

# The New Politics of Beijing–Hong Kong Relations

## Ideological Conflicts and Factionalism

Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo

Hong Kong University Press  
The University of Hong Kong  
Pok Fu Lam Road  
Hong Kong  
<https://hkupress.hku.hk>

© 2024 Hong Kong University Press

ISBN 978-988-8805-72-3 (*Hardback*)

All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed and bound by J&S Printing Co., Ltd. in Hong Kong, China

# Contents

List of Figures and Tables	vi
Acknowledgments	viii
List of Abbreviations	xi
Introduction	1
1. Chinese Politics and Its Implications for Beijing–Hong Kong Relations	10
2. Ideologies and Factionalism in Beijing–Hong Kong Relations	70
3. Beijing’s Comprehensive Jurisdiction, Sino-Western Value Clashes, and Hong Kong Elections from 2021 to 2023: Implications for Taiwan	180
Conclusion	229
Bibliography	255
Index	281

# List of Figures and Tables

## Figures

Figure 2.1: Pro-Beijing Nationalism and Hongkongism	99
Figure 3.1: Beijing's Interactions with Hong Kong before the 2020 National Security Law	186
Figure 3.2: Beijing's New Interactions with Hong Kong after the 2020 National Security Law	186

## Tables

Table 2.1: Ideologies, Factions, and Political, Economic, Social, and Legal Disputes in Hong Kong	117
Table 2.2: The Evolution of the Legislative Council, 1947–1985	159
Table 2.3: The Evolution of the Legislative Council, 1985–2021	159
Table 2.4: Main Elements of the 2020 Electoral Reform Amended by the National People's Congress	163
Table 2.5: How District Council Members Are Removed and Replaced by Pro-Beijing Clients in the Fourth and Fifth Sectors of the Election Committee	164
Table 3.1: Beijing's Comprehensive Responses to Localist Populism	181
Table 3.2: Number of Voters and Voter Turnout in Legislative Council Elections, 2008–2021	197
Table 3.3: Results of the Legislative Council's Direct Elections in December 2021	198
Table 3.4: Results of the Election Committee in Legislative Council Elections, 2021	200
Table 3.5: Results of the Legislative Council's Functional Constituency Elections, 2021	203

Table 3.6: New Political Profile of the Legislative Council after the 2021 Elections	206
Table 3.7: The December 2023 District Council Elections in Hong Kong	212

# Introduction

Since the publication of my earlier book on Beijing–Hong Kong relations in 2008, political transformations in both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) have necessitated a reassessment of their historical interactions and the rapidly changing external political environment.<sup>1</sup> As such, this book adopts a different approach to understanding Beijing–Hong Kong relations by focusing on the ideological conflicts and factional politics on both sides. Since July 1, 1997, when the sovereignty of Hong Kong reverted from Britain to China, ideological conflicts have increasingly become prominent in Beijing–Hong Kong relations, especially after the mass protests against the Tung Chee-hwa government on July 1, 2003. From 2003 to 2019, as this book will discuss, such ideological clashes became far more serious than ever before—a process complicated by the evolution of different factional politics in both the mainland and the HKSAR. The ideological and power struggles between some Hong Kong people and the PRC resulted in Beijing’s deeper and swift intervention in Hong Kong matters after the end of 2019, leading to the victory of the central authorities over the local resistance movement.

This book argues that the promulgation of the national security law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC) for Hong Kong on June 30, 2020, was a watershed in Hong Kong’s political history. It was arguably both dependent and independent variables in Hong Kong’s turbulent political development. The national security law was an outcome of the severe ideological conflicts between the PRC authorities on the one hand and some pro-democracy elites and radical populists in Hong Kong on the other hand, as this book will show. The national security law was also a causal event that ushered

---

1. Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, *The Dynamics of Beijing–Hong Kong Relations: A Model for Taiwan* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008).

in the new politics of Beijing–Hong Kong relations, changing the Hong Kong political system from patron-client pluralism to patron-client and paternalistic authoritarianism. By patron-client pluralism, I refer to it as a phenomenon in which Hong Kong’s polity from 1997 to late 2019 was marked by the proliferation of the clientelist groups and individuals, who sought political influence from the politically powerful patron, namely Beijing authorities responsible for Hong Kong affairs.<sup>2</sup> However, the rise of a localist movement in Hong Kong’s pluralistic polity, including democratic populism and its radical faction, challenged the legitimacy of the HKSAR authorities and the central government in Beijing continuously from 2003 to 2019, leading to the PRC’s decision to intervene in Hong Kong affairs by imposing the national security law onto the HKSAR and turning the “one country, two systems” into a PRC-led political system. The imposition of the national security law represented a conservative nationalistic and hardline move made by the central authorities—a hardline action that filtered downward to a forceful implementation of the law by the HKSAR authorities. The effect was to establish a patron-client and paternalistic authoritarian system; it was patron-clientelist because Beijing, as the powerful patron, can select who are the “patriotic” elites governing Hong Kong and who should be excluded from the political system. The political system of Hong Kong is increasingly paternalistic because the central government sees itself like a strict father ruling the Hong Kong son, who was politically “naughty” and behaviorally “rebellious” from 2003 to 2019. The Hong Kong polity is partially “populist” in the sense that the pro-Beijing “patriotic” groups have become the most powerful populist sector directly replacing the democrats and shaping the policy-making process and legislative politics. Yet, compared with the democratic populists in Hong Kong before the promulgation of the national security law in late June 2020, the pro-Beijing and nationalistic populists are now electorally much weaker, although they have been empowered to dominate the entire polity through the top-down control of the electoral system by the central authorities.

Factional politics in the HKSAR was complicated by a temporary alliance between the radical democrats, who sought to lobby the Western democratic states against the implementation of the extradition bill in the latter half of 2019, and some Western democracies like the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK). The PRC perceived such a temporary alliance as a “conspiracy” by the Western states and some local democrats to “subvert” the political system of Hong Kong, thereby enhancing its determination to impose the national security law on the HKSAR in mid-2020.

The new political system in Hong Kong has been characterized by the official preoccupation with the protection of national security, the arrest and

---

2. For patron-client pluralism, see Lo, *The Dynamics of Beijing–Hong Kong Relations*.

prosecutions of the offenders concerned, a much stronger executive-led branch vis-à-vis a relatively weak but “patriotic” legislature, the elevation of the political influence of pro-Beijing and nationalistic populists, and the exclusion of moderate, radical, and confrontational populists from the Legislative Council (LegCo) since December 2022 and District Councils since December 2023. In short, the SCNPC’s promulgation of the national security law for Hong Kong on June 30, 2020, transformed the political system from patron-client pluralism to both patron-client and populist authoritarianism. Patron-client politics are proliferating and deepening in Hong Kong where the new electoral system established a 1,500-member Election Committee in which *guanxi* politics among the patriotic elites have become inevitable. Beijing as the most powerful political patron could decide who became the political kingmakers in the 1,500-member Election Committee, which was responsible for not only choosing forty out of ninety LegCo members in December 2021 but also for selecting the Chief Executive in March 2022.

