Modern Chinese Counter-Enlightenment

Affect, Reason, and the Transcultural Lexicon

Peng Hsiao-yen
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The Enlightenment propelling modernity as a global event in modern history has gained critics’ attention in recent years. They cautioned against “a Eurocentric mythology” that is obsessed with the Enlightenment’s European origins in the eighteenth century. Instead, as Sebastian Conrad points out in 2012, Enlightenment had many authors in many places, and it should be engaged with “comparatively and globally.” In addition, its global impact, rather than merely a diffusion of the ideas of the French philosophes, is “the work of many actors and the product of global interactions” (Conrad 2012).¹ By contrast, Matthijs Lok and Joris van Eijnatten’s 2019 article advocates studies of “a global Counter-Enlightenment across space, time and culture.” Furthermore, the idea of multiple modernities and the “global opposition” to Westernization across history and places indicate that “there is no escaping Counter-Enlightenment.” For them, comparisons between Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) and Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788) with “leading non-European but often Western-trained intellectuals,” such as the Hindu Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), the Muslim Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), and the Confucian Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988), show that they saw Western, Enlightened modernity as “an assault on tradition and ‘Eastern’ values” (Lok and van Eijnatten 2019). To me, the attitude of the “enemies of Enlightenment” is much more complex than seeing it as “an assault” on tradition. My investigation indicates that the Counter-Enlightenment discourses embracing their own cultural heritage, rather than denouncing Enlightenment, were intended to carry on a dialogue with its agenda. They believed that Enlightenment rationality should be supplemented by affective Enlightenment.

The trend of Counter-Enlightenment, which traces to Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1712–1778) in the age of Enlightenment and culminated in the life philosophy movement flourishing at the turn of the twentieth century, should indeed be studied

in global history. This book is devoted to this topic. In addition to the European and
Asian philosophers connected to the movement, their Anglo-American counterparts such as Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and John Dewey (1859–1952), who were invited to China in the early 1920s to lecture on Henri Bergson's (1859–1941) life philosophy, also figure prominently. This shows that the global reach of Counter-Enlightenment cannot be ignored. However, rather than from a comparative perspective, this book emphasizes the transcultural connectivity of the global Counter-Enlightenment discourses and attributes the networking of related ideas to transcultural players linking like-minded people from countries oceans apart, including Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1868–1936), Lu Xun 魯迅 (1881–1936), Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), Liang Shuming, and Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868–1940) from China; Inoue Tetzujirō 井上哲次郎 (1856–1944) and Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945) from Japan; Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) from India; Rudolf Eucken (1846–1926) and Hans Driesch (1867–1941) from Germany; Bergson from France; Russell from England; and Dewey from the United States. It is about the stories of their transcultural interactions that activated the global Counter-Enlightenment network. To put it simply, my perspective is transcultural rather than comparative. As I have stated elsewhere, transcultural studies highlight the self-transformation of a culture as a result of its inception of other cultures. Interaction with others provides a key to self-renewal (Peng 2010).

The May Fourth period has been dubbed an Enlightenment era, as Vera Schwarz demonstrates in The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (Schwarz 1986). Her view constitutes in fact the mainstream May Fourth interpretation in mainland China and elsewhere since the 1930s. Since the late Qing dynasty, China had been humiliated by unequal treaties and obsessed with national survival at the continuing onslaught of foreign invaders. Disappointments with the socio-political instability during the two world wars led to the belief in the radical overhauling of feudal traditions. This period of national crises entangled with global calamity was a breeding ground for epistemic as well as cultural, ideological, and socio-political contentions. Schwarz's book recounts how at the time Enlightenment rationality—modeled on European Enlightenment rationalism—and the establishment of science and democracy

2. The May Fourth movement turned the 1910s–1920s New Culture movement, which called for the modernization of Chinese language and culture, into a political movement. A game changer, it grew out of a student protest that began in Beijing on 4 May 1919. The students were protesting Western imperialism and the Chinese government’s apparent inability to negotiate the Treaty of Versailles, which proposed to allow Japan, rather than China, to retain the province of Shandong after Germany’s control of the territory during World War I. The ramifications of the event on cultural and political dimensions forced China to speed up modernization on all fronts. Often compared with the European Enlightenment, the May Fourth era, roughly from the 1910s to the 1920s, was dubbed “the May Fourth Enlightenment” or “The Chinese Enlightenment” by critics (Chow 1960; Schwartz 1986).
became prized as a cure-all for the country’s setbacks on all fronts. My book, by con-
trast, intends to show that the same period also saw the burgeoning of the Chinese
Counter-Enlightenment movement. While Enlightenment rhetoric stressed the
power of reason, Counter-Enlightenment underlined the significance of the affec-
tive cultivation of the whole nation in solving China’s problems. It emphasized the
capabilities of the affects, a concept that would be made famous by Deleuze’s 1980s
study of Spinoza.3 This book studies how the Counter-Enlightenment discourses
in modern China, roughly beginning in the 1900s, peaking in the late 1920s, and
continuing until the 1940s, put into relief the traditional Chinese concept of qing
(情), which I equate with “the affects,” to dialogue with Enlightenment rationality.

In Chinese, the word qing often appears in the saying renqing shili 人情事理,
which literally means “human affective relations and the order of things” (see the
conclusion). For the Chinese, not only does qing indicate emotions, feelings, “pre-
individual bodily forces,” and “automatic responses,” but it denotes the relational
forces that connect humans, living and non-living beings, atmospheric elements, and
everything in the universe as a whole. In other words, the concept of qing constitutes
the cosmological truth—a relational ontology that includes all living bodies, matter,
and the cosmos in an affiliative entirety. While the perspective of the affects is called
“an ontology of the human” in The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Clough and
Halley 2007, x), it is also indeed about such a relational ontology although its cos-
mological aspect was generally neglected until recently (Beaulieu 2016; see Chapter
5). I connect qing with affect, mainly because the two concepts, examined together,
illuminate each other and help us arrive at a better understanding of both. This con-
nection is made possible due to the popularity of Bergson in 1920s China that led
to a reinterpretation of the traditional concept of qing in Bergsonian terms such as
sympathie diviniatrice (divining sympathy; see Chapter 3). As a result, qing was iden-
tified as the central concept of the ancient Confucian text Yijing 易經 [The book of
changes], while its principle of change governing all things in the universe was easily
associated with the Bergsonian concept of change and ceaseless becoming.4 In other

3. In the 2007 edited book The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social, highlighting the concepts of “pre-
individual bodily forces” and “automatic responses of the body,” Patricia Clough identifies “the
affective turn” in the humanities since the mid-1990s (Clough and Halley 2007, 2). “The body”
here includes the technoscientific products with capacities to affect and to be affected. These con-
cepts are derived from Brian Massumi’s Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (2002).

4. Discussions of the Book of Changes can be seen throughout this study, except Chapter 2. See espe-
cially Chapter 5 for the topic. According to Alfred Huang and John Minford, two translators of Yijing
into English, the literal meaning of jing 經 is Dao, or truth. Originally an oracular text, the Zhouyi
周易 [The Yi of the Zhou dynasty] that we use today teaches the laws of change. It is a systematic
book approaching the unity of Heaven, Earth, and humanity. While the legendary ancient saint
Fuxi 伏羲 drew the primary eight gua 八卦 (eight trigrams), it is said that Fuxi or Wen Wang 文王
(King Wen, 1112–1056 BCE) developed it into the sixty-four gua 卦 (hexagrams). It is likely that King
Wen named and explained the meaning of the gua (guaci 卦辭, the hexagram judgments), while
yaoqi 文辭 (line statements), attributed to Zhou Gong 周公 (Duke of Zhou, reigning in 1042–1035
words, modern Chinese intellectuals, inspired by their understanding of Bergson, rediscovered, or, to be more exact, reinvented their tradition. This is what I want to emphasize in this book: transcultural practice often leads to a renewed understanding of the self and the possibility of creative self-transformation.

