China's Contested Capital

Architecture, Ritual, and Response in Nanjing

Charles D. Musgrove

University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu
Hong Kong University Press


香港大學出版社
HONG KONG UNIVERSITY PRESS

First published in North America by University of Hawai'i Press
ISBN 978-0-8248-3628-3

Published in China by Hong Kong University Press
ISBN 978-988-8139-95-8

Printed in Hong Kong, China
18 17 16 15 14 13 6 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Musgrove, Charles D., author
China's contested capital : architecture, ritual, and response in Nanjing / Charles D. Musgrove.
pages cm. — (Spatial habitus)
Published in China by Hong Kong University Press.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8248-3628-3 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Nanjing (Jiangsu Sheng, China)—History. 2. Nanjing (Jiangsu Sheng, China)—Politics and government. 3. Architecture—Political aspects—China—Nanjing (Jiangsu Sheng) 4. City planning—China—Nanjing (Jiangsu Sheng) 5. China—History—1928–1937. I. Title. II. Series: Spatial habitus (Series)
DS797.56.N365M87 2013
951'.136—dc23
2012044804

Printed on acid-free paper and meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources.

Designed by Carrie Yu

Printed and bound by Liang Yu Printing Factory Ltd., Hong Kong, China

Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction 1

1 The Capital Established 23
Sun Yat-sen, Nationalist China, and Nanjing

2 Visions of Grandeur in the Capital Plan 55

3 Administrative Aesthetics and Architectural Revolution in the Capital 89

4 The Necropolis of Nanjing 125
The GMD's Ceremonial Center and Cosmological Microcosm

5 Lessons in Allure 167
Celebrations of State in the Capital

6 Views from the Street 204
Development, Defiance, and Discipline in Nanjing

Conclusion 245

Notes 267

Bibliography 285

Index 305

Introduction

In the February 1938 issue of *National Geographic,* Julius Eigner introduced the magazine's substantial reading public to the city of Nanjing. By that time many readers may already have heard of the widely publicized atrocities committed by the Japanese in late 1937 and early 1938. Most probably knew from that incident that the city had been the capital of China under the Chinese Nationalist Party, or the Guomindang (GMD).[1] But beyond these basic facts, the Western public knew little about the city or its inhabitants. Eigner began his article, written in November 1937 before the city's fall, with some observations about the remarkable transformation that had taken place in the city during the previous ten years: "In 1928 the city had no lighting system worthy of the name, no water works, no sewers; normally, now, its wide thoroughfares blaze with neon lights, modern sanitation has been installed, and water runs from the tap instead of being sold in the streets by the caskful. From a straggling, overgrown village, tucked away behind its immense encircling wall, Nanking fast developed into China's most progressive metropolis" (Eigner 1938, 189).

Just as remarkable to Eigner was how unexpected the physical transformation of the city had been. "This amazing evolution was achieved in the face of bitter skepticism among those Chinese and foreigners who resented the removal of the Nation's capital from Peiping [Beijing], with its rich tradition of bygone grandeur and its comfortable amenities. Upstart

Nanking was seen as a mere militarist stronghold, doomed to extinction so soon as a mightier man than Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek should arise" (189). Indeed, there were many who felt this way in China and abroad during the Nanjing Decade from 1927 to 1937. Many might even say now that Eigner's statement about the city's future was prophetic: with Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party's victory in the civil war that followed World War II, Nanjing's capital status was revoked and Beijing became the capital once more.

But for certain moments during those ten years, Nanjing seemed to represent all that the former revolutionary and GMD party founder Sun Yat-sen hoped it would be for a nation struggling to emerge from nearly a century of "humiliation" at the hands of the foreign powers. Back in 1912, when Sun was the first provisional president of the Republic of China, he firmly advocated that Nanjing be made capital instead of Beijing. He hoped that the move would allow the country to make a fresh start, to distance itself from a corrupt, crumbling dynastic system in order to create a vibrant new state that would usher China into the modern age. At that time, Sun was forced to bow to political realities, allowing Yuan Shikai to take the position of president with Beijing as his capital. But in 1928, several years after Sun's death, when the Nationalist Party's Northern Expedition nominally reunited the country, the GMD leadership was adamant that the Party Leader's "long-cherished wish" would be fulfilled. Nanjing was confirmed as the capital, and the party made grand plans to turn the city into a model for modern development and Chinese nationalism. Using the techniques of modern urban planning, the city was to feature the latest in communications and infrastructure technologies, a distinct new architectural style that would be both modern and Chinese, as well as monumental spaces for the performance of celebrations of state that would create loyalty and teach the Chinese people how to be responsible citizens.

In ten years, it was not possible for all of the goals set forth by city planners to be met. There were unforeseen difficulties, such as a worldwide depression and the Japanese invasion of

resource-rich Manchuria. But a good portion of the blame easily went to the GMD itself. Chiang Kai-shek, obsessed with the goal of achieving direct control over his rivals, provoked one after another into a series of civil wars that were costly and demoralizing to a population that mostly wanted to engage in national reconstruction. Furthermore, the Chiang-led GMD constantly postponed implementation of democratic reforms that Sun Yat-sen had called for in his writings. And when people complained about the government, Chiang was more than willing to use censorship and brutal methods to quell dissent. Despite such attempts, however, the Chiang-led GMD never could silence all of its critics, and during the decade thousands of protestors frequently took over the streets of major cities.

Yet by 1936, despite the many unpopular policies of the GMD, the city of Nanjing hosted some of the largest patriotic celebrations that the nation had seen since the birth of the republic. As Eigner put it, the former pessimism "gave way to a feeling of confidence" (189). After all the complaints about moving the capital, somehow ten years had not only brought significant physical changes to the city, but also it seemed to have become a genuine capital, which indeed served as "a Symbol of New China," just as Sun Yat-sen had hoped it would (191).

