

EASTERN FORTRESS

A MILITARY HISTORY OF HONG KONG, 1840–1970

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Foreword

The closure to Britain's involvement in the affairs of Hong Kong, signalled by the handover of sovereignty to the People's Republic of China in 1997 and marking the definite end to any British pretensions to a continued military role in East Asia, prompts the question of how we should look back on Hong Kong's military role. The authors of *Eastern Fortress* take up this challenge with aplomb. In analyzing Hong Kong's history as a British military outpost, they look at the issue from both the British and the local Hong Kong perspectives. They base their analysis on a wide reading in British, American and Japanese archives as well as a thorough familiarity with military history more generally. The result is a study which not only is hugely well informed and superbly documented, but also places the history of Hong Kong in a wide context, making it relevant to students of military affairs, British imperial history, and the history of Hong Kong. It is a real achievement and will become the starting point for any further research on Hong Kong's military role.

As *Eastern Fortress* makes clear, Hong Kong was for Britain an asset but also a liability. Hong Kong became a British colony as a result of the 1838–1842 Opium War when the British fought their way into Guangzhou and blocked the Grand Canal to stop taxes arriving in Beijing, thus compelling the Qing dynasty to sign the Treaty of Nanjing, the first of the Unequal Treaties as they became known later. If perceived insults to British dignity were one cause of the Opium War, it was also the case that for its economic health Britain needed to build up a trade network in “the East” to make up for the loss of its colonies in “the West” as a result of the late 18th century revolutions in the Americas. Until the Napoleonic Wars were over, little could be done. But once they were and the industrial revolution had begun to deliver economic and financial success, as well as better weapons, including the *Nemesis*, the first steam-driven naval vessel put to devastating effect during the Opium War, Britain set about the task with energy and determination. So Hong Kong became the easternmost major bastion of British power, a position that would give Britain a role in South China and East Asian affairs for a century and a half.

But Hong Kong also made the British military position vulnerable to overextension. Hong Kong was far away from Britain, which meant that until the arrival of the telegraph, London could do little if local commanders took action off their own bat, as they did during the 1856–1860 Arrow War. During much of the 19th century many soldiers died from tropical diseases to which they were not immune. The acquisition of Kowloon and the New Territories toward the end of the 19th century in some ways weakened the British position, as it now had a land border with China that was difficult to defend. And Hong Kong Island was always vulnerable to market strikes, as became clear, for instance, during the rise of the Nationalists in the 1920s. To make Hong Kong militarily secure, Britain would have had to occupy a significant swathe of land and invest heavily in building up its military presence in it. The occupation of Guangzhou during the Arrow War was difficult, demonstrating that it was one thing to defeat Qing forces in a pitched battle but quite another to occupy and govern a large city. This, and the 1857 Indian Uprising, ensured that little enthusiasm remained for building large colonies in China. During the Opium War, Hong Kong was acquired in a bout of British aggression, but after the Arrow War it became a bit of a bluff, depending more on the threat than the actuality of force. That threat was worth maintaining because of the influence it gave Britain in East Asian affairs, and as such it proved an investment that paid handsome dividends. But Britain never really wanted to put in the effort, or spend the treasure, to turn Hong Kong into a true fortress: too difficult, too far away, too risky, and too costly.

The great strength of *Eastern Fortress* is its broad approach to examining how these realities worked themselves out over time. This is not a narrow military history, focusing on the number of troops stationed in Hong Kong at any given time, the type of arms these forces possessed, the ships the British navy maintained in port, or the aircraft the RAF deployed at the Kai Tak aerodrome. Nor is it an account of a single war such as the Opium War, the Arrow War, or the Japanese conquest of Hong Kong in December 1941. Rather, *Eastern Fortress* looks at the *longue durée* of the British military involvement in Hong Kong, which is analyzed consistently, and convincingly, from its position in British imperial strategy. It tells us about the thinking of military strategists and political leaders in London, showing how their views were shaped by, of course, imperial strategy, as well as available resources, personalities, and British diplomatic relations. Importantly, it demonstrates that while the Hong Kong government was usually consulted, military strategy trumped local political imperatives. This broad perspective allows the authors to bring out an important tension in British imperial strategy, namely the rivalry between Singapore and Hong Kong for preferment in British strategy. Singapore became increasingly

favoured as India, a colony, outpaced China, a semi-colony, not only economically but also in the British public imagination and in the British official mind.

Eastern Fortress is path-breaking in another way as well. Military history is a field that has focused on big topics and big events such as, in the case of Western historians, the 19th century arms race, the causes of the First World War, the impact of industrialization on the conduct of war, the Battle of Stalingrad, and the emergence of total war. In Chinese history, while the Opium War has been studied at great length, for more recent periods it has been the War of Resistance, the Boxer Rebellion, and the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War that have received far more attention. Neither Western nor Chinese historians have paid much attention to Hong Kong, in the case of the first probably because they considered it largely irrelevant and in the case of the latter perhaps because they did not consider it a legitimate topic in Chinese history, or perhaps because Hong Kong's military history was regarded as somewhat embarrassing. Both will find food for thought in *Eastern Fortress*. The book forms an important illustration of the fact that military history can be enriched, and enlivened, by delving into its backwaters.

Hong Kong has many identities, some of them contradictory, including as a free port, a haven for capitalist enterprise, a centre for smuggling, and an example of British law-based governance. The significance of its development as being a British military outpost, however, is one of the many thought-provoking suggestions of *Eastern Fortress*. The ways that British military needs shaped the pattern of its urban development as well as sanitary and hygiene regulation, that military life was frequently and visibly interwoven with public life in Hong Kong, and that the Hong Kong garrison was important in maintaining stability and order in the city, including during the Cold War, form important insights.

For the foreseeable future, Hong Kong will not have a serious military role. The garrison of the People's Liberation Army now stationed in Hong Kong is small and, largely confined to barracks, it remains inconspicuous. Whether many decades from now, when the arrangements struck for the 1997 transfer of sovereignty become obsolescent, *Eastern Fortress* will be followed by a study with the word "Chinese" in the title is an open, and intriguing, question for the future. But that its military inconspicuousness today is not the natural order of things is one important lesson of this study.

Hans van de Ven
October 2013

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INTRODUCTION

The islands of the south [China Sea] were of utmost importance . . . If under our control, our southern border would be secure . . . They [the British] travelled far away and put so much effort into taking this island [Hong Kong]; as a result, they are now able to hold the key to the south and control our country's front gate.

—Wu Guangpei (吳廣霽), a secretary of Li Hongzhang, 1881

This remote but important station should be fortified and garrisoned as the chief British stronghold in the East.

—John Pope Hennessy, Governor of Hong Kong, 1878

Themes and Structure

This book is an introduction to the military history of Hong Kong. More than narrating important events such as the Battle of the New Territories in 1899, the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong in 1941 and the riots in 1956 and 1967, it tries to examine a number of interrelated themes and to explore their historical significance. First, it critically examines, through British, American, Japanese and Chinese historical sources, the changing strategic role of Hong Kong and the British defence policy for the colony from 1841 to 1970. It attempts to highlight the roles of cosmopolitan politics in Britain, international relations, financial considerations and technological change in the making of Hong Kong defence policies. In addition, this work examines the social and policy implications of the British military presence in Hong Kong, and the relationship between colonial government and metropole in aspects such as garrison finances, land use and hygiene.

Through the use of previously unseen archival sources, this work also tries to shed new light on ongoing debates within Hong Kong military history, such as on the British perception of the relative importance of Hong Kong and Singapore during the 19th and 20th centuries; changing defence plans and facilities; the controversial “Gin Drinker’s Line,” built during the 1930s; British preparations and planning for the Japanese threat throughout the interwar period (1919–1939); the performance

of the British and Japanese forces and the role of the Chinese during the invasion of December 1941; and the British, Chinese and American policies for Hong Kong during the early phase of the Cold War.

This book is divided into eleven chapters. The Introduction describes the aim, structure and features of the book, and provides an overview of the primary sources used. An outline of the geographical features of Hong Kong is included. Chapter 2 discusses the defence and strategic roles of Hong Kong during the early decades of the British takeover. Chapter 3 illustrates the place of Hong Kong in British discussions of imperial defence and the impact of the emergence of iron- and steamships on the defence of Hong Kong.

Chapter 4 examines the problem of Hong Kong defence during the late 19th century, when Britain faced the challenge of rising powers such as the United States and Japan. It also elucidates the emergence of the defence line in Kowloon before and during the First World War. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 all focus on the inter-war period, which receives special attention as it sets the stage for the fall of Hong Kong in December 1941. Chapter 5 outlines the prolonged discussion from 1919 to 1938 over the defence of Hong Kong and the actual structures built, such as the Gin Drinker's Line. Chapter 6 examines the changing international situation from 1938 to 1941 and British responses concerning the defence policy for Hong Kong. It contributes to the ongoing discussion over the preparedness of the Hong Kong garrison and the Canadian reinforcement by highlighting the role of Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British Commander-in-Chief of the Far East. Chapter 7 focuses on the situation in Hong Kong before the Japanese invasion, the economic contribution of the colony to Britain and China during the early stages of the Second World War, and the consequences of the colonial government's war preparations.

Chapter 8 revisits the Battle of Hong Kong through British, Japanese and Chinese sources, while Chapter 9 focuses on the period of Japanese occupation. Chapter 10 deals with the post-1945 military history of Hong Kong, highlighting the British, Chinese and American strategic considerations and major events such as the gradual disarmament of Hong Kong and the large-scale riots in 1956 and 1967. Chapter 11 summarizes the book and briefly discusses several major historical questions. Chapters 1 to 7, 9 to 11 of this manuscript were written by Kwong Chi Man; Chapter 8 was written by both Tsoi Yiu Lun and Kwong Chi Man.

Sources

The major sources consulted for this book are declassified archival sources from Britain, Japan, China, Hong Kong and the United States. Many of these sources

are unpublished. Most of the British sources consulted lie in the National Archives of the United Kingdom and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London. They provide important details, including the defence schemes for Hong Kong from 1889 to the 1930s, the defence reports written by various organizations and the Armed Services, and the minutes of cabinet committees such as the Committee of Imperial Defence. For example, the report of Major General Frederick Barron, the Inspector of Fixed Defences, provides details as to the design, planning and construction of the notorious Gin Drinker's Line, built during the 1930s to resist a possible Japanese invasion. British archival sources also offer much insight into British planning before the Japanese invasion, the battle of December 1941 and post-World War II defence.

This book also utilizes, for the first time, a large number of Japanese documents from the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records and the National Institute for Defense Studies. These documents not only provide a fresh perspective for the study of the Battle of Hong Kong, but also offer more important and previously unseen information such as the actual design and detail of each and every pillbox of the Gin Drinker's Line, the Japanese defence arrangements in Hong Kong during the Second World War, and Japanese intelligence activities before the invasion. Chinese sources, such as the Qing and Republican archival materials, are also used. In particular, the documents of the Nationalist government (國民政府) of China and the diary of Admiral Chan Chak are most useful.

Military Geography of Hong Kong

Hong Kong lies at the centre of the Western Pacific region, midway between Singapore and Japan. It controls the estuary of the Pearl River Delta and is one of the best seaports along the South China coast. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, ocean traffic between East Asia, Europe and the Americas usually followed the route of Hong Kong–Singapore–India–Cape of Good Hope (later, the Suez Canal). This made Hong Kong one of the most important seaports in Asia during a substantial part of the period covered by this book.

In 1881, Wu Guangpei (吳廣霈), a secretary of Li Hongzhang, noted the strategic importance of Hong Kong in the age of steam:

The islands of the south [China Sea] were of utmost importance . . . If under our control, our southern border would be secure . . . They [the British] travelled far away and put so much effort into taking this island [Hong Kong]; as a result, they are now able to hold the key to the south and control our country's front gate.¹

As Hong Kong was an important strategic node in the Western Pacific (Table 1, Figure 1), the British used it as a major naval base soon after acquiring it from the Qing in 1842. In 1865, the China Station, a permanent station of the Royal Navy, was established, with its headquarters placed in Hong Kong until 1940 (Appendix II). After the Second World War, Hong Kong remained a major naval base, until the British withdrawal from East of Suez in the 1960s.

