankou and Tianjin. Britain also dominated the International Settlement of Shanghai and the entire Yangzi valley.29

At the Versailles conference in 1919, following the end of the First World War, China’s attempts failed at dissolving the system, which held its territories hostage to foreign control.30 Between 1918 and 1920 China became a member of the wider “international society” (as understood by the “English School” of international relations), by accepting international rules and norms.31 China had hoped to use its new status to leverage international support for its lost territories through a process of treaty revisions but came to realise that any amendment at this level required significant bilateral negotiation.32 At home, Chinese sentiment for reversion grew on the back of an anti-imperialist Chinese nationalism
(from 1923 to 1928) reinforcing these claims. Foreign perpetuators were given the label of “enemies of the Chinese people”.33 Having support internally was an important advantage psychologically but the Chinese would only reap rewards later.

Britain’s role of international protagonist on the world stage appealed to China’s hunger for power and need to “settle scores” with imperialist Britain. Anti-British agitation first broke out in Shanghai and the rest of the Chang (Yangzi) River Valley, followed by an organised strike in the foreign concession of Xiamen. Hong Kong had boycotts by local Chinese from July 1925 to October 1926. The movement aimed to put an end to foreign domination.34 These occurrences had a determining effect in the future status quo of the foreign concessions, beginning with the peaceful retrocession of the Hankou concession to China.35

This wave of pro-Chinese nationalism also reached the British enclave of Weihaiwei in Shandong, in the 1920s. The Weihaiwei case not only provides an interesting background for the understanding of retrocession in China, but sheds some light in the importance of Hong Kong for the British, as it had been leased to Britain by China in 1898, along with the New Territories of Hong Kong.36 Although the arrangements for the two leaseholds were practically identical, Britain was far more committed to the New Territories than it was to Weihaiwei. While the inhabitants of the New Territories were given British citizenship, the subjects of Weihaiwei remained Chinese citizens: it had been a conscious British decision to differentiate between the Crown colony of Hong Kong-New Territories and Weihaiwei along citizenship and benefit lines. In short Britain sought a better stature for the former and, after a protracted negotiation process, Weihaiwei was redeemed in 1930.37 Fearing an anti-British backlash, the British were happy to leave the colony, a process that was simplified further as Weihaiwei had in effect lost much of its value for Britain.38

China snubbed the idea of differences between the various foreign concessions, on grounds that these were of equal importance irrespective of size, economic or financial stature. They argued that the treaties, into which China was coerced, were unequal and that the restoration of sovereignty over these foreign concessions was inevitable. Through progressive negotiation, China succeeded in recovering most concessions by the early 1930s.39 Hong Kong and Macau would continue under foreign administration. However, with the capitulation of Japan in 1945, China took a decisive step forward, requesting that Portugal end consular extraterritoriality in Macau. This meant:

the extension of the jurisdiction of a state behind its borders, implying the existence of certain rights, privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of a state within the limits of
other state, exempt from local jurisdiction and exclusively subjected to the laws and judicial administration of the respective state.40

In 1947 Portugal and China held a meeting to discuss Portugal’s relinquishment of consular jurisdiction. The minutes of the meeting shaped the content of the notes that resulted in “Portugal renouncing its rights relating to consular jurisdiction in China”.41 Those notes were meant to mark the culmination of the end of extraterritoriality in China already experienced by foreign countries.42 During the negotiations both sides resorted to a process of “give and take”. China decided to abandon a clause relating to the Macau question in order to lure Portugal to agree with another clause in the agreement that “Portuguese citizens are subject to the law and jurisdiction of Chinese courts”. Thus, the notes did not mention the status of sovereignty.43 By the mid-1940s, against the background of a tenuous civil war on home ground between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, China abandoned its claims on Macau for the time being.44

The CCP proclaimed the PRC on 1 October 1949. For the next couple of years, China’s focus would remain internal. The PRC sought to maintain the status quo of Macau and Hong Kong.45 The decision was based on pragmatism induced primarily by economic motives: it was fundamental to keep the two enclaves as they stood, i.e. neutral territories, as leverage to break the blockade imposed by the West while concurrently keeping the Soviet Union at arm’s length.46 It was not until the mid-1970s that the pending issue of Hong Kong assumed relevance once more. Naturally Macau assumed relevance in tandem with Hong Kong.

The Chinese Communist regime did not seek to remain completely isolated from international affairs, although it sought to retain some distance from imperialist and fascist nations. At some point the mainland would be required to resolve the issue of the remaining foreign concessions. With this in mind, the PRC developed a strategy, as a “warm up” exercise. To gauge Portuguese receptivity, the PRC made two attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Portugal: October 1949 and 1954 (after the Geneva Conference), but António Oliveira Salazar’s regime opposed China’s overtures. This had a decisive impact on the manner in which the mainland broached the Portuguese in impending dealings. In 1950 the PRC started to break away slowly from its erstwhile international isolation, reinforced by the recognition of four North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members: the UK, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. This recognition set the tone for initiating a paradigm shift in the West, but the stubbornness of the Portuguese dictator allied with strong pressures within the regime and from the United States prevented this from happening.47
In spite of Portugal’s stance, the PRC did not apply strong pressure to establish relations with Portugal because the Chinese recognized that they had de facto control over Macau. The PRC relied increasingly on the traditional associations in the enclave with which it maintained strong links and through which it exerted influence. An example of this tacit approach was the use of Macau to obtain Western military equipment during the blockade on China during the Korean War and to teach Portuguese language and culture to Chinese officials sent to influence the liberation movements in the Portuguese Africa.48

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s Portugal and the PRC did not have de jure relations, although they seemingly had good de facto relations. This had a positive overall impact on Macau. Before the formalisation of diplomatic relations in 1979, the Chinese elite in the enclave de facto managed affairs. On the other hand, the Portuguese government used political co-option to attract local elements to the administrative structure, as emissaries. These envoys, responsible for the exchange of information between Portugal and China, were the most influential political actors in Macau.49

Despite satisfactory Sino-Portuguese de facto relations, China considered the Portuguese presence in Macau illegitimate and ambiguous. The Chinese official position on Macau at the time was that: the Lisbon Protocol of 1887 had been an unequal treaty that had lost its validity; Macau’s territorial status was one of “perpetual occupation” differing from “situations of annexation, concession or lease”; and it was a “question pending” inherited from the past, which “should be settled peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be maintained”.50

Portugal’s presence in the enclave grew in prominence, against the backdrop of rising internal discontentment. In 1952 a number of confrontations between the Portuguese and Chinese troops on guard51 at the Porta do Cerco broke out, suggesting it was the dawn of resolving the question of Macau’s administrative future. Later in 1955, through the use of a “stick” in stark contrast to the familiar “carrot” approach, the PRC prevented the Portuguese authorities from organising the fourth centenary celebrations of Portuguese presence in the territory. At the time, the PRC made the first public declaration on Macau, warning the Portuguese authorities that it would not accept much longer the occupation of the enclave.52

With the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, the Portuguese obtained a respite from Chinese attempts to bring about a swift conclusion to the question of Macau. The social unrest in Macau coincided with instability in the mainland, peaking with the “1, 2, 3” incident. It was given that name as it had taken place on 3 December (in Chinese 12, 3). The
Portuguese refused to issue permission for the building of a “patriotic” (communist) school on Taipa Island, which led to a violent confrontation between the Macau police and Maoists, resulting in martial law being declared in the territory.\textsuperscript{53} Internationally the press concluded that in effect the Portuguese government was beginning to show signs of lassitude in Macau and that they would surrender next. The reality was somewhat different.

Surrendering Macau was not an option for Salazar. Keeping Macau was considered less humiliating. Governor Nobre de Carvalho set out to undertake damage control and agreed to a “twofold agreement” with two parties, underestimating the consequences they carried for Portugal. Agreements were signed with the “people of Macau” and the Guangdong authorities. The agreements turned out to be extremely humiliating for the Portuguese, setting strict limits on the powers of the governor while the representatives of Beijing gained greater control of the territory.\textsuperscript{54} Portugal’s discomfort in the enclave became more apparent as one of the conditions that China imposed was the exhaustive fulfilment of a note that the government of Macau had published in the press in 1963 in which it:

\begin{quote}
will not tolerate subversive activities towards China based from Macau. Anyone found implicated in these activities will be prosecuted and handed over to the Chinese People’s Republic authorities.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

In the end the “1, 2, 3” episode had irrevocable consequences for Macau: Portugal recognised \textit{de facto} Macau as a Chinese territory, marking the end of the Portuguese power over it.\textsuperscript{56} It is arguable that the Portuguese government could have threatened to leave Macau and get a better deal with China, as Mao’s regime intended to maintain the \textit{status quo}: soon after “1, 2, 3”, China declared that Taiwan was the priority, and only after recovering Taiwan would the PRC claim Macau and Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{57}

At this point in time, we see a lack of finesse on the part of the Portuguese. The Portuguese government could have threatened to leave or simply left and in doing so could have pushed China into an advantageous deal for the Portuguese in Macau. The time factor was an important one that Portugal undervalued. Given that the retrocession of Macau was inevitable, Portugal could have used its trump cards at decisive moments, as in this case. It could have benefitted by drawing upon Mao’s intentions to keep the \textit{status quo} even after “1, 2, 3”, which culminated with the declaration that Taiwan and not Hong Kong or Macau was a priority for the mainland (and only after recovering Taiwan did the PRC intend to take over Macau and Hong Kong).
The Chinese continued support for the liberation movements in Portuguese colonies, except, ironically, Macau, led them to make public declarations against Portuguese colonialism. By 1971, after replacing Taiwan as the representative of China in the United Nations (UN), the PRC declared that the settlement of the question of Macau and Hong Kong was “entirely within China’s sovereignty rights” and justifiable by the inequity of treaties that in effect bestowed rights and guarantees on Portugal to the detriment of China. The PRC argued that these enclaves did not “fall within the ordinary category of ‘colonial territories’” requesting that they be removed from the UN list of colonised territories. The request was granted during the meeting of the Special Committee on Decolonization on 17 May 1972.

