

Strait Rituals

China, Taiwan, and the United States in the
Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954–1958

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Cover image: ROCS Chung Ting (LST-203) landed at Quemoy; ROC soldiers were unloading bags of cement to reinforce fortifications on the island, December 4, 1958. Photo by Tommy Trampp. Source: <https://www.navsourc.org/archives/10/16/160537.htm>.

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Introduction

On September 3, 1954, the People's Republic of China (PRC or China), under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, launched a massive artillery bombardment on Nationalist-controlled (Taiwan) Quemoy and Matsu islands off the provincial coast of Fujian, triggering the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Ultimately, the United States, which took a great interest in the region, resorted to nuclear threats in early spring of 1955. Altogether, it took an agonizing eight months of tensions and threats before the Chinese were willing to negotiate. Nonetheless, hostilities erupted again on August 23, 1958. The second crisis, however, stood out for its swift resolution. Within a fortnight, both parties publicly announced possible peaceful steps to defuse the crisis and this led to the convening of Sino-US negotiations in Warsaw from September 15, onwards. All sides claimed credit for the resolution. Beijing expressed its satisfaction with the “lesson”—the artillery bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu. Washington reaffirmed its faith in nuclear deterrence. The Republic of China's (ROC) president, Chiang Kai-shek, even announced that the wisdom of Sun Yat-sen's *Sanmin zhuyi* (Three principles of the people) would henceforth guide the ROC's effort in reclaiming mainland China and the next phase of Taiwan's economic policy.¹

The interpretative wars over the two Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–1955 and 1958 proceeded almost immediately. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower singled out the Taiwan Strait and the continuing hostilities with Communist China as having caused him the utmost frustration in the Cold War. Mao declared that without a resolution of the Taiwan question, “[w]e do not want conciliation with the USA”; in 1955 the PRC resolved to develop its own atomic bomb. Chiang allegedly saw the crises as a threat to the political survival of the ROC and resorted to various

1. Roger Buckley, *The United States in the Asia-Pacific Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 100–101; Warren I. Cohen, *American Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 4th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 186; Robert Garson, *The United States and China Since 1949* (London: Pinter Publishing, 1994), 58–59; Bevin Alexander, *The Strange Connection: US Intervention in China* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 160.

tactics in the ROC's relations with the US and the PRC.² What do the contradictory accounts tell us about the importance of the crises for each antagonist? By returning to the recently available new sources, could one attempt a reexamination of causal factors that caused the eruption of the crises? What does the unfolding of the crises—from outbreak to resolution—reveal about conflict resolution? What can such a development of the Taiwan Strait Crises tell us about the foreign relations of the PRC, the United States, and the ROC in the 1950s?

From the start, the China threat model gained adherents quickly. Analysts expanded upon the Soviet-inspired expansionist models of the early Cold War: specifically, deliberate provocations and the expansion of boundaries. In particular, scholars looked at Mao's revolutionary ideology and "military romanticism" in the context of concurrent international relations.³ The Taiwan Strait crises were manifestations of the Maoist "peaceful struggle," or war by other means in the face of overwhelming US superiority. The main goal of Beijing was inherently limited: forcing the Nationalists off the offshore islands especially if US commitment was weak, so that the Chinese would tightly control the probe and intensity.⁴

The obvious antidote to communist probing appeared to be effective deterrence. This analytical stand was manifested in early criticism of the US role in the Taiwan Strait. The scope for US independent action was seemingly hindered by Taiwan.⁵ In fact, Washington lacked the "classical statesmanship in supplementing deterrence with conciliation and flexibility."⁶ Contemporaneous scholarship pointed out that deterrence seemed to be undermined by misperceptions. The US suffered from excessive moralism, emotional politics, and miscalculation of the effectiveness of belligerence. While earlier scholarship focused on the follies of Washington, increasingly researchers have looked critically at Beijing as well.⁷

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2. Cited in Gordon H. Chang, "Eisenhower and Mao's China," in *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, ed. Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 191; Mao Tse-tung, interview by Eduardo Mora Valverde, March 3, 1959, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 16, no. 25 (July 15, 1964): 5–6; Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglia: Chiang Kai-shek and the United States," *The Western Political Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (December 1959): 1075–91; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 37–38.
 3. Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-Tung* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1966), 293; Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behaviour," *The American Political Science Review* 59, no. 1 (Mar 1965): 80–99.
 4. Morton H. Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 15, 55–62; Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History," Memorandum, RM-4900-ISA, December 1966, Rand Cooperation; Halperin and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," in *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control*, ed. Morton H. Halperin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967), 265–303.
 5. D. F. Fleming, "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa Strait," *The Western Political Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (September 1956): 535–52; O. Edmund Clubb, "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 1950–1955," *Political Science Quarterly* 74, no. 4 (December 1959): 517–31.
 6. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 370, 376, 381, 384.
 7. Gordon H. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis," *International Security* 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 96–123; He Di, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy toward the Offshore Islands," in *The Great Powers in East Asia*, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 222–45; Gordon H. Chang and He Di, "The Absence of War in

Other scholars preferred using realism as an analytical tool. China experts emphasized nationalism and further elaborated the differences between the Soviet Union and the PRC. China's actions, claimed Allen S. Whiting, could be explained as "reactive, defensive and for deterrence purposes only."⁸ Saber rattling by the Chinese was characterized as a calculated affair aimed at deflecting or preempting foreign threats and husbanding domestic economic policies.⁹ Domestic concerns notwithstanding, Chen Jian added a twist, Mao's contests with the Soviet Union and the US had transformed into a "struggle for true Communism" as well as "a struggle for China's integrity."¹⁰ Likewise, scholars have highlighted the overarching realpolitik outlook of Washington. Indeed, the US recognized that tensions existed between the Soviet Union and China, and thus sought to exploit such tensions. Secretary of State Foster Dulles did maintain tenuous peace with Beijing.¹¹

An eventual convergence of interests to avert conflict is the best possible outcome for rivalries tempered by realpolitik limitations. Scholars have noted the tacit communication and accommodation in the crises—a general desire to maintain the status quo.¹² But little work has been done in explaining the transformation

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- the US-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954–1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?" *The American Historical Review* 98, no. 5 (December 1993): 1500–1524; Zhang Shu Guang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontation, 1949–1958* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 268, 282; Qiang Zhai, *The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949–1958* (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1994), 4.
8. John W. Lewis, "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," *World Politics* 18, no. 3 (April 1966), 504; Allen S. Whiting, "The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 402 (July 1972): 55–66; Stephen C. Averill, "The Chinese Revolution Reevaluated," *Problems of Communism* 38, no. 1 (January–February 1989), 77; Bin Yu, "The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospect," *World Politics* 46, no. 2 (January 1994), 239; Harry Harding, "The Evolution of American Scholarship on Contemporary China," in *American Studies on Contemporary China*, ed. David Shambaugh (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993): 14–40; Joseph W. Esherick, "Ten Thesis on the Chinese Revolution," in *Twentieth Century China*, ed. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 43.
 9. Don E. Kash, "United States Policy for Quemoy and Matsu: Pros, Cons and Prospects," *The Western Political Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (December 1963): 912–23; Richard Lowenthal, "Communist China's Foreign Policy," in *China in Crisis: China's policies in Asia and American Alternatives*, Vol. 2, ed. Tang Tsou (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 1–18; Leon V. Sigal, "The 'Rational Policy' Model and the Formosa Straits Crises," *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (June 1970): 121–56; Whiting, "New Light on Mao: Quemoy 1958: Mao's Miscalculations," *China Quarterly* 62 (June 1975): 263–70; Whiting, "Mao China and the Cold War," in *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, ed. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), 252–76; Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); Thomas E. Stolper, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 115, 119, 125; Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
 10. Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 82, 279 and "Gemingsyuweiji de naindai" 革命与危机年代 [Revolution and Crisis], *Lengzhan guojishi yanjiu* 冷战国际史研究 [Cold War International Studies], no. 7 (December 2008), 46–96.
 11. Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Nancy Tucker, "John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the 'Two Chinas' Policy," in *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, ed. R. H. Immerman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 235–62.
 12. Charles A. McClelland, "Decisional Opportunity and Political Controversy: The Quemoy Case," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6, no. 3 (September 1962): 201–13; Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), 296, 305.

of “tacit communication” into “tacit accommodation.” Taking a step further, J. H. Kalicki claimed that both countries improved their management of crises over time and a “Sino-American crisis system.” While fundamental issues were not settled during the Taiwan Strait Crises, there existed “the establishment and relative stabilization of a balance of power system in the Far East.” Elsewhere, other scholars have noted that formulaic negotiations with the PRC were not totally in vain.¹³

While existing scholarship on the US-PRC-ROC relations does exist, most of it relies largely on US sources, supplemented by published PRC and ROC materials, and focuses primarily on Sino-US relations and, in a few instances, on US-ROC relations. New sources from the ROC, PRC, and US have been used herein and integrated to present simultaneously the perspectives of the ROC, PRC, and US on the Taiwan Strait Crises. As a result, some of the main arguments in existing scholarship can be more clearly elucidated, elaborated, or modified. One example of such a revision is the reasoning behind the outbreak of the Taiwan Strait Crises and the impact of the nuclear deterrence strategy of the US. Another example will be how the PRC and the US went about seeking international support for their respective courses of action. A fourth example will be how the ROC planned for its *fangong dalu* 反攻大陆 (counter-offensive against the mainland) mission and the stratagems used by Chiang and his emissaries to bind the US to Taipei, as well as how the *fangong dalu* mission and rhetoric changed from 1950 to 1958.

In addition, insights garnered from cultural and ritual studies have broadened the analytical analyses of the Taiwan Strait Crises. In particular, historian Martin Stuart-Fox has argued that in examining China’s foreign relations, affective domains, “irrational” factors, “cultural presuppositions,” and “historical influences” offer better explanatory powers in assessing strategic matters and military planning, and provide insights on “how peaceful intercourse with other states should be conducted.”¹⁴ Walter Hixson has similarly contended that a nation’s international behavior flows directly from its prevailing culture and assumed national identity and that in terms of foreign relations, the national identity of the United States is its locomotive to action and policy.¹⁵ In more general terms, Frank Costigliola and Thomas Paterson have observed that “culturally-conditioned feelings, such as injured pride, resentment, and a desire for respect or revenge, can influence supposedly rational perceptions and decisions about foreign relations.”¹⁶ Seen in

13. J. H. Kalicki, *The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 218, 172–75, 187, 190; Steven M. Goldstein, “Dialogue of the Deaf? The Sino-American Ambassadorial-Level Talks,” in *Reexamining the Cold War US China Diplomacy 1954–1972*, 200–237.

14. Martin Stuart-Fox, *A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence* (Crowns Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2003), 4.

15. Walter L. Hixson, *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and US Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 1–4.

