

Young Rebels in Contemporary Chinese Cinema

Zhou Xuelin



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The logo consists of four vertical columns of stylized Chinese calligraphy characters. From top to bottom, the characters are: 新 (Xin), 聞 (Wen), 蘭 (Lan), and 閣 (Ge). Together, they form the name 'Square Word Calligraphy' in a unique, artistic font.

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— Britta Erickson, *The Art of Xu Bing*

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Introduction: Young Rebels and Social Change

Any study of mainland Chinese film needs to take account of its social and cultural contexts, as changes in these aspects have an intricate influence on the content and style of films, especially after 1949. Lenin's alleged comment about film — that when the medium is in the hands of socialist cultural workers, it becomes one of the most powerful weapons for educating people — remained an important principle in the policing of the Chinese film industry up to the 1980s. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, Chinese filmmaking, like other areas of the country's social and cultural life, was monitored by a highly centralized political establishment and extensively exploited as a propaganda tool. This study traces the relationship between changes in politics and changes in film from the 1950s to the present, with particular reference to the altered cinematic portrayal of young adults from the late 1980s. Those years saw the release of a number of films with young adults as protagonists, many of them rebels. In these films, workers, peasants and soldiers — who had occupied the central position on China's silver screens since 1949 — were replaced by angry and alienated young men and young women living on the periphery of mainstream adult society. This book is a study of this new type of central character who appears in what I call “young-rebel films.” While focusing in particular on the 1980s, it also examines some earlier and later periods of Chinese film to provide comparative perspectives.

A quick way to give readers a sense of what the book is about is to say that it looks for evidence in the young-rebel films that may help to answer the question: Has China gone through a phase of “youth rebellion” comparable with that represented in films such as *Rebel Without a Cause* (1954), *Look Back in Anger* (1959) or *Easy Rider* (1969)? Although this comparison with the West is secondary to the book's focus on China, one chapter does compare and contrast the youth rebellion in China with a similar phenomenon in Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Although youth study (*qingnian xue*), as an academic discipline, boasts but a short history in mainland China, there has already been much controversy over when a “youth culture” (*qingnian wenhua*) was formed. Some have claimed that youth culture

existed in China over 2,500 years ago. The theoretical assumption of proponents of this school is that youth culture is characterized by universality (*pubianxing*), exploration (*kaituoxing*), and immaturity (*youzhixing*); that is, where there are youth, there is youth culture. On this basis, they see elements of youth culture contained in some of the earliest literary works such as *The Book of Songs*, because some poems in this collection are about the life and love of young people.¹ However, one might argue that this way of thinking adopts too broad a definition of “culture,” relating it to the general characteristics of individuals rather than to the specific kinds of social activity and group communication, the sharing of icons and role models, associated with the term today in sociology or cultural studies.

Meanwhile, others have sought to pin down the origin of Chinese youth culture to the beginning of the twentieth century when youth movements were springing up vigorously across the country. According to these theorists, the main indicators of the formation of youth culture are the popularity of mass organizations among young people, the influence of youth movements on society, the development of a cultural market for youth, generational conflicts and a collective identification among young people.² The May Fourth period of 1919 satisfied these conditions. This classification has, however, been challenged by those who believe that youth culture in China only emerged during the Cultural Revolution years, which witnessed (among many other changes) the birth and rise of the Red Guard Movement and the implementation of the “rustication movement.” Launched by a group of Beijing high school students in 1966, the Red Guard Movement received strong endorsement from Chairman Mao, and it spread like a raging prairie fire to encompass an enormous number of students coming from literally every high school and university across the country. As political fanatics in early stage of the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards took an active role in “beating, smashing and looting” (*da za qiang*). However, by 1968, the Red Guards had been disciplined and their activities curtailed by the Party leader, who would soon have hundreds and thousands of them sent down to “work in the countryside and mountain areas,” which formed the “rustication movement” (*shangshan xiexiang*), a nationwide campaign to transfer urban youths to rural areas. Between 1968 and late 1975, more than 12 million urban youths, about 10 percent of the entire urban population, were removed from cities. However, as “one of the largest population movements and one of the most unusual social experiences in history,”³ the rustication movement was a reversal of the normal population trend in modern societies towards increased urbanization.

Before any judgment can be passed on the validity of these efforts to define youth culture, it is important that we turn first to the complex word “youth.” “Youth” can be understood biologically with reference to those who have not yet reached full sexual maturity, or more generally to the period of radical transformation from dependent childhood to responsible adulthood. Alternatively, it can be understood sociologically with reference to an intermediate phase of life during which the individual is developing an autonomous personality and establishing a clear place in society. Because of these nuances, a precise definition of the word is never possible as the concept of “youth” alters

with social changes. The development of education, employment patterns, disposable income, and even diet have played a role in the re-shaping of the pattern of youth. Even the biological maturation of the body can occur earlier in some cultures than in others. For a long time it was common practice in modern China to regard the ages of 15 and 25 as the lower and upper thresholds marking the beginning and ending of youth. In 1982, however, this was expanded to the period between 14 and 28. Since this revision was approved by the Eleventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League as the official age range for Chinese youth to join the organization, it came to be regarded as the official duration of “youth” in contemporary China. The fifteen years from 14 to 28 can be further divided along the lines of Margaret Mead’s *Culture and Commitment* which speaks of three different cultural styles: the pre-youth period (14–17), the co-youth period (18–22) and the post-youth period (23–28).⁴ Although the ages of the young rebels portrayed in the films described in this book are never explicitly revealed, their background and experience suggest that they fall into the second phase of Mead’s classification.⁵

Despite these complexities, the word “youth” retains a general meaning in relative terms as a period of “between,” a period of transition, a period that is fluid and exploratory. Terms that crop up frequently in discussions of youth culture include: marginalized, flexible, transient, spontaneous, hedonistic, subversive, and non-conformist. One may compare this list of associations with a typical Western account — Robert Chapman’s 1953 essay “Fiction and the Social Pattern” which describes the young adult years in New Zealand as a complex period of ferment between the controls of childhood and the conformity of adulthood:

... [A]s soon as reaction becomes possible — when they [young people] start to earn between fifteen and eighteen ... [their] reaction takes the form of a rebellion, which seems, but only seems, to be a rebellion against the pattern. Actually, to strike out against parental authority ... to assert or experiment with other values and practices ... , this is the normal course over the ten years between seventeen and twenty-seven. A period of adolescent and post-adolescent *Sturm und Drang* seems to be an inherent part of cultural patterns deriving ultimately from the European complex; though not being a part, apparently, of all cultural patterns.⁶

While avoiding the tendency to overgeneralize or to essentialize “youth culture,” it is possible to mark out a certain territory for study, if only as a hypothetical way of understanding social phenomena. What is clear is that such a study must be socially and historically specific: universalist notions of youth culture are too broad to be of use. For this reason, it is better to focus on the twentieth century as the period in which the concept of “youth culture” explicitly emerged. While we must dismiss the first conception of youth culture in ancient China, the second conception may hold some value. The May Fourth Movement — a movement that changed China’s cultural and intellectual landscape once and for all — involved much participation and even some leadership by youth. But Chinese society at that time was far from modernized, especially in terms of education and economic development. While university students

might have become an independent force in society, they encompassed only a small minority of the young generation; and there were only rare indications that their values and behaviour patterns constituted a distinct subculture. Also, Chinese society and the Chinese nation (*minzu*) were at a crossroads. The most urgent need was for its people, especially its youth, to stand up against foreign aggression. Though young students spearheaded various protests and movements, the general social context limited the formation of youth culture as an end in itself. Therefore, the May Fourth era remains very different from later versions of youth culture. As for the Red Guards and the rustication movement in the Cultural Revolution years, these were not signs of a spontaneous cultural rebellion so much as a strategy of manipulation by the Party and its leader. The Red Guard movement was destructive and rebellious, but strictly speaking its participants were not subversive since they were following an established ideology. In sociological terms, the Red Guards were “normative transgressive groups organized from above into a norm-oriented movement.”⁷⁷ And this movement “was not contracultural in style since there was no proclamation of inverse values. For, while attacking those in authority (transgressive), Red Guards in general sought to alleviate the disharmony between normative standards and actual social conditions not by modifying the norms but rather by affirming the norms and modifying social conditions.”⁷⁸

Rejection of these conceptions is not to suggest that only one meaning of “youth culture” is possible. Rather, it is to stress the distinctive context of China in the 1980s and the novelty of the youth culture that emerged at this point. Similarities to Western youth culture since the 1950s can be seen, although (as we shall explore later) such comparisons are complex. For Chinese youth, the 1980s was a period that saw education flourishing and economy booming. It was a time of new concepts, new styles and new values, a time when the market economy partially replaced the planned economy, and the growth of mass media made trans-national communication possible. The decade also saw the importation of popular culture from the West. Imported films, TV programs, popular literary writings as well as concepts and ideas offered Chinese youth alternative ways of thinking and living that had never been heard of in this ancient country. In a context of increasing decentralization and deregulation and the retreat of politics (compared with its centrality in previous decades), the “youth question” (*qingnian wenti*) became an important topic in popular culture as well as in academic discourse. According to Lu Jianhua, “Many changes on different levels of society found an expression in the changing lifestyle, concepts and value system of the youth in the decade [of the 1980s]. Besides, the youth question itself became an autonomous social factor that influenced social progress.”⁷⁹ No deviant youth culture has space to develop so long as the dominant culture of a society closely controls and guides the socialization of adolescents. But by the late 1980s, young people were able increasingly to claim autonomy, freedom and independence. In many different ways young people engaged in social transgression, as though to demonstrate an identity of their own. Such activities eventually gave rise to a youth culture in the Western sense. The term “youth culture” thus came to be conceived in a new way, and as this

idea became increasingly conscious and explicit, it became itself an agent of history, a rallying point for those seeking an alternative way of life.

To understand the new characters of the 1980s young-rebel films, and the relationship with their elders and with Chinese society in general, it is necessary to situate them within a broad generational context. The concept of “generation” implies that those who grew up during a particular period of history are likely to share certain beliefs and styles of behaviour. There are, naturally, many individual exceptions, as other factors besides age come into play. Nevertheless, such a concept helps us make sense of large amounts of social and cultural data, and such simplifications can provide a starting point for more detailed analysis. Moreover, Chinese society has itself long been accustomed to looking for such groupings. “Generation” is a common organizing concept in many areas of society, and how the Chinese people have defined the main “generations” exerts an influence on everyday judgments, as well as providing valuable social data.

Throughout the twentieth century, profound cultural changes swept Chinese society approximately once a generation — the Revolution of 1911, the Communist revolution (1937–49), the socialist revolution (1949–66), the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), etc. In each case, a major political change has been associated with a conscious attempt to mould the way young people think. The concept of generation need not assume that such moulding was entirely successful; but it does acknowledge that every citizen of a certain age is likely to have been exposed to certain major experiences and influences. The Western equivalents of such upheavals include the Depression, World War II, and the Vietnam War. Such events were so powerful that they touched almost everyone’s life in some way. Nevertheless, in this study the concept of generation has been used with care, limiting it to China and remaining alert to individual differences at the level of detail.

According to Mao-sang Ng, China has been a hero-worshipping country from the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁰ Its people have tended to speak in terms of four generations of Communist China up to the 1980s, with each generation represented by particular exemplary figures or “heroes.”¹¹

To summarize common assumptions about the character of these four generations: The First Generation included those who founded the People’s Republic. A rallying point of this generation was the May Fourth Movement — “What began as a demonstration to protest China’s treatment at the Paris Peace Conference developed during the following year into a national movement for cultural and political awakening.”¹² Born at the turn of the twentieth century, a time of great change and of enlightenment in modern Chinese history, this generation was made up of “rebel heroes,” such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. They were known for their commitment to rebelling against old systems, old structure, old morality and old culture, and for their determination to build a new China. This is the generation that would dominate the social and political life of the twentieth-century China and shape the lifestyle, private as well as public, of the next two generations.

The Second Generation was made up of those born in the 1920s and 1930s, reaching adulthood in the 1950s. This generation allegedly played a key role in constructing the

socialist project and received high praise from the Party. The best-known comment — from Chairman Mao in 1957 — became a household quotation in China over the next two to three decades: “The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. You young people, full of vigour and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you.”¹³ Despite the emphasis placed on them by the Communist leadership, this generation lived primarily in the shadow of the First Generation. On the one hand, members of the generation were described as vigorous, diligent and self-sacrificing workers of socialist construction; on the other hand, they were considered inexperienced and in need of political education, so they could throw themselves heart and soul into mass revolutionary struggles, serve the interests of the masses, and qualify themselves to become successors to the socialist cause.