For concepts to circulate in different cultures, translation is indispensable. Lexical choices then become crucial in the transmission (or modification) of knowledge. In the case of Chinese Counter-Enlightenment discourses, I use the term “the transcultural lexicon” to indicate how translation plays a key role in Chinese intellectuals’ propagation of European life philosophy and their reformulation of Confucianism as such. The major events that contributed to the popularity of the huge set of transcultural lexicon related to the Counter-Enlightenment movement include the Chinese translation of Bergson’s *L’Évolution créatrice* [Creative evolution] in 1918, the Aesthetic Education movement in the 1910s and 1920s, the famous 1923 Science and Lifeview debate, and the burgeoning of the theory of *weiqinglun* 唯情論 in the 1920s. How to transmit the concept of *weiqinglun* into English was an ordeal for me during the process of writing this book. I eventually decided to use “affectivism” to render the concept since, in its conceptualization, *weiqinglun* was intended to be an alternative to the translated concepts of *weixinlun* 唯心論 (idealism) and *weiwulun* 唯物論 (materialism). My decision to use such a neologism was reinforced by a June 2021 article in *Nature* entitled “The Rise of Affectivism,” co-authored by dozens of leading cognitive scientists such as Daniel Dukes, Antonio Damasio, and Joseph E. LeDoux. Tentatively announcing the coming of “the era of affectivism,” it underscores “the impact of affective phenomena” on human thought and behavior (Dukes et al. 2021). The dialectic of affect and reason is an ongoing research topic spanning science and the humanities, after all. Since literary theory announced the affective turn in 2007 (Clough and Halley), it has taken fourteen years for science to recognize the rise of affectivism. The Chinese intellectuals who promoted life philosophy in the 1920s likewise invented the concept of affectivism to highlight the synergy of spirit and matter, mind and body. For them, the affects connect thought and action. Although, due to the mainstream Enlightenment ideology established on mainland China in the 1930s, the term *weiqinlun* (together with the Counter-Enlightenment discourses it represented) has been largely forgotten, my study shows that its traces can nonetheless be detected in

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BCE), named and explained the meaning of the 384 *yaoxiang* 爻象 (figures or images) although stories vary. Each *gua* is composed of six horizontal lines, which are called *yao* 爻, representing the intersecting of the *yin* (two broken lines) and the *yang* (a solid line). It is generally believed that the *Shiyi* 十翼 [Ten wings], attributed to Confucius (551–479 BCE) or different Confucian scholars in different times, commented and completed the *Yijing*. Of the Ten Wings, *Wings* 3 and 4 are called “Xiangzhuan” 象傳 [On the Images of the Hexagrams]. *Wings* 5 and 6 are called “Dazhuan” 大傳 [The great treatise] or “Xici” 繫辭 [Commentary on the appended statements], a cosmological and metaphysical treatise (Huang 2010, 1–6; Minford 2014, xiv–xv).
literary and philosophical texts, both during and after the 1920s. Many transcultural terms of European origin that came to China via Japan at the time, such as lixing 理性 (reason), zhijue 直覺 (intuition), and renshengguan 人生觀 (Lebensanschuung; lifeview), have survived and become part of modern Chinese everyday language. Without such translated terms, which are countless, and which Chinese today may think are originally Chinese, daily conversations are hardly possible. The foreign is absorbed unawares as an integral part of the self. Translation is in fact everywhere. Hence the ethical attitude entailed in transcultural studies: to recognize the numerous others in ourselves, so that we realize that the so-called national or racial “purity,” “authenticity,” and the like, are nothing but illusions.

Furthermore, East and West, rather than defined as marginal/center, or dominated/dominating, should be considered as co-living and co-becoming. Co-living necessitates co-becoming, because only when all the parties involved are willing to effect timely self-change in order to share global resources in peace can co-living and co-becoming, or living and prospering together, be achieved. The essentialist East/West dichotomy has led to numerous wars, resulting in tremendous destruction and human suffering. To avoid confrontation we should realize that, throughout global history, East-West encounters have effected mutual self-transformation (Hobson 2004; Standaert 2002; Phillips 2014; Osterhammel 2018; Heurtebise 2020). Investigations of this book indicate that indeed the European Enlightenment itself had taken inspiration from the Lixue 理學 (philosophy of Universal Order) Confucianism transmitted by Christian missionaries to Europe, while Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) found the Book of Changes resonating with his own idea of binary arithmetic. Likewise, Eucken considered Confucianism akin to his own life philosophy. His interaction with the Chinese Lifeview intellectuals was a process of mutual illumination, while Bergson thought Buddhism and his own theory shared the idea of direct intuition. In the current century, Julia Kristeva acknowledged her indebtedness to the Chinese logic as expounded by Zhang Dongsun in the 1930s. A new understanding of East-West relationships based on two-way transculturation, rather than one-way acculturation of the “dominated” culture as maintained by postcolonialism, is begging for further studies.

Transculturality indicates as well the blurring of boundaries and freedom from prejudices (Epstein and Berry 1999; Peng 2010). As my study indicates, the

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5. John M. Hobson defines the West as “a late developer” and the East as “an early developer,” that discovered and led the world through “oriental globalization” from 500 to 1800. Nicholas Standaert points out that, in the seventeenth century, “it was the Chinese that occupied the dominant position” when European missionaries were allowed to stay in China. They were demanded to adapt to the native culture and communicate with the natives in the Chinese language (2002, 3–4). Both Jürgen Osterhammel and Kim M. Phillips denounce Eurocentrism while reexamining Said’s concept of Orientalism. Jean-Yves Heurtebise reveals that Hegel’s relegation of Chinese thought to the “pre-philosophical” stage contributes to the turn from “Sinophilia” to “Sinophobia” in Europe (2020, 94–126).
categorical dichotomies of modern/tradition, center/periphery, East/West are less valid than are the efforts to cross the divide and connect the seeming opposites. Connectivity is the key to transcultural practice. While proponents of the Lifeview school in China have often been dubbed “conservative” and “unscientific” because of their hold onto traditional wisdom, this book shows their informed opinions during the epistemic debate with the Science school and their audacity to challenge the so-called “progressive” mainstream. Interestingly, Confucianism, which had long been denounced since the May Fourth era as responsible for China’s backwardness and failure, was revived almost overnight in the late 1980s. Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door policy has ushered in a new era of national confidence emboldened by the continuing growth in wealth and power, while the Confucius Institutes recently established worldwide are now flaunting China’s soft power. It is high time to reevaluate the Lifeview intellectuals together with their philosophy of life from a transcultural stance.
Moral rectitude originates from qing (情 the affects), rather than hui (慧 reason, or intellect). When not based on qing, even reasoning as perfect as a small vase and rhetoric as smooth as the hot oil lubricating carriage axles would not prevail. When based on qing, it inspires either admiration or animadversions.


As I have not yet abandoned hope for the promise of the future, I remain eager to hear the voices of the heart-mind of all wise men and earnestly entreat them to share with me their inner light. For this inner light can break through darkness and silence, while the voices of the heart-mind can provide deliverance from falsehood and chicanery.

—Lu Xun, “Po e sheng lun” 破惡聲論 [Toward a refutation of malevolent voices, 1908] (LXQJ 8:23; Lu Xun 2011, 40)²

Lu Xun and Qing (Affect): The Heart-Mind Has Its Reasons

Depicted as “the chief commander of China’s cultural revolution” and deified by Mao Zedong as “the Saint of modern China,” Lu Xun has gradually been recognized as a more complex figure than a symbol of party ideology (Goldman 1982, 447; Lovell 2009, xxxii; Yau 2023).³ During his student days in Japan, he was a

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1. “Sixiangyuan xia” is collected in Zhang Taiyan quanji 章太炎全集 [Complete works of Zhang Taiyan] (ZTYQJ 4:133–38). The original sentence for “Moral rectitude originates from qing, rather than reason” is Lide zi qing bu zi hui 立德自情不自慧. Qing 情 is more appropriately translated as “affect” than “feeling,” for reasons explained in this chapter.


3. Merle Goldman’s “The Political Use of Lu Xun” discusses how in different periods Lu Xun’s life and work were twisted to fit the latest mutation in party policy (Goldman 1982). For a biography of
ponent of ancient Chinese wisdom, denouncing scientific rationality, as can be seen in the five essays he published in *Henan Monthly* 河南月刊 in 1907 and 1908. The journal was the official organ of the Henan Province Branch of the Chinese Revolutionary Confederation (Zhonghua Tongmenghui 中華同盟會) in Tokyo, edited by Liu Shipei 劉師培 (1884–1919), an anti-Manchurian revolutionary who fled to Japan in February 1907 and became an anarchist there under the guidance of Kōtoku Shūshui 幸德秋水 (1871–1911; Wang 2010, 86–87; 2011, 70–72). These early essays written by Lu Xun, in infamously archaic language, have since posed a challenge to many critics. Perplexing as they are, if examined together these texts in fact share the tenet of Counter-Enlightenment thinking, which was prevalent in Japan at the time (Lin Shaoyan 2018, 347–52). The second epigraph above, much more readable in translation, is quoted from the opening paragraph of “Toward a Refutation of Malevolent Voices,” published in December 1908.

Before analyzing this essay, it should be noted that Lu Xun’s mentor, the late Qing revolutionary Zhang Taiyan in exile in Japan then, consistently critiqued Enlightenment scientism and progressivism. The archaic language Lu Xun uses in these early essays was no doubt due to Zhang Taiyan’s influence. An expert on Old Text scholarship, Zhang advocated pre-Qin thinkers and considered Confucius the most significant among them, as opposed to the New Text scholars who maintained the incontestable status of Confucianism as religion. For Zhang, the six Classics (六經 liujing) were historical texts that evidenced Confucius as a historian and an educator. With recourse to Buddhist and Daoist thought to complement Confucianism, Zhang believes that the *Book of Changes* is not some mysterious book of premonitions. Rather, it is a record of ancient society and its daily life experiences, while Confucianism is mainly about human affairs or the way of the world (Zhang 2011, 52–68; Wang 1985, 46–67). All these concepts are integral to the May Fourth life philosophy （rensheng zhexue 人生哲學）, as this book argues. Distrusting hypocritical doctrinaires and flowery rhetoric, Zhang Taiyan highlights the value of texts (wen 未文)，or literature in a broad sense, as the indispensable human medium for sincere affective expressions. For him, the origin of morality is by no means reason 慧 (hui),

Lu Xun, see David Pollard’s *The True Story of Lu Xun* (2002). For translation of Lu Xun’s fictional works, see Julia Lovell’s *The Real Story of Ah-Q and Other Tales of China: The Complete Fiction of Lu Xun* (2009). Kevin Ting Kit Yau reads Lu Xun, Chen Duxiu, and Cai Yuanpei through the lens of the dialectic of affect and reason.