16. Frank Costigliola and Thomas G. Paterson, “Defining and Doing History of United States Foreign Relations: A Primer,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 16.

such contexts, what may have appeared to the US to be “irrational” moves, such as Chiang Kai-shek’s refusal to budge from the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu or the odd-day bombardments by the PRC during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, might well have been accepted as epitome of wisdom or “coded” as “toughness” by the Asians.¹⁷

Following Kalicki’s crisis system, and further insights from anthropological ritual studies, a case for “ritualization” in Sino-US relations can be made. As each side engaged in ritualized actions toward the other, how such actions facilitated the process of conflict resolution proved crucial. That rituals can be useful in “conflict management” is seen in the cross-cultural work of Philip Gulliver, which showed how ritualization could function in negotiation and mediation in the societies of East Africa and North America.¹⁸ The conflict resolution scholarship of Lisa Schirch has also placed rituals squarely in “the process of peace building.”¹⁹ It stands to reason that the US and China achieved a limited but shared understanding of the modus operandi of one another through their ritualized actions in terms of their use of public symbols, identity issues, cultural images, and official discourses on one hand, and military posturing, diplomatic canvassing for international support, and negotiations on the other hand. While the symbolic nature of China’s military maneuvers during the Taiwan Strait Crises is mentioned in existing scholarship, no one has analyzed Sino-US interactions in the context of ritualization. Yet, ritualization is particularly salient in unraveling the turbid diplomatic episodes of the Taiwan Strait Crises: the “silent poetry” of diplomacy, the tacit allowances for withdrawals, the muted back-channel negotiations, the paradoxically loud denunciations, and the sound and fury of artillery bombardments.²⁰ In the words of Robert Darnton: “By picking at the document where it is most opaque, we may be able to unravel an alien system of meanings.”²¹

This book attempts a reconsideration of the Taiwan Strait Crises with new primary sources and cross-disciplinary perspectives. The main contention is that the Taiwan Strait Crises cannot be merely explained in terms of nuclear deterrence and implacable Cold War stand-off. The first step to discern how tacit communication during the Geneva Conference of 1954 tenuously edged toward tacit accommodation in 1958, is to acknowledge that such developments in PRC-ROC-US relations were contested and negotiated at every stage of the crises. Facilitating this

17. Frank Costigliola discusses the “signaling masculine-coded ‘toughness,’” see “Reading for Meaning: Theory, Language, and Metaphor,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 285.

18. Mark Davidheiser, “Rituals and Conflict Transformation: An Anthropological Analysis of Ceremonial Dimensions of Dispute Processing,” in *Beyond Intractability*, ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, 2006), accessed June 17, 2008, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/rituals_and_ceremonials/.

19. Lisa Schirch, *Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding* (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2005), 13.

20. For an elaboration of “silent poetry” of negotiations, see Schirch, *Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding*, 9.

21. Robert Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 5.

process was the ritualization of discourses, embodied in signaling and symbolic gestures. Such a ritualization of foreign policy often happened in a “symbiotic” manner, consisting of “soft” and “hard” elements, as an *untidy* confluence of nationalistic discourse, symbols, cultural images, military posturing, canvassing for international support, and diplomatic negotiation. The process of tacit accommodation was not an inexorable process destined to succeed, but one influenced by a plethora of factors—international relations, domestic developments, and issues of national identity in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. Such an analytical lens allows one to appreciate the complexity of adversarial and alliance diplomacy, so aptly captured in the many nuances of PRC-ROC-US relations, as revealed in the unfolding of the many turbid diplomatic episodes of the Taiwan Strait Crises from 1954 to 1958.

In this nine-chapter book, the first part (Chapters 1–3) starts with the major developments in the foreign relations of the US, PRC, and ROC from 1950 to April 1954, in order to understand the origins and making of the Taiwan Strait Crises. Especially important is the Geneva Conference, April 26 to July 21, 1954, where tacit communication was first made between the US and China. For the second part (Chapters 4–5), we look at developments in July and August 1954 leading to the eruption of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. How did China, the United States, and Taiwan act following the outbreak of this crisis? What were the motivations for their actions and how did Sino-US relations develop from the eve of the Yijiangshan campaign to the Bandung Conference? We then examine the sustaining linkages in US-PRC-ROC relations that occurred between May 1955 and December 1957. The final part of the book (Chapters 7–8) uncovers how Sino-US tacit accommodation was reached almost immediately in the wake of the crisis. In what ways did China and the United States seek to justify their actions to their domestic public and in the international arena and how did they attempt to court domestic and international support? How did Beijing and Washington consolidate their tacit accommodation and how did the ROC respond? Why did the PRC and the ROC again engage in secret back channels? This study concludes that tacit accommodation was extremely limited in hammering any solid gains, but the threat of war was averted.

The bulk of my Chinese sources are from Academia Historica (Taipei) and Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing). It was only in recent years that the post-1953 papers of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo are released. This liberalization of materials coincided with the tenure of the former Chen Shui-bian Presidency (2000–2008). Next, up to 70 percent to 80 percent of the PRC foreign ministry archives are declassified. This archive has also published three volumes of documents that contain a significant amount of materials not duplicated in the archives.²² Supplementary Chinese materials such as memoirs, collected papers and official publications were consulted and cross-referenced.

22. Zhang Sulin, “The Declassification of Chinese Foreign Ministry Archival Materials: A Brief Introduction,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin (CWIHPB)*, Issue 16 (Fall 2007–Winter 2008): 11.

Most US documents were from Dwight D. Eisenhower presidential Library; new materials declassified from 2006 onwards were consulted on site.²³ The archival staff had further granted on-the-spot Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Elsewhere, one particular commercial database, *Declassified Documents Reference System*, has enabled the tracking down of obscure materials missed during the field trip to Abilene. The public FOIA website of the Central Intelligence Agency also has many new materials which are useful for this book.

23. Colleen Cearley, "Eisenhower Presidential Library Releases Formerly Secret Documents," News Release, February 2, 2006, DDEL.

Conclusion

The Return of the Prodigal Plans: From Fangong to Guoguang

Despite criticizing the Eisenhower administration for its ham-fisted management of the Formosa Strait, especially during the 1960 presidential campaign's third television debate (October 14, 1960), John F. Kennedy was even quicker at distancing himself from the generalissimo after his inauguration. Aides of the youthful president helpfully drafted "Operation Candor with the GRC"; its main thrust was to put across to Chiang: "We do not intend to desert Chiang, but we feel entitled, as his chief supporter, to insist that he rationalize his position for the long pull." In various actions, Kennedy showed his mettle. He withdrew nuclear tipped Matador missiles from Taiwan and cancelled the lone transport plane C-130B (for airborne assault) that had previously been approved by Eisenhower. Two other international issues particularly stood out. Washington forced Chiang to withdraw all KMT irregular troops from the Burmese-Chinese border. Those insurgents had been part of Chiang's *fangong* oeuvre; now Kennedy put paid to that scheme. Taipei was also deterred from vetoing Mongolia's admission to the UN. Chiang had maintained that Mongolia was part of China. The quid pro quo engineered by Kennedy was to maintain the ROC in the UN should ROC acquiesce in accepting Mongolia. All these events led Chiang "to suspect that despite protestations of support, the US Government is actually embarked on a calculated change of its China policy."¹

Therein partly lies the genesis of a resurgence of military planning in the 1960s—*Guoguang Jihua* 国光计划, to reclaim mainland China once more. There was simply no way that Chiang was turning the other cheek. *Guoguang* was

1. Sylvia Ellis, "Leadership Experience in the Cold War: Cuba, Khrushchev, and Quemoy-Matsu in the 1960 Presidential Election Campaign," in *US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy*, ed. Andrew Johnstone and Andrew Priest (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 128–53; Steven M. Goldstein, *The United States and the Republic of China, 1949–1978: Suspicious Allies* (Stanford, CA: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 2000), 8; Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., *U.S.-Taiwan Economic And Military Relations. In The Context of American Presidential Administrations, 1949–2008* (Clemson, SC: Strom Thurmond Institute, 2014), 11; Memorandum. Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Bundy, Washington, May 2, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, *Northeast Asia*, Volume XXII, no. 23, 54; Telegram, Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State, June 21, 1961, *ibid.*, no. 32, 72–76; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (New York: Fawcett Premier, 1965), 447.

designed to keep the *fangong* flame alive, especially now when the White House was occupied by a young and inexperienced Democrat. Chiang was also clearly cognizant of the fact that a number of KMT cadres under Vice President Chen Cheng were totally opposed to *fangong*.² Indeed, Jay Taylor, Chiang's foremost biographer, has characterized *guoguang*'s function as "to keep things stirred up and to occupy his forces."³ The very scale of *guoguang* was breathtaking; all three services formed their planning offices, which were staffed by elite staff officers, and their efforts were coordinated by the main *guoguang* office in the Ministry of Defense. Spanning a decade, Chiang personally chaired ninety-seven *guoguang* "Special Conferences" from 1961 to 1970. *Guoguang* planning concentrated on four types of warfare:

1. All out counteroffensive—focusing on second stage operations;
2. Partial counteroffensive—expansion of beachhead toward inland;
3. Assault operations—occupation of a concentration area for a limited time for intelligence gathering;
4. And, special operations—to be carried out in tandem with assault operations.

Admiral Wang Ho-su recalled that the general thrust of Chiang's plans involved taking Xiamen in stage one. From that secured beachhead, ROC forces would cut off the Yingtan–Xiamen railway, thereby impeding PRC resupply and reinforcement efforts. From its base camp, ROC forces could secure resupplies via the Quemoy front. ROC would form a pincer movement—left flanked to Guangzhou and right wheeled to Hunan or Fujian. Ironically, Admiral Ho admitted that stage two was a puzzle because for all its best intentions and purposes, Taipei could never lock down American support for its latter stages. Indeed, such plans did not shield its participants—ROC's best and brightest—from *guoguang*'s moribund state. Retrospective interviews with seventeen ROC generals revealed the same problems and constraints that were previously highlighted in *fangong* planning in the 1950s. The reincarnation of *guoguang* underscored the Sisyphean task of counterattacking mainland China again and again via paper play or sand table ritualistically, albeit by younger officers, supervised by senior officers such as General Peng Meng-chi, presided over by an aging generalissimo.⁴

Nonetheless, turmoil in China strongly encouraged Chiang. The country was seemingly on the verge of implosion. Mass famine—in the words of the PLA chief of general staff, General Huang Kecheng, "unprecedented shortages unseen since

2. Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, April 16, 1962, reprinted in *Jiang Zhongzheng xiansheng nianpu zhangbian* 蒋中正先生年谱长编, Vol. 11, ed. Lü Fangshang 吕芳上 (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 2015), 556 (hereafter cited as *Jiang nianpu*).