The PRC could gain from UN entry both doctrinally and pragmatically in relation to their position on Macau. The PRC was able to validate internationally its position on why it viewed the treaties related to Macau as unequal. It argued that: the guarantees provided by the perpetual occupation of Portugal in Macau, instituted in the 1887 Protocol, was the result of an unequal imposition of imperialism, and therefore null and void; Macau was “Chinese territory ‘occupied’ by Portuguese authorities”; and that China had the right to exercise full sovereignty over Macau as the Portuguese retained their presence exclusively at the will of China. At the same time, the mainland attempted to contain the censuring voices of countries, such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), that questioned China’s contradictory behaviour on the world stage. On one hand China supported liberation movements in the Third World. On the other hand it approved of existing autonomous regions that bordered on illegitimate/authoritarian governance in Hong Kong and Macau.

From a pragmatic viewpoint, the PRC took the decision to prepare the groundwork for the eventual re-integration of the two enclaves into China, seeking to deprive them of the means to self-determination. By avoiding a potential process of internationalisation from transpiring in the two enclaves, China believed that it could restrict the issue to Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese bilateral relations, curtailing interference from third parties within the traditional preference for bilaterality rather than multilaterality. In the end, the PRC succeeded at sustaining the status quo of Hong Kong and Macau until settlement was sorted through bilateral channels. Bilateral negotiations began when the PRC felt that the time was ripe.

In Portugal the sentiment was similar to that of the Chinese in that the Portuguese felt the Macau question should not be settled within the UN. They agreed also with the Chinese that the UN should not list Macau as a colonial territory. They may have agreed in essence with one another
but the motives were very different, demarcating stark contrasts in definition and strategy. The two countries regarded Macau as an extended territory; for the Portuguese it was an Overseas Province; for the Chinese it was a part of China. Under international law, both countries recognised that the UN could not intervene in Macau, as Macau fell under the territorial legitimacy of internationally recognised nation states.62

**Portuguese Withdrawal from Empire**

The rapid return of the majority of Portuguese from a number of colonies was a harrowing experience, a bleeding wound which had a profound impact on the country’s domestic and foreign consciousness. These events brought with them a cloud of destitution that hovered in the country for some time to come. The decolonisation experience was psychologically and politically traumatic for Portugal. It is against this background that the Portuguese leaders conducted negotiations with China over Macau. The far-reaching effects of the abrupt withdrawal from empire were felt at every stage of the negotiations, mapping the way forward—uneventful and lacklustre. The Portuguese right (who kick-started the negotiation process) developed a strategy for the negotiations on the basis of fear, preventing at all costs another traumatic experience. Under this constraining environment Portugal gained less and lost more. The fear factor was counterproductive and self-destructive, constricting Portugal to calculated and risk-free moves. On the contrary China attempted to make significant use of Portugal’s fragilities, which gave it in effect the upper hand in the negotiations.

By the mid-twentieth century, Portugal was arguably the oldest European empire, dating to the fifteenth century. The commercial empire it had in the Orient collapsed at the beginning of the seventeenth century but ambitious politicians and colonial ideologues longed for a return of Portugal’s greatness, rooted in successful expeditions that opened exotic lands and sources of wealth. The motivation to keep this memory alive sustained Portugal’s desire for India, Timor and Macau, regions in which it had a presence.

The second imperial construction had been in Brazil, lasting until 1822, even though Portugal exerted a level of influence there until the economic recession of the 1930s. The third imperial epicentre had been in Africa—Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe. Although well into decline by the nineteenth century, Portugal managed to revive its claims in Africa during the European scramble for the continent at the end of the century.63

The colony or victim of a dominant power co-existed in a relationship of *colonised* host versus *colonising* parasite. By definition a colony is “a
domination imposed by an external political power . . . with a tendency to subordinate the resources and institutions of the dependent region to the interests of the political power and the ethnic or cultural dominant group”, whilst decolonisation refers to the “measures intended eventually to terminate formal political control over colonial territories and to replace it by some new relationship”. European powers, including Portugal, claimed it a European responsibility to aid ‘inferior’ peoples to achieve higher levels of development.

Between the First and Second World Wars, there were two basic models of colonialism. European colonial powers more or less followed either the British model of autonomy or the French model of assimilation. Assimilation derived from the common belief in France that the “natives” would assimilate French culture and language until they became French citizens, ultimately represented in the French parliament. France claimed to have a special mission civilisatrice, a mission to civilise the indigenous peoples widely believed too primitive to rule themselves but capable of being uplifted.

Britain conceived its empire along devolution lines. It sought non-interference in local affairs, while France was more interventionist, which resulted in a greater predisposition to fight for its colonies. The French government believed in principles of equality and equity, although it gravitated towards a centralised administration. British counterparts preferred decentralised rule, equipping the locals for the task of governance. Unlike France, Britain understood that empire had a temporal limit: independence was inevitable, a component part of its anatomy. The intention to transform the colonial subjects into British citizens was virtually non-existent, focussing more on developing capabilities for self-rule.

Portugal was influenced heavily by the French model, a reality that peaked with the arrival of António Oliveira Salazar as the new Portuguese prime minister in July 1932. The Estado Novo (New State), the ideology of Salazar’s rule, set out to establish new rules and objectives on which overseas policy was based, emulating the French colonial model as the prototype for its colonial policy at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Portuguese colonial system was characteristically centralised, administratively autonomous and culturally assimilative, with the exception of Macau and Timor. Through a kind of cross-pollination approach, the Portuguese nominally foresaw the beginning of a new civilisation for its colonies with native characteristics, composed of Portuguese citizens with equal duties and rights of other citizens.

Like the French, the Portuguese government declared its relationship with its colonies special and the government of the empire was in essence authoritarian, centralising the administrative apparatus in
the metropolis. The *Acto Colonial* (Colonial Act), published in 1930, masked this reality, seeking to unify the colonial administration under centralised rule with "moderate autonomy".

After the Second World War, European powers faced semi-forced removal from their colonies, officially bringing imperialism to an abrupt end on the African continent, with Portugal essentially remaining the odd one out. Scholars found different reasons for this transformation, ranging from allegations around European declining military power to the impact of public opinion on domestic policy in most colonial powers, calling for more pro-activity in the development policies of colonial regions. At the same time, new normative values rose up around the world, questioning the viability and validity of colonialism, underlining the exploitative and oppressive aspects of the system.

By 1960 anti-colonialism had become the new catchword, encapsulated in the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The right of all people in colonial dependencies to self-determination was claimed, condemning at the same time every kind of pretext that delayed the independence movements.

These calls were ignored by the Portuguese, resolute on keeping its colonies that nominally were considered Portuguese provinces. Lisbon also played its neutrality trump card, rejecting the transformations internationally as products of the post-Second World War period. Portugal’s attitude was one of general apathy with which it regarded these worldly events, facilitated by a number of existing situations. The combination of a number of factors, i.e. the invitation to participate in the Marshall plan, the Portuguese-British alliance, and Portugal’s admittance into NATO (thanks to the use of the Azores as an air base by the Allies during and after the war), assured the Portuguese government international recognition. This in effect carried forward the Portuguese colonial system in the African continent without Portugal feeling the pressure to initiate decolonisation.

There are a number of explanations for Portugal’s rebuffing of the idea to consider decolonisation seriously. Some authors consider that, as a poor capitalist country, Portugal’s need for external markets and foreign exchange (to fight the balance of payments crisis) superseded the inescapable necessity to decolonise sooner rather than later. Considering that the Portuguese colonies carried significant economic weight and that it was not only about prestige, they argue that the colonies were preferential markets and sources of cheap raw materials, allowing Portugal to create and save foreign exchange. According to this argument, Lisbon had a lot to gain from exploitation of the colonies.
natural resources. At the time it would not make economic or financial sense to embark on neo-colonialism. Other theorists think that the idea that supports notions of Portugal’s backwardness in relation to colonies is nonsensical. For example, it could be that the costs of maintaining colonial administrations led some imperial powers to get out of formal colonialism. Franco Nogueira, Portuguese foreign minister at the time, mentioned the emergence of a new type of colonialism with economic or ideological basis that dominated growing areas in Africa after the chaos. After all, one could take down the flag, reduce administrative costs and still largely exploit a former colony through control of local elites. The reasoning behind this idea would be the belief that had Portugal decolonised in the 1950s, it would have had the means to exercise neo-colonial influence and more to gain in its former formal colonies. This argument deduced that the colonies sustained economically the metropolis and not the other way around.

From the 1950s onwards the international economic environment showed signs of undergoing transformation, spilling into a number of domestic settings, agitating the foundations of this theory. By the 1960s Portugal had started to invest more in Europe. France and the United States and not Africa became attractive destinations for the escaping Portuguese émigré. The outflow of people had a parallel effect on the commercial arrangements Portugal enjoyed with Africa, perceived to be beneficial and affluent. In reality the empire showed signs of financial fatigue; the colonies, it turned out, had become a burden to the metropolis’ public finances and an obstacle to Portuguese integration in Europe. By the early 1970s, the trade balance between Portugal and the world tilted in Europe’s favour, whilst the colonies constituted a smaller share in the overall balance, and African colonies were no longer exclusive resources of foreign currency, surpassed by the exponential growth of the tourism sector in Portugal and emigrant remittances.