4. Lin Shaoyang’s study is the first to investigate systematically the connection between late Qing intellectuals sojourning in Japan and the Japanese Counter-Enlightenment movement.

5. For Zhang Taiyan’s view of the great masters, see “Lun zhuzi xue” 論諸子學 [On the great masters] (ZTYQJ 4.1: 48–67); for his view of the six Classics as historical records, see “Lun jingshi shilu buying wugu huaiyi” 論經史實錄不應無故懷疑 [The historical truths recorded in the Classics should not be offhandedly doubted] (4.2:573–81); For his view of *Yijing* as a record of ancient society and daily experiences, see “Yilun” 易論 [On the *Book of changes*] (3:385–92).
but the affects 情 (qing), which are stirring in literary texts and reverberating like music (ZTYQJ 4:137).6

At the turn of the twentieth century, Chinese intellectuals taking refuge from Manchurian persecution or studying in Japan witnessed the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment movements during the Meiji (1868–1912) and Taishō (1912–1926) periods. Reformers and revolutionaries such as Liang Qichao, Cai Yuanpei, and Wu Zhihui 吳稚暉 (1865–1953), prominent May Fourth Counter-Enlightenment and life philosophy leaders, were also sojourning in Tokyo around this time. While Fukusawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉 (1835–1901) was Japan's leading Enlightenment thinker during the Meiji period, the most famous Counter-Enlightenment intellectual was Nakae Chōmin 中江兆民 (1847–1901), who, known for his translation of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762) between 1882 and 1883, was lauded as the Rousseau of the East (Lin 2018, 388). We will see in Chapter 1, how Nishida Kitarō, founder of the Kyoto school philosophy and advocate of life philosophy (jinsei tetsugaku 人生哲學, or seimei shugi 生命主義),7 has recourse to irrational concepts such as ujō 有情 (sentient beings) in Buddhism, “Gefühl” (feeling) in German Romanticism, and qing in traditional Chinese texts to refute Enlightenment rationality. Central to Lu Xun’s early writings published in Tokyo as well, these concepts expressed in traditional Chinese and Buddhist terms are particularly illuminating for this study.

In “Malevolent Voices,” Lu Xun’s Counter-Enlightenment stance is crystal clear when he writes: “The confessions of Augustine, Tolstoy, and Rousseau embody true greatness; these are the exuberant voices of the heart-mind” (LXQJ 8:27; Lu Xun 2011, 48). Through voices of the heart-mind (xinsheng 心聲), “the inner light” (neiyao 内曜) is able to shine through the suffocating darkness and “silence,” which are forced upon the people by the sophistry of “rash doctrines” and “reckless demagogues” (LXQJ 8:23; Lu Xun 2011, 40). What doctrines and demagogues is Lu Xun referring to? He takes Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919, German zoologist and philosopher) for an example of those who, endeavoring to eradicate religions as superstitions, worship instead science and build a temple for reason (lixing 理性; risei in Japanese; LXQJ 8:28; Lu Xun 2011, S1). Note the juxtaposition between the sound of the heart-mind, which refers to qing in Chinese tradition, and lixing, which is a Japanese kanji term originating from the West. The sound of the heart-mind,

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6. These lines fully disclose Zhang Taiyan’s views: “The texts [wen 文] of the six Classics are all elegant and magnificent, the best of which can be attuned to music and sung, while the rest can also be like meandering melodies. As recorded in the six Classics, the language teaching morals is distributed properly in them. When read aloud, it inspires adoration, while its repetition is never tiring.”

which yearns for the divine, is contrasted with scientific rationality. The former 
“can provide deliverance from the falsehood and chicanery” of scientism, because 
it expresses the natural feelings of the people, uncontaminated by theoretical hypoc-
risy. In other words, the sound of the heart-mind reaches truth without depending 
on reason. The “inner light” that can break through darkness and silence is the light 
that comes from the heart-mind; it is the “inner sincerity” that seeks to be expressed 
in words. “Inner sincerity” (cheng yu zhong 誠於中) is a citation from Daxue 大學 
[The great learning],8 while the inner light refers to intuitive knowledge, or liangzhi 良知 in the words of Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529), a Ming dynasty pro-
ponent of xinxue 心學 (the Heart-Mind philosophy) as an alternative for lixue 理 
學 (the philosophy of Universal Order). It is also what Nishida Kitarō understands 
as la connaissance par coeur (knowledge of the heart) in modern French philosophy.
Chapter 1 discusses this in detail. It is important to bear in mind that the heart-mind 
in Chinese philosophy refutes the heart/mind dichotomy à la Descartes, or feeling/ 
reason dualism. For the Chinese, the heart-mind is capable of cognitive as well as 
affective function.9 The Counter-Enlightenment intellectuals discussed in this study 
all maintain that, far from being polarized and exclusive to each other, affect and 
reason are complementary and mutually reinforced, affect encompassing reason.

In “Malevolent Voices” it is emphasized that the heart-mind has its reasons, 
over which the mind has no control. Lu Xun writes:

> When one returns to the heart-mind, one can keep to his own faith without 
> chiming in on the chorus sung by the world. The sound of the heart-mind is sub-
> stantial and cannot be self-controlled, because it originates from one’s heart-mind 
> and reverberates in one’s brain like waves. (LXQJ 8:24; Lu Xun 2011, 41)10

One’s heart must be touched before one’s brain begins to respond. The heart, being 
part of the body as the brain is, is connected to the universal order of affect that stirs 
the body. For Lu Xun, religions are necessary because they have been created for the 
need of the human heart-mind to aspire to the divine. A single God or pantheism 
makes no difference. Pantheism practiced in China since four thousand years ago 
has expressed rural dwellers’ understanding of natural phenomena. Such faith is not 
to be found with the gentry class, who are only concerned with utilitarianism and 
petty gains and have no interest at all in the mysteries of life. Lu Xun declares: “Thus

8. It is said in The Great Learning: “Cheng yu zhong xing yu wai” 誠於中形於外 (Inner sincerity will be 
expressed outward). James Legge’s 1861 translation reads, “What truly is within will be manifested 
without” (2014, 235).
9. For an analysis of the philosophical significance of the heart-mind in Chinese philosophy, see Yu 
10. The original for “return[s] to the heart-mind” is fan qi xi 反其心, meaning “return to the original 
self,” or “return to one’s conscience.” The original for “cannot be self-controlled” is buneng ziyi 不能自已. 
Von Kowallis renders it as “[his speech must] not circumscribe or contain them [his own 
views].”

Modern Chinese Counter-Enlightenment
the most urgent task today is to rid ourselves of this hypocritical gentry; superstition may remain” (LXQJ: 8:28; Lu Xun 2011, 51). I will explain in Chapter 3 how a decade later “heart-mind” (心) is used to render the French concepts of “conscience” and “l’esprit” in Zhang Dongsun’s 張東蓀 (1886–1973) 1918 translation of Henri Bergson’s Creative Evolution (1907). Zhang’s monumental translated text constituted the theoretical basis for the May Fourth Counter-Enlightenment movement.

It is worthwhile to investigate deeper what Lu Xun calls the “sound of the heart-mind.” The concept is derived from the Han dynasty Confucian Yang Xiong’s 揚雄 (53 BCE–18 CE) “Wen shen” 問神 [Questions on the divine] in Fa yan 法言 [Exemplary words] (Yang 2010). Following the dialogic mode in The Analects of Confucius, Yang writes at the outset: “Someone asks about the divine. I answer: ‘It is the heart-mind.’” What is then the “sound of the heart-mind”? According to Yang,

Speech is the sound of the heart-mind, and writing, its graphic depiction. When sound and graphic depiction take form, great and petty persons are revealed. Aren’t the speech and writing of the great and the petty where the affects are stirring (dongqing 動情)?

I translate dongqing as “the affects are stirring,” because qing in traditional Chinese thought is more than feeling or emotion. It indicates the force-relations constituted by the energies released from celestial, living, and non-living bodies in the universe. This kind of force-relations is also the main concern of Deleuzian affect theory. In fact, “affect” is most often rendered as qingdong 情動 in modern Japanese and Chinese. For Gilles Deleuze (1950–1995), while explicating Baruch Spinoza’s (1632–1677) affect theory, all forms of matter and life are governed by such force-relations. Chapter 5 discusses how, thanks to the popularity of Spinoza and Bergson in the May Fourth era, the concept of qing derived from the Book of Changes can be connected with affect theory.