Table 1 Distance between Hong Kong and major ports in Asia²

Ports	Distance (km)	Ports	Distance (km)
Weihaiwei	1,891	Incheon	1,915
Singapore	2,334	Shanghai	1,303
Labuan	1,706	Guangzhou (Canton)	129
Yokohama	2,151	Macao	56
Taipei	563	Halong Bay	740
Port Arthur (Lüshun)	2,012	Hanoi	869
Vladivostok	2,655	Saigon	1,497
Jiaozhou (Kiaochow)	1,818	Manila	1,104



Figure 1 Hong Kong in Asia




Figure 2 Hong Kong in 1941

Geographically, Hong Kong may be divided into three parts: Hong Kong Island; Kowloon and the New Territories adjacent to mainland China; and the more than 260 islands within Hong Kong waters (Figure 2). The total area of Hong Kong Island is currently 80 km² (2013). The island is divided into two parts by the two mountain ranges cutting across the island from east to west. They are in turn divided by Wong Nai Chung Gap in the middle of the island. From west to east, the western range includes Mount Davis (269 m), High West (494 m), the Peak (552 m), Mount Kellett (501 m), Mount Gough (479 m), Mount Cameron (439 m) and Mount Nicholson (430 m). The eastern range includes Jardine's Lookout (433 m), Violet Hill (433 m), Mount Butler (436 m), The Twins (386 m), Mount Stanley (364 m), Mount Parker (528 m), Mount Collinson (348 m) and Mount Pottinger (312 m). After years of reclamation and urbanization, the northern coast of the island has been built up since the 1980s. The island also has two peninsulas, both (Stanley and D'Aguilar) are found on the southeast shore.

The Kowloon Peninsula was incorporated into the colony of Hong Kong in 1860. Its area expanded from about 7 km² to more than 11 km² in the period of British rule. Before the 1920s, the peninsula consisted largely of farmland, with several hills such as Ho Man Tin Hill. The peninsula points like a dagger towards the northern

coast of Hong Kong Island. Protected by the mountains on Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, Victoria Harbour between the peninsula and the island is an ideal natural harbour. From 1841, the harbour has been regarded as one of the best deepwater harbours in Asia. In 1863, Guo Songtao, the first Qing minister to London, noted that Lyemun, the eastern entrance of the harbour, was the “key” to Hong Kong defence as it may be easily enclosed by the surrounding mountains.³

Major General William Gascoigne, commander of the Hong Kong garrison from 1898 to 1903, used the analogy of India to describe the terrain of Kowloon and the New Territories:

This chain of hills runs for two-thirds of the way due west and east, and then sharply recurves for the remaining distance to the south. The western and eastern flanks rest on the sea, and it thus forms a barrier wall affording many facilities for defence, and represents to Kowloon in miniature degree much what the Himalayan range does to India.⁴

A continuous mountain range covers the area from the northwest of Kowloon (near Lai Chi Kok) to the Sai Kung Peninsula east of Junk Bay (Tseung Kwan O). From west to east, there are Piper’s Hill (223 m), Eagle’s Nest (305 m), Golden Hill (369 m), Beacon Hill (458 m), Lion Rock (495 m), Unicorn Ridge (437 m), Temple Hill (488 m), Tate’s Cairn (577 m) and Kowloon Peak (603 m). Along the so-called “Kowloon Ridge” mentioned above, there are numerous passes; most of these existed before the construction of the tunnel of the Kowloon-Canton Railway. From west to east, there are Smuggler’s Pass, Beacon Hill Pass, Grasscutters Pass, Customs Pass, Shatin Pass, Kowloon Pass and Lead Mine Pass. From the 1880s, the British garrison had already talked of occupying this area in order to protect Kowloon more effectively. Soon after the British takeover of the New Territories in 1899, plans were laid to fortify the area against an enemy invasion.

To the north of the Kowloon Ridge, are more mountains, such as Needle Hill (532 m), Tai Mo Shan (957 m) and Grassy Hill (647 m). Together they form the Shing Mun Valley, which became the Shing Mun Reservoir in 1937. Another mountain range stretches from Tai Mo Shan to present-day Tuen Mun, including the mountains Shek Lung Kung (473 m), Lin Fa Shan⁵ (578 m), the Tai Lam area and Castle Peak (583 m). To the north of this string of mountains, are the plains of Yuen Long, Kam Tin and Shek Kong. The northeastern part of the plain is surrounded by the mountains of Lam Tsuen, which also separate the Kam Tin plain with Tai Po. Northwest of Yuen Long and modern-day Tin Sui Wai is Deep Bay. The relief of the Hong Kong–China border that existed from 1899 to 1997, north of Lam Tsuen and stretching from Deep Bay to Shataukok from west to east, is relatively gentle. It should be noted that before 1945, most of these mountains had yet

to be covered by forest and vegetation as they are nowadays. Thus, in the 1910s, the commander of the Hong Kong garrison actually proposed to plant cactus as obstacles on these mountains.⁶

The eastern part of the New Territories consists of a very broken coastline and numerous peninsulas. The largest of these include the Sai Kung Peninsula, located east of Kowloon. This rugged coastline has many coastal enclaves, such as Starling Inlet, Plover Cove, Tolo Harbour, Port Shelter and Junk Bay. Fortunately, as the British found out, many of them are too small and isolated to create a serious problem for defenders. Because of currents and tidal surges, the western part of the New Territories is not suitable for large-scale amphibious operations.

Before the emergence of large steel vessels in the last decade of the 19th century, ships entering Hong Kong were of shallow draught and able to use most of the entrances to Victoria Harbour. Later, as the ships became larger and harbour traffic control more elaborate, most ships entering the harbour used Tathong Channel (east of Lyemun), Kap Shui Mun (Throat Gates) and East Lamma Channel (between Hong Kong and Lamma islands). Although the West Lamma Channel (between Lamma and Lantau islands) was wider, the depth of the former could reach as deep as thirty metres, allowing larger vessels to enter.

In general, Hong Kong has rugged relief. Except for reclaimed land and the Yuen Long–Kam Tin area, Hong Kong lacks flat land. Broken terrain dominates the island and the mainland; the major islands are also hilly. The lack of flat land prevented the British from constructing a large military air base throughout the colonial period. While this feature allowed the defenders to use the broken terrain to their advantage, it also proved to be a major problem for the garrison after the First World War.

The climate of Hong Kong is generally hot and humid in summer (June to September) and cold in winter (November to March). The likelihood of fog is high due to the high humidity. Using the statistics of 1883 to 1903, the Defence Scheme of 1910 suggested an average of 147 foggy days each year, of which “March, April, May and June were the most foggy months, and September, October and November the least” (see Table 2).⁷

Table 2 Probability of foggy days noted in the Defence Scheme of 1910

Fog appearing between 609.6 m and 304.8 m	Probability	Fog appearing between 304.8 m and 243.84 m	Probability
Jan, Feb, July, Aug	42.0%	Jan, May, June	14.0%
Mar, April, May, June	64.0%	Feb, Mar, Apr	33.0%
Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec	15.0%	July to Dec	5.5%

Precipitation in Hong Kong is concentrated between May and September. The temperature during this part of the year is also the highest. Typhoons from the Western Pacific usually attack Hong Kong during these months. Thus, the China Station usually left Hong Kong for North China or Japan in summer, and stayed in Hong Kong for training between October and March.

2

A BRITISH Foothold IN CHINA, 1839–1861

To retain Hong Kong will require the loss of a whole regiment every three years, and that to have 700 effective men, it is necessary to maintain 1,400.

—Major General D’Aguilar, 1845

The First Opium War and the Taking of Hong Kong

As the story of the Opium War has been told many times, this chapter gives only a brief description of events and focuses instead on the importance of Hong Kong as a staging area for British military activities on the China coast in the mid-19th century.¹ As early as 1806, the East India Company had noted the advantages of the anchorage between Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula.² During the Napoleonic War and the War of 1812, the British Royal Navy was already active in the South China Sea.³ When Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu (林則徐) pressured the British merchants in Guangzhou to hand in their opium stocks by threatening to cut off food and water supplies in March 1839, Charles Elliot, the British Plenipotentiary to China, led the British merchants and their ships to Hong Kong. The first shot of the First Opium War (1839–1842) was fired at Hong Kong, when Elliot ordered on 4 September 1839 the bombardment of the Qing war junks and batteries near Kowloon.

When London decided to dispatch more troops to China in November 1839, the anchorage off Kowloon and Hong Kong Island was already a shelter for British warships and merchantmen operating in South China. The objective of the British expedition of forty-four ships that arrived off Hong Kong from India in June 1840 was not Hong Kong but Chusan Islands, some 1,000 kilometres northeast of Hong Kong. Within two months after its arrival, the expedition had captured Dinghai of Chusan and sent a warship near Tianjin. While Charles Elliot and Chinese High Commissioner Qishan (琦善) were still negotiating, the British captured the batteries at Bogue to keep up the pressure. On 25 January 1841, before Qishan and Elliot had concluded a treaty (the Convention of Chuenpee), Commander Edward Belcher was ordered to land a party of sailors and marines at what would become

Possession Point on Hong Kong Island.⁴ The British expedition, which had 448 men die of disease between 13 July and 31 December 1840, abandoned Chusan and bivouacked at Hong Kong.⁵

As London was not satisfied with the Convention of Chuenpee, Elliot was replaced by Henry Pottinger, who brought additional troops. Soon after Pottinger arrived, in August, British forces recaptured Dinghai and took Xiamen and Ningbo. Reinforcements and replacement troops continued to reach China from India, using Hong Kong as a staging and resting area. By July 1842, the British forces about to attack Zhenjiang (Chinkiangfu) amounted to “9,000 bayonets,” excluding the Royal Marines and the navy.⁶ When British forces reached Nanjing, the Qing sent Qiyong (耆英) to negotiate with Pottinger, ceding Hong Kong Island to the British through the Treaty of Nanking in August 1842. After more than a year of British occupation, Hong Kong became the first formal British possession along the China coast.

Early Defence and Garrison, 1841–1861

As John Carroll has pointed out, Hong Kong during the early colonial period was hardly a successful commercial port.⁷ It was more of a military station and logistic hub for British activities on the China coast. Thus, even before the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanking, the British had already erected a temporary battery on Kellett Island and a naval store at West Point.⁸ Before 1842, however, no permanent structures were built because the island was seen only as a bargaining chip in exchange for Chusan.⁹

As the Hong Kong garrison suffered heavily from disease, the British tried to build permanent structures to house the garrison and to protect the town of Victoria and the harbour. The first permanent British defensive structures in Hong Kong were the Wellington, Murray and Royal batteries (all located near modern-day Admiralty). Two barracks, named Victoria and Murray, were also built on nearby hillocks. These structures were designed by a Royal Engineers officer, Major Edward Aldrich, who was sent to Hong Kong by the War Office in 1843. These structures, all finished by 1847, formed the early defence of the colony (Figure 3). Temporary barracks were also erected in different parts of the island. Barracks for the Indian garrison were located at Sai Ying Pun; others were erected at Stanley, Tai Tam and Tin Wan in the south. One hundred and fifty thousand silver dollars was spent on these works, with another one hundred thousand dollars as land premium.¹⁰

The gravest threat facing the garrison during this period was not foreign invasions but disease. From November 1842 to late 1843, of the 526 officers and men of the 55th Regiment of Foot, 242 died of disease. Major General D’Aguiar, the

garrison commander, noted in 1845 that “to retain Hong Kong will require the loss of a whole regiment every three years, and that to have 700 effective men, it is necessary to maintain 1,400.” *The Illustrated London News* also noted that “the graveyard was soon filled and another was required from the Surveyor-General, who found it difficult to point out a proper spot.”¹¹ Disease was so lethal that the navy was unwilling to install any permanent shore facilities. Until the late 1840s, the naval headquarters was on the decommissioned ship-of-the-line HMS *Minden*, which also served as the harbour ship. Even so, Captain Le Fleming Senhouse, the first Senior Naval Officer (SNO), died of disease.¹²




Figure 3 Early defence of Hong Kong, 1850¹³

The most lethal disease of all was malaria. It was argued that the absence of permanent barracks was the cause of the high fatalities suffered by the garrison. On the other hand, as Lieutenant John Ouchterlony, the first garrison engineer, pointed out, the lack of crown land in the town of Victoria had prevented the construction of such barracks. Many Royal Engineers troopers and officers responsible for the construction work also succumbed to disease.¹⁴ Garrison duties outside the barracks were very dangerous for European soldiers. When twenty soldiers were sent to Lyemun during the 1840s, five were dead in five weeks and six had to be hospitalized.¹⁵ As Christopher Munn has noted, the high mortality rate of the garrison led to widespread desertion, self-inflicted wounds, heavy drinking and occasional suicide.¹⁶