In September 1982, the concept of “one country, two systems” was proposed by the late PRC leader, Deng Xiaoping, to the late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to deal with the question of Hong Kong’s future.<sup>3</sup> China would resume its sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, but the promise of “one country, two systems” would be implemented in the HKSAR, whose economic system and lifestyle would remain unchanged for fifty years. In June 1983, when Deng met with Winston L. Y. Yang from Seton Hall University, the former said that

after the reunification of the motherland, the Taiwan Special Administrative Region can have its own independence, practice a system different from that of the mainland, and its independent judiciary and right of final judgment need not reside in Beijing. Taiwan can retain its army so long as it does not constitute a threat to the mainland. The mainland will station neither troops nor administrative personnel in Taiwan. Taiwan’s party, government and army departments are managed by Taiwan itself. The central government will reserve some seats for Taiwan . . . The systems can be different, but only the PRC can represent China in international affairs.<sup>4</sup>

---

3. Wen Qing, “One Country, Two Systems’: The Best Way to Peaceful Reunification,” *Beijing Review*, May 26, 2009, accessed March 24, 2021, [http://www.bjreview.com.cn/nation/txt/2009-05/26/content\\_197568.htm](http://www.bjreview.com.cn/nation/txt/2009-05/26/content_197568.htm).

4. Wen Qing, “One Country, Two Systems.” See also Edward A. Gargan, “Taiwan Could Buy Arms Abroad after Reunification, Deng Asserts,” *New York Times*, August 21, 1983, accessed March 24, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/08/21/world/taiwan-could-buy-arms-abroad-after-reunification-deng-asserts.html>.



Obviously, Deng Xiaoping wanted to use the “one country, two systems” to settle the future of Hong Kong and Macau first and to cope with Taiwan’s future in the long run.<sup>5</sup>

However, Deng passed away in February 1997 and could not witness the handover ceremony of Hong Kong from Britain to the PRC. Nor could he envisage the turbulent relations between the HKSAR and the PRC after the retrocession period. From the national security perspective of the central government in Beijing, it had to intervene in Hong Kong affairs in view of the increasingly anti-PRC activities in the HKSAR, ranging from the occurrence of the anti-national education campaign in the HKSAR during the summer of 2012 to the Occupy Central Movement from September to December 2014, from the Mong Kok riots in early 2016 to the oath-taking controversies of two young legislators-elect (Yau Wai-ching and Baggio Leung) in October 2016, and from the socio-political movement to oppose the extradition bill in May–December 2019 to the holding of so-called “primary elections” by the local democrats in July 2020.

The crux of the problem is that the more Beijing intervenes in Hong Kong matters, the more resistant the Taiwanese regime and its people become to the concept of “one country, two systems.” From the PRC perspective, the central government’s intervention in the matters of Hong Kong is undoubtedly positive, as Deng Xiaoping had long remarked. However, from the vantage point of many Taiwanese people, the political development of Hong Kong has provided them a significant lesson for Taiwan, which to them should not and cannot be another HKSAR where the central authorities’ intervention has been perceived by the Taiwanese as “negative” rather than positive.

The sudden visit of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan on August 2, 2022, aroused the tensions between the mainland and Taiwan. The PLA conducted military exercises around the island of Taiwan. Following the military drills that tested the capacity of Taiwan’s military to deal with a possible partial military and economic blockade by the PRC, the State Council published a *White Paper on the Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification*. The document did not mention that the PLA would not be stationed in Taiwan, reserving the right of the PRC to send the PLA to deal with any “separatists” in Taiwan in case of any military action to recover China’s sovereignty over the island. Deng Xiaoping’s remark in June 1983 that China would not send military personnel to Taiwan was no longer mentioned in the white paper—an indication that the PRC has silently become more hardline toward Taiwan since Pelosi’s highly provocative visit to Taipei.

This book will show that ideological conflicts and factional struggles between some Hong Kong democrats and the HKSAR government and pro-Beijing

---

5. Macau was returned from Portugal to the PRC on December 20, 1999.

forces on the one hand, and between the radical democrats and PRC authorities on the other hand, have triggered far more intervention from the central government in Hong Kong's political development than ever before. Arguably, this result stems partly from the underestimation and miscalculation of most Hong Kong democrats about the nature of the PRC regime and partly from the increasingly dominance of a conservative nationalistic faction in the mainland. The underestimation of many Hong Kong democrats originated from a batch of young and radical localists who were imbued with a very strong sense of Hong Kong identity but who were lacking a profound knowledge of how the mainland's Marxist-Leninist political ideology operates. They participated in peaceful and violent protests in such an intertwined manner that the PRC authorities were angered and forced to intervene as a politically powerful patron. From the Marxist-Leninist perspective, the "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong must respect the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the HKSAR and the mainland. Unfortunately, some radical protestors in the 2019 anti-extradition movement disrespected the CCP and the mainland's state-owned enterprises in Hong Kong, utilizing violent activities to plunge the legitimacy of the HKSAR government into an unprecedented crisis. Some of them even went so far as to desecrate China's national flags and attack the Liaison Office's headquarters, seriously challenging the legitimacy of the central government in the HKSAR. On the other hand, the moderate democrats totally miscalculated the intention of the PRC authorities, except for the unprecedented 2010 political compromise between them regarding the ways in which LegCo elections should be designed. The 2010 political compromise came at a time when the PRC side was dominated and ruled by liberal nationalists, notably the former President Hu Jintao, and when the HKSAR side was characterized by not only the split between radical and moderate democrats but also the desire of moderates to negotiate with PRC officials. However, after the summer of 2010, the moderate democrats turned more receptive to the radical faction of the democrats, including the participation in the 2014 Occupy Central movement, and their failure to denounce and abandon violence in the 2019 anti-extradition protests. The result was the intertwined relations between some moderate and radical democrats, whose future would be easily cracked down on by the national security law enacted in June 2020.