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11. The original for “the need . . . to aspire to the divine” (xiangshang zhi xuyao 向上之需要) means literally “the need to strive upward.” In Lu Xun’s text, “xiangshang” as a rule refers to the aspiration to the divine high above us.

12. The Chinese original reads: Yan, xin sheng ye; shu, xin hua ye. Sheng hua xing, junzi xiaoren jian yi. Sheng hua zhe, junzi xiaoren zhi suyi dongqing hu 言,心聲也;書,心畫也。聲畫形,君子小人見矣。聲畫者,君子小人之所以動情乎。The best rendering of these lines I have read is by Béatrice L’Haridon into French. The last two lines of this quote are rendered by her as follows: “Sons et tracés ne sont-ils pas le lieu où se meuvent les affects de l’homme de bien et l’homme de peu?” (Yang 2010, 43). It is apparent that L’Haridon has the affect theory in mind when she translates Yang Xiong’s work.

13. According to Malissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth, “Affect is in many ways synonymous with force or forces of encounter . . . Affect can be understood then as a gradient of bodily capacity—a supple incrementalism of ever-modulating force-relations. . . . Hence, affect’s always immanent capacity of extending further still: both into and out of the interstices of the inorganic and non-living, the intracellular divulgences of sinew, tissue, and gut economies, and the vaporous evanescences of the incorporeal (events, atmospheres, feeling-tones)” (2010, 2).
Qing: Universal Co-living and Co-becoming

As we can see in “Malevolent Voices,” Lu Xun explicates the concept of qing, with recourse to a peculiar combination of natural science and traditional thought such as Confucianism and Buddhism. After the lines quoted in the second epigraph, Lu Xun continues to point out how, due to the nature of matter (wuxing 物性) and biological principles (shengli 生理), all youqing 有情, a Buddhist term for “sentient beings,” meaning all living creatures\(^{14}\)—including insects, birds, crawling animals, and humans—are affected by external forces such as wind, sun, moon, the ebbs and flows of tides, and seasons; in the midst of all these external forces they either feel inflicted or blessed, and “changes are bound to occur” (LXQJ 8:23; Lu Xun 2011, 41). Here, the sense of the co-living, or co-becoming, of the myriad things in the universe as taught by the concept of qing is more than clear. Nevertheless, according to Lu Xun, when it comes to humans, one aspect differentiates them from other sentient beings. Although likewise swayed by natural phenomena, their sentiments inevitably affected by external forces—feeling elated in spring, focused in summer, desolate in autumn, and somber in winter—they are unique among living creatures in that they are able to use speech (yan 言) to express their inner light. Perhaps greater than any natural forces (tianwu 天物), the power of speech, or the sound of the heart-mind, can reawaken the entire land and shake the human world with a sense of awe, which is the beginning for humans to aspire to the divine (LXQJ 8:23–24; Lu Xun 2011, 41).\(^{15}\) Lu Xun’s indebtedness to Yang Xiong is more than clear. Darwinian biology, a major source of inspiration for modern philosophy and a recurrent topic in this book, no doubt plays a role here in Lu Xun’s thinking. His interest in biology can also be seen in his first Tokyo essay, “Ren de lishi” 人的歷史 [The history of man, 1907], which is an overview of the history of evolutionary biology (8:8–24).

Let’s go back to the opening lines of “Malevolent Voices”: “Corroded at the core and wavering spiritually, our once-glorious nation seems destined to wither away of its own devices amid the internecine quarreling among its offspring” (LXQJ 8:23; Lu Xun 2011, 41). Throughout the essay the “once-glorious nation” is juxtaposed with twentieth-century China. The latter is beset by foreign military, economic, and cultural invasions that culminate in the hypocritical doctrines of Enlightenment

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14. The Tang dynasty monk Huilin 慧琳 points out that youqing 有情 is originally sattva in Sanskrit. Sa means you 有 (to have), while tva means qing 情 (sentiment), hence ‘having sentiment.’ It is also called zhongsheng 種生 (all beings): “Here we use zhongsheng as another term for youqing” (Huilin 1983, 54:621). According to a recent study, “In Buddhism youqing (sattva, transliterated as saduopo, sachueifu, or sachuei, and formerly translated as zhongsheng) means ‘all living beings with sentiment’” (Ho 2009, 114). Youqing in Chinese is pronounced as ujō in Japanese.

15. In Lu Xun’s original text, quran 瞿然 means “a sense of awe” when one faces the supernatural, while xiangshang zhi quanyu 向上之權舆 means “the beginning . . . to aspire to the divine,” or to strive upward.
scientism, the malevolent voices. They are a contrast to the sound of the heart-mind, which bespeaks qing, or affect, as the everlasting universal order of co-living and co-becoming. The "internecine quarreling among its offspring" refers to the late Qing debate on Enlightenment rationality (the faith in science and progressivism) and affective Enlightenment (the faith in the sound of the heart-mind and traditional Chinese values). Of the latter, Zhang Taiyan was a prominent harbinger. Like his mentor, Lu Xun valorizes ancient China and points out the necessity of traditional festivities worshiping gods, because these celebrations are farmers’ brief respite from their yearlong labor and commemorate their spiritual connections with the divine. He likens these festivities to the chanting of poets, which depicts the yearning of the heart-mind, and the stretching and bending of dancers, which limber up the body. Myths and fables such as the mythical dragons in ancient China, deemed irrational "in the name of science," were, however, created by the divine imagination (shen si 神思) of the ancients. Lu Xun stresses the importance of myths in Western literature, arts, and philosophy (LXQJ 8:30; Lu Xun 2011, 54). The refutation of malevolent voices thus indicates a return to the “once-glorious nation,” the traditional China uncontaminated by European Enlightenment rationalism, which justifies colonialism and military infiltrations into “backward” and “weak” countries such as China, Poland, and India. Although backward in the eye of the world, the people of Poland are very affectionate (duo qingsu 多情愫) and love freedom and peace; India, by contrast, is famous for its philosophies, religions, codes of morality, and arts and literature (LXQJ 8:33; Lu Xun 2011, 60). Nevertheless, qing, the principle of universal co-living and co-becoming, engenders empathy for the weak among peoples around the globe. At the end of the essay, Lu Xun praises those who fought for the freedom of oppressed peoples: the Polish general Jóseph Bem (1794–1850), who participated in the liberation war of the Hungarian people in 1849, and the British Romantic poet Lord Byron (1788–1824), who led the campaign for the Greek war of independence around 1824.

The power of literature and arts is a central theme in Lu Xun’s early Tokyo essays. In “Moluo shili shuo” 魔羅詩力說 [On the power of Māra poetry] (LXQJ 1:63–115), published in February and March 1908, he maintains that “the most powerful heritage of human civilization is the sound of the heart-mind (63) and that “Poets and bards use their wonderful songs to convey their intuitional instinct (ling jue 灵觉) so as to beautify and improve our temperaments and magnify our thinking” (69). A Buddhist term, ling jue refers to bodhi 菩提16—the awakening of “the intuitional instinct that lies dormant in all beings” (Nyanatiloka 1945, 13–14). It is the attainment of true enlightenment, when one, awakening from the slumber or stupor inflicted upon the mind by the defilements of phenomena

16. According to Ding Fubao, ling jue refers to the innate, intuitive understanding of bodhi (1956, 2:852), which means Buddha’s ultimate wisdom (4:2110).
and ego-identity, comprehends the Four Noble Truths.17 As the “real knowledge gained through intuition by some extraordinary seers or mystics” (LXQJ 1:58), and by poets as well, it is also exactly what Lu Xun calls “the inner light,” or the innate knowledge in all humans. He constantly juxtaposes literature and science, writing in one instance: “All great literary works in the world are keys to the secrets of life. Literature honestly reflects the facts and laws of life, while science is incapable of doing the same” (1:71–72). He lauds Romantic poets such as Lord Byron, Robert Burns (1759–1796), and Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822) as “great men” who defied hypocrisy and sympathized with the oppressed (1:82–87). Their revolutionary spirit fills both their poetry singing of justice, freedom, truth, and love, and their action aiming to improve life. He calls Shelley “a man of divine imagination,” who enjoyed contemplating nature and was infatuated with the secrets of life and death (85). Coming from “palpitations of the heart-mind naturally attuned to sounds of nature” (86),18 Shelley’s lyrical poetry is a divine creation unmatched by none but the works of Shakespeare (1564–1616) and Edmund Spencer (1552–1599; poet of the Medieval romance The Fairie Queene). By contrast, when the intellect is devoted solely to science, the aim is to control nature and discover its laws, while the most inferior will never feel their heart-minds stirring when experiencing the magnificent natural phenomena such as the change of seasons.