If the Second Generation were “socialist heroes,” devoting themselves wholeheartedly (and blindly) to building a socialist China, then the Third Generation was made up of “revolutionary heroes.” Born in the early 1950s, this new generation — like its immediate predecessor — was welcomed by the Communist regime as “the most active and vital force in society” and “the most eager to learn and the least conservative in their thinking.”¹⁴ Receiving Communist education from the cradle, members of the generation firmly believed in the ideas of socialism, such as the notion that the meaning of individual life was to serve others. Its core values “included such things as collectivism, redness and expertise, glorification of Mao, altruism and unquestioning acceptance of Party leadership.”¹⁵ When the Cultural Revolution erupted in 1966, many of them plunged into the Red Guard Movement and envisioned themselves as “revolutionary successors” and “revolutionary rebels,” dedicating to eliminating “old thought, old culture, old customs and old habits.” The iconoclasm of the Red Guard Movement may seem to align it with the worldwide youth rebellion of the 1960s in the West,¹⁶ but the movement was politicized in an Eastern style, and in some respects it was highly organized. The passion and enthusiasm of the Red Guards were mobilized to uphold the thought of Chairman Mao and to protect the “revolutionary fruits,” not to distinguish youth as an independent bloc or to turn “revolt into style.” Not surprisingly, by 1969 when more than 400,000 young people gathered at Woodstock, carrying the anarchism and hedonism of Western youth culture to a new high, their Chinese counterparts were simply engaged in answering the call of Chairman Mao and submitting themselves to being re-educated by “poor and lower-middle peasants” (*pinxia zhongnong*). In some of the most remote and isolated areas of the country, and after encountering local poverty and local scepticism about politics, they were awakening from decade-long blind worshiping; and their minds began to change though not necessarily in ways the Chairman had intended. Some started to question the Cultural Revolution which had not only damaged their country but also brought themselves a “sacrificed youth.”

The Fourth Generation, consisting of those born in the late 1950s or the early 1960s, did not share the same optimism and sense of duty as the two previous generations. Unlike its elders, the Fourth Generation was too young to be directly affected by the

Cultural Revolution. Although the anti-cultural, anti-intellectual and anti-scientific turmoil had deprived them the opportunity of a systematic education, this disruption meanwhile offered a bigger space in which they could develop their own interests. While their elders were humiliated and “purged,” members of this generation were by and large enjoying a life devoid of supervision and discipline in an era of “lawlessness and disrespect for authority.”¹⁷ By the time China opened the nation’s doors to the outside world in 1978, this generation was neither sophisticated enough nor ready for a rapidly transforming society. As new values and styles were introduced from abroad, some became dislocated in the face of this challenge. Like a group of children lost in an expanding urban “concrete jungle,” they ventured to cross roads without being accompanied by adults. Some more adventurous (or rebellious) ones started to alter the traffic regulations to suit their own needs, and determined to cross even when the pedestrian light was red.¹⁸

This brief discussion of generations provides an initial overview of the period of history covered by this study. The classification has become sufficiently codified in popular use for capital letters to be appropriate (“First Generation”). The book will concentrate on the third and fourth of these generations — with the directors of many films coming from the third, and their on-screen protagonists coming from the fourth. Above all, this study seeks to analyze how some members of the Fourth Generation were represented in the cluster of young-rebel films produced and released in China in the late 1980s.

My use of “young rebel” as a core phrase of this study can be related to the vast literature around this term and similar terms, written in the West since the 1950s and in China today. In 1968, Theodore Roszak’s *The Making of a Counter Culture* categorized youth into five groups: 1) conservative youth; 2) liberal youth; 3) old-line Marxist youth; 4) militant black youth; and 5) counter cultural youth.¹⁹ Two-and-a-half decades later, Michael Brake suggested “four main areas” as a way to classify young people when he compared and contrasted youth culture in a number of Western societies: 1) respectable youth (making up the majority of the younger generation); 2) delinquent youth (referring to some young adolescent males from the working class); 3) cultural rebels (often coming from a middle-class family); and 4) politically militant youth.²⁰

As we shall see in the course of this book, Chinese young-rebel films of the 1980s portray a style of rebellion that exhibits strong Chinese characteristics. It combines elements of Roszak’s category 5 and Brake’s categories 2 and 3 with elements of what was described as “slacker culture” in the USA in the 1980s and 1990s. However, these elements are mixed and inflected in a way that is specific to Chinese culture and history. The present study sometimes uses other phrases such as “angry and alienated youth,” “disaffiliated youth,” “dissenting/discontented/malcontented youth,” and “rebellious youth.” On some occasions, the phrase “problem youth” appears, as a phrase in use among members of mainstream society who see discontented young people as causing problems for parents, neighbours and officials. It should be emphasized that when the term appears in this study, it does not indicate any value judgment but simply refers to a social attitude. Similar terms such as “juvenile delinquent” were in use in the West

in the 1950s. It should also be noted that — like the “angry young men” in England in the late 1950s or the “counter cultural youth” of the United States in the 1960s — the Chinese young rebels of the 1980s represented “only a strict minority” of the Fourth Generation. As the product of a society undergoing radical transformation, these young Chinese somehow emerged from their orthodox socialist education not as “Communist successors” but as “rebels.”

By turning the spotlight on films that have taken these young rebels as central characters, the book investigates how a “Chinese youth culture” has been constructed, represented and interpreted. The scope of the study is mainly confined to the movies of the 1980s. What merits such a study is not the number of young-rebel films but their innovative and controversial content. Films focusing on dissenting youth make up only a minority of the Chinese films during that period of time. For example, 1988 was the year that saw the greatest number of such films being produced — six in all — whereas the total output of Chinese films for that year, as listed in the *1989 China Film Yearbook*, was 144 (excluding co-productions). But a small number of films can still have a major impact, as was the case in Western countries when some “underground” films acquired an iconic significance during the 1950s and 1960s. For Chinese cinema, the production and public circulation of young-rebel pictures represented a direct challenge to tradition. The expectation that the central characters or protagonists would be workers and peasants was disrupted by film-makers who preferred to focus on angry and alienated youth on the periphery of mainstream society.

The films selected for discussion in this book were confined to those produced in the 1980s, with a contemporary urban setting, and featuring characters who had been born locally (not inclusive of the mobile population from rural areas). There is one important exception, Zhang Yuan’s 1993 *Beijing Bastards* (*Beijing zazhong*, *Beijing Bastards* Group production). My decision to include this film in a study that concentrates on the 1980s was motivated primarily by its detailed coverage of the culture around rock ‘n’ roll, which came into being in China only in the mid-1980s and did not receive detailed exploration in film until the 1990s. Other films on rock ‘n’ roll include *Weekend Lover* (*Zhoumo qingren*, dir. Lu Xuechang, Fujian Studio, 1993) and *Dirt* (a.k.a. *Dishevelled Hair*, *Toufa luanle*, dir. Guan Hu, Inner Mongolian Studio, 1994).²¹ Though these films are very similar in theme and mood to the 1980s young-rebel films, they were denied public distribution after their completion. Copies have found their way overseas but in China they have had only an illegal, underground circulation.

It is an underlying hypothesis of this study that there emerged in China in the late 1980s a youth culture that was informed on the one hand by the collapse of the Communist dream in the horrors of the Cultural Revolution, and on the other hand by the commodity culture of consumer capitalism. The collapse provided an opening for something new, but one may ask whether the arrival of commodity capitalism — or the kind of youth culture associated with it — was the necessary result, and also whether this development was altogether emancipatory. As it proceeds, the book will seek to explore the implications. This is not to forget that the relationship between Western

youth culture and consumer capitalism is far from straightforward. Some types of youth culture have displayed a strongly alternative or oppositional spirit; but rebel forms of music (for example) have been quickly absorbed by the capitalist music industry. And when these maverick forms reached China, it was natural that they should carry with them many traces of the Western context from which they had emerged.

In the context of the 1980s, the arrival of new Western influences, including youth culture, was greeted by many urban Chinese, both young and old, as a positive development. The decade represented a landmark on the country's journey from a fixed policy of national isolation to marching out to meet the world. The decade marked a clear turning-point from a planned and centralized economy to a market economy; from strict ideological control to cultural diversity; from economic sterility to economic prosperity; and from a society in which everyone felt they were engaged in class conflict and class struggle to one where most people came to believe that — as a popular expression of the times says — “Money may not be omnipotent, but without it one is as good as impotent.” Commodity capitalism only reached China as the country was (in the words of Tao Dongfeng) transforming “from a pre-modern to a modern society, from an elite to a mass society, from an agricultural to an industrial society. Therefore, modernity is the question of the first importance. What accompany the coming of modernity are inevitably a tide of secularization and the rise of popular culture and commodity culture. Although secularization, popular culture and commodity culture are marked with various shortcomings ... they play a positive role in deconstructing the centralization and monopolization of political culture.”²²

Thus, the fact that some members of the younger generation were no longer willing to conform to established norms and values coincided with the upsurge of consumerism and materialism, and, as we shall see, the two developments were linked in complex ways. The young rebels of the 1980s, with their films and rock music, were part of the avant-garde of Western influences. This youth rebellion in China had a spontaneous character — it did not appear to be the result of any capitalist conspiracy, though the government sometimes portrayed it as such. Inevitably these young rebels were helping to pave the way for a later and broader influx of capitalist mass culture, with all its negative as well as positive aspects; but during the early stage described in this study, it can be argued that these rebel forms of culture functioned in a largely progressive way. Western styles, genres and images were borrowed and (with some imagination) adapted to Chinese conditions, providing an alternative to an official Communist culture that for many individuals had become intolerable. It is in the light of this 1980s context that the present study views the changes in the role of youth — from docile children of the Party to defiant young rebels — as a kind of emancipation.

Not surprisingly, there are alternative points of view, just as comparable periods in Western history (such as “the sixties”) have received a mixed press. It can be argued that the young Chinese rebels spearheaded a consumer revolution, encouraging a general (and less than discriminating) appetite for American and British music and films, and a more hedonistic style of adolescent behaviour that has created much stress for family life in capitalist countries. Capitalism in the West may have come to

expect and tolerate youth rebellion, and to view it as a source of innovation, but such behaviour is still controversial within families and within communities. By the 1990s, the commodity revolution – imported from the West this time – had already generated some strong social fallout in China and began to have a significant – and not always positive – impact on society. What Chinese cinema has experienced over the past decade is revealing in this respect. The importation and popularity of Hollywood blockbusters, while diversifying the Chinese film market and entertaining audiences with a wider range of colours and tastes, also brought “wolves to the door” by throwing the Chinese film industry into crisis.²³ Today, after twenty years of modernization (or Westernization), Chinese society can now boast that it is the world’s fastest growing economy; but this has been achieved at a cost. While traditional Chinese values have been severely challenged and sometimes entirely rejected, no comparable moral or ethical standards have come along to replace them. The growth of materialism has been accompanied by a range of social problems, such as corruption within government departments; fraud, counterfeit, and ugly forms of competition in business and financial circles; and a new type of social indifference and detachment among many individuals. By the late 1990s, there had been much talk of “moral crisis” within Chinese society. Growing up in a context of modernization and Westernization, the fin de siècle China youth have demonstrated even more startling changes in their values and worldview.²⁴ Ji Baochen commented recently:

When our teenagers are crazy about Hollywood blockbusters but have no idea who Qu Yuan and Si Ma Qian [well-known historical figures] are; when our university students can gain very high scores in TOEFL tests but can not write fluently in Chinese, we have sufficient reasons to believe that something has gone wrong with our education.²⁵

Yet criticisms of youth should not always be accepted at face value. Here, as elsewhere, university students are often singled out to represent the extent of the general moral crisis that Chinese society is said to be facing at the moment. University students, in Roszak’s category of “conservative youth” and Brake’s category of “respectable youth,” have always aroused feelings of envy in China, where, up to the 1980s, they were regarded as “favourites of society” (*shehui de chonger*) or “proud children of heaven” (*tianzhi jiaozhi*). The borderline in the 1980s that still separated rebellious youth from mainstream youth became blurred in the 1990s. As one Chinese scholar remarked, “In terms of its basic value and spiritual status, the difference and distance between current youth culture and the mainstream culture might be the least since the 1980s; to some extent similar to the situation of the 1950s and 1960s.”²⁶ Certainly, the culture of the 1980s young rebels has gone on to influence an increasing number of young people such as university students, in a similar manner to the way the music, values and icons of the 1960s counter-culture in the West spread over the following decades through the mainstream of youth culture (albeit in diluted or commercialized forms). Thus young people in general came to be criticized for having “neither acquired the spirit of traditional culture nor adopted a new ideal and spiritual haven,” and described generally as “a beat generation” or “a generation of no theme.”²⁷

To the extent that this dissemination of “rebel” values has occurred, we may ask the question: When the majority of a generation rejects traditional values, and there is a widespread sense of crisis, is it still appropriate to speak of them as “rebels”? A further question would be: What are the threats and opportunities in such a situation? Clearly there are exciting new freedoms, but also “the fabric of society” is placed at risk.²⁸ These are large questions, and to answer them fully would require a separate study. I hope the present book will at least help to prepare the ground for such a study. While this book will focus on the emancipatory aspects of youth culture within the context of the 1980s, the reader should remain aware that the changing cinematic representations of young people signals not only the development of a new youth culture, but also a number of other drastic changes that Chinese society was (for better or worse) experiencing at that time. What John Clark, Stuart Hall, and others have said of the growing significance of the category of “youth” in post-war Britain applies here:

Youth appeared as an emergent category in post-war Britain, one of the most striking and visible manifestations of social change in the period Above all youth played an important role as a cornerstone in the construction of understandings, interpretations, and quasi-explanations of the period.²⁹

Christine Griffin adds that the importance of the category reflects the belief that young people hold the key to the nation’s future, being “expected to reflect the cycle of booms and troughs in the economy; shifts in cultural values over sexuality, morality and family life; and changes in class relations, concepts of nationhood, and in occupational structures.”³⁰

As mentioned earlier, “youth” has generated substantial discussion in the West, in both quantity and quality, as well as in academic and popular contexts. One aim of this book is to investigate whether similar themes and approaches have relevance to the less-analyzed field of recent Chinese history, using film as a case study. One thing that quickly became apparent to me is that Western analyses cannot be applied without considerable modification. For example, in comparison with the Western rebels of the 1950s (the “Angry Young Men” or the “Beats”), the Chinese young rebels were much less educated, due to their often irregular and highly politicized education during the years of the Cultural Revolution. Also, the “left-wing” politics associated with some of the Western counter-cultures can not be transferred directly to Chinese society, where the “establishment” has for years promoted communism and demonized capitalism. When China began its reform program, many young rebels gave up the jobs connected with the state that had been arranged by their parents and instead set out to make their fortune as wheelers and dealers in the new world of consumerism. Another difference is the fact that Chinese young-rebel films were limited to a minority or niche audience and did not have as widespread a social impact as the best-known counter-culture movies in the West.