Other acute problems facing the early garrison were venereal disease (VD), drunkenness and desertion. The problem with VD was an obvious result of the gender imbalance in the colony and would haunt the garrison for some time to come.¹⁷ For example, one-third of the crew of the only ship-of-the-line at Hong Kong (HMS *Winchester*, 60 guns) was infected by VD.¹⁸ When Colonial Surgeon J. Murray arrived in 1859, he found that “both among naval and military invalids the syphilitic amount to nearly twenty-five percent of the whole.”¹⁹ To curb the spread of VD, Governor John Bowring introduced in 1857 “An Ordinance for Checking the Spread of Venereal Diseases,” which put all brothels and prostitutes serving the Europeans under a registration and examination system. A decade later, it became the Contagious Disease Ordinance, introduced in other parts of the British Empire. The infected prostitutes would be sent to the Lock Hospital until they were cured or dead. The measure caused much resistance among the prostitutes, who were forced to undergo unfamiliar and humiliating examinations by male physicians.²⁰ According to Murray, the ordinance significantly reduced the VD infection rate of the garrison.²¹ However, as later pointed out by the commission set up by Governor Hennessy to investigate the VD control measures, the infection rate of the European garrison and the Royal Navy remained serious.²²

The new colony was rather chaotic throughout the 1840s despite the heavy military presence. Colonial Treasurer Robert Montgomery Martin noted that “the European inhabitants are obliged to sleep with loaded pistols; frequently to turn out of their beds at midnight to protect their lives and property from gangs of armed robbers, who are ready to sacrifice their number if they can obtain a large plunder.”²³ The garrison was equally unruly. As early as 1841, there were already Indian deserters.²⁴ *The Friend of China* received a letter in 1842 claiming that “the disgraceful scenes of which our streets are the arena, call loudly for magisterial interferences, each day they become worse and worse . . . I can only allude to the drunker delinquencies of our soldiers and sailors . . .”²⁵ Until the 1850s, deserters tried to leave on the American whalers calling at the colony.²⁶

During this period, the main defence of Hong Kong was the East Indies and China Station of the Royal Navy, formed in 1844 after a separation of the East Indies and China squadrons.²⁷ The British naval presence on one hand was used to coerce the Qing, and on the other was employed to deter potential enemies that could threaten the British diplomatic and economic interests.²⁸ During the early days of the colonial rule, the Governor of Hong Kong, who concurrently served as the Plenipotentiary in China and Superintendent of British Trade, always tried to control the movement of the ships of the Royal Navy despite the protest of the Commander-in-Chief of the China Squadron, who was also based in Hong Kong.²⁹

The issue was not sorted out until the later period, when improved communication (by telegraph) allowed London to enforce central control over British political and military operations in East Asia.

When Lieutenant Colonel Chesney, commander of the Royal Artillery at Hong Kong, arrived in July 1843, he noted that there were three ships-of-the-line stationed in Victoria Harbour.³⁰ According to *The Navy List* of 1848, the East Indies and China Station and the Pacific Station had two third-rate battleships (64 to 80 guns), seven fifth-rate frigates (32 to 44 guns), three sixth-rates (20 to 28 guns) and fifteen sloops (16 to 18 guns).³¹ In 1861, the East Indies and China Station had eighty warships and 8,000 officers and men.³² Although it was smaller than either the Channel or the Mediterranean fleets, it was enough to secure British naval supremacy in Asia.

The Royal Navy fought a number of battles against large fleets of Chinese pirates. In September and October 1849, HMS *Columbine*, HMS *Fury* and HMS *Medea* attacked the pirate lair of Chui A-poo at Bias Bay. During the ensuing battle, twenty-six pirate junks were destroyed and more than 400 pirates killed. Chui was captured later by Chinese authorities but was handed back to the British; he killed himself in gaol.³³ Later, HMS *Columbine* and a Sino-British fleet together destroyed the pirate fleet of Sap Ng Tsai near Cochinchina, killing as many as 1,700 pirates and sinking more than sixty ships.³⁴ Another major action was the Anglo-American expedition against Chinese pirates at Ty-ho Bay, near modern-day Lantau Island, in 1854. Again, hundreds of pirates were killed or captured. Although small-scale pirate attacks persisted until the late 1930s, large pirate fleets no longer existed near Hong Kong after these actions. The change was also the result of the introduction, from the 1860s, of the Water Police and of ship registration.³⁵

Under the aegis of the Royal Navy, only a few coastal batteries and usually two regiments (one British and one Indian) were kept in Hong Kong. In order to cut costs, London even hired Indian gun lascars to replace European gunners. In 1847, the Hong Kong Singapore Artillery (later renamed the Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery, or HKRSRA), consisting of one subedar and eighty-eight gun lascars, was formed.³⁶ The military expenditure of Hong Kong decreased from £80,778 in 1848 to £50,346 in 1853.³⁷

In March 1854, because of a dispute over Palestine and the Ottoman Empire, a war broke out, pitching Britain and France against Russia. Although the war was later known as the Crimean War, fighting was not confined to the Crimean Peninsula. In the Pacific theatre, other than the ill-fated expedition against Petropavlovsk led by Rear Admiral David Price, the situation was largely quiet. Soon after the news of the war arrived, both Governor Bowring and Vice Admiral James Stirling, the Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies and China Station, left Hong Kong for Japan

with the main body of the fleet, including the ship-of-the-line HMS *Winchester*, frigate HMS *Spartan* and steam frigate *Barracuda*.³⁸ They went to Japan to prevent Russian warships from using the Japanese ports. In effect, however, they forced the opening of the country by a show of force.³⁹ At that time, the garrison consisted of merely 565 men of all ranks, with only 357 fit for combat (Table 3).

Table 3 Hong Kong garrison, May–June 1854⁴⁰

	Officers	Ranks	Fit for duty
59th Foot	11	412	263
Artillery	4	53	28
Gun Lascars	1	84	66
Total	16	549	357

To prepare for a Russian attack, the garrison installed spare guns on the guard ship HMS *Hercules* and converted the vessel into a floating battery that could cover both sides of the harbour.⁴¹ By June 1854, a temporary battery was built at West Point to support HMS *Hercules* and the existing batteries. Together, these batteries had thirty-two 32-pounders, six 24-pounders, three 10-inch and two 8-inch mortars.⁴²

Pirates and local armed groups in South China probably posed a larger threat to Hong Kong during the Crimean War. In May 1854, William Caine, the acting governor, reported that there was a pirate fleet of nineteen ships near Hong Kong. Meanwhile, adherents of the Heaven and Earth Society (天地會) wreaked havoc in Guangdong Province, capturing the Kowloon Walled City in August. Kowloon was thoroughly looted.⁴³ As the colony was seemingly threatened from different sides, the first volunteer militia, known as The Hong Kong Volunteers, was formed in that year. It was led by Caine and had ninety-nine men at its peak. Most of the volunteers were staff of the British trading and shipping companies. At that time, there were only three hundred British males in the colony. The Volunteers existed only for a few months, as the situation improved. It was revived briefly between 1863 and 1865, and was not reformed until 1878.⁴⁴ During the war, both Governor Bowring and Admiral Stirling asked for and received help from the Chinese authority in Guangzhou to suppress the pirates near Hong Kong.⁴⁵

Hong Kong during the Second Opium War, 1856–1861

Soon after the Crimean War, Britain and the Qing started another war over treaty revision and the Arrow Incident of October 1856. As Sino-British tensions were heightened, Governor Bowring introduced a curfew. In January 1857, about four

hundred European inhabitants were poisoned by the bread produced in a Chinese bakery. The owner of the bakery, himself poisoned, was found not guilty and expelled from the colony.⁴⁶ Although the event was most likely an accident, the heightened tension persuaded Bowring to revive the Hong Kong Volunteers. However, the proposal was not carried out.⁴⁷

During the Second Opium War, Hong Kong was again the base of the British land and naval forces operating in China. Although the Indian Mutiny of 1857 delayed the British operation, the Royal Navy had launched from Hong Kong a series of actions against the Qing fleet and batteries at Lantau and the Pearl River estuary. By December 1857, 7,000 troops were concentrated in Hong Kong or its vicinity. The British also hired hundreds of Hakka coolies to form the Canton Coolie Corps, providing them with uniforms and an insignia. It was possibly the first Anglo-Chinese military unit to be formed.⁴⁸ By May 1858, the British had captured Guangzhou, Nantou and Taku Fort, near Tianjin. The Qing offered peace and negotiated the Treaty of Tianjin with Britain, France, Russia and the United States.

It was during the Second Opium War that the British decided to extend the colony of Hong Kong to include Kowloon Peninsula. In June 1858, the British government instructed Lord Elgin, the High Commissioner to China, to acquire Kowloon and Stonecutters while ratifying the Treaty of Tianjin with the Qing. However, the fleet carrying him to Beijing exchanged fire with Taku Fort as it forced its way into Baihe in June 1859. This action led to renewed fighting; the British occupied Kowloon on 18 March 1860.⁴⁹ Harry Parkes, the British consul at Guangzhou, demanded that the Commissioner of Guangdong and Guangxi, Lao Chongguang (勞崇光), lease Kowloon and Stonecutters to the British. It was stipulated in the “contract” that, as long as the British were able to pay the rent on time, the Qing was forbidden to retake the territories. In addition, the lease would be in force before the British had concluded any permanent treaties with the Qing over the ownership of Kowloon. After Lao signed the leasehold, the inhabitants of Kowloon were notified that the territory was British. In the same month, two British regiments were sent from Hong Kong to recapture Chusan. By June 1860, British forces in China consisted of 14,000 men, with most having passed through or been garrisoned at Hong Kong.⁵⁰ These forces were to be sent north to attack Beijing and Tianjin with French forces from Ningbo. After the British and French had captured Beijing and burnt the Summer Palace, the Qing ratified the Treaty of Tianjin and signed the Treaty of Peking that ceded the Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters to Britain in October 1860. When the peninsula was formally transferred in January 1861, the British had already been garrisoned on it for almost a year.

Conclusion

Between 1841 and 1861, the Royal Navy enjoyed unchallenged supremacy in East Asia, with the exception perhaps of the littoral area, where piracy was still rife. The British Army also enjoyed a considerable advantage over the Qing and other powers in Asia. The British ability to project power in Asia was unprecedented. Possessing the strategic points of Singapore and Hong Kong, the British were able to send credible military forces to North China during the two Opium Wars. During these campaigns, Hong Kong acted as the anchorage of the expeditionary fleets, providing not only provisions but also accommodation and medical care. Although disease claimed many lives during the early days of occupation, the death rate of the garrison steadily declined as medical services improved and as permanent structures on Hong Kong Island were built. The whole process of turning Hong Kong into a valuable strategic possession did not, however, come without a price: between 1841 and 1866, 5,375 British and Indian officers and men died in the colony. All were buried in Happy Valley; most had died of disease.⁵¹

While the British enjoyed unchallenged military superiority in East Asia, the problem of Hong Kong defence was relatively simple. However, as military technologies developed rapidly during subsequent decades, and as France, Russia and the United States gradually industrialized and turned their focus to Asia, the defence of Hong Kong became an increasingly difficult and complex issue from the 1860s.

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31. Alderson, *History of Royal Air Force Kai Tak*, p. 12.
32. Richard Hopton, *A Reluctant Hero: The Life of Captain Robert Ryder VC* (London: Pen and Sword, 2011), p. 15.
33. Martyn Sherwood, *The Voyage of the Tai-Mo-Shan* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1957), p. 3.
34. *China Side*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Dec. 1935), pp. 3–17.
35. Steven Schwankert, *Poseidon: China's Secret Salvage of Britain's Lost Submarine* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014).
36. Kemp Tolley, *Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1971), p. 93.
37. "Two Wars in Hong Kong," 8/4/1940, *Life*, p. 12.
38. Augustus Muir, *The First of Foot: The History of the Royal Scots* (Edinburgh: The Royal Scots History Committee, 1961), p. 113.
39. Report of Advisory Commission for the Protection and Welfare of Children and Young People, League of Nations, 1929, p. 80.
40. "Admiralty to CO," 7/4/1924, CO129/486.
41. Norman Miners, *Hong Kong Under Imperial Rule: 1912–1941* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 198–9.
42. Frank Welsh, *A History of Hong Kong* (London: HarperCollins, 1997), pp. 391–2; Miners, *Hong Kong Under Imperial Rule*, p. 204.

