

From Fu Manchu to Kung Fu Panda

Images of China
in American Film

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The Pendulum Swings . . . and Swings Again

Past and Present

This book is about the representations of China found in American films, Or, more precisely, about the images and myths regarding China found in such films. It is based on two underlying premises. First, that film both reflects and fuels widespread, and often deeply rooted, perceptions and attitudes. In a book about the interactions of film and history, French historian Marc Ferro argues that cinema is both a “source” and an “agent” of history. A film is a “source” in that it reveals not only the physical and social realities of the past but also the attitudes and beliefs of the period in which it was made. It acts as an “agent” in a two-fold way. That is, it shapes visions of the past—think, for example, of how *Gone with the Wind* has influenced memories and perceptions of the Civil War¹—that almost invariably have an impact on future behavior and decisions. “Attitudes and policies are formed,” writes Jerome Ch’en in a book about China and the West, “approaches and procedures are chosen, on the basis of things as they are perceived, not as they really are.”² Ch’en may not have been thinking principally of how film shaped perceptions of China—he was concerned, rather, with the role played by “missionaries and converts, scholars and students, traders and emigrants”—but no one would deny that, once film turned to China, it created powerful perceptions that became part of a landscape of shifting sympathies and strident fears.

This brings us to the second general premise: that is, in the case of American perceptions of China, screen images bear on a relationship between two countries—that is, China and America—that is as deeply problematic as it is critically important. No country has figured more prominently in recent American history: since the onset of the cold war the presence of China has loomed large in domestic American politics as well as foreign policy. Fears of China arguably prompted the United States to fight in Korea and, later, in Vietnam. Speaking of the Korean War, historian David Halberstam makes the point that the war “was never just

about Korea. It was always joined to something infinitely larger—China, a country inspiring the most bitter kind of domestic political debate.”³ And if China was a critical player in the nation’s recent past, it has become abundantly clear that no country promises to play a more important role in America’s future. Even as early as 1970, China’s growing importance was sensed by historian Henry Steele Commager. “What was said of America in Tocqueville’s day,” wrote Commager, “can be said of China in ours, that no student can be indifferent to its existence, no economist omit it from his calculations, no statesman ignore its immense potentialities, and no philosopher or moralist refuse to accommodate his speculations to its presence.”⁴

In the years since Commager wrote those words, China’s “immense potentialities” have loomed larger with every passing day. “The most important thing happening in the world today,” declared a succinct Nicholas Kristof in the pages of the *New York Times* on December 10, 2003, “is the rise of China.” Barely a week goes by that we do not read about how China appears to be catching up to, if not surpassing and challenging, the United States. Headlines tell us that “China is drawing high-tech research from the U.S.” even as it races to replace the United States “as economic power in Asia.” Its construction of a “vast network of fast trains” means that the United States “falls further behind.”⁵ Almost as if there were no other important countries or national groups in the world—as if the European Union, and the nations of Latin America barely existed—Americans tend to view the contest for global hegemony in terms of America and China. Every realm of experience—the Olympic medals won by athletes, the achievements of schoolchildren—is measured in terms of this contest. The coming century, suggests one commentator after another, will belong not to America but to the Chinese. “If the 20th was the American century,” writes William Grimes flatly, “then the 21st belongs to China. It’s that simple.”⁶

In recent years, perceptions of this contest have given rise to insistent comparisons between China’s “rise”—as it is inevitably called—and America’s “fall.” Books about China’s rise and what it portends for this century—such as Ted C. Fishman’s *China, Inc: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World* (2005), Wendy Dobson’s *Gravity Shift: How Asia’s New Economic Powerhouses Will Shape the 21st Century* (2010), Martin Jacques’ *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order* (2009), Clyde Prestowitz’ *Three Billion New Capitalists: The Great Shift of Wealth and Power to the East* (2005), Stefan Halper’s *The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century* (2010), Aaron L. Friedberg’s *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (2012)—are matched only by those devoted to America’s imperial decline. A sampling includes Cullen Murphy’s *Are We Rome? The*

Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America (2007), Amy Chua's *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall* (2008), and Robert Kagan's *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (2008).

Yet despite the important role China has played in the past, and will clearly play in the future, no country—as the films under consideration make clear—has been more enveloped in American ignorance or bathed in changing illusions and myths. In part, of course, such myths are symptomatic of a broader ethnocentric bias: Americans are not known for their interest in, or knowledge of, other places in the world. Long before the contemporary era, as historian Tony Judt once observed, “foreign visitors were criticizing [America’s] brash self-assurance, the narcissistic confidence of Americans in the superiority of American values and practices, and their rootless inattentiveness to history and tradition—their own and other people’s.”⁷ Still, even within this general context of “inattentiveness,” Americans’ ignorance of China *is* striking. It may not be as acute as it was in the postwar era, when virtually all contacts between America and China—educational, cultural, and economic—were severed. Nonetheless, it is telling that an observation made in 1974 by the dean of American Sinologists, John K. Fairbank, still rings largely true. “At any given time,” said Fairbank wryly, “the ‘truth’ of China is in our heads, a notoriously unsafe repository for so valuable a commodity.”⁸ And well before Fairbank wrote those words, Harold Isaacs—author of what is widely considered a pathbreaking study of American attitudes toward China, *Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India*—declared that China “occupies a special place in a great many American minds. It is remote, strange, dim, little known.”⁹

Throughout the years, the “strange” and “remote” place that China occupies in the American mind has been accompanied by a curious phenomenon. It is one that, as we will see, comes vividly to life in the films explored in these pages. That is, under the force of changing historical circumstances, Americans tend to swing from intensely positive images of China to those that are relentlessly negative. On the positive side, China is regarded as an ancient and wise civilization—a land blessed with citizens who are intelligent and industrious, peaceful and stoic, devoted to the values of family and the moral teachings of Confucius. But there is another—fearsome—China. This is the land of Oriental despots, of Genghis Khan and his marauding hordes, of strange practices and barbaric tortures. Noting that “the inhuman powers of endurance attributed to the Chinese are loosely related to the idea that they are also inhumanly cruel,” Harold Isaacs observes that “the term ‘Chinese torture’ has a place in our language signifying devilishly ingenious methods of inflicting pain and death.”¹⁰ A land of “devilish” methods of torture, this latter China is peopled, continues Isaacs, by “a faceless, impenetrable, overwhelming mass, irresistible if once loosed. Along this way we

discover the devious and difficult heathen, the killers of girl infants, the binders of women's feet, the torturers of a thousand cuts, the headsmen, the Boxer Rebellion and the Yellow Peril."¹¹

Isaacs wrote those words more than a half century ago. But in the eyes of many Sinologists, historians, and political scientists, the schizophrenic view of China he describes is still alive and well. Reflecting on the dueling visions of China that seem to inhabit the American imagination, in the wake of a 1979 visit to China, David Chan underscored Americans' "inability to be objective" about China even as he suggested that China either "seduces" or "repels."¹² Approaching this from a slightly different perspective, in a study published in the year 2000, Jasper Becker made much the same point. Noting that China is seen either as an "oriental utopia" or a "Communist hell," he pointed out that then recent books portrayed China along characteristically dualistic lines, that is, "as the next superpower, the new evil empire or as descending into chaos and civil war."¹³

In today's media-saturated world, where images and perceptions change with astonishing speed, the swings of the pendulum and dueling images of China described by these commentators have, if anything, become more visible than before. To see this phenomenon at work, one has only to consider two important dates—1972 and 1989—when the pendulum governing perceptions of China took a violent swing. The first date represents the year that President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Chairman Mao Zedong in the course of a historic visit to Beijing. In the period that followed that visit, the "repulsion" that Americans had felt for China throughout the era of the cold war gave way to a moment of "seduction"—one marked by an infatuation with China so strong that Harry Harding likened it to a kind of "China fever."¹⁴ The second date, of course, marks the year that viewers around the world witnessed soldiers of the People's Liberation Army fire on unarmed student protestors in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. Putting an end to what Richard Madsen calls the "liberal China myth" that had guided Americans' relationship to China for a quarter century,¹⁵ the massacre at Tiananmen Square suddenly reawakened quasi-dormant fears of Chinese malevolence and brutality. This watershed event was, moreover, soon followed by a number of confrontations between America and China so tense that, as historian Warren Cohen writes, for a while it seemed as if a new cold war loomed on the horizon.¹⁶

As political tensions escalated and "seduction" gave way to "repulsion," negative images of China—absent from view since 1972—came back to life with a vengeance. Nowhere was this phenomenon clearer, perhaps, than in America's newspaper of record, the *New York Times*.¹⁷ Revealing the weight of ancient stereotypes, articles insistently brought to mind age-old images of Chinese torture and inhumanity, of weird practices and strange superstitions. For example, a June 29,

2001, report about the alleged harvesting of organs from executed Chinese prisoners was replete with grisly details that evoked the specter of Chinese torture.¹⁸ In other articles, China's faceless bureaucratic leaders were described in ways that brought to mind visions of cruel and barbaric Oriental despots. Going so far as to use the term "satrap," a report on May 29, 2001, sententiously declared that in China "might makes right, whether wielded by traditional clan chiefs, by cabals of corrupt police, Communist Party satraps and gangsters or . . . by all of the above." And once the SARS crisis erupted, images of "devilish" methods of Chinese torture and of Oriental despotism were joined by those bearing on dirt and disease, on the perceived weirdness and degeneracy of Chinese habits and tastes. While some articles faulted China's leaders for their response to the outbreak of illness, others lingered on what were, to American eyes, the strange foods, superstitions, and medicines used by the Chinese to battle the plague. A front-page article published on May 10, 2003, bore the deliberately shocking headline "Herbs? Bull Thymus? Beijing Leaps at Anti-SARS Potions."¹⁹ Earlier images of a strange and barbaric people given to wearing pigtailed and eating weird creatures assumed a contemporary cast even as rats—the symbol of Chinese dirt and deceit—surfaced everywhere in American media coverage of China. One article described an expensive Guangdong restaurant that featured on its menu small mammals like civet cats that, it said, "may have caused the original outbreak"; still another focused on a Chinese slaughterhouse where trucks arrive daily "with animals jammed into cages—cats, dogs, pigeons, goats, ostriches, even rats."²⁰

As in the past, the rise of such stereotypes was directly linked to the perception of threats or danger. In recent decades, of course, fears have borne principally on China's growing economic might. Portrayed as both a "Communist hell" and a country of cutthroat capitalism, China is seen as a menacing behemoth eager to devour U.S. markets, alienate U.S. friends and allies in Africa and Europe, exacerbate the U.S. trade imbalance, attract U.S. graduates with jobs, draw high-tech research from the United States, and challenge the U.S. military by stealing its secrets. Not surprisingly, reporters have been all too happy to chronicle the dark side of China's stunning economic success. Sensationalistic headlines in the *New York Times* announce Dickensian portraits of the ravages wrought by unbridled capitalism: for example, "China's Workers Risk Limbs in Export Drive" (July 4, 2003), "Making Trinkets in China, and a Deadly Dust" (June 18, 2003), "China Crushes Peasant Protest" (October 13, 2004), "When China's 'Haves' Are Abusive, 'Have Nots' Respond with Violence" (December 31, 2004), "Rivers Run Black, and Chinese Die of Cancer" (September 12, 2004), "China's Super Elite Learn to Flaunt It While the New Landless Weep" (December 25, 2004), "A Village Grows Rich Off Its Main Export: Its Daughters" (January 3, 2005), and "Rules Ignored: Toxic Sludge Sinks Chinese Village" (September 4, 2006).

As one might have expected, the drumbeat of negative articles intensified during the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. Even as China dazzled the world with its flair for spectacle and its growing athletic prowess, readers learned about ordinary Chinese people whose homes were gutted in the name of “development,” about elderly women forced into “re-education” for complaining when their houses were seized, about protests (in Xinjiang and Tibet) carefully hidden and brutally suppressed.²¹ Every aspect, and detail, of the Olympics became symbolic of a country whose rulers would stop at nothing in their quest to impress viewers around the world. Even the fact that the young girl who sang at the opening ceremony lip-synched was taken, for example, as a sign of Chinese “deceit.”²² At least when Pavarotti lip-synched at the 2006 Olympics, waxed the indignant reporter for the *New York Times*, he did so to his own voice!