3. Taylor, *The Generalissimo*, 510.

4. Chen Han-T'ing 陈汉廷 and Lo Shun-te 罗顺德, *Guofang Buzhang Yu Dawei* 国防部长俞大维 (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue, 2016), 204–11; Maj-Gen. Hsing Tsu-yuan 邢祖援, interview by Peng Ta-nien, in *Chenfeng dezuozhan jihua: Guoguang Jihua: Koushu lishi* 尘封的作战计画: 国光计画: 口述历史, ed. Peng Ta-nien 彭大年 (Taipei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyishi, 2005), 39–72; Adm. Wang Ho-su 王河肃, interview by Peng, *ibid.*, 17–37.

the days of liberation”—were caused by Great Leap Forward disaster. This was compounded by the attending general political purges—especially of PRC General Peng Dehuai and Huang.⁵ Externally, the Kremlin cancelled its atomic aid to China in June 1959. The following year (July 16), it withdrew all Russian military and industrial experts from China. A month earlier Khrushchev even unwisely slammed Mao in the Third Romanian Worker’s Party Congress as a “galosh” and a “Buddha who gets his theory out of his nose.”⁶ All in all, Beijing was beset, in Chiang’s eyes, the Chinese *bête noire* of *neiluan waihuan* 内乱外患 (internal crisis, external threats). The stars were ostensibly aligned for Chiang’s return. However, Chiang’s prognosis was inadvertently premature. CIA’s NIE 13–60 written in December 1960 saw very little of the impending chaos to the CCP political body,

We believe it unlikely that anti-regime activities will threaten the regime’s ability to control and direct the country during the next five years. The Soviet experience of the early 1930’s demonstrated that even mass starvation may not generate resistance that can upset a ruthless totalitarian regime. The majority of people will probably be dissatisfied with their personal lot under communism, but they will lack any effective means of translating their discontent into active resistance. As disillusionment and the pressures toward dissidence increase, the sophisticated and pervasiveness of Peiping’s control mechanism will also grow. Peiping’s chief problem will not so much the suppression of dissidence as the overcoming of apathy, fatigue, and passive resistance. In any case, we now see no serious threat, either internal or external to the continuance of the regime.

Ambassador Averell Harriman in his special consultation on March 15, 1962, with Chiang stressed repeatedly for the “need not only for consultation, but also agreement” to any ROC attacks on mainland China. In addition, Kennedy, a fortnight later, called upon Ray Cline, the CIA station chief in Taiwan, “to get a commitment from the GRC that there would be no further public discussion of a return to the mainland.”⁷

But the ship had already sailed. In his New Year Day broadcast, Chiang literally called upon the citizenry of mainland China to rise up in rebellion. “The time for vengeance and erasure of national humiliation is at hand.” Chiang exclaimed,

5. The other prominent CCP leaders who were purged were Hunan Party Secretary Zhou Xiaozhou and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian. See Huang Kecheng 黄克诚, *Huang Kecheng jun shi wen xuan* 黄克诚军事文选 (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2002), 736; Huang Jing and Li Xiaoting, *Inseparable Separation: The Making of China’s Taiwan Policy* (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2010), 67.
6. “Galosh” is a sexualized Russian slang word for condoms. See William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man, His Era* (New York: The Free Press, 2003), 471; Mercy A. Kuo, *Contending with Contradictions* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 153–54; Vladislav M. Zubok and Hope M. Harrison, “The Nuclear Education of Nikita Khrushchev,” in *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb*, ed. John Lewis Gaddis et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 154.
7. CIA, National Intelligence Estimate no. 13–60 (December 6, 1960), in *Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China during the Era of Mao, 1948–1976* (Pittsburgh: Supt. of Docs., G.P.O., 2004), 11; Telegram, From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State, Taipei, March 15, 1962, 3 p.m., *FRUS*, 1961–1963, Northeast Asia, Volume XXII, no. 92, 196; Memorandum, Roger Hilsman, Washington, March 31, 1962, *ibid.*, no. 97, 205.

“The time to act has arrived. Our national army is fully prepared to proceed any time.”⁸ Offshore island ROC troops were increased, and Chiang Ching-kuo even requested from Washington enough airplanes to insert two hundred paratroopers into mainland China.⁹ Whatever Chiang’s intentions were, Beijing was on the alert. The Central Military Commission ordered an emergency mobilization. On January 25, Fuzhou military area command transferred thirteen divisions to the command of the 28th Group Army. The deputy chief of the General Staff, Su Yu, and his staff devised an envelopment strategy, which aimed to make use of Fujian’s vast hinterland to draw in Chiang’s divisions. One 244th regiment was deputized to cut off Chiang’s retreat. To the troops, such a maneuver was colloquially known as *guanmen dagou* 关门打狗 (close the door to beat the dog). Meanwhile, the PRC navy mustered 186 vessels, which was supported by 150 fighter planes. No fewer than six divisions were detected by US intelligence being dispatched to Fujian province. Mao approved a general populace mobilization alert along especially along the eastern coastal area on June 11, 1962, via a telegram, which was to be published in the *People’s Daily* subsequently on June 23.¹⁰

Fully aware of the defensive nature of the PRC, Kennedy immediately activated the Warsaw conduit; this was significant in which tacit accommodation established in Eisenhower’s era appeared to be working even in Kennedy’s time. Washington was confident that regardless of hostile rhetoric, Beijing was highly capable of nuanced practical responses.¹¹ Moreover, the Kennedy administration independently did a thorough study of the ambassadorial talks in 1961; it was found that: “The talks constitute a direct, private means of communications between the United States and Communist China which we have been able to use to bring up a wide array of topics.” Foreign minister Chen Yi’s general instructions for PRC Warsaw negotiations, which were covered by Ambassador Wang Bingnan, were likewise genial: “You can greet and shake hands with the American ambassador, invite him to a meal on Sunday. You don’t have to be so tense, be neither servile nor overbearing, be reasonable, and act with restraint, as befitting a big nation.”¹²

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8. Presidential notice, Chiang, Kai-shek, January 1, 1962, in *Zongtong Jianggong Sixiang Yanlun Zongji* 总统蒋公思想言论总集 [The anthology of President Chiang Kai-shek’s thoughts and speeches] vol. 33, ed. Qin Xiaoyi 秦孝义 (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, 1984), 293.
 9. Charles J. Pellegrin, “There Are Bigger Issues at Stake: The Administration of John F. Kennedy and United States-Republic of China Relations, 1961–63,” in *John F. Kennedy, History, Memory, and Legacy: An Interdisciplinary Inquiry*, ed. John Delane Williams et al. (Grand Forks: University of North Dakota, 2010), 109.
 10. Xiao Hongming 萧鸿鸣, Xiao Nanxi 萧南溪, and Xiao Jiang 萧江, *Jinmen Zhanyi Jishi Benmo* 金门战役纪事本末 (Taipei: Xinyu chubanshe, 2016), 661–63; *Xiao Jinguang Huiyilu*, 237; Bruce A. Elleman, *High Seas Buffer: Taiwan Patrol Force 1950–1979* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2012), 112–15; *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao* 建国以来毛泽东军事文稿 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2010), vol. 3, 138–40.
 11. Michael Lumbers, *Piercing the Bamboo Curtain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 29; Xia, *Negotiating*, 113–17; James Fetzer, “Clinging to Containment: China Policy,” in *Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 183.
 12. Huang Sui 黄穗, “Chen Yi waizhang zai waijiao zhanxian shang de huihuang yeji” 陈毅外长在外交战线上的辉煌业绩, in *Chen Yi bainian danchen jinian wenji* 陈毅百年诞辰纪念文集, ed. Ma Hongwu, et al. (Chengdu:

Hence, for this crisis, both sides simultaneously activated their respective ambassadors to give reassurances that no military assaults were envisioned. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman gave a heads-up about the US's position to the Soviet ambassador Dobrynin a day before the scheduled Warsaw talks. Similarly, on the same day, British ambassador David Ormsby-Gore was also given the same message.¹³ Wang Bingnan was briefed by Zhou Enlai and hurriedly returned to Warsaw and met with Ambassador John Cabot on June 23. Cabot duly relayed to Wang that the "US Government had no intention of supporting any GRC attack on the mainland under existing circumstances. I pointed out that the GRC committed not to attack without our consent. I then noted Chicom military build-up opposite Taiwan and said if this defensive, it was unobjectionable." Wang recalled in his memoirs that he "heaved a sigh of relief." Cabot reported, "Wang was relaxed and friendly when offering us tea after [our] formal exchange." To drive home the point, in a news conference on June 27, Kennedy elucidated that Washington was "opposed to the use of force in this area" and emphasized the "defensive nature of our arrangement there."¹⁴ Fully appreciative of Washington's candor, Zhou Enlai responded to the visiting British Labor MP, Malcolm MacDonald, in October 1962, that Beijing was fully prepared for such ambassadorial talks to "continue for another seven years."¹⁵

Hereafter, the wind was seemingly knocked out of Chiang's sails. "America will never agree to my *fangong*," Chiang bitterly wrote in his diary on September 9. "Even if there's an agreement at the moment, it will be given up halfway or become a total sell out. If one hopes that America will agree or demonstrate unstinting support, it will just be wishful thinking." Instead of some grand invasion from Taiwan, PRC Naval Commander General Xiao Jinguang recalled in his memoirs, there were some intense ROC commando raids along Guangdong; from 1963 onward, the raids peppered the coasts from Fujian to Zhejiang. Adm. Ronald N. Smoot, the commander of the Taiwan Defense Command, reminisced how ROC commandoes, inserted by

Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2001), 581.

13. Memorandum of Conversation, Harriman to Dobrynin, Washington, June 22, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, Northeast Asia, Volume XXII, no. 127, 269; Telegram, Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, June 22, 1962, 9:25 p.m., *ibid.*, no. 128, 269; Young, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists*, 250.
14. Wang Bingnan 王炳南, *Zhong Mei huitan jiu nian huigu* 中美会谈九年回顾 [Nine years of Sino-US talks] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1985), 87–90; Telegram from the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State, Warsaw, June 23, 1962, 8 p.m., FRUS, 1961–1963, Northeast Asia, Volume XXII, no. 131, 274–75; John F. Kennedy: "The President's News Conference," June 27, 1962. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8735>.
15. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "Continuing Controversies in the Literature of US-China Relations since 1945," in *Pacific Passage*, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 226; Tucker, "No Common Ground: American-Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1948–1972," *Diplomatic History* 16, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 319–24; James C. Thomson, "Whose Side Are We On?" *The New York Review of Books* (July 29, 1990): 25; Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, 224–27; 247–50; Kenneth T. Young, *Diplomacy and Power and Washington-Peking Dealings: 1953–67* (Chicago: University of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1967), 17; Wang, *Zhong Mei huitan*, 90; Zhou further hinted to MacDonald that Beijing and Taipei had maintained "hidden contacts," FRUS (1961–1963) 22, 234n2.

submarines, would cut the throats of PLA artillery gunners in many of those raids. Yet success was limited. PLA official accounts listed the interception of forty-three batches of such raids from 1962 to 1965. Chiang was personally apprised of the abject failure of nine such raids in late 1962.¹⁶