43. Miners, *Hong Kong Under Imperial Rule*, p. 104.
44. Sit Fung-shuen and Kwong Chi Man, *Xinjie xiangyiju shi: you zujiedi dao yi guo liang zhi* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2011), particularly Chapter 5.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 105–6.
46. Sinclair joined the navy at the age of fourteen. He was the captain of HMS *Temeraire* in 1914 and rose to command a squadron of cruisers and battleships. He was the Commander-in-Chief of the China Station from 1925 to 1926.
47. Luard joined the army at the age of eighteen as an officer of the Durham Light Infantry. He had participated in the Boer War and became a brigadier during the First World War. He saw extensive action as a brigadier in the Middle East. In 1925, he was appointed the General Officer Commanding Hong Kong. He retired in 1929.
48. “Defence Against Overseas Attack,” 17/2/1926, CO 129/498, p. 412.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 417.
50. Wilfred Egerton was the Director of Naval Plans from 1925. He died while studying at the Royal Naval College in 1931.
51. William Dobbie was a military engineer by origin, and had participated in the Boer War and the First World War. After the war, he served in the War Office, before being appointed Inspector General of the Engineers in 1933. In 1935–1939, he was the General Officer Commanding Malaya. It was Dobbie who pointed out the vulnerability of the Malay Peninsula. From 1940 to 1942, he was the Governor of Malta.
52. Richard Peck was an infantry officer before joining the Royal Flying Corps. In 1919, he became the commander of the 84th Squadron at Iraq and was later admitted to the Army Staff College. He then served as a planning officer of the RAF before entering the Imperial Defence College in 1933. He reached the rank of Air Marshal in 1940.
53. “Defence of Hong Kong: Report of Joint Planning Sub-committee,” 10/12/1927, COS 117, CAB 53/14, pp. 1–2.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
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57. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–8.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–6.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
62. Tyrwhitt joined the navy at the age of fifteen. He became the commander of a torpedo boat flotilla in 1912. During the First World War, he was commander of the Harwich Force, which was responsible for coastal defence and protection of shipping across the English Channel. He replaced Sinclair as the Commander-in-Chief of the China Station in 1926.
63. “Naval, Military and Air Force Appreciation on the Defence of Hong Kong Received from the Commander-in-Chief, China,” 25/4/1928, COS 146, CAB 53/14, p. 3.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–6.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 7–13.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

67. Roger Bellairs was the staff officer of the Grand Fleet during the Battle of Jutland in 1916. He became the assistant of the First Sea Lord in 1919–1925, before serving as the Director of Naval Plans in 1928. In 1941, he was the British representative discussing joint strategy with the United States. See Barry Dennis Hunt, *Sailor-scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871–1946* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1982), p. 88; Haywood Hansell, Jr., *The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir* (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1986), p. 27.
68. Liddell served as a logistics officer during the First World War. He then taught in the Staff College and was in the first batch of graduates of the Imperial Defence College in 1927. He then served in the General Staff during the 1920s and 1930s, before being given command of a division. He retired in 1942 as the Inspector of Training.
69. “Defence of Hong Kong: Report of the Joint Planning Sub-committee,” 31/5/1930, COS 233JP, CAB 53/21, pp. 17–26.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
72. *Ibid.*, pp. 17–26.
73. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–7.
74. “Imperial Defence Policy,” 15/2/1932, COS 295, CAB 53/22, p. 2.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
78. “Reports by the Deputies to the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee on the Situation in the Far East,” 22/2/1932, COS 295 (D.C.), p. 4.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 14.
82. “Plans for Singapore and Hong Kong,” 7/4/1933, COS 304, CAB 53/23, pp. 3–5.
83. “RAF Requirements for Singapore, Hong Kong, Penang, Ceylon and Aden,” 23/1/1934, COS 318, CAB 53/23, p. 3.
84. Ian Cowman, *Dominion or Decline: Anglo-American Naval Relations on the Pacific, 1937–1941* (Oxford; Washington, DC: Berg, 1996), p. 44.
85. Rollo, *Guns and Gunners of Hong Kong*, p. 105.
86. Robert Haining joined the Royal Artillery in 1901. He served in various staff and administrative posts before being appointed Director of Military Operations in 1931–1933. He was the commandant of the Imperial Defence College from 1935 to 1936.
87. Arthur Harris joined the Royal Flying Corps in 1915 and became a squadron leader by the end of the war. He then commanded various RAF formations in Iraq, India and Arabia, and was known for his bombing tactics against rebellious tribes. He served in the Air Ministry as a planning officer throughout the 1930s. During the Second World War, he was first the Vice Chief of Air Staff before serving as the Commander-in-Chief of the Bomber Command from 1942 to 1945.
88. “Hong Kong—Plan for Defence, Relief or Recapture,” 30/7/1934, COS 344, CAB 53/24, p. 1.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 22.
93. "Strategic Position in the Far East with Particular Reference to Hong Kong and Air Requirements for the Far East," 29/10/1934, COS 347, CAB 53/24, pp. 5–6.
94. Reynolds Salerno, *Vital Crossroads: Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935–1940* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 98.
95. "Strategic Position in the Far East with Particular Reference to Hong Kong," 16/9/1935, COS 403, CAB 53/25, pp. 3–4.
96. *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.
97. Ian Johnston and Ian Buxton, *The Battleship Builders: Constructing and Arming British Capital Ships* (Bransley: Seaforth Publishing, 2013), pp. 294–5.
98. Basil Liddell-Hart held an interview with John Dill, the DMO, in 1935. Dill told him that the War Office had been unwilling to send additional troops as it did not want to see an immense blow to British prestige if the colony was captured. Basil Liddell-Hart, *History of the Second World War* (London: Pan Books, 1973), p. 228.
99. "Proposals for the Acceleration of the Programme for the Defence of Ports Aboard," 4/12/1936, COS532, CAB 53/29, pp. 3–5.
100. *Hong Kong Defence Scheme, 1936*, Chapter 1, 343.01 HON (HKPRO), p. 11.
101. *Ibid.*, Chapter 1, p. 16.
102. *Ibid.*, Chapter 1, pp. 14–6.
103. *Ibid.*, Chapter 2, p. 4.
104. *Ibid.*, Chapter 4, p. 59.
105. *Ibid.*, Chapter 4, p. 59.
106. *Ibid.*, Chapter 4, pp. 57–9, 63.
107. "GOC Hong Kong to DMO," 30/1/1936, WO 106/5358.
108. "WO to C.W. Orde," 25/3/1936, WO 106/5358.
109. Brereton Greenhous, *"C" Force to Hong Kong: A Canadian Catastrophe, 1941–1945* (Toronto; Buffalo, NY: Dundurn Press, 1997), p. 8.
110. "Strategical Position in the Far East with Particular Reference to Hong Kong," 10/10/1935, COS 405, CAB 53/25, p. 1.
111. Thomas Phillips joined the Royal Navy in 1903 and became a lieutenant in 1909. During the First World War, he served in a destroyer. After the war, he studied at the Naval College and became the military adviser to the League of Nations from 1920 to 1922. Having briefly served as a cruiser captain in the China Station in 1934–1935, he served for the longest as a planning officer in the Admiralty throughout the 1930s. In December 1941, he died on HMS *Prince of Wales* when it was sunk by Japanese naval air force.
112. "Far East Appreciation 1937," 7/5/1937, COS 579, CAB 53/31, pp. 27, 29.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
114. *Ibid.*, pp. 31–2.
115. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
116. *Ibid.*, pp. 59–60.
117. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

120. Cowman, *Dominion or Decline*, p. 42.
121. “Hong Kong: Policy of Re-Fortification or Demilitarisation,” 30/7/1937, COS 605, CAB 53/32, p. 2.
122. “Chiefs of Staff 217th Meeting,” COS/217Mtg, CAB 53/8, pp. 11, 13.
123. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
124. *Ibid.*, pp. 12–15.
125. “Defence of Hong Kong,” 18/12/1937, COS 655, CAB 53/35, pp. 1–2.
126. “Defence of Hong Kong,” 1/12/1937, COS 657, CAB 53/35, p. 4.
127. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
129. “Hong Kong—Refortification,” 2/3/1938, COS 693, CAB 53/37, p. 10.
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138. “The Policy for the Defence of Hong Kong,” 16/5/1938, COS 725, CAB 53/38, p. 5.
139. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–8.
140. “The Policy for the Defence of Hong Kong,” 26/5/1938, COS 731, CAB 53/39, pp. 6–8.
141. “The Policy for the Defence of Hong Kong,” 15/7/1938, COS 740, CAB 53/39, p. 2.
142. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.
143. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
144. Carl Vincent, *No Reason Why: The Canadian Hong Kong Tragedy: An Examination* (Stittsville, ON: Canada’s Wings Inc., 1981), p. 8.
145. Franco David Macri, “Abandoning the Outpost: Rejection of the Hong Kong Purchase Scheme of 1938–1939,” *JRASHKB*, Vol. 50 (2010), pp. 303–16.
146. For more detail, see Bernard Lowry, “The Gin Drinker’s Line: Its Place in the History of Twentieth Century Fortifications,” *Surveying & Built Environment*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Dec. 2011); Kwong Chi Man, “Reconstructing the Early History of the Gin Drinker’s Line from Archival Sources,” *Surveying & Built Environment*, Vol. 22 (Nov. 2012), pp. 18–35. For a map of the locations of the pillboxes, see Lawrence W. C. Lai, Stephen N. G. Davies, Ken S. T. Ching and Castor T. C. Wong, “Location of Pillboxes and Other Structures of the Gin Drinker’s Line Based on Aerial Photo Evidence,” *Surveying & Built Environment*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2011), p. 69.
147. Barron first joined the army as a junior artillery officer. He served as a logistician during the First World War in Mesopotamia, and then served in the War Office as a staff officer throughout the 1920s. From 1930 to 1933 he was the fortress commander of the Southern Command, responsible for the British coastal defences facing the English Channel. He was the Inspector of Fixed Defences from 1934 to 1938.
148. “Mock Battle at Hong Kong,” *The Straits Times*, 20/3/1935; “10,000 Men in Secret Battle,” *The Straits Times*, 9/4/1935; “British Defences in Far East,” *The Straits Times*, 18/4/1935.

149. “Report on the Defences of Hong Kong,” 4/1935, WO 106/111, pp. 3–5.
150. “Report on the Defences of Hong Kong,” 4/1935, WO 106/111, p. 18.
151. “Extract from DO Letter Col. Harrison, Hong Kong,” 13/2/1937, WO 106/2363.
152. “Work Completed on Gin Drinker’s Line,” circa 1936, WO 106/2363. The following two paragraphs mainly come from Kwong, “Reconstructing the Early History of the Gin Drinker’s Line from Archival Sources.”
153. Please also see Kwong, “Reconstructing the Early History of the Gin Drinker’s Line from Archival Sources,” p. 27.
154. “Report of the Director of Public Works for the Year 1937,” Annual Report 1937, 55. It is possible that they were pillboxes of the Shing Mun Redoubt, but concrete documentary evidence has yet to be found.
155. “Landward Defence,” 4/1938, WO 106/2363.
156. From Lawrence Lai et al., “Decoding the Enigma of the Fall of the Shing Mun Redoubt Using Line of Sight Analysis,” *Surveying & Built Environment*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2011), p. 35.
157. Lai et al., “Location of Pillboxes and Other Structures of the Gin Drinker’s Line Based on Aerial Photo Evidence,” p. 69.
158. While this might be the cause of the rapid fall of the Shing Mun Redoubt during the Battle of Hong Kong in December 1941, further investigation on whether the Japanese had such knowledge before the battle and acted accordingly is needed.
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161. “Report on the Defences of Hong Kong,” 4/1935, WO 106/111, p. 12.
162. “Minute by Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, War Office,” 5/11/1938, JDC 226, AIR 2/1666, pp. 1–6.
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164. Map based on WO 78/5361.
165. “Recapitulation Island Defences,” WO 106/2363.
166. Rollo, *Guns and Gunners of Hong Kong*, p. 114.
167. Civil Engineering and Development Department, “Investigation of Disused Tunnels: Preliminary Report, Victoria Barrack—Disused Underground Operations Headquarters,” Document #5341, Hong Kong, 10/1983, p. 5.
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169. Richard Walding, “Indicator Loops: Royal Navy Harbour Defences—Hong Kong,” <http://indicatorloops.com/hongkong.htm>

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2. Franco David Macri, “C Force to Hong Kong: The Price of Collective Security in China,” *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 77 (2013), p. 154.