Because of these national differences (and others to be noted in the chapters that follow), I found myself engaged in a balancing act. On the one hand I could see useful links to be drawn between East and West, but on the other hand I was very aware of

the need for a culture-specific approach. Ultimately my way of inter-relating the two aspects was to identify phases when historical conditions created a structural similarity, when capitalist and socialist societies were curiously paralleled, despite the obvious differences in social texture. One such phase occurred in China in the late 1980s, which I compare (in Chapter 5) with Britain in the late 1950s. Other comparisons are possible — say, with the United States in the early 1950s — but there was space in this book to explore only one example in detail. What my comparison does at least illustrate is the extent to which angry and alienated youth in different cultures may, under specific social conditions, share similar patterns of behaviours and attitudes in opposition to mainstream values.

In the course of undertaking this study, I have sought to observe the following two principles.

First, as discussed elsewhere in this introduction, I have attempted to deal with concepts of youth as social constructions, rather than engage in the difficult and controversial activity of arguing that a particular concept is the most authentic or valid. In other words, I have sought to work as often as possible with those concepts that are widely accepted within the culture, that are themselves socially active and influential. At times, however, I have also sought to view such concepts critically, to locate them within social history. There will, therefore, be times when I seem to have departed from my aim of maintaining a critical distance in viewing all conceptions of youth as social constructions. A more assertive and judgmental approach is sometimes demanded because of the sheer weight of data that I am attempting to analyze. Generalizations are required if we are to start to see patterns. China is a large country with a huge population base, and we are still at a very early stage of identifying such patterns. The book may occasionally err in the direction of over-generalization, although I would urge the reader to remember that most of the large categories and generalizations I use are not my own but the product of that culture. Even if — to avoid too much repetition — I do not always remind the reader of their conceptual status, such categories should always be viewed as constructions, as part of the conceptual sorting process constantly at work within a society.

My second principle has been to discuss films as films, in the light of film studies, and not merely to reduce them to raw sociological data. That is, it is always necessary to acknowledge that films can be sophisticated constructions, mediations, and representations. The book is thus a close study of films as “texts,” although it also relates them to relevant social and industrial contexts. To supplement my personal reading of these young-rebel films, I undertook interviews in China with film directors and scholars for first-hand information about the making of these films. In addition, I have immersed myself in the available secondary resources published both in China and in the West. The Western resources can be broadly grouped into three categories: social history and cultural studies work on the phenomenon of youth culture; film and media studies work on Chinese cinema; and studies of Chinese society from a Western perspective (in some cases through a sociological reading of media texts). Although Western perspectives can be limiting, all these categories of material have provided

me with useful concepts and analytical tools. The Chinese resources are comparatively sketchy, scattered in newspapers and journals, together with rare book-length studies of youth cultural practices. Publications concerned with the study of youth in China tend to offer either abstract and ambiguous explanations from a physiological and sociological perspective, or accounts of youth movements from a highly ideological political perspective. The field has simply not yet been explored fully, and this study aims to introduce a new perspective.

In general, this book attempts to bring together Chinese and Western modes of analysis by employing an eclectic approach. Sometimes I will draw upon my personal experience to supplement the textual and social analysis, as I grew up in China and lived through most of the years covered in the study. These multiple perspectives seem to me necessary in writing about recent history, because the record is full of uncertainty, and at times unavoidably sketchy or hypothetical. As noted earlier, the primary purpose of the book will be to analyze the construction of youth culture in mainland China in the 1980s by examining the young-rebel films produced and released at that time. In exploring some of the political, social, cultural and commercial elements that contributed to that phenomenon, the book will follow a thematic rather than chronological framework.

Chapter 1 will explore the long-held antithesis between the city and the countryside in the development of Chinese society in general — and Chinese cinema in particular — up to the 1980s. It will argue that the emergence of the urban dynamic provides Chinese young rebels with a “battlefield” for alternative ways of living and dying.

Chapters 2 to 4, which constitute the bulk of the book, will show how youth culture in 1980s China was constructed on the basis of three aspects — beliefs, behaviour and product (popular music as well as film). Chapter 2, “The Apolitics of Rebellion,” will look at how malcontented young adults rebel against various aspects of the established society, in terms of education, intellectual elite, morality, domestic and social authority, and sexual values. The films examined include *Awakening* (*Su xing*, dir. Teng Wenji, Xi’an Studio, 1980), *Drive to Win* (*Sha Ou*, dir. Zhang Nuanxin, Youth Studio, 1980), *Masters of Mischief* (*Wanzhu*, dir. Mi Jiashan, E’mei Studio, 1988), and *Samsara* (*Lun hui*, dir. Huang Jianxin, Xi’an Studio, 1988). The particular significance of the youth rebellion described in these films can further be understood by examining how and why the young rebels begin to be “vindicated by history” towards the end of these films.

Chapter 3, “The Politics of Lifestyle,” will focus on lifestyle changes among the young people of the 1980s and what those changes signify. The formation of a youth culture in China, like that of other countries, is linked with commodity capitalism. This chapter will look at how Chinese young rebels practise an alternative lifestyle by pursuing a blend of anarchy and anomie. The key films of this chapter are *Sunshine and Showers* (*Taiyang yu*, dir. Zhang Zeming, Pearl River Studio, 1987), *Coffee with Sugar* (*Gei kafei jia dian tang*, dir. Sun Zhou, Pearl River Studio, 1987), *Out of Breath* (*Da chuan qi*, dir. Ye Daying, Shenzhen Film Company, 1988), *Obsession* (*Fengkuang de daijia*, dir. Zhou Xiaowen, Xi’an Studio, 1988), and *Half Flame, Half Brine* (*Yiban shi huoyan, yiban shi haishui*, dir. Xia Gang, Beijing Studio, 1988).

Chapter 4, “Rock ’n’ Roll: From Rebellion to Consumption,” will trace the development of rock ’n’ roll music in China and its links with the emergent youth culture. The chapter will look in particular at how young rebels use their own rock music as a means of reflecting their changing attitudes, behaviour and “mood of living.” The films examined include *Rock Kids* (*Yaogun qingnian*, dir. Tian Zhuangzhuang; Beijing Studio, 1988) and *Beijing Bastards*. Jiang Wen’s *In the Heat of the Sun* (*Yangguang canlan de rizi*, Dragon Air Film [Hong Kong] and Xiehe Film [Taiwan], 1994) also receives considerable attention, to show how the rock myth constructed by the rock and rollers and their audiences in the 1980s came to be deconstructed in the following decade.

Chapter 5, “A British Comparison,” will offer a sample comparative study of youth cultures. It aims to bring together the films of two countries that seem at first sight to be overwhelmingly different: the British angry-young-man films of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the Chinese young-rebel films of the 1980s. The British films discussed here were made between 1959 and 1963, including *Room at the Top* (dir. Jack Clayton, Remus Studio, 1959), *Look Back in Anger* (dir. Tony Richardson, Woodfall Studio, 1959), *Saturday Night and Sunday Morning* (dir. Karel Reisz, Woodfall Studio, 1960), *A Taste of Honey* (dir. Tony Richardson, British Lion/Woodfall Studio, 1961), *A Kind of Loving* (dir. John Schlesinger, Vic/Waterfall Studio, 1962), *The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner* (dir. Tony Richardson, British Lion/Woodfall Studio, 1962) and *This Sporting Life* (dir. Lindsay Anderson, Romulus, 1963). Drawing on the Western literature on youth rebellion, the chapter will compare the social history of the two countries in terms of structural similarities, and draw some general conclusions about the nature of youth rebellion and how it should best be understood, within its particular national and historical contexts.

Notes

Introduction Young Rebels and Social Change

1. Wen Xianliang, 1989, “Zhengque pingjia Zhongguo qingnian wenhua de tezheng jiqi zuoyong” (A critical review of the features and functions of youth culture in China), *Zhongguo qingnian yanjiu* (China Youth Study), No. 4, p. 30.
2. Yang Xiong, 1992, *Dangdai qingnian wenhua huisu yu sikao* (Contemporary youth culture: A retrospective reflection), Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, p. 72.
3. Peter Seybolt, 1977, *The Rustication of Urban Youth in China*, New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., p. ix.
4. Margaret Mead, 1978, *Culture and Commitment: The New Relationships between the Generations in the 1970s*, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 13.
5. This assumption is endorsed by the title of a 1989 young-rebel film *The Birth Year* (a.k.a. *Black Snow, Benming nian*, dir. Xie Fei, Beijing Youth Film Studio).
6. Robert Chapman, 1973, “Fiction and the social pattern,” in Wystan Curnow (ed.), *Essays on New Zealand Literature*, Auckland: Heinemann Educational Books, p. 86.
7. Richard W. Wilson and Amy A. Wilson, 1970, “The Red Guard and the world student movement,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 42 (April), p. 101.
8. Wilson and Wilson, “The Red Guard,” p. 101.
9. Lu Jianhua, 1990, “Qingnian wenti de zhidu beijing” (Institutional background of the youth problem), *Shehuixue yanjiu* (Sociological Research), No. 5, p. 87. Lu’s article generated widespread responses in the field of youth study in the early 1990s China. See, for example, Song Qinnian and Xiao Si, 1992, “Dui ‘Qingnian wenti de zhidu beijing’ yiwen de pouxi yu piping” (A criticism of the “Institutional background of the youth problem”), *Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian* (University Theory Battleline), No. 2, pp. 50–55; Shao Daosheng, 1992, “Kexue de fengxi bashi niandai de Zhongguo qingnian wenti: Dui ‘Dui ‘Qingnian wenti de zhidu beijing’ yiwen de pouxi yu piping’ de fan piping” (A scientific analysis of Chinese youth problems in the 1980s: A counter-criticism of “A criticism of the ‘Institutional background of the youth problem’”), *Shehuixue yanjiu*, No. 4, pp. 25–35; Tan Jianguang, 1993, “Qingnian wenti yanjiu de duochong

- shiye” (Multiple perspectives in youth study), *Shehuixue yanjiu*, No. 2, pp. 43–47. For an evaluation of Lu Jianhua’s article, see Zhou Xiaohong and Zhou Yi (eds.), 2000, *Da guodu shidai de Zhongguo qingnian* (Chinese youth in a rapidly transforming era), Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, pp. 11–12.
10. Mao-sang Ng, 1988, *The Russian Hero in Modern Chinese Fiction*, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, p. 4.
 11. For some discussions on how Chinese people are generated along the line of their relationship with socialist China, see Michael Yahuda, 1979, “Political generations in China,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 80 (December), pp. 793–805; Zhang Yongjie and Cheng Yuanzhong, 1988, *Di si dai ren* (The fourth generation), Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe; Liu Xiaofeng, 1989, “Guanyu ‘siwu’ yidai de shehuixue sikao zhaji” (Some notes on the sociology of the ‘April Fifth’ generation), *Dushu*, No. 5, pp. 35–42; C. Montgomery Broaded, 1990, “The lost and found generation: Cohort succession in Chinese higher education,” *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 23 (January), pp. 77–95. In these writings, different terms are used to refer to the four generations discussed here, for example, “May 4th generation,” “liberation generation,” “April 5th generation,” and “fun generation” as identified in Liu Xiaofeng’s article. My discussion of the four generations here is inspired by these writings.
 12. Vera Schwarcz, 1986, *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919*, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 7.
 13. Mao Zedong, 1966, “Talk at a meeting with Chinese students and trainees in Moscow, 17 November 1957,” in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, p. 288.
 14. Mao Zedong, 1966, “Introductory note to ‘A youth shock brigade of the No. 9 agricultural producers’ co-operative in Hsinping Township, Chungshan County”, in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, p. 290.
 15. Thomas B. Gold, 1993, “Youth and the state,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 127 (September), p. 599.
 16. See, for example, Wilson and Wilson, “The Red Guard,” pp. 88–104; Gu Xiaomin, 1990, “Zai shijie xing qingnian ‘fan wenhua’ beijing zhong de hongweibing yundong” (The Red Guard Movement in the context of the worldwide youth anti-culture movement), *Zhongguo qingnian yanjiu* (China Youth Study), No. 2, p. 43.
 17. Gold, “Youth and the state,” p. 604.
 18. Zhang and Cheng, *The Fourth Generation*, p. 112.
 19. Theodore Roszak, (1968) 1969, *The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition*, London: Faber and Faber, p. xii.
 20. Michael Brake, 1985, *Comparative Youth Culture: The Sociology of Youth Culture and Youth Subcultures in America, Britain and Canada*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 23.
 21. The book uses the *Hanyu pinyin* system to romanize film titles. In each case of its first appearance in the book, the romanized title, along with the director’s name, the name of the studio and the film’s release year, will follow the English version in brackets.
 22. Tao Dongfeng, 1999, “Daode lixiang zhuyi yu zhuanxinqi zhongguo wenhua” (Moral idealism and Chinese culture in the era of transformation), in Liu Zefeng, (ed.), *Daode Zhongguo* (Morality of China), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, p. 327.