All this, of course, is not to defend the policies of the Chinese government. Nor is it to suggest that the reports are necessarily untrue or to ignore the extent of the problems the nation faces: no one could deny that China’s record on human rights is deplorable or that the country faces pressing social, economic, and environmental issues as it makes the difficult transition to a consumer capitalist culture. Still, without denying the truth of many journalistic reports—or the fact that they bear upon important problems—their tenor *is* nonetheless striking. Replete with the lingering presence of ancient stereotypes, they are often marked by a patronizing tone and an ethnographic bias that, ignoring Chinese history and values, applies American criteria to China.²³ Their obvious determination to cast Chinese realities in the worst possible light frequently seems to defy common sense. Can we really believe, as *New York Times* reporter Mark Landler implies in a front-page feature, “Chinese Savings Helped Inflate American Bubble,” published on December 26, 2008, that China deliberately fueled American profligacy by lending the United States money at low rates? Why, too, with so many terrible and repressive regimes around the world (some of which are U.S. allies)—to say nothing of the United States’ own lamentable record on human rights in recent years—does the newspaper feel called upon, at every possible moment, to remind us of the authoritarian and repressive nature of China’s rulers past and present? Indeed, why are the problems of other emerging nations—the example of India immediately comes to mind—treated in a far more benign way than those confronting China?²⁴ In short, why is China seen not as a country like any other—one with its own failings, virtues, and problems—but as a “paradise” or (as is far more often the case) a “hell”? In short, why, as Gore Vidal once wrote, is “the yellow peril [such] a permanent part of the American psyche?”²⁵

Clearly, the specter of the yellow peril has waxed and waned in relation to American fears of China. Such fears of China may be particularly intense at the present time, but, as Robert McClellan reminds us, even in the nineteenth

century, the Chinese—as non-Christians—were perceived as a “different kind of people whose very nature was threatening to Western civilization.” Moreover, as he points out, the obvious greatness of Chinese civilization seemed to challenge the belief in “American uniqueness”—a belief that justified America’s expansion westward and across the Pacific. Americans, he writes, “seemed unable to face the possibility of China’s being a great civilization and a possible power in the Far East, because it would require a reevaluation of basic values.”²⁶ And the challenge China posed to American “superiority” in the nineteenth century paled, of course, alongside that which occurred a century later: that is, China’s embrace of Communism in 1949 seemed to threaten the universality of U.S. values as well as America’s exceptional role as a nation. In this sense, China’s choice of Communism seemed, to borrow a phrase from historian Henry Steele Commager, nothing short of “treasonous.” Noting that Americans “must be first in everything,” Commager goes on to say that “their system must not only be the best in the world, but must be acknowledged to be the best; preference for another system is regarded as a kind of treason. . . . It is American standards that must be accepted as the norm everywhere.”²⁷

The fury evoked by China’s “treason” had still another dimension—one rooted in the nineteenth century rather than in the politics of the cold war. That is, Mao’s victory was not merely a rejection of America’s deeply rooted belief in its own “system.” It was also the last act, the convulsive end, of a towering historical phenomenon that had done more to shape American perceptions of China than any other single factor. I am referring, of course, to the missionary enterprise. Again and again, commentators have underscored the role played by nineteenth-century Protestant missionaries—usually from America’s heartland—in creating the United States’ first, crucial, images of China. The letters and reports missionaries sent back from the field, as well as the accounts of China they gave to church audiences while on furlough, writes Paul A. Varg, “did more to give form to the American image of China than all the other factors combined.”²⁸ Similarly emphasizing the tremendous legacy of the missionary enterprise, in a vivid passage Harold Isaacs writes that the men and women who went to China as missionaries “placed a permanent and decisive impress on the emotional underpinning of American thinking about China. The scratches they left on American minds over the generations, through the nineteenth-century and into our own time, are often the most powerfully influential of all. More than any other single thing, the American missionary effort in China is responsible for the unique place China occupies in the American cosmos, for the special claim it has on the American conscience.”²⁹

The “scratches” etched by missionaries were fundamental in two critical, deeply interrelated ways. First, they created an image of radical Chinese

“otherness”—an image based principally on the fact that the Chinese were regarded as “heathens.” (Indeed, it was precisely because of its huge population of heathens that China was regarded not only as the “the key to world-wide salvation” but also as “Satan’s chief fortress.”³⁰) Perceived as an inferior people who “lacked the light of God,”³¹ the Chinese were considered, as nineteenth-century writer Bret Harte wrote in a famous couplet of “Plain Language from Truthful James,” pitiful and deceitful. “For ways that are dark / And for tricks that are vain,” wrote Harte, “The Heathen Chinee is peculiar.”³² In utter contrast to the “the heathen Chinee,” the missionaries—as still another well-known poem had it—were “heavenly troops” assigned a divine mission. The men and women who went to China were nothing less, enthused poet Vachel Lindsay, than

An endless line of splendor,
 These troops with heaven for home . . .
 These, in the name of Jesus,
 Against the dark gods stand,
 They gird the earth with valor,
 They heed their King’s command.³³

The martial tone of Lindsay’s poem opens upon still another critical dimension of the missionary enterprise. For if the missionaries went to China in search of souls, they also played an important and multifaceted role in the imperial project itself—that is, America’s march westward and then across the Pacific and into China. For one thing, the presence of American missionaries in China justified the use of military force; that is, they had to be protected by American gunboats. For another, their mission both fueled and embodied the sense of “benevolence” and “mission” that served to legitimize the imperial project itself. As Lian Xi writes, “America’s incorporation of all adjacent lands was virtually the inevitable fulfillment of a moral mission delegated to the nation by Providence itself.”³⁴ Lastly, their involvement in the imperial project meant that their charge—or what William Hutchison deems their “errand”—was double: both “Christian soldiers” and “couriers” for the nation, America’s missionaries were to spread the Gospel even as they helped create a new society modeled on the values and the religion of the country they had left behind.³⁵ As one missionary declared, “Wherever on pagan shores the voice of the American missionary and teacher is heard, there is fulfilled the manifest destiny of the Christian Republic.”³⁶ This sentiment was echoed, by one president after another, from the bully pulpit of the White House. “Christianity,” declared President William Howard Taft, “and the spread of Christianity are the only basis for the hope of modern civilization.”³⁷

It is against this background—amid what James Thomson calls the “tides of missionary and manifest destiny”³⁸—that one sees the full impact and lasting resonance of the missionary advance into nineteenth-century China. It is not only that missionaries created the crucial first images of China and its people. It is also that the missionary enterprise interacted with Americans’ history and self-image in a profound way. For, as Harold Isaacs writes in a particularly dramatic and important passage, the missionaries’ dream of saving “400 million souls from damnation” inspired a larger national dream—that is, it inspired “the role of benevolent guardian in which the American saw himself in relation to the Chinese and which is so heavily stamped on the American view of all this history.”³⁹ For more than a century this role enhanced the American ego—“we felt ourselves,” writes Fairbank, “on the giving end and enjoyed the feeling”⁴⁰—even as it heightened the conviction that, in China, America had been chosen to play a special role. That is, America had been assigned nothing less than what Lian Xi describes as “a disproportionately large role in God’s saving plan for humankind.”⁴¹

Given the psychological dimension of this “disproportionately large role,” it is hardly surprising that when it came to an end, in 1949, the results were dramatic. As the recipient of American benevolence for as long as people could remember, China had enhanced Americans’ self-image and offered proof of America’s exceptional nature and special destiny. Now, in rejecting a long tradition of evangelical effort and paternalistic benevolence, China not only dealt what Fairbank calls a “grievous blow” to Americans’ self-confidence⁴² but also challenged the American belief in the superiority and universality of American values. Noting that the repercussions of this “blow” would reach far into the future, Shirley Stone Garrett does not exaggerate when she writes that

with the Communist takeover hope gave way to frustration, friendship to bitterness, and the collapse of the missionary era left a deep sense of betrayal. . . . China’s repudiation of the missionary gift worked like a disease in the consciousness of many Americans, infecting the relationship between the two countries more than has yet been assessed. The connection is too subtle to be traced precisely, but is nevertheless worth close attention, for it may indicate why the American passion for China turned to rage, and why for twenty years America blotted the Chinese state from its map of the world.⁴³

As Garrett suggests, once this “disease” took hold, China morphed from its role as the principal theater of U.S. benevolence into that of America’s worst enemy. As it did so, ancient images roared back in ways that, as I hope to show, continue to reverberate into the present day.

Dueling Images

Nowhere do the impulses I have just described—the centrality of the missionary enterprise, the perceived otherness of the Chinese, the ebb and flow of fears—come to life more vividly, more nakedly, than in cinema. In some sense, of course, films echo information that can be gleaned from more orthodox historical documents. Like historical documents, films mirror the dramatic shifts of the pendulum, the opposing constellations of images, that have marked the United States' relationship to China. But films also allow us to glimpse beliefs and emotions—often welling up from a kind of collective unconscious—that may resist clear articulation. At the same time, by giving concrete form to relatively abstract ideas or concepts, films suggest not only the presence but also the intensity of certain desires and fears. For example, it is one thing to speak about America's belief in its benevolence. It is another to glimpse the almost desperate quality of that belief in one cold war film after another. Even the improbabilities and erasures, the contradictions and tensions, of films are telling. It is significant, surely, that films as otherwise diverse as *Broken Blossoms* (D. W. Griffith, 1919) and *The Sand Pebbles* (Robert Wise, 1966) bear witness to similar tension—that is, although both consciously espouse the values of tolerance and humanism, they are permeated by currents of deep, undoubtedly unconscious, racism.

Paying close attention to telling inconsistencies and tensions such as these, this study follows the arc of history as it traces how films both reflected and fueled the swings taken by the pendulum governing images of China for nearly a century. On rare occasions, these swings take place within a single film: in *Mr. Wu* (William Nigh, 1927), the Chinese protagonist morphs from a cultivated mandarin into an obsessed murderer before our eyes. More often, though, we are at one end of the pendulum or the other. When the pendulum is at its most positive, we see images of self-sacrificing Buddhist scholars (*Broken Blossoms*), hardworking laundrymen (*Shadows*; Tom Forman, 1922), noble peasants (*The Good Earth*; Sidney Franklin, 1937), and courageous allies (*Thirty Seconds over Tokyo*; Mervyn LeRoy, 1944). When, instead, the pendulum swings to its negative pole, these images are replaced by those of devious torturers like Fu Manchu, evil warlords and perverse half-castes (*Shanghai Express*; Josef von Sternberg, 1932), scheming Chinese dragon ladies (*The Shanghai Gesture*; Josef von Sternberg, 1941), and treacherous “allies” (*The Mountain Road*; Daniel Mann, 1960). But whether films depict the Chinese as good or evil, they rarely acknowledge the complex dimension of otherness—that is, the ways the Chinese are, in fact, both like and unlike ourselves. Instead, almost invariably, difference is either fear—or erased.

It is true that, over the course of time, certain images—and the attitudes they embody—have faded or receded into the past so deeply that they leave few traces behind. Religion and sexuality—issues at the center of early films such as *Broken Blossoms* and *The Bitter Tea of General Yen* (Frank Capra, 1933)—are no longer used as markers of Chinese otherness. If the use of yellowface has disappeared, so, too, has the swirl of fascination and fear that surrounded the Chinese other in, say, *Shanghai Express* and *The Shanghai Gesture*. While *Kundun* (Martin Scorsese, 1997) resembles cold war films in that its portrayal of China harks back to images of Genghis Khan and his marauding hordes, it contains no Chinese villains like Fu Manchu or his later incarnation, the ruthless brainwashing expert at the center of *The Manchurian Candidate* (John Frankenheimer, 1962). In recent decades, as I suggest in Chapter 6, changes have been even more dramatic. Faced with competing images coming both from Chinese films and from Chinese American films, as well as the demands of a globalized film industry, films deliberately avoid the stereotypes of an earlier era even as they suggest the stilling of the pendulum.

And yet, despite these changes, one fundamental impulse—at the root, perhaps, of all the others—has remained constant. That is, from first to last, cinematic portrayals of China and the Chinese inevitably raise the division between the self and the other. In this sense, they confirm Gary Y. Okihiro's argument that we still live in a world permeated by rigid dichotomies, or what he calls binaries." Suggesting that the "attributions of 'West' and 'East'" constitute the "principal geographical binary in American history," Okihiro underscores the long-lived nature of these binaries. Comparing them to often detested but indomitable insects like cockroaches, he observes that binaries "survive, may thrive, in environments old and new, diminutive and prodigious, noxious and wholesome. They scurry about, those binaries, despite ice ages, urban pollution, and exterminators. . . . They seem to persist, over decades, over centuries."⁴⁴

There is no question but that these "binaries" haunt films about China: every aspect of these works—characters, emotions, actions, visual style—feeds into and reflects the fundamental divide between East and West, between the (American) self and the (Chinese) other. When, for example, the pendulum is at its positive end, the Chinese characters seen on-screen bear a distinct resemblance to the self—at least to our better self. The virtuous scholar of *Broken Blossoms* and the stoic laundryman of *Shadows* could hardly be more Christian; the noble peasants of *The Good Earth* would not be out of place on a midwestern farm; the courageous Chinese soldiers in *Thirty Seconds over Tokyo* are, we are told, just "like our boys." When, instead, negative images dominate, a towering chasm separates the self from the other: there is absolutely no resemblance between the bloodthirsty Boxers of *55 Days at Peking* (Nicholas Ray, 1963) and their Western opponents; no

understanding or dialogue is possible between the American businessman of *Red Corner* (Jon Avnet, 1997) and the Chinese officials who frame him for a murder he did not commit.

At times, this fundamental divide, or binary division, seems to recede or even disappear. This is especially true in the case of films that paint a rosy picture of China. Take, for example, a 1934 film directed by Sam Taylor with comedian Harold Lloyd—*The Cat's-Paw*. Not only does this film mock Chinese stereotypes but also it seems to bridge the gap between the self and the other by creating a protagonist who, though American, was inculcated with Chinese virtues during his missionary upbringing in China. But the disappearance of this divide is ultimately more apparent than real; that is, as I make clear in Chapter 2, the film actually erases the other by turning China into a nostalgic version of an earlier America. This erasure becomes even more sweeping in the animated features discussed in Chapter 6, *Mulan* (Tony Bancroft and Barry Cook, 1998) and *Kung Fu Panda* (John Wayne Stevenson and Mark Osborne, 2008). Both films create a mythic, one-dimensional China in which everyone thinks and behaves like Americans. Far from destroying binary divisions, then, all these works create a world in which the self has engulfed the other.