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8. Carl Vincent, *No Reason Why: The Canadian Hong Kong Tragedy: An Examination* (Stittsville, ON: Canada’s Wings Inc., 1981), p. 9.
9. Fedorowich, “Cocked Hats and Small, Little Garrisons,” p. 128.
10. “Hong Kong—Period Before Relief,” 17/2/1940, COS (40) 238, CAB 80/8, p. 1.
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12. Quoted from Ian Cowman, *Dominion or Decline: Anglo-American Naval Relations on the Pacific, 1937–1941* (Oxford; Washington, DC: Berg, 1996), p. 45.
13. Cowman, *Dominion or Decline*, pp. 44–5.
14. “Memorandum of Japanese Occupation of the Land Frontier of the New Territories, 1938–1941,” 20/3/1941, CO968/132.
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31. "The Local Chinese Population and the Defence of Hong Kong," 2/7/1940, COS (40) 834 (J. P.), CAB 80/20, Annex I, p. 3.
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86. Untitled Document, CO 968/13/2, 9/9/1941; also see Fedorowich, "'Cocked Hats and Small, Little Garrisons,'" p. 142.
87. Untitled Document, CO 968/13/2, 11/9/1941.
88. LHCMA, Brooke-Popham Papers, 6/2/19, Brooke-Popham to Ismay, 29/10/1941; see also Fedorowich, "'Cocked Hats and Small, Little Garrisons,'" p. 135.
89. Fedorowich, "'Cocked Hats and Small, Little Garrisons,'" pp. 133, 135. Studies on the Canadian reinforcement to Hong Kong seldom mention the Australian decision to send two battalions to Timor and Ambon. These battalions were sent in October 1941 and were overrun in January 1942. The death rate of these 2,500 soldiers was even higher than that suffered by the two Canadian battalions in Hong Kong.
90. "Dominion Office to the Government of Canada," 19/9/1941, CO 968/13/2.
91. Fedorowich, "'Cocked Hats and Small, Little Garrisons,'" p. 116.
92. Carl Vincent of *No Reason Why* and Brian McKenna and Terence McKenna of *The Valor and the Horror* were champions of the "misleading" school. However, this thesis has been recently rebuked by historians. See Galen Roger Perras, "Defeat Still Cries Aloud for Explanation: Explaining C Force's Dispatch to Hong Kong," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2011), pp. 40–2.
93. Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General*, p. 165.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
95. Fedorowich, "'Cocked Hats and Small, Little Garrisons,'" pp. 136–40.
96. Macri, "C Force to Hong Kong," p. 160.
97. "Extract from Minutes of COS (41) 345th Meeting held on Wednesday, 8th October, 1941," CO 968/13/2, slide 91.
98. "Government of Canada to Dominions Office," 29/9/1941, CO 968/13/2, slide 98; "WO to GOC Hong Kong," 3/10/1941, CO 968/13/2, slide 95; "WO to GOC Hong Kong," 8/10/1941, CO 968/13/2, slide 93; "GOC Hong Kong to WO," 9/10/1941, CO 968/13/2, slide 92.
99. Richard Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan*, pp. 54–7, 83–6; Robert Love (ed.), *Pearl Harbor Revisited* (Washington: Palgrave, 1994), p. 164; Michael Smith,

The Emperor's Codes: The Breaking of Japan's Secret Ciphers (New York: Arcade, 2001); Charles Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1968, 1948).

100. "Hong Kong Despatches, Appendix B, War Narrative," WO 106/2401B.
101. On 19 November, Tokyo instructed the Japanese consulates around the world that if they received "East Wind Rain" in the weather broadcast from Japan, that would mean war with the United States. "North Wind Cloud" meant war with the Soviet Union, and "West Wind Sunny" meant war with Great Britain only.
102. "Fortress War Diary," WO 106/2401A, p. 1.
103. Colin Crisswell and Mike Watson, *The Royal Hong Kong Police, 1841–1945* (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1982), p. 166.
104. "Hong Kong Despatches, Appendix B, War Narrative," WO 106/2401B, p. 5.
105. "Fortress War Diary," WO 106/2401A, p. 1.

7 Hong Kong before the War

1. "Report on operations (together with appendices) leading up to the surrender of Hong Kong to the Japanese Imperial Army, December 1941, with special reference to the part played by the 1st Battalion the Middlesex Regiment," WO 172/1689, p. 3.
2. Air Raid Precaution Department, *Report on Census of the Colony of Hong Kong (exclusive of the New Territories) taken on 13th/14th and 14th/15th March, 1941* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printers, 1941).
3. Philip Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 2–22, 28–51; Xie Yongguang, *Xianggang kangri fengyunlu* (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1995), pp. 2–5; Cai Rongfang, *The Hong Kong People's History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 173–225.
4. Gerald Horne, *Race War: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 2004).
5. In 1937, the police had discovered the bodies of 1,353 homeless people. This shows the often difficult living conditions of the colony before the war. See David Faure (ed.), *Society: A Documentary History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), p. 181; Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, pp. 17–22.
6. Richard Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America, and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 39–41; Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p. 45.
7. George MacDonell, *One Soldier's Story 1939–1945: From the Fall of Hong Kong to the Defeat of Japan* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2002), pp. 57–8.
8. Tony Banham, "Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, Number 3 (Machine Gun) Company," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, Vol. 45 (2005), pp. 113–39; Li Chaoyuan, *Rijun xi Gang ji: weikun Zhongguo de shaju Taipingyang zhan de xumu* (Ontario: Jishan shushi, 2002), p. 22.
9. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 249.
10. Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p. 27.

11. Nonetheless, it was only a ruse with which to trick the Japanese. See Yang Tianshi, *Zhaoxun zhenshi de Jiang Jieshi: Jiang Jieshi riji jiedu* (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe, 2008).
12. “Governor to the Right Honourable Malcolm Macdonald,” 18/1/1940, CO 129/585; Xie, *Xianggang kangri fengyunlu*, p. 171.
13. “Chūkon kyōsantō no ippan katsudō,” 1942, RD, NIDS, JACAR, Ref: C01000136000; Li Guoqiang and Zhang Peixin, *Xianggang zai kangri qijian* (Hong Kong: Xianggang wenshi chubanshe, 2005), pp. 42–3; also see Xie, *Xianggang kangri fengyunlu*.
14. Yang Mingwei, “Zhou Enlai yu dongjiang zhongdui ji Xianggang kangzhan,” in Chan King Tong, Yau Siu Kam and Chan Ka Leung (eds.), *The Defence of Hong Kong: Collected Essays on the Hong Kong-Kowloon Brigade of the East River Column* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Museum of History, 2004), p. 129.
15. Liu Zhijian, “Xianggang haiyuan yu zuguo kangzhan,” in Chan, Yau and Chan (eds.), *The Defence of Hong Kong: Collected Essays on the Hong Kong-Kowloon Brigade of the East River Column*, pp. 155–9.
16. W. W. Yen, *An Autobiography by W. W. Yen: East-West Kaleidoscope* (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue, 1973), p. 242; see also Xie, *Xianggang kangri fengyunlu*, p. 55.
17. Jozef Straczek, “The Empire Is Listening: Naval Signals Intelligence in the Far East to 1942,” *Journal of the Australian War Memorial*, No. 35 (2001). Website: <http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j35/straczek.asp>
18. Peter Elphick, *Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930–1945* (London: Coronet Books, 1998), p. 70.
19. Elphick, *Far Eastern File*, pp. 71–72. A listening station was later established at Little Sai Wan before the war, which was used after the war as well. However, details are sketchy. See <http://www.littlesaiwan-367su.talktalk.net/history.html>.
20. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan*, pp. 25–6.
21. “Jiang weiyuanzhang zhi junshi weiyuanhui canmou zongzhang He Yingqin bingzhuan Kunming xingying zheren Yun Long gaoyi Fa yi tongyi wokou jiadao Yuenan gonghua xi jizao coufang dian” [Chiang Kai-shek to He Yingqin and Yun Long about the French decision to allow Japan to attack China from Indochina], 21/8/1938, *Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian bianji weiyuanhui* (ed.), *Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian—duiri kangzhan shiqi*, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 198.
22. Robert Hanyok, “How the Japanese Did It,” in *Naval History Magazine*, Vol. 23, No. 6 (Dec. 2009). Online version: <http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2009-12/how-japanese-did-it>
23. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan*, pp. 21, 23.
24. Philip Davies, *MI6 and the Machinery of Spying* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 130.
25. John O’Connell, *Submarine Operational Effectiveness in the 20th Century: Part One (1939–1945)* (Bloomington: iUniverse Publishing, 2011), p. 87.
26. “Chūkon Jūkei (Chongqing) soku kōkyū tokumu kikan no gairyaku,” 1942, RD, NIDS, JACAR, Ref: C01000135900; Xie, *Xianggang kangri fengyunlu*, pp. 110–2.
27. Xie, pp. 131–7.
28. Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p. 48.
29. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan*, p. 63.
30. Sambo Hombu (ed.), *Honkon heiyo chishi* (Tokyo: Sambo Hombu, 1938), p. 125.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 127, 129.
32. “Honkon gunji shisetsu nikansuru chūhon i-sōryōji no setsumeimei no ken hashū san den,” 25/5/1939, RD, NIDS, JACAR, Ref: C04121059300.
33. “Honkon bōgyo shisetsu to,” 8/1939, National Diet Library Japan.
34. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan*, p. 44.
35. Xie later surrendered again to the Nationalist government. See Brian Martin, “Shield of Collaboration: The Wang Jingwei Regime’s Security Service, 1939–1945,” *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Winter 2001), p. 129.
36. Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p. 39.
37. “Ha shu san den,” 12/10/1941, Rikugun ichihan shiryō (RIS), NIDS, JACAR, C12122326000, slide 7. Ken Kotani, “Nihongun to Intelligence: seikō to shippai no jirei karu,” *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2008), pp. 55–6; Ken Kotani, *Japanese Intelligence in World War II* (Oxford, New York: Osprey, 2009), p. 49.
38. Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p. 27; Wang Zhenghua, “Kangzhan qianqi Xianggang yu Zhongguo junhuo wuzi de zhuan yun, 1937–1941,” *Gang Ao yu jindai Zhongguo xueshu yantaohui lunwenji* (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 2000), pp. 393–439.
39. However, only Lin Shiliang was executed. No further investigation took place. Wakeman, *Spymaster*, pp. 325–7.
40. Cai, *The Hong Kong People’s History of Hong Kong*, pp. 183–7.
41. Ma Yau-woon, *Jinghai chengjiang: Zhongguo jindai haijun shishi xinqun* (Taipei: Lianjing, 2009), pp. 474–5.
42. George Endacott, *A Biographical Sketch-book of Early Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), p. 38.
43. A. H. Fernyhough, *History of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, 1920–1945* (London: Royal Army Ordnance Corps, 1966), p. 318; Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, *Gudu qianshao: Taipingyang zhanzheng zhong de Xianggang zhanyi* (Hong Kong: Cosmos, 2013), p. 83.
44. George Endacott, pp. 39–41.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 42; Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, p. 83.
46. Endacott, *A Biographical Sketch-book of Early Hong Kong*, pp. 35–6.
47. *The Kung Sheung Daily News*, 14/10/1941.
48. Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p. 28.
49. Michael Calvert, *Prisoners of Hope* (London: Cooper, 1971), p. 41.
50. Denis Rollo, *The Guns and Gunners of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: The Gunners Roll of Hong Kong, 1991), p. 113; *Dragon Journal* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Ex-Servicemen’s Association, 1997), pp. 14–6.
51. DGB, 8/11/1941; 11/11/1941.
52. “Prisoner of War Diary of Chief Signal Officer, China Command, Hong Kong, 1941–1945,” 940 547252 PRI.
53. “C-in-C Hong Kong to Secretary of State for Colonies,” 21/9/1945, CO 820/60/4; “Extract from Prologue to the Volunteers at War,” Elizabeth Ride Collection, Hong Kong Heritage Project.
54. Endacott, *A Biographical Sketch-book of Early Hong Kong*, p. 45.
55. Regulations under the Emergency Regulations Ord., 1922, GA 1938 no. 775; Restrictions on alien combatants, Emergency Regulation Ord., 1922, GA 1938 no.

- 794; Additional Regulations, Emergency Regulation Ord., 1922, GA 1938 no. 798; Regulations regarding squatters and destitutes, Emergency Regulations Ord., 1922, GA 1938 no. 902.
56. Endacott, *A Biographical Sketch-book of Early Hong Kong*, p. 30.
57. Defence Regulations, 1939, Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, GA 1939 no. 703; Additional Defence Regulations, Emergency Powers (Colonial Defence), GA 1939 no. 740; Additional Defence Regulations, Emergency Powers (Colonial Defence), GA 1939 no. 747; Additional Defence Regulations, Emergency Powers (Colonial Defence), GA 1939 no. 820; Order fixing the maximum retail prices of sugar, Defence Regulations 1939, GA 1939 no. 859; Order prohibiting the export, except by license, of certain goods, Defence Regulations, 1939, GA 1939 no. 1229; George B. Endacott, p. 30.
58. Defence Regulations, 1941, GA 1940 no. 709.
59. Order prohibiting the export, except by license, of Nickel Coins, Defence Regulations, 1939, GA 1940 no. 318; Order prohibiting the importation of motor vehicles and radio receiving sets, Defence Regulations, 1939, GA 1940 no. 475.
60. Endacott, *A Biographical Sketch-book of Early Hong Kong*, pp. 31–2; Xie, *Xianggang lunxian: Rijun gong-Gang shibari zhanzheng jishi* (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1996), p. 10.
61. Endacott, *A Biographical Sketch-book of Early Hong Kong*, pp. 32–3.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
63. “General Statement on A.R.P. During the Period 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1939,” *Annual Report 1939*, P (1) A.R.P., pp. 1–6.
64. *China at War*, Vol. 5 (1940), pp. 95–6. The horrendous tunnel suffocation accident during a bombing of Chongqing in 1941 had yet to happen.
65. Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, p. 92.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 87–89.
67. *The Kung Sheung Daily News*, 1/10/1941.
68. DGB, 3/9/1941; 4/9/1941; 5/9/1941; 1/10/1941; 3/10/1941; 14/10/1941; 16/10/1941; 17/10/1941; 18/10/1941; 21/10/1941; 1/11/1941; 2/11/1941; 5/11/1941; 8/11/1941.
69. DGB, 5/11/1941.
70. Endacott, *A Biographical Sketch-book of Early Hong Kong*, p. 52. Endacott, who relied mainly on English newspaper sources, subscribed to this myth.
71. DGB, 18/11/1941.
72. Leo Goodstadt, *Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between Public Interest and Private Profit in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), pp. xv, 267.
73. “Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies,” 2/12/1941, CO 129/590.
74. Kent Fedorowich, “The Evacuation of Civilians from Hong Kong and Malaya/Singapore, 1939–1942,” in Brian Farrell and Sandy Hunter (eds.), *Sixty Years On: The Fall of Singapore Revisited* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002), pp. 122–32.
75. Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p. 51.