Chapter 1 will focus on the literature on the PRC's political development and assess how the features of mainland Chinese politics can be applied to our deeper understanding of Beijing–Hong Kong relations. Chapter 2 will focus on the emergence of various factions inside Hong Kong, ranging from pro-democracy and pro-establishment forces, and inside the PRC, including the gradual shift from the relatively liberal nationalistic faction during the Hu Jintao era to the conservative nationalistic faction in the Xi Jinping era. Chapter 3 will show how Beijing responded to the rapid emergence of radical and localist

populism in the HKSAR and how the elections held for the LegCo in December 2022 and those held for District Councils in December 2023 established the foundation of “patriotic” elites ruling Hong Kong—a process paving the way for the implementation of Beijing’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over the HKSAR. The concept of “comprehensive jurisdiction” was first mentioned by Beijing in its white paper on the implementation of the Basic Law of Hong Kong in mid-2014, but it took nine years for its realization through a series of measures, including the imposition of the national security law in mid-2020, the chief executive election in March 2022, the LegCo elections in December 2022, the District Council elections in December 2023, and the scheduled legislation on Article 23 of the Basic Law in 2024.

In the process of implementing the “one country, two systems,” there are considerable tensions in the interactions of the two systems, politically speaking. First, while many Hong Kong people and foreign states, especially Western democracies, see the HKSAR as an international city, the PRC authorities have increasingly seen Hong Kong as a mainland Chinese city where its political development should not be shaped and manipulated by external forces. In short, the vision of a cosmopolitan and an international Hong Kong has been clashing with the mainland conception of a Hong Kong whose sovereignty is possessed exclusively by the PRC. From the Western point of view, the Sino-British Joint Declaration that was reached in September 1984 provided the fundamental safeguards for Hong Kong’s autonomy vis-à-vis the PRC, and it protects the rights and freedom of the Hong Kong people. As such, it has been argued that China’s imposition of the national security law on Hong Kong “violated” the Joint Declaration.<sup>6</sup> However, the PRC Foreign Ministry argued that national security is China’s internal affairs and that it does not allow foreign intervention; moreover, “the basic policies regarding Hong Kong declared by China in the Joint Declaration are China’s statement of policies, not commitment to the UK or an international obligation as some claim.”<sup>7</sup> The tensions in the interactions of the “one country, two systems” are shown in how Western countries and some Hong Kong democrats, especially the young ones, have perceived the importance of “two systems” as opposed to “one country,” which, however, has become the constant emphasis of PRC authorities who handle Hong Kong matters.

Second, the identity clashes between Hong Kong as a city with its strong local identity and Hong Kong as a mainland borderland that should have a

---

6. See “Foreign Secretary Declares Breach of Sino-British Joint Declaration,” November 12, 2020, accessed January 1, 2024, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-declares-breach-of-sino-british-joint-declaration>.

7. “Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on June 3, 2020,” June 3, 2020, accessed January 1, 2024, [http://mw.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202006/t20200603\\_5808452.htm](http://mw.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202006/t20200603_5808452.htm).

stronger sense of mainland Chinese national identity have become increasingly prominent. Those who support the persistence of local identity saw Hong Kong's integration into mainland China as "unnecessary" and having "negative" impacts on its society and economy, making the HKSAR more economically dependent on the mainland. But those who champion the mainland Chinese national identity have contended that the Hong Kong people should become more politically "patriotic" and more supportive of the city's socio-economic integration with the mainland, especially the Greater Bay Area.

Third, the clashes between the upsurge in Hong Kong's localism and the rising mainland Chinese assertive nationalism were prominent from 2014 to 2020, leading to (1) the SCNPC action of interpreting the Basic Law on the proper behavior of legislators to take their oath in November 2016, (2) the enactment of the national security law for Hong Kong in June 2020, (3) the SCNPC decision on the allegiance requirements of LegCo members in November 2020, and (4) the SCNPC revamp of Hong Kong's electoral system in March 2021. Such assertive Chinese nationalism became obvious in not only the remarks made by PRC authorities on Hong Kong but also in the ways in which the SCNPC has been intervening in Hong Kong's matters.

Fourth, the tensions between democratic change and national security have become apparent. While many local democrats have seen democratization as natural, inevitable, and negotiable, PRC authorities have regarded democratization as a ploy used by local democrats in collaboration with foreign forces to foster a "color revolution" in Hong Kong and to undermine China's national security.

Fifth, the tensions between the Western conception of democracy and the Chinese notion of democracy have become prominent. Prior to mid-2020, many Hong Kong people yearned for a Western-style democracy in which the entire LegCo should be directly elected and the Chief Executive should be directly elected from universal suffrage without political control from the central authorities. To PRC leaders, the HKSAR should develop its Hong Kong-style democracy instead of copying directly from Western-style democracies. Most importantly, PRC authorities are determined to retain their say and veto over the candidates of chief executive elections. On December 20, 2021, the State Council published a *White Paper on Hong Kong's Democratic Development*, emphasizing that democracy was absent in Hong Kong under British colonial rule and that national security is a prerequisite for democracy in the HKSAR.<sup>8</sup> Without

---

8. "White Paper on Hong Kong's Democratic Development," the State Council's Information Office, December 20, 2021, accessed September 11, 2022, <https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/252582#Full-text:-White-paper-on-Hong-Kong's-democratic-development>.

national security, democratic development in Hong Kong is vulnerable to external influences—a situation disallowed by the central authorities in Beijing.

Sixth, while the people of Hong Kong have gotten used to living in a relatively pluralistic political system, such pluralism clashes with the mainland Chinese political culture of paternalism in which the state is like a parent protective of the interests of the children. Before the promulgation of the national security law in June 2020, many Hong Kong people were imbued with a Western concept of human rights, believing that human rights were universal and natural. But to the PRC, the rights enjoyed by the people of Hong Kong have been conferred upon them by the Chinese constitution and the Hong Kong Basic Law. From the PRC perspective, the rights of the people of Hong Kong, such as freedom of speech, of the press, and of association, have their limits in that they have to observe and protect China's sovereignty and national security.