The final blow was yet to come. In Xiao's estimation, from 1962 to 1965, there were ten aerial engagements, and the PRC sunk or captured around ten vessels. Two major ROC naval setbacks occurred in 1965. On August 6, two ROC submarine chasers *Jianmen* and *Zhangjiang*, on another commando insertion mission, were overwhelmed by a combination of PLA-Navy fast-attack craft and torpedo boats in waters southeast of Dongshan Island, Fujian. Unfortunately, the same circumstances befell ROC gunboat *Yongchang* and submarine chaser *Yongtai* on November 14, near the eastern coast of Chongwu, in the vicinity of Wuchiu Island (*Yongtai* was damaged and scuttled). Chiang was reportedly enraged by these losses. Significantly, from 1966 to 1970, Chiang was no longer so enamored with *guoguang* planning. From the peak of presiding over twenty-plus conferences a year, he only turned up twice for 1966 *guoguang* planning. Insights from the interviews done with *guoguang* participants overtly referred to the naval losses and most implicitly linked the twin disasters to the downturn in *guoguang's* fortunes.¹⁷

Causes of the Taiwan Strait Crises

In its examination of the unfolding of the Taiwan Strait imbroglio, this study has traced the strategic concerns of the United States: maintaining Chiang's Taiwan, keeping Japan firmly under the US security umbrella, and preventing communism from spreading in Southeast Asia. During this period, US also persisted with non-recognition of China, economic embargo, and covert operations against China. A new course of United Action, a US proposal to stem the Communist tide in Indochina that would lead to the formation of SEATO in September 1954, further emerged as a strategy to counter the PRC's involvement in Indochina. All these actions helped entwine the Taiwan Strait issue with other events happening in Southeast Asia and contributed to the making of the Taiwan Strait Crises. These actions would later be perceived by the PRC to constitute a US strategy of encircling China, and they would provide a context for China's bombing of the Quemoy and Matsu islands, which in turn would trigger the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. In the aftermath of the Korean War armistice agreements, Beijing was anxious to emerge from diplomatic isolation. To this end, China placed the Taiwan Strait issue on the

16. Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, September 9, 1962 and December 30, 1962, *Jiang nianpu*, vol. 11, 580 and 601; Xiao Jinguang *huiyilu*, 237–39; Elleman, *High Seas Buffer*, 112–13; John W. Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 104–9.

17. Xiao Jinguang *huiyilu*, 237–39; Elleman, *High Seas Buffer*, 112–13; Garver, *Sino-American Alliance*, 105; Rear Adm. Hsü Hsüeh-hai 徐学海, interview by Peng, in *Chenfeng*, 221–56; Huang Chuanhui 黄传会 and Zhou Yuxing 舟欲行, *Xiongfeng: Zhongguo Renmin Haijun jishi 雄风: 中国人民解放军海军人纪实* (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2007), 320–67.

backburner, expressed its concerns regarding the US and United Action, sought to win over Asian neutralist countries, and advocated a “talking while fighting” posture with respect to Vietnam.

This inquiry has further located the making of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in the Geneva Conference where many significant issues were not settled, highlighting again the entwining of the Taiwan Strait issue with events in Southeast Asia. China's efforts to win over Asian countries seemed momentarily successful in countering the specter of United Action. Nonetheless, it was clear that in Geneva, US difficulties in rallying allies to its cause and the negativity of its association with neocolonialism hampered its efforts in developing a regional countermeasure against China. US dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Geneva Conference led it to disregard the Geneva Accords and dulled Beijing's diplomatic achievements. Beijing was unhappy with the continued insistence of the US on non-recognition for China, and frustrated with the formation of SEATO and the likelihood of a potential ROC-US defense treaty, which it viewed to be targeting directly at China. Coupled with the continuation of ROC commando raids and the danger of “two Chinas” looming ahead, the PRC launched massive bombardments on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu on September 3, thereby setting off the First Taiwan Strait Crisis.

To some extent, Sino-US misperceptions and miscalculations played a significant part in the outbreak of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The US noted that China's gains in Geneva were limited and the probability of a Communist armed attack low. US budgetary constraints, the limitations of US nuclear deterrence, and Eisenhower's firmness against casual belligerency further meant that the US was not about to provoke a war with China. Although United Action culminated in the formation of SEATO, which would unsettle China, Dulles was aware of the limitations of US sponsorship. Clearly, the US was caught flat-footed by Chinese ire and bombardments. At the same time, the tremendous energy with which Beijing expedited convincing its Asian neighbors such as India and Burma in late 1954 of its peaceful intentions bespoke of China's anxiety in addressing unexpected tensions in the Strait with remedial actions.

Nevertheless, within the first week of the bombardment, the US accurately assessed that Beijing's intentions were limited. Eisenhower's Denver decision on September 12, 1954, against any military action regarding the offshore islands proved to be consistent with the view that he had of China since 1953. Even in the wake of the Yijiangshan campaign in January 1955, the US tacitly accepted the PRC's international standing, recognized the inevitability of another diplomatic engagement with China, and hoped that by proposing Operation Oracle (New Zealand's UN resolution), this would not only salvage the US international standing and support the ROC's UN position, but would also signal to China the US willingness to talk. Similarly, Beijing understood the value of public posturing coupled with tacit agreements. While there can be no “private compromises,” there was a tacit understanding about which boundaries should not be crossed. By April 1955, both

parties had reached the liminal stage where the belligerents were familiar with each other's maneuvers. Ironically, it took a neutral figure such as UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to make explicit the process of communication that was emerging in Sino-US relations: he accurately perceived the emergence of a *ritualized* pattern of diplomacy where "inner pressure" and "quiet" diplomacy would define the contours of Sino-US relations from that point onward.

China's domestic imperatives did also play a part in the outbreak of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. China hoped that its bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu would deter the US from further carrying out perceived encirclement actions. China's desire for a stable international environment to focus on its domestic goals stemmed directly from the deleterious impact of the Korean War. Rehabilitation of the economy was China's top priority. Demands on the PRC's state budget were indeed tight. With the signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance in 1950, the Chinese borrowed wholesale the Soviet model of industrial development and other forms of development. In the first Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), the PRC set aside \$20 billion for development and up to 58 percent went into heavy industries. The Soviets' contributions were mainly in terms of technical knowledge and advisors. Not only did the Chinese have to put up most of the \$20 billion with only a small amount of Soviet aid, the Chinese also had to pay for all of the industries set up by the Soviets.

For the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, this research contends that China's political decision to bombard Quemoy was cast in a mode of defiance against the timidity of the Soviets, against the specter of US encirclement and perceived American intransigence, and in the face of Taiwan's provocations. In the mid-1950s, tensions were building up in Sino-Soviet relations as the Soviets spoke of the dangers of nuclear warfare, advocated peaceful coexistence with the US, and were generally noncommittal about Mao's economic blueprint of radical agricultural collectivization. With the launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite in 1957, it was clear to Mao that the way forward was a communist bloc energetically led by the Soviet Union. To Mao, US provocations—such as constructing B-52 nuclear bomber runways in January 1957 and placing nuclear-tipped Matador missiles in Taiwan on May 2, 1958—had to be firmly dealt with. He also questioned why the PRC had to put up with US intransigence in Sino-US negotiations and the numerous raids that Taiwanese commandoes made on China's southern coasts. Beijing was also highly dissatisfied with the Soviets' handling of the Middle East crisis. Under the banner of the Eisenhower Doctrine enunciated in 1957, the US Marines landed in Lebanon on July 15, 1958, in reaction to internal Lebanese rebellions. However, to Mao's intense frustration, Khrushchev belatedly chose the softer option of talking in the UN Security Council. Moreover, the US appeared infuriatingly tardy in responding to PRC demands for the resumption of ambassadorial talks. Beijing decided to move and in a grand show of defiance. To head off another specter of US encirclement, the Chinese Politburo on July 17, 1958, agreed to proceed with further bombardments

on Quemoy. Artillery barrages rained on Quemoy and Matsu on August 23, igniting the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis.

To some extent, there were varying degree of Sino-US misperception in the outbreak of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The US was apprehensive about Sino-Soviet collusion when Khrushchev made a surprise visit to Beijing in August 1958. Dulles displayed no small amount of hand-wringing over the suitability of dropping nuclear weapons on China before his Newport speech on September 4. Similarly, Mao famously declared, albeit rather casually, to the Supreme State Conference on September 5 that “I simply did not calculate that the world would become so disturbed and turbulent.”¹⁸ Yet, miscalculations played a smaller role in the outbreak of the second crisis. New documentation from Abilene, Beijing, and Taipei have provided ample evidence that the US, PRC, and ROC were acutely aware of one another’s intentions.

China’s domestic imperatives played a major role in the outbreak of the second crisis.¹⁹ The Chinese leadership was confronted by unexceptional agricultural gains. In 1957, China only achieved a 3.5 percent increase in the gross value of agriculture production. Worse, food grain production only attained an increase of a miserable 1 percent.²⁰ At the same time, other problems of the command economy reared their heads. Mao carped about the slipping of revolutionary fervor of the CCP cadres, and forced the issue with his speech “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People” on February 27, 1957. Mao wanted the CCP to acknowledge that elitist bureaucratism had eroded its revolutionary spirit. He proposed to resolve the issue by mass campaign.²¹ Thus, China’s intellectuals were unleashed by the Hundred Flowers Campaign in May 1957 designed to allow greater freedom of speech, including criticism of the CCP.²² However, the plan backfired, remind-

18. In light of new documents and Chinese memoirs, the thesis on Mao’s miscalculation seemed overdrawn, see Allen S. Whiting, “New Light on Mao: Quemoy 1958: Mao’s Miscalculations,” *China Quarterly* 62 (June 1975): 263–70.

19. Besides China’s desire for a stable international environment to focus on its domestic goals, China also seemed to be making use of the Crisis to support its domestic agenda. Throughout the 1950s, the Soviets readily responded with “the largest transfer of technology in the recent era” to the PRC. Bruce Cumings, “The Political Economy of Chinese Foreign Policy,” *Modern China* 5, no. 4 (October 1979): 415; Peter Van Ness, “Three Lines in Chinese Foreign Relations, 1950–1983: The Development Imperative,” in *Three Visions of Chinese Socialism*, ed. Dorothy J. Solinger (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 122.

20. Kenneth R. Walker, *Planning in Chinese Agriculture: Socialisation and the Private Sector* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), 71.

21. By doing so, Mao hoped to forestall the same kind of groundswell of unhappiness that had erupted against the communist governments in Poland and Hungary. Mao was confident that the intellectuals who had so recently been cleansed by the Thought Reform movement (1951) and the Purge Counterrevolutionaries Movement (1955) would be useful in highlighting the shortcomings of the CCP. In January 1956, the National Conference on the Problems of the Intellectuals even declared that working class now consisted of intellectuals. As a result, intellectuals who became cadres formed 16% of the total CCP membership by 1957. Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan*, 81.