For Portugal, the colonies held the importance of an award, holding subdued prestige and political status and not necessarily economic value. The colonial war had seemingly been fought “to preserve the regime rather than to save the economy.” It is widely believed in Portugal that the Estado Novo commitment to the empire was more political than economic and that the psychological repercussions of a Portuguese withdrawal would surpass the costs involved in sustaining a diminishing empire. The importance of this symbolical and psychological dimension later framed Portugal’s approach regarding withdrawal from Macau, perceived by Portuguese politicians as a sensitive issue in their domestic political agenda.
Salazar used nationalism and myths of imperial greatness to harness social support with social and political homogeneity, factors which had given him initially the reins of power. Salazar intelligently used these props to reinforce his position domestically, consolidating further his grip on power. The Portuguese bought into the ideals of a “single Portugal” composed of a mainland and colonies. It was not until the end of the 1960s that opposition to Salazar’s policies began to be felt at home.

Salazar also appeared to consolidate his power internationally, namely in the UN. The *Estado Novo* argued that Portugal’s reasons for colonialism stood apart from the economically motivated British and the Belgians. The Portuguese government argued that Portugal was driven by a universal mission that aimed at civilising the natives in Lusophone Africa. Unmotivated by issues of control and power struggles over matters of territory, its concern was one of a humanitarian order, a duty towards the colonial people which the international community should consider earnestly. According to Franco Nogueira:

> ... without the support of an European united Portugal, without strong bonds connecting the whole nation, it was difficult to maintain in Africa a multi-racial society and any of its ethnic groups should expect to subsist in peace and progress after breaking those bonds. ... And when we are told that we have no techniques, no means, no instruments, we reply that our provinces in Africa are more progressive and developed in all domains than any other recently independent African territory in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The *Estado Novo* used the “lusotropic” theories of the Brazilian sociologist, Gilberto Freyre’s to seize the moment. Freyre argued:

> ... no other European was ever so intense and symbiotic in its constancies in different tropical areas”; The Portuguese people have a “deeper, more intimate, more constant, more emphatic” experience and knowledge of the tropics than any other European coloniser of the warm lands.

Lusotropicology was meant to explain how the efforts on the part of the Portuguese served to integrate colonised peoples in Brazil, through a process of cross-pollination, resulting in the creation of a new civilization in the form of mestíços (people of mixed race). It was applied to Portuguese-speaking Africa but not to Timor and Macau—these territories were not even included in Freyre’s visit to Portuguese colonies in August 1951, organized by the *Estado Novo*.

Demographic results attempting to prove this loose theory, which could almost have as easily applied to Spanish colonial America, were inconclusive, failing to demonstrate that this “racially blind” doctrine
had ever taken place. Further Portuguese claims of racial toleration and miscegenation in the tropics were flawed, failing to prevent discrimination from occurring on the ground. However, the idea that Portugal had nobler intentions than Britain, for example, and that Portuguese people are less racist than other Europeans, are still part of domestic politics and public culture; even “anti-colonial” Portuguese believe in lusotropicalism.

The Acto Colonial of 1951 gave birth to the nominal expression “overseas provinces”, putting an end to the term “colonial empire” as to avoid the negative repercussions of growing international antipathy towards colonial empires, from permeating the domestic front. The idea the Portuguese had was that the overseas empire would remain indefinitely a part of Portuguese reality. So when Portugal faced disapproval at the United Nations in 1956 for its continued presence in Africa, the candid reply given by the Portuguese government was that Portugal “does not administer Territories which fall under the category indicated by Article 73” of the Declaration Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories which bound colonial powers to develop “self-government” and “free political institutions” in the colonies. In short the Portuguese government considered Chapter XI inapplicable to its circumstances and resultantly not bound by it as: “[Portugal] is, and always has been, a unitary state, regardless of the relative geographic situation of its various provinces”.

Notwithstanding, social instability, which emerged in the mid-1950s and increased with the colonial war since early 1960s, had peaked in Portugal’s African colonies by early 1970s, exacerbated by the Nationalist agitation in Asia and other parts of Africa in spite of efforts by the Estado Novo to isolate these incidents. The belief that Portugal was protected from such incidents, which the expression “overseas territories” skilfully defended, paralysed the regime politically. Portugal had by every criterion the means to decolonise, hold democratic elections or negotiate with leaders of the liberation movements in time to prevent a catastrophic withdrawal in Africa. By the time Marcelo Caetano took over from Salazar in 1968 it was already too late.

If Portugal had accepted the inevitability of decolonisation, negotiated a withdrawal or prepared the colonies for self-rule earlier, it could have mitigated the side effects of decolonisation. From an economic and social point of view, the return of several hundreds of thousands of Portuguese from the colonies, due to the abrupt change in the political situation and living conditions, had a devastating impact, not just on the regime but also in the people and nation of Portugal. The reintegration in the Portuguese society of those “returnees” (retornados) that left all their possessions in Africa represented a huge burden to the economy.
Had the withdrawal been prepared, many of those families would have stayed in the colonies. From a political point of view, the conservative part of the society continued thinking that the Empire was part of the Portuguese territory, blaming the left-wing for the withdrawal.

By 1975, Lusophone Africa had started to enjoy the benefits of its new-found freedom with independence established and East Timor faced invasion of the Indonesian military under the pretext of anti-colonialism. Exhausted by external developments, Lisbon started to show little interest in Macau. The enclave alone would not sustain the myth of Portuguese imperialism. Beginning with the withdrawal of all Portuguese military forces known as the Independent Territorial Command (approximately one thousand soldiers) and leaving the task of domestic security in the hands of the local police, Portugal demonstrated a paced policy approach to detachment from the enclave. Under the pretext of “lesson learnt”, Lisbon would seek restitution from its dismal performance in Africa by avoiding the same fate for Macau.106

In October 1974 Portuguese Minister of Inter-territorial Coordination Almeida Santos paid an official visit to Macau, and the Chinese local elite “stated publicly the specificity of the Macau status, which was to be solved in due time by the two governments”.107 In 1975 (1 April) The New York Times stated that “Portugal’s ruling Armed Forces Movement tried to give Macao back to China . . . but Peking said it did not wish to alter the status of the territory.”108 Articles like “China Does Not Want Macau”, published in The Star — Hong Kong, would continue to appear quite often in the international press, saying that Hong Kong and Macau “were much more valuable to China as sources of information, trade and hard currency from the West than they would be as annexed territories”. However, this news was strongly denied by Portuguese politicians in Lisbon and Governor Garcia Leandro classified it as “absolutely untrue”: “The Macau Government regrets the issue of this sensationalistic and unethical type of information, on account of the serious repercussions on the future of both Macau and Hong Kong.”109 In his recent book he explained that:

Since the beginning of the decolonization process some journalists frequently claimed in their articles that Portugal proposed the return of Macau to China. As governor I denied this statement whenever I had opportunity. After my return to Lisbon, when that happened, I always contacted the person responsible for that writing or tried to seek the source of this initiative, but I did never get a concrete answer. It was, they told me, a mere repetition of something that they read, but that they have not investigated . . .110
Nevertheless, researchers that have worked on the topic widely conclude that, at least, Lisbon was prepared to let Macau go, as there was relatively little Portuguese activity in the economic, financial, cultural and political spheres at the time.\textsuperscript{111} Most of them argue that Lisbon offered to return Macau to China but Beijing declined those offers.\textsuperscript{112} In any case, Lisbon’s indifference, framed by the context of decolonisation in Portugal and the irrelevance of Macau to its economy, had a determining influence over the Portuguese later approach adopted during the negotiations over Macau.

In China, Portugal seemingly found an obliging ally. The PRC would pace its advances on Macau in accordance with Portugal’s step by step process, although, in the mid-1970s it was in China’s interest to maintain the status quo in the enclave. There were three reasons for this. First, the PRC was wrapped in internal social and political uncertainty. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were seriously ill, resulting in a sense of insecurity around China’s future. It seemed wisest to concentrate efforts internally and not towards Macau or Hong Kong. Second, the PRC maintained its closed door policy but understood the significance of utilising Hong Kong and Macau as intermediaries and gateways to the world. Both were important sources of investment and foreign currency that kept it in Beijing’s interest to maintain their status quo. Third, attempts to recover Macau at that time were considered inappropriate, only serving to marginalise the British and jeopardise international and local confidence in Hong Kong. China feared damaging its relations and reputation, the reunification with Taiwan being the priority.\textsuperscript{113} In the late 1970s, CCP rhetoric was like a two-edged sword: on the one side revolutionary and ardently anti-colonialist; on the other, and when it suited Beijing, pragmatic, bouncing between favouring and/or criticising Portugal’s decolonisation in Africa and asserting the Portuguese administration in Macau.

**The Establishment of Sino-Portuguese Relations**

Soon after the founding of the PRC in 1949, there were several attempts by China to establish diplomatic relations with Portugal. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, these efforts remained inconclusive. Salazar refused to recognise the PRC. Under a new political regime after 1974, Lisbon became willing to establish contacts with China and to discuss Macau’s future. The first sign was an official press release by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 6 January 1975, declaring intentions to establish relations with all countries, including China.