Seventh, the tensions between some Hongkongers' political culture tolerant of protests and dissent and a mainland Chinese elite disposition relatively intolerant of political dissident persist. In the latter half of 2019, some local democrats argued for the establishment of a social reconciliation committee to investigate the anti-extradition bill movement, but the HKSAR government and PRC authorities rejected such a move. After the implementation of the national security law in mid-2020, public protests have almost disappeared, except for a notable exception of a protest by one hundred citizens against a land reclamation plan in Tseung Kwan O district in March 2023, when they were asked to wear numbered tags under tight police surveillance.<sup>9</sup>

Eighth, there were tensions between a mass culture of adopting an open but confrontational approach on the one hand and the PRC political culture of giving face (*mianzi*) to authorities and emphasizing harmony between the state and society on the other. The contentious state-society relations in Hong Kong from 2003 to 2019 made it difficult for PRC authorities to accept politically a weak state vis-à-vis a strong society, especially as the mainland Chinese state has traditionally dominated the society. Ninth, there are contradictions between the Chinese legalism that has been adopted by PRC officials on Hong Kong matters and a more lenient approach advocated by some liberal democrats on how local protestors in 2019 should be handled. Tenth, while PRC authorities attach immense importance to the executive-led polity in Hong Kong, many Hong Kong democrats argued for an executive-legislative relation in which the LegCo could effectively check the power of the executive branch of the government.

---

9. "Hong Kong police make protesters wear numbered tags, carry own cordon line, 100 people maximum, mask free," March 23, 2023, *Hong Kong Free Press*, accessed January 1, 2024, <https://hongkongfp.com/2023/03/27/hong-kong-police-make-protesters-wear-numbered-tags-carry-own-cordon-line-100-people-max-mask-free/>.

While the democrats went so far as to advocate and support a system with a separation of powers, the mainland authorities have rejected the notion of the separation of powers. To PRC authorities, the Hong Kong polity is characterized by an executive-led system, and there should be “harmony” between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.

All these ten contradictions have proven to be increasingly prominent in Beijing–Hong Kong relations since the outbreak of mass protests against the Tung Chee-hwa government on July 1, 2003. All these contradictions were fully illustrated in the clashes between two political systems, one far more pluralistic and tolerant than the other. In a sense, the power struggles between the local democrats and the HKSAR government on the one hand and the radical localists and PRC authorities on the other were ferocious, leading to the final decision of Beijing to intervene in Hong Kong’s political development and to defeat its political enemies and factional opponents in the HKSAR.

Many Hong Kong people underestimated the possibility that the PRC’s authoritarian political system could be transferred or diffused to the HKSAR across the border easily. Many assumed naively and wrongly that since the PRC treated Hong Kong as a golden goose that can lay eggs, Beijing would not have cracked down on political dissidents in the HKSAR. However, treating Hong Kong as a golden goose laying eggs is one thing, but protecting China’s sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, and national dignity is another issue. In the eyes of the PRC authorities handling Hong Kong matters, the anti-extradition bill movement went beyond their bottom line of political tolerance as it plunged the HKSAR into political chaos, violence, terrorism, and “subversion.” The PRC’s perception that the 2019 anti-extradition bill movement was mingled with foreign forces was a testimony to the belief held firmly by the ruling CCP that a “color revolution” was emerging in the HKSAR. Hong Kong was perceived as a Trojan horse for foreign countries to “subvert” Hong Kong first and then influence the mainland’s political system. As a result, the PRC had to intervene decisively and comprehensively to restore political and social stability. In short, some Hong Kong people have neglected the likelihood of authoritarian diffusion from the PRC to the HKSAR, especially as some of them participated in political activities that went beyond the political red lines tolerated by Beijing.

# Index

- accountability, 59, 140, 187–188
- accountable, 41, 84, 133, 188, 190
- agreeing to disagree, 252–254
- Alibaba, 167
- allegiance, 7, 100, 170, 180–183, 227, 230–231, 234, 241, 267
- Alliance for Universal Suffrage, 95
- amnesty, 106
- anarchists, 174, 251
- ancient concept of sovereignty, 47
- anti-corruption, 22
- anti-extradition movement, 35, 55, 64, 124–125, 149, 157, 182, 220, 238, 241, 244, 248
- anti-foreignism, 191–192
- anti-intellectualism, 20
- anti-mainlandization, 63
- Anti-Mask Law, 126
- anti-national education, 4, 14, 46, 82, 96–98, 103, 107–109, 119, 182, 207, 230, 234, 239–240
- anti-sanctions law, 32, 250
- Article 45 of the Basic Law, 90
- Article 68 of the Basic Law, 90
- Article 104 of the Basic Law, 15, 17, 47, 63, 156–157, 173, 181, 184, 230, 233, 241
- Article 158 of the Basic Law, 101
- assertive nationalism, 7, 11, 13–15, 47, 63, 175, 192, 240, 248–249, 278, 281
- August 31 parameters, 110, 114, 168–169
- authoritarian diffusion, 9, 38
- authoritarianism, 26
- autonomy vis-à-vis the business elites, 167
- Bar Association, 129
- bargaining, 94–95
- Bauhinia Party, 166, 212–213
- Basic Law, 6, 82–96, 100–101, 109, 157, 170, 173, 182, 188, 196, 207, 234, 241, 243–244, 249, 252, 258
- Basic Law Committee, 199
- Beijing, 105–107, 109–118, 120–127, 130–142, 144, 146–147, 150, 152–157, 164–169, 172–190, 192–199, 207–211, 216–222, 224–228, 229–254
- Beijing–Taipei relations, 57–58, 216, 220, 222, 224–225, 227–230, 239, 241–242, 244, 246–247, 250–254, 263
- Belt and Road, 104, 176, 192
- Biden, Joe, 116, 218–219, 224, 226
- Bill of Rights Ordinance, 196
- bishop, 139
- Blinken, Anthony, 191, 194, 218
- Bo, Xilai, 72
- Boomerang effect, 26, 170, 227
- bourgeois democratization, 119
- British citizenship, 195
- British National Overseas (BNO) passports, 195
- business elites, 40, 61, 129, 167, 172, 193, 238, 250
- business factions, 165
- business interests, 80, 167, 238, 250
- Business Professionals Alliance, 199, 212
- business tycoons, 115
- Cao, Erbao, 48, 262