“Kexueshi jiaopian” 科學史教篇 [Lessons from the history of science], published in June 1908 (LXQJ 1:25–43), is a free rendering of Kimura Shūnkiji’s 木村駿吉 (1866–1938) “General View of the History of Science,” introduction to his 1890 book, Kagaku no genri 科學之原理 [The principles of science] (Song Shengquan 2019). It was a physics primer for students of humanities at First Higher School in Tokyo (Kimura 1890, 1–2). While giving an objective overview of the development of science and lauding its stellar achievements, Kimura keeps on reminding the reader that science does not cover everything in human life, that literature and arts are likewise essential, and that throughout Greek and Roman history and the Middle Ages there were repeated shifts from one extreme to the other. What should be maintained, nevertheless, is “the middle course,” so that religion, morality, and the arts can prosper along with science (8–9). The conclusion points out the limits of science: it is unable to explain the freedom of will and the wonder of the unknowable (188–89). Lu Xun’s essay basically follows this line of thinking. He writes:

Science is the holy light that shines on the world. . . . However, when the world worships nothing but knowledge, life will completely wither. In the long run, our beautiful, noble feelings will deplete, while our sharp thought will be lost. The so-called science thus also becomes nothing. (LXQJ 1:35)

17. The four Noble Truths are “the truths about the universal sway of suffering, about its origin, its extinction, and the path leading to its extinction” (Nyanatiloka 1945, 2).
18. The original sentence is “xinxian zhi dong, zi yu tianlai hediao” 心弦之動, 自與天籟合調.
Chapters of the Book

The book contains five chapters and the conclusion. Chapter 1 sets China’s Lifeview movement in the context of global Counter-Enlightenment. All the actors who promoted the Lifeview movement in China were either close friends or disciples of Liang Qichao, the principal player that made the connections with Japan, Germany, and France possible. During his exile in Japan, Liang Qichao witnessed the Lifeview movement led by people like Nishida Kitarō, who used the Buddhist concept of sentient beings to critique scientific rationality. Liang actively participated in the Eastern Ethics Renaissance movement headed by Inoue Tetsujirō and Kanie Yoshimaru. In 1918, Liang led a group of burgeoning Chinese intellectuals to Europe and visited Rudolf Eucken, while Zhang Junmai, who was acting as interpreter during the trip, stayed in Jena to study philosophy with the German life philosopher. Zhang’s article “Lifeview” triggered the Lifeview and Science debate in China in 1923.

Chapter 2 investigates the Aesthetic Education movement led by Cai Yuanpei. Learning from German and Japanese Aesthetic Education movements, Cai began to advocate the concept in his capacity as the first Education Minister in 1912. Later that year his essay “Worldview and Lifeview” was ready for press. In 1917, he published “Yi meiyu dai zongjiao” [Replacing religion with aesthetic education], which became the bible for the Aesthetic Education movement in China. The journal Aesthetic Education, established in 1920, claims that aesthetic education aims to construct a “new lifeview,” so that the education overemphasizing intellectualism could be reformed. Cai’s blueprint of “an aesthetic life” indicates that theory and praxis are of equal importance to the Lifeview school.

Chapter 3 discusses Chuanghualun, Zhang Dongsun’s 1918 translation of Bergson’s Creative Evolution. Inspired by traditional Heart-Mind philosophy, Zhang turned “consciousness” in French to “heart-mind” in his Chinese rendering. A close ally of Liang Qichao, Zhang Dongsun was serializing Chuanghualun in a newspaper established by Liang when the latter embarked on his grand European trip to visit Eucken with his disciples. In February of 1920, Guo Moruo, while studying in Japan, wrote about his experience of reading Zhang’s Chuanghualun. The following year, he established the Creation Society with Cheng Fangwu and Yu Dafu, who were then also students in Tokyo.

Chapter 4 discusses Dongxi wenhua ji qi zhexue [Eastern and Western cultures and their philosophies], published by Liang Shuming in 1921, is the central topic of Chapter 4. He compares Chinese, Indian, and Western philosophies, trying to establish the relevance of traditional Chinese culture in the modern world. Declaring that Confucius was a life philosopher, he connects Confucianism with the life philosophy of Eucken and Bergson. However, while Zhang Dongsun disagrees that Bergson was
against science, Liang Shuming believes this to be true. He critiques the concepts of “Easternization” and “Westernization” and wonders if Easternization is possible when all the countries in the world are eager to Westernize themselves. This kind of essentialist dichotomy is, of course, to be questioned.

The central issue of Chapter 5 is affectivism. The Lifeview intellectuals, believing that “all things between Heaven and Earth are sentient,” a Buddhist and Confucian teaching, invented the theory of affectivism and intervened in the global dialectic of affect and reason. The theory was proposed in 1922 by Liang Shuming’s student Zhu Qianzhi, who maintains that rather than reason, qing, or the affects, is the core of ontology. Referring to the Book of Changes tradition and resonating with Zhang Dongsun’s view of Bergson, Zhu points out that the truth of the universe is zhenqing zhi liu 真情之流 (affective flows), which, like life itself, is a holistic force and changes unceasingly. In 1924, Yuan Jiahua 袁家驊 (1903–1980) invented the concept of qingren 情人 (homo sentimentalis, or sentimental man) to refute Nietzsche’s chaoren 超人 (Superman).

The Conclusion centers on Fang Dongmei 方東美 (1899–1977), one of the forerunners of New Confucianism in postwar Taiwan and Hong Kong. His 1927 book, Kexue zhexue yu rensheng 科學哲學與人生 [Science, philosophy, and life] stands out among the May Fourth life philosophy corpus because it summarizes neatly the Science and Lifeview debate: “The Universe and life are a harmonious unity of affect and reason, which should not be divided.” His thought combines Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist concepts as well as Bergsonism. Fang maintains that the pursuit of knowledge should aim to aid life: “Without you, Life, what’s the worth of knowledge?” This statement defines the meaning of life philosophy.

I Feel, Therefore I Am

We are all familiar with Descartes’ 1637 maxim “I think, therefore I am” (Cogito, ergo sum; Je pense, donc je suis), a Latin phrase he invented during the European Enlightenment. What has probably escaped most people’s attention is Daniel Mornet’s (1878–1954) counter-rationalism maxim in 1929, Je sens, donc je suis (I feel, therefore I am), a belated motto that has revived the study of Rousseau-esque Counter-Enlightenment (1929, 64). A Rousseau expert, Mornet coined this French phrase to indicate the significance of Rousseau-esque sentimentalism vis-à-vis Enlightenment rationality.

According to Mornet, the French Revolution was mainly triggered by Romanticism, which had been inspired by Rousseau’s sentimentalism rather than by Enlightenment rationalism. As has been pointed out by quite a few later historians, the work that directly led to the Revolution was not Encyclopedie, the monumental collection that immortalized the European Enlightenment, but rather Rousseau’s 1762 Du contrat social [Social contract] (McDonald 2013). Modern China witnessed
a similar case of the interaction between philosophy, literature, and revolution. The establishment of the Creation Society in 1921 ushered in the Romantic generation of modern Chinese literature (Lee 1973). Why the Creation writers declared around 1927 that they would switch from literary revolution to revolutionary literature seems to be a mystery that has puzzled quite a few critics (Zheng 1953; Hou 1974; Xu 2013), but in fact there had been plenty of indicators pointing to that inevitable turnabout. Several chapters in this book point out that life philosophy is a practical philosophy advocating action, as can be evidenced by the idea of “an aesthetic life” maintained by the Aesthetic Education movement (see Chapter 2). Zhu Qianzhi believes that “the universe is an unceasing flux. That is to say, an endless revolution. . . . Revolution means creation simultaneously” (see Chapter 5). That the Creation writers such as Cheng Fangwu and Guo Moruo, having close affinity with the Lifeview school, would call themselves artists and revolutionaries and walk down the path of socialist revolution, was only to be expected (see Chapter 3).

This book argues that modern Chinese Counter-Enlightenment was part and parcel of the global Counter-Enlightenment movement that had begun with the European Enlightenment. “Lifeview,” the essay that triggered the May Fourth Science and Lifeview debate, was originally a lecture delivered by Zhang Junmai at Tsinghua University on 14 February 1923. Just ten days earlier, a similar event had occurred in Europe on 4 February. The British geneticist and evolutionary biologist John Burdon Sanderson Haldane (1892–1964) gave a talk at the University of Cambridge titled “Daedalus; or, Science and the Future,” lauding science for its capacity to bring about happiness for human beings. The following year Bertrand Russell, who had visited China in 1920, reacted with the publication of a pamphlet titled Icarus: or, The Future of Science, in which he warns that the misuse of science would only lead to disasters (see Chapter 4). During the global crisis between the two world wars, the progressive values of the sciences and the self-questioning values of the humanities, seemingly poles apart, were in fact interacting in a dialectic mode. The dialectic of reason and affect has been a recurrent global event since the European Enlightenment. Throughout history it has been impossible for China or any other country to isolate itself from the global interactions of ideas, events, people, and material culture. Such transcultural interactions have transcended the boundaries of time, space, languages, and cultures, linking all that are related in an inseparable connectivity. To avoid war and coexist in harmony, one has to feel the need to reach for others and the indispensability of mutual self-transformation to achieve affective communion and sustainability. This is the significance of transcultural co-living and co-becoming.