In the end, of course, the divide between the self and the other reflects and fuels, at the individual level, the distinction between two countries, the United States and China. Speaking of still another divide—that between East and West—in his now classic book, *Orientalism*, Edward W. Said makes the following observation: “The Orient,” he writes, “is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also . . . its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.”⁴⁵ It seems to me that, framed somewhat differently, a similar observation can be made about China and America. That is, just as “the Orient has helped to define Europe,” I would argue that, more than any other country, China has helped define America. China has served not only as America’s absolute “Other” but also as America’s “contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.” Films about China illustrate this phenomenon in a particularly dramatic way. In other words, as I argue throughout these pages, films about China are, inevitably, films about America itself. Informed both by the crucial dialectic between the self and the other, and by unacknowledged or even unconscious desires and fears, they are often revealing mirrors—what one critic has called Rorschach tests—of our deepest selves.

One of the most obvious examples of this phenomenon stems from the ways early films in particular portray Chinese sexuality. For, like all binary divisions, those bearing on sexual difference bring us back to the self. Perceptions of the sexual other speak of our own sexual longings and fears. Thus the taboo forbid-

ding miscegenation, or “love between the races”—a taboo at the heart of many early melodramas—reveals not only the heavy weight of Puritanism but also the suffocating legacy of America’s own unhappy racial history. That is, behind the anxiety produced by the possible Chinese lover—or would-be lover—lurked sexual fears bearing on relations between black men and white women. Foregrounding this taboo, the films explored in Chapters 2 and 3 approach it in ways that say much about American views of sexuality. In *Broken Blossoms*, for example, this taboo merges with a Victorian perception of the dangers inherent in all sexuality; in *Shanghai Express* and *The Shanghai Gesture*, instead, the taboo fuels an obsession with the darkest, most death-infused corners of desire. Only *The Bitter Tea of General Yen* dares to challenge this taboo—to probe how racial prejudice seeps into and corrupts love itself.

If sexuality is the most striking aspect of the mirror that films such as these hold up to America, it is by no means the only one. In fact, works as otherwise diverse as *Broken Blossoms*, *Shadows*, *The Bitter Tea of General Yen*, and *The Cat’s-Paw* all draw a comparison—implicit or explicit—between China and America. Indeed, they create an idealized vision of China—as a spiritual civilization given to nonviolence and harmony—from which to cast a jaundiced eye on the failings of the West. So, too, is *The Good Earth* marked by an idealized China, but here, explicit comparisons are replaced by a tendency to project American realities and mythologies onto a Chinese landscape. Not surprisingly, comparisons such as these—whether implicit or explicit—vanished after 1949. At that time, it became impossible to compare two civilizations that were so radically, unalterably opposed to each other.

But even as such comparisons disappeared, as I suggest in Chapter 4, films about China continued to say a great deal about America. In fact, in many ways, the often murky reflection of America seen in films made after 1949 is more intriguing than the more transparent gaze of earlier works. They offer a kind of distorting mirror marked by omissions and denials, by repetitions as revealing as they are strident. Darkened by the paranoia of the era, some films expressed the anguish of the present—the doubts and anxieties that began to assail the nation as we went from the war in Korea to the war in Vietnam. Thus, for example, behind the fears surrounding China in both *The Manchurian Candidate* and *The Sand Pebbles*, one senses still deeper fears—those bearing on the collapse of American political institutions (*The Manchurian Candidate*) and on the failure of its imperial mission (*The Sand Pebbles*).

While these films expressed contemporary anxieties, still other cold war films seemed to take refuge in an idealized past. But they, too, said much about the mood of the country. It is telling, for example, that at the very moment when China’s “betrayal” challenged Americans’ self-image and sense of mission, one

film after another took care to remind viewers of the good faith, the benevolence, that had marked American conduct there in the past. The memory of a time when benevolence was generously given and gratefully received was so important that it permeated even action films and melodramas. It was not only self-sacrificing missionaries—like Ingrid Bergman in *The Inn of the Sixth Happiness* (Mark Robson, 1958)—who stood ready to come to the aid of the Chinese people but also, and far more improbably, rough-and-tumble heroes like John Wayne in *Blood Alley* (William Wellman, 1955) and Charlton Heston in *55 Days at Peking*. In these films—and even more dramatically in *Kundun*—binaries have expanded to the point where they suffuse, and divide, the entire world.

Even when films about China turned their back on history—and, indeed, on the real world itself—they continued to reflect telling images of America. At least this is the case, I think, of the two animated features—*Mulan* and *Kung Fu Panda*—discussed in Chapter 6. Set in a mythical China, both films pull us into a post-modernist world of pastiche and parody marked by many of the strategies seen in children's cartoons. Here, distinctions—between the real and the unreal, history and myth, animals and humans—dissolve amid frenzied swirls of slapstick and farce. But if the fantasy realm they create is deliberately unreal, it also testifies to impulses that could hardly be more real: that is, they reflect the ultimate triumph of the self as well as the centrifugal force of American popular culture that pulls everything into its orbit. In *Mulan*, a legendary Chinese heroine is transformed into an American teenager; in *Kung Fu Panda*, the age-old Chinese tradition of the martial arts is emptied of weight and meaning. In both films, China itself is reduced to a heap of motifs in which the Forbidden Palace and the Great Wall have no more meaning—and probably less—than egg rolls and chopsticks. Projecting American values onto a Chinese landscape, not only do these films absorb the other but also, as if they had a magic wand, they make the real China vanish before our eyes.

To a large extent, the focus of this study—the changing perceptions of China and what they say about America—has determined the choice of films explored. That is, insofar as possible, I have chosen images that bear on China and its people rather than on Chinese immigrants to America's shores or on Chinese Americans. True, it is often very difficult to make this distinction: not only do the two sets of images tend to blur into one another but also they have had a profound impact on one another. As Harold Isaacs notes, “The experience with Chinese in the United States is second only to the missionary experience as a source of some of the principal images and emotions about the Chinese to be found in contemporary American minds.”⁴⁶ The corollary to this is also true; that is, America's changing relationship to China has deeply affected perceptions of both Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans. It is telling that during periods of great

anti-Chinese sentiment, Chinese Americans have become targets of persecution. For example, as Lynn Pan observes, after 1949 “federal agents swooped the Chinatowns repeatedly, to sniff out ‘un-American’ activities.”⁴⁷ Similar instances of persecution were also visible during the tense decade of the 1990s: the most notorious of these occurred when, in charges later proved baseless, Chinese American scientist Wen Ho Lee was accused of spying for the Chinese.⁴⁸

It is no surprise, then, that films, like Americans at large, have frequently blurred similar distinctions. Take, for example, the case of two of the most enduring Chinese stereotypes: the sinister Fu Manchu and immensely sympathetic San Francisco detective Charlie Chan. The two figures clearly represent a study in opposites: in fact, Richard Bernstein reminds us that in creating the figure of Charlie Chan, novelist Earl Derr Biggers “wanted to counter the demeaning portrayals of Asians that were standard at the time, particularly the evil Fu Manchu, the most recognizable Chinese character in Western books and movies before Chan came along.”⁴⁹ Lynn Pan tells us that the producers of the original Charlie Chan films at Fox Studios nourished a similar hope: they wanted their portrait of an amiable, Confucius-spouting detective to “counter the characterizations of Chinese as Fu Manchus.”⁵⁰

Times change. And one of the ironies of changing mores is that today, Charlie Chan—with his inexhaustible fund of Chinese proverbs and his inscrutable “Eastern” wisdom—is often perceived as no less a detestable racist stereotype than Fu Manchu. In fact, as historian Jill Lepore observes, Charlie Chan is “one of the most hated characters in American popular culture—a kind of yellow Uncle Tom.”⁵¹ As for Fu Manchu, while he has hardly become more sympathetic, he, too, has changed. That is, the resurgence of fears of a powerful China has meant that he has taken on new interest. In fact, when Yungte Huang, the author of *Charlie Chan: The Untold Story of the Honorable Detective and His Rendezvous with American History*, suggested the possibility of translating his book into Mandarin, he was told politely by one Chinese publisher, “Right now, we’re actually more interested in Fu Manchu.”⁵² Whatever the changing resonance of these two archetypal figures, the fact remains that when they first came to prominence, the geographical and national divide separating them was lost on viewers and critics alike. Although Fu Manchu plotted revenge on America from the plains of Central Asia while Charlie Chan won sympathizers and fans on the streets of San Francisco, viewers saw both men in exactly the same way, that is, as “Chinese.”⁵³

For many years, scholars and critics alike seemed more interested in Charlie Chan—and what he represented in terms of Chinese American stereotypes—than in Fu Manchu. This may be because many Chinese American critics, as well as filmmakers, were touched by such stereotypes in a deep, existential way. In any case, while recent decades have seen the publication of numerous books and

articles devoted to the representation of Chinese Americans in the media,⁵⁴ the situation is quite different when it comes to books dealing with screen representations of China. In fact, for many years, the only work principally devoted to this topic was one written more than a half century ago: Dorothy B. Jones' *The Portrayal of China and India on the American Screen, 1896–1955* (1955). This began to change in the 1990s as scholars began to look at screen representations of China from a variety of perspectives. For example, both Gina Marchetti's *Romance and the "Yellow Peril": Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction* (1993) and Mari Yoshihara's *Embracing the East: White Women and American Orientalism* (2003) view such representations through the prism of romance and sex, while Homay King's *Lost in Translation: Orientalism, Cinema, and the Enigmatic Signifier* (2010) brings a psychoanalytic lens to the visual tropes that signify Orientalism. Still other critical works have begun to examine how China is represented not only in American films but also in those coming from mainland China as well as from various communities of the Chinese diaspora. I am thinking here of studies such as *Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nationhood, Gender* (a 1997 collection of essays edited by Sheldon H. Lu), Gary G. Xu's *Sinascapes: Contemporary Chinese Cinema* (2007), and Kenneth Chan's *Made in Hollywood: The Global Chinese Presence in Transnational Cinemas* (2009).

Although many of these works touch on issues and films explored in these pages, none explores the historical arc of American film representations of China from the point of view of the tensions between the self and the other or, broader still, those between America and China. The films I have chosen to explore in terms of these tensions clearly constitute but a limited sample of those that portray China and its people in one way or another. But arguably, they are among the most revealing and compelling. Marked by ambiguities, they suggest some of the complex and often conflicting emotions and perceptions that characterize American beliefs about China. I am not sure that we can ever give an adequate answer to the rhetorical question posed by Fairbank decades ago: "How," he asked in 1974, "could the Chinese be such 'bad guys' in the America of the 1950's and 1960's and such 'good guys' today?"⁵⁵ But films remind us of how easy it was to move from perceptions of the Chinese as "our kind of people" to a worldview in which China was seen as the embodiment of betrayal and deceit. Films may not tell the whole story, but they make it easier to understand how the "good guys" of yesterday became the villains of today. If, as it is said, the past is another country, then as seen in these films, this "country" speaks all too eloquently about the present.

Afterword

The Darkening Mirror

The triumph of the American cultural narrative seen in films like *Mulan* and *Kung Fu Panda* is, of course, a global or quasi-global phenomenon. China's culture is by no means the only one in the landscape of contemporary film that has been hollowed out, reduced to "banality" (to use Todd Gitlin's term). Yet its virtual erasure in these works inevitably has a political resonance. For in the end, of course, China *is* different. Long granted a special place in the American imagination, it is now shrouded in fear and perceived as America's most formidable rival. What better way, after all, to rid America of this rival than to turn it into a site of pure spectacle? And what better way to tame the awakening dragon than to replace it with a cuddly panda or a diminutive creature like the pint-size Mushu of *Mulan*?

In this sense, I think, it is not difficult to discern the contemporary political relevance of films like *Kung Fu Panda* and *Mulan*. But the case is somewhat different when it comes to earlier works. There, practices and stereotypes that so clearly belong to the past—the use of yellowface, the force of sexual taboos, the presence of dragon ladies and brutal warlords—risk obscuring more fundamental impulses. Yet, as I argue throughout these pages, if figures like Fu Manchu and Charlie Chan have been banished from America's screens, the schizophrenic images of China they embody are still alive and well. Again and again, one feels the continuing weight of the attitudes and beliefs that underlie even the earliest films about China. Contemporary battles over abortion and the teaching of evolution suggest the persistence of the desire for a Christian America reflected in works like *Broken Blossoms* and *Shadows*. So, too, do current suspicions of Muslims take us back to the fear of heathens displayed by the young American missionary in *The Bitter Tea of General Yen*. The suspicion and fear of otherness that run throughout these films—and that fuel a desire to transform the other into the self or to banish the other from America's midst—have prompted harsh immigration laws and eruptions of populist nativism. Foreigners and immigrants are blamed for the fact that, as Ronald Dworkin suggests in an essay on

the success of the Tea Party, America is no longer the “most envied and wonderful country in the world.”¹

Suspicion of others—be they Hispanic, black, Muslim, or Chinese—both feeds into and is fueled by the outburst of the paranoid style that took shape in the wake of the attack of 9/11. Even before that watershed event, as historian Tony Judt once observed, Washington tended to view the world as “a series of discrete challenges or threats, calibrated according to their implications for America.”² But the tragedy that took place on that fatal day prompted an outburst of paranoia as ferocious and intense as that which swept over the nation in the early 1950s. Dissent was stifled, privacy concerns swept aside, civil liberties suspended, torture condoned. To read Hofstadter’s essay about the paranoid style, declared *New York Times* columnist Paul Krugman five years after 9/11, “is to be struck by the extent to which he seems to be describing the state of mind not of the lunatic fringe, but of key figures in our political and media establishment.”³ Striking a still bleaker note, Mark Danner suggests that the decades-long cold war that began in the 1950s has morphed, before our eyes, into today’s War on Terror. “The politics of fear,” he writes, “have been embodied in the country’s permanent policies, without comment or objection by its citizenry. The politics of fear have won.”⁴

In the climate of fear Krugman and Danner describe, the impulses at the heart of cold war films—the confusions that mark the films of Samuel Fuller, the paranoid cast of *The Manchurian Candidate*, the insistence on American benevolence seen in *55 Days at Peking*, the ambivalences toward empire that run throughout *The Sand Pebbles*—have assumed a new resonance. Once again, paranoia seems to have engendered surreal confusions: attacked from one country, the United States invades still another. Once again—reflecting the apocalyptic worldview seen in a film like *Kundun*—the world seems to have split in two: in the words of the first President Bush, other nations are either “with us” or “against us.” Even as fears grow, what Reinhold Niebuhr calls the United States’ “messianic consciousness”—Americans’ conviction that the United States has been elected to bring “freedom” and “democracy” to the other countries of the world—assumes new fervor.⁵ Convinced of their nation’s mission, Americans continue to cling to the moral high ground, to maintain the illusion that the United States has no imperial designs, even while engaged in one of the greatest imperial ventures in history. The wars the United States wages are seen not as imperial ventures but as wars of liberation. In short, Americans want to arrive as conquerors and be welcomed as benefactors.