22. But Mao underestimated the level of discontentment with the CCP; criticisms of the intellectuals were combined with that of university students who called for the end of CCP rule. The open publication (June 6, 1957) of a heavily edited version of “On Contradictions,” which emphasized crushing intellectual dissent, signaled the start of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. United Front leaders, CCP cadres, and outspoken intellectuals

ing the CCP that more work needed to be done in socializing the population and party.²³ The proper social organization of the PRC's plentiful manpower could act as a kind of capital input to multiply China's agricultural outputs and industrial development—the communes. By returning to the masses, CCP cadres would also receive another dose of revolutionary activism. The Great Leap Forward in 1958 could thus be understood as the culmination of Mao's frustrations with reforming the CCP and also the high tide of repressive economic and social policies enacted.²⁴

Evidence shows that Beijing was interested in the domestic mobilization value of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis to fuel the Great Leap Forward. From the beginning of September 1958, the PRC then “stepped up internally” on reporting the Taiwan Strait Crisis to its domestic audience. Beijing's mass mobilization on September 6 was also aimed at deflecting perceived the PRC's eagerness at negotiations while whipping up support for domestic social changes. The British chargé noted that “the press has since been completely taken up with reports of mass demonstrations throughout the country in support of Chou En-lai's statement.” So concerned was the PRC with any possibility that critics would latch on its capitulation to the enemy that more strident slogans, such as “China will certainly liberate Quemoy and Matsu, and will certainly liberate Taiwan,” appeared.

The Great Leap Forward also had implications for the foreign relations of the PRC in terms of highlighting China's role as a revolutionary beacon, the “leader of the East,” with China adopting a euphoric posturing to the world comprising a cocktail of nationalistic pride, exhilaration, and an intense eschatological glimpse into the future. Fraternal countries were impressed with China. Vylko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian deputy prime minister, was entranced by the Chinese.²⁵ India sent two delegations to learn from the Chinese experience, and they set about implementing their own version of the Great Leap Forward.²⁶ The US was extremely wary of the seductiveness of the PRC's crowing, and sought to be more generous in foreign aid to India precisely to counter this trend.

were effectively culled by this round of ratification. The failure of the Hundred Flowers Campaign Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Contradictions among the People* Vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 207–10, 218–69.

23. Between 750,000 to 550,000 were persecuted as rightists. Many were simply indicted as party cadres were at pains to fulfill the quota of 5 percent stipulated by Beijing. The upper limit of 750,000 was estimated by Merle Goldman. Fu on the other hand suggests the lower limit, see Fu Zhengyuan, *Autocratic Tradition and Chinese politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 294.
24. In June 1958, Mao announced a timetable of two to three years to surpass Britain. At the height of the frenzy in September, Mao declared that China would catch up with the capitalist nations the following year. See, Wong, *Contemporary*, 23; Shapiro, *Mao's War against Nature*, 74.
25. The Bulgarians began to collectivize their farms and expand their heavy industries at the same time. Khrushchev sourly noted in his memoirs that when the Bulgarians met with economic disaster, the Soviets had to foot the bill. But the motherland of the October Revolution was similarly affected. “Soviet newspapers,” complained Khrushchev, “had also raised the question of borrowing from the Chinese experience of building communes,” although such speculations were quickly squashed. Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev* Vol. 3, 447–50.
26. Alexander Eckstein, *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade: Implications for U.S. Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 267–74.

This analysis has also further highlighted the important roles played by the ROC, the most directly affected party, in accounting for the outbreaks of both Taiwan Strait Crises. That the Taiwan Strait issue assumed crucial significance for Taiwan was seen in how the issue played a significant role in the formulation and implementation of policies to uphold Taiwan's political survival and cultural revival. Its importance was further seen in the construction of the clarion call to wage *fangong dalu* (counteroffensive against the mainland), which led to a militarization of Taiwan's society and constituted a major component of its foreign policy. Yet, military planning for the *fangong* mission became ritualized, changing domestic and international developments had gradually led to the waning of *fangong*. With defensive thinking quietly given precedence over the belligerency of counterattack, the slogan of "counteroffensive" also became subverted into a more pedestrian domestic rallying cliché aimed at boosting morale, stabilizing and militarizing society, and disciplining a credible work force.

Mode of Communication

This treatise supports contentions in existing scholarship that China's actions against the offshore islands were purposeful, limited probes and did not constitute a prelude to occupying Taiwan. Both military and diplomatic sources of the PRC have made it clear that limited objectives were sought; political goals mattered more than military objectives. The possibility of the physical occupation of the offshore islands was remote at best, let alone the recovery of Taiwan. From this perspective, the issue of nuclear deterrence can also be better contextualized and not seen as the overwhelming thrust of Eisenhower's strategy during the Taiwan Strait Crises (of the latter, more will be further elaborated upon in this chapter).

The original argument here centers on the themes of tacit communication, management of crises, and negotiations and tenuous peace. Building upon the pioneering efforts of McClelland's "tacit communication," Kalicki's "Sino-American crisis system," and the works of Tucker and Goldstein on "negotiations and tenuous peace," this study further demonstrates the dynamic mechanism via four main phases during the Taiwan Strait Crises. First, the foundation for a framework of "tacit communication" was laid as early as April–July 1954 during the Geneva Conference which was convened to discuss matters pertaining to the conflicts in Korea and Indochina, prior to the outbreak of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The Geneva Conference could be interpreted as a bellwether attempt, for the belligerents and allies, to work out a tentative modus operandi. A good example was seen in the initiative taken by US representative in Geneva Bedell Smith, without reprimands from Eisenhower, to establish fleeting personal links with Zhou. Eisenhower himself was intuitively working to shift his colleagues toward the eventual loosening of trade sanctions against the PRC. Progress was miniscule and limited in manner.

Second, further steps in “tacit communication” were constructed during the early months of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, leading to “tacit accommodation” in the later months of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. In the early phase of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, Beijing had conveyed its political concerns about the Taiwan problem and its peaceful intentions and limited belligerencies through a wide array of international contacts. Washington appeared ham-fisted in response to Beijing’s peace feelers directly, i.e., evoking the UN Security Council could be viewed as a counter move in tacit communication. In the later phase, there did emerge a burgeoning stabilization of the crisis. Both Washington and Beijing demonstrated flexibility as they inched toward Bandung with the intention to tacitly resolve the crisis. Helped by the “quiet diplomacy” of UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, the US and the PRC made progress, with the PRC’s conciliatory gesture on April 23, 1955 in Bandung paving the way for the Sino-US ambassadorial talks to be held in Geneva in August 1955.

Third, progress in “tacit accommodation” was made but at the same time its limitations became apparent during the period between the two crises. Although the Sino-US ambassadorial talks held in Geneva from August 1955 to December 1957 represented progress from a framework of tacit communication toward Sino-US tacit accommodation, the limitations of such an accommodation became apparent during the negotiations to discuss the issues of US airmen and the Taiwan Strait, and different expectations led to inconclusive results by the end of 1957. Nonetheless, even though the talks could not resolve the issues, its long-term consequences were noteworthy as it facilitated the way for the holding of future Sino-US ambassadorial talks, which became one of the main communication channels in subsequent Sino-US relations.

Fourth, “tacit accommodation” was then consolidated, enabling the rapid resolution of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Right from the start of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, both Washington and Beijing exercised remarkable restraint. Eisenhower was calm and despite Dulles’ uncertainty and the different views of US officials. Dulles’ offer of tacit accommodation on September 4, 1958, was swiftly accepted by Zhou on September 6. Armed with good intelligence, experience with Beijing’s *modus operandi*, and sharp instincts, Eisenhower at once concluded the Taiwan Strait Crisis would blow over. But Washington could not elaborate too much on the contours of tacit accommodation, thus suffering from public opinion backlash. Indeed, Mao placed each piece deliberately and symbolically to make sure the Americans were not overtly alarmed. The Chairman appeared more interested in upsetting the Soviets. Beijing’s odd-day bombardment announcement, provided yet another example of Sino-US tacit accommodation.

In other words, while the Taiwan Strait Crises highlighted conflicts and tensions in Sino-US relations (the predominant stress in existing scholarship), this critique has established that embedded in the crises were also seedlings that prepared the ground for conflict resolution in Sino-US relations. “Lessons” learned

from the interactions arising from the episodes of the Geneva Conference, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the inter-crisis period, and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis were digested and internalized. Each episode could be seen to have represented one building block of tacit understanding, constructed in a complex manner intricately linked to the international relations, domestic developments, and issues of national identity of Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. This torturous path toward mutual understanding was conditioned by realism and littered with misperceptions, and laid the groundwork for a substantive change in the nature of Sino-American relations—from one of hostile nuclear confrontation in 1954 to one of tacit accommodation in 1958.

The transformation from “tacit communication” to “tacit accommodation” was facilitated by “ritualization” in Sino-US relations. Each side engaged in ritualized actions toward the other party, and such actions facilitated the process of conflict resolution. These ritualized actions included the use of such “soft” elements as public symbols, identity issues, cultural images, and official discourses,²⁷ complemented at times by the “hard” language of “signaling” via military posturing, canvassing for international support, and diplomatic negotiations.²⁸ This combination of the “soft” and “hard” aspects can be seen to constitute a “symbiotic” engagement of ritualization. Although ritualization is more commonly used in anthropological studies of societies and religion than in studies of international relations or diplomatic history, one major argument advanced here is that ritualization can be a very useful concept in understanding the Taiwan Strait Crises.²⁹

Catherine Bell has urged for a broader appreciation of rituals as “a strategic form of cultural practice”:

Ritual practices are themselves the very production and negotiation of power relations. . . . Ritualizations as a strategic mode of practice produces nuanced relationships of power, relationships characterized by acceptance and resistance, negotiated appropriation, and redemptive reinterpretation of the hegemonic order.³⁰

If ritualization holds the promise of renegotiation of power relations, it stands to reason that interstate relations such as those of the PRC-US-ROC could profit

27. Joseph S. Nye Jr. posits “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion” as “soft power” an alternative to political coercion and economic pressures. For example, one relevant study looks at the discourse of war policies during the Vietnam War to determine how policies are “fitted together into a comprehensible recommendation.” See “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1990): 153–71; for an elaboration, see *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); David Sylvan et al., “Theoretical Categories and Data Constructions in Computational Models of Foreign Policy,” in *Artificial Intelligence and International Politics*, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 327.

28. Another research looks at how naval maneuvers could be constructed as symbolic signaling performed at the state level. Ola Tunander, *Cold Water Politics: The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front* (London: Sage, 1989), 169.

29. Ritualization and state power is discussed in John Pemberton, *On the Subject of “Java”* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 4; Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theater State in Nineteenth-Century Bali* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 13.

30. Bell, *Ritual Theory*, 196.

from such an analytical lens. As ritualization engages with elements of tradition, history, foreign threat, and national destiny through such mass exhortations and persuasions as political speeches, campaigns, and generally accepted discursive logos, this also makes it a powerful tool in deciphering the intricacies of the Taiwan Strait Crises. Analyzing the “symbiotic” ritualization of the processes and methods of war and peace can lead to several outcomes. It can render comprehensible one’s actions to the “other” and vice versa, which results in a muted acceptance of political and cultural differences without coming to blows, albeit displays of “predictable” belligerencies.³¹ Ritualization can also show that the underlying culture or national identity, which cannot be changed, must be silently reconciled with, socializing reluctant nations with their allies and enemies. With the limits and boundaries “ritualized” out, strategic withdrawal can be achieved with no loss of prestige.