31. Cheng Fangwu published “Cong wenxue geming dao geming wenxue” 從文學革命到革命文學 [From literary revolution to revolutionary literature] in Creation Monthly in 1928, announcing the decision of the Creation writers to embark on a revolutionary agenda. The draft of the essay was finished on 23 November 1927, as is indicated at the end of the essay published in Creation Monthly. For more discussion of this, see Chapter 3.
I would rather create some new light,  
Than be a goddess in this niche.  

—Guo Moruo, *Nišhen女神 [The goddesses, 1921]*

Thanks to *Chuanghualun 創化論* (Figure 3.1), Zhang Dongsun’s (1886–1973) 1918 translation of Henri Bergson’s *Creative Evolution* (1907), May Fourth affectivism reexamined the traditional learning inherited from *The Book of Changes*, connecting the becoming and flows (bianhua liuxing 變化流行) of *qing* with the Bergsonian concept of creative evolution (see Chapter 5). Also due to Zhang’s monumental translation, the transcultural term *chuangzao 創造* (creation) became a familiar usage in daily language in the May Fourth era, while the same term, meaning “writing an original piece of work” or “inventing an apparatus,” had existed during the Northern and Southern dynasties (420–589 CE). Even though Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, prominent founders of the Communist Party in 1921 and proponents of the Science school during the 1923 debate, had published essays on *Creative Evolution* in 1915 (see the conclusion), it was Zhang Dongsun’s translation of the book in 1918 and the establishment of the Creation Society in 1921 that precipitated the popularity of the term “creation” among ordinary people as well as intellectuals.

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1. In “Ying Shao zhuan 應紹傳 [Biography of Ying Shao], collected in Fan Ye’s 范曄 (398–445 CE) *Hou Han shu 後漢書 [History of the Later Han, 432–45 CE]*, Ying Shao (fl. before 207 CE) explained in thirty essays to the emperor his method of tidying up the laws. All of the essays except one were taken from previous historical accounts and revised by him. The term *chuangzao* was used when Ying Shao referred to the twenty-seventh piece originally written by him. The original reads: 其二十七，臣所創造 (Fan 1973, 6.48:1613). In Shen Yue’s 沈約 (441–513 CE) *Song shu 宋書 [History of the Liu Song dynasty, 487 CE]* it is recorded that the compass chariot, believed to have been invented by the legendary ruler Huangdi 黃帝 in antiquity, was not known during the Qin (221–207 BCE) and the Western Han, or Former Han (202 BCE–9 CE). It was not reinvented until the Eastern Han, or Later Han (25–220 CE) by Zhang Heng 張衡 (78–139). The original reads: 至於秦漢，其 [指南車] 制無聞，後漢張衡始復創造 (Shen 1974, 2.18:496).
When Liang Qichao took Zhang Junmai and five other young intellectuals to Europe in late December 1918 to visit Eucken, he had intended to visit Bergson as well, because for him they were the two most important contemporary philosophers in the world. To his disappointment, the latter was not available for an interview. Although he missed the opportunity of meeting the French philosopher in person, Zhang Dongsun, his close ally, had serialized *Chuanghualun* in the newspaper *Current Times*, one of the organs of Liang Qichao’s Research Coalition. The serialization of *Chuanghualun* lasted from 1 January to 31 March 1918 (Bergson 1919; Zuo 2013, 81–82). The following year the whole translation was published by Commercial Press in Shanghai, with a preface written by the political commentator Tang Hualong 湯化龍 (fl. 1910s) advocating the complementarity and mutual reinforcement of Eastern and Western philosophies (Bergson 1919, iv), a concept the Lifeview school fully embraced.\(^2\) Unfamiliar with French, Zhang mainly relied on the 1911 English translation by Arthur Mitchell (Bergson 1975) and the 1912 Japanese translation by Kaneko Umaji 金子馬治 (1870–1937) and Katsurai Tōnosuke 桂井當之助 (1870–1915), as he divulges in “The Translator’s Preface” (Bergson 1919, i). The Japanese version, titled *Sōzōteki shinka* 創造的進...

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\(^2\) In Zhang Dongsun’s text, the preface written by Tang Hualong, “The Translator’s Preface,” and the main text all start with page one. To distinguish them, I use roman numerals for the page numbers of the prefaces. I do likewise for other similar books published in the same period or earlier.
化 (Bergson 1913), was certainly a significant resource when Zhang deliberated the lexical choices in his own translation. While the Lifeview discourses had been in the making since the early 1910s, the publication of *Chuanghualun* provided the main concepts and transcultural lexicon needed to forward its cause.

On 26 May 1921, Zhang Junmai, arriving from Jena and with a co-member of the Research Coalition Lin Zaiping 林宰平 (1879–1960), who was on a European tour at the time, managed to meet with Bergson and converse with him for an hour at his home in Paris. The report on this visit, discussed later in this chapter, was published in *Gaizao* 改造 [*La Rekonstruo*]³ in August that year (Zhang 1921b) and later included in *People’s Tocsin*’s special issue on Bergson in December of the same year.⁴ Others who contributed to the special issue include Li Shicen, Zhang Dongsun, Cai Yuanpei, Lü Zheng, and Liang Shuming, all Lifeview intellectuals that are discussed in this study, in addition to Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (Fung Yu-lan, 1895–1990). Feng, like Liang Shuming, would also be lauded as a first-generation New Confucian trying to revive Confucianism based on modern Western philosophy (Bresciani 2001, 35–36).⁵ Both stayed in China after World War II and suffered persecution during the Cultural Revolution.

Zhang Dongsun was sent by the Qing government to Japan to study philosophy from 1905 to 1911. He studied at Tokyo University first, and then at The Private Academy of Philosophy (now Toyo University). In 1906, he established the journal *Jiaoyu* 教育 [*Education*] with friends like Lan Gonwu 藍公武 (1887–1957), exploring issues of philosophy and ethics. While in Japan, he befriended Zhang Junmai and supported Liang Qichao’s constitutional position. After returning to China, he was hired by the provisional government in Nanjing. Although listed as a member

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3. The journal, issued twice a month, was originally named *Jiefang yu gaizao* 解放與改造 [*Liberation and La Konstruo*], a bimonthly edited by the Research Coalition under Liang Qichao’s aegies. Introducing socialist thought as the dominant theme, it was first published in Shanghai on 15 September 1919. The Research Coalition then moved to Beijing in August 1920, and the name of the journal was changed to *Gaizao* beginning with the issue dated 15 September 1920, but the journal continued to be published in Shanghai. After the issue dated 15 September 1922, it stopped publication due to financial strain.

4. For the interview collected in the special issue on Bergson, see *People’s Tocsin* 3, no. 1 (December): 10–14.

5. For the three generations of New Confucians listed in *Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement*, see Bresciani 2001, 11–36. According to Bresciani’s chart of the members of the “New Confucian movement” (35–36), Liang Shuming, Zhang Junmai, Fang Dongmei, Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968), and Feng Youlan are the first-generation New Confucians; Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978), Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995), and Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1904–1982), are among the second generation; Ying-shih Yü 余英時, Tu Wei-ming 杜維明 (b. 1940), Chung-ying Cheng 成中英 (b. 1935), and Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先 (1934–2016) are the third generation. Many of the second and third generations left the People’s Republic of China after the war and went into exile in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States. Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan were students of Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968), who was purged during the Cultural Revolution. Zhang Junmai left for the United States and passed away there.
of the Nationalist Party, he was in fact closer to the Progressive Party led by Liang Qichao, who opposed Yuan Shikai’s 袁世凱 (1859–1916) plan of restoring the monarchy. Later, Zhang Dongsun became an editorial writer for major newspapers in Shanghai. In 1918, he succeeded Zhang Junmai as the editor-in-chief of *Current Times*. In 1920, the Lecture Society invited Russell to lecture in cities like Hangzhou, Nanjing, and Changsha, Zhang Dongsun escorting him along the way (Wang 1999, 1–22; Zuo 2013). In 1921, his translation of Bergson’s *Matter and Memory* was published by Commercial Press in Shanghai. Zhang later taught philosophy at Kwang Hua University 光華大學 (present-day East China Normal University 華東師範) and Zhongguo Gongxue 中國公學 (Chinese Public University) in Shanghai, and National Chengchi University 政治大學 in Nanjing. After the war he stayed in mainland China and passed away in prison during the Cultural Revolution.

**Theory of Knowledge and Theory of Life**

Zhang Dongsun’s *Chuanghualun*, rarely studied so far (Chan 2009), had a lasting impact on the May Fourth generation; it was a tour de force that shaped the Lifeview discourse. Translated into archaic Chinese, the book is not easily accessible to the general reader today. Even for readers at the time it would have been a struggle to read it, the major obstacle being the transcultural lexicon rendering philosophical and scientific concepts unfamiliar to the Chinese. Due to Zhang’s antiquated language, the sizable transcultural lexicon in the translation becomes even more problematic. One thing we should bear in mind: both the Japanese version of *Creative Evolution* and Zhang’s rendering are interpretive rather than verbatim translations, quite free in their lexical choices and often tending to add explanations or eliminate sentences as necessary. It takes an effort of comparison to see what is behind the choices made by the translators. As we can see in this chapter, Zhang Dongsun is struggling between available Chinese translated terms, Japanese neologisms, and his own invented lexicon. As history proves, either his inventions carried the day, or the Japanese neologisms prevailed.