This study describes how the "model capital" at Nanjing became a symbol of Chinese nationhood during the first part of the Nationalist era from 1927 to 1937. To do so, it describes the political sources that led to establishing the capital in Nanjing, the ideological discourse used to try to legitimize the city as the new capital, and the "scientific" methodology used to plan the city. It also focuses on the symbolic aspects of building the city: the aesthetic experiments used to construct it, the reinvention of traditions used to make official spaces appear and feel sacred to the populace, and the ways people actually experienced life in the capital. By looking at the various layers of meaning assigned to Nanjing over these years, a better understanding of what it meant and means to be a modern capital in China emerges.

Putting Nanjing Back in the Nanjing Decade

Nanjing is routinely included in Chinese-language works about the great cities of ancient China. It is typically considered to have a "royal air," with an innate power that emanates from the landscape of mountains and rivers, giving the whole region the power of a "coiling dragon, crouching tiger" (*longpan huju*). Nanjing had served as the capital of ten imperial kingdoms and dynasties beginning with the Wu kingdom in the third century CE and reaching a peak of prosperity as a capital for various southern dynasties between 280 and 589. However, the historical memory is tainted by the fact that Nanjing was usually the capital of a divided country, when "barbarians" ruled northern China (Shi Nianhai 1996; Chen Qiaoyi 1991; *Zhongguo gudu yanjiu* 1986). The pinnacle of Nanjing's status as an ancient capital arrived when Zhu Yuanzhang founded the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) in the city. But even that triumph was short lived. After the Ming founder's death, officials cited the inherent weakness represented by a southern capital to convince the new emperor to move the capital back to Beijing. Lastly, contemporary histories of China's ancient capitals usually mention that Nanjing served as the capital of the Taiping "Heavenly Kingdom" of Hong Xiuquan. The period of Hong's power, however, was also short lived. The Qing dynasty crushed the Taiping capital in 1864, bringing massive destruction from which the city never seemed to fully recover. In short, Chinese histories of ancient capitals portray Nanjing as a city of mixed legacies: power and weakness, pride and humiliation.[2]

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a popular revival of interest in the urban history of modern China. Numerous Chinese-language books have been written on Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (Canton), often with photographs and colorful stories depicting a vibrant urban culture in the early twentieth century. Similar books on Nanjing have also appeared that portray the city as an important contributor to Chinese modernization. The problem is that Nanjing's recent past is even more ambiguous—and more sensitive—than its ancient history. While contemporary writers try

to portray Nanjing as the city of great men (such as Sun Yat-sen) and republican dreams, many still consider it the site of great crimes (such as the anti-Communist purge of 1927 and the Nanjing Massacre of 1937) and great traitors (such as Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei).[3] With its past still politically troublesome, recent Chinese academic works in China on twentieth-century Nanjing have usually focused on the modernization of the city—that is, the physical elements of modernization that remain visible today: the tree-lined streets, the infrastructure, and the buildings.[4] Nanjing has also figured prominently in Chinese studies on the symbolism of Sun Yat-sen, but the relationships between the city, its residents, and these symbols have yet to be developed fully.[5]

In Western-language scholarship, though the proliferation of studies focusing on the cities of late Qing and Republican-era China is impressive, there has been little work done on Nanjing. Since the late Qing, reform-minded officials and civilians have looked at cities as centers of modern life. Many assumed that to lead the nation in the modern age, successful states would have to understand and organize cities in new ways to encourage modernization not only of the economy but also the people themselves. Much of the early interest in China's modern development attempted to evaluate the effects of changes in administration and economic development that occurred in the cities, especially in treaty ports, where the foreign powers established new municipal institutions and invested in new industrial enterprises.[6] The recent surge in urban studies has also focused on the changing relationships between state and society during the period. Initially, Western scholars investigated whether a "civil society" existed in China that was comparable to what existed in the cities of early-modern and modern Europe and America. More recent studies have focused on the emergence of distinctly Chinese forms of modernity, offering more nuanced understandings of the way individuals and groups respond to the changing economic, social, and cultural circumstances.[7] Considerable work has been done on cities where the contradictions of modern development seemed most dramatic: where conflict between various contenders

(e.g., central governments, regional regimes, foreign powers, etc.) for municipal power allowed citizens to carve out spaces for protecting their own interests in cooperation with or in defiance of official power. Thus we have a large body of work on the cities of Shanghai and Beijing, as well as an increasing number of studies investigating other major cities.

One would think that as the capital of Nationalist China, Nanjing would garner more scholarly attention, but there have been few full-length studies on the subject (Coleman 1984; Lipkin 2006). One reason for the relative neglect perhaps lies in the assumption that, although the GMD did not exercise as much control over China as it had hoped, it did effectively control Nanjing. For example, while the regime tolerated occasional student demonstrations in the city, when protests became overly threatening the government easily suppressed them. In essence, then, Nanjing represented the GMD at its most controlling and repressive. That hardly made the city fertile ground for discovering an effective civil society. Nevertheless, this book attempts to put the city of Nanjing back into the Nanjing Decade by investigating what the city's experience reveals about China's modern development, as well as the role that it played in redefining relations between state and society. To recognize what actually changed during the period, we must evaluate the changes on their own terms.