23. The expression “wolves at the door” was used by a Western scholar to describe the grim situation faced by the Chinese film industry in the 1990s. See Stanley Rosen, 2002, “The wolf at the door: Hollywood films in China, 1994–2000”, in Eric J. Heikkila and Rafael Pizarro (eds.), *Southern California and the World*, Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 49–77.
24. For some discussion on the value changes of Chinese youth in the 1990s, see Luo Xu, 2004, “Farewell to idealism: Mapping China’s university students of the 1990s,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 13, No. 41, (November), pp. 779–799; Yan Wang, 2006, “Value changes in an era of social transformations: college-educated Chinese youth,” *Educational Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2, (June), pp. 233–240.
25. Ji Baochen, 2005, “Chonggu guoxue de jiazhì” (Re-evaluate Chinese national culture), *Nanfang Weekend*, May 26.
26. Cited in Luo, “Farewell to idealism”, p. 795.
27. Luo, “Farewell to idealism”, p. 781.
28. See Erik H. Erikson, 1968, *Identity, Youth and Crisis*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., p. 156; cited in Wilson and Wilson, “The Red Guard,” p. 96.
29. Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (eds.), 1976, *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain*, London: Unwin Hyman, p. 9.
30. Christine Griffin, 1993, *Representations of Youth: The Study of Youth and Adolescence in Britain and America*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 9.

Chapter 1 Re-forming China

1. See Xiao Luo, 1986, “Huizhe shenzhi de chizi zhiai — Chen Kaige tan *Huang Tudi* daoyan tihui” (With the deep and sincere love of a loyal son — Chen Kaige talks about his experience in making *Yellow Earth*), in *Huashuo Huang Tudi* (Talking about *Yellow Earth*), Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, pp. 264–284; and Zhang Yimou, 1994, “Jiupai zhekuaitu! — *Huang Tudi* sheying tihui” (This is the piece of land! — My experience in shooting *Yellow Earth*), in *Lun Zhang Yimou* (On Zhang Yimou), Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, pp. 107–110.
2. Joseph W. Esherick, 2000, “Modernity and nation in the Chinese city,” in Joseph W. Esherick (ed.), *Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900–1950*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p. 1.
3. Linda Cooke Johnson, 1993, *Cities of Jiangnan in Late Imperial China*, Albany: State University of New York Press, p. 2. For more details about this feature of Chinese urbanism, also see F. W. Mote, 1973, “A millennium of Chinese urban history: Form, time and space concepts in Soochow,” *Rice University Studies*, Vol. 59, pp. 35–65.
4. Rhoads Murphey, 1954, “The city as a centre of change: Western Europe and China,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 44, p. 359.
5. Arthur F. Wright, 1977, “The cosmology of the Chinese city,” in G. William Skinner (ed.), *The City in Late Imperial China*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 33–34.
6. Murphey, “The city as a centre of change,” p. 349.
7. Murphey, “The city as a centre of change,” p. 349.
8. Murphey, “The city as a centre of change,” p. 353.
9. The poem remains in the textbook of primary education as an exemplary artistic work of ancient China. See primary school textbook for the nine-year compulsory education, *Yuwen* (Chinese), Vol. 5, Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1994, p. 151.

10. Chang Kuan, 1990, “Chengli ren” (City-dwellers), from his album *Chongxin jihua xianzai* (Remaking plans for now). The translation is from Andrew F. Jones, 1992, *Like a Knife: Ideology and Genre in Contemporary Chinese Popular Music*, Ithaca NY: Cornell University, p. 158.
11. For a detailed account of these contradictions and their implications, refer to “Chengshi dianying de wenhua maodun” (Cultural contradictions of urban cinema), in Ni Zhen, 1994, *Tansuo de yinmu* (The exploratory screen), Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, pp. 34–52.
12. Leo Ou-fan Lee, 1999, *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930–1945*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 3–4.
13. Cheng Jihua (ed.), (1963) 1998, *Zhongguo dianying fazhan shi* (The development history of Chinese film), Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, Vol. II, p. 222.
14. Yiqun, “Zhongguo dianying de xinluxiang” (New trends in Chinese cinema); cited in Cheng, *The Development History of Chinese Film*, Vol. II, p. 222.
15. Poshek Fu, 1998, “Projecting ambivalence: Chinese cinema in semi-occupied Shanghai, 1937–41,” in Wen-hsin Yeh (ed.), *Wartime Shanghai*, London: Routledge, p. 86.
16. Cheng, *The Development History of Chinese Film*, Vol. II, p. 220.
17. Bret Sutcliffe, “A Spring River Flows East: ‘Progressive’ ideology and gender representation,” <http://www.latrobe.edu.au/www/screeningthepast/firstrelease/fir1298/bsfr5c.html>.
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19. See, for example, Cheng, *The Development History of Chinese Film*, Vol. I, pp. 171–244.
20. Paul Pickowicz, 1993, “Melodramatic representation and the ‘May Fourth’ tradition of Chinese cinema,” in Ellen Widmer and David Der-wei Wang (eds.), *From May Fourth to June Fourth: Fiction and Film in Twentieth-Century China*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 298.
21. Pickowicz, “Melodramatic representation,” p. 302.
22. R. J. R. Kirkby, 1985, *Urbanisation in China: Town and Country in a Developing Economy 1949–2000 AD*, London: Croom Helm, p. 4.
23. Murphey, “The city as a centre of change,” p. 360.
24. Mao Zedong, 1991, *Mao Zedong xuanji* (Selected works of Mao Zedong), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, Vol. III, p. 959.
25. Kirkby, *Urbanisation in China*, p. 5.
26. See Paul Clark, 1987, *Chinese Cinema: Culture and Politics since 1949*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 94–124.
27. Merle Goldman, 1967, *Literary Dissent in Contemporary China*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 90.
28. See Mao Zedong, 1951, “Yingdang zhongshi dianying *Wu Xun zhuan* de taolun” (Attention must be paid to the discussions of the film *The Life of Wu Xun*), *Renmin*

- ribao*, 20 May, p. 1; and Zhou Yang, 1951, “Jianjue guanche Mao Zedong wenyi luxian” (Steadfastly carry out Mao Zedong’s line in literature and art), *Renmin ribao*, 8 August, pp. 2–3. For an English translation of Mao’s article, see Michael Y. M. Kau and John K. Leung (eds.), 1986, *The Writings of Mao Zedong 1949–1976*, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., Vol. I (September 1949–December 1955), pp. 196–201.
29. Clark, *Chinese Cinema*, p. 51.
 30. Yingjin Zhang and Zhiwei Xiao, 1998, *Encyclopaedia of Chinese Film*, London: Routledge, p. 298.
 21. Zhang and Xiao, *Encyclopaedia of Chinese Film*, p. 298.
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 34. X. L. Ding, 1994, *The Decline of Communism in China: Legacies Crisis, 1977–1989*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 84.
 35. See *People’s Daily (Renmin ribao)*, 7 February 1977.
 36. For Western literature on “Beijing Spring,” see James D. Seymour (ed.), 1980, *The Fifth Modernisation: China’s Human Rights Movement, 1978–1979*, Standfordville, New York: Human Rights Publishing Group; James Tong (ed.), 1980, “Underground journals in China, part 1 and part 2,” *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol. 13, No. 3–4 and Vol. 14, No. 3; David S. G. Goodman, 1981, *Beijing Street Voices: The Poetry and Politics of China’s Democracy Movement*, London: Marion Boyars; and Andrew J. Nathan, 1985, *Chinese Democracy*, New York: Knopf.
 37. Quoted in Ding, *The Decline of Communism in China*, p. 91.
 38. Hu Yaobang; quoted in Li Honglin, 1999, *Zhongguo sixiang yundong shi: Yijiu sijiū — yijiu bajiu* (History of China’s Ideological Movements: 1949–1989), Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, p. 249.
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 40. Deng Xiaoping, (1979) 1983, “Uphold the four cardinal principles, 30 March 1979,” in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, p. 172.
 41. Deng Xiaoping, (1978) 1983, “Emancipate the mind, seek truth from facts and unite as one in looking to the future, 13 December 1978” in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, pp. 151–165.
 42. Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 154–155.
 43. Deng Xiaoping, (1981) 1983, “On opposing wrong ideological tendencies, 27 March 1981,” in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 356–359.
 44. Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, p. 359.
 45. Deng Xiaoping, (1981) 1983, “Concerning problems on the ideological front, 17 July 1981,” in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, pp. 368–369.
 46. Teyue pinglunyuán (Special Guest Commentator), 1981, “Sixiang jiben yuanze burong weifan” (The four cardinal principles must not be violated), *Jiefangjunbao* (Liberation Army Daily), 20 April. The article is included in Li Yunhui, Liu Yong and Shi Bainian

- (eds.), 1992, *Renmin gongheguo chunqiu shilu* (Historical Records of the People's Republic), Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, pp. 1372–1377.
47. Bai Hua, 1982, “No breakthrough, no literature,” Denis C. Mair (trans.), in Howard Goldblatt (ed.), *Chinese Literature for the 1980s: The Fourth Congress of Writers & Artists*, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, p. 57.
 48. Due to the unavailability of the film, the analysis here is based on the “literary film script” (*dianying wenxue juben*) which describes scenes in a novelistic way. The script was reprinted in *Zhongguo dalu juben xuan: Kulian* (Selected Scripts from Mainland China: Unrequited Love), Taipei: Youshi wenhua shiye gongsi, 1982.
 49. Definition of *guojia*, in *Xiandai hanyu cidian* (Contemporary Chinese Dictionary), Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1995, p. 424.
 50. Translation from Michael Duke, 1985, *Blooming and Contending: Chinese Literature in the Post-Mao Era*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 131.
 51. Jonathan Spence, 1992, *Chinese Roundabout: Essays in History and Culture*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, p. 285.
 52. Special Guest Commentator, “The four cardinal principles must not be violated,” p. 1376.
 53. Bai Hua, *Selected Scripts from Mainland China: Unrequited Love*, p. 1.
 54. Duke, *Blooming and Contending*, p. 135.
 55. *Hibiscus Town* (*Furong zhen*) was a novel by Gu Hua published in 1981, and later adapted into a film in 1987. *Black-Cannon Incident* was adapted in 1986 by Huang Jianxin from a short story titled *A Romantic Black Cannon* (*Langmande heipao*), first published in 1984.
 56. See Lee Yee, (1988) 1989, “Beihua hai zhimibuwu de kulian zuguo ma?” (Does Bai Hua still obstinately love his motherland?), *Jiushi niandai* (The Nineties), No. 216 (January), p. 88.
 57. Special Guest Commentator, “The four cardinal principles must not be violated,” p. 1376.
 58. Bai Hua, 1979, “Chunchao zai wang” (Spring tide is in sight), *People's Daily*, 17 March.
 59. Bai Hua, 1981, “Chuntian dui wo ruci houai” (Spring loves me so much), *Xin guancha* (New Observer), No. 4.
 60. Richard Kraus, 1986, “Bai Hua: The political authority of a writer”, in Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek (eds.), *China's Establishment Intellectuals*, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, p. 185.
 61. Tang Tsou, 1984, “Political change and reform: The middle course”, in Norton Ginsburg and Bernard A. Lalor (eds.), *China: The 80s Era*, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 41.
 62. Quoted in Richard Baum, 1994, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 158.
 63. Deng Xiaoping; quoted in Geremie Barmé and John Minford (eds.), 1988, *Seeds of Fire: Chinese Voices of Conscience*, New York: Hill & Wang, p. 345.
 64. Baum, *Burying Mao*, p. 164.
 65. Hu Qiaomu, 1982, “Dangqian sixiang zhanxiande ruogan wenti” (Some current problems on the ideological front), *Wenyibao*, 5(3). The translation is from He Yuhuai, 1992, *Cycles of Repression and Relaxation: Political-Literary Events in China 1976–1989*, Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, p. 202.