For instance, the symbolic bombardment of the offshore islands by Mao was a stark reminder of how ritualization in war and peace could serve equally as a political language and a diplomatic protest. One finds that Mao was particularly insistent in controlling the number and manner of the bombardment that was to be delivered during the Taiwan Strait Crises. Analyzing the data of the Communist shells fired upon Quemoy in 1958, Jonathan T. Howe found that very few “deep-penetration” bunker destroying shells were used. Even Communist air raids were limited. The bombing almost seemed to be *perfunctory*.³² When one compares the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis with the first, it becomes obvious that the ritualized bombardments had their desired effect. Internal deliberations in the White House demonstrated that the US was very clear how far the Chinese would go. Likewise, intelligence generated by the ROC military showed acute knowledge about the ritualized manner of bombardment on the offshore islands. This “hard” language of signaling was complemented by the PRC’s frequent “soft” ritualistic refrain of the sacred principle of “one China.” As a matter of fact, it was the *predictability* of the PRC’s belligerency that made Eisenhower’s job easier in waving off any usage of nuclear devices. Lloyd Etheredge has further demonstrated that the much-vaunted US nuclear deterrence can be understood as “dramatic art.” “One creates and manages power as an exercise in applied psychology,” elaborates Etheredge, “shaping a dramatic presence that in the minds of others, becomes their experience of reality.”³³

Ritualization was also seen in the ROC-US relations. The Taiwan riots in May 1957 are particularly instructive in this instance. In the aftermath of the riots, the nuance and role of ritualized apology stood out. Chiang Kai-shek’s symbolic public apology and the report by the Executive Yuan straddled the domestic demands for

31. David I. Kertzer, *Ritual, Politics and Power* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 128.

32. Howe followed Halperin and Tang’s interpretation that the Chinese Communist was only interested in a limited probe. See *Multicrises: Seapower and Global Politics in the Missile Age* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), 242.

33. Lloyd Etheredge, “One Being More Rational Than Rationality Assumption: Dramatic Requirements, Nuclear Deterrence and the Agenda for Learning,” in *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*, ed. E. Singer and Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 62.

justice while upholding the international needs of the state. Taipei's sensitive nods to ritualized cultural concepts of filial piety, honor, and justice, dovetailed neatly with appeals to the pragmatic appreciation of power realities: Taiwan needed the US. Washington recognized the symbolism of Chiang Kai-shek's apology and quickly accepted his public apology to make up for initial lapses in justice in the death of Liu Tzu-jan, and also as recognition of the stress that Taipei felt about the Sino-US ambassadorial talks. In this manner, the renegotiation of power relations and the reconciliation of differences in a ritualized manner took place between Washington and Taipei and between Taipei and its populace. Another example of an adroit "symbiotic" engagement of ritualization was seen in Taiwan's military planning exercises, in which *fangong dalu* was ritualized into ceremonies in which Chiang's leading generals swore loyalty to the aging patriarch. The discourse component of such military planning had a formulaic slant whereby one must first swear eternal loyalty to the *fangong* mission, with later insertions of the difficulties of *fangong* allowed in the last few pages. More importantly, loud ritualistic adherence to the fantasy of the *fangong* mission had the practical benefits of loosening the tight fist of the US over monetary and military aid again and again.

This study highlights as well the relevant aspects of "culture" to better understand the intricacies of the PRC-US-ROC relations.³⁴ By using the cultural prism to reexamine the Taiwan Strait Crises, it also advances the counterintuitive proposal of the possibility of a tacit understanding between belligerents. The most obvious example was the secret channels maintained by Beijing and Taipei. Informed by the shared memories of China's humiliation at the hands of the English and other Western powers in the late nineteenth century, it was no small wonder that both Beijing and Taipei saw Dulles's "two Chinas" proposal as the biggest threat. Indeed, political ideologies were put aside when the universal Chinese concept of *guochi* (national humiliation) was evoked. No regime, be it communist or nationalist, could survive the blowback if it was perceived as responsible for dividing China. Thus, while it was incomprehensible to Washington that the belligerents could actually tacitly band together momentarily, it is indicative of the possible influences of historical and cultural commonalities in the realm of international relations.

More importantly, cultural sensitivities could also act as a kind of invisible gel that connected otherwise disparate nations. One example was how China's successful international debut during the Geneva Conference was facilitated by a strategy of combining cultural blitzkrieg and realpolitik. Accompanying China's negotiations grounded in pragmatic national interests was the ample dishing out of food, wine, movies, and cultural exhibitions, achieving what no amount of hardcore communist rhetoric could do, in winning friends and establishing prestige. This research has further contributed by showing how China also influenced Cambodia

34. For a succinct discussion of culture and IR, see the indispensable Valerie M. Hudson, "Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda," in *Culture and Foreign Policy*, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 1–26.

and Laos. Here, in perhaps some of the most poignant but little discussed incidents, such nations (including Burma) automatically positioned themselves as “younger brothers” in their interlocution with either Zhou or Mao. The US might arrange all kinds of containment defensive treaties around the PRC, but the China’s adjacent Asian neighbors knew instinctively that the US would be far away should trouble break out in their region. In a similar manner, the partition of Vietnam could hence also be interpreted partly as the product of such a hierarchical acknowledgement of the cultural hegemony and political power of the PRC.

The Taiwan Strait Crises and the Foreign Relations of the PRC, US, and ROC

Current studies of Chinese foreign relations consider such *nonrealist factors* as historical-cultural baggage, communist ideology, and human idiosyncrasy to have played a big role in China’s foreign policy. This is a departure from earlier studies from the 1980s and 1990s, which expanded on the realist model as their central organizing theme. Older studies often proposed that the PRC’s actions were defensive, and they explained China’s motivations based on naked power and alliance manipulations.³⁵ In this reexamination, cultural perceptions heavily influenced by historical experiences are found to be an essential element in decision-making. New Chinese sources also show the persistence of Marxist ideology running through Mao’s conception of modernity. Further, the highly personal involvement of Mao in all aspects of China’s development is seen to have presented additional challenges.³⁶

This study of the Taiwan Strait Crises follows the intellectual mien of Michael H. Hunt, who has attempted to bridge the gap between the realist and the nonrealist schools.³⁷ The present analysis endorses the proposal that realist and nonrealist factors are not mutually exclusive. Any research into the foreign relations of the

35. Representative works are Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); James Reardon-Anderson, *Yenan and the Great Powers* (New York: Columbia University press, 1980); Sergei N. Goncharov, John W Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).

36. For instance, Zhang Shu Guang argues in his book *Deterrence and Strategic Culture* (1992) that distinguishing the cultural differences of the antagonists’ perceptions will offer a sharper analytical tool. Michael M. Sheng’s *Battling Western Imperialism* (1997) advocates a return to the ideology of Marxist-Leninism sustained the identity and the integrity of the CCP. Chen Jian’s *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (2001) maintained that the ideology of “Continuous Revolution” underscored both the domestic economic policies and foreign policy orientation of China. Chen highlighted how the cultural context of China’s stake in the international proletarian revolution dovetailed with China’s traditional ethnocentrism. Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontation, 1949–1958* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Michael M. Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 196, 123; Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

37. Vivienne Shue has earlier argued that the crux for Mao was “making its ideological goals and its practical goals interlock.” Michael H. Hunt, *The Genesis of the Chinese Communist Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Vivienne Shue, *Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism, 1949–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 334–35.

PRC cannot escape the implications of the Communist ideology as official speeches and national justifications were full of such ideological bent. Likewise, documents depicting realist concerns such as security and defense were just as plentiful. For example, Mao's numerous hesitations and deliberations regarding the appropriate degree of bombardment during both crises demonstrated a master pragmatist at work. At the same time, issues such as the communist ideology in prompting Mao's 1957 "East wind over west wind" speech in Moscow and the subsequent Great Leap Forward cannot be ignored. Both spectrums of the debate could be profitably reconciled.

Nevertheless, this study further maintains that an overemphasis on ideology as the primary factor may be inadequate.³⁸ Rather than pigeonholing Mao's strategic calculations into neat compartments, Mao should be portrayed as having at his disposal a wide variety of stratagems and tactical postures for foreign and domestic consumption. Mao's realism could just as comfortably complement his "military romanticism" and "Continuous Revolution."³⁹ Two other Chinese scholars have concurred. Gong Li has stressed the political intentions of Mao and downplayed the military aspect of the 1958 crisis.⁴⁰ Li Xiaobing has concluded that the Chinese were cognizant of US intentions and reacted with "cautious policy."⁴¹ This reexamination, backed by archival materials, too believes that Mao's ideological considerations formed only a part of the picture. During the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Mao deeply considered the "state security perspective" and rationalized it in stark realpolitik terms. When the North Vietnamese displayed overenthusiasm about the impending Chinese recovery of the offshore islands, Mao informed Ho Chi Minh firmly that the crisis should not be blown out of proportion.⁴²

Closely related to the ideology-realism debate is the discourse on the nature of China's relations with the Soviet Union in the 1950s. This study contributes to

38. Andrew G. Walder has pointed out that recognizing the context of Mao's ideological forays was equally important: "Mao was no detached philosopher, but a shrewd, often ruthless political fighter, and his writings must be approached with this in mind . . . Like Stalin, his ideas were also weapons which he used in political combat." Andrew G. Walder, review of *Continuing the Revolution* by Starr, *Pacific Affairs*: 341.

39. Richard Baum, for example, in his masterful analysis of the Deng Xiaoping reforms, posits that ideological labeling for Chinese communists might be counter-effective. A nuanced analysis would leave ample allowances for changes in policy formulations. This useful insight could well be applied to the Mao era in the 1950s. See *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

40. Gong found that Mao had multiple political aims and the restart of negotiations was one. Overall, Gong presented the Taiwan Strait Crises in the light of China's domestic and international pressures; he also "We fought this campaign, which made the US willing to talk," Mao had stated, "for the overall situation, it is better to settle disputes with the US through talks." The other aim stressed by Gong was the "punitive" aspect of the bombardment on the KMT harassment of the Chinese coast. Gong Li, "Tension across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s Chinese Strategy and Tactics," in *Reexamining the Cold War US China Diplomacy 1954-1972*, 141-71.

41. PLA generals were puzzled by Mao's limited bombardment on the offshore islands in 1958. See Li Xiaobing, "PLA Attacks and the Amphibious Operations during the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55 and the 1958," in *Chinese War Fighting*, ed. Mark A. Ryan et al. (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 143-72.

42. Mao's rationalizations about the partition of Vietnam in 1954 provided a very good example. In 1958, Chinese domestic economic developments were deemed more important and Vietnam was told firmly that China would not support its Southern Revolution. Mao to Ho Chi Minh, September 10, 1958, JGMWG, vol. 7, 413.

the discourse by highlighting further the sharp political and ideological differences between the PRC and the Soviets as well as how cultural differences also played a part in reinforcing the mistrust between these two allies. As discussed earlier, in the 1950s tensions had built up in Sino-Soviet relations over a host of issues and Beijing viewed the Soviet Union's symbolic maneuvers in the Middle East and Soviet attitudes toward the US and the PRC with mounting distrust. The political decision to bombard Quemoy in 1958 was cast in a mode of defiance against the timidity of the Soviets as well as in the face of the specter of US encirclement and perceived American intransigence and Taiwan's provocation.