In the ranks of the nations who are “against” the United States, China seems—as at the time of the cold war—to have been assigned a leading role. The Middle Kingdom may no longer be seen as the land of Genghis Khan or Fu

Manchu, but the fears sparked by its growing economic might—fears that became particularly intense in the wake of the economic meltdown of 2008—mean that the specter of these earlier villains is still alive and well. A report published in July 2013 concerned a poll that indicated that American attitudes toward China—as well as Chinese attitudes toward America—had soured even more in the last two years. Americans seem to resent China’s growing self-confidence on the world stage, Chinese companies’ acquisition of American brands, and even the wealth often displayed by Chinese visitors to America’s shores. “In the United States,” writes reporter Jane Perlez, “Chinese personal wealth has been on conspicuous display, generating bitterness.”⁶ In some cases, this bitterness leads to incendiary rhetoric. For example, a 2012 film by Peter Navarro, which argues that the admission of China to the World Trade Organization has harmed American interests, bears the inflammatory title *Death by China*.

Negative feelings about China inevitably shadow the American political landscape. Americans have become accustomed to politicians who campaign on the strength of their toughness toward China. “With many Americans seized by anxiety about the country’s economic decline,” observed David W. Chen in October 2010, “candidates from both political parties have suddenly found a new villain to run against: China. . . . The ads are striking not only in their volume but also in their pointed language.”⁷ Most telling of all, perhaps, is a political ad directed against President Barack Obama that has run in two presidential elections. It depicts a large auditorium where people are listening to a lecture delivered in Mandarin. Translated for the viewer by subtitles, the speaker’s words carry a chilling message for America. Insisting that “empires destroy themselves through spending,” the speaker tells his audience that China owns America’s debt. This means, he concludes, that “now we own them [i.e., the Americans].” If the origins of the ad remain murky, its meaning is crystal clear: “bought” by Chinese wiles, profligate America will have to recognize its new master.

The distance between the Chinese lecturer in the ad and Fu Manchu is both great—and not great at all. On the surface, of course, the speaker hardly resembles the sinister doctor. He has neither Fu Manchu’s mustache nor his clawlike fingers; nor does he share Fu Manchu’s knowledge of mysterious brews or his talent for torture. But the point is this: he and his fellow technocrats and bureaucrats do not need these qualities to succeed in their quest. By buying American debt, and manipulating currencies and markets, they can manage to “own” America. In this sense, if, in the words of Sax Rohmer, Fu Manchu embodies the “Yellow Peril incarnate in one man,” these anonymous-seeming bureaucrats are the latter-day incarnation, the new face, of the yellow peril specter.

Infused with this specter, this ad also bears witness to what Harold Isaacs, in remarks made well over half a century ago, called the “apocalyptic” view of China

that often prevailed in the West. “Lack of contact,” he wrote, “plus images of undifferentiated vastness plus Fear equal An apocalyptic view.”⁸ As the films explored here make clear, it is precisely this view that held sway for much of the last century. From the torture chambers of Fu Manchu to the diabolical brainwasher of *The Manchurian Candidate* and the terrifying ghosts of *Kundun*, China evoked fears of an overwhelming clash of civilizations. But films also remind us of moments, however brief, when the pendulum shifted—a time when the China was seen as the land of noble Confucian scholars, of virtuous peasants, and even of fighting men who were just like “our boys.” It is probably safe to say that these particular positive images—infused with stereotypes of their own—will not reappear. Nor would we want them to. But is it too much to hope that one day China will be seen without the distortions imposed both by the weight of ancient images and by America’s own fears and apprehensions? Or that some day, as Richard Madsen urges, China’s leaders and America’s will “develop new ‘master narratives for a new world, new visions allowing a new politics to show its postmodern face’?”⁹ In short, that one day China will be seen as a country like any other?

Notes

Chapter 1: The Pendulum Swings . . . and Swings Again

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3. David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korea War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 188.
4. Henry Steele Commager, foreword to *Americans and Chinese: Passage to Differences*, by Francis L. K. Hsu (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1981), xii.
5. See Keith Bradsher, "China Drawing High-Tech Research from U.S.," *New York Times*, March 18, 2010, sec. A; Keith Bradsher, "As China Builds a Vast Network of Fast Trains, the U.S. Falls Further Behind," *New York Times*, February 13, 2010, sec. A; Jane Perlez, "China Races to Replace U.S. as Economic Power in Asia," *New York Times*, June 28, 2002, sec. A.
6. William Grimes, "Car Clones and Other Tales of the Mighty Economic Engine Known as China," *New York Times*, February 15, 2005, sec. B.
7. Tony Judt, "Its Own Worst Enemy," *New York Review of Books*, August 15, 2002, 12.
8. John K. Fairbank, *China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations* (New York: Knopf, 1974), xvi.
9. Harold Robert Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India* (New York: John Day, 1958), 66.
10. *Ibid.*, 104–106.
11. *Ibid.*, 63.
12. David B. Chan, "The China Syndrome: Some Thoughts and Impressions after a 1979 Trip," in *America Views China: American Images of China Then and Now*, ed. J. Goldstein, J. Israel, and H. Conroy (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1991), 184.
13. Jasper Becker, *The Chinese* (New York: Free Press, 2000), 3–4.
14. Harry Harding, "From China, with Disdain: New Trends in the Study of China," in Goldstein, Israel, and Conroy, *America Views China*, 244.

15. Richard Madsen, *China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 28.
16. Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 4th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), i.
17. On the close relationship between American foreign policy and the *New York Times*' reporting about China, see Wenjie Yan, "A Structural Analysis of the Changing Image of China in the *New York Times* from 1949 through 1988," *Quality and Quantity* 32 (1998): 47–62. On the broader issue of biased reporting, see Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon, 1988).
18. Craig S. Smith, "Doctor Says He Took Transplant Organs from Executed Chinese Prisoners," *New York Times*, June 29, 2001, sec. A.
19. Elizabeth Rosenthal, "Herbs? Bull Thymus? Beijing Leaps at Anti-SARS Potions," *New York Times*, May 10, 2003, sec. A.
20. Jim Yardley, "Chinese Diners Shrug Off SARS: Bring on the Civet Cat," *New York Times*, December 29, 2003, sec. A; Jim Yardley, "The SARS Scare in China: Slaughter of the Animals," *New York Times*, January 7, 2004, sec. A.
21. See, for example, Jake Hooker, "Before Guests, Beijing Hides Some Messes," *New York Times*, July 29, 2008, sec. A; Andrew Jacobs, "Specter of Arrest Deters Demonstrators in China," *New York Times*, August 14, 2008, sec. A; Andrew Jacobs, "A Would-Be Demonstrator Is Detained in China After Seeking a Protest Permit," *New York Times*, August 19, 2008, sec. A; Andrew Jacobs, "No Voice Is Too Small for a China Still Nervous About Dissent," *New York Times*, August 30, 2008, sec. A.
22. Jim Yardley, "In Beijing's Grand Olympic Show, Politburo Initiated Sleight of Voice," *New York Times*, August 13, 2008, sec. A.
23. On the difference between America and China in regard to two key areas of experience—the law and the relationship between the individual and the social whole—see John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China*, 4th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 123.
24. From the coverage of the *New York Times*, we would be hard put to learn, as Nicholas D. Kristof points out in an article in the *New York Review of Books*, that in crucial respects China has been far more successful than India. See Nicholas D. Kristof, "A Little Leap Forward," *New York Review of Books*, June 24, 2004, 56.
25. Gore Vidal, *Screening History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 42.
26. Robert McClellan, *The Heathen Chinese: A Study of American Attitudes Toward China, 1890–1905* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), 105–106.
27. Commager, foreword to Hsu, *Americans and Chinese*, xvii.
28. Paul A. Varg, *The Closing of the Door: Sino-American Relations, 1936–1946* (Ann Arbor: Michigan State University Press, 1973), 3. For a discussion of the influence of the missionary sensibility on American foreign policy, see James Reed, *The Missionary Mind and American East Asian Policy, 1911–1915* (New York: John Day, 1958).
29. Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds*, 67–68.

30. Stuart Creighton Miller, “Ends and Means: Missionary Justification of Force in Nineteenth-Century China,” in *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 273.

31. Raymond Dawson, *The Chinese Chameleon* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 134. Jane Hunter makes the point that women missionaries, in particular, saw China as a land “mired in the timeless dirt, death, and degradation of the ages.” See Jane Hunter, *The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 1.

32. Bret Harte, *The Complete Poetical Works of Bret Harte* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1886), 131.

33. Cited in Paul Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Missionary Movement in China, 1890–1952* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 2.

34. Lian Xi, *The Conversion of Missionaries: Liberalism in American Protestant Missions in China, 1907–1932* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 3.

35. William Hutchison, *Errand to the World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 7. For a discussion of how the notion of manifest destiny was used to legitimize the “myth” of empire, see Thomas Hietala, *Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 225.

36. Cited by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in “The Missionary Enterprise and Theories of Imperialism,” in Fairbank, *Missionary Enterprise*, 356.

37. Cited in Hunter, *Gospel of Gentility*, 8–9.

38. James Thomson, *While China Faced West: American Reformers in Nationalist China, 1928–1937* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), xii.

39. Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds*, 127, 125.

40. Fairbank, *United States and China*, 309.

41. Lian, *Conversion of Missionaries*, 7.

42. “Insofar as the missionary conversion had expressed our conviction that we led the march of human progress,” writes Fairbank, “our self-confidence was dealt a grievous blow. . . . If the Chinese people willingly chose communism, it could be concluded that a majority of mankind was not going our way.” Fairbank, *United States and China*, 455.

43. Shirley Stone Garrett, “Why They Stayed,” in Fairbank, *Missionary Enterprise*, 309–310.

44. Gary Y. Okihiro, *Common Ground: Reimagining American History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), xii, xvi, 120.

45. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979), 1–2.

46. Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds*, 68.

47. Lynn Pan, *Sons of the Yellow Emperor: A History of the Chinese Diaspora* (New York: Kodansha International, 1990), 220.

48. In light of what appeared to be the anti-China bias of the *New York Times*, it is interesting that that paper led the charge against Lee. In an article devoted to the

“case” against Lee, Lars-Erik Nelson writes that, in terms of these unproven accusations, “no newspaper has been more credulous than *The New York Times*.” Lars-Erik Nelson, “Washington: The Yellow Peril,” *New York Review of Books*, July 15, 1999, 6.

49. Richard Bernstein, “A Very Superior ‘Chinaman,’” *New York Review of Books*, October 28, 2010, 16.

50. Pan, *Sons of the Yellow Emperor*, 292.

51. Jill Lepore, “Chan, the Man,” *New Yorker*, August 9, 2010, 70. For a discussion of the continuing controversies surrounding Charlie Chan, see Pradnya Joshi, “A Charlie Chan Film Stirs an Old Controversy,” *New York Times*, August 3, 2010, sec. B.

52. Charles McGrath, “Charlie Chan: A Stereotype and a Hero,” *New York Times*, August 11, 2010, C6.

53. In terms of the connection between Fu Manchu and Charlie Chan, it is noteworthy that the same actor, Warner Oland, played both roles.

54. Such works include Jachinson Chan’s *Chinese American Masculinities: From Fu Manchu to Bruce Lee* (2001); Robert G. Lee’s *Orientalism: Asian Americans in Popular Culture* (1999); Eugene Wong Franklin’s “On Visual Media Racism: Asians in the American Motion Pictures” (1978); Jun Xing’s *Asian America Through the Lens: History, Representation, and Identity* (1998); Darrell Y. Hamamoto and Sandra Liu, eds., *Countervisions: Asian American Film Criticism* (2000); and Peter Feng, ed., *Screening Asian Americans* (2002).

55. Fairbank, *China Perceived*, xvi.

Chapter 2: East Meets West

1. “The motion picture industry,” writes Kevin Brownlow, “as a rule followed the popular line. The Chinese tended to be portrayed as friendly but idiotic laundrymen, the subtitles leplensenting their lemmarks thus, or sinister opium fiends, mastermind operations of unspeakable evil. The very word ‘wily’ seemed to have been coined for these characters.” Kevin Brownlow, *Behind the Mask of Innocence: Sex, Violence, Prejudice, Crime: Films of Social Conscience in the Silent Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 320.