Moving beyond Failure

The prevailing perception is that the Nationalists in Nanjing presided over an "abortive revolution" that did not live up to its early promises (Eastman 1974). In the late 1920s, GMD officials drew up many ambitious plans for modernizing China. At the same time, expert urban planners and architects set out to design and build Nanjing as a new, modern center for the nation. Most of the grand ambitions weren't fully realized in the ten years before total war with Japan began in 1937. Thus, in depicting Nanjing as the Nationalist capital, it is difficult to avoid confirming a story of its "failure." I have tried to resist drawing such an easy

conclusion, because after ten years as the Nationalist capital, the city demonstrably changed a great deal. It had new buildings, new streets, new monuments, and new attitudes about municipal and national governance. The responsibilities and relationship between the government that managed the capital and the citizens that lived in it also had changed.

The Nanjing Decade is coming to be viewed not as a period of simple failure but as an important stage in the long-term development of modern China. Recent studies have noted the remarkable achievements of the period. Domestically, even the GMD's detractors have long recognized that Chiang Kai-shek's strategies of anticommunist campaigns and taking on warlords one by one over the course of the decade were slowly expanding the influence of Nanjing's central government.[8] Meanwhile, it has been noted that central government officials, particularly in fiscal and foreign affairs, were better qualified and more professional than earlier studies have depicted, leading to an understanding that the government's institutional effectiveness generally expanded, despite persistent problems (Strauss 1998). It has furthermore been shown that the central government also implemented some impressive development projects, many of which were related to key military industries. In foreign affairs, the GMD-led state impressively maintained the international recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, Xinjiang, and the northeast provinces; won tariff autonomy; and convinced the powers to agree in principle to the ending of other privileges such as extraterritoriality (Kirby 1984, 2000b). Thus, while problems certainly persisted, it is now more widely recognized that real progress was made.

One evaluation of Nationalist social policy in Nanjing from 1927 to 1937 describes how the government attempted to deal with society's "undesirables," such as rickshaw pullers, prostitutes, and beggars (Lipkin 2006). At first glance, one might think that this was another story of a repressive regime that tried—and ultimately failed—to remove such "eyesores" from the streets in an attempt to present a veneer of modernity to the world. But Lipkin shows that the Municipal Government was more effective than generally

believed in planning and constructing public housing that, indeed, helped thousands of people move off the streets. She also reveals, though, that people within the city were more than capable of organizing to resist the initiatives of the state when those initiatives clashed with their own interests.

Demonstrating administrative effectiveness is only one part of how a nation is built or a new state establishes legitimacy. Other scholars have been exploring how GMD power was conceptualized and constructed through discursive and symbolic frameworks that affected how power was exercised in the country.[9] For example, John Fitzgerald (1996) describes how the concept of "awakening" was a commonly held ideal by which members of self-proclaimed "enlightened" groups, such as the Nationalist Party, legitimized their attempts to teach the masses how to be proper loyal citizens, especially since the masses had yet to understand what was in their own best interests (or so argued the enlightened). Michael Tsin (1999), meanwhile, has shown how the GMD attempted to bring a measure of control to the process of revolution by categorizing the members of the "masses" into various social groups—such as workers, peasants, merchants, and women—and then forming official organizations, which would serve as a conduit between the party and the now represented people (rather than letting the people represent themselves in a liberal democratic fashion). Fitzgerald and Tsin have both described the narrowing of scope of these discursive constructs, which for Fitzgerald led to the legitimizing of single-party rule (among party members themselves). For Tsin, the narrowing consisted of a gradual exclusion of groups from the realm of the "loyal" masses, such as striking workers or violent merchant militias that challenged single-party rule. Excluding such groups by declaring them to be "counterrevolutionary" and then suppressing their views reinforced the party's claim to be the only enlightened, revolutionary party that could represent all the people.

Both of these studies end, however, on the eve of the Nanjing Decade. We have a good picture of how some basic modes of understanding about the relationship between leaders and followers were formed in the key years leading up to the

Nationalist Revolution of 1926–1928, but it is unclear how these understandings changed or how broadly they were accepted during the decade of Nationalist rule that followed. In this study, it is apparent that the basic ideals described by Fitzgerald and Tsin influenced how the capital was constructed, but at the same time the GMD-led state developed new approaches to maintaining the power of these discursive constructions.

While the GMD tried to create a plausible framework for explaining and naturalizing its desire to lead a new kind of intrusive "revolutionary" state, it also made use of an array of rituals and symbols that plugged party power into an already existing framework within which common people reimagined their roles in a nation among nations instead of at the center of "All under Heaven."[10] The rituals described by Henrietta Harrison (2000) legitimized new methods of popular participation in culture and politics. Even as liberal democratic institutions failed in the early years of the republic, the new symbols were seized upon by a wide variety of individuals and social groups as an increasing number of people were in fact empowered by the opportunities that republican political culture offered for popular political participation (Harrison 2000). That is, the people had to be represented somehow for any republican government to be considered legitimate. Thus, various groups used popular symbols to stake their own claims to political influence, making the early republic a far more "popular" movement than previous studies assumed. However, Harrison continues her study into the early part of the Nanjing Decade, and like Fitzgerald and Tsin she finds that the GMD tried to narrow the scope of legitimate popular action by co-opting and controlling the social organizations newly empowered by the transformed political culture. The resulting implication, once again, is that by 1932 the GMD seems to have stifled true participation by the masses in favor of something that was perhaps less genuine and not fully legitimate.

By focusing on the model capital at Nanjing, this book builds on this emerging story of the construction and contestations over notions of national identity. It continues the investigation of the

symbols and rituals of nationhood that were developed as part of the GMD's nation-building efforts.[11] While this study confirms these views that the GMD attempted to narrow the scope of accepted meanings of national symbols in ways that supported its ideal of single-party rule, it also reveals how the important dynamic of social negotiation that took place over these meanings continued unabated. By 1936, even as dramatic protests in Nanjing and elsewhere seemed on the verge of completely overshadowing them, national holidays were celebrated with greater gusto than ever. Even critics of the government admitted that the popular mood was changing to favor Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD.