In two separate declarations, Portugal demonstrated a positive position towards China, stating that it regarded the PRC as “the sole
legitimate representative of the Chinese people”, and that Taiwan was “an integral part” of Chinese territory. Portugal surprised sceptical onlookers on the question of Macau by declaring that it “could be negotiated when both Governments considered appropriate” and until then the Portuguese government would uphold “the rights of the Chinese citizens of Macau”. In short, Lisbon suggested that it saw Macau as an opportunity to forge political ties with China and not as an obstacle to achieving its foreign policy goals. On the other side, Portugal was also beginning to make preparations to distance itself from Taiwan, which had a Legation in Lisbon and a Consulate in Timor; this was a pre-requisite to resuming diplomatic relations with the mainland.

In an unexpected reaction, the Chinese demonstrated a degree of indifference to the Portuguese declarations. Even though the Chinese Foreign Ministry welcomed the communication with optimistic caution, its response on 13 January 1975 revealed that on the “... question of Macau there is still some distance between the attitude of the Portuguese Government and the consistent position of the Chinese Government”. The Chinese position on the Macau question was non-negotiable. Macau could not be the object of negotiations with a foreign power as it was Chinese territory and not the territorial possession of a third party. The PRC described the eventual termination of Portuguese rule in Macau as a “transfer of administration”.

Shortly after the 6 January 1975 note, the Chinese ambassador in Budapest communicated in confidence with the Portuguese ambassador that the Chinese were considering seriously the resumption of diplomatic relations with Lisbon. Later, the chargé d’affaires of the Yugoslav Embassy in Lisbon informed the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, despite divergences regarding Macau as a (non-)negotiable question, the Chinese government was content with the Portuguese declarations but that the resumption of relations would be shaped by responses from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) concerning the interdiction imposed on African countries to establish relations with Portugal. This official Chinese narrative also spread to other European capitals, such as Paris and Rome, in preparation for Chinese willingness to engage the Portuguese bilaterally.

The argument of waiting for the OAU to free up African countries, and countries supportive of the OAU such as China, to resume relations with Portugal, allowed China to gain time. The PRC opted to concentrate on domestic problems, in spite of dissatisfaction and the weakness of Portugal’s rule in Macau, following demonstrations there in 1966. Having to focus on domestic issues was only one reason that China did not rush to establish diplomatic relations with Portugal: the Chinese leaders feared a Portuguese reversal to colonialism. The PRC was waiting
for the accomplishment of the conclusion of the Portuguese decolonisation process and the definition of country’s political re-alignment on the international stage.\textsuperscript{119}

China’s hard line softened when reassured that the new regime in Portugal post-1975 was ending the era of colonialism, was not under Soviet influence, and thus was not regarded as an enemy of China.\textsuperscript{120} Portugal’s submission to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1977 served to tranquilize China, reassuring it of Portugal’s integration into Western Europe. China’s fears of Soviet influence were reduced further in 1979, by the formation of the new political party, the \textit{Aliança Democrática} (Democratic Alliance), offering a viable political alternative to the communists.\textsuperscript{121} By the late 1970s China appeared more willing to embrace the likelihood of welcoming a new juncture in Sino-Portuguese relations.

In August 1975, informal talks between Portugal and China began in earnest in Paris. The French capital had become a privileged European platform for negotiations with China since 1964, following General De Gaulle’s recognition of China.\textsuperscript{122} Given the trend, it was only a matter of time until Portugal followed suit. After establishing cordial relations, involving Zeng Tao (representing China) and Coimbra Martins (representing Portugal), talks began with a slow start but they included discussion of Macau.

At the same time, the final version of the Macau Organic Law was approved by the Council of the Revolution in Lisbon on the 6 January 1976 and came into force on 17 February of the same year, after a period of intense debate.\textsuperscript{123} The Organic Law stipulated that the new political system of Macau gave a high degree of legislative, administrative, economic and financial autonomy to the territory and delegated all the powers in the governor and Legislative Assembly.\textsuperscript{124} Similarly to the note published on 6 January 1975, the Organic Law avoided addressing the sovereignty of Macau.

As will be discussed later, Portugal has a semi-presidential system where the president has certain functions while the prime minister has sole responsibility over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and foreign policy. Under normal circumstances this meant that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs managed Sino-Portuguese bilateral relations but, in the special case of Macau, the territory fell under the tutelage of the president as well. The Macau Organic Law was approved at a time of political difficulties in Portugal: governments changed very often and this instability would not be beneficial to Macau.\textsuperscript{125} As a result, the Organic Law bestowed certain political powers upon the governor of Macau. The governor was appointed by the president and not by the government or prime minister as such.\textsuperscript{126} The governors nominated, who were
sometimes friends or political allies of the president,¹²⁷ were politically accountable to him.¹²⁸

The same situation applied to the appointment of the under-secretaries (secretários-adjuntos) of the Macau government who functioned as a sort of cabinet. The president of the Republic could dismiss all political appointments. In addition, the Portuguese president was in charge of Macau’s external security. The president had powers to dissolve Macau’s Legislative Assembly and to determine when the courts should have jurisdiction.¹²⁹ In short the Macau Organic Law gave greater powers over Macau to the Portuguese president while the prime minister and the government had negotiating authority over the territory with China. This division of powers would leave room for confusion and disagreement on the Portuguese side and was one important reason for Portugal’s weakness at the negotiating table, especially during the transition period.¹³⁰

In any event, the Portuguese Constitution of 25 April 1976 confirmed the paragraph about Macau’s status in the Organic Law. The new Constitution categorized Macau as a “territory under Portuguese administration”.¹³¹ According to Governor Garcia Leandro (1974–1979), this designation facilitated relations with China as the debate on sovereignty was abandoned. Furthermore, within the Portuguese logic of decolonisation, it made sense to state that Macau was not a colony any more.¹³² The Organic Law and the new Constitution gave some stability to Macau at what was a time of great uncertainty in Portugal. The Macau administration now had some autonomy, particularly the capacity to make investment decisions.¹³³

While these changes reflected a sharp political turnaround for Portugal, the PRC faced similar challenges. Successive internal crises in the leadership inhibited China from having decided earlier to establish relations with Portugal. In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping emerged as the new political leader, bringing order and internal tranquillity to China after the Cultural Revolution. Deng chose to reinstall purged party leaders, marking the beginning of a new phase of Chinese pragmatism, pulling away from the radical ideology with which China had been associated for the past two decades.¹³⁴

The rise of Deng Xiaoping meant China was now to strategize along nationalist and not Marxist or Maoist lines. In a period marked by intense political in-fighting among conservative and radicals groups, on either side of the political scale, Deng managed to instil political order at home whilst simultaneously beginning to look abroad with new foreign policy directives and objectives. Pragmatic Deng sought to distance himself from earlier political rhetoric, seeking ways to establish better relations with America and Europe, not only for political reasons but also on
economic grounds. He believed that his internal reforms required significant engagement with the outside world. On the question of Macau, Deng had a longer-term view of the issue, preferring to think of reversion as part of China medium-to-long term priorities. As a strategist, the realisation of this objective required time and adequate planning.

In August 1976 the Portuguese prime minister, Mário Soares from the Socialist Party, presented plans in parliament to normalise relations with China.\textsuperscript{135} The Portuguese, through Minister of Foreign Affairs Medeiros Ferreira, were beginning to sound out the Chinese for clues of their strategy for Macau, hoping to buy time but simultaneously preparing the groundwork for establishing bilateral relations. After questioning the Chinese ambassador in New York in 1976 and 1977, Medeiros Ferreira concluded that the Chinese leadership was not certain about their national or foreign strategy for reunification and the question of diplomatic relations with Portugal would be shaped through the definition of Beijing’s strategy towards the future of Macau.\textsuperscript{136}

It would take years and numerous informal meetings before China would finally agree to arrive at a date for resuming bilateral negotiations. In January 1978, formal negotiations began in Paris. This resulted in the establishment of the Xinhua delegation in Lisbon in March, under the directorship of the previous director of the Xinhua-New China News Agency in Beijing, Zeng Tao. Once bilateral relations were a reality the tone was set to broach the issue of Macau.\textsuperscript{137}

China believed its rights to Macau’s sovereignty outweighed any Portuguese position, although Portugal demanded acknowledgment of the weight of history on which its national dignity and self-respect rested.\textsuperscript{138} Both sides were pragmatic and open to compromise. They agreed mutually that Macau was “a problem left over from history”. At the outset of the negotiations, it seemed that Portugal did not oppose the Chinese sovereignty principle and China acknowledged the importance of Portugal’s history in Macau. They were committed unilaterally to maintain the status quo for the time being, seeking settlement of the question through negotiation.\textsuperscript{139}

From January to June 1978, formal conversations proceeded without significant hitches, concluding the last leg of negotiations to resume bilateral relations. The Chinese ambassador in Paris, Han Kehua, made a formal visit to the Portuguese embassy to celebrate Portugal’s National Day, 10 June. This was extremely significant, as in the past Chinese ambassadors agreed to meet with Portuguese diplomats in secret, when there were no representatives of other countries present.\textsuperscript{140} However, the signature of the much-anticipated joint communiqué was cancelled at the last minute and delayed for more than seven months as a result of internal issues on the Portuguese side. During a coalition government
cabinet meeting in Lisbon on 14 July, Minister Basílio Horta objected on patriotic grounds to the agreement on Macau as it stood. Horta belonged to the Central Democratic Social Party, a right-wing party representing a group of politicians who were against “giving away the empire”, as it was understood. In the end, Cabinet approved a secret political directive, highlighting specific instructions to be undertaken by Ambassador Coimbra Martins:

[T]he Portuguese Constitution does not include Macau in the Portuguese territory; it merely considers it under Portuguese administration. The Portuguese Government considers that the end of the Portuguese administration of the territory of Macau could be an object of negotiations between the People’s Republic of China and Portugal, when both Governments consider it appropriate. Meanwhile, the Portuguese Government assumes the responsibility for the rigorous respect of the rights of the Chinese citizens residents in Macau. The Portuguese Government also assures the Chinese Government that it will not allow the use of this territory under its administration for the practice of acts hostile to the People’s Republic of China.