2. Paul A. Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Missionary Movement in China, 1890–1952* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 79. No one expressed these hopes better than philosopher John Dewey. After witnessing one of the massive strikes that sparked the so-called May Fourth Movement, which put China on the path to becoming a modern nation, Dewey declared: “We are witnessing the birth of a nation, and birth always comes hard. . . . To think of kids in our country from fourteen on, taking the lead in starting a big cleanup reform politics movement and shaming merchants and professional men into joining them. This is some country.” Cited in Lynn Pan, *In Search of Old Shanghai* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Company, 1982), 104.

3. Lian Xi, *The Conversion of Missionaries: Liberalism in American Protestant Missions in China, 1907–1932* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 5–6.
4. Cited in Karen Janis Leong, “The China Mystique” (PhD diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1999), 130.
5. Brownlow, *Behind the Mask of Innocence*, 325.
6. Cited by Verina Glaessner in *Kung Fu: Cinema of Vengeance* (London: Lorimer, 1974), 91.
7. Alfred Kazin, introduction to *Limehouse Nights*, by Thomas Burke (New York: Horizon Press, 1973), 15–16.
8. Thomas Burke, “The Chink and the Child,” in *Limehouse Nights* (New York: Horizon Press, 1973), 26.
9. Richard Schickel, *D. W. Griffith: An American Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 390.
10. Cited by Dorothy B. Jones, *The Portrayal of China and India on the American Screen, 1896–1955* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1955), 15.
11. Schickel, *D. W. Griffith*, 389.
12. See Gary Y. Okihiro, *Common Ground: Reimagining American History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 122–124.
13. Schickel, *D. W. Griffith*, 390.
14. Julia Lesage, “Artful Racism, Artful Rape,” *Jump Cut*, no. 26 (December 1981), 54.
15. Robert G. Lee, *Orientalists: Asian Americans in Popular Culture* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), 129.
16. Sander L. Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 120.
17. Gaylyn Studlar, *In the Realm of Pleasure: Von Sternberg, Dietrich, and the Masochistic Aesthetic* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 18.
18. Gilles Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty,” in *Masochism* (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 32.
19. *Ibid.*, 34.
20. Studlar, *In the Realm of Pleasure*, 20.
21. Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty,” 33.
22. Alice Maurice, “What the Shadow Knows: Race, Image and Meaning in *Shadows*,” *Cinema Journal* 47, no. 3 (2008), 76. In an interesting interpretation of the film, Maurice begins by arguing that *Shadows* “links the Chinese subject to shadow puppetry, theatricality, and magic in order to produce the mystical, mysterious ‘Oriental.’”
23. Michael F. Blake, *Lon Chaney: The Man Behind the Thousand Faces* (Vestal, NY: Vestal Press, 1993), 88.
24. Wilbur Daniel Steele, “Ching, Ching, Chinaman,” in *Full Cargo* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1951), 107.
25. *Ibid.*, 109.

26. Anthony Lane, "Lady Be Good," *New Yorker*, April 30, 2007, 46.
27. "I would urge," writes Ray Carney, "that the dichotomy is a false one and that the films of the second type can only be understood properly when the imaginative extravagance or inordinacy that profoundly links them with the 'exotic' films is appreciated." Ray Carney, *American Vision: The Films of Frank Capra* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England/Wesleyan University Press, 1986), 225–226.
28. Joseph McBride, *Frank Capra: The Catastrophe of Success* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 280.
29. Gina Marchetti, *Romance and the "Yellow Peril": Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 54.
30. Cited in McBride, *Frank Capra*, 280.
31. Gina Marchetti, "The Threat of Captivity: Hollywood and the Sexualization of Race Relations in *The Girls of the White Orchid* and *The Bitter Tea of General Yen*," *Journal of Communications Inquiry* 11, no. 2 (Winter 1987), 32.
32. Linking the figure of the warlord to that of the gangster, Dorothy Jones makes the point that Chinese "warlords—military personalities outside the official Chinese government who were seeking control and domination over certain areas of the country—came to be pictured on the American screen as the Chinese equivalent of the American gangster." Jones, *Portrayal of China and India*, 19.
33. "As in the most traditional captivity stories," observes Marchetti of *The Bitter Tea of General Yen*, "Megan here is severely punished for straying from male authority. In fact, her odyssey takes her to a point at which she comes to understand her true 'place' as a woman—kneeling, subservient, passive, and broken by her own passion." Marchetti, *Romance and the "Yellow Peril"*, 54.
34. McBride, *Frank Capra*, 280.
35. Elliott Stein, "Frank Capra," in *Cinema: A Critical Dictionary*, vol. 1, ed. Richard Roud (New York: Viking, 1980), 186.
36. Cited by Eric Smodin in his *Regarding Frank Capra: Audiences, Celebrity, and American Film Studies, 1930–1960* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 250.
37. Cited in McBride, *Frank Capra*, 281.
38. Jeffrey Vance and Suzanne Lloyd, *Harold Lloyd: Master Comedian* (New York: Harry Abrams, 2002), 180; Adam Reilly, *Harold Lloyd: The King of Daredevil Comedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1977), 127.
39. John Belton, "Harold Lloyd: The Man and His Times," in Reilly, *Harold Lloyd*, 198.
40. Richard Schickel, *Harold Lloyd: The Shape of Laughter* (Boston: New York Graphic Society, 1974), 5.
41. William K. Everson, "Harold Lloyd: The Climb to Success," in Reilly, *Harold Lloyd*, 170.
42. Interestingly, Clarence Budington Kelland, who wrote the story upon which *The Cat's-Paw* is based, also wrote Capra's *Mr. Deeds Goes to Town* (1936).
43. Roland Lacourbe, *Harold Lloyd* (Paris: Seghers, 1970), 45.

44. Everson, “Harold Lloyd: The Climb to Success,” in Reilly, *Harold Lloyd*, 171–172.
45. Schickel, *Harold Lloyd*, 4.

Chapter 3: Questions of Otherness

1. Interestingly, both the play and the novel explicitly denounce the racist stereotypes embraced by the English family. Suggesting that even the most sympathetic of Westerners are marked by racial prejudice, in the novel, Mr. Wu delivers an eloquent speech—filled with allusions to Shakespeare’s *Merchant of Venice*—in which he compares the British mistreatment of the Chinese to the way Venetian merchants shunned and exploited the Jews. See Louise Jordan Miln, *Mr. Wu* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1918), esp. 117.
2. Harold Robert Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India* (New York: John Day, 1958), 164.
3. Dorothy B. Jones, *The Portrayal of China and India on the American Screen, 1896–1955* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1955), 20.
4. Sax Rohmer, *The Insidious Dr. Fu-Manchu* (New York: Dover, 1997), 13.
5. Lynn Pan, *Sons of the Yellow Emperor: A History of the Chinese Diaspora* (New York: Kodansha International, 1990), 89.
6. For a concise overview of the various incarnations of Fu Manchu, see Eugene Franklin Wong, *On Visual Media Racism: Asians in the American Motion Pictures* (PhD diss., University of Denver, 1978), 97–102.
7. Sheridan Prasso points out that even when Fu Manchu himself was not present, his presence often made itself felt. Prasso discerns the shadow of the evil doctor in “such evil Chinese triad Leader roles as John Lone in *Year of the Dragon* (1985), and Jet Li, yet again, in *Lethal Weapon 4* (1998), among many others.” See Sheridan Prasso, *The Asian Mystique* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 106.
8. Robert G. Lee, *Orientalism: Asian Americans in Popular Culture* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), 117.
9. Jones, *Portrayal of China and India*, 41.
10. Kevin Brownlow, *The Parade’s Gone By* (New York: Ballantine, 1968), 231.
11. Josef von Sternberg, *Fun in a Chinese Laundry* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 263.
12. *Ibid.*, 262.
13. Herbert G. Weinberg, *Josef von Sternberg: A Critical Study of the Great Film Director* (New York: Dutton, 1967), 218.
14. Claude Ollier, “Josef Von Sternberg,” in *Cinema: A Critical Dictionary*, vol. 2, ed. Richard Roud (New York: Viking, 1980), 953.
15. Homa King, *Lost in Translation: Orientalism, Cinema, and the Enigmatic Signifier* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 2.
16. John Baxter, *The Cinema of Josef von Sternberg* (New York: Barnes, 1971), 91.

17. Von Sternberg, *Fun in a Chinese Laundry*, 81.
18. Baxter, *Cinema of Josef von Sternberg*, 154–155.
19. Andrew Sarris, *The Films of Josef von Sternberg* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1966), 8.
20. Lynn Pan, *In Search of Old Shanghai* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Company, 1982), 3.
21. Stella Dong, *Shanghai: The Rise and Fall of a Decadent City* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 1.
22. Harriet Sergeant, *Shanghai: Collision Point of Cultures, 1918/1939* (New York: Crown, 1990), 3.
23. Cited in Weinberg, *Josef von Sternberg*, 215. Underscoring the resonance of Dietrich in this role, a musical made shortly afterward—*Footlight Parade* (Lloyd Bacon, 1933)—contains a dreamlike sequence choreographed by Busby Berkeley that pays explicit homage to Shanghai Lily. In this sequence, an American sailor (James Cagney) searches for his sweetheart, named Shanghai Lil, in all the dives of a port city. “I’ve been searching high,” he sings, “and I’ve been searching low, looking for my Shanghai Lil.” Finally, he finds her: she is none other than dancer Ruby Keeler made up to look a bit like a latter day Madama Butterfly.
24. Baxter, *Cinema of Josef von Sternberg*, 94.
25. An observation by Andrew Sarris suggests some of the possible terms of such a debate. At the end of the film, writes Sarris, as Doc Harvey searches his lover’s countenance for some sign of explanation or expiation, “her face merely taunts him in a myriad of mirrors until he surrenders to the illusion she represents, but on her terms rather than his.” See Sarris, *Films of Josef von Sternberg*, 35.
26. Prasso, *Asian Mystique*, 29.
27. Lee, *Orientalism*, 116.
28. Gary Hoppenstand, “Yellow Devil Doctors and Opium Dens: A Survey of the Yellow Peril Stereotypes in Mass Media Entertainment,” in *The Popular Culture Reader*, ed. Jack Nachbar and Christopher D. Geist (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1983), 174.
29. Weinberg, *Josef von Sternberg*, 71.
30. See von Sternberg, *Fun in a Chinese Laundry*, 80–81.
31. Cited by Weinberg, *Josef von Sternberg*, 217.
32. Ado Kyrou, *Le surréalisme au cinéma* (Paris: Terrain Vague, 1963), 121.
33. Cited in Weinberg, *Josef von Sternberg*, 217.
34. See John Colton, *The Shanghai Gesture: A Play* (New York: Horace Liveright, 1926), 166.
35. Cited in Jones, *Portrayal of China and India*, 46.
36. Jones, *Portrayal of China and India*, 46.
37. James C. Thomson, “Pearl S. Buck and the American Quest for China,” in *The Several Worlds of Pearl S. Buck*, ed. Elizabeth J. Lipscomb, Frances E. Webb, and Peter Conn (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 14.
38. Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds*, 63.

39. Ibid., 155–156.
40. Thomson, “Pearl S. Buck and the American Quest for China,” 13.
41. Reader’s supplement to *The Good Earth*, by Pearl S. Buck (New York: Pocket Books/Washington Square Press, 1973), 40.
42. Ibid., 37.
43. Ibid., 43.
44. Carl Van Doren, *The American Novel, 1789–1939* (New York: Macmillan, 1940), 353.
45. Michael H. Hunt, “Pearl Buck: Popular Expert on China, 1931–1939,” *Modern China* 3, no. 1 (January 1977), 47.
46. Sophia Chen Zen, “*The Good Earth*,” *Pacific Affairs* 4 (October 1931), 915–916.
47. Younghill Kang, “China Is Different,” *New Republic* 67 (July 1, 1931), 186.
48. Cited by Kang Liao in his *Pearl S. Buck: A Cultural Bridge across the Pacific* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 43.
49. Almost forty years after the publication of *The Good Earth*, Paul Doyle, a scholar of Buck’s work, deemed “reprehensible” the way several Chinese scholars and intellectuals behaved in this matter. See Paul Doyle, *Pearl S. Buck* (New York: Twayne, 1965), 52–54.
50. Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds*, 157.
51. Zhang Longxi, “The Myth of the Other: China in the Eyes of the West,” *Critical Inquiry* 15 (Autumn 1988), 127.
52. Hunt, “Pearl Buck: Popular Expert,” 57.
53. Pearl Buck, *Is There a Case for Foreign Missions?* (New York: John Day, 1932), 30.
54. In an incendiary speech that precipitated her break with the missionary establishment, Buck left no doubt about her dismay at the cultural blindness and arrogance that in her view too often characterized American missionaries in China. “I have seen missionaries,” she declared, “so lacking in sympathy for the people they were supposed to be saving, so scornful of any civilization except their own, so harsh in their judgments upon one another, so coarse and insensitive among a sensitive cultivated people that my heart has fairly bled with shame. I can never have done with my apologies to the Chinese people that in the name of a gentle Christ we have sent such people to them.” See Buck, *Is There a Case for Foreign Missions?*, 8.
55. Lian Xi, *The Conversion of Missionaries: Liberalism in American Protestant Missions in China, 1907–1932* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 116.
56. In her biography of her father, Absalom Sydenstricker, Buck describes him as the “manifestation of a certain spirit in his country and his time. For he was a spirit, and a spirit made by the blind certainty, that pure intolerance, that zeal for mission, that contempt of man and earth, that high confidence in heaven, which our forefathers bequeathed to us.” Pearl S. Buck, *Fighting Angel: Portrait of a Soul* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1936), 11.