8 The Fall of Hong Kong, December 1941

1. “Operations in the Far East, from 17th October 1940 to 27th December 1941,” *Supplement to London Gazette*, 20/1/1948, p. 541.

2. *Hohei dai nihihachi rentai shi* [History of the 228th infantry regiment] (Nagoya: Hohei dai nihihachi rentai shi kankōkai, 1973), p. 103.
3. *Entries in Personal Diary Brigadier J.K. Lawson* (hereafter Lawson Diary), 1941, Library and Archives Canada, R1961–0-9, p. 1.
4. The next day, a man died of a heart attack due to seasickness. Lawson Diary, p. 1.
5. The officers tried to set an example by joining the physical training, but Lawson was injured in the leg as a result. Lawson got a “slight kink” at physical training on 5 November and was unable to resume until the 10th. Lawson Diary, pp. 1–2.
6. The consequences of this incident remain elusive, but three events occurred afterwards. After *Awatea* had left Honolulu, the schedule of the *Taiyo Maru* was delayed by an extended investigation of its passengers and mails. It could not leave until 5 November, after some negotiation. Lawson wrote in his diary after the incident that the ship was the “only possible source of leakage,” without any follow-up. G. Hutson, a junior engineer on board *Awatea*, recalled that “it was reported that a ship had shadowed us for several days, and it was presumed to be a Japanese warship . . .” On 15 November, when *Awatea* was just one day away from Hong Kong, it had to change course to avoid Japanese cruisers. It could be an interesting question about the relationship between this possible leakage and the sudden extension of the U.S. Customs investigation. Did *Taiyo Maru* send any intelligence report to Japan and did it have any relationship with the suspected Japanese cruisers? They are questions that await answer. “Honolulu zeikan tōyoku no Taiyo Maru jōkyaku tenimotsu kensashin nikansuru ken,” Rikugunshō dainiki (RD), NIDS, JACAR, Ref: C04014873400; Lawson Diary, pp. 2–3; G. Hutson, *Awatea at War* (2010), website of New Zealand Ship and Marine Society, <http://www.nzshipmarine.com/node/52>.
7. Lawson Diary, p. 3.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. Lawson Diary, pp. 3–4.
11. Ronald Parker, *Deadly December: The Battle of Hong Kong, The Royal Rifles of Canada, The Winnipeg Grenadiers* (London: Lulu.com, 2008), p. 18.
12. “Telegram from C in C Far East to the War Office,” 19/11/1941, CO 968/13/2, slide 72.
13. *Ibid.*, slide 70.
14. *Ibid.*, slide 70.
15. *Ibid.*, slide 69.
16. *Ibid.*, slide 67.
17. “Anti-Aircraft Allocations for December 1941,” COS (41) 709, CAB 80/32.
18. “Minutes of Meeting held on Monday,” 1/12/1941, CAB 79/16.
19. “Anti-Aircraft Defence of Hong Kong (Draft Report),” CO 968/13/2, slide 62.
20. “Extract from Minutes of Meeting held on Wednesday,” 3/12/1941, CO 968/13/2, slides 56–58.
21. “An abbreviated narrative of events during the action at Hong Kong, December, 1941,” WO 106/2401A, Appendix A, p. 1. This abbreviated narrative was the first draft of Maltby’s *Supplement to the London Gazette: Operations in Hong Kong from 8th to 25th December, 1941*; however, the above quotation was omitted when it was published.

22. WO 106/2401A, Appendix A, p. 1.
23. “Letter to WO from Maj. Gen. Maltby,” 21/11/1945, WO 106/2401A, p. 2.
24. Southeast to Li Muk Shue Milestone No. 7 of Castle Peak Road.
25. “Report on Operations Leading up to the Surrender of Hong Kong on the Japanese Imperial Army, December, 1941, with special reference to the part played by the 1st Battalion the Middlesex Regiment,” WO 172/1689, pp. 1–2.
26. The construction of S-class destroyers started in 1917. With its tonnage of 1,075 tons, its top speed reached 36 knots. These destroyers were armed with three 4-inch rapid-firing guns, one 2-pounder machine cannon, four Lewis light machine-guns and two 21-inch torpedo tubes. HMS *Scout* and HMS *Thanet* were built in 1919 and HMS *Thracian* was built in 1923. Christopher Briggs, *Farewell Hong Kong 1941* (Carlisle: Hesperian Press, 2001), pp. 6–11.
27. Specifications of the Insect-class gunboats: 635 tons, 14 knots, two 6-inch guns, one 3-inch AA, one 2-pounder, and eight MGs; HMS *Tern*: 262 tons, 14 knots, two 3-inch rapid-firing guns and eight MGs; HMS *Robin*: 226 tons, 13 knots, one 3.7-inch howitzer, one 6-pounder gun and eight MGs.
28. These six MTBs weighed 22 tons each with a top speed of 33 knots. They were armed with two 18-inch torpedo tubes and four 0.303-inch twin machine-guns. MTBs 26 and 27 weighed 14 tons each and had a top speed of 40 knots. They were armed with two 18-inch torpedo tubes and two 0.303-inch twin machine-guns. Due to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the fall of Nanjing and Shanghai, the Hong Kong government held six MTBs bought by the Chinese Nationalist government in custody when the boats were being transferred to China. Two of them were bought by the Hong Kong government, which became MTBs 26 and 27; the rest later reached Wuhan.
29. Hong Kong War Diary, www.hongkongwardiary.com; Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, *Gudu qianshao: Taipingsyang zhanzheng zhong de Xianggang zhanyi* (Hong Kong: Cosmos, 2013), pp. 130–1.
30. “War Narrative,” WO 106/2401B, p. 3.
31. “Copy of Proceedings of the Court of Enquiry Held on 8 May 1942 in P.O.W. Camp in Argyle Street to Investigate the Circumstance Leading to the Loss of Shing Mun Redoubt,” CAB 106/166, p. 15.
32. Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, p. 150.
33. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen* [Hong Kong-Changsha operations] (Tokyo: Asagumo, 1971), pp. 10–11.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 53–4. A recently published book argues that the directives were actually drafted by the Chief of Staff of the 23rd Army, Maj. Gen. Kuribayashi Tadamichi and his colleague Lt. Col. Toda. Harayama Shigeo, *Kuribayashi Tadamichi, Imai Takeo monogatari* (Nagano: Hōzuki, 2011), pp. 142–8.
36. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, p. 36.
37. It was sometimes suggested that the Japanese were trained at the Baiyun Mountain of Guangzhou. However, no information about this has been found in Japanese documents. “Honkon kōryakusen nikansuru shoken kyu kyōkun” [Opinions and lessons on the Offensive Operation in Hong Kong], 10/1/1942, RIS, NIDS, JACAR, Ref: C13031812500.

38. “1941 nen 12 getsu ni okeru Honkon kōryaku sakusen kikoru” [Report of the Offensive Operation in Hong Kong in December 1941], RIS, NIDS, JACAR, Ref: C13031811200, pp. 18–20. See also Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, pp. 151–3.
39. Map based on the description in Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, pp. 10–11.
40. “Dai ni kenshi kantai shireibu senshi nisshi” [Wartime Diary of HQ, Second China Fleet], 1/12/1941–31/12/1941, Kaigun ichihan shiryō (KIS), NIDS, JACAR, Ref: C08030033500.
41. Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, p. 138.
42. “1941 nen 12 getsu ni okeru Honkon kōryaku sakusen kikoru,” RIS, NIDS, JACAR, Ref: C13031811200, p. 27.
43. “1st Hong Kong Regiment HKSRA Mainland,” WO 172/1688, p. 3. The war diary of the Royal Artillery provides rather different data: “ammunition was sent to gun positions on a scale of 100 rounds per gun with the same held at West Fort and 200 r.p.g. at Mau Tau Kok [sic] Ordnance Depot as a further reserve.” “Royal Artillery Report of Operations in Hong Kong,” WO 172/1687, p. 1.
44. “War Diary,” WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 1.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*
47. Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, p. 161.
48. “No.1 Company HKVDC War Diary,” WO 172/1693, p. 2.
49. H. M. Montague, “Report of Proceedings from Outbreak of Hostilities with Japan at Hong Kong until His Arrival at Chungking” (hereafter “Montague’s Report”), CO 968/9/4, slide S6; Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Chukoku hōmen rikugun kōkū sakusen* [Army Air Force’s War in China] (Tokyo: Asagumo News, 1974), p. 255.
50. This exceptionally low level was recorded in both Japanese and British sources. The award for Takatsuki Hiraki claimed that they strafed the British aircraft at the level of little more than ten metres; Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, p. 119. Maltby said the Japanese aircraft attacked “down to 60 feet” in a letter; “Letter to WO by Maj. Gen. Maltby,” *Hong Kong Despatches*, WO 106/2401A, p. 6.
51. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 2. The report of the 23rd Army noted that the light bombers at the level of 4,200 metres failed to find their targets; it was the fighters at low level that destroyed the British planes. See “Honkon kōryakusen nikansuru shoken kyu kyōkun,” 23rd Army, Shina-Shina shihen: nanshi-64, NID, p. 26.
52. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 2.
53. “Honkon kōryakusen nikansuru shoken kyu kyōkun,” p. 10.
54. “Dai sanjuhachi shidan Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō” [Report of the 38th Division’s Offensive Operation in Hong Kong], Shina-Shina shihen: nanshi-15, pp. 159–61.
55. Chan Chak, “Xianggang zhan tuwei riji,” in Chan On-kwok (ed.), *Chan Chak Jiangjun jinianji* (2011), pp. 236–40.
56. The fall of the Shing Mun Redoubt has been comprehensively discussed by Lawrence Lai and others, based on British sources and the official Japanese history of the campaign. However, as we have pointed out the difference in the time zones used by either side, this section attempts to reconstruct events on the basis of the Japanese primary documents as well as the Shing Mun inquiry, conducted by the British in the 1950s.