Such popular attitudes cannot be manufactured out of nothing. During this period, Nationalists also seemed to be making progress in the symbolic realm, just as they were in the other aspects of national development mentioned above. By looking at the construction of the nation through the lens of the capital, it is apparent how common understandings intersected within the discursive ideals, the actual constructions, the ritual prescriptions, and the popular uses of capital spaces. They did so in a manner that may not have entailed the kind of unanimity that the GMD's self-conception apparently demanded, but the result was shifting levels of conditional support, which is all that any form of legitimacy can really be.

Superabundance: The Importance of Architecture and Ritual in Chinese Capitals

A capital city is where vital functions of national administration, security, and finance are carried out. It also serves as a center of the nation's "collective memory," as its structures and events form a common frame of reference for the country's experience (M. Boyer 1994). Capitals are rife with symbols of nationhood, with massive government buildings, palaces for heads of state, national museums, and archives. They also provide stages for the performance of national rituals and places where society can interact with the state. All of these sites are woven together in a capital matrix that

solidifies the "imagined community" of the nation (Anderson 1991). As new nation-states emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, political leaders recognized the importance of capitals in the creation of modern citizens. Following Haussmann's transformation of Paris, there was an apparent competition—from Washington to Canberra, Ankara to Tokyo—to create magnificent national centers (Cannadine 1983; Fujitani 1996; Vale 1992). China was no exception. The Chinese Nationalist Party's leadership recognized these important functions, and after moving the capital to Nanjing they set out to create a "model capital" for a New China and for world consumption as well.

As will be developed in later chapters, there was common agreement among party members, newspaper writers, and even student dissidents that the capital had a special role to play in the development of the young nation. In particular, it was assumed that a modernizing nation needed a center not only to organize development but also to serve as a model for how the challenges of modernization might be overcome, including the challenge of fostering nationalism and loyalty. Capitals are widely recognized as serving important political and symbolic functions, but in newly emerging nation-states they take on more importance because it is often imagined that the very fate of a young nation depends on having an appropriately positioned, effectively managed capital city.

The arguments of Nanjing's advocates and planners in the 1920s and 1930s, though differing considerably from the past, resonated with long-held assumptions about the importance of capital cities in China. China has a long history of planned capitals, which were often divided into various wards serving particular administrative and economic functions. In the imperial-era discourse of capital construction, the emphasis was on how to position the capital effectively and then build the appropriate ceremonial spaces that would allow the emperor to maintain balance in the imperium. Centrality was an important element in the symbolic construction of a capital. During the later part of the Zhou period, a discourse on state building developed in which the capital's placement at an appropriate center was considered crucial to the ruler's ability to tap

into the cosmological forces of nature to maintain proper balance. A quote attributed to the Duke of Zhou, which appears in the *Zhou li* (Zhou rituals), compiled in the third century BCE, states the importance of centrality clearly:

> May the King come and assume the responsibility for the work of God on High and himself serve (in this capacity) at the center of the land. I say that, having constructed the great city and ruling from there, he shall be a counterpart to August Heaven. He shall scrupulously sacrifice to the upper and lower (spirits), and from there govern as the central pivot. . . . I say, if you rule from this central place, the myriad states will all enjoy peace and you, the King will achieve complete success. (Quoted in Steinhardt 1990, 30; Wheatley 1971, 430)

Other scholars have described certain physical features of the "ideal" Chinese capital, such as north-south orientation, city walls ideally forming a square-shaped city, as well as key structures in the maintenance of the imperial state cult: a palace complex; a temple to the ancestors; altars to the sun, moon, soil and grain; and so on. This morphology was laden with meaning and served to place the ruler at the center of a microcosm of the commonly conceived Chinese cosmos. Despite claims that the ideal capital should follow ancient models, this was no unchanging tradition in reality: tremendous variation existed between China's constructed capitals and the ideal, due in part to the dictates of the site's geographical features or to changing ideas, over time, of space and monumentality (Steinhardt 1990; Knapp 2000; Wu Hung 1995; Xiong 2000; A. Wright 1977; S. Chang 1977). Nevertheless, there was a consistent belief that successful rule depended on having a capital properly located at the center and that it should include certain architectural features for conducting the key rituals deemed necessary to maintain the realm. In fact, would-be emperors, such as the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang, felt the need to construct the ritual spaces of the capital even before the end of military campaigns of unification; both were considered essential to establishing the

successful transfer of power from one dynasty to the next (Mote 1977; also see Fei 2009).

By reflecting the idealized cosmology, the structures of the capital then reinforced the rituals that made the emperor the "Son of Heaven" and head of state. Angela Zito's work (1997) on the Grand Sacrifice during the Qing era illustrates how rituals in the capital did not just *reflect* common notions about the cosmos; they defined power relationships that could only be *constituted* through the bodily performance of rituals set in spaces that properly embodied that cosmos. Zito describes how every component of state ritual—such as ritual objects, clothing, the position of ritual sites, the layout of buildings and spaces—was imbued with significance drawn from a commonly understood connection to a cosmological worldview based on yin and yang correspondences. Placed in their proper spatial context, rituals then embodied a "natural" hierarchy in which ritual performers, whether they believed in the rituals or not, were bodily placed within this hierarchy. The Grand Sacrifice positioned the emperor consistently at the center of the entire structure, which helped to legitimize his imperial authority by placing him at the pinnacle of the material hierarchy while also reemphasizing the ideal of balance in his exercise of power. The rituals also forced participants to shift their positions from time to time, thus moving the emperor and placing him in inferior roles while allowing seeming subordinates—the bureaucratic functionaries, for example—to take on superior roles. These rituals succeeded because all involved had an investment in their performance.