57. On this issue, see Doyle, *Pearl S. Buck*, 40.
58. Discussing this issue, Mari Yoshihara suggests Buck's "annihilation of specificity" functioned as a "technique to evade positioning the novel in relation to the political and ideological debate over China's modernization." Mari Yoshihara, *Embracing the East: White Women and American Orientalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 155.
59. Zhang, "The Myth of the Other," 116.
60. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage, 1973), xix. For a discussion of Chinese otherness seen in the light of Foucault, see Zhang, "The Myth of the Other."
61. On the social and political dimension of these films, often deemed part of the golden age of Chinese cinema, see Lai Kwan Pang, *Building a New Cinema in China: The Chinese Left-Wing Cinema Movement, 1932–1937* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).
62. Cited by Bob Thomas in his *Thalberg, Life and Legend* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), 302–303.
63. The original director of the film, George Hill, died before production began. His role was taken over by Victor Fleming; when Fleming became ill, it fell to director Sidney Franklin to complete the film.
64. See Samuel Marx, *Mayer and Thalberg: The Make-Believe Saints* (New York: Random House, 1975), 247.
65. Jones, *Portrayal of China and India*, 45.
66. On this letter, see James Hoban Jr., "Scripting *The Good Earth*: Versions of the Novel for the Screen," in Lipscomb, Webb, and Conn, *The Several Worlds of Pearl S. Buck*, 127.
67. Cited in Peter Conn, *Pearl Buck: A Cultural Biography* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 159. On that same page, Conn points out that it initially seemed as if the notoriously strong-willed novelist would have her way: the crew did indeed take shots of peasants and their farms, of mud huts and beasts of burden. But, he writes, Buck's triumph was short-lived. "When the crew brought the footage out of China, the Kuomintang arranged to have all the containers X-rayed. A few weeks later, several thousand feet of blank film arrived in Hollywood."
68. Pearl Buck, *My Several Worlds: A Personal Record* (New York: John Day, 1954), 393.
69. Roland Flamini, *Thalberg: The Last Tycoon and the World of MGM* (New York: Crown, 1994), 255.
70. See Jones, *Portrayal of China and India*, 43.
71. See *ibid.*, 46.
72. Buck, *My Several Worlds*, 393.
73. Cited in Conn, *Buck: A Cultural Biography*, 196.
74. Robert Gottlieb, "Orientially Yours," *New York Review of Books*, January 13, 2005, 42.
75. Frank Nugent, "The Good Earth," *New York Times*, February 3, 1937.

76. Van Doren, *American Novel*, 353.
77. Conn, *Buck: A Cultural Biography*, 131.
78. Karen Janis Leong, “The China Mystique” (PhD diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1999).
79. Hunt, “Pearl Buck: Popular Expert,” 51.
80. Cited in Jones, *Portrayal of China and India*, 46.
81. Cited in Hoban, “Scripting *The Good Earth*,” 138.
82. Cited in *ibid.*, 139.
83. Buck, *Good Earth*, 181–182.
84. *Ibid.*, 186.
85. Conn, *Buck: A Cultural Biography*, 192.
86. Hoban, “Scripting *The Good Earth*,” 139.
87. Conn, *Buck: A Cultural Biography*, 193.
88. Hunt, “Pearl Buck: Popular Expert,” 58.
89. Even a later critic like Dorothy Jones makes the point that “every effort was made to make the film not only faithful to the Pearl Buck novel, but also as accurate as possible a picture of China and the Chinese people.” Jones, *Portrayal of China and India*, 45.
90. Cited by Hoban, “Scripting *The Good Earth*,” 141.
91. Hunt, “Pearl Buck: Popular Expert,” 47.

Chapter 4: The Cold War in Three Acts

1. Nora Sayre, *Running Time: Films of the Cold War* (New York: Dial, 1978), 25.
2. A. T. Steele, *The American People and China* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 37.
3. Ronald Steel, *Pax America* (New York: Viking, 1967), 131.
4. Iris Chang, *The Chinese in America* (New York: Viking, 2002), 149. A 2000 documentary, *The Chinatown Files*, contains firsthand accounts of the experiences of seven Chinese Americans who found their loyalties questioned at the beginning of the cold war.
5. Cited by Martin Walker in *The Cold War* (New York: Holt, 1993), 67.
6. Warren Cohen makes the point that, at first, Chinese Communism seemed quite different from the Soviet variety: rallying peasants rather than urban workers, it seemed inspired less by Marxism than by nationalism. See Warren Cohen, *America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 4th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 135.
7. David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korea War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 187.
8. Walker, *Cold War*, 66.
9. “Throughout the twentieth century,” writes Jane Hunter, “Americans regarded Chinese missionaries as emblems of the purity of American motives. This

was particularly apparent following the Communist victory of 1949.” Jane Hunter, *The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 7.

10. Theodore H. White, *In Search of History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 127.

11. Halberstam, *Coldest Winter*, 242.

12. “Madame Chiang Kai-shek, a Power in Husband’s China and Abroad, Dies at 105,” *New York Times*, October 25, 2003, sec. A.

13. Cited by Patricia Neils in *China Images in the Life and Times of Henry Luce* (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1990), 94.

14. Halberstam, *Coldest Winter*, 223.

15. Ibid.

16. Cited by Michael Schaller in *The United States and China: Into the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 123. In large measure, McCarthy’s animus against this division of the State Department stemmed from the fact that its China experts had never endorsed the vision of an anti-Communist, pro-American China dear to McCarthy’s (and to Luce’s) heart. On the contrary, they had warned against the “bankruptcy” of the Nationalist regime and cautioned that China was falling apart.

17. Cited in Steel, *Pax America*, 129.

18. Cited in Schaller, *United States and China*, 1, 122.

19. Cited in Walker, *Cold War*, 66.

20. Cited in Harold Robert Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India* (New York: John Day, 1958), 196.

21. Cited in James C. Thompson, Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry, *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 245.

22. Cited by Hugh Deane in *The Korean War, 1945–1953* (San Francisco: China Books, 1999), 103.

23. Historians have often speculated on the reasons behind the decision to ignore Chinese warnings and to drive American troops deep into North Korea. Some lay the blame on an overconfident General Douglas MacArthur, who wanted to provoke the Chinese to intervene so that he could deliver a crushing defeat against Communism. Others, like Ronald Steel, remind us that the administration, having lost Eastern Europe, was under tremendous pressure to show that it could “liberate” a Soviet satellite. See Ronald Steel, “Harry of Sunnybrook Farm,” *New Republic*, August 10, 1992, 38.

24. Cited in Schaller, *United States and China*, 131.

25. Colin Mackerras, *Western Images of China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 94.

26. Lewis McCarroll Purifoy, *Harry Truman’s China Policy: McCarthyism and the Diplomacy of Hysteria, 1947–1951* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), xiv.

27. Cohen, *America’s Response to China*, 180.

28. Richard Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” in *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present*, ed. David Brion Davis (New York: Cornell University Press, 1971), 6.

29. David Brion Davis, introduction to Davis, *Fear of Conspiracy*, xxi.

30. Phil Hardy, *Samuel Fuller* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 13.

31. Walker, *Cold War*, 78.

32. Samuel Fuller, *A Third Face: My Tale of Writing, Fighting, and Filmmaking*, with Christa Lang Fuller and Jerome Henry Rudes (New York: Knopf, 2002), 353. Despite this remark, the prologue did not “stand”—at least in some versions of the film. One version I saw recently begins by saying that the film is dedicated to France, whose battle in Indonesia is vital to stopping the advance of Communism in Asia.

33. *Ibid.*, 353.

34. An even more bizarre rescue is featured in still another strange film of the era. In *Blood Alley*, John Wayne portrays a rugged Westerner living in China who comes to the rescue of an entire Chinese village oppressed by the new Communist regime. Assuming the role of a modern-day Noah, Wayne commandeers a ferry and carries the inhabitants of the village downriver until they reach safety in the non-Communist haven of Hong Kong. If the film raises unanswered questions—what, after all, is the film’s protagonist doing in Communist China?—its ideological message (like that of *China Doll*) is crystal clear. Underscoring American benevolence, it suggests that China’s new Communist regime oppressed the Chinese people.

35. Cited by Schaller, *United States and China*, 3.

36. Greil Marcus, *The Manchurian Candidate* (London: BFI, 2002), 45. See also Greil Marcus, “A Dream of the Cold War,” in *The Dustbin of History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

37. Susan L. Carruthers, “*The Manchurian Candidate* and the Cold War Brainwashing Scare,” *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 18, no. 1 (March 1998), 83–84.

38. Bruce Crowther, *Hollywood Faction: Reality and Myth in the Movies* (London: Columbus Books, 1984), 157.

39. See Sean Wilentz, “Confounding Fathers: The Tea Party’s Cold War Roots,” *New Yorker*, October 18, 2010.

40. In a book that traces the history of these weird experiments, John D. Marks (who worked for the CIA at one point) makes the point that if a “brainwashing” machine “were even remotely feasible, one had to assume the communists might discover it. And in that case, national security required that the United States invent the machine first.” John D. Marks, *The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate”: The CIA and Mind Control* (New York: Norton, 1991), 139.

41. Thomas Powers, introduction to Marks, *Search for the “Manchurian Candidate,”* viii.

42. *Ibid.*, ix. In recent years we have witnessed still another bizarre consequence of American fears of Chinese torture in Korea. A front-page article published

in the *New York Times* on April 22, 2009, recounts that the American use of torture techniques in Iraq was apparently based on methods used on American soldiers during their military training in the 1950s to prepare them lest they fall into Chinese hands.

43. Richard Rovere, *Senator Joe McCarthy* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959), 72.

44. Cited by Carruthers, “*Manchurian Candidate* and the Cold War Brainwashing Scare,” 75.

45. See, for example, Stephen Badsey, *The Manchurian Candidate* (Trowbridge, UK: Flicks Books, 1998), 41.

46. See J. Hoberman, “When Dr. No Met Dr. Strangelove,” *Sight and Sound* 3, no. 12 (December 1993), 19.

47. Purifoy, *Harry Truman’s China Policy*, 170.

48. Tom Engelhardt, *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 184.

49. Marks, *Search for the “Manchurian Candidate,”* 134.

50. Charles S. Young, “Missing Action: POW Films, Brainwashing and the Korean War,” *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 18, no. 1 (1998), 53.

51. *Ibid.*, 53.

52. “We consulted every book written about brainwashing,” said Frankenheimer, “and I remember reading one called *In Every War but One*, about American prisoners of war in Korea, and not one prisoner ever attempted to escape.” Cited in Gerald Pratley, *The Films of Frankenheimer: John Frankenheimer Talks about His Life in the Cinema* (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1998), 40.

53. Eugene Kinkead, *In Every War but One* (New York: Norton, 1959), 15.

54. Badsey, *Manchurian Candidate*, 9–10.

55. Callum MacDonald, *Korea: The War before Vietnam* (New York: Free Press, 1986), 255–256.

56. Marks, *Search for the “Manchurian Candidate,”* 194.

57. Kinkead, *In Every War but One*, 125.

58. Robert Jay Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of “Brainwashing” in China* (New York: Norton, 1961), 4.

59. Richard Condon, *The Manchurian Candidate* (New York: Mysterious Book Club, 1988), 38.

60. Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds*, 191.

61. John King Fairbank, *Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), 332.

62. Rovere, *Senator Joe McCarthy*, 8.

63. For a discussion of the references to Lincoln and other American symbols, see Badsey, *Manchurian Candidate*, 43.

64. Pauline Kael, *5001 Nights at the Movies* (New York: Henry Holt, 1991), 462.

65. Ray collapsed midway through the shooting and the task of director fell to second unit director Andrew Marton. For Marton's contributions to the film, see Bernard Eisenschitz, *Nicholas Ray: An American Journey*, trans. Tom Milne (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), 387.

66. Jerome Ch'en, *China and the West: Society and Culture, 1815–1937* (London: Hutchison, 1979), 144.

67. Since the title of the film is *55 Days at Peking*, I use "Peking" throughout this chapter to refer to the Chinese capital rather than its modern pinyin romanization, Beijing.

68. John King Fairbank, *The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800–1985* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 138.

69. Diana Preston, *The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China's War on Foreigners That Shook the World in the Summer of 1900* (New York: Walker and Company, 2008), 24.

70. Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 389–390.

71. Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860–1870* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 269.

72. See Preston, *Boxer Rebellion*, 26.

73. Cited in Fairbank, *Great Chinese Revolution*, 137.

74. Cited in Preston, *Boxer Rebellion*, 26.

75. Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: Norton, 1990), 234.

76. Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 15.

77. Pearl S. Buck, *My Several Worlds: A Personal Record* (New York: John Day, 1954), 34.

78. Cited in Preston, *Boxer Rebellion*, xx.

79. James L. Hevia, *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 284.

80. On the changing Chinese versions of the Boxer Rebellion, see Cohen, *History in Three Keys*.

81. See Sterling Seagrave, *Dragon Lady: The Life and Legend of the Last Empress of China* (New York: Random House/Vintage, 1992), 288; Hsü, *Rise of Modern China*, 397.