66. Fang Lizhi was an astrophysicist and a former vice-president of the Chinese University of Science and Technology. Wang Ruowang was a Shanghai-based writer, critic and essayist. Liu Binyan was a famous reportage writer and a journalist of *People's Daily*. He was a vice-chairman of the Chinese Writers' Association.
67. Zhao Ziyang; quoted in Baum, *Burying Mao*, p. 211.
68. See CCP Central Committee, *Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic Structure*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984.
69. Deborah S. Davis, 1995, "Introduction: Urban China," in Deborah S. Davis, Richard Kraus, et al. (eds.), *Urban Spaces in Contemporary China*, p. 7.
70. See Joseph C. H. Chai, 1992, "Consumption and living standards in China," *The China Quarterly*, No. 131, p. 721. (The living standards of Chinese people doubled again in the 1990s.)
71. Li Yun, 1996, "Beijing suojian suosi" (What I think and see in Beijing), *Zheng Ming*, No. 230 (December), p. 36; quoted in Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, 1998, "China's consumer revolution: The 1990s and beyond," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 7, No. 18, p. 362.
72. Chinese youth had to wait until the 1990s for the opportunities of a more dynamic and individual style of consumption. By that time, the mythology of the "three items" had been more or less deconstructed. New fashions and styles kept appearing, catering to the more diversified preferences and tastes of young people. According to a survey conducted by China Adolescence Research Centre in the mid-1990s, the electrical appliances that enjoyed greatest popularity among youth were (in order of popularity): Hi-Fi (46.85%), air-conditioning (40.5%), colour TV (39.7%), motor bicycle (37.6%), refrigerator (31.5%), private car (25.5%), and personal computer (23.2%).
73. Deborah S. Davis, 2000, "Introduction: A revolution in consumption," in Deborah S. Davis (ed.), *The Consumer Revolution in Urban China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 2–3.
74. For detailed analysis, see Thomas B. Gold, 1989, "Guerrilla interviewing among the *getihu*," in Perry Link, Richard Madsen and Paul G. Pickowicz (eds.), *Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic*, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 178.
75. Gold, "Guerrilla interviewing among the *getihu*," p. 179.
76. Wang Hui, 1989, "Dangdai dianying zhong de xiangtu yu dushi: Xunzhao lishi de jieshi yu shengming de guisu" (The countryside and the city in contemporary film: Seeking a historical explanation and a settling place for life), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 2, p. 17.
77. Wang Hui, "The countryside and the city in contemporary film," p. 13.
78. The director of these rural films is Wu Tianming, the head of Xi'an Film Studio from the mid- to late 1980s. He established his name in the national and international film scene not only for his award-winning films such as *Life* and *Old Well* but also for his patronage of the Fifth-Generation filmmakers. An outspoken director/film officer and "godfather" of the Fifth-Generation filmmakers, Wu Tianming left for America in 1989 but returned to China to resume his filmmaking career in the mid-1990s.

79. Wu Tianming; cited in Wang Zhongming, 1990, *Dachao chudong — Lun Zhongguo dianying yu shehui* (Emerging tides — On Chinese cinema and society), Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, p. 30.
80. Zhong Dianfei, “Innovation in social and cinematic ideas: A forward given at the First Annual Meeting of the Learned Society of Chinese Film Criticism, Dalian, 1984,” in George Semsel, Xia Hong, and Hou Jianping (eds.), 1990, *Chinese Film Theory: A Guide to the New Era*, New York: Praeger, p. 11.
81. Wu Tianming, 1987, “Yuanyu shenghuo de chuanguo chongdong” (Creative impulse originating from life), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 12, p. 6.
82. Joseph Levenson, 1971, *Revolution and Cosmopolitanism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 55; cited in Lee, *Shanghai Modern*, p. 339.
83. Dai Jinhua, 1999, “Invisible writing: The politics of Chinese mass culture in the 1990s,” *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring), p. 49.
84. Dai, “Invisible writing,” p. 37.

Chapter 2 The Apolitics of Rebellion

1. See, for example: Zhong Dianfei, 1985, “Lun shehui guannian yu dianying guannian de gengxin” (On updating social and film concepts), *Dianying Yishu* (Film Art), No. 2, pp. 2–18 (especially p. 6); Xu Qihua, 1985, “Qiaozhen he Yaping de yinmu xingxiang buru xiaoshuo” (Screen images of Qiaozhen and Yaping are inferior to those in the fiction), *Dianying Yishu* (Film Art), No. 2, pp. 25–26; Wang Zhongming, 1990, *Dachao chudong — Lun Zhongguo dianying yu shehui* (Emerging Tides — On Chinese Cinema and Society), Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, especially pp. 26–33.
2. Pan Xiao, 1980, “Rensheng de lu a, weishenme yuezou yuezhai ... ?” (Why is life’s road getting narrower and narrower ... ?), *Zhongguo qingnian* (China Youth), No. 5, pp. 3–5.
3. For a more detailed account of the event, see Peng Bo (ed.), 2000, *Yidai zhongguo qingnian de sixiang chulian: Pan Xiao tao lun* (The Ideological First Love of China’s Younger Generation: Pan Xiao’s Debate), Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe, especially pp. 297–298.
4. *How the Steel Was Tempered* (Gangtie shi zenyang lianchengde) was a novel by the former Soviet writer Nicolas Ostrovskii in the 1930s. The first Chinese translation appeared soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The novel has been highly recommended to youth by the authorities as an impeccable text for revolutionary moral education, with its hero Pavel as a model committed to the communist cause. In 2000, the novel was made into a twenty-part TV series, a co-production of the Propaganda Department of Chinese Communist Party Shenzhen Committee, China International Television Company and China Central Television. Lei Feng was another model set up for Chinese youth by the Chinese Communist Party. [Author’s note]
5. Galathee is a selfish figure in Balzac’s *Eugénie Grandet* and Nekludov a hypocritical character in Tolstoy’s *Resurrection*. [Author’s note]
6. Translation from Ding, *The Decline of Communism in China*, pp. 104–106, and Peter J. Seybolt, 1981, “‘What is the meaning of life?’ Selections from *Zhongguo qingnian*,” *Chinese Education*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 7–13, with my alterations.

7. See *China Youth*, No. 3, 1981, p. 16.
8. *China Youth*, No. 7, 1980, p. 18. (Translation from Ding, *The Decline of Communism in China*, p. 106.)
9. Facts and figures cited here are from Huang Jie and Mou Guoyi, 1989, “Pan Xiao taolun yu ‘ren de shidai’ de huhuan” (Pan Xiao’s debate and the call for the “human era”), *Qingnian yanjiu* (Youth Study), No. 6, p. 18.
10. *China Youth*, No. 8, 1980, p. 2.
11. Jonathan Spence, 1990, *The Search for Modern China*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 540–541.
12. See Ding, *The Decline of Communism in China*, p. 106. The publication of the letter had been interpreted by some sinologists as *China Youth*’s “deliberate attempt to elicit expressions of discontent.” See Helen F. Siu and Zelda Stern (eds.), 1983, *Mao’s Harvest: Voices from China’s New Generation*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 3; and Alan P. L. Liu, 1984, “Opinions and attitudes of youth in the People’s Republic of China,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 24, No. 9 (September), p. 977.
13. For an account of the controversies over the debate within the Party’s high levels, see Peng, *The Ideological First Love of China’s Younger Generation*, pp. 21–29.
14. *People’s Daily*, 29 July 1980, p. 1.
15. I.e. Peng, *The Ideological First Love of China’s Younger Generation*.
16. Peng, *The Ideological First Love of China’s Younger Generation*, front cover.
17. See, for example: Beverley Hooper, 1985, *Youth in China*. Victoria (Australia): Penguin, p. 161; Ding, *The Decline of Communism in China*, p. 103; Siu and Stern, *Mao’s Harvest*, p. 3. The letter, alongside the editor’s remarks, even drew attention from the other side of the Taiwan Strait where they were considered as anti-Communist voices, along with Wei Jingsheng’s (in)famous article “The fifth modernization.” See *Dalu qingnian de nuhou: yuanshi ziliao huibian zier* (The voice of rebel from the mainland youth: A collection of raw materials), Vol. 2, Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gongsi, 1983, pp. 377–385.
18. Zhao Lin, “Wo mingyun zhong de yige zuizhongyao de shuniudian” (A turning point in my life), in Peng, *The Ideological First Love of China’s Younger Generation*, p. 102.
19. Lu Xun, 1981, “Preface to Nahan,” *Luxun quanji* (Complete Works of Lu Xun), Vol. 1, Beijing: Renmin wenzue chubanshe, p. 419; translation from Leo Ou-fan Lee, 1987, *Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 86.
20. See Peng Mingbang, “‘Pan Xiao taolun’ shimo” (A full account of ‘Pan Xiao’s debate’), in Peng Bo, *The Ideological First Love of China’s Younger Generation*, p. 9
21. Peng, “A full account of ‘Pan Xiao’s debate,” p. 9.
22. *China Youth*, No. 5, 1980, p. 2.
23. See Sun Lung-kee, 1983, *Zhongguo wenhua de “shengceng jiegou”* (The “Deep Structure” of Chinese Culture), Hong Kong: Jixianshe, p. 394.
24. Charles A. Reich, 1970, *The Greening of America*, New York: Randon House, p. 9.
25. *China Youth* Editorial Board, “Rensheng de lu weishenme yuezou yuekuan” (Why is life’s road becoming wider and wider?), in Peng, *The Ideological First Love of China’s Younger Generation*, p. 2.
26. Xie Fei, 1990, “Benmingnian daoyan canshu” (*Black Snow*: A director’s explanation), *China Film Yearbook*, Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, p. 76.

27. He Zhiyun, 1982, “Liaojie qingnian, zhunque biaoxian qingnian” (Understand youth, and represent them accurately), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 2, p. 22.
28. Source: *China Film Yearbook*, 1982, pp. 525–535; *China Film Yearbook*, 1981, pp. 639–647.
29. Zhang Nuanxin and Li Tuo, 1979, “Lun dianying yuyan de xiandaihua” (On the modernization of film language), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 3. For an English version of the article, see George S. Semsel, Xia Hong, and Hou Jianping (eds), 1990, *Chinese Film Theory: A Guide to the New Era*, New York: Praeger, pp. 10–20.
30. He, “Understand youth”, p. 24.
31. See Zhang Nuanxin, 1983, “*Sha Ou*: Cong juban dao dianying” (*Drive to Win*: From script to film), Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, December; reprinted in *Journal of Beijing Film Academy*, No. 3, 2005, p. 84.
32. For some debates on “Sha Ou spirit,” see Chen Wugong, 1982, “Dianxing yinggai shi teding de” (Model people should be specific); Liu Shijie and Liu Shuming, 1982, “Wei Sha Ou xingxiang de dianxingxing yibian” (In defence of Sha Ou as a model person), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 8, pp. 14–18 and pp. 19–23.
33. Teng Wenji, 1981, “Changsi he tansuo: Tantan *Suxing*” (Experiment and exploration: A chat on *Awakening*), *Dazhong dianying* (Popular Cinema), No. 8, p. 6.
34. Teng, “Experiment and exploration,” p. 6.
35. Teng, “Experiment and exploration,” p. 6.
36. Ding Yan, 1982, “Zai gandao ‘menglong’ zhihou” (After feeling “misty”), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 3, p. 5.
37. I.e. *Little Flowers* (*Xiao hua*, dir. Huang Jianzhong, Beijing Studio, 1979). For details, see Xia Zhihou, 1980, “Cong *Xiao hua* kan ‘yishiliu’ shoufa” (*Little Flowers* and the “stream of consciousness” technique), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 10, pp. 60–63.
38. This “old man” is Lu Xun, one of the most important and influential essayists and short-story writers of the twentieth-century China. He is perhaps the only writer untouched by the numerous political movements in socialist China. His words quoted in the Yuanmingyuan scene of *Awakening* are constantly used by authorities to encourage youth to make daring efforts in the construction of socialism.
39. See Chen Guangzhong, 1982, “Tansuo yu miman: Qianyi *Su xing*” (Exploration and confusion: A tentative analysis of *Awakening*), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 1, p. 10; and Ding, “After feeling ‘misty’”, p. 9.
40. This translation of the “Three T Company” (*santi gongsi*) is from Jing Wang, 1996, *High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 274.
41. Quoted in Wang Yunzhen, 1989, “Fang Mi Jiashan tan *Wan zhu*” (Interviewing Mi Jiashan and chatting about *Masters of Mischief*), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 5, p. 3.
42. Huang Jianxin, 1989, “*Lunhui* daoyan chanshu” (*Samsara*: A director’s explanation), *Zhongguo dianyingbao* (Chinese Film Bulletin), 15 April, p. 3.
43. Børge Bakken, 2000, *The Exemplary Society: Human Improvement, Social Control, and the Dangers of Modernity in China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.411.
44. Zhang Yi, 1993, *Kankan Wang Shuo* (Wang Shuo Talking up a Storm), Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, p.12; quoted in Wang, *High Culture Fever*, pp. 268–269.