However, the opportunity to establish diplomatic relations was delayed as the coalition cabinet collapsed and Portugal’s internal political crisis led to three different governments in one year: the first provisional government was led by Mário Soares, the second by Alfredo Nobre da Costa and the third, Carlos Mota Pinto. Coimbra Martins waited in Paris for the Portuguese position on how to proceed with resuming diplomatic relations with the PRC. When Mota Pinto took over as the new prime minister the negotiations finally began in earnest.

A new set of conversations around bilateral relations commenced between Coimbra Martins and Han Kehua, resulting in the signature of the joint communiqué. It was agreed that the signing of the accord take place at the Portuguese embassy in Paris on 10 January 1979. The Portuguese Foreign Affairs Ministry, however, considered that the agreement required minor changes on the subject of Macau, postponing the ceremony to a later date. The reasons the Portuguese provided for the alterations to the text were pretexts to delay the negotiations, arguably revealing the position of the prime minister, Mota Pinto, who feared a negative reaction in Portugal to an agreement on Macau. Since a number of political leaders such as Basílio Horta relied on political manipulation through the use of nationalistic jargon to reinforce existing fears rooted in the decolonisation process, the prime minister was cautious about adopting assertive positions on Macau. The period was marked by political in-fighting as political parties in Portugal altered positions continuously, reflecting the lack of a common strategy on
Macau in Portugal which would persist throughout the negotiations process.

On 8 February 1979, the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Portugal was finally signed. The two sides agreed to exchange ambassadors within three months and to hold diplomatic relations according to “the principles of mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity, of mutual non-intervention in internal affairs, of equality and reciprocal affairs”. Portugal recognised the government of the PRC as “the only legal Government of China, and Taiwan as an integral part of the People’s Republic of China”.146

The official joint communiqué made little reference to Macau other than mentioning the principle of “sovereignty and territorial integrity”.147 A number of declarations around Macau’s future in a memorandum signed between Coimbra Martins and Han Kehua along with the joint communiqué were initially kept secret, allegedly to protect the stability of Hong Kong but by Portuguese suggestion these were omitted from the joint communiqué. Throughout this period Prime Minister Mota Pinto kept the negotiation details on Macau away from public scrutiny, insisting continuously that Macau’s status remained unchanged in spite of allegations suggesting that both sides would need to prepare for the eventual retrocession of Macau to China.148 On the Chinese side, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian reported on what the joint communiqué had achieved at the Fifth National People’s Congress:

> While negotiating the establishment of diplomatic ties, the two Governments reached a mutual understanding on the Macau issue, confirming that Macau was Chinese territory and deciding that the time and details for returning Macau to China would be settled between the two Governments at an appropriate time.149

Portuguese government officials were extremely careful not to upset the Chinese, seeking almost at all costs to keep the negotiations behind closed doors. This was one of the reasons behind the political decision to wait ten years before making parts of the content of the Acta Secreta (Secret Memorandum) public in 1987, referred to as Acta das Conversações (Minutes of Conversations).

The Acta Secreta constituted a mutual agreement establishing reciprocal obligations and rights, although by having picked the word “memorandum” instead of “agreement”, it demonstrated a general unimportance with which both parties viewed the content material of the Acta.150 There were moments in the negotiation process when claims were made about the legitimacy of this Acta with some political figures stating that they had no prior knowledge of its existence. Notwithstanding, the Acta had been written up on the basis of Portuguese cabinet instructions on 14
June 1978, consisting of two paragraphs. The first represented the Portuguese position via a statement by Coimbra Martins, while the other gave China voice on the matter through Han Kehua. The Portuguese government stressed agreement with the position of the Chinese government on Macau, as follows:

1- Macau is part of Chinese territory and will be returned to China. The question of the date and the modalities of the reversion can be solved through negotiations in the future, when both Governments consider appropriate. 2- Before the reversion, the Portuguese authorities of Macau must respect and protect the rights and legitimate interests of the Chinese inhabitants, without allowing the Soviet Union, Taiwan’s authorities or other political forces to use Macau to hold activities prejudicial to the People’s Republic of China.

This official reference to the Soviet Union or Taiwan was behind the decision of keeping the Acta secret, as it could lead to misinterpretation and potentially damaging for continued Sino-Portuguese talks. However, it remained Portugal’s official stance even after the PRC had ceased to regard the Soviet Union as “the most dangerous superpower and the first enemy of the peoples.”

While China’s posture towards Portugal remained one of relative irreverence, having it appeared to welcome the Portuguese declarations as a pre-condition for proceeding with formal negotiations, China’s apparent unexpected interest in discussing Macau was a reflection of the changing climate in the Chinese and Portuguese domestic environments.

In Portugal, the trauma experienced in the mid-1970s from the decolonisation process in Africa resulted in demands from the Portuguese public to ensure a more dignifying withdrawal from Macau. Many Portuguese resent the left for abandoning the African colonies in the aftermath of the 1974 democratic revolution and, even amongst those that stood against the colonial war, there is the feeling that decolonization should have been handled differently to avoid negative impact in the economy and the society. Being part of the decision-making process regarding the “decolonisation” of Macau, as it was domestically perceived, centrist and right-wing politicians were not in favour of adopting unpopular measures that could lead to public finger-pointing. Even if Macau was never a hot topic, public opinion in Portugal is very critical about the “loss” of empire.

During the 1986–1987 Sino-Portuguese negotiations the Acta became a source of embarrassment among the governing classes. After a number of politicians declared never having seen it and doubting its existence, eyebrows were raised among the political elite about the credibility of
The negotiations. For example, in 1986 and early 1987, Macau Governor Pinto Machado referred frequently to the Acta in the press, declaring that he had no previous knowledge of it. Adriano Moreira was the first member of parliament (MP) to raise the question of the Acta, seeking its complete public disclosure, during a parliamentary discussion on 20 October 1986 nearly four months after the Portuguese-Chinese negotiations had begun. The Central Democratic Social Party MPs made similar requests only to have these fall on deaf ears. Ramalho Eanes, Portuguese president in 1976–1986, in a decisive move, explained that the Acta remained in the archives of the office of the prime minister, Aníbal Cavaco Silva from the Social Democrat Party (PSD), which succeeded Mário Soares and Mota Pinto of the Central Block (PS and PSD). Prime Minister Cavaco Silva stated that the Acta had been misplaced, adding another layer of mystery to the debacle. These inconsistencies triggered an angry response from President Eanes, given that the Acta served as “the negotiation base of all the process of the transfer of the Portuguese administration of the territory of Macau to the People’s Republic of China”.

The Acta was finally found at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The prime minister took the decision to read the contents at the State Council meeting on 6 January 1987. Two days later, the Cabinet released a communiqué, providing a background explanation to Portugal’s policy towards China over Macau. Around the same time, Cavaco Silva had begun to show discontent about accepting the responsibilities of negotiating Macau’s future left by the previous government. After having consulted Mário Soares, which succeeded Eanes as Portuguese president in 1986, Cavaco Silva agreed to publish the communiqué. For the first time since 1979, the content of the Acta was made public, to the relief of sceptical political onlookers.

A Muddled and Multifaceted Process

As we have seen, Portugal lacked a national strategy for negotiations with China over Macau. The Portuguese were reduced to this passive strategy because of their precarious presence in Macau and the fatigue felt from the African decolonisation process and withdrawal from East Timor. From the Portuguese settlement in Macau in the sixteenth century to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979, Portugal had shared sovereignty over Macau with China. Sino-Portuguese relations evolved through different stages and the fragility of the Portuguese presence in Macau fluctuated with China’s levels of political stability and power. For example, events associated with the Cultural Revolution during 1966–1967 led to Portugal losing de facto sovereignty over Macau.
Portugal’s diminished legitimacy in the enclave remained superimposed as an idealistic aspiration of prominence—the only way to sustain the Portuguese administration in the territory.

For China, Macau never ceased to be a part of its national territory. The government, however, only began to contemplate retrocession when it was advantageous. Macau had an important role to play in Chinese national reunification. The PRC wanted to use it and Hong Kong as showcases for Taiwan. In 1972, soon after China became a member of the United Nations, Macau was removed from the UN list of colonial territories, paving the way for the re-integration of Macau into China, depriving it of the possibility of self-determination. The PRC had a bipolar political policy, playing the revolutionary or the pragmatic card depending on the question at hand. This was the case with the support it gave to Third World movements against colonialism whilst interested in maintaining the status quo in Macau, even though for them Macau was Chinese territory.

After the 25 April 1974 revolution in Portugal, due to the prevailing indifference regarding Macau explained in the previous section, and eager to gain international recognition, the new regime was more interested in developing diplomatic relations with the PRC than in maintaining (arguably recovering) sovereignty over Macau. The process for the establishment of Sino-Portuguese diplomatic relations was onerous. The new Portuguese regime publicly announced on 6 January 1975 that it considered the PRC the sole representative of the Chinese people with Taiwan an integral part of China, and Macau would be the object of negotiations when both governments considered it appropriate.