82. Seagrave, *Dragon Lady*, 288.

83. Hevia, *English Lessons*, 222.

84. Seagrave, *Dragon Lady*, 287.

85. Sheridan Prasso, *The Asian Mystique* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 29.

86. Buck, *My Several Worlds*, 30.

87. Seagrave, *Dragon Lady*, 11.

88. Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds*, 99.
89. On this issue, see John K. Fairbank, *China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations* (New York: Knopf, 1974), 90.
90. *Ibid.*, 94.
91. Preston, *Boxer Rebellion*, 34.
92. “The perceived superiority of the westerner,” writes Preston, “and in particular of the English-speaking white male, dominates American and British accounts of the Boxer uprising. They speak disparagingly of ‘Continental’ lounging about, smoking and drinking and generally keeping out of harm’s way, while the Anglo-Saxons got on with the hard work.” Preston, *The Boxer Rebellion*, xvi. The reverse apparently also held true: Lanxin Xiang observes that that French and German accounts of the events offer a far-from-flattering view of Anglo-American diplomats. See Lanxin Xiang, *The Origins of the Boxer War* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), viii.
93. Buck, *My Several Worlds*, 49.
94. Peter Wollen, “Never at Home,” *Sight and Sound* 4, no. 5 (1984), 13.
95. Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds*, 99.
96. Cited in Bernard Cole, *Gunboats and Marines: The United States Navy in China, 1925–1928* (London: Associated University Presses, 1983), 21.
97. Cited by Dorothy Borg in *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925–1928* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 17.
98. Paul A. Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Missionary Movement in China, 1890–1952* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 186.
99. Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution*, 288.
100. “The mission cause is in sight of defeat at this moment,” warned an editorial in a leading religious journal, the *Christian Century*, “because, in the eyes of the Chinese, it is inextricably bound up with the economic imperialism of western nations. . . . It is time for the missionary organizations to make it clear to the world that the Christian cause as a whole is done with gunboats.” Cited in Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution*, 73–74.
101. Lian Xi, *The Conversion of Missionaries: Liberalism in American Protestant Missions in China, 1907–1932* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 12.
102. Buck, *My Several Worlds*, 216.
103. Cole, *Gunboats and Marines*, 172.
104. *Ibid.*, 173.
105. See Casey St. Charnez, *The Films of Steve McQueen* (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1984), 125.
106. Cited by Danièle Grivel and Roland Lacourbe in *Robert Wise* (Paris: Edilig, 1985), 122.
107. Richard McKenna, *The Sand Pebbles* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 158–159.
108. *Ibid.*, 260.
109. *Ibid.*, 558–559.

Chapter 5: The World Splits in Two

1. Arthur Miller and Inge Morath, *Chinese Encounters* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1979), 40.
2. Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 4th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), i.
3. Kenneth Chan, *Remade in Hollywood: The Global Chinese Presence in Transnational Cinemas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 57.
4. On these events, see "Sympathy on the Streets, But Not for the Tibetans," *New York Times*, April 18, 2008; "Chinese Student in U.S. Caught in Ugly Confrontation," *New York Times*, April 17, 2008.
5. Nicholas D. Kristof, "A Not-So-Fine Romance," *New York Times*, April 3, 2008, sec. A.
6. Nicholas D. Kristof, "An Olive Branch from the Dalai Lama," *New York Times*, August 7, 2008, sec. A.
7. Donald Lopez, foreword to *Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China's 100 Questions*, ed. Anne-Marie Blondeau, Katia Buffetrille, and Wei Jing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), xvii.
8. Orville Schell coins the term in his *Virtual Tibet: Searching for Shangri-la from the Himalayas to Hollywood* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000).
9. Jim Sangster, *Scorsese* (London: Virgin Books, 2002), 257.
10. Years earlier, the Chinese had made what I think is a far more powerful propaganda film, *Nongnu*, which advances the view of Tibet as a feudal society liberated by the Chinese.
11. Clearly designed to appeal to Western viewers, the feminist hue of the film implicit in the monk's reincarnation in a woman disturbed certain scholars and students of Buddhism. Calling the film's implicit appeal to feminist values "dishonest and mystifying," Martin Brauen declared that while nothing stands in the way of a female incarnation, throughout "the long Tibetan tradition, not a single reincarnation combination is known that matches the one shown in the film." Martin Brauen, with the help of Renate Koller and Markus Vock, *Dreamworld Tibet: Western Illusions*, trans. Martin Wilson (Trumbull, CT: Weatherhill, 2004), 87.
12. Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 63.
13. Ian Buruma, "Found Horizon," *New York Review of Books*, June 29, 2000, 14.
14. Brauen, *Dreamworld Tibet*, 168.
15. On the distortion of history in *Seven Years in Tibet*, see Marc Abramson, "Kundun and Seven Years in Tibet," *Cinéaste* 23, no. 3 (April 1998).
16. Buruma, "Found Horizon," 14.
17. Ibid.
18. Abramson, "Kundun and Seven Years in Tibet," 3.
19. Cited by Sandra Marti, "Kundun: Scorsese et la non-violence," in *Martin Scorsese, Études Cinématographiques*, vol. 68, ed. Michel Estève (Paris: Lettres Modernes-Minard, 2003), 230.

20. Beginning in 1956, America did offer clandestine—that is, CIA—aid to Tibetan guerrillas. But as Tibet historian Melvyn C. Goldstein puts it, this help was “too little too late.” See Melvyn C. Goldstein, *The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 55. On the issue of CIA involvement in Tibet, see John Kenneth Knaus, *Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999); Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, *The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002).

21. Blondeau, Buffetrille, and Wei Jing, *Authenticating Tibet*, 69.

22. Dalai Lama XIV, *Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 89.

23. Goldstein, *Snow Lion and the Dragon*, ix–x.

24. On these competing narratives, see John Powers, *History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People’s Republic of China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

25. An interesting discussion of the way the Chinese view the Tibet question is found in Peter Hessler’s “Tibet through Chinese Eyes,” *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1999, 56–66.

26. Summarizing these competing claims, Powers writes that “the Tibetan version of Tibetan history is one in which Tibet, prior to the Chinese takeover in the 1950s, is presented as an independent and closed society based on Buddhist principles and ruled by Buddhist monks. The people were both happy and devout. . . . According to the Chinese version, China is a multiethnic society in which the Han make up over 93 percent of the population, but fifty-six minorities [including Tibet] are also an integral part of the ‘motherland,’ coexisting peacefully since time immemorial.” Powers, *History as Propaganda*, 4.

27. *Ibid.*, 158.

28. On this issue, see Jeffrey Paine, *Re-enchantment: Tibetan Buddhism Comes to the West* (New York: Norton, 2004), 13.

29. On the issue of homosexuality, reports Patrick French, the Dalai Lama’s stand is “close to that of Pope John Paul II, something his Western followers find embarrassing and prefer to ignore.” See French, “Dalai Lama Lite,” *New York Times*, September 19, 2003, sec. A.

30. Paine, *Re-enchantment*, 15.

31. Indeed, a number of important Tibetan activists and scholars lament the fact that contemporary Tibet continues to be seen less as a real country (that might awaken the political will of the West) than as a mythic repository of spiritual and sacred values. On this issue, see, for example, the essays by Jamyang Norbu, Robert Barnett, and Toni Huber in *Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections and Fantasies*, ed. Thierry Dodin and Heinz Räther (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001).

32. Peter Bishop, *The Myth of Shangri-La: Tibet, Travel Writing and the Western Creation of Sacred Landscape* (London: Athlone Press, 1989), 7.

33. Antonin Artaud, “Adresse au Dalai Lama,” in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1956), 262.

34. Although, of course, it was Hilton who first imagined the community of Shangri-La, it was arguably the film that gave it its enormous resonance in the popular imagination. Capra’s beloved classic, declares John R. Hammond, “has done more to popularize the idea of Shangri-La than any other film or book and seems destined to have a permanent place in the history of motion pictures.” John R. Hammond, *Lost Horizon Companion* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2008), 144–145.

35. Bishop, *Myth of Shangri-La*, 212.

36. Lowell Thomas Jr., *Out of This World: Across the Himalayas to Forbidden Tibet* (New York: Greystone Press, 1950), 30–31, 17. Pointing to the continuing resonance of Shangri-La, in the decades since Hilton published his famous novel—which has never gone out of print—novelists have written sequels to *Lost Horizon*, while explorers have sought the “real” Shangri-La. In a contemporary ironic twist, the Chinese are now building tourist facilities in a remote mountainous region that, they have determined, is the site of Shangri-La.

37. “One cannot appreciate the Tibetan landscape that was forming in the imagination of eighteenth-century Britain,” declares Bishop, “without simultaneously understanding the era’s fantasy of China.” Bishop, *Myth of Shangri-La*, 34.

38. James Hilton, *Lost Horizon* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1934), 114.

39. *Ibid.*, 214.

40. Thomas, *Out of This World*, 30–31.

41. Bishop, *Myth of Shangri-La*, 206.

42. Hilton, *Lost Horizon*, 237.

43. Bishop, *Myth of Shangri-La*, 206.

44. Amaury de Riencourt, *Roof of the World: Tibet, Key to Asia* (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1950), 306.

45. Bishop, *Myth of Shangri-La*, 209.

46. Riencourt, *Roof of the World*, 306.

47. Colin Thubron, *To a Mountain in Tibet* (New York: HarperCollins, 2011), 30.

48. Bishop, *Myth of Shangri-La*, 244.

49. Brauen, *Dreamworld Tibet*, 1.

50. Bishop, *Myth of Shangri-La*, 243.

51. Schell, *Virtual Tibet*, 206.

52. Thubron, *To a Mountain in Tibet*, 32.

53. Donald Lopez Jr., *Prisoners of Shangri-La* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 7.

54. Ian Christie, “Martin Scorsese’s Testament,” in *Martin Scorsese Interviews*, ed. Peter Brunette (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1997), 235.

55. “Scorsese: la tentation bouddhiste,” *Le nouvel observateur*, May 21–27 (1991), 55. Scorsese’s memory may have played him false here: *Storm over Tibet* and *The Mask of the Himalayas* seem to be different titles for the same film.

56. Scorsese, “La tentation bouddhiste,” 55.

57. Brauen, *Dreamworld Tibet*, 87.
58. Schell, *Virtual Tibet*, 246.
59. Thelma Schoonmaker, “Il voulait évoquer le Tibet, pas l’expliquer,” *Positif* 447 (May 1998), 30. Interestingly, the Criterion release of *The Tales of Hoffman* is accompanied by a commentary by Scorsese.
60. Marti, “*Kundun*: Scorsese et la non-violence,” 239.
61. Cited by Gavin Smith, “The Art of Vision: Martin Scorsese’s *Kundun*,” in Brunette, *Martin Scorsese: Interviews*, 239.
62. For example, Marc Abramson argues that neither *Seven Years in Tibet* nor *Kundun* shows “the exploitive, regressive, and ultimately self-defeating nature of the dual religious and secular hierarchies which governed Tibet.” Abramson, “*Kundun* and *Seven Years in Tibet*,” 9. Pankaj Mishra reminds us of the use of torture in twentieth-century Tibet. See Mishra, “Holy Man,” *New Yorker*, March 31, 2008, 121.
63. Discussing these maneuvers, former Tibetan activist Patrick French tells us that the Dalai Lama’s great-uncle and elder brother “were important reincarnate lamas in Amdo, his uncle was financial controller of nearby Kumbum monastery, and the region’s notoriously brutal Muslim warlord, Ma Bufang—who was personally instrumental in choosing the Dalai Lama—turned out to be a friend of his mother’s family.” Patrick French, *Tibet, Tibet: A Personal History of a Lost Land* (New York: Vintage, 2003), 18.
64. Thubron, *To a Mountain in Tibet*, 87, 32.
65. Michael Henry, “*Kundun* vu par Martin Scorsese: Quel est le pouvoir de la compassion?” *Positif* 447 (May 1998), 26.
66. Michael Pye and Linda Myles, *The Movie Brats: How the Film Generation Took over Hollywood* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 202.
67. On this issue, see Martin Brauen, *Dreamworld Tibet*, 260.
68. Henry, “*Kundun* vu par Martin Scorsese,” 27.
69. Hubert Niogret, “*Kundun*: Une conscience en development,” *Positif* 447 (May 1998), 20.
70. Cited by Sandra Marti, “*Kundun*: Scorsese et la non-violence,” 236.
71. Niogret, “*Kundun*: Une conscience en développement,” 20.
72. Dalai Lama XIV, *My Land and My People, by His Holiness, the Dalai Lama of Tibet* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), 56.
73. Cited in Amy Taubin, “Everything Is Form,” in Brunette, *Martin Scorsese: Interviews*, 258.
74. Henry, “*Kundun* vu par Martin Scorsese,” 27.
75. Dalai Lama, *Freedom in Exile*, 92, 90.
76. *Ibid.*, 89.
77. *Ibid.*, 98–99, 100.
78. French, *Tibet, Tibet*, 284.
79. Marti, “*Kundun*: Scorsese et la non-violence,” 236.
80. Serafino Murri, *Martin Scorsese* (Milan: Editrice il Castoro, 2000), 134.
81. Henry, “*Kundun* vu par Martin Scorsese,” 26.

82. Taubin, “Everything Is Form,” 260.
83. French, *Tibet, Tibet*, 264.
84. Pankaj Mishra, “Staying Power: Mao and the Maoists,” *New Yorker*, December 20 and 27, 2010, 126.
85. “What Mao accomplished between 1949 and 1956,” writes a leading historian of the Mao years, Roderick MacFarquhar, “was in fact the fastest, most extensive, and least damaging socialist revolution carried out in any communist state.” Cited by Mishra in “Staying Power,” 128.
86. Murri, *Scorsese*, 134.
87. Abramson, “*Kundun* and *Seven Years in Tibet*,” 12.