Qing emperors of the eighteenth century benefited from inheriting a form of what Clifford Geertz has called "charisma" that was already widely accepted among the elites of China. Charisma, as Geertz describes it, is the ability of power holders to claim a central position in the popular imagination, whereby they seem to occupy a sociocultural space "near the heart of things," as understood by people in the social order. Where they succeed, then, ceremonies of state "mark the center as center and give what goes on there its aura of being not merely important but in some odd fashion connected with the way the world is

built." In the case of the Qing, as in the examples cited by Geertz, the emperor largely inherited an already existing "collection of stories, ceremonies, insignia, formalities, and appurtenances" that both elites and the imperial state used to "justify their existence and order their actions" (Geertz 1983, 124, 143–144). In reality, this "inheritance" was actually a process of discursive re-creation through sorting, editing, and authenticating the texts and practices that had been passed on to them (Zito 1997; Elman 1990; Chow 1994). However, while there was considerable debate among scholars about how to conduct the rituals properly, there was little questioning of the larger cosmological framework within which the political structure successfully claimed the central place.

By 1926, however, the worldview that naturalized the imperial state's power had lost its legitimacy. The questioning of the old connections had precipitated the fall of the Qing dynasty, particularly after the examination system that had helped to indoctrinate elites in that worldview was abolished in 1905. As more and more educated elites looked to Western science to answer questions about how the universe worked, they simultaneously began looking for scientific methods to strengthen the military, modernize the economy, reform the state, reorganize society, remake the family, and even reimagine the individual. During the May Fourth Movement—a broad-based patriotic movement begun in the wake of student protests in May 1919—one vocal group of critics called for the complete rejection of what they described as the backward, superstitious ideology of Confucianism, to allow for the construction of a scientific "New Culture" that would ensure the survival of the Chinese "race." Though the New Culture iconoclasts represented a minority among educated elites, by the 1920s the old understanding of "the way the world is built" clearly was no longer adequate, and a new set of symbols was needed to demarcate the new imagined space "near the heart of things."

GMD leaders during the Nanjing Decade shared Sun Yat-sen's understanding that a ceremonial center was needed to forge national identity and, hence, develop loyal citizens through participation in state rituals. Almost instinctively, those who constructed and

contested them knew that the nation's symbols and rituals would not just *reflect* a new political order, they would also *create* it. I argue that to understand what the GMD did accomplish (instead of simply what it did not), it is necessary to look closely at how the Nationalists attempted to create that new order, how people responded to and affected what was constructed, and in what ways the ritual environment succeeded in establishing a kind of conditional legitimacy that other regimes made use of later. To begin to understand what the GMD accomplished, one has to look at the model capital of Nanjing and how various actors engaged in the enterprise of constructing change.

One key to the successful transformation of subjects through ritual is to convince them to participate in the first place. Lindsay Jones (2000) has developed the idea of the "ritual-architectural event" in order to analyze how sacred architecture embodies social truths and transforms those participating. While older architectural studies have emphasized the meanings of buildings as stand-alone objects, now scholars are coming to recognize that buildings only acquire meaning in the ways they are used by people and that as uses change over time, the meanings change as well. Edifices are now seen as playing fundamental roles in framing how people who live and work in or around them perceive their world, as in Pierre Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* (1990). Architectural frames work simultaneously with other social and cultural constructs of knowledge to build commonsense understandings of the world that are then embodied in the particular actions that take place within that structure. Without analyzing the sociocultural practices that take place within buildings, there can be no apprehending the meaning of architecture, as recent studies by Ronald Knapp (2010), Ruan Xing (2006), Francesca Bray (1997), and others on vernacular architecture in China have demonstrated (Knapp and Lo 2005).

With concepts like the ritual-architectural event, works of architecture acquire a "superabundance" of meanings as a wide variety of official, sacred rituals (which change over time) take place, affecting and affected by the understandings of mundane people such as believers, tourists, and anthropologists (which also change

over time). Jones' use of the concept of ritual-architectural event is particularly useful for the investigation of symbolic change, for it more clearly explains the potential role of architectural monuments to turn neutral space into transformative *events.* In transformative, sacred architecture, Jones describes a process of "allure," in which an architectural monument through an immeasurable combination of comfortable familiarity and challenging difference invites potential participants to enter into a kind of interactive relationship with the space. Participants then can be transformed in any number of ways, which Jones categorizes broadly as ontological (one's being is transformed), sociological (social conflicts are resolved, hierarchical relationships defined, etc.), spiritual (in the form of an awakening), and pedagogical (one learns something). One need not be consciously aware that change is taking place, but one does have to engage in the ritual-architectural event. To trigger the engagement, there has to be some kind of allure (Jones 2000, 95–98).

In older, inherited symbolic systems, convincing people to participate in a transforming event might not be challenging; the forms are familiar and the sociopolitical investment of participants already has been established (even if participants are not fully cognizant of how it all works or attach their own dissonant meanings to them). In this study, I argue that GMD ritualists, like other nationalists, saw the nation as a sacred entity, but the party faced the problem of convincing people to enter into a ritual relationship when many of the forms were too obviously and deliberately new, and when the benefits were not entirely apparent. The GMD wanted to transform the people into loyal citizens who would, for the present at least, agree to be subject to GMD single-party rule and "political tutelage." At first, the GMD felt that the idea of revolutionary change in the name of strengthening the nation would be enough to satisfy most people, but party leaders discovered that there would have to be a more appealing allure if more people were to enter into the ritual-architectural event and be transformed.