In the wake of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, as the PRC worked toward gaining international support for its actions, Beijing was eager for Soviet support but chafed at perceived Soviet condescendence. Subterranean cultural and historical currents deeply colored Mao's approach to the Soviets, who were subsequently taken aback by Mao's radical actions.⁴³ But China received resounding symbolic support from fraternal countries, shielding Beijing from Soviet criticism. Such an endorsement by fraternal states further raises the question of whether Mao and the PRC represented the *sole* example of "aggressive stance" in this period of international communism, as presented in conventional scholarship. Ironically, the PRC's cultural pride with Chinese-ness also translated into similar big power chauvinism toward lesser fraternal communist nations. This explained why Beijing felt perfectly justified in forcing the North Vietnamese to accept Vietnam's partition but experienced considerable chagrin when the North Vietnamese became "holier than the pope" in urging the Chinese to liberate the offshore islands in 1958, which represented a backhanded Vietnamese response to Chinese refusal to support the Vietnamese "Southern Revolution" for reunification.

This research further enriches existing scholarship by illustrating the creativity with which the PRC plotted its reemergence onto the world scene in the aftermath of the Korean War, as well as the unexpected outcomes that such diplomacy generated. In the aftermath of the Korean War, the PRC took every opportunity to showcase its new "public face" at international circles. This was the strategy to counter the US attempts to make a pariah out of Communist China. One outcome of the PRC's public relations campaign was that friendly Afro-Asian leaders voiced their opinions, in quantities considered excessive at times by their Chinese counterparts, on such issues as Asian security, China's economic development and the Taiwan problem. Indeed, recently declassified documents of the PRC's Foreign Affairs Archives demonstrated that the PRC tried to marshal such non-Soviet bloc

43. Declassified documents showed Mao's considerable ire with the Soviet Union and this fit squarely with the accounts given in memoirs in which PRC interpreters fondly recalled how Mao snubbed Khrushchev in various creative ways. Although the issue started with what the PRC Chairman saw as Soviet encroachment upon Chinese sovereignty via a joint Sino-Soviet fleet, it became conflated to the larger issue of cultural pride and racial xenophobia against foreigners. Mao was not alone in his prejudices, as Khrushchev had responded just as much if not in kind. At the same time, during the Taiwan Strait Crises, Beijing had deliberately projected a strategy of ambiguity in the international arena to disguise its limited aims.

opinions to its advantage during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The PRC's efforts were successful as there was no lack of volunteers who aired dissent regarding US foreign policy, but these new allies also wished to mediate between the US-ROC and Communist China. Such efforts were perceived by China at times not to be in accord with the PRC's domestic and strategic outlook in the region. The PRC then embarked upon an active "management" of disparate world opinions, which was an entirely new endeavor. Although the PRC tried to provide a sanitized "script" for its new friends, most had their own ideas. The volume of third-party interferences grew during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Overwhelmed by such international attention, the PRC responded by openly rejecting the unwelcome mediation efforts and demanded just outright condemnations of the US. One thus goes away with the insight that the achievements of the PRC's new international strategy were mixed. This is an important corrective to the emerging triumphalist interpretation by some recent scholars of China's foreign policy.⁴⁴

Any study of the US approach toward the Taiwan Strait Crises inevitably has to grapple with divergent appraisals of Eisenhower's leadership. Traditional accounts have described the Eisenhower presidency negatively. The president allegedly deferred decisions to his advisors.⁴⁵ But revisionist interpretations have been glowing in their assessments. Some, like Richard Saunders, consider the president an example of "prudent and restrained presidential decision making."⁴⁶ This study

44. Tao Wang, "Isolating the Enemy: The Bandung Conference and Sino-American Relations," AHA Conference (January 9, 2010).

45. Marquis Childs, Richard Rovere, and Richard Neustadt, among others, were critical. Most gave the impression of a lethargic administration counseled by "vicious advisors" such as White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams. Other studies by Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz and Richard Good-Adams emphasized the dominance of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The genial ex-general-turned-president was depicted as more interested in golf than the affairs of the state. Even Eisenhower himself knew of the common perception, see D. D. Eisenhower to Edgar N. Eisenhower, April 1, 1953, in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency: The Middle Way*, ed. Louis Galambos (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), Doc 121 (hereafter cited as PDDE); Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence," *Political Science Quarterly* 94, no. 4 (Winter 1979–1980): 575–99; Timothy D. Rives, "Ambrose and Eisenhower: A View from the Stacks in Abilene," *History News Network* (May 17, 2010), <http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/126705>.

46. However, in the 1980s, dominant accounts of the foreign relations of the Eisenhower presidency usually gave Eisenhower full credit on his handling of various crises. The studies of Bennett C. Rushkoff and Leonard Gordon provide good examples. While Rushkoff applauded Eisenhower for demonstrating leadership in rallying the Congress to pass the Formosa Resolution in 1955 during the First Taiwan Crisis, Gordon contended that as early as March 1955, it was the policy of the White House to avoid provoking a Chinese Communist invasion and Eisenhower was able to deflect the overbearing demands of Chiang Kai-shek. Saunders depicted Eisenhower as exercising restraint in the application of force in foreign policy and his articulation of strategic ambiguity in nuclear threats was deemed to be an effective deterrence against the Chinese communists. Similarly, George C. Eliades argued that excellent US intelligence strengthened Eisenhower's hand in the 1958 crisis: as Eisenhower knew for sure that the PRC's intention was limited to shelling the offshore islands, he reciprocated with limited US responses. See Richard M. Saunders, "Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Presidency," *Political Science Quarterly* 100, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 97–116; Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954–1955," *Political Science Quarterly* 96, no. 3 (Autumn 1981): 465–80; Leonard H. D. Gordon, "United States Opposition to the Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954–1962," *The Journal of American History* 72, no. 3 (December 1985): 637–60; Eliades, "Once More unto the Breach: Eisenhower, Dulles, and Public Opinion during the Offshore Islands Crisis of 1958," 343–67.

finds ample examples of positive leadership from the documents in Abilene. Among his cabinet members, Eisenhower was ahead of his colleagues in proposing that economic sanctions against the PRC be lifted. Eisenhower had also adroitly chosen representatives such as Nixon and Colonel A. J. Goodpaster on fact-finding missions. When situations called for tacit negotiations to wind down crises, Eisenhower was prompt. Even the lackluster Geneva negotiations were recognized as a convenient forum for conflict resolution, demarcating the limitations which either Washington or Beijing was willing to go.

However, Eisenhower's mastery of the presidency should also not be exaggerated as the Taiwan Strait Crises had proven in retrospect to be one of the most intractable foreign policy problems the Eisenhower administration faced. On more than one occasion, the president had wished that the "offshore islands would sink." One major problem was the difficulty the US faced in convincing the ROC to abandon the offshore islands as "outposts." Inasmuch as the Chinese Communists were a thorn at the side of the US, its ROC ally was no easy pushover either. Evidence aplenty exists to illustrate the frustration the White House felt toward the ROC.

Another constraint the Eisenhower administration faced was the need to consider world opinion and garner "allied support." So effective was Beijing's wide-ranging propaganda offensive centering on the discourses of nationalism and sovereignty in the wake of decolonization in Asia, the US was left with little room to maneuver.

To worsen matters, the disarrayed nature of the US-Britain-France alliance, meant that various security schemes such as SEATO were not well received. The US had to be "disciplined" to display its "moderateness" to its allies. Ultimately, the US also reoriented its policy toward communism and promoted more actively "spiritual values of the Free World" to counter the perceived increasing international appeal of communism. Such a cultural offensive included promoting images of American modernity and the "benevolent conception of American national identity," illustrating again the need of the US to address changing tides in world opinion.

Closely related to the issue of the performance of the Eisenhower presidency in managing US foreign relations was the discourse on the strategy of nuclear deterrence in the 1950s. Historians have discussed the extent of Eisenhower's strategic vision and the utility of nuclear deterrence. But nuclear deterrence should not be seen as the overwhelming thrust of Eisenhower's strategy during the Taiwan Strait Crises as amply demonstrated in this study. Any endorsement could probably be explained in the context of what David Alan Rosenberg has vividly portrayed as the Kafkaesque "massive retaliation" culture that Eisenhower presided over.⁴⁷ Although

47. While Alexander George and Richard Smoke criticized the White House for lacking the "classical statesmanship in supplementing deterrence with conciliation and flexibility," Richard Betts discerned in Washington a tendency for a "risk-maximizer" approach and explained Eisenhower's confidence in brandishing nuclear threats as exemplifying the US position of strength. Others have highlighted the domestic needs of Eisenhower's "New Look" policy and the constraints that accompanied it. Michael S. Sherry maintained that the president had to pacify a conservative Congress and enforce cuts in defense spending. Eisenhower also

explicit nuclear threats were publicly made in March 1955, this should be viewed as theatrical belligerency stemming from Eisenhower's firm grasp of the Taiwan situation. Despite Washington's hot rhetoric—Eisenhower's issuance of nuclear threat on March 16, 1955, subtle signaling to Beijing was the preferred mode of communication. In retrospect, as the Eisenhower administration was extremely cautious in action, such US moves can be better interpreted as attempts to justify to American officials and the public the "conventional" nature of America's New Look nuclear deterrence doctrine. Similarly, Eisenhower was even more decisive in downplaying nuclear threats in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Inured by the PRC's maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait, Eisenhower decided against the nuclear option even before the outbreak of hostilities. The US interest in negotiations figured more prominently, as seen in Dulles' offer to defuse the crisis on September 4, 1958.

In addition to the issues of the performance of the Eisenhower presidency in managing US foreign relations and the discourse on the strategy of nuclear deterrence, historians have also highlighted the influence of domestic factors on the foreign relations of the US in the 1950s.⁴⁸ This book's findings support the impor-

had the thankless job, according to Campbell Craig, of working out a plan to avoid a nuclear war. To this end, Eisenhower paradoxically pursued a thermonuclear war contingency, with all the attending paper planning of targets in the Soviet Union and increased budgets for supposedly cheaper nuclear weapons, instead of a "flexible response" which was an expansion of ground troops to deal with world-wide emergencies. Worse of all, according to H. W. Brands, Eisenhower was hoping that technology would solve his budgetary problems; instead, it fettered the administration's flexibility in responding to the Taiwan Strait Crises, with the New Look (NSC 162/2), a cost-cutting measure, nearly causing a nuclear war in 1955. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 370, 376, 381, 384; Richard Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), 22, 70, 76, 78; Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); Campbell Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); for an extension of this argument, see H. W. Brands Jr., "Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait," *International Security* 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), 228–55; David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960," *International Security* 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983): 3–71, 34–35.