- Candidate Eligibility Review Committee, 157–159, 162–163, 169, 182–183, 232  
 candidate for the chief executive, 161  
 capitalism, 37, 59, 110, 174, 237  
 capitalist class, 118, 238, 250–251, 253  
 capitalist system, 87, 177  
 Cardinal Joseph Zen, 140  
 Catholic, 139–140  
 Central Committee, 174, 189  
 Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, 106  
 central government, 2, 5, 24, 48, 54, 83, 85–86, 100, 102–103, 105, 109, 126, 133–134, 156, 165, 174, 182, 185, 187, 189–190, 196, 206–210, 217, 227, 232, 238–239, 251, 253  
 centralism, 161, 169–170, 178, 209  
 Central-local relations, 48, 57, 63, 84, 114  
 Central Military Commission, 36, 72, 209  
 central state, 34, 62, 96, 150, 152, 154, 169, 172–174, 177, 179, 194, 244  
 Chan, Kin-man, 107  
 Chang, Ya-chung, 226, 252, 255  
 Chen, Shui-bian, 115  
 Chen, Yun, 71  
 Cheung, Anthony Bing-leung, 106  
 Cheung, Man-kwong, 112  
 chief executive elections, 182, 196, 206–211, 232  
 chief executive office, 187  
 China, 1–9, 23, 190–196, 229–254  
 China threat, 248, 256  
 China-US rivalries, 65, 116  
 China model, 57–58  
 China's concept of national security, 108  
 Chinese Communist Party, 5, 8–9, 13, 48, 72–73, 104–195, 123, 174, 265, 270, 272, 275, 279  
 Chinese democracy, 157–167, 171, 191, 195  
 Chinese exceptionalism, 192  
 Chinese legalism, 8, 15–17, 63, 67–68, 150, 185, 240–241, 248  
 Chinese nation, 50–53, 221, 225  
 Chinese national identity, 7, 67–68, 240–241  
 Chinese nationalism, 98  
 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 157  
 Chinese politics, 10, 168  
 Chinese renaissance, 50  
 Chinese-style democracy, 105, 168, 170, 172, 191, 240–241, 248, 270  
 Choi, Peter, 139  
 Chow, Stephen Sau-yan, 131  
 Chu, Yiu-ming, 107  
 Civic Party, 94, 112  
 Civic Passion, 137  
 civil liberties, 43, 97–98, 118, 122, 128–129, 150, 194–195, 243, 248  
 Civil Service Code, 189  
 civil society, 29–30, 33, 38, 44–46, 58, 64–65, 67, 80, 115, 123, 191, 229, 232, 237, 242, 244, 261, 265  
 civil society groups, 45, 123, 191, 242  
 clan groups, 193, 232  
 clashes of Sino-Western political civilizations, 190–196  
 class struggle, 27  
 clients, 63, 65, 162, 164, 184, 229  
 coat-tail effect, 81  
 collective leadership, 72  
 colonial, 7, 45, 49, 59, 64–65, 80–81, 105, 158, 176, 178, 232, 239, 246, 263, 269  
 colour revolution, 7, 9, 21, 25–26, 30, 45, 63, 65, 109, 130, 132, 175–177, 185, 191, 242, 248–249  
 Commission on Strategic Development, 92  
 Committee for Safeguarding National Security, 135, 185–186  
 common law system, 67, 150, 192, 249, 250–251  
 Communist Youth League, 72  
 complete reunification, 57, 224, 226, 253  
 comprehensive jurisdiction, 6, 102, 109–110, 146, 172–173, 180, 183–190, 193, 227, 229–230, 249, 251–253



- compromise, 95–96  
 concessions, 92, 94, 95–96, 111, 115–116  
 confrontational localists, 118, 120  
 conservative, 90  
 conservative business elites, 193  
 conservative nationalism, 107, 109, 122, 174, 176, 230  
 conservative nationalists, 100–102, 104, 106–107, 110, 114–116, 118, 120, 122, 124, 127, 142, 153, 176–177, 207, 248  
 conspiracy, 2, 65, 108, 146–147, 153–155, 174  
 constitutional conventions, 187, 190  
 continuous showdown, 178  
 convenor, 162  
 convergence, 12, 57, 65, 68, 171, 245, 249, 273  
 cooptation, 49, 96, 246  
 court judges, 141, 147–148, 177, 251  
 Court of Final Appeal, 147, 149, 170  
 COVID-19, 127, 154  
 crisis of governance, 207, 234  
 crisis of legitimacy, 64, 182, 230  
 cultural identity, 97  
 cultural-political identity, 97, 217  
 cyclical pattern of control and relaxation, 168  
  
 deep contradictions, 253  
 deep state, 150–152, 178–179, 251, 276  
 Democratic Alliance for Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), 80–81, 111, 113, 128, 197–198, 212, 200, 203–204  
 democratic centralism, 161, 169–170, 178, 209  
 Democratic Party, 20, 81, 94–95, 106, 165, 213, 247  
 democratic populists, 183, 232–233, 238, 234, 238–243, 251  
 democratization, 7, 40, 42–44, 46, 55, 58, 67, 108, 115–116, 119, 158, 171, 178, 191, 245–247, 253  
  
 democrats, 2, 4–5, 8, 64–65, 81–83, 92–96, 111–114, 116, 123, 137, 152–155, 161, 165–166, 170–172, 183, 199, 202, 229–230, 238–240, 242–243, 246–247  
 Demonstration effect, 116  
 dependent development, 57–58, 60, 65, 249  
 Deng, Xiaoping, 24, 48, 50–51  
 Deng, Zhonghua, 160  
 deter, 144, 182, 218, 226  
 deterrence, 65, 132  
 developmental interest, 18, 103  
 developmental state, 58–59, 249–250, 268  
 Ding, Xuexiang, 187–188  
 direct elections, 81  
 disqualification, 159, 165, 170–171, 184  
 District Committees, 162  
 District Council elections, 127, 211–215, 227, 233–234  
 District Councils, 92, 153  
 district federations, 115  
 Dongsha Islands, 136  
 double direct elections, 82  
 dual state, 62, 172–173, 179  
 duty visit, 185–190  
  
 economic base, 66–67, 174–175, 178, 192, 232  
 economic blockade, 4, 219  
 economic diversification, 188–189  
 economic expertise, 208, 211  
 economic integration, 40–41, 118, 121, 189  
 economic internationalization, 192  
 economic modernization, 36, 60, 62, 65–66, 192  
 education system, 177, 232, 241  
 egalitarian society, 119  
 Election Committee, 91, 157–159, 161, 169  
 elections, 161  
 electoral reforms, 157  
 eligibility test, 162  
 elite political culture, 67, 238