Bergson’s main purpose is to show that “theory of knowledge” and “theory of life” are inseparable and that they should reinforce each other when it comes to questions of life (1975, ix). The former refers to epistemology as well as scientific knowledge. It was Kant who successfully transformed philosophy into epistemology,
combining Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism. “Theory of life” refers to biology, especially Darwinian evolutionary biology, which is mainly a science of life.

In Zhang Dungsun’s Chinese translation, the two terms become “quanzhi zhi xue”訳知之學 and “shisheng zhi xue”釋生之學 (Bergson 1919, 5), which are his own odd neologisms that would never catch on. When he further explains what they mean, the two terms he uses, “zhishilun”知識論 and “shengminglun”生命論, are easier to understand. The former has been in use as a philosophical term in Chinese, but the meaning of the latter, also used in the Japanese version (Bergson 1913, 8), is still unclear. It is only when one reads through a substantial part of the book, in Chinese, Japanese, English, or French, that one realizes “theory of life” indicates evolutional biology and that Bergson’s own concept of creative evolution intends to improve, or supplement, it.

Bergson maintains that “a theory of life” should be accompanied by “a critique of knowledge,” meaning a critique of knowledge based mainly on intellect and materialism (1998, ix; 1975, xxiii). In 1920, when Dewey lectured in China, he pointed out that Bergson was critiquing the mechanism of Darwinian evolutionism (2005, 247), but Darwin never discussed mechanism. Although Bergson does criticize Darwin for attributing the cause of evolution to exterior environment, and thus eliminating the possibility of an interior urge of the organism to transform itself, the possibility of “élan vital” (vital impetus; Bergson 1998, 56), here his main target is not Darwin. Rather, it is Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), whose First Principles (1862) treats evolutionism as a positive science from a pure materialist view, believing that evolution is mechanic and determined by physical laws (Durant 1953, 351–400).

The aim of Creative Evolution is to forward a new theory of life based on evolutionary biology—meaning Bergson’s own life philosophy centering on the concept of creative evolution. It intends to correct the materialism and intellectualism manifested in both Spencerian evolutionism and Kantian epistemology (Bergson 1998, 223–28), as Bergson declares in the introduction: “the false evolutionism”偽進化論 of Spencer should be replaced by “a true evolutionism” (1998, x; 1975, xxiv; 1919, 6), meaning creative evolutionism.

**Critique of European Enlightenment**

While Kant synthesized the rationalist and empiricist traditions inherited from the European Enlightenment, in Creative Evolution, Bergson consistently denounces the Enlightenment philosophes for their tendency to use the laws of physics to analyze the

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8. While Zhang uses the term zhishilun 知識論 for “la théorie de connaissance,” the Japanese version uses ninshikiron 識識論, which has also been widely used in present-day Japanese and Chinese.

9. Bergson criticizes biological theory for lacking a critique of knowledge: “Une théorie de la vie qui ne s’accompagne pas d’une critique de la connaissance.”
The Universe and life are a harmonious union of affect and reason (qingli jituan 情理集團), which should not be divided.

—Fang Dongmei, Science, Philosophy, and Life (FDMQJ 4:5)

In Science, Philosophy, and Life (1927), Fang Dongmei (1899–1977), a philosophy professor at National Central University in Nanjing, borrows from Lewis Carroll’s (1832–1898) Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and deftly makes clear his observation of the contention between science and philosophy throughout European history. Known to be a first-generation New Confucian, in this book he adroitly sums up, in a manner of speaking, the Science and Lifeview debate. At the outset he refers to the traditional concept of qingli, or renqing shili 人情事理, literally “human affective relations and the order of things.” Here “the order of things” includes the systematic understanding of the relational connections between humans, living and non-living things, and the universe. Fang maintains that in life neither affect nor reason is dispensable. They are in a symbiotic relationship and should complement each other and co-live in harmony, but modern intellectuals in Europe were unable to grasp this truth. Spending hundreds of years from the Middle Ages to modern times searching for the secret of life, they are like the little girl Alice, who is eager to open the door to the mysterious garden she is peeping at, but, after several futile attempts, fails to grasp the key to the door.

As everyone may know, in Lewis Carroll’s work, at first, Alice discovers on a glass table a tiny golden key that enables her to open the little door leading to the garden. But she is too big to get through the door. Then, on the glass table again, she discovers a bottle labeled with the words “DRINK ME.” She drinks the bottle and finds herself shrunk to ten inches tall. To her dismay, she finds the key to the garden lying on the glass table, too high for her to reach. Disappointed, she cries her heart out. She tries to comfort herself, talking to herself as if there were two people debating. Then, suddenly, she makes another discovery: under the table is a glass box, in
which there is a small cake marked with the words “EAT ME.” She eats the cake, thinking that if she dwindles further, she will be able to get into the garden by creeping under the door. If she becomes bigger, she will be able to get the key. The result is that she becomes nine feet tall, and even though she manages to get the key to open the door, she is again unable to get through. When she is desperate and crying, she sees the White Rabbit running by in a hurry, dropping on the ground a pair of white kid gloves and a fan. While she picks up the fan and is fanning herself, she discovers that she has absentmindedly put on one of the gloves when she was talking to herself. She suddenly dwindles rapidly to two feet and is continually shrinking until she drops the fan she is holding. She is glad that she is still in existence and quickly runs to the little door leading to the garden. But the door is shut again, while the key is again left on the table. Dejected, Alice finds she has fallen into the pool of tears that she has wept (Carroll 1992, 5–16; FDMQJ 4:134–36).

Fang Dongmei, after recounting this episode in Lewis Carroll’s work, continues to make it a parable of the debate on affect and reason, one that crystallizes Chinese intellectuals’ self-evaluation vis-à-vis decades of encounter with Western science and philosophy:

If this lovely garden is a metaphor of the connection between qing and li (affect and reason), or of the continuities between the rational aspect of the universe and the affective aspect of life, then in the past three or four hundred years the story of European intellectual history is nothing but these three interesting episodes: drinking the bottle, eating the cake, and putting on a glove. As much as the Europeans, with their green eyes, curly hair, aquiline noses, and white faces, pride themselves on being the best race under Heaven, they are not better off than the poor Alice. (FDMQJ 4:134–36)

The “three interesting episodes” in European history Fang refers to are: (1) After the Europeans were emancipated from the religious and patriarchal societies of the Middle Ages, they proudly took out a golden key—scientific materialism—to unlock the secret of the universe. Yet with the development of science and its dazzling achievements, the place of humans in the universe has dwindled. (2) They took out the second golden key—spiritualism in philosophy, advocated by Kant—to magnify the spirit so that it becomes a gigantic colossus, dwarfing material existence into almost nothing. Yet this arrogant attitude, asserting spiritual life while negating the material world, resulted in promoting spiritual nihilism. (3) To rectify these two dogmatic trends, the development of modern physics and Einstein’s theory of relativity spurred the recent trends of new understandings of both the universe and life, trends that are ongoing. Their outcomes are therefore hard to predict, but at least it is to be expected that the rational visions of the universe (yüzhou lijing 宇宙理境) and the affective nuances of life (rensheng qingqu 人生情趣) are bound to undergo significant changes (FDMQJ 4:137). One statement earlier in the book
summarizes succinctly the key concept of *Science, Philosophy, and Life*: “The fine arts are the representation of the affective nuances of life, whereas science represents the rational aspects of the world” (107). Using this conceptual framework to delineate the development of Western intellectual history, Fang is in fact also summing up the complex debates on science, philosophy, and aesthetics that involved almost all renowned intellectuals during the 1920s, when the New Culture movement in China was at its peak.

Probably the first philosopher to use the adventures of Alice as a metaphor to discuss philosophy, Fang was certainly not the last. Deleuze, in *Logiques du sens* [The logic of sense] (1969), develops the famous concept of “becoming,” inspired by how Alice becomes bigger and smaller repeatedly in the novel (7–8). Carroll’s story of Alice was translated into Chinese by the renowned linguist Yuen Ren Chao in 1922 (Chao 1947). Shen Congwen in 1928 transformed the story by having Alice visiting China and thereby ridiculed the many flaws of the traditional customs and westernized behaviors of modern Chinese intellectuals (*SCWQJ* 3:1–270). Apparently, by the late 1920s, *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* was already widely known in China. The reference to Alice in *Science, Philosophy, and Life* testifies to Fang Dongwei’s erudition in nonphilosophical disciplines. As we will see in this chapter, Fang’s work is brilliantly transcultural, constantly transreferencing philosophy and nonphilosophical disciplines, including art, literature, religion, natural and social sciences such as astronomy, physics, biology, and psychology, while the boundaries between China and West, traditional and modern are blurred.