These unilateral concessions reflected the Portuguese attempt at cooperation with China through which it hoped to obtain significant concessions from the Chinese, even if it meant Portugal renouncing many important positions. Recognizing Taiwan as part of China, although as a concession, was not harmful for the Portuguese interests. However, accepting that the Macau question would be solved through Sino-Portuguese negotiations acknowledged the Chinese sovereignty over the territory: Macau would not be offered the right to self-determination or a seat at the negotiation table. By 8 February 1979, with the Sino-Portuguese bilateral relations firmly in place, Portugal reinforced its concessions in the *Acta Secreta* signed in Paris along with the joint communiqué for the establishment of diplomatic relations to which both swore secrecy. Later, these negotiations proved to be very advantageous for the PRC.

While negotiating the *Acta Secreta*, the Portuguese government could have obtained noteworthy political returns in exchange for the maintenance of the status quo as it had been China and not Portugal, who
had demonstrated approval at Portugal’s continued administration in Macau. In the context of withdrawal from Empire and lack of interest regarding Macau, the new regime did not take advantage of these exceptional circumstances. A close analysis of the process suggests that the Acta had in fact limited negotiating space for the Portuguese government during the 1986–1987 talks: there was not much left to negotiate if Portugal had already promised to hand Macau over to China. Once the Chinese leaders considered that the time was ripe for negotiating the Macau question, they fell back on the agreement endorsed by Portugal. At that time, the Portuguese leaders were uncoordinated and lacked a concise strategy for going forward. It was a period of controversy and uncertainty, reinforced by the amplified mystery under which the negotiations advanced.
Notes

Introduction


Chapter 1  The Ambiguity over the Future of Macau

3. See Barreto, Guia do Museu.
13. There is some academic dispute about the date of the definitive settlement of the Portuguese in Macau. Dai Yixuan argues that both 1553 (presented by the Chinese sources) and 1557 (acknowledged by the Portuguese sources) are acceptable dates for the settlement of the Portuguese in Macau, since the first one refers to their first arrival in the enclave and the second concerns the building of the houses, as a sign of the permanent settlement. However, the Portuguese administration chose 1555 to celebrate the 400 years of the Portuguese settlement in Macau (the celebrations were cancelled by the PRC). Dai Yixuan, *Anotações Correctivas da Crónica de Folangji da História Oficial dos Ming*, Beijing, Editora de Ciências Sociais da China, 1984, p. 69, quoted in Wu, *Segredos da Sobrevivência*, p. 45; for this last paragraph, see pp. 45–47.
20. Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relações de Portugal com a China e situação em Macau” [Portugal-China relations and the situation in Macau], Information de serviço [internal memorandum], Lisbon, 9 August 1976; Diplomatic Historical Archives—Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon.
27. The term “unequal treaties”, used since the 1920s by the Kuomintang and by the PRC after 1949, was not the result of a doctrinal elaboration, but rather a general category in which China included all treaties and conventions containing, among others, “clauses relative to consular jurisdiction, unilateral clauses of most favoured nation, cessions or territorial leases”, i.e. “all the treaties concluded by China over the 19th and early 20th centuries”. Both Nationalist and Communist China maintained the position that all unequal treaties should be abolished. António Vasconcelos de Saldanha, “Some Aspects of the ‘Macau Question’ and Its Reflex in Sino-Portuguese Relations within the United Nations”, *Portuguese Review of International and Community Institutions*, Lisbon, IS CSP, 1996, pp. 203–4 and 205–6.
32. Kirby, “The Internationalization of China”.
34. See Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat*, pp. 35–44.
37. N. J. Miners, Foreword to Atwell, *British Mandarins*, p. ix. One of the main reasons for the predisposition arose out of Britain’s geo-political strategy at the time: Weihaiwei’s lease agreement would sustain British supremacy over other foreign powers such as Russia through the creation of a naval base in the constituency. London was able to pull out an important trump card, making use of its hard power if required, when Russia occupied Port Arthur and Dairen and the Germans occupied Jiaozhou (Kiaochow) Bay, given that the UK had the naval base at Weihaiwei to fall back on. Although the lease had a date of expiry at the time of Russia’s withdrawal from Port Arthur,
Britain was allowed to remain in Weihaiwei following Russia’s upset in Port Arthur on the dawn of its devastating defeat to the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Miners, Foreword to Atwell, *British Mandarins*, pp. vii–x.

44. Fernandes, “Portugal, Macau e a China”, p. 58.
49. Pedro José Lobo, chief of Macau Economic Services and one of the most powerful men in Macau, was greatly respected by the dictator, António Salazar. Pedro Lobo controlled the concession of the gold trade in Macau (the main source of Macau income in the 1950s and 1960s) along with his assessor Roque Choi, Y. C. Liang and Ho Yin, head of the Macau Chinese Chamber of Commerce and owner of the Tai Fung exchange office and the *Tâi Chông Pou* daily newspaper. Among the members of the Chinese elite in Macau, which the PRC liked to call “red capitalist compatriots”, the messengers favoured by China were O Lon, director of the Jinghu (Kiangyu) hospital, and Carlos Basto, attached-commissary of the Chinese maritime custom-house in the Lapa island, a Chinese speaker known as incorruptible. These intermediates were entrusted the most sensitive issues. For example, in 1949 Carlos Basto was chosen to transmit the PRC’s intentions over Macau: the maintenance of the status quo. Shanghai would be invaded but not Macau. Fernandes, *Sinopse*, pp. xii–xvii; and conversation with Prof. Moisés Silva Fernandes, Lisbon, 18 and 20 December 2001.
54. Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relações de Portugal com a China”.
55. *South China Morning Post*, 19 September 1963.
59. Nihal Jayawickrama, “The Right of Self-Determination”, proceedings from a seminar on the Basic Law, held at the University of Hong Kong, 5 May 1990, p. 92.
61. Ibid.
107. Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relações diplomáticas entre Portugal e a República Popular da China: passos para o seu estabelecimento” [Portugal-China diplomatic relations: steps for its resumption], Informação de Serviço [internal memorandum], Lisbon, 20 October 1975; Diplomatic Historical Archives—Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon.


115. Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relações de Portugal com a China”.


120. Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relações diplomáticas”.


122. Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relações diplomáticas”.


130. This division of powers will be explained with further detail in the Double Tutelage section of this book.
133. All legislative and executive decisions that were not exclusive from Lisbon (Justice, Defense and External Relations) were then settled by Macau, which hold enormous legislative power. Subsequently questions that were not limited by the Constitution of the Republic were then responsibility of Macau. General Garcia Leandro, Macau governor from 1974 to 1979; interviewed in Lisbon, 28 June 2011.
141. Fernandes, Sinopse, p. 359.
145. Mota Pinto preferred to sound out the public first before moving ahead with the negotiations, provided a public vote of confidence was guaranteed.
146. “Comunicado Conjunto do Governo da República Popular da China e do Governo da República Portuguesa sobre o Estabelecimento de Relações Diplomáticas entre a China e Portugal” [Joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Portugal], Paris, 8 February 1979; Diplomatic Historical Archives—Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon.
147. Lima, Macau, p. 533.
150. Expresso, 10 January 1987.
151. Lima, Macau, p. 535.
152. “Acta das Conversações sobre a Questão de Macau” [Minutes of Conversations on the Macau Question], Paris, 8 February 1979; Diplomatic Historical Archives—Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, paragraph 1.
156. Fernandes, Sinopse, p. 411.
158. Diário de Noticias, 26 December 1986.

Chapter 2 Negotiations for the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration on Macau

5. The British wanted to change what was their colonial structure of authority, namely the system of appointing the members of the Legislative Assembly—they wanted them to become elected. In Macau, a percentage of those members were already elected during Portuguese rule, being expectable to maintain it in the Joint Declaration.
7. Conclusions drawn by information provided during interviews to Portuguese diplomats involved in the process. The date of 19 December was agreed during an official lunch in Beijing during the last negotiation round, in which Zhou Nan said that the last day of the year would be acceptable for the Chinese but he acknowledged that New Year’s Eve was an important date for the Portuguese so he suggested five days earlier. As someone said that Christmas was even more important, later Zhou Nan would come up with the suggestion of 20 December.
29. Kemenade, *China, Hong Kong, Taiwan*, p. 77.
30. Kemenade, *China, Hong Kong, Taiwan*, pp. 77–78.
32. The Standing Committee of the Sixth NPC Congress endorsed the Joint Declaration on 14 November and the British Parliament approved it in early December.
33. According to *Beijing Review*, 24 December 1984, after the agreement was signed and sealed, Zhao praised Thatcher’s notable “vision and statesmanship” during the Sino-British negotiations and “significant and praiseworthy contribution to the satisfactory settlement of the Hong Kong question”.
42. Ambassador António Costa Lobo, interviewed in Lisbon, 7 August 2002.
43. *Expresso*, 30 August 1986, for the last paragraph.
61. Silva, *Autobiografia Política*, p. 207. The details included: a longer transition period, maintenance of the Portuguese administration during the
transition, guarantee of an unchanged system and maintenance of rights and liberties for a fifty-year period after the handover.