- Emperor Qin Shihuang, 52–53  
 engagement, 40, 247  
 espionage, 144–145  
 ethnic minorities, 24, 214  
 ethnoterritorial federalism, 23–24  
 etiquette, 190  
 Examination Authority, 137  
 executive-led, 8, 67, 84, 89, 120, 233  
 executive-legislative relations, 169  
 extradition bill, 128–129  
 extraterritorial, 135
- face, 8, 32, 67–68, 94, 221, 238–241, 257, 262  
 factional fragmentation, 99  
 factionalism, 28, 70, 81, 96, 98–99, 127, 150, 157, 165, 168, 172, 178, 230  
 factional politics, 1–2, 28, 70, 72–82, 90–91, 96–98, 123, 128, 166, 224, 228, 230, 252, 275  
 factional struggles, 99  
 factions, 73–82, 152–178  
 fear, 139  
 Federation of Education Workers, 199  
 Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labor Unions, 199, 212  
 Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), 166, 197–201, 203, 206, 212  
 Fight Crime Committees, 162  
 filibustering, 103, 120, 184  
 Foreign Ministry, 6, 12, 24, 213, 222  
 fragmentation, 82, 99, 118–123, 165–166, 213, 236  
 fragmentation of democrats, 165  
 fragmentation of patriotic elites, 166  
 functional constituencies, 161
- Gao, Siren, 75  
 gatekeeper, 44–46, 162, 214  
 general-secretary, 71–74, 182, 209, 223, 253  
 geographical constituencies, 161  
 geopolitical struggle, 248  
 golden goose, 9  
 governing capability, 207, 235  
 governing capacity, 183, 207, 244  
 government-business relations, 250  
 government performance, 233–234  
 gradual and orderly manner, 88–90  
 gray areas, 101  
 Greater Bay Area, 7, 19, 62, 168, 171, 189, 246  
 great unification, 50–56  
 guanxi, 3, 19–20, 99, 231  
 Gui, Minhai, 76–77, 122
- Han Chinese, 100  
 Han, Kuo-yu, 131, 216, 220, 224–225  
 Han, Zheng, 100–101  
 harmony, 8–9, 67–68, 117, 171, 208, 240–241, 247  
 Hengqin, 188–189  
 Ho, Albert, 94, 112, 148, 151, 209  
 Ho, Iat Seng, 185–186, 187–188  
 Hong Kong and Macau Work Office, 189  
 Hong Kong identity, 5, 40, 66, 82, 96, 99, 217, 233, 238, 240–241, 246  
 Hongkongism, 99, 119  
 Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO), 73, 88, 160, 187–188, 213  
 Hong Kong National Party, 131, 207  
 Hong Kong New Direction, 198–199, 205–206, 212  
 Hong Kong-style democracy, 7, 168, 170, 191, 215  
 house rules, 184–185  
 housing shortage, 131  
 Hu, Jintao, 83, 88, 95, 107, 112  
 Hu, Yaobang, 71  
 human rights, 8, 24, 26, 37, 80, 126, 128–129, 133, 149, 179, 190, 195–196, 248, 257, 262, 267
- ideological clashes, 1, 98–118, 230  
 ideological conflicts, 11, 119, 150, 174, 178, 238, 254  
 ideological contentions, 254  
 ideologically dogmatic, 178, 220  
 ideologies, 40, 65, 68, 70, 175, 230  
 imperialism, 33, 39, 64, 174, 175, 190–191

- individual visit scheme, 98  
 institutionalization, 188  
 intellectuals, 20, 33–35, 71  
 internal actor, 43–49  
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 133, 196  
 international financial and monetary center, 192  
 internationalization, 61, 190, 192, 194  
 interpreting the Basic Law, 87, 101  
 Ip, Regina, 199, 210  
  
 Ji, Pengfei, 73  
 Jiang, Enzhu, 75  
 Jiang, Zemin, 21–23, 36, 72, 74–76, 78, 175, 239  
  
 Kaohsiung, 136  
 Kuomintang (KMT), 12, 56, 116, 219, 221  
  
 Lai, Jimmy, 103, 115  
 Lai, William, 220  
 Lam, Carrie, 40, 105–107, 125–126, 129, 131, 135–136, 140–141, 156, 177, 205–210, 234–235, 272  
 Lam, Wing-kee, 76–78, 122, 255  
 land and housing policies, 167  
 land developer, 167  
 landed elites, 184, 237  
 landlord, 167  
 Lau, Emily, 94, 112  
 Law Society, 129  
 leading small groups, 72  
 League of Social Democrats, 81–82  
 Lee, Bo, 76  
 Lee, John, 11, 19, 62, 129, 135, 185, 187–188, 206–211, 214, 232, 234–236, 249–250, 258–259, 269–271  
 Lee, Martin, 118  
 legalism, 15–17, 53, 63, 68, 230, 240–241, 248, 267, 278  
 legalist conservatives, 90  
 legalists, 90  
 Legislative Affairs Commission, 88  
 Legislative Council (LegCo) elections, 172, 181–182, 196–206  
 legislative elections (Hong Kong), 170, 197, 211, 214, 233  
 legislative elections (Macau), 170  
 legitimacy, 2, 5, 15, 28, 77, 83, 106, 122, 169, 180, 182, 207–209, 230, 234, 239–240, 244, 275, 246, 248–249  
 Leninism, 17, 21, 37, 63, 65, 67, 69, 174–175, 230, 248, 277  
 Leong, Alan, 112, 209  
 Leung, C. Y., 14, 105, 107–108, 114, 208–209  
 Li, Gang, 94  
 Li, Hou, 74  
 Li, Peng, 74  
 Li, Qiang, 187–188  
 Liaison Office, 75, 94–95, 100, 111–113, 123–125, 134, 151–152, 187–188, 205, 213  
 liberal democrats, 8  
 liberal faction, 93, 95  
 liberal localists, 123  
 liberal nationalism, 119, 230  
 liberal nationalists, 5, 105–106, 116–117, 124, 178, 239  
 Liberal Party, 80, 111, 199, 201, 204, 212  
 liberal studies, 137–139, 182, 241, 258, 267  
 liberalization, 23  
 limited pluralism, 172  
 linkage, 44  
 livelihood issues, 19, 83, 207, 234, 236–237, 253  
 localism, 29, 63, 68, 96, 98–119, 230  
 localist populism, 181–182, 193, 216–217, 227, 251  
 localist populists, 154, 181–183, 190–191, 227, 230, 232, 234, 241–244  
 localists, 15  
 Loh, Christine, 106  
 lower-class citizens, 238, 302  
 loyal opposition, 32, 165, 172, 232, 236, 243, 247  
 loyal oppositionists, 165  
 loyalty, 19, 100, 185, 235