45. The translation is from Huihui Zhang and John Michaan, 1998, “*The Troubleshooters*,” *Chinese Education and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January/February), p. 49. Also see Yuan Liangjun, 2001, “Wangshuo de zhishifenzi guan” (Wang Shuo’s view on intellectuals), *Hainan shifan xueyue xuebao: renwen shehui kexueban* (Journal of Hainan Normal University, Humanities and Social Science), No. 3, pp. 7–12; and Yang Jianlong, 2002, “Lun Wangshuo xiaoshuo de fanfeng yishu” (On ironical skill of Wang Shuo’s fiction), *Zhongguo wenxue yanjiu* (Research of Chinese Literature), No. 1, pp. 62–66.
46. A Western scholar also noted the significance of his name, which, in his view, is made up of two characters for the mythical sage-emperors Yao and Shun. He further suggested that the name may also be a reference to Mao Zedong’s poem “Sending off the God of Disease” (Song wenshen), in which the Chairman spoke of the Chinese people as “six hundred million Yaos and Shuns.” See Geremie Barmé, 1999, *In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture*, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 402.
47. The Five Stresses and Four Points of Beauty (*wu jiang si mei*) are stresses on decorum, manners, hygiene, discipline and morality; beautification of the mind, language, behaviour and the environment. The movement was launched by the government with the aim of civilizing ordinary Chinese citizens. It went public for the first time in March 1982 in the form of “Civic Virtues Month” (*wenming limao yue*).
48. For a comprehensive account of the conflicts arising between the youth education specialists and Shekou youth, see Zeng Xianbin, 1988, “‘Shekou fengbo’ dawenlu” (A record of interviews about “Shekou Incident”), *People’s Daily*, 8 August. For a detailed profile and stimulating discussion of the incident in English, see Luo Xu, 1995, “The ‘Shekou Storm’: Changes in the mentality of Chinese youth prior to Tiananmen,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 142 (June), pp. 541–572.
49. See Liu Xueqiang, 1986, *Hongchen xinzhao — Shenzhen qingnian guannian genxing lu* (*Dusts and Tide: Changing Concepts Among Youth in Shenzhen*), Kunming: Yunnan renming chubanshe, p. 56.
50. “Qingnian jiaoyujia zai Shekou yudao de tiaozhan” (The challenge confronted by youth educators at Shekou), *Qingnian yanjiu* (Youth Study), No. 11, 1988, p. 4.
51. “The challenge confronted by youth educators at Shekou,” p. 4.
52. For accounts of the controversy surrounding the film, see Geremie Barmé and John Minford (eds.), 1988, *Seeds of Fire: Chinese Voices of Conscience*, New York: Hill & Wang, pp. 251–269; Bonnie S. McDougall, 1991, *The Yellow Earth: A Film by Chen Kaige*, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, pp. 115–129 and pp. 151–167.
53. Li Yiming, 1989, “Shifu xingwei zhihou — Dangdai dianying zhong de jiating: Queshi yu buchang” (After father was beheaded — Family in contemporary cinema: Absence and compensation), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 6, p. 10.
54. See Mi Jiashan, 1998, “Discussing *The Troubleshooters*,” *Chinese Education and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January/February), p. 10.
55. Huang Jianxin, 1989, “*Lunhui duihua lu*” (A dialogue on *Samsara*), in Zhang Ziliang and Zhu Zi (eds.), *Huang Jianxin zuopin ji* (Selected Works of Huang Jianxin), Xi’an: Huayue wenyi chubanshe, p. 220.
56. See Li Erwei, 1998, *Cuican de fengjingxian* (Spectacular Scenes), Jinan: Shandong huabao chubanshe, p. 189.

57. For a subtle analysis of the visual imagery of the film and an exquisite exploration of the underlying message, see Zhang Jiaxuan, 1989, “Review of *The Big Parade*,” *Film Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Fall), pp. 57–59.
58. Zhang, “Review of *The Big Parade*,” p. 59.
59. George Melly, (1970) 1989, *Revolt into Style: The Pop Arts in the 50s and 60s*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 9.
60. Stanley Cohen, 1972, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers*, St Albans: Palladin, p. 26.
61. Reich, *The Greening of America*, p. 362.
62. See *Wenhui dianying shibao* (Shanghai Film Times), 8 April 1989, p. 1.
63. Quoted in Wang, “Interviewing Mi Jiashan and chatting about *Masters of Mischief*,” p. 3.
64. Wang, “Interviewing Mi Jiashan and chatting about *Masters of Mischief*,” p. 8.
65. The translation is from Xiaobing Tang, 1994, “Configuring the modern space: Cinematic representation of Beijing and its politics,” *East-West Film Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (July), pp. 49, 67.
66. For a stimulating description and interpretation of the transforming process from *guangchang* (square) to *shichang* (market) and the significance of the transformation, see Dai Jinhua, 1999, “Invisible writing: The politics of Chinese mass culture in the 1990s,” *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring), especially pp. 31–35.
67. Yan Jingming, 1989, “Wanzhu yu dushi de chongtu: Wang Shuo xiaoshuo de jiazhi xuanze” (The masters of mischief and their conflicts with the city: The choice of values in Wang Shuo’s writings), *Wenxue pinglun* (Literary Critique), No. 6, p. 90.

Chapter 3 The Politics of Lifestyle

1. Xiao Chen, 1981, “*Lushan Lian* laigao zongshu” (A summary of incoming articles on *Love on Lushan Mountain*), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 3, p. 63.
2. See Jiang Sishen, 1980, “You qingren zhongchen juanshu: ping *Lushan lian* de yishu gousi” (All lovers will sooner or later get married: On the artistic conception of *Love on Lushan Mountain*), *Xiju yu dianying* (Theatre and Cinema), No. 11, p. 23.
3. See Deborah S. Davis, 2000, “A revolution in consumption,” in Deborah S. Davis (ed.), *The Consumer Revolution in Urban China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 3–6.
4. For details, see Hanlong Li, “To be relatively comfortable in an egalitarian society,” in Davis, *The Consumer Revolution in Urban China*, pp. 124–141.
5. Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, 1998, “China’s consumer revolution: The 1990s and beyond,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 7, No. 18, p. 351.
6. For some Western literatures on the “consumer revolution” taking place in China since the 1980s, see Zhao Bin and Graham Murdock, 1996, “Young pioneers: Children and the making of Chinese consumerism,” *Cultural Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 201–217; Wu Yanrui, 1998, *China’s Consumer Revolution: The Emerging Patterns of Wealth and Expenditure*, London: Edward Elgar; Li Conghua, 1998, *China: The Consumer Revolution*, New York: John Wiley; Chao and Myers, “China’s consumer revolution,” pp. 351–368; Davis, *The Consumer Revolution in Urban China*; Beverley Hooper,

- 2000, “Globalization and resistance in post-Mao China: The case of foreign consumer products,” *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December), pp. 439–470.
7. Ye Nanke, 1991, “Bashi niandai qingnian shenghuo fangshi bianqian jiqi yanjiu” (A study of the changing patterns of lifestyle among the 1980s youth), *Qingnian yanjiu* (Youth Study), No.8, p. 21.
 8. Paul Willis, 1990, *Common Culture*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, p. 137.
 9. For a comprehensive account of the situation of the employment market before, during and after the Cultural Revolution, see Deborah Davis, 1992, “Job mobility in post-Mao cities: Increases on the margins,” *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 132, pp. 1062–1085.
 10. Chao and Myers, “China’s consumer revolution,” p. 359.
 11. Li, *China: The Consumer Revolution*, p. 192.
 12. Nicholas D. Kristof, 1992, “Chinese Communism’s secret aim: Capitalism,” *New York Times*, 19 October, p. A6.
 13. Wu Houxin, 1992, “Lun zhuying de dushi dianying” (On urban films by the Pearl River Studio), *Zhongguo dianying nianjian* (China film yearbook 1990), Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, p. 281.
 14. See Xu Ming, 1988, “Xin langchao, shijieguan, shidai yishi” (New wave, world outlook, and modern consciousness), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 3, pp. 24–28; Hu Weiyao et al., 1988, “Xiaoxiao sasa *Taiyang yu*” (Natural and unrestrained *Sun Showers*), *Dangdai dianying* (Contemporary Cinema), No. 2, pp. 76–80.
 15. “Diwudai ‘yinshi daoyan’ Zhang Zeming yu chongchu jianghu” (The fifth-generation “hermit director” Zhang Zeming will resume filmmaking), *Qingnian shibao* (Youth Times), 2 June 2003, <http://ent.sina.com.cn/s/m/2003-06-02/1709152690.html>, retrieved on 15 August 2006.
 16. Jin Dacheng, 1988, “*Gei kafei jia dian tang mantan*” (A chat about *Coffee with Sugar*), *Dangdai dianying* (Contemporary Cinema), No. 2, p. 59.
 17. Daniel Bell, 1973, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, New York: Basic Books, Inc., p. 68.
 18. Hong Cheng, 1996, “Advertising in China: A socialist experiment,” in Katherine Toland Frith (ed.), *Advertising in Asia: Communication, Culture and Consumption*, Ames: Iowa State University Press, p. 78.
 19. See Huang Huilin and Yin Hong, (eds.), 1998, *Dangdai Zhongguo dazhong wenhua yanjiu* (Studies of Popular Culture in Contemporary China), Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, p. 435. There has been controversy over what is the first advertisement in the post-Cultural Revolution China. One scholar noted that it was “on 14 January, 1979, the *Tianjin Daily* ran an advertisement for the Tianjin Toothpaste Factory.” See Cheng, “Advertising in China,” p. 78. Others argued that “the curtain lifted in Shanghai’s *Liberation Daily*” on 28 January 1979. See Randall Stross, 1990, “The return of advertising in China: A survey of the ideological reversal,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 123, p. 486.
 20. Xu Weidong, 2000, “Wo di yi ge qiaokai Zhongguo guanggao damen” (I’m the first one to knock open China’s advertising door), *Huanqiu shibao* (Global Times), Beijing, 1 December.
 21. Zhang and Cheng, *The Fourth Generation*, pp. 48–49; translated and quoted in Zhao and Murdock, “Young pioneers,” p. 204.

22. Stross, “The return of advertising in China,” p. 485.
23. Liu W. Z., 1986, “Shehui zhuyi shangpin guanggao de tedian” (The characteristics of socialist commercial advertising), *Guangming ribao*, 15 February, p. 3. The translation is from Cheng, “Advertising in China,” p. 81.
24. See He Xin, 1985, “Dangdai wenxue zhong de huangmiugan yu duoyuzhe” (On the sense of absurdity and superfluous people in contemporary literature), *Dushu*, No. 11, pp. 3–13.
25. Liu Suola, 1985, “Ni bie wu xuanze,” *Renmin wenxue* (People’s Literature), No. 3, pp. 4–29; Xu Xing, 1985, “Wu zhuti bianzou,” *Renmin wenxue* (People’s Literature), No. 7, pp. 29–41; Chen Cun, 1984, “Shao nan shao nü, yi gong qi ge.” Chen’s novella was first published in 1984 and was later included in *Chen Cun we ji: Tamen* (Selected works of Chen Cun: Them), Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1996, pp. 55–121.
26. Martha Cheung, 1993, “Introduction” to Liu Suola’s *Blue Sky Green Sea and Other Stories*, Martha Cheung (trans.), Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, p. x. (Author’s note: The angry-young-man fiction genre became popular in Britain in the mid- to late 1950s, ten years before Cheung’s dates.)
27. Wei Xiaolin, 1990, “Bianyuanren: yizhong xinde yinmu zhurengong xingxiang” (Marginalized people: A new type of screen figures), *Yishu guangjiao* (Art Perspective), No. 2, p. 70.
28. See Dai Jinhua, 2000, *Wuzhong fengjing* (Scenes in the fog), Beijing: Peking University Press, pp. 445–446.
29. “Rubber man” (Xiangpi ren) is the title of the original novella from which the film *Out of Breath* was adapted. See Wang Shuo, 1995, *Wang Shuo wenji* (Selected works of Wang Shuo), Vol. 2, Beijing: Huayi chubanshe, pp. 1–105.
30. Quoted in Dick Hebdige, 1979, *Subculture: The Meaning of Style*, London: Methuen, p. 100.
31. Luo Xu, 2002, *Searching for Life’s Meaning: Changes and Tensions in the Worldviews of Chinese Youth in the 1980s*, University of Michigan Press, p. 244.
32. *People’s Daily*, 5 June 1982, p. 5. Quoted in Hooper, “Globalization and resistance in post-Mao China,” p. 450.
33. Paul Willis, 1978, *Profane Culture*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 57.
34. Willis, *Profane Culture*, London, p. 57.
35. Interestingly, these values have been celebrated by Western enterprises in China to expand their business. For example, a leading promotion slogan for the Beijing McDonald in early 1990s was “Get together at McDonalds; enjoy the happiness of family life” (*Huanju Maidanglao; gong xiang jiating le*). See Yunxiang Yan, 1997, “McDonalds in Beijing: The localization of Americana,” in James L. Watson (ed.), *Golden Arches East: McDonalds in East Asia*, California: Stanford University Press, p. 59.
36. Maria Galikowski and Lin Min, 1997, “Fragmentation and heterogeneity: Xu Xing’s literary treatment of the contemporary human condition,” in “*Variations Without a Theme*” and *Other Stories by Xu Xing*, Maria Galikowski and Lin Min (trans.), Sydney: Wild Peony, p. 2.
37. *Float to the Surface of the Sea* (*Fuchu haimian*) is the Chinese title of the novella from which young-rebel film *Samsara* was adapted.
38. Clark, *Chinese Cinema*, p. 161.