67. See Silva, Autobiografia Política, p. 207.
69. Silva, Autobiografia Política, p. 208.
70. Fernandes, Sinopse, p. 401.
73. Silva, Autobiografia Política, pp. 208–9, for the whole paragraph.
74. Silva, Autobiografia Política, p. 209.
75. Expresso, 22 November 1986. The threats apparently originated with Zhou Nan during the meeting with Pires de Miranda (confirmed by interviews with people involved in the process).
76. Diário de Notícias, 10 January 1987. The Ministry declared that negotiations were held in an environment of mutual respect.
78. Zhou Nan’s visit to Porto was under a much more relaxed atmosphere than his meetings in Lisbon. For details see Miranda, “The Joint Declaration Negotiations”.
82. Diário de Notícias, 28 December 1986.
83. O Tempo, 8 January 1987.
86. See Pedro Catarino, “Macau Seen from Four Angles at Four Different Moments in Its History: From Macau, Hong Kong, Lisbon, and Beijing”, in Barreto (ed.), Proceedings, pp. 89–108.
87. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is lack of clarity about Portuguese arrival and settlement in Macau and thus the use of 1553 or 1557 as an official “starting date” for the Portuguese presence.
91. President Eanes declared that the Acta remained in the archives of the prime minister’s office while Cavaco Silva stated that it had been misplaced. *Expresso*, 10 January 1987.
92. Fernandes, “Contextualização das negociações”, p. 112.
94. *Diário de Notícias*, 9 January 1987. For a closer analysis of the mentioned documents see previous sections.
116. The memorandum signed with the Macau Joint Declaration did not refer to the descendants of those with Portuguese nationality. The alteration in the Portuguese Nationality Law of 1981 (Law 37/81) predicted *jus sanguinis*: children of Portuguese passport’s holders were Portuguese and had the right to hold Portuguese passports (Law 25/1994).
119. “Chinese Foreign Minister Reports on Macau Accord to Fifth NPC Session”, Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 2 April 1987, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 4 April 1987, FE/8534/C1/1–4. The text of the agreement was made public on the same day.
120. With the exception of two: the president of the Legislative Assembly, Carlos d’Assumção, and Henrique de Senna Fernandes, Macanese lawyer and writer. Governor Pinto Machado was invited in his capacity as adviser to the Portuguese State Council while Carlos Monjardino and Mário Cordeiro, under-Secretaries in Macau, were nominal guests of the Portuguese government (Fernandes, *Sinopse*, p. 429).

122. Diário de Notícias, 26 March 1987 for the paragraph.


124. The censure motion was allegedly caused by a controversy regarding the government cancelation of a visit of a parliamentary delegation to the Soviet Union with a call at Estonia, at a time in which democratic parliaments did not pay official visits to Soviet states. With little perspectives of increasing its electoral capital in a future legislative election, the PRD wanted to increase its limited political influence in the parliament. Maritheresa Frain, “O PSD como partido dominante em Portugal”, Análise Social, 4th Issue, vol. xxxi (138), p. 990. See also Expresso, 4 April 1987 and Diário de Notícias, 3 April 1987.

125. Silva, Autobiografia Política, p. 218.


132. Diário de Notícias, 11 April 1987. According to Cavaco Silva (Autobiografia Política, p. 215), 20 December 1999 was an acceptable date for Portugal, with a transition period of thirteen years and with the transfer of the administration two and a half years after the Hong Kong’s handover. According to Diário de Notícias (20 March 1987), Macau Governor Pinto Machado agreed that 1999 was compatible with the necessary adjustments to be made for safeguarding the interests of the people of Macau during the transfer of administration. Pires de Miranda also shared this opinion: Miranda, “The Joint Declaration Negotiations”, p. 75.

133. Silva, Autobiografia Política, p. 217.


136. Silva, Autobiografia Política, p. 220.


139. Silva, Autobiografia Política, p. 221.


141. As previous Governor Garcia Leandro noted, referring to the drafting of the Organic Law in 1976: “The process of the new Organic Law was followed with interest by the Government of Hong Kong, but not only. In particular the question of the Legislative Assembly (two thirds of which elected and not chaired by the governor) . . . In the case of the Assembly,
it was an innovative and far-reaching experience, since in Hong Kong such situation did not exist, being all members of the Legislative Council appointed or carrying out their duties by right. Moreover, in both Hong Kong and London, some entities with political responsibilities and citizens on a personal level defended the existence of a semi-elected Legislative Council, arguing that local government would not be possible for several reasons, but mainly because China would not accept it. The experience in Macau has come to put in doubt this thesis. . . . Almost in the end of his administration in Hong Kong, Governor Chris Patten made a great effort towards democratization of the legislative and decision making, being registered known historical difficulties. In Macau the matter was solved 20 years before.” Leandro, “The Years of the Great Change”, p. 95.

Chapter 3  The Transition Period and the Problems of “Localisation”

3. The post of under-secretary for the transition was created by Governor Melancia and abolished by Governor Rocha Vieira. In the Rocha Vieira administration it was mainly the under-secretary for justice that handled the issues of the transition, arguably leading to some delays in the localization of the Law.
6. Having re-established the Socialist Party in Portugal in 1973, Soares was prime minister from 1976 to 1978, negotiating the resumption of Portuguese-Chinese bilateral relations, and from 1983 to 1985, in a governing coalition with the PSD.
7. It was widely believed that unlike Carlos Melancia, seen as “the man of the President”, Rocha Vieira was appointed under the umbrella of a PS/PSD cohabitation period, suggesting greater political impartiality. See Vasco Rocha Vieira, “Macau and the Future”, pp. 139–40.
10. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Gama signed the joint communiqué for the launch of Sino-Portuguese negotiations in 1985.
31. “Joint Declaration . . . on the Question of Macau”, Annex II, Section I.
33. “Joint Declaration . . . on the Question of Macau”, Annex II, Section I.
34. During the transition period Joint Liaison Group’s meetings took place alternatively between Lisbon, Beijing and Macau. Whenever negotiations at the JLG stalled, alternative meetings were allowed for on a rotating basis, with the view to turn to bilateral diplomacy as a means against which a solution would be sought. The general rule for the Portuguese would be to seek directly resolution for divergent views with representatives of the Chinese government. The Chinese on the other hand seemingly saw the meetings in Lisbon and Macau as a means with which to exert pressure on Portuguese authorities, swaying the negotiations in a specific direction in their interest.
35. Catarino, “Macau Seen from Four Angles”, pp. 100–5. According to one observer, the Chinese delegation received instructions from the Macau Office in the Foreign Ministry, from the Macau Office in the State Council, from the president and from the prime minister. They did not have an interlocutor, but had to consult all these elements that sometimes had divergent opinions.
38. “Joint Declaration . . . on the Question of Macau”, Annex II, Section II, paragraph 3.
39. “Joint Declaration . . . on the Question of Macau”, Annex II, Section II.
40. “Funções do Grupo de Terras; Sua interferência no processo de concessão de terrenos” [Functions of the Land Group; Its interference in the process of concession of land], Sino-Portuguese Land Group, 14 June 1988, pp. 3–4.
42. Yee, Macau in Transition, p. 41.
43. For the whole paragraph, Yee, Macau in Transition, p. 42.
44. Yee, Macau in Transition, p. 41.
46. Yee, Macau in Transition, pp. 55 and 49.
49. “A Questão da Localização na Administração” [The localisation question in the administration], Memorandum, Governor’s Office, Macau Government, p. 5.
50. “Joint Declaration . . . on the Question of Macau”, Annex I, paragraphs V and VI.
51. Lo, Political Development in Macau, p. 164.
53. Yee, Macau in Transition, pp. 42–46 and 52. Yee points out that, prior to 1989 the administration did not recognize degrees from non-Portuguese language universities.
55. Lo, Political Development in Macau, pp. 156 and 158.
56. Formerly known as the University of East Asia.
57. Yee, Macau in Transition, p. 52.
59. Yee, Macau in Transition, p. 47.
62. Decree no. 357/93, Lisbon, 14 October 1993, in “Localização de Quadros e Generalização do Uso da Língua Chinesa”, p. 20. In February 1994, the
Macau government issued a decree authorising civil servants to take early retirement or to leave the civil service by paying a financial compensation with the transfer of responsibilities to the CGA.


65. Lo, Political Development in Macau, p. 156.


67. In July 1991, the draft of the Macau Basic Law included the following paragraph in Chapter I, Article 9: “Besides the Chinese language, the Portuguese language can be used in the administrative, legislative and judicial bodies of the Macau Special Administrative Region. The Portuguese language is also an official language.” In “Acta de conversa na 10ª reunião do GLC sobre o estatuto da língua chinesa e língua portuguesa em Macau” [Minutes of talks on the 10th JLG meeting on the status of the Chinese language and Portuguese language in Macau], Macau, 12 April 1991.


69. In February 1992, the governor created a Linguistics Commission (Comissão de Acompanhamento da Situação Linguística de Macau), an organ of direct support to the governor, presided by the governor and composed by other twenty-three elements from within and outside the administration, to monitor the official use of the Chinese language and to discuss the problems resulting of the linguistic situation of Macau. Despatch no. 16/GM/92, Official Bulletin of Macau, no. 8, 24 February 1992. The governor also asked the Chinese Affairs Bureau (Direcção dos Serviços de Assuntos Chineses) to propose measures to the enlargement of the use of the Chinese language in the public services of the administration, facilitating the access of the majority of the population to the administrative system. Despatch no. 106/GM/91, Official Bulletin of Macau, 27 May 1991.

70. “Reunião Informal do Grupo de Trabalho sobre as Três Grandes Questões” [Preparation of the Meeting of the Joint Working Group on the Three Big Issues], to take place on 10 June 1991.


73. “Joint Declaration . . . on the Question of Macau”, paragraph 2 (5).