- Luo, Huning, 100
- Ma, Ying-jeou, 58, 116, 221, 225
- Macau, 127, 169–170
- Macau Electoral Affairs Commission, 170
- Macau national security law, 171
- Macaunize, 169
- mainlandization, 34, 63–64, 121, 125, 130–131, 194, 224, 244, 270
- mainstream democrats, 82, 95–96
- mandate of heaven, 50, 53, 217
- Marshall, George, 219
- Marxist, 5, 26, 66, 117–120, 123, 157, 174, 232, 238, 242, 250
- Marxism-Leninism, 174–175, 230
- Marxist localists, 118, 119
- mass participation, 227
- memorandum of understanding, 226, 252–254
- military exercises, 4, 219
- military weapons, 218, 226
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 134
- Ministry of National Security, 26, 107, 207
- Ministry of Public Security, 107
- miscalculation, 5, 113, 128, 238, 240, 268
- mobilization, 30, 33, 43, 55, 81, 108, 111, 115, 128, 207, 211, 236, 241, 249
- moderate democrats, 5, 94–96, 112–113, 123–124, 165–166, 172, 178, 183, 202, 239, 247
- moderate reformers, 71
- modern concept of sovereignty, 47
- money-laundering activities, 125
- Mong Kok riots, 122
- naïve, 9, 22, 116, 124, 248
- national dignity, 9
- national education, 14, 34–35, 97–98, 107, 117, 138–139, 175, 182, 192, 207, 230, 232, 234, 239–240, 249, 252, 262, 273, 276, 278
- national flags, 5, 124, 191
- nationalistic populists, 2–3, 232–233
- National People's Congress (NPC), 10
- national security, 1–9, 56–57, 64, 68, 82, 108, 132–134, 138–140, 192–196, 207, 213, 227, 229–254
- national security adviser, 133
- National Security Commission, 107–109, 244
- national security education, 35, 139
- national security law, 1–9, 11, 31, 46, 56, 61, 127, 132–152, 154, 229–252, 256, 260, 262–263, 273, 275–279
- neutrality, 141
- New China News Agency, 73
- New Macau Association, 170
- New People's Party, 197, 212
- Ng, Kuok Cheong, 170
- 1992 consensus, the, 51, 116, 216, 220–224, 228, 252
- Nomination Committee, 110
- nominations, 161
- non-interventionist governing philosophy, 250
- normative state, 173, 176, 250
- oath-taking, 4, 15, 17, 21, 47, 82, 101, 156, 178, 180–181, 189, 238, 240–241
- Occupy Central Movement, 5, 21, 46, 58, 108–110, 114, 119, 123, 135, 143, 176–177, 190–191, 207, 234, 238–240
- Office for Safeguarding National Security, 134, 145, 185–186
- Official Secrets Ordinance, 145
- one-China principle, 216, 219, 224, 254
- one country, two systems, 3–6, 52, 56–57, 63, 65–66, 68–69, 101, 109, 131, 157, 169, 189, 196, 205, 215–228, 238, 240, 251–253, 255, 259, 261–262, 267, 277–278, 280
- party authority, 188
- party-state, 33, 60, 64, 116
- paternalism, 8, 17, 63, 229–230, 237, 240–241, 248
- paternalistic authoritarianism, 2, 229, 237, 246, 249, 252

- Path of Democracy, 165–166, 197, 212  
 patriotic, 110  
 patriotic elites, 2–3, 6, 20, 40, 147,  
     160–162, 165–166, 171–172, 237,  
     245–247, 249, 251  
 patriotic populists, 193  
 patriotism, 87  
 patron, 162, 184, 230  
 patronage, 39–40, 115, 184, 229  
 patron-clientelist, 229  
 patron-client pluralism, 2–3, 229  
 Patten, Christopher, 81  
 peace consensus, 221  
 peace memorandum, 226  
 Pelosi, Nancy, 4, 57, 218–219  
 Pence, Mike, 128  
 Peng, Qinghua, 75, 112  
 People's Armed Police (PAP), 126  
 People's Liberation Army, 134  
 Pingtung, 136  
 pluralism, 2, 115, 194, 229  
 police power, 125  
 policy research, 207  
 political actors, 141  
 political climate, 123  
 political compromise, 5, 95, 118, 123–124,  
     239  
 political concessions, 239  
 political convergence, 244  
 political correctness, 106, 137–138, 185  
 political culture, 8, 17–21, 66–68, 185,  
     194, 230, 232, 234, 237, 239–241, 245,  
     248, 253, 271, 276  
 political development, 10, 15, 35, 68, 89,  
     110, 116, 123, 137, 168, 171, 176, 209,  
     227, 241, 244–245, 247–249, 251,  
     270, 272  
 political divergence, 176  
 political harmony, 208  
 political identity, 97  
 political ideology, 5, 240  
 political liberalization, 43–44, 70–71, 119,  
     168, 172, 247  
 political loyalty, 100  
 political opposition, 92  
 political party, 91  
 political patron, 3, 40, 162, 229, 231, 246  
 political patronage, 115  
 political pawn, 65  
 political provocation, 178  
 political red lines, 9, 17, 63, 124, 139, 239,  
     242  
 political reform, 23, 95, 110  
 political trust, 96, 207  
 political will, 252  
 political winds, 113  
 politically converge, 169  
 Pompeo, Michael, 134, 149, 218  
 populist authoritarianism, 3, 193, 231  
 positive intervention, 227, 230  
 poverty, 22, 26, 59, 131, 167, 234  
 power dependence, 62  
 power politics, 73, 254, 266  
 power structures, 155, 244  
 power struggles, 9, 80, 230, 241, 244, 246,  
     248, 252, 254  
 prerogative state, 173, 176, 251  
 pro-Beijing forces, 111–112, 114, 127, 178,  
     199, 230, 241  
 pro-Beijing nationalism, 100  
 pro-democracy candidate, 136–137,  
     170–171  
 pro-democracy faction, 92  
 pro-democracy forces, 81  
 productive forces, 174, 192  
 pro-establishment forces, 5, 211–212  
 progressive tax, 238  
 pro-Hong Kong localism, 100  
 proportional representation system, 81,  
     161  
 protests, 5, 8–10, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23–24,  
     30, 32, 37, 46, 56, 61, 64, 67, 68, 75,  
     80, 82–83, 103, 106, 108, 114–115,  
     118, 125–132, 140–141, 152–153,  
     162, 167–168, 176–177, 180, 192,  
     195, 202, 208, 227, 229, 235, 238, 240,  
     242, 271, 274, 280  
 public nuisance, 108  
 public opinion, 88, 93  
 Pye, Lucian, 12, 17–20, 70