48. Dallek criticized Eisenhower's "global perspective" as just an excuse for branding everything threatening as a "worldwide Communist threat" for popular domestic consumption, as tough talk served to "rationalize domestic unity or mass conformity" against communism. The powers of the US Congress were highlighted by Gary W. Reichard, who argued that Eisenhower considered it pertinent to seek Congressional approval for possible deployment of troops in the defense of Formosa as this would have the desired effect of "clarify[ing] and remove[ing] any such possible doubts from the arena." Likewise, Rosemary Foot contended that rigid posturing by Congress halved the bargaining space for Eisenhower, an example being the unanimous decision of Congress to deny the PRC a seat in the UN in 1956. Historians have also underscored US public opinion as another important consideration. Marian D. Irish argued that the conduct of Eisenhower's foreign policy was "modif[ie]d" by public sentiments and postulated that a negative report in the September 27, 1958 edition of *Times* was the tipping point which forced the White House to adopt what Dulles himself characterized as a more "flexible" policy. Eliades agreed with Irish that the inclination toward methods other than nuclear threats was strongly propelled by public opinion. The Gallup polls on September 5, 1958 indicated a whopping 82% supporting negotiations in ending the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The fact that domestic pressures could influence the direction of US foreign policy was not lost on Mao Zedong. Persuading his countrymen to be bold against the "paper tiger" imperialists, Mao shrewdly hedged his chances in the Taiwan Straits. After all, Mao cautioned, "the enemy should be despised strategically, but respected tactically." Scholars such as John Wilson Lewis and Ralph L. Powell were quick to identify the strategic significance of Mao's "paper tigers" speech. US nuclear posturing over the Taiwan Straits invited a barrage of criticisms and opposition within

tance of domestic factors in influencing the foreign relations of the US in the 1950s. The dominance of domestic conservative currents partly accounted for continued US nonrecognition of China, economic embargo and covert operations against China, and support for Chiang's Taiwan. In the wake of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, domestic conservative currents facilitated the conclusion of the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. With the onset of the Yijiangshan campaign, Eisenhower had to placate potential unhappiness from Congress and the American public concerning American military entanglement in the Taiwan Strait, by presenting the Formosa Resolution as a "virtuous" American act in accordance with American "tradition." Following the PRC's conciliatory gesture on April 23, 1955, in Bandung, Eisenhower had to persuade the China Lobby of the desirability of participating in the forthcoming Sino-US negotiations to be held in Geneva in August. In the wake of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, US public opinion missed the nuances of the Sino-US tacit accommodation and Eisenhower had to reach out to the public to "reverse the poll." Moreover, while the president was able to garner bipartisan support for his various foreign initiatives previously, Eisenhower faced more hurdles in the 1958 crisis. Not only was the GOP a minority party in the Congress, vocal Democrats were voicing opposition to the administration's China policy for political gains during the midterm elections. It was only with great difficulty that Eisenhower was able to subsequently turn the crisis around.

In the debate on the nature of the ROC-US relations, early scholarship discussed how Chiang Kai-shek held the US hostage through various nefarious stratagems.⁴⁹ From another angle, other Taiwanese historians revealed many instances in which the US appeared fickle if not right down unreliable.⁵⁰ Current scholarship has presented a more nuanced picture by highlighting the political cost incurred by Eisenhower in supporting Taiwan and the domestic political motives of Chiang's

and without. Further strategic involvement with Nationalist China, according to Lewis and Clubb, eradicated for the US whatever maneuver[ing] space available. See Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 210; Diary, January 17, 1955, PDDE, Doc 1255; Reichard, "Eisenhower and the Bricker Amendment," 95, 202; Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 260; Marian D. Irish, "Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," *Political Quarterly* 31 (1960): 151–62; Ralph L. Powell, "Great Powers and Atomic Bombs are 'Paper Tigers,'" *The China Quarterly* 23 (July–September 1965): 55–63; John Wilson Lewis, "Quemoy and American China Policy," *Asian Survey* 2, no. 1 (March 1962): 12–19; Clubb, "Formosa and the Offshore Islands," 531.

49. D. F. Fleming, "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa Strait," *The Western Political Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (September 1956): 535–52; O. Edmund Clubb, "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 1950–1955," *Political Science Quarterly* 74, no. 4 (December 1959): 517–31; Tang, Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglion: Chiang Kai-Shek and the United States," *The Western Political Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (December 1959): 1075–91.
50. Hungdah Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in *China and the Taiwan Issue*, ed. Hungdah Chiu (New York: Praeger, 1979): 147–211; Chao Ching, "A General Review of the Chinese Communist Artillery Shellings on Kinmen and Matsu during the Past Decade," *Issues & Studies* 2, no. 10 (July 1966): 20–24; Lin Cheng-yi, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis and US Leadership," in *US Leadership in the World*, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 71–100; Jonathan R. Adelman and Shih Chih-yu, *Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840–1980* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1993), 198.

continuous exhortations of returning to the mainland.⁵¹ John W. Garver has depicted a more balanced equation. Taiwan served as an important instrument to “pressure” the PRC. Having enjoyed Taiwan’s strategic position in containing communism the US now despaired over Chiang’s independent tactics. Because the overall benefits outweighed the cost, successive US administrations found it expedient to endure Chiang.⁵²

This work contends that although the ROC was the junior partner in the ROC-US alliance, it did possess and exercise “the leverage of the weak,” a term used by Günter Bischof to argue that even small nations were able to exert influence disproportionate to their size on their international patrons.⁵³ While such influence should not be exaggerated, this study proposes that considerable Taiwanese gains were made. From 1950 to 1958, *fangong dalu* was a major component of Taiwan’s foreign relations and Taiwan made various attempts to win over US officials to its cause. While the US kept Chiang at arm’s length despite Chiang’s repeated offers to aid the US to counter the PRC, by situating Taiwan firmly in US strategic concerns, Chiang managed to use the First Taiwan Crisis to secure a treaty and more aid from the US. Every US diplomatic initiative to rein Taiwan in resulted paradoxically in more aid and assurances from Washington.

Nevertheless, the positive overtone of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks of 1955–1957 did rile the ROC. Taipei’s uneasiness and paranoia with Washington then played out in two areas: secret negotiations with Beijing from 1955 to 1957 and the 1957 Taiwan Riots. While the CIA had patchy intelligence about possible secret contacts between the ROC and the PRC, it seemed to have doubted the veracity of such information and was persuaded by the steadfastness of the ROC. From the ROC’s perspective, secret communication provided an additional security blanket in view of perceived US faithlessness and thwart progress in tacit accommodation between the US and the PRC in Geneva. The May 1957 Taiwan riots provided a case study of the latent cultural fault lines between Taipei and Washington. It also presented insights on Taiwanese fractured cultural and nationalistic resentments against Americans. Nevertheless, the speed at which Washington accepted Taipei’s apologies also signaled the recognition of mutual pragmatic concerns and the burgeoning maturity and tenacity of the ROC-US relations.

More interested in reassuring Beijing than coddling Taipei in the wake of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, Washington exerted steady pressure on the ROC. Taipei reflexively sought to shore up the perimeter of the rationale, legitimacy, and

51. Steve Tsang, “Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kuomintang’s Policy to Reconquer the Chinese Mainland, 1949–1958,” *In the Shadow of China*, ed. Steve Tsang (London: Hurst & Co., 1993), 48–72; Robert Accinelli, “‘A Thorn in the Side of Peace’: The Eisenhower Administration and the 1958 Offshore Islands Crisis,” in *Reexamining the Cold War US China Diplomacy 1954–1972*, 106–40.

52. John W. Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and the American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997).

53. Günter Bischof, *Austria in the first Cold War, 1945–55: The Leverage of the Weak* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).

morality of the ROC-US relationship. Nonetheless, the reactivation of the Taipei-Beijing secret back channel from August to October 1958 again enabled Taipei and Beijing to tap on nationalist concerns and maneuvered to thwart Washington and avoid the specter of “two Chinas.” Taipei adroitly manipulated the channel to pressure the US to accede to its demands and succeeded in procuring more military aid, even though it had to go along with the US request to soft-pedal the belligerent rhetoric of its *fangong* mission. Akira Iriye, amongst others, lamented that Taiwan had transformed, for better or worse, into a symbol for freedom or part of “free Asia.”⁵⁴

Closely related to the debate on the nature of the ROC-US relations is the discourse on close linkages between foreign relations and domestic policies. Most English accounts have explained the Taiwan economic miracle by way of crediting the security given by the US.⁵⁵ Contrary to this view, what emerges from the primary sources is a more complicated picture. It shows that the early ROC government had devoted as much time and energy on the quixotic “mainland counteroffensive” and that the economic miracle that occurred two decades later was the joint product of a “counteroffensive” culture. Systematic economic planning hence went hand-in-hand with military planning for *fangong*. Arguing that previous studies of Taiwan’s economic miracle have profoundly underestimated the impact of the *fangong* ideology, this critique stresses the centrality of *fangong* in the Taiwanese polity and society. Applying Paul Cohen’s salient study of the concept of *guochi* (national humiliation) in Chinese history, this study proposes that *fangong* was an ideology that animated simultaneously the foreign relations and domestic policies of Taiwan, and this was manifested in the changing permutations of the *fangong* in the 1950s.

While Taipei emerged from the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis more secure than before and its major economic development toward export-oriented industries started from this point onwards, the significance of *fangong* lay with not just its saliency in creating a foundation for Taiwan’s economic development. Through the annual multiple war planning sessions of *fangong*, the ROC’s military elites used such occasions to proclaim loyalty to Chiang. The other elites of the ROC likewise employed as a state routine the rhetoric of *fangong* to proclaim loyalty to the aging patriarch while subverting the national mission of *fangong* to a more pedestrian goal of economic development. In this context, although Chiang’s foreswearing the military reunification of China in 1958 was commonly credited to Dulles’s effort, the present study complicates the discourse by illustrating how the increasingly

54. Akira Iriye, “Dilemmas of American Policy towards Formosa,” *The China Quarterly* 15 (July–September 1963): 51–55.

55. In numerous English accounts of the Taiwan’s economic miracle, a common observation runs that: “With the security of Taiwan guaranteed by the US, the ROC government was able to devote more energy and resources to agricultural, economic and political development and transformed Taiwan from a developing society into a modern industrialized country.” Winberg Chai, “Foreign Relations,” in *Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience 1950–1980*, ed. James C. Hsiung (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 384.

moribund rhetoric of *fangong* had actually initiated a movement toward the normalization of the Taiwanese society, which coincided with the gradual evolution of Sino-US relations from tacit communication to tacit accommodation. Since military reunification of the mainland was no longer possible, it stood to reason that showcasing Taiwan's economic development as a glaring alternative to mainland China's quixotic Great Leap Forward would be a better cause. Hence, this study offers an additional perspective by demonstrating as well how the ethos of *fangong dalu* had played significant roles in simultaneously propelling military, foreign policy and economic concerns, underscoring how the close linkages between the foreign relations and domestic policies of Taiwan were manifested in the changing permutations of the *fangong* in the 1950s.

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