74. Yee, Macau in Transition, p. 58.

75. Yee, Macau in Transition, p. 57.

77. The sources in the previous note observe that the criteria for the solution to possible divergences of interpretation between Portuguese and Chinese versions of text were inadequate.


83. Cabrita, “Oficialização da Língua Chinesa”, p. 33. Sampaio, Portugueses, Vol. I, pp. 359–62 note that the magistrates were gradually localized to work in synchrony with the community that they served.

84. According to Eduardo Cabrita, “Nível de Localização do G.T.J.”, Memorandum, Legal Translation Bureau, Macau Government, 3 September 1991, the Legal Translation Bureau aimed at “creating conditions for the existence of official versions in the Chinese language of the normative acts in force invoked with the same rigour and juridical security of the versions in Portuguese language”. No author (perhaps Eduardo Cabrita), no name, Legal Translation Bureau, Macau Government, no date (perhaps 1991), p. 17 notes that in 1991, the GTJ had seven translation teams, each composed of a jurist with Portuguese training, a jurist of Chinese training, an interpreter-translator and a scholar.

85. Macau had a District Court with appeal to the High Court of Justice in Lisbon.

86. No author (perhaps Eduardo Cabrita), no name, Legal Translation Bureau, Macau Government, no date (perhaps 1991), p. 19. These included the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, the Macau Organic Law, the Law of the Bases of the Judicial Organisation of Macau, and the five “major codes”.

87. Sampaio, Portugueses, Vol. IV, p. 404. Portuguese laws either were enacted specifically for Macau or were national laws extended to Macau through publication in the Official Bulletin of Macau. According to Yee, Macau in Transition, p. 59, so-called local laws were created by Macau’s bodies with legislative authority such as the Legislature Assembly or the governor.

88. “Joint Declaration . . . on the Question of Macau”, no. 2 (4).


90. Members of the juridical department of Xinhua News Agency privately repeated to the coordinator of the Macau Legal Affairs Bureau that the Chinese interpretation of “laws in force in Macau” only referred to the
legal laws that emanated from the bodies of the territory. In Jorge Oliveira and Luis Melo, “Da ‘Localização das Leis’ à Definição de uma Estratégia Conjunta entre Portugal e a RPC quanto à Continuidade do Ordenamento Jurídico de Macau” [From the ‘Localization of the Law’ to the definition of a common strategy between Portugal and the PRC on the continuity of Macau’s juridical organisation], Legal Affairs Bureau, Macau Government, no date (perhaps 1991), pp. 4–5.

91. For the whole paragraph, Oliveira and Melo, “Da ‘Localização das Leis’”, p. 32.

92. According to Annex I, Paragraph II, of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, “After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e. the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law) shall be maintained, save for whatever therein may contravene the Basic Law or subject to any amendment by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature.”


94. No author (perhaps Eduardo Cabrita), no name, Legal Translation Bureau, Macau Government, no date (perhaps 1991), pp. 36–37. According to Oliveira and Melo (“Da ‘Localização das Leis’”, pp. 7–9) for the Portuguese authorities preservative of Portuguese law in Macau was an objective of “the highest priority”.


101. The most relevant legislation was inserted in specific legal codes, namely the “major codes”.


103. *Ou Mun*, 30 September 1991. For example, according *O Comércio de Macau*, 31 August 1991, while the Portuguese criminal code of 1982 had already been revised several times, in Macau the criminal code in force dated from 1886 and its limitations had been surpassed by the production of detached legislation since the 1970s.


105. The aim of the Portuguese negotiators was that the laws would remain in force after the handover, contrary to what happened in Hong Kong. Teresa Silva and Carlos Dias (eds.), *Direito e Justiça em Macau*, Office of the Under-Secretary for Justice, Editora Livros do Oriente, Macau, 1999, p. 11.

Chapter 4 Other Delicate Transition Issues

8. According to Article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, \(\text{http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art41}\) accessed on 24 November 2010, “A State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant. Communications under this article may be received and considered only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.”
17. The Chinese side did not accept to include in the Joint Declaration memoranda the applicability to Macau of the International Covenants.
32. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 4 September 1991, p. 2.
33. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Beijing, 10 September 1991, pp. 6–7.
34. Letter from the Under-Secretary for Justice to the Governor, 25 September 1991, p. 3.

36. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Beijing, 10 September 1991, p. 5.


42. Oliveira and Melo, “Da ‘Localização das Leis’”, p. 3.

43. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 21 June 1991, pp. 5–6.

44. For a detailed account of the final financial shares of the Macau International Airport see Vieira, Todos os Portos, p. 210.


50. Proceedings of JLG’s 9th plenary meeting, Lisbon, 4 December 1990, p. 3.

51. Proceedings of JLG’s 10th plenary meeting, p. 2.

52. Proceedings of JLG’s 7th plenary meeting, Beijing, 16 May 1990, p. 9.

53. Proceedings of JLG’s 10th plenary meeting, p. 3.


55. Proceedings of JLG’s 10th plenary meeting, p. 2.

56. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 21 June 1991, p. 11.

57. Proceedings of JLG’s 11th plenary meeting, Macau, p. 10.


60. Proceedings of JLG’s 11th plenary meeting, p. 11.


65. Proceedings of JLG’s 14th plenary meeting, Macau, 7 July 1992, p. 3.
66. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 6 July 1992, p. 4.
68. The issue of possible financial reserves after the handover worried Cavaco Silva and Jaime Gama. Both wanted to talk with Ambassador Duarte Jesus about this issue and there was also a meeting with the economist Vítor Pessoa, concluding that the Macau obligations before the handover would not be inherited by Portugal. Ambassador José Manuel Duarte de Jesus, Portuguese Ambassador in Beijing from 1992 to 1997; interviewed in Lisbon, 3 June 2011.
69. Lo, Political Development in Macau, p. 27.
70. Proceedings of JLG’s 12th plenary meeting, p. 25.
73. Before, the acting governor was a momentary choice and all the under-secretaries had the same statute.
75. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 18 June 1991, p. 7.
76. In 1989 this amount changed to 1.6 per cent of STDM’s gross revenue. Proceedings of JLG’s 12th plenary meeting, Macau, p. 25. In 1988 the Orient Foundation had a capital of 300 million patacas—the equivalent to 37 million US dollars—and the annual contributions of STDM exceeded 200 million patacas. In Yee, Macau in Transition, note 45, p. 173.
77. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 21 February 1992, p. 8.
78. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 21 February 1992, pp. 7–8.
82. Letter of the Under-Secretary for Justice to the Governor, “Preparation of JLG’s 12th Plenary Meeting”, Macau, 27 November 1991, p. 3.
84. Meeting restricted to the members of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 7 July 1992, p. 2.
86. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Beijing, 10 September 1991, p. 2.
87. Meeting restricted to the members of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 7 July 1992, p. 5.
88. Ibid., p. 2.
89. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 22 June 1991, pp. 5–6.
90. Meeting restricted to the members of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 7 July 1992, p. 5.
92. Meeting restricted to the members of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 11 November 1992, pp. 1–3.
93. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Macau, 21 February 1992, pp. 7–8.
94. Informal meeting of the heads of the JLG’s delegations, Beijing, 10 September 1991, pp. 2–3.
96. Lo, *Political Development in Macau*, p. 50, note 42.
102. Yee, *Macau in Transition*, p. 12. The Development and Co-operation Foundation of Macau financed the creation of the Jorge Álvares Foundation in Portugal (*Fundação Jorge Álvares*), to be headed by Governor Rocha Vieira after the handover. This led to an incident which destroyed Social Democrat Rocha Vieira’s political ambitions in Portugal, as he was accused of intending to use the Jorge Álvares Foundation for his own interests, and as Socialist President Sampaio (PS) and Foreign Minister Jaime Gama (PS) delayed the process of legalizing the Foundation. For the two contentious views see: João Gabriel, *Confidencial: A Década de Sampaio em Belém*, Prime Books, 2007, pp. 318–19; and António Ramalho Eanes in the “Preface” of Vieira, *Todos os Portos*, p. 2 and Vieira, *Todos os Portos*, pp. 283–88.
103. Lo, *Political Development in Macau*, p. 49, note 42.
Chapter 5 A Final Assessment

4. About the importance of dignity, see, for example, Miranda, “The Joint Declaration Negotiations”, p. 68.
5. Communication to the Press, Press Services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 6 January 1975; Diplomatic Historical Archives—Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon.
7. See paragraph one of the *Acta* in Chapter 1: “Macau is part of Chinese territory and will be returned to China . . . when both Governments consider appropriate.” “Acta das Conversações sobre a Questão de Macau”.
10. These points were confirmed by interviews with people involved in the process.
11. For the Portuguese elite perception of the differences between Macau and Hong Kong see, for example, Miranda, “The Joint Declaration Negotiations”, p. 73 and Vieira, “Macau and the Future”, p.127.


21. See, for example, Miranda, “The Joint Declaration Negotiations”, pp. 74–75.

22. Portugal accepted not having sovereignty over Macau since early stages of the settlement.


24. See, for example, Vieira, “Macau and the Future”, p. 147.


34. Catarino, “Macau Seen from Four Angles”, p. 104.


36. Santos and Gomes, Macau, p. 492.

37. For more information on the solution found for the Portuguese School, kindly see Vieira, “Macau and the Future”, pp. 157–58.


39. Ambassador Octávio Neto Valério, Portuguese Ambassador in Beijing from 1985 to 1989 and advisor of the Portuguese delegation in the negotiations with China; interviewed in Lisbon, 1 August 2002.

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