39. *Film Art* Editorial Board, 1980, “Duiyu aiqing ticai yingpian chuanguo de kanfa: fang tuanzhongyang, Zhongguo qingnianbaoshe he Zhongguo qingnian zazhishe” (Some views on the making of films with a love subject: An interview with the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China, *China Youth Daily* and *China Youth* magazine), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 12, pp. 22–25, 63.
40. *Film Art* Editorial Board, “Some views on the making of films with a love subject,” p. 22.
41. *Film Art* Editorial Board, “Some views on the making of films with a love subject,” p. 25.
42. See *Dazhong dianying* (Popular Cinema), No. 9, 1979, pp. 6–9, and No. 10, pp. 4–7.
43. For a more detailed account of the relationship between “desexualization” and “social harmony,” see Sun Longji, 1988, “The deep structure of Chinese sexuality,” in Geremie Barmé and John Minford (eds.), *Seeds of Fire: Chinese Voices of Conscience*, New York: Hill & Wang, pp. 227–231.
44. For an explanation of the principles and contradictions of the patriarchal-socialism, see Judith Stacey, 1983, *Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 203–247, and Harriet Evans, 2000, “Fashioning identities, consuming passions: public images of women in China,” *Culture/China: A Journal of Culture/Theory/Politics*, No. 40 (Spring), particularly pp. 118–120.
45. Mingyan Lai, 1995, “Female but not women: Genders in the Chinese socialist texts,” in Carol Siegel and Ann Kibbey (eds.), *Forming and Unforming Identity*, New York: New York University Press, p. 293.
46. Ann Anagnost, 1994, “The Politicised Body,” *Stanford Humanities Review*, 2(1), p. 91.
47. Elizabeth Croll, 1981, *The Politics of Marriage in Contemporary China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 6.
48. *Daughter of the Party* (*Dang de nüer*, dir. Lin Nong, August First Studio, 1958)
49. Evans, “Fashioning identities,” p. 117.
50. Feng Yu, 1955, “Jintian de funü fuzhuang wenti” (The question of women’s dress today), *Zhongguo funü* (China Women), No. 3; quoted in Evans, “Fashioning identities,” p. 118.
51. See Liang Xiaoshen, 1988, *Yige hongweibing de zibai* (Confession of a Red Guard), Chengdu: Sichuan wenyi chuabanshe, p. 260.
52. Clark, *Chinese Cinema*, p. 134.
53. Meng Yue, 1993, “Female images and national myth,” in T. E. Barlow (ed.), *Gender Politics in Modern China: Writing and Feminism*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, p. 136.
54. Meng, “Female images and national myth,” p. 119.
55. Sandra Burton, 1988, “The sexual revolution hits China,” *Time*, 12 September, p. 65.
56. Zhang Yingjin, 1990, “Ideology of the body in *Red Sorghum*: national allegory, national roots, and third cinema,” *East-West Film Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 40.
57. See Zhang Ziliang and Zhu Zi (eds.), 1989, *Huang Jianxin zuopin ji* (Selected works of Huang Jianxin), Xi’an: Huayue wenyi chubanshe, pp.223–224.
58. Chris Berry, 1999, “Representing Chinese women: researching women in the Chinese cinema,” in A. Finnane, and A. McLaren (eds.), *Dress, Sex and Text in Chinese Culture*, Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, p. 210.

59. For a critical study of the “gender inequality” as represented in this film, refer to Elissa Rashkin, 1993, “Rape as castration as spectacle: *The Price of Frenzy*’s politics of confusion,” in Tonglin Lu (ed.), *Gender and Sexuality in Twentieth-Century Chinese Literature and Society*, Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 107–119, and Tonglin Lu, 1993, “How do you tell a girl from a boy? Uncertain sexual boundaries in *The Price of Frenzy*,” in William Burgwinkle et al. (eds.), *Significant Others: Gender and Culture in Film and Literature East and West*, Honolulu: College of Languages, Linguistics and Literature, University of Hawaii, East-West Center, pp. 63–74.
60. Rashkin, “Rape as castration as spectacle,” p. 113.
61. Mo Yan, 1988, “Ye jiao ‘honggaoliang jiazu’ beiwanglu” (Another memorandum on *Red Sorghum Saga*), *Daxibei dianying* (Film of the Northwest), April, p. 4.
62. Tony Rayns, 1987, “The position of women in new Chinese cinema,” *East-West Film Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June), p. 43.
63. Berry, “Representing Chinese women,” p. 206.
64. Clark, *Chinese Cinema*, p. 40.
65. Rashkin, “Rape as castration as spectacle,” p. 114.
66. Chao and Myers, “China’s consumer revolution,” p. 368.

Chapter 4 Rock ‘n’ Roll: From Rebellion to Consumption

1. Liu Yiran, 1988, “Yaogun qingnian” (*Rock Kids*), in *Qingnian wenxue* (Youth Literature), No. 10, pp. 4–28; the translation is from Geremie Barmé and Linda Jaivin (eds.), 1992, *New Ghosts, Old Dreams*, New York: Times Books, pp. 14–15.
2. Isabel K. F. Wong, 1984, “*Geming gequ*: Songs for the education of the masses,” in Bonnie S. McDougall (ed.), *Popular Chinese Literature and Performing Arts in the People’s Republic of China 1949–1979*, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 143.
3. See Huang Huilin and Yin Hong (eds.), *Studies of Popular Culture in Contemporary China*, p. 164.
4. Peter Manuel, 1988, *Popular Music of the Non-Western World: An Introductory Survey*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 228.
5. Arnold Perris, 1983, “Music as propaganda: Art at the command of doctrine in the People’s Republic of China,” *Ethnomusicology*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (January), p. 14.
6. See, for example, Han Kuo-Huang, 1978, 1979, “The Chinese concept of program music,” *Asian Music*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 17–38, and “The modern Chinese orchestra,” *Asian Music*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1–8.
7. Wong, “*Geming gequ*,” p. 133.
8. See Deng Zhufei, 1997, “*Xiaohua pingxi yu xinshang*” (Appreciation and evaluation of *Little Flowers*), in Cheng Shu’an (ed.), *Zhongguo dianying mingpian jianshang cidian* (Dictionary of appreciation of famous Chinese movies), Beijing: Changzheng chubanshe, p. 317.
9. See Wang Haizhou, “*Leihen pingxi yu xinshang*” (Appreciation and evaluation of *Traces of Tears*), in Cheng, *Dictionary of Appreciation of Famous Chinese Movies*, p. 322.
10. Huang and Yin, *Studies of Popular Culture in Contemporary China*, p. 181.

11. Geremie Barmé, 1999, *In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture*, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 221.
12. Chen Qian and Xie Haiguang, 1996, “Liuxing gequ bainian liubian yu qingnian wenhua shiji guiji” (A century of changing trends of popular music and youth culture), *Dangdai qingnian yanjiu* (Contemporary Youth Study), No. 3, p.39.
13. Andrew Jones, 1992, *Like a Knife: Ideology and Genre in Contemporary Chinese Popular Music*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 16.
14. Quoted in Yu Jin, 1999, *Kuanghuan jijie: Liuxing yinyue shiji jufeng* (The season of revelries: Popular music hurricane), Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, p. 61.
15. *Farewell Rock: A Tribute to Teresa Teng*, Hubei yinxiang yishu chubanshe, 1996.
16. Han Shaogong, 1985, “Wenhua de ‘gen’” (The “roots” of literature), *Zuojia* (Writers), No. 4.
17. Yi-tsi Mei Feuerwerker, 1998, *Ideology, Power, Text: Self-Representation and the Peasant “Other” in Modern Chinese Literature*, California: Stanford University Press, p. 193.
18. See Zhu Linbo, 1988, “Di san dai shiren de liu ge fandui he san ge tedian” (The six-anti’s and three features of the third-generation poets), *Qingnian shige pinglun* (Youth Poetry Criticism), No. 2, p. 43.
19. Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture*, p. 45.
20. Yan Haiping, 1998, “Theatre and society: An introduction to contemporary Chinese drama,” in Yan Haiping (ed.), *Theatre and Drama: An Anthology of Contemporary Chinese Drama*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, p. xix.
21. Gao Minglu, 1998, “From elite to small man: The many faces of a transitional avant-garde in Mainland China,” in Gao Minglu (ed.), *Inside Out: New Chinese Art*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 150–151.
22. The success of the local popular music was only a temporary phenomenon. Popular music from Hong Kong and Taiwan made a return thrust in the early 1990s, with the rapid, quiet withdrawal of Northwest- wind music from the centre stage.
23. Simon Frith, 1978, *The Sociology of Rock*, London: Constable, p. 19.
24. Lawrence Grossberg, 1992, *We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture*, New York: Routledge, p. 205.
25. Quoted in Ding Jin, 1996, “Zhongguo yaogun: Fengli, wuli, yuli, mengli” (China rock in wind, in mist, in rain, and in dream), *Haishang wentan* (Shanghai Cultural World), No. 4, p. 13.
26. Zhao Jianwei, 1992, *Cui Jian: Zai yiwu suoyou zhong nahan* (Cui Jian: Cries of the dispossessed), Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, p. 127.
27. See “Cui Jian: Zhi zun” (Cui Jian: The most revered and respected), *Nanfang nongcun bao*, 19 October 1999; quoted in Meng Wa, 2000, “Fanpan yu guiyi de changzhenglu” (The road of Long March from revolt to conversion), in Dai Jinhua (ed.), *Shuxian wenhua yingxiang: Shiji zhijiao de wenhua yanjiu* (Writing cultural heroes: Cultural studies at the turn of the century), Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, pp. 231–232.
28. Yu, *The Season of Revelries*, p. 74.
29. Jeroen de Kloet, 2000, “‘Let him fucking see the green smoke beneath my groin’: The mythology of Chinese rock,” in Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang (eds.), *Postmodernism and China*, Durham: Duke University Press, p. 241.

30. Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, 1991, *Deathsong of the River: A Reader's Guide to the Chinese TV Series Heshang*, introduced, translated and annotated by Richard W. Bodman and Pin P. Wan, New York: Cornell University Press, p. 171. (Author's note: The "four little dragons" refer to South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.)
31. Quoted in Zhao, *Cui Jian*, p. 78.
32. The phrasing borrowed from the title of a Laurence Grossberg's essay, 1997, "I'd rather feel bad than not feel anything at all," in Laurence Grossberg, *Dancing in Spite of Myself: Essays on Popular Culture*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, pp. 64–88.
33. Philip Jenkinson and Alan Warner, 1974, *Celluloid Rock: Twenty Years of Movie Rock*, London: Lorrimer Publishing, p. 11.
34. Quoted in Zhao, *Cui Jian*, p. 78.
35. Kloet, "'Let him fucking see the green smoke beneath my groin,'" pp. 243 and 242.
36. Andrew Jones, 1994, "The politics of popular culture in post-Tiananmen China," in Jeffery N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds.), *Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China*, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 155.
37. Wu'er Kaixi, 1989, "Chinese writers under fire: The struggle for human rights in China" (transcript of panel discussion), *Pan American Center Newsletter*, No. 70 (December), p. 19; cited by Jones, *Like a Knife*, p. 123.
38. For instance, the government's soft attitude towards Cui Jian was signaled by Wang Meng, then Minister of Culture, during a visit to New Zealand in late March 1989 when he cited it "as an example of the Mainland's cultural liberalism." See Barmé, *In the Red*, p. 129.
39. *People's Daily*, 16 July 1988; cited in Jones, *Like a Knife*, p. 134.
40. *Rock on the Road of the New Long March* (Xin changzheng lu shang de yaogun) was Cui Jian's, and also China's first rock album. Tracks include "Rock on the road of the New Long March," "Don't cover it up again" (Bu zai yan shi), "Let me have a sound sleep" (Rang wo shui ge hao jiao), "Flower house girl" (Hua fang guniang), "Phony wandering monk" (Jia xing seng), "Start over again," "Run away" (Chu zou), "Nothing to my name" and "It's not that I don't understand." The album was released by Zhongguo liuyou shengxiang chubanshe (Beijing).
41. Jon Landau, "It's too late to stop now;" quoted in Simon Frith, 1978, *The Sociology of Rock*, London: Constable, p. 191.
42. Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture*, p. 126.
43. For an exhaustive description of the enthusiastic responses from audiences, see Zhao, *Cui Jian*, especially pp. 12–64.
44. Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture*, p. 129.
45. Quoted in Charles Hamm, 1991, "Music and radio in the People's Republic of China," *Asian Music*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring/Summer), p. 37.
46. The phrase was used by Ray Pratt to refer to the role of Bob Dylan in the counter culture of the 1960s in *Rhythm and Resistance: Explorations in the Political Uses of Popular Music*, New York: Praeger, 1990, p. 207. For an interesting parallel between Cui Jian and Bob Dylan, see Claire Huot, 2000, *China's New Cultural Scene: A Handbook of Changes*, Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 162–163 and pp. 169–170.

47. Yang Ping, 1986, “A director who is trying to change the audience,” *Popular Cinema*, No. 9, p. 4. An English version of the interview is available from Cherry Berry (ed.), 1991, *Perspectives on Chinese Cinema*, London: BFI, pp. 127–130.
48. For an exhaustive discussion of the late-1980s trend of making “entertainment films” and the controversy around the trend, see George S. Semsel, Chen Xihe and Xia Hong (eds.), 1993, *Film in Contemporary China: Critical Debates, 1979–1989*, Westport: Praeger, pp. 83–139.
49. Michael Berry, 2005, “Tain Zhuangzhuang: Stealing horses and flying kites,” in *Speaking in Images: Interviews with Contemporary Chinese Filmmakers*, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 65.
50. Zhang Wei, 1989, “Xunzhao gexing zhangyang yu gewu yingpian de qihe duiying,” (Seeking a harmonious expression of personality in the song-and-dance movie), *Wenhui Dianying Shibao* (Shanghai Film Times), 21 January, p. 2.
51. Berry, “Capturing a transforming reality,” in *Speaking in Images*, p. 195.
52. Jones, *Like a Knife*, p. 130.
53. He Yong, 1994, *Lajichang* (Garbage Dump), Shanghai: Shanghai shengxiang chubanshe.
54. Barmé and Jaivin, *New Ghosts*, p. 10.
55. Cui Jian, “A piece of red cloth” (Yi kuai hong bu), from Cui Jian’s *Jie jue* (Resolution), Zhongguo beiguang shengxiang yishu gongshi, 1991; the translation taken from Jones, *Like a Knife*, pp. 138–139 (with my alterations).
56. Dai Jinhua, 2000, *Wuzhong fengjing* (Scenes in the fog), Beijing: Peking University Press, p. 412.
57. Tony Rayne, 1993, “Dream on,” *Sight and Sound*, July, p. 16.
58. See Liu Xinwu, 1993, “Ni zhineng miandui” (You have no other choice but face it), *Dushu*, No. 12, p. 4.
59. Zhang and Xiao, *Encyclopaedia of Chinese Film*, p. 92.
60. Cui Jian, “The last complaint” (Zuihou de baoyuan), in *A New Generation under the Red Flag* (*Hongqi xia de dan*), Shenzhenshi jiguang jiemu chuban faxing gongsi, 1994.
61. Liu, “You have no other choice but face it,” p. 5.
62. Gu Cheng, 1983, “A generation,” in Helen F. Siu and Zelda Stern (eds.), *Mao’s Harvest: Voices from China’s New Generation*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 16.
63. Kloet, ““Let him fucking see the green smoke beneath my groin,”” p. 239.
64. E. Ann Kaplan, 1987, *Rocking around the Clock: Music Television, Postmodernism, and Consumer Culture*, New York: Routledge, p. 13.
65. Rey Chow, 1993, “Listening otherwise, music miniaturized: A different type of question about revolution,” in *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 147.
66. Luo Dayou, “Song of the dwarf” (Zhuru zhige); cited in Chow, “Listening otherwise,” p. 158.
67. Jones, “The politics of popular music in post-Tiananmen China,” p. 149.
68. *Hong taiyang* (Red Sun), Zhongguo changpian zonggongsi Shanghai gongsi, 1992.
69. Zhang Guangtian, 1993, “Mao Zedong,” in *A Collection of Modern Songs by Zhang Guangtian*, Beijing: Zhongguo yinyue yinxiang chubanshe. Translation from Huot, *China’s New Cultural Scene*, p. 164.

70. Quoted in Jiang Wen et al., 1997, *Yibu dianying de dansheng* (The birth of a film), Beijing: Huayi chubanshe, p. 70.
71. In an interview with A. Solomon, “Not just a yawn but the howl that could free China,” *New York Times Magazine*, 19 December 1993; cited in Huot, *China’s New Cultural Scene*, p. 59.
72. Cited in Meng, “The road of Long March from revolt to conversion,” p. 256.
73. Sun Mengjin, 1995, “Bei yiqi de huoyan — No yuedui” (A cast-off flame — the No band), in *Rock: Souvenir Album* (Yaogun: Jinian ban), Beijing; as cited in Huot, *China’s New Cultural Scene*, p. 168.
74. Huot, *China’s New Cultural Scene*, pp. 168–169
75. Cui Jian, 1998, *Wuneng de lilian* (The power of the powerless), China Record Cooperation.

Chapter 5 A British Comparison

1. The calculation was made on the assumption that the average income was 100 *yuan* in 1952. The figures are from *Zhongguo tongji nianjian* (China Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1989, p. 29. Other figures related to Chinese society in the chapter are from the same source, unless otherwise indicated.
2. John Hill, 1986, *Sex, Class and Realism: British Cinema 1956–1963*, London: BFI Publishing, p. 7.
3. Beverley Hooper, 1985, “The youth problem: Deviations from the socialist road,” in Graham Young (ed.), *China: Dilemmas of Modernisation*, Sydney: Croom Helm, p. 229.
4. Arthur Marwick, 1982, *British Society since 1945*, Penguin Books, p. 120.
5. Arthur Marwick, 1991, *Culture in Britain since 1945*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 56.
6. John Montgomery, 1965, *The Fifties*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, p. 162.
7. Jeffery Richards, 1992, “New waves and old myths: British cinema in the 1960s,” in Bart Moore-Gilbert and John Seed (eds.), *Cultural Revolution? The Challenge of the Arts in the 1960s*, London: Routledge, p. 220.
8. Arthur Marwick, 1984, “Room at the Top, Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, and the ‘cultural revolution’ in Britain,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (January), p. 127.
9. See Ni Zhen, 1994, *Gaige yu Zhongguo dianying* (Reform and Chinese cinema), Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, p. 44. In 1979, the circulation of the pictorial monthly *Popular Cinema* was 9.6 million, a record to date.
10. For a director’s account of his motives in adapting writings about young urbanites, see Mi Jiashan, 1998, “Discussing *The Troubleshooters*,” *Chinese Education and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January/February), pp. 8–9. Similar accounts were given by the directors of some of these young-rebel films including Tian Zhuangzhuang, Xia Gang and Huang Jianxin in my interviews with them in Beijing in November and December 2000.
11. Edward Goring, 1959, *Daily Mail*, 5 November; quoted in Hill, *Sex, Class and Realism*, p. 39.
12. James Park, 1990, *British Cinema: The Lights That Failed*, London: B. T. Batsford Ltd, p. 12.

13. Lindsay Anderson, 1957, "Get out and push!" in Tom Maschler (ed.), *Declaration*, St Albans: MacGibbon and Kee, p. 157.
14. Peter Stead, 1991, *Film and the Working Class: The Feature Film in British and American Society*, London: Routledge, p. 180.
15. Stuart Laing, 1984, "Room at the Top: The morality of affluence," in Christopher Pawling (ed.), *Popular Fiction and Social Change*, New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 180.
16. Stead, *Film and the Working Class*, p. 184.
17. Peter Harcourt, 1962–1963, "I'd rather be like I am: Some comments on *The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner*," *Sight and Sound*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter), p. 16.
18. Peter Lewis, 1978, *The Fifties*, New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, p. 164.
19. Stuart Laing, 1984, "Room at the Top: The morality of affluence," in Christopher Pawling (ed.), *Popular Fiction and Social Change*, New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 167.
20. Tony Richardson, 1959, "The man behind the Angry Young Man," *Films and Filming*, February, p. 9.
21. Jeffery Richards, "New waves and old myths," p. 222.
22. Quoted in Redmer Yska, 1993, *All Shook Up: The Flash Boddies and the Rise of the New Zealand Teenager in the Fifties*, Auckland: Penguin Books, pp. 227–228.
23. Rank Annual Report, 1963, p. 18; cited in Hill, *Sex, Class and Realism*, pp. 49–50.
24. Terry Lovell, 1990, "Landscape and stories in 1960s British realism," *Screen*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter), p. 367.
25. Quoted in Tom Dewe Mathews, 1994, *Censored*, London: Chatto & Windus, p. 144.
26. John Trevelyan, 1973, *What the Censor Saw*, London: Michael Joseph, p. 106.
27. Alexander Walker, 1974, *Hollywood England*, London: Michael Joseph, p. 85.
28. Roy Armes, *A Critical History of the British Cinema*, London: Secker & Warburg, p. 273.
29. Armes, *A Critical History of the British Cinema*, p. 264.
30. James Park, *British Cinema*, p.108.
31. Zhang Ziliang and Zhu Zi, *Selected Works of Huang Jianxin*, p. 212.
32. Lewis, *The Fifties*, p. 158.
33. Paul G. Pickowicz, 1995, "Velvet prisons and the political economy of Chinese filmmaking," in Deborah Davis, Richard Kraus, Barry Naughton and Elizabeth Perry (eds.), *Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community in Post-Mao China*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 199.
34. Quoted in Andrew Gamble, 1974, *The Conservative Nation*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 66.
35. Quoted in Hill, *Sex, Class and Realism*, p. 9.
36. See Hill, *Sex, Class and Realism*, p. 213.
37. Colin Wilson; quoted in Kenneth Allsop, 1958, *The Angry Decade*, London: Peter Owen, pp. 194–195.
38. Eva Orbanz, 1977, *Journey to a Legend and Back: The British Realistic Film*, Berlin: Edition Volker Spiess, p. 58.
39. William L. Horne, 1999, "'Greatest pleasures': A Taste of Honey (1961) and *The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner* (1962)," in James M. Welsh and John C. Tibbetts (eds.), *The Cinema of Tony Richardson: Essays and Interviews*, Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 116–117.

40. Jeffrey Richards, 1992, “New waves and old myths: British cinema in the 1960s,” in Bart Moore-Gilbert and John Seed (eds.), *Cultural Revolution? The Challenge of the Arts in the 1960s*, London: Routledge, p. 219.
41. Dai Jinhua, 1989, “Ideology, Wang Shuo, 1988,” *China Screen*, No. 4, p. 28.

Conclusion

1. See Zhao Zixiang, Li Shuliang, and Wang Zheng, 1988, “Qingnian wenhua yu shehui bianqian” (Youth culture and social changes), *Shehui kexue zhanxian* (Social Science Front), No. 4, p. 110.
2. See, for example, Jin Guohua (ed.), 1999, *Qingnian xue* (Youthology), Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe.
3. Dai Jinhua, *Scenes in the Fog*, p. 361.
4. Quoted in Bai Xiaoding, 1994, “Xia Gang dianying, wuren hecai?” (Xia Gang’s films, no one cheers?), *Dianying yishu* (Film Art), No. 1, p. 27.
5. Wang Chunguang, 2005, “Yige zhengzai jueqi de xin gongren jiecheng” (A newly emerged working stratum), *Xuexi yu tansuo* (Study and Exploration), No.1, p. 21.
6. See Xi Xifu, 2004, “‘Deng’ zai zhongguo: Xiao Wu suo qishi de zhongguo xiandaixing” (‘Crouching’ in China: Chinese modernity conveyed in film *Xiao Wu*), in *The Chinese Culture Map of 21st Century*, Vol. 2, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, p. 83.
7. “The global teenager,” 1989, *Whole Earth Review*, (Winter), p. 2.

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