In this endeavor to transform the people, Nanjing was not simply just another city. The model capital was conceived as a conceptual

whole: as a singular space in which the twin goals of material and spiritual construction were to find concrete embodiment.[12] The capital was a place where residents and visitors alike would see how the advances of modern urban planning improved the efficiency of production and transportation in the city. People would participate in the new parades, mass meetings, and pilgrimages to the nation's sacred monuments. As the center of all these functions and more, the capital itself was conceived as a sacred space where the people would be changed and the nation take shape. These transformations would be replicated throughout the land and someday influence the course of revolutionary change around the world.

At one level, Nanjing, the model capital, was conceived as a symbolic whole; yet in the day-to-day experiences of people who visited, lived, or worked in the city, there was no limit to the possible interpretations and meanings attached to the city or to specific sites within the city. By looking at the model capital in terms of the superabundance of meanings supplied by officialdom, planners, residents, and protestors, one can begin to see not only that the GMD was more effective than previously believed, but also that residents carved out their own form of agency, even at a time when individual rights did not exist. The choices city residents made sometimes conformed to and sometimes defied efforts by the party, the government, and planners to define roles that in their view clearly demarcated what it meant to be modern and Chinese. City residents who resisted using the new urban spaces in the prescribed ways were often labeled "backward" or "counterrevolutionary," but in fact they were negotiating their own forms of modern life in the capital. In the end, both the plans and the people changed, and through investigating how the various social actors engaged in the dialogue of change, we can add another piece to our emerging picture of Chinese modernity.

Overview of Chapters

This study traces the formation of the hopes and visions for the capital and nation that were crucial to establishing new forms

of collective identity. The first chapter shows how the capital at Nanjing was born of factional and regional conflicts. It focuses on the bitter public debate that erupted in 1928 over where to locate a permanent capital. In this contest, regional biases between southern and northern Chinese were quite apparent and had to be transcended for Nanjing to be accepted as the legitimate capital of all of China. To this end, the GMD turned to familiar symbols and rituals built around their popular late founder, Sun Yat-sen. Sun Yat-sen was presented as a national hero whose temporary presidency in 1912 was used as the basis of a founding myth for locating the new capital at Nanjing. These efforts were an effective beginning of the process of legitimizing Nanjing as the capital, but it would take time to create the kind of new collective identification with the city that would allow that legitimacy to fully develop.

Chapter 2 examines the early visions of the new capital and focuses on the city's urban planning "technocrats." These officials attempted to plan the perfect capital, which would not only impress the Chinese people and instill loyalty with its monuments to nationalism and Sun Yat-sen but would also impress the rest of the world with its scientific efficiency and order. Nanjing was to be very different from the cities of old China. Planners wanted to transform the city from a backward place, littered with peasant farms and crumbling houses, into a gleaming modern city with a Chinese essence. In their writings, these experts emphasized international standards of modernization that included reforms in transportation, communication, hygiene, and recreation. However, the construction of Sun Yat-sen Road, which was to become the main artery for the new Chinese template of urban order, demonstrated that common people would have to suffer "short-term pain" for "long-term prosperity," as thousands of homes were torn down for its construction.

After publication of the city plan in late 1929, architects began the effort of designing buildings that would turn ambiguous concepts such as "state" and "nation" into concrete reality. Chapter 3 evaluates a self-proclaimed attempt at an "architectural revolution" that combined the "best of East and West." Though

early plans to create an elaborate capitol complex with a palatial GMD headquarters at its center were abandoned for lack of funds, many significant buildings were erected nonetheless. As with other elements of the Nationalist Revolution, previous studies of the city's architecture have dismissed the stylistic combinations of buildings during the Nationalist era as "not remarkable" (Su Gin-djih 1964, 244; also see L. Liu 1989, 273, and Liang Ssu-cheng 1984). Looking at these government structures from the perspective of a historian interested in sociopolitical and cultural change, however, it becomes apparent that changes in spatial layouts revealed the forming ideals of statecraft and citizenship in China, as well as troubling contradictions.

The GMD hoped to use grand boulevards, new stadiums, parks, and public buildings as places for ceremonies that would in turn help to mold the new national citizen. Chapter 4 describes Nanjing's most effective Nationalist monument, the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, which served as the main tool for reinventing the relationship between state and polity. The mausoleum and its surrounding memorial grounds served as the ceremonial center of GMD-led China, becoming the focus of efforts to create a new state cult around Sun Yat-sen that sought to inspire and educate people on how to be loyal to the "national family" and one-party government. By borrowing practices from the imperial-era state cult, Nanjing's ritual center resembled those of old capitals. Yet significant changes were made to impart distinctly modern, Nationalist aesthetics and meanings to the ceremonies. In the combination of architectural influences, one can see the GMD extending an "invitation" to a domestic and international audience to participate in ritual-architectural events that the GMD hoped would earn the party greater legitimacy.

Chapter 5 continues the analysis of the celebrations of state that were centered in Nanjing. Beginning at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, such celebrations branched out to include mass meetings at other major sites throughout the city, such as at the National Government Building and GMD Party Headquarters. Celebrations of state usually also culminated in mass entertainment

programs and parades designed to incorporate the entirety of the "masses," as defined by the party. In the past, such celebrations during the Nanjing Decade have been described by historians as formalistic and insincere, denying the masses an avenue of true participation in the national polity. Yet thousands of people did participate. In this chapter, I attempt to evaluate these ceremonies to see why people participated and why by the end of the decade, more and more reports indicated that people "genuinely" entered into the ritual dialogue on national celebration.