- For Lai's study and the comparison of his timeline with that of Tony Banham in *Not the Slightest Chance*, see Lawrence Lai et al., "Decoding the Enigma of the Fall of the Shung Mun Redoubt Using Line of Sight Analysis," *Surveying & Built Environment*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2011), pp. 21–42.
57. *Hohei dai nihachi rentai shi*, pp. 76–9; "Battle Progress Report of the 228th Infantry Regiment in the Hong Kong Invasion Operations in December 1941," HKMS 100–1-5, pp. 3–5.
 58. According to Latham's report, Maj. Gen. Maltby described Capt. Jones as "useless" while Brig. Wallis described Capt. Jones as "weak," when Wallis was serving at the inquiry in 1942. "Notes of an Interview with Major-General Maltby, 1 October 1957," CAB 44/175, Appendix I; "Copy of Proceedings of the Court of Enquiry Held on 8 May 1942 in P.O.W. Camp in Argyle Street to Investigate the Circumstances Leading to the Loss of Shing Mun Redoubt," CAB 106/166, p. 5.
 59. Where they withdrew to is not clear, but it was possibly L. 104. Please refer to the text for further details.
 60. *Report on the Action of the 2nd Battalion The Royal Scots in the Fighting on the Mainland during the Hong Kong Campaign, 8th–13th December 1941*, CAB 44/175 (unpaginated).
 61. There were no alternative positions for PB 400 and PB 401, as the terrain was too rough. CAB 44/175.
 62. Jones mentioned in the inquiry in 1942 that he had proposed to block the dam with barbed wire but was turned down by Public Works Department, which claimed that the wire would "interfere with the water supply." No other records may be found to support his claim. CAB 106/166, p. 21.
 63. "Dai sanjuhachi shidan Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō," Shina-Shina shihen: nanshi-15, pp. 159–61.
 64. "War Diary 2nd Battalion Royal Scots," WO 172/1690, p. 5.
 65. *Hohei dai nihachi rentai shi*, p. 78.
 66. *Ibid.*, pp. 79–83.
 67. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, pp. 147–8.
 68. HKMS 100–1-5, p. 5; *Hohei dai nihachi rentai shi*, pp. 79–80, 116–7.
 69. CAB 106/166, p. 23.
 70. Robb later broke out and withdrew to D/Rajput on Smugglers' Ridge; *Hohei dai nihachi rentai shi*, p. 79.
 71. *Hohei dai nihachi rentai shi*, p. 79.
 72. "Dai sanjuhachi shidan Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō," Shina-Shina shihen: nanshi-15, p. 165.
 73. *Hohei dai nihachi rentai shi*, p. 80; "Dai sanjuhachi shidan Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō," Shina-Shina shihen: nanshi-15, pp. 166–8.
 74. Harayama, *Kuribayashi Tadamichi, Imai Takeo monogatari*, pp. 142–8.
 75. CAB 106/166, p. 20; CAB 44/175.
 76. CAB 44/175. In all, PBs 208, 210, 211, 212, 213 and 214 were damaged; 211 and 214 were almost destroyed. See "Kyūryū hantō okeru honbōgyo jinchi chōsa hōkoku," 1/1942, Shina-Dai Tōasen-Nanshi 90, NID.
 77. WO 172/1690, p. 10.
 78. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, p. 167; "Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō dai sanju hachi shidan hohei dai nihakusanju rentai" [Action

- Report of the 230th Infantry Regiment of the 38th Division during the Hong Kong Campaign], Shina-Shina shihen: nanshi-34, NID, pp. 69–70.
79. “Events on Castle Peak Road Morning 11th Dec, 1941,” WO 106/2401A, Appendix C, p. 1.
 80. WO 106/2401A, Appendix C, p. 1. World Pencil Factory was located on Fuk Wah Street.
 81. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, pp. 168–9.
 82. CAB 44/175.
 83. WO 172/1689, p. 4.
 84. One of the searchlight positions was inside the present-day Tsing Yi Garden.
 85. Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, pp. 199–200.
 86. Chiu Lan Chu is nowadays the quarry of Anderson Road. Tai Wan Tsun is the area around the present-day Jordan Valley.
 87. It was located at the entrance of Wilson Trail No. 3.
 88. These Chinese non-combatants were mainly truck drivers and ship crew. They were neither regular soldiers nor volunteers. WO 106/2401A, Appendix A, p. 9.
 89. WO 106/2401A, Appendix A, p. 10; Appendix B1, p. 5.
 90. “Memorandum on Dynamite Incident,” WO 106/2401B.
 91. “The Work of the Hong Kong Police during the Siege,” CO 968/9/4, slides 2–3.
 92. Philip Snow’s *The Battle of Hong Kong* describes in detail the triad incident. He described Shaftain as the head of Special Branch. However, the head of Special Branch was actually H. R. S. Major. Shaftain was the head of the Criminal Investigation Department, which was responsible for the investigation of the triad societies’ activities. That is the reason the report went to Shaftain. “The Work of the Hong Kong Police during the Siege,” CO 968/9/4, slides 2–3.
 93. Alan Birch and Martin Cole, *Captive Christmas: The Battle of Hong Kong—December 1941* (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979), p. 60.
 94. Zhou Yumin and Shao Yong, *Zhongguo banghuishi* (Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 2012), pp. 447–50, 498–500, 576–81, 671–5; For a description of the triads, please also see Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, *Gudu qianshao: Taipingyang zhanzheng zhong de Xianggang zhanyi*, pp. 329–31.
 95. Birch and Cole, *Captive Christmas*, p. 61.
 96. CO 968/9/4, slide 4. Birch and Cole, *Captive Christmas*, p. 61.
 97. L. H. C. Calthrop, “Hong Kong Police War Diary—December 8th–25th, 1941,” CO 129/592/4, slide 40. This line was originally deleted: the authors of this book were able to reconstruct this line letter by letter through magnifying the microfilm of the document.
 98. CO 968/9/4, slide 7.
 99. Birch and Cole, *Captive Christmas*, pp. 61–2.
 100. He was called “Colonel” in Lavalle’s account.
 101. Kenneth Cambon, *Guest of Hirohito* (Vancouver: PW Press, 1990), Appendix 1, p. 138.
 102. *Ibid.*, pp. 138–40.
 103. Gwen Dew, *Prisoner of the Japs* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1943), p. 51; *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, p. 186.
 104. “Governor to CO,” 14/12/1941, CO 968/9/3, slide 127.

105. “CO to Governor,” 14/12/1941, CO 968/9/3, slide 130.
106. The area is nowadays between the Fortress Hill and Quarry Bay stations. *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, p. 201.
107. The war diary of the 38th Division also contained detailed description of the shelling of Hong Kong Island. See “Dai sanjuhachi shidan Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō,” *Shina-Shina shihen: nanshi-15*, pp. 181–96.
108. Tai Shek Ku is nowadays Shek Ku Street in Ho Man Tin.
109. This area is probably the present-day Hong Ning Road Park.
110. The E Company consisted of the replacement troops of the Winnipeg Grenadiers.
111. “War Diary East Infantry Brigade,” WO 172/1686, p. 3.
112. “The Work of the Hong Kong Police during the Siege,” CO 968/9/4, slide 2.
113. Three “units” (twenty 240-mm, thirty 150-mm cannon and mortar, and forty 150-mm howitzer shells) were expended for each gun.
114. WO 172/1687, p. 7.
115. Lawson Diary, pp. 4–5; “Montague’s Report,” CO 968/9/4, slide 58; WO 106/2401A, Appendix A, p. 13. In his book *Not the Slightest Chance: The Defence of Hong Kong, 1941* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), Tony Banham put this action on the nights of 15 and 16 December. However, HMS *Thracian*’s action was dated in the diary of Brig. Lawson, the reports of Cmdr. Montague and the original reports dated 1942 by Maj. Gen. Maltby as actually taking place on the nights of 14 and 15 December. Tom Quillam, who was on board HMS *Thracian*, mistakenly recorded the date as 15 December. Maj. Gen. Maltby also made the same mistake in his full report dated 1945. Tom Quillam, *Eye Witness Tells the Thracian’s Story*, 940.53 QUI, p. 4; C. M. Maltby, *Supplement to The London Gazette* (London: HMSO, 1948), p. 709.
116. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 8.
117. *Ibid.*
118. “Report from Kwangtung Province, December 1941/January 1942,” Elizabeth Ride Collection, Hong Kong Heritage Project.
119. “G.O.C. Hong Kong to C. in C. Far East,” 15/12/1941, WO 106/ 2420A; Chan Chak, “Xianggang zhan tuwei rijj,” p. 246.
120. E. C. Ford, “Memos of the Battle of Hong Kong and Impressions of a Prison Camp,” *Letters, Memoranda, Reports Diary Extracts and Other Narratives Written by Hong Kong Residents Relating Their Experiences and Observations during the Battle for Hong Kong, the Japanese Occupation and Surrender*, HKMS100–1–6, p. 17.
121. “Montague’s Report,” CO 968/9/4, slide 58; “Dai ni kenshi kantai senshi nisshi sentō shōhō,” 1/1/1942–31/1/1942.
122. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Chukoku hōmen rikugun kōku sakusen*, pp. 258–9.
123. “Kanoya kōkutai hokōkitai sentō kōdō chōsho” [Action Report of the Kanoya Wing], 12/1941–2/1942, KIS, NIDS, JACAR, C08051612900.
124. “Montague’s Report,” CO 968/9/4, slide 58.
125. Kwong and Tsoi, *Gudu qianshao*, p. 166.
126. When they were hit by British shell fire is not certain. *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen* claimed that they were hit when returning from Tide Cove, while the record of 229th Regiment claimed that they came under fire on the way towards Tide Cove. The authors have followed the version of the latter. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa*

- Sakusen*, p. 179; *Hohei dai ninikyū rentai shi* [History of the 229th infantry regiment] (Fukufukukai, 1981), p. 209. Although it was said that each regiment formed a company of capable swimmers, this event is reported only in the regimental histories of the 229th and 230th regiments.
127. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, pp. 189–90.
 128. “Governor to CO,” 17/12/1941, WO 106/ 2420A.
 129. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 10.
 130. *Ibid.*
 131. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, pp. 202–6.
 132. *Ibid.*, pp. 223–4.
 133. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 10.
 134. PB 41 was at the junction of present-day Shau Kei Wan Road and Aldrich Bay Road. PB 42 is nowadays the petrol station at Tai Hong Street. *Hohei dai ninikyū rentai shi*, p. 303.
 135. The beach is in present-day the area of Tai Hong Street, Tai On Street, Holy Cross Path, Hoi Ning Street and Hoi An Street.
 136. “An Abbreviated Narrative of Events during the Action at Hong Kong, December, 1941,” WO 106/2401A, Appendix A, p. 18.
 137. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, p. 226.
 138. WO106/2401A, Appendix A, p. 18.
 139. “Report by O.C. 5/7 Raj (Taikoo) on Events on North Face between 0900 hours 18 Dec. 41 & 0900 hours 19 Dec. 41,” WO 106/2401A, Appendix D, p. 1.
 140. WO106/2401A, Appendix A, p. 19.
 141. The British record of the landing time is rather confusing. The record of Rajput had mistakenly put the time of landing at 20:00, while Japanese troops were still crossing Victoria Harbour. WO 106/2401A, Appendix D, p. 1; “Dai sanjuhachi shidan Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō,” pp. 208–10.
 142. “Dai sanjuhachi shidan Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō,” *Shina-Shina shihen: nanshi-15*, p. 204; “Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō dai sanju hachi shidan hohei dai nihakusanju rentai,” *Shina-Shina shihen: nanshi-34*, NID, p. 99; Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, *Gudu qianshao*, p. 226.
 143. The reservoir is now called Choi Sai Woo.
 144. WO 106/2401A, Appendix D, p. 2.
 145. Appendix D, 2401A; *Hohei dai ninikyū rentai shi*, pp. 296–314.
 146. Appendix D, 2401A.
 147. Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, *Gudu qianshao*, p. 305.
 148. Chan Chak, “Xianggang zhan tuwei riji,” p. 251.
 149. The platoons were from the HQ Company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers.
 150. Chan Chak, “Xianggang zhan tuwei riji,” p. 251.
 151. “Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals: The Proceedings of the Trial of Maj. Gen. Shoji Toshishige of the Imperial Japanese Army,” WO 235/1015, Exhibit Z, p. 3; “Dai sanjuhachi shidan Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō,” p. 206.
 152. “Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō dai sanju hachi shidan hohei dai nihakusanju rentai,” p. 102.
 153. The British record had given Jacosta’s rank as captain, but his tombstone in the Stanley War Cemetery has his rank as lieutenant. We have followed the latter here.