Chapter 6: Challenges and Continuities

1. Kenneth Chan, *Remade in Hollywood: The Global Chinese Presence in Transnational Cinemas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 4, 25.
2. The term was apparently first used in an anthology of writings edited by Sheldon H. Lu, *Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nationhood, Gender* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997). Arguing that Chinese national cinema “can only be understood in its properly transnational context,” in his introduction to this volume, Lu observes that “transnationalism in the Chinese case can be observed at the following levels: first, the split of China into several geopolitical entities . . . second, the globalization of the production, marketing, and consumption of Chinese film in the age of transnational capitalism in the 1990s; third, the representation and question of ‘China’ and ‘Chineseness’ in filmic discourse itself . . . fourth, a reviewing and revisiting of the history of Chinese ‘national cinemas,’ as if to read the ‘prehistory’ of transnational filmic discourse backwards.” Sheldon H. Lu, “Historical Introduction: Chinese Cinemas (1896–1996) and Transnational Film Studies,” in Lu, *Transnational Chinese Cinemas*, 3. On transnational Chinese cinema, also see Gina Marchetti, *From Tian’anmen to Times Square: Transnational China and the Chinese Diaspora on Global Screens, 1989–1997* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006).
3. Jaap Van Ginneken, *Screening Difference* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 31, 21.
4. *Ibid.*, 39.
5. Roger Garcia, “Outside Looking In: Notes on Asian America,” in *Out of the Shadows: Asians in American Cinema*, ed. Roger Garcia (Milan: Olivares, 2001), 78.
6. Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 8.
7. Yingjin Zhang, *Screening China: Critical Interventions, Cinematic Recon-figurations, and the Transnational Imaginary in Contemporary Chinese Cinema* (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Chinese Studies, 2002), 40.
8. Julian Stringer, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora in Contemporary Hong Kong Cinema,” in *Countervisions: Asian American Film Criticism*, ed. Darrell Y. Hamamoto and Sandra Liu (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 302.

9. Daniel Fried, "Riding off into the Sunrise: Genre Contingency and the Origin of the Chinese Western," *PMLA* 122, no. 5 (October 2007).
10. Cited in Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 10.
11. Gary G. Xu, *Sinascap: Contemporary Chinese Cinema* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 4.
12. Steve Fore, "Jackie Chan and the Cultural Dynamics of Global Entertainment," in Lu, *Transnational Chinese Cinemas*, 255.
13. Chan seemed to confuse two iconic Western figures when he remarked that John Wayne (rather than Gary Cooper) played the lead in *High Noon*. He saw *Shanghai Noon*, he said, as a "very smart pun on the John Wayne film *High Noon*." See Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 138.
14. Kenneth Chan, for one, views Chan's transformation in a particularly dark light. In his view, the difficulties that Chon Wang faces and overcomes "expose the cultural violence involved in the processes of immigrant assimilation, in this case pitched against the racial impossibility of measuring up to the mythic standards of a John Wayne. The ultimate violation, of course, comes when Lo Fong cuts off Chon Wang's queue, a moment of symbolic 'racial castration.'" See Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 141.
15. Darrell Y. Hamamoto, "Introduction: On Asian American Film and Criticism," in Hamamoto and Liu, *Countervisions*, 17.
16. Cited by Gina Marchetti in "*The Wedding Banquet*: Global Chinese Cinema and the Asian American Experience," in Hamamoto and Liu, *Countervisions*, 277.
17. Significantly, the film, as Sheldon H. Lu reminds us, "has been advertised under different rubrics for different audiences: a gay and lesbian film, a Chinese American film, a Taiwanese film, and so forth." See Lu, "Historical Introduction," in Lu, *Transnational Chinese Cinemas*, 18.
18. Cited by Chan, *Remade in China*, 81.
19. Poshek Fu and David Desser, introduction to *The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity*, ed. Poshek Fu and David Desser (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2.
20. David Desser, "The Kung Fu Craze: Hong Kong Cinema's First American Reception," in Fu and Desser, *Cinema of Hong Kong*, 20.
21. Gary G. Xu points out that although films such as "Wang Xiaoshuai's *So Close to Paradise* (1999), Lou Ye's *Suzhou River* (2000), and Jia Zhangke's Hometown Trilogy series (*Xiao Wu*, 1998; *Platform*, 2000; *Unknown Pleasures*, 2002) all achieved tremendous success in overseas house markets and at international film festivals . . . none made it to Chinese movie theaters due to their violations of state regulations governing the film industry." Xu, *Sinascap*, 47–48.
22. Lu, "Historical Introduction," 12.
23. Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 27.
24. Hamamoto, introduction to *Countervisions*, 10.

25. Diane Mark, introduction to Wayne Wang, *Chan Is Missing* (Honolulu, HI: Bamboo Ridge Press, 1984), 2.

26. *Ibid.*, 6.

27. A similar dilemma confronts the female protagonist of Canadian director Mina Shum's film *Double Happiness* (1994). She, too, is torn between a desire to live her own life—in this case to pursue her dreams of becoming an actress—and familial demands and ties. Interestingly, whenever she auditions for a film, she is confronted by stereotypes: in the midst of an audition for a Canadian production she is asked to assume a Chinese accent; when she attempts to join a Hong Kong theatrical troupe she is rejected because she cannot read Chinese. Constantly forced to assume one role or another, she questions her very identity.

28. Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 76. On this issue, see also Joseph M. Chan, "Disneyfying and Globalizing the Chinese Legend Mulan: A Study of Transculturation," in *In Search of Boundaries: Communication, National-States and Cultural Identities*, ed. Joseph M. Chan and Bryce T. McIntyre (Westport, CT: Ablex Publishing, 2002), 225–248.

29. Todd Gitlin, "The Unification of the World under the Signs of Mickey Mouse and Bruce Willis: The Supply and Demand Sides of American Popular Culture," in Chan and McIntyre, *In Search of Boundaries*, 31.

30. Hamamoto, introduction to *Countervisions*, 12.

31. See Evans Chan, "Postmodernism and Hong Kong Cinema," in *Postmodernism and China*, ed. Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000).

32. Michael Curtin, *Playing to the World's Biggest Audience: The Globalization of Chinese Film and TV* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 1. Curtin nonetheless goes on to express the hope that Hollywood—like the Detroit of forty years ago—might well collapse because of its inability to envision "transformations now on the horizon." "What if," he asks, "the future were to take an expected detour on the road to Disneyland, heading instead toward a more complicated global terrain characterized by overlapping and at times intersecting cultural spheres served by diverse media enterprises based in media capitals around the world?"

33. Xu, *Sinascapes*, 151.

34. On this issue, see Lan Dong, *Mulan's Legend and Legacy in China and the United States* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), 216.

35. Van Ginneken, *Screening Difference*, 38.

36. Xu, *Sinascapes*, 135.

37. Shiamin Kwa and Wilt L. Idema, eds., *Mulan: Five Versions of a Classic Chinese Legend* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 2010).

38. For example, the issue of female "transgression" runs throughout Dong, *Mulan's Legend and Legacy*.

39. Alan Nadel, "A Whole New (Disney) World Order: *Aladdin*, Atomic Power, and the Muslim Middle East," in *Visions of the East: Orientalism in Film*, ed. Matthew

Bernstein and Gaylyn Studlar (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 192.

40. Sheng-mei Ma, *The Deathly Embrace: Orientalism and Asian American Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 127.

41. *Ibid.*, 129.

42. *Ibid.*, 138.

43. *Ibid.*, 127.

44. Dong, *Mulan's Legend and Legacy*, 166.

45. “As ever,” they write, “the reimposition of the patriarchal order at the end of the Disney film serves to undo the liberating potential of its central female character. A woman might be allowed to save China but she voluntarily gives up her place as a member of the Emperor’s council to return home to look after her father and take a husband.” Eleanor Byrne and Martin McQuillan, *Deconstructing Disney* (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 165.

46. Cited by Dong in *Mulan's Legend and Legacy*, 172.

47. *Ibid.*, 219.

48. See Dong, *Mulan's Legend and Legacy*, 170.

49. Xu, *Sinascapes*, 49.

50. Nicholas Saada, “The Shadow of Whom? Asian Films and Hollywood Action Cinema,” in *Out of the Shadows: Asians in American Cinema*, ed. Roger Garcia (Locarno Film Festival, August, 2001), 68.

51. David Bordwell, *Planet Hong Kong: Popular Cinema and the Art of Entertainment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 194.

52. Jeff Yang, *Once upon a Time in China: A Guide to Hong Kong, Taiwanese, and Mainland Chinese Cinema* (New York: Atria, 2003), 52.

53. Although the term *wuxia* is often translated as “chivalry” or “knight errantry,” I prefer the definition given by my Chinese dictionary: here *wuxia* is defined as “a person adept in martial arts and given to chivalrous conduct (in olden times).”

54. Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 76.

55. Speaking of these considerations, Lee raised a crucial question confronting Chinese directors: given the economic dominance of Hollywood—and the need to appeal to Western audiences—how can they make a martial arts film without “exoticizing” China for the Western gaze? “Hollywood,” said Lee of *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*, “was responsible for the esthetics. I use a lot of language that’s not spoken in the Ching dynasty. Is that good or bad? Is it Westernization or modernization? . . . In some ways modernization *is* Westernization—that’s the fact we hate to admit. Chinese people don’t watch Chinese films anymore. They watch Western movies.” Cited in Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 79.

56. Sheldon H. Lu, “*Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*, Bouncing Angels: Hollywood, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Transnational Cinema,” in *Chinese-Language Film*, ed. Sheldon H. Lu and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005), 231.

57. Sheldon H. Lu, “National Cinema, Cultural Critique, Transnational Capital: The Films of Zhang Yimou,” in Lu, *Transnational Chinese Cinemas*, 127.
58. Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 75.
59. Cited by Chan in *Remade in Hollywood*, 80.
60. Speaking of the impact that Hu’s film had on him, Tsai Ming-liang waxed as rhapsodic as Ang Lee when he spoke of his “dream” of China. “The sound of the vertical flute in [Hu’s] film,” recalled the director, “made me feel for the first time the vastness and loneliness of the world of knights-errant. In other martial arts films, the characters fly around and tread freely on roofs and walls. Only King Hu’s knights-errant walk the lonely path in desolate mountains. Some say King Hu chose a lonely and difficult road of filmmaking, but this is precisely what makes his films unforgettable.” Cited in Xu, *Sinascapes*, 89. See Chapter 4 of Xu’s work for a very interesting discussion of *Goodbye, Dragon Inn*. Tsai Ming-liang was not alone in his admiration for King Hu’s film. *Dragon Gate Inn* has been remade at least twice in recent decades: by Raymond Lee in his 1992 *Dragon Inn* and in 2012 in a 3-D version by Tsui Hark, *Flying Swords of Dragon Gate*.
61. Yang, *Once upon a Time in China*, 142.
62. Bordwell, *Planet Hong Kong*, 217.
63. Bhaskar Sarkar, “Hong Kong Hysteria: Martial Arts Tales from a Mutating World,” in *At Full Speed: Hong Kong Cinema in a Borderless World*, ed. Esther C. Yau (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 154.
64. In this respect, *Kung Fu Panda* belongs to what Kenneth Chan describes as “a growing line of Hollywood films that exaggerate and make fun of martial arts films and kung fu comedies from Hong Kong: *Big Trouble in Little China* (1986), *Beverly Hills Ninja* (1997), *Kung Pow: Enter the Fist* (2002), and the bizarre sports-kung fu *Balls of Fury* (2007) . . . these films thrive on and are protected by their (sometimes questionably) ironic play on ethnic stereotypes.” Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 129.
65. Verina Glaessner, *Kung Fu: Cinema of Vengeance* (London: Lorrimer, 1974), 51.
66. Fore, “Jackie Chan,” 253.
67. Ibid.
68. Chan, *Remade in Hollywood*, 139. In terms of this “cultural allegiance,” it is telling that when, as in *Shinjuku Incident* (Derek Lee, 2009) Chan loses—or is forced to lose—his moral compass, comedy gives way to tragedy.
69. Nadel, “A Whole New (Disney) World Order,” 200.
70. Gitlin, “The Unification of the World,” 29.

Afterword: The Darkening Mirror

1. Ronald Dworkin, “The Historic Election: Four Views,” *New York Review of Books*, December 9, 2010, 56.

2. Tony Judt, “Its Own Worst Enemy,” *New York Review of Books*, August 15, 2002, 16.
3. Paul Krugman, “The Paranoid Style,” *New York Times*, October 9, 2006.
4. Mark Danner, “The Politics of Fear,” *New York Review of Books*, November 22, 2012, 54.
5. “Bush’s Freedom Agenda,” writes Brian Urquhart, “was the latest restatement of the venerable idea that Providence had chosen Americans to ensure the blessings of liberty for all.” Urquhart, “What You Can Learn from Reinhold Niebuhr,” *New York Review of Books*, March 26, 2009, 24.
6. Jane Perlez, “In China and U.S., Mutual Distrust Grows, Study Finds,” *New York Times*, July 18, 2013, sec. A.
7. David W. Chen, “China Emerges as a Scapegoat in Campaign Ads,” *New York Times*, October 10, 2010.
8. Harold Robert Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India* (New York: John Day, 1958), 59.
9. Richard Madsen, *China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 228.

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