To conclude, I look at the capital from the street level. Chapter 6 illustrates how residents of Nanjing resisted new regulations of spatial and temporal control. It also describes how citizens used the city as a stage to contest the new symbols and rituals of nationhood. It is through such contention that an administrative center truly becomes a capital. When people begin to express themselves using the structures and spaces of the new capital within a commonly held scope of meaning, those structures and spaces gain broader legitimacy. The sources of architectural meaning are no longer limited to the abstract symbolism attached to buildings or the denoted lessons of inscriptions and signs (N. Goodman 1988). The actions of the people in those spaces create a social meaning of accumulated and collective memory. Thus I focus on the streetscapes and public spaces where people gathered—for both celebrations of state and social protest against it. Even the Sun Yat-sen memorial became a symbolic battleground. Protests there revealed that the mausoleum, like the Lincoln Memorial, had strong symbolic power, which the state could not monopolize.

Overall, this study is about constructing the legitimacy of a capital city. It is the contention of this book that "legitimacy" is the product of conflict, not unanimity.[13] A symbol gains its power not from being free from conflict but from convincing people it is representative of a higher truth, above the fray. By the end of the Nationalist era, Nanjing had become the legitimate capital of China, not because it had magically united the masses of China under the charisma of Sun Yat-sen, but because it was a functional symbol for the values of Chinese nationalism. As long as people

believed that it was important to struggle over the meanings and goals of nationhood in Nanjing, then the capital had succeeded in embodying the imagined nation that transcended the struggles.

Conclusion

Nationalist Party efforts to construct a model capital that would produce modern citizens succeeded in changing the expectations of the people in the city and, arguably, across the country. Indeed, citizens had appeared. They were not the cooperative students of political tutelage that the GMD had hoped to cultivate, but they were nevertheless invested in the welfare of the nation-state even as they sought to define it in ways that reflected their own interests. Even though the interactions of people with the capital as a ritual-architectural event often defied the intent of GMD planners, the city emerged as an effective symbol of the modern Chinese nation and supplied the central government with an important aura of legitimacy as well. Yet, when the Communist Party won the civil war in China, the nation's capital was relocated back to Beijing in 1949. So, what claim does the city have to a place in the history of China? To answer this question, one must look first to the issues of Nanjing's legitimacy as a capital city and then, once more, at what impact transformations of space and ritual in the capital had on the party's legitimacy and the larger process of revolutionary change in China.

Nanjing as a Permanent Capital

In the West, the belief that a capital should be a permanent, fixed place is closely tied to the institution of centralized government,

which needs large bureaucracies to manage affairs and large buildings to house the documents that allow them to do so. In contrast, the charismatic ruler of a decentralized system had more flexibility to mount his horse and move the government. The advisors in such a ruler's mobile court also easily moved from place to place as strategic needs dictated. With a centralized government, those in charge need a permanent place to center administrative functions, to maintain records, dispense justice, and conduct negotiations (Mumford 1961, 353; Wheatley and See 1978).

Since the Qin dynasty, founded by Qin Shihuang in 221 BCE, China has had a centralized, bureaucratic government and large, planned capital cities. The capital, with its sacred sites and rituals, was necessary to construct and maintain the emperor's legitimacy. An emperor was also a mobile entity, though, who upon receiving the power of his position at a central capital could move the locus of authority elsewhere. This has led scholars to conclude that during the imperial era, sovereignty traveled with the emperor. The capital, then, primarily functioned as the locus of the bureaucracy that would have preferred the emperor stay home so its members could garner more power as the gatekeepers of information (M. Chang 2007, chap. 1; Foret 2000). Bolstering these views is the fact that there was often more than one capital in imperial China. Typically, one city served as the primary capital, while other cities shared administrative and ceremonial functions as auxiliary capitals. For example, in the Ming dynasty, Beijing was the primary capital and Nanjing was a southern capital. During the Qing, Shenyang and Chengde served as alternative sites for the emperor to hold court. In short, the imperial-era capital was both permanent and fluid (Farmer 1976; Steinhardt 1990, 27; Wu Songdi 1994, 69–77).

In the Qing system, however, Beijing never lost its legitimacy as the main capital. People always knew that the emperor would return to the city. There were practical necessities for returning to the nerve center of the centralized bureaucracy. Equally important, the central capital was still the "pivot of the four quarters," and the "son of heaven" had an obligation to fulfill the important ceremonies of state at fixed altars within and near the capital. Furthermore, the

tombs of the ancestors since the Shunzhi emperor (r. 1644–1661) were located near Beijing.[1] As generations passed, more and more ancestors populated the imperial necropolis, which ensured that the descendants would come back to perform the sacred rites to the imperial family.

By the early republic, Beijing had been the primary capital for so long that once the idea that a modern nation-state required a single, stable capital became popular, it was not difficult, despite Sun's objections, to make Beijing that "permanent" capital. In fact, if the legitimacy of a capital is defined solely by the sense of its permanence, Beijing during the early republic was usually more legitimate than the governments that occupied it. Power holders came and went, but the city remained China's capital. Other cities had rival governments, which sometimes claimed to be "national capitals," but they were always associated with particular regimes and political actors. Nanjing in 1927 was no exception. As chapter 1 described, Nanjing began as the capital for one faction of a divided political party that had only regional authority. Despite numerous party manifestos to the contrary, even when forces loyal to the GMD occupied Beijing, most people still expected that the capital of a unified China would naturally be in Beijing.

The outcome of capital debates in 1928 revealed that to party leaders like Chiang Kai-shek, Nanjing was the only permanent capital of GMD-led China. Unfortunately, Nanjing's legitimacy suffered from the fact that throughout the Nanjing Decade, much of China remained free from its authority, run by relatively autonomous military governors. Furthermore, during the early part of the period, rumors often circulated that the capital would move again, usually to Shanghai. Part of the reason for these rumors was the fact that for the first few years, due to the lack of facilities in Nanjing, many officials actually lived in Shanghai. Most ministries operated branch offices in Shanghai, where more work seemed to be conducted than in the main offices in the capital. However, in mid-1929 the National Government, recognizing this situation as a problem of economy, efficiency, and legitimacy, closed down those branch offices ("Jing Hu za ji"

1928; *North China Herald,* December 29, 1928; January 5, 1929; August 31, 1929).