154. Ted Ferguson, *Desperate Siege: The Battle of Hong Kong* (Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1980), p.148.
155. *Hohei dai ninikyū rentai shi*, p. 231.
156. “Personal Account by the Hon: Major J. J. Paterson, HKVDC, On North Point Power Station,” *Hong Kong Despatches*, WO 106/2401A, Appendix L; WO 172/1689, Appendix 4; WO 172/1689, Appendix 4E; *Hohei dai ninikyū rentai shi*, pp. 231–2.
157. WO 172/1689, Appendix 4.
158. “Report on the Hong Kong Chinese Regiment in the battle of Hong Kong 1941 Dec. 8–25, by Captain R. D. Scriven,” CAB 106/88.
159. Royal Scots Diary, WO 172/1690, p. 26. For a survey map describing the disposition of the defenders in Wong Nai Chung Gap before the battle, see Lawrence W. C. Lai, Ken Ching, Tim Ko and Y. K. Tan, “‘Pillbox 3 Did Not Open Fire!’: Mapping the Arcs of Fire of Pillboxes at Jardine’s Lookout and Wong Nai Chung Gap,” *Surveying & Built Environment*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2011), pp. 54–5.
160. “Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō dai sanju hachi shidan hohei dai nihakusanju rentai,” *Shina-Shina shihen: nanshi-34*, NID, pp. 105–6.
161. “Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō dai sanju hachi shidan hohei dai nihakusanju rentai,” p. 102.
162. *Hohei dai ninihachi rentai shi*, p. 88.
163. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
164. “Dokuritsu sokushahō dai go daitai dai san chutai sentō jōhō” [Action Report of the 3rd Company of the 5th Independent Rapid-fire Gun Battalion], RIS, NIDS, JACAR, Ref: C13031807100; Lawrence Lai has suggested that PB 3 failed to engage because it was unable to train its fire on the advancing Japanese. However, the 3rd Rapid-Firing Gun Company noted that it had exchanged fire with PB 3 and silenced it. See Lai et al., “‘Pillbox 3 Did Not Open Fire!’” pp. 43–57; in addition, for accurate survey maps of the battle, see the above article by Lawrence Lai.
165. A Company was then commanded by Captain K. J. Campbell; it probably regrouped after arrival at Hong Kong Island. “Account of Events in the Jardine’s Lookout—Wong Nei Chong Gap Area,” *Hong Kong Despatches*, WO 106/2401A, Appendix E, p. 2.
166. “G.O.C. Hong Kong to WO at 0836,” 19/12/1941, WO 106/2420A.
167. *Hohei dai ninikyū rentai shi*, pp. 231, 251–2; Tim Luard, *Escape from Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Kong Kong University Press, 2012), pp. 44–5.
168. “Dai sanjuhachi shidan Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō,” pp. 212–3.
169. “Dokuritsu sokushahō dai go daitai dai san chutai sentō jōhō,” Ref: C13031807100.
170. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, p. 243.
171. “Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō dai sanju hachi shidan hohei dai nihakusanju rentai,” p. 107. He died or incapacitated later, as he was never in active service again throughout the war.
172. “War Narrative,” WO 106/2401B, p. 36. Maltby wrote two versions of what happened next. In 1942, he wrote: “He spoke to me over the telephone and told me that the situation there was critical and that he was leaving his HQ to organize an attack on the enemy at Jardine’s Lookout. I subsequently heard that he was killed instantaneously shortly after leaving his Bde HQ.” In his final report in 1945, he wrote: “Brigadier J. K. Lawson reported that the HQ shelters were overrun, firing into them was actually taking

- place at point blank range and that he was going outside to fight it out, after destroying telephone exchanges etc. He did so, and I regret to say he was killed, together with his Bde Major, Major Temple and personnel of HQ West Group R.A., and also C.B. Group personnel were killed too.” WO 106/2401A, Appendix A, p. 24; “War Narrative,” WO 106/2401B, p. 36.
173. Japanese soldiers did not discover the death of Brig. Lawson until four days later, when they completely controlled Wong Nai Chung Gap and had cleared the battlefield. According to Col. Shoji, Lawson “had died as a result of wounded fractured right leg and loss of blood. It appeared that considerable time had elapsed before his death and that necessary medical supplies had been lacking.” They wrapped up the body of Lawson with the blanket of Lt. Okada, the commander of 9th Company, and buried him on site. WO 235/1015, Exhibit Z, p. 6.
174. It is nowadays the Celestial Garden at No. 5 Repulse Bay Road.
175. The owner, George Tinson, assisted the defenders with his Chinese servant; he later died during a Japanese bombardment.
176. CAB 106/88.
177. It is probably the present-day Hong Kong Tennis Centre.
178. WO 172/1690, p. 32.
179. “Account of Events at PBs 1 & 2 (Wong Nai Chung Area) by Lieut. B. C. Field, H.K.V.D.C.,” WO 106/2401A, Appendix F, p. 2.
180. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 14.
181. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
182. Nathan Greenfield, *The Damned: The Canadians at the Battle of Hong Kong and the POW Experience, 1941–45* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010), p. 124. There was an entry in the Fortress HQ diary for 16:55, 19 December. It reads: “A report from the R.A. at this time stated the position of the enemy at Wong Nei Chong Gap was not known. He was thought to be holding the Police Station and ridge at 225514 [south of Wong Nai Chung Reservoir] and to be working round south of the Reservoir.” Since the Royal Artillery counterattack had not yet been launched, it is believed that Maj. Gen. Maltby mistook Capt. Hopkinson as personnel of the Royal Artillery. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 14.
183. “Personal Account by Lieut. I. Tamworth, Hong Kong Engineering Corps,” WO 106/2401A, Appendix J, p. 1.
184. In the Fortress HQ diary, it reads “O.C. 1st H.K. Regt. H.K.S.R.A.,” referring to Lt. Col. Yale. But Lt. Col. Yale was already wounded and missing. According to the war diary of the Island East Group Royal Artillery, it should be Maj. Hunt who went to Fortress HQ. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B1, p. 15; WO 172/1687, p. 14.
185. Dan Waters, “The Country Boy Who Died for Hong Kong,” *JRASHKB*, Vol. 25 (1985).
186. “Examination of 9th Witness for Prosecution—G. J. White on 12th March, 1947,” Military Courts for the Trial of Major General Shoji Toshishige, WO 235/1015, pp. 49–55.
187. “Montague’s Report,” CO 968/9/4, slide 59.
188. David Macri, “Hong Kong in the Sino-Japanese War,” unpublished PhD thesis, the University of Hong Kong (2010), p. 488; CAB 106/88.

189. There were at least three versions of the casualties suffered by 230th Regiment. In his statement dated 18 November 1946, Col. Shoji claimed they had suffered 800 casualties. In the Operation Report of 38th Division, it was stated that the 230th Regiment suffered casualties of 39 officers and 629 other ranks. The Operation Report of 230th Regiment claimed the total casualties were 36 officers and 580 soldiers. WO 235/1015, Exhibit Z, p. 6; “Dai sanjuhachi shidan Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō,” Appendix 6; “Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō dai sanju hachi shidan hohei dai nihakusanju rentai,” Appendix 1.
190. WO 235/1015, Exhibit Z, p. 5.
191. WO 172/1690, p. 33.
192. “Dokuritsu sokushahō dai go daitai dai san chutai sentō jōhō,” RIS, NDI, JACAR, Ref: C13031807100. After the battle, it was recommended that the artillerymen should be equipped also with rifles.
193. WO 106/2401A, Appendix E.
194. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 16.
195. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, pp. 259–60.
196. Benjamin Proulx, *Underground from Hong Kong* (New York: Stratford Press, 1943), p. 43.
197. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, p. 265.
198. *Ibid.*, p. 262; “Events at Little Hong Kong: Personal Narrative by Major H. Marsh. 1 Mx.,” WO 106/2401A, Appendix K.
199. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, pp. 255–6.
200. “Dai sanjuhachi shidan Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō,” pp. 224–9.
201. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 17.
202. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
203. Chan Chak, “Xianggang zhan tuwei riji,” p. 253.
204. “Dokuritsu sanhōhei dai niju daitai honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō,” RIS, NDI, JACAR, Ref: C13031799700, slides 0976–0977.
205. “Report from Kwangtung Province, December 1941/January 1942,” Elizabeth Ride Collection, Hong Kong Heritage Project.
206. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, pp. 18–9.
207. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
208. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
209. Col. Doi reported that there were only two survivors who were severely wounded. HKMS 100–1-5, pp. 13–4.
210. *Hohei dai ninihachi rentai shi*, pp. 91–2, 104–6; Banham, *Not the Slightest Chance*, p. 188. Col. Doi recalled that 3rd Company had suffered 40 percent casualties. HKMS 100–1-5, p. 13.
211. “Montague’s Report,” CO 968/9/4, slide 60.
212. *Hohei dai ninikyu rentai shi*, pp. 253–4. The European engineers were later murdered. See “Examination of 15th Witness for Prosecution—Chan Sai-So on 20th January, 1948,” Military Courts for the Trial of Lt. Gen. Ito Takeo, WO 235/1107, pp. 73–6.
213. *Hohei dai ninikyu rentai shi*, pp. 235–9, 249–59, 264–6; *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, pp. 269–70.
214. Grant S. Garneau, *The Royal Rifles of Canada in Hong Kong 1941–1945* (Carp, ON: The Hong Kong Veterans’ Association of Canada, 1980), pp. 71–7; WO 172/1693, pp. 14–7; WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, pp. 19–22.

215. The telegram also said the Chinese hoped to operate twenty bombers against Japanese airfields from 20 December. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 21.
216. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
217. WO 172/1686, pp. 76–7; Greenfield, *The Damned*, pp. 164–5.
218. “N.O.I.C. Hong Kong to Admiralty,” 21/12/1941, WO 106/2420A.
219. *Ibid.*
220. “Grey 36, 1840/20,” WO 106/2420A.
221. “D.M.O. P/340a,” WO 106/2420A.
222. *Ibid.*
223. “Admiralty to Cdre. Hong Kong,” 21/12/1941, WO 106/2420A.
224. “WO to G.O.C. Hong Kong,” 21/12/1941, WO 106/2420A.
225. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 23.
226. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, pp. 276–7.
227. Chan Chak, “Xianggang zhan tuwei riji,” pp. 253–5.
228. WO 172/1686, pp. 78–80.
229. “Personal Account by Lieut. I. Tamworth, Hong Kong Engineering Corps,” WO 106/2401A, Appendix J.
230. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 23.
231. “Cdre. Hong Kong to Admiralty,” 22/12/1941, WO 106/2420A.
232. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, pp. 24, 30–1.
233. “Events at Little Hong Kong,” *Hong Kong Despatches*, WO 106/2401A, Appendix K, p. 6; *Hohei dai ninihachi rentai shi*, pp. 92–3.
234. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 24.
235. “Honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō dai sanju hachi shidan hohei dai nihakusanju rentai,” p. 120.
236. “Events at Little Hong Kong,” WO 106/2401A, Appendix K, p. 6.
237. WO 172/1686, p. 88.
238. *Ibid.*, pp. 89–90.
239. It is where the Police Museum stands nowadays.
240. Hill 281 is nowadays the location of Guildford Road, Mansfield Road and Watford Road.
241. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, pp. 27–8.
242. Mount Parrish is nowadays the location of Wah Yan College.
243. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 27.
244. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
245. WO 172/1686, pp. 91–3.
246. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 27.
247. WO 172/1686, pp. 95–7.
248. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 29.
249. WO 172/1686, p. 103.
250. *Hohei dai ninikyū rentai shi*, pp. 239–40, 259–61. This searchlight probably belonged to PB 28.
251. “Statement by Sgt. H.F. Hopkins, HKVDC,” WO 106/2401B, Appendix Q, p. 83.
252. “Recommendations for Honours and Awards,” WO 106/2401B, Appendix Q, pp. 80–4.
253. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 29.

254. *Hohei dai ninikyū rentai shi*, pp. 241–3; WO 172/1689, Appendix 2b, pp. 5–7; WO 172/1686, pp. 106–7.
255. Wallis claimed in his war diary that on the evening of 24 December, “I learned to my astonishment some European nurses were at St. Stephens College. I sent an ambulance with water and succeeded in evacuation [*sic*] 3, the others had been killed during the fighting, to the Fort.” There were no survivors of the evacuation mentioned. Most of the nurses were trapped inside the main building until capitulation. St. Stephen’s College was used as a military hospital; wounded soldiers from Red Hill, Repulse Bay and Middle Spur were housed inside the main building. When Wallis planned the in-depth defence of Stanley Peninsula, St. Stephen’s College was somehow cut into two by the second line, with the main building at its front. It seems possible that Brig. Wallis chose not to withdraw the wounded into either Stanley Prison or Stanley Fort, as these two places were either out of water or lacked enough space. The military hospital continued to function as fighting in Stanley Village continued. WO 172/1686, p. 100.
256. Bōeishō bōei kenshusho senshishitsu, *Honkon-Chosa Sakusen*, pp. 307–8.
257. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 31.
258. WO 172/1690, pp. 38–9.
259. WO 106/2401A, Appendix B, p. 31.
260. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
261. “Letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies from Sir Mark Young,” CO 968/98/6, slide 52.
262. “Governor, Straits Settlements to Colonial Office,” 25/12/1941, WO 106/2420A.
263. By then, Wallis did not have enough time to destroy the Stanley and Bluff Head batteries; they were taken over unscathed by the Japanese.
264. *Hohei dai ninihachi rentai shi*, p. 103; *Hohei dai ninikyū rentai shi*, p. 286.
265. Chan On-kwok (ed.), “Chan Chak jiangjun zhuanlue,” *Chan Chak Jiangjun jinianji* (2011), p. 98.
266. “Sir A. Clark Kerr to FO,” 15/12/1941, CO 129/590.
267. Chan On-kwok (ed.), “Xianggang kangzhan tuwei zongbaogao,” *Chan Chak Jiangjun jinianji* (2011), p. 279.
268. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
269. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
270. *Ibid.*, pp. 95, 101–2.
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staying in Hong Kong. Cohen was arrested and interned in Stanley Internment Camp until 1943.

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