**Fang Dongmei on Science, Philosophy, and Art**

In *Science, Philosophy, and Life*, Fang Dongmei is concerned with the transdisciplinary relationships between science, philosophy, and art. He is in a way offering his concluding remarks on the Science and Lifeview debate and the Aesthetic Education movement in his time. It is illuminating if we call into mind Deleuze and Guattari’s idea in *What Is Philosophy* that these three disciplines “slip in” on one another’s plane although each discipline utilizes its own particular elements. For the two authors, the brain is the junction of three planes (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, 196; 1994, 208): the plane of immanence of philosophy (form of concept), the plane of composition or creation of art (force of sensation), and the plane of reference or coordination of science (function of knowledge; 1991, 204; 1994, 216). For them, philosophy needs a nonphilosophy to comprehend it, just as art needs nonart, science needs nonscience (1991, 205–6; 1994, 217–18). Fang’s capability to carry on such a transdisciplinary task was due to his home-based and self-directed learning as well as school education, which prepared him well for transcultural practices—in translingual, transnational, transdisciplinary, and transhistorical dimensions.
A sixteenth-generation descendant of the Qing-dynasty Tongcheng school leader Fang Bao 方苞 (1668–1749), Fang Dongmei had solid training in Neo-Confucianism at home. His love for literature was well known when he was a student of philosophy at Jinling University, Nanjing. Since it was a Christian university, all students had to attend Sunday services. Fang was almost expelled from school because during the services he often read novels instead of the Bible. In 1918, he joined the Young China Association. The following year, when Dewey came to Nanjing to give lectures, Fang delivered the welcome address in fluent English for the Nanjing Branch of the association. Dewey’s lectures were on Western philosophy of antiquity, which Fang quite enjoyed, but he was not keen on Dewey’s pragmatism. In 1919, Fang published under the pen name Fang Xun 方珣 an article titled “Bogesen ‘sheng zhi zhexue’” 伯格森「生之哲學」 [Bergson’s “philosophy of life”] in The Journal of the Young China Association (Fang 1919).

After graduating from college he was recommended by the university to study at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and later temporarily transferred to Ohio State University to study Hegel’s philosophy. At Wisconsin–Madison his essay titled “A Critical Exposition of the Bergsonian Philosophy of Life” was so well argued and written in such beautiful English that Evander Bradley McGilvary (1864–1953), an expert on Bergson and Whitehead, distributed it among the students and teachers of the department. Other May Fourth intellectuals were probably no match for Fang in the study of Bergson. He learned to read German and French by himself and studied Buddhism on his own. Graduating from Wisconsin–Madison in 1924, he returned to China to teach at Wuhan University and Central University. A polyglot engaging in transcultural practice, Fang refers to Nietzsche’s Also Sprach Zarathustra and Faust in the German original, and cites the English version of Bergson’s Creative Evolution, another notable philosophical work influenced by Darwinian biology. Apparently Fang’s German proficiency is better than his French proficiency. His Chinese fully demonstrates the influence of Zhang Dongsun’s translation of Bergson’s text. Expressions such as mianyan 绵延 (duration), shengming xianxiang, xixi chuanglezao 生命現象, 息息創造 (the unceasing creation of the phenomena of life), and chuangelin buxi 創進不息 (unceasing creative evolution) appear constantly in Fang’s book. He also relies heavily on traditional Chinese and Buddhist expressions, especially when he discusses the concept of qing, or affect. After World War II he moved to Taiwan and taught at Taiwan University, Tunghai University, and Fu Jen Catholic University. In 1957, his monograph The Chinese View of Life: The Philosophy of Comprehensive Harmony was published by Union Press in Hong Kong. It originates from six broadcast lectures he gave in Nanjing addressing the nation in moments of national crisis, just two months before the Japanese invasion. When the Chinese version was going through the press, the Sino-Japanese War broke out. The English version aimed to appeal to “the English-speaking world for a sympathetic understanding of Chinese mentality” (Fang 1957, iii–iv). He died of lung cancer
in Taipei in 1977 (Sun 1982). Most of his works were lectures recorded and transcribed by his students and published posthumously.

The third-generation New Confucian Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先 (1934–2016) points out that Fang Dongmei, his teacher at Taiwan University, belonged to the first generation of New Confucians (2010, 3–18) and lauds him for the richness and creativity of his thought (Liu 1989), which to a great extent can be attributed to his literary savvy. Fang points out in *The Chinese View of Life* the difficulty of translating Chinese philosophy and its poetic intuition into English: “Philosophy, like poetry—there is a good deal of poetic insight in Chinese philosophical meditations—can never be adequately rendered into a foreign language” (1957, iv). Admitting that the translation of philosophy and literature is a daunting task, he does it anyway. Take, for example, the way he explains how ancient Greeks and modern Europeans differ in their universeviews. Using the British romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s (1772–1834) two poems, “Dejection, an Ode” and “The Destiny of Nations: A Vision,” he illustrates the major difference between the two systems. The first poem, reflecting the materialism of ancient Greeks’ universeview, reveals the limited universe perceived by them. In line with this limited view of the universe, mathematics and Euclidean geometry both stuck to “the size, form, wideness, position, and structure of objects.” This universeview was thus unable to inspire the brilliance of the human mind and lacked “abstract, superb ideals.” The speaker in “Dejection, an Ode” therefore laments, “I see, not feel, how beautiful they [the stars] are!” (Section II, line 18; 4:139). By contrast, “The Destiny of Nations: A Vision” reflects how for modern Europeans the universe is “a vast, infinite system.” What the five senses can perceive is only “a drop in the ocean”; one ought to use “intellectual fantasy and emotional epiphanies” to grasp the infinity of the universe. The reason is that sense impressions are only facile signs that symbolize the infinite order of things in the universe, as the speaker in the poem declares, “For all that meets the bodily sense I deem/Symbolical” (Stanza 3, lines 6–7; 4:139). Fang refers to Faust’s praise of the greatness of the universe in Goethe’s eponymous play, quoting the original German, “Welch Schauspiel! aber ach! ein Schauspiel nur!/Wo faß’ ich dich, unendliche Natur?” (Scene I, lines 454–55; Such a spectacle! Ah, alas! Merely a spectacle!/How then can I grasp you, endless Nature?; *FDMQJ* 4:140). Fang quotes two lines from Book 13 of William Wordsworth’s (1770–1850) “Prelude,” describing how a road disappearing on the top of a faraway hill “Was like an invitation into space/Boundless, or guide into eternity” (Stanza 6, lines 9–10; 4:142).

All the English and German poems Fang uses to illuminate Western philosophy are translated into the format of classical Chinese poems by him, and I have to admit that the original poems are much easier to understand than are his archaic Chinese lyrics, which are, however, exceptionally elegant for adepts. Fang Dongmei is certainly not alone in discussing the development of European philosophy as evidenced by romantic poetry. As pointed out in Chapter 1, Eucken holds Romanticism in high
esteem for allowing things in nature to acquire a life of their own, while Nishida values the romantic spirit represented by Novalis’s “die blaue Blume.” In Chapters 2 and 5 we have seen the Creation writers’ enthusiasm for Creative Evolution and how their poetry inspires Zhu Qianzhi’s affectivism. The mutual appreciation between the Lifeview school and romantic poets is more than obvious.

In the following we will see how Fang Dongmei opposes Cartesian mind-matter, or philosophy-science, dualism, and how he demonstrates that it is through art that such dualism can be resolved. As Will Durant wrote in 1926, “Every science begins as philosophy and ends as art; it arises in hypothesis and flows into achievement” (1953, xxvi), Fang Dongmei believes that art combines the essence of both science and philosophy and that in art affect and reason are in perfect harmony.

**Mind-Matter Dualism in the Modern Age**

For Fang Dongmei, the invention of function mathematics was a modern scientific revolution. As opposed to Euclidean geometry, function is keen on the abstract analysis of the “infinite.” In other words, a new spirit and a new sign appeared during a cultural transition in Europe. He sums up: “The fundamental sign of the Greek people was matter with its individual forms, while the spiritual sign of modern Europeans was the infinite space.” Because of the concept of the infinite universe, modern Europe produced great scientific systems, including the astronomy discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo, and Johannes Kepler (1571–1630); Isaac Newton’s (1642–1726) laws of motion in physics; and the chemical inventions of Robert Boyle (1627–1691) and Antoine Lavoisier (1743–1794). All these were epoch-making achievements (*FDMQJ* 4:94–95).

Yet, despite their splendid scientific accomplishments, modern Westerners were unfortunate, because their emphasis on natural sciences led to the undermining of human nature. They were like the poor Alice, “Once the sweet dew of science is drunken, their own beautiful image is shrunken” (*FDMQJ* 4:178). Citing Whitehead’s *The Concept of Nature* (1919), Fang Dongmei points out that modern scientists, in order to realize the ideal of mathematic simplicity, divided the whole universe into matter and mind, the former being its primary qualities, and the latter, its secondary qualities (178–79), as discussed at the end of Chapter 1. This mind-matter division has led to the stark bifurcation of science and philosophy, which were once “a harmonious unity” before the seventeenth century, a unity that Fang hopes would return to our own age. He writes:

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