- radical democrats, 95–96
- radical localists, 9, 63, 82, 102, 153, 162, 165, 167, 182, 238, 242, 251
- radical reformers, 71
- Radio Television Hong Kong, 140
- realpolitik, 64, 219, 241, 247
- Red Flag, 176–178
- referendum, 93–94
- reformers, 71
- relative autonomy, 167
- renminbi, 61, 192, 250
- renminbi offshore center, 192
- residual power, 48
- reunification, 3–4, 51–52, 54–58, 65–68, 176, 215–216, 218, 223–226, 251, 253–254, 260–261, 266, 278–279
- right of abode, 101
- rise of China, 61, 68, 226, 247–249
- rotation of political parties in power, 217
- rules-based international order, 194
- sanctions, 32, 40, 133, 135, 153, 155, 193, 225, 243
- Scholarism, 109
- self-censorship, 139
- separating politics from economics, 192
- separation of powers, 9, 26, 75, 84, 101, 120
- separatist localists, 117–123
- Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 98
- Shanwei, 134
- Shenzhen, 42, 71, 83, 126, 136, 181, 199, 210, 246
- Singapore model, 58
- Sinic civilization, 194
- Sinification, 121
- Sino-British Joint Declaration, 6, 193–195
- Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong, 118
- Sino-US struggles, 179, 226
- sinologists, 10
- socialism, 16, 104, 110, 174, 250
- Sou, Sulu, 170
- sovereignty, 3–4, 8–9, 11, 23, 47–48, 86, 109, 124, 217, 223, 230
- Soviet-style collapse, 21
- speedboat, 136
- stage-by-stage negotiations, 57, 66, 223
- Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (SCNPC), 87, 91, 101, 110
- State Council, 91
- state-society relations, 8
- status quo, 14, 23, 89–90, 100, 111, 217, 225
- strategic ambiguity, 218–219
- strategies, 18, 25, 40, 172
- strong executive, 245, 247
- strong state, 29, 64
- subvert, 2, 9, 26, 34, 36–37, 44, 46, 64–65, 104, 127, 143, 153, 160, 174, 176, 242–243, 259, 276
- superstructure, 66, 174–175, 177–178, 183, 192, 232–233, 249, 251–252
- Szeto Wah, 118
- Tai, Benny, 103, 107–108
- Taiwan, 215–227, 251–256, 260–261, 263, 266, 270–272, 276, 278–279
- Taiwan link in Hong Kong protests, 131
- Taiwan model of “one country, two systems,” 52, 56–57, 65–66, 69, 215–227
- Taiwan's political future, 50–51, 56–57, 68, 215, 220, 252–253
- Taiwan's presidential elections, 116
- Taiwanese identity, 217
- Tang, Chris, 132, 135, 143, 145, 210, 232
- Tang, Henry, 140, 209
- taxes, 167
- teargas, 129
- term of office of the chief executive, 91
- territorial integrity, 9
- terrorism, 9
- Tian, Feilong, 165
- Tibet, 55
- Tik, Chi-yuen, 20, 106, 205
- tolerance, 9

- Tong, Hon, 139  
 Treaty of Nanking, 195  
 Trojan horse, 9, 26, 36, 108, 127, 241  
 Trump, Donald, 116, 126, 150–151, 126, 218, 222  
 trust-building, 225, 227, 240, 246  
 Tsai, Ing-wen, 58, 116, 131, 216, 221  
 Tsang, Donald, 86, 91, 93, 95, 112, 209  
 Tsang, Jasper Tak-sing, 105, 110, 131  
 Tsang, John, 209  
 Tsang, Yok-sing, 105  
 Tung, Chee-hwa, 83, 88, 90, 104, 209  
 Tung, Chao-yung, 104  
 turbulence, 60, 170, 178, 183, 192–193  
 two-point policy, 218  
  
 uncivil aspect of civil society, 33, 229, 243  
 United Democrats of Hong Kong, 118  
 united front, 34, 74–75, 80, 94, 96, 104, 113–115, 131, 140, 151–152, 167, 171–172, 187, 193, 232, 236, 247, 250–252, 271  
 united front groups, 114–115  
 united front work, 34, 74, 80, 94, 96, 113, 131, 140, 152, 167, 177, 187, 193, 232, 247, 250–252, 271  
 United Nations Human Rights Council, 195  
 United States, 126  
 United States–style democracy, 191  
 universal suffrage, 85, 87, 90, 93, 108, 160, 196  
 US Indo-Pacific strategy, 222  
  
 Vatican, 139–140  
 vested interest, 166  
 veto power, 88  
 victim, 19, 116, 128, 220, 248  
 victory, 195, 199, 241  
 violence, 5, 9, 103, 117, 120, 143, 173, 180, 183  
 violent populism, 230  
 voter turnout, 170, 197, 211, 214, 233  
  
 Wang, Huning, 102  
 Wang, Zhimin, 100, 124  
 weak legislature, 236, 245, 247  
 weak local state, 67, 244  
 weak society, 29, 64  
 welfarist approach, 167  
 Wen, Jiabao, 83, 90, 105  
 Western concept of human rights, 8  
 Western democracy, 38, 86, 241  
 Western idealism, 253  
 Westernization, 71, 101, 248, 253  
 Western states, 2, 24–25, 46, 153, 174, 242, 247  
 Western-style democratization, 7, 68, 176, 192, 231, 245, 249  
 White Paper on the implementation of the Basic Law, 109  
 wolf-warrior diplomacy, 12–13  
 women, 30, 98, 121, 162, 193  
 women organizations, 193  
 Wong, Joshua, 103, 109, 119  
 Woo, Kwok-hing, 209  
 Woo, Peter, 209  
 Wu, Bangguo, 88, 91  
 Wu, Jianfan, 83  
 Wukan village, 134  
  
 xenophobic, 191  
 Xi, Jinping, 5, 16, 22, 27, 36, 59, 72, 77, 90, 109, 112, 127–128, 175–176, 182, 187, 192, 196, 208–209, 216, 221, 226, 234, 250, 253, 258, 261–262, 265, 268, 274, 279  
 Xia, Baolong, 100, 103, 113, 135, 151, 187–189, 202, 239, 257, 261  
 Xia, Yong, 83, 85  
 Xiao, Weiyun, 83–84  
 Xinjiang, 24, 53, 130, 195  
 Xu, Chongde, 83–85  
 Xu, Jiataun, 73, 105, 124  
  
 Yang, Jiechi, 151–152, 191, 194  
 Yang, Shangkun, 73  
 Ye, Jianying, 217  
  
 Zhang, Dejiang, 100–101

Zhang, Xiaoming, 75, 100, 113, 124, 160  
Zhao, Kezhi, 132  
Zhao, Ziyang, 71  
Zheng, Yanxiong, 134, 151, 187  
Zhou, Ji, 187–188  
Zhou, Nan, 74  
Zhou, Yongkang, 72