In early 1932, the National Government did move temporarily to Luoyang, as Japanese warships on the Yangzi threatened Nanjing during the Shanghai War. Luoyang was considered the "temporary capital" (*xingdu*) of Nationalist China during the crisis, while Nanjing still retained the status of "main capital" (*shoudu*). However, a debate emerged as to whether or not Nanjing was too vulnerable to remain the capital in the long term. The issue at that time was resolved by reestablishing a system of multiple capitals, where other cities would be designated as "auxiliary capitals" (*peidu*). Xi'an became an auxiliary capital, often known as Xijing, or "Western Capital." Unlike auxiliary capitals under the Qing system, Xijing was not really designed to share the burdens of actual administration. Instead, it served as the focus of contingency plans in case Nanjing was threatened in the future. On December 1, 1932, the National Government officially moved back to Nanjing and held a ceremony at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum to report that the government had returned.[2]

Also problematic was the perception that Nanjing did not really operate as a capital unless its most important patron, Chiang Kai-shek, was present. As commander-in-chief, Chiang was often away from the city. He spent a good deal of time in Shanghai and often spent his summers in the resort area of Guling, near Lushan in Jiangxi Province. In fact, so many top GMD officials lived in Guling during the summer that it became known in the foreign press as the "summer capital" (*North China Herald,* May 16, 1934; August 26, 1936). Meanwhile, to more effectively coordinate his anti-Communist extermination campaigns, Chiang set up a headquarters in Nanchang, which became a national command center not only for military affairs but also for the political and cultural movement encompassed in Chiang's New Life Movement.[3] Many believed that without his personal attention, things in Nanjing simply did not get accomplished. Funds were lacking and people were not as motivated to show results. Anecdotal observations indicate that the city really seemed to come alive when Chiang was

present, and some opined that it settled into a kind of meaningless routine when he was away.[4]

In short, to some Nanjing continued to be considered Chiang's city, not a true, permanent capital. Unlike Beijing during the Qing, people were not always confident that the state would return to Nanjing when the government or its most important personages traveled elsewhere. Yet, over the course of the Nanjing Decade, these fears became less and less pertinent. The rumors subsided after the capital moved back to Nanjing in late 1932. Even though there was now an "auxiliary capital" in Xi'an, this contingency capital did not really take away from Nanjing's legitimacy. Part of the reason is that even though Chiang Kai-shek often traveled himself and even though he set up alternative power centers, there was still only one recognizable national ceremonial center for the GMD party-state: Nanjing.

Just as the emperors had to return to Beijing to perform their sacred rituals to the ancestors, Chiang and other party leaders had to return to Nanjing because it was the home of the GMD's ancestral tombs on Purple Mountain. The rites conducted at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and other GMD cemeteries were crucial for maintaining the ideological concept of the "national family" that allowed for political tutelage by the ever-living spirit of the "national father." Thus, Nanjing was ensured to be the national capital for as long as this symbolic construct remained important to state authority in China. The capital and party were locked in an embrace of mutual legitimization that could not easily be broken. By the end of the decade, people at least began to recognize that—even if there was still some question about whether or not the party should be leading the "national family" that it had helped to create—there was little question that Nanjing would be that party-state's capital.[5]

It takes a great deal of time to make a capital in a new location so legitimate or permanent that its status transcends its ties to the political coalition that establishes it. Many capitals that seem firmly entrenched today originally had only a tenuous hold on the imagination of the publics they represented. Washington is a

good example. In the early years of the United States, Congress had met in nine different cities before a dual-capital system was set up in 1783, one in the North and one in the South. Finally leaders settled on a capital on the Potomac, which in 1790 was considered to be in the South. L'Enfant drew up impressive Baroque plans for Washington in 1791, but these were almost for naught when the British burned the city during the War of 1812. In the aftermath, Congress debated moving the capital to a more secure location. Eventually it decided against moving, but the young capital was clearly vulnerable to such considerations. Even as late at 1870, people argued the capital should be moved inland, closer to the new center of the country (Vale 1992).

Through the 1800s, L'Enfant's plans remained on a shelf. The government built avenues and some public buildings but made little progress. In 1842, Charles Dickens described Washington as a city of "spacious avenues that begin in nothing and lead nowhere; streets a mile long that only want houses, roads, and inhabitants; public buildings that need only a public to be complete, and ornaments of great thoroughfares that need only great thoroughfares to ornament" (quoted in Mumford 1961, 407). Meanwhile, the capital's most recognizable structures were not built for many years. The imposing Capitol Building was finally completed in 1863; it took eighteen years to build the dome alone. The Mall was not built to the spirit of L'Enfant's specifications until the MacMillan Commission in 1902 cleared it of natural debris that had blocked the views. The Washington Monument appeared in 1885 (after forty years of construction), the Lincoln Memorial in 1922, and the Jefferson Memorial in 1943 (Vale 1992; Reps 1967). Monument construction has continued, with new memorials, most recently to Martin Luther King Jr. (2011), adding new physical and social layers to the symbolic meanings of a capital that never ceases to change. It took many decades for Washington to secure the sense of permanence that it now enjoys as capital of the United States.

In the few years before and after war with Japan, the GMD had time only to initiate the long process of capital construction. Not only did the GMD erect buildings and monuments, most of

which still stand today, it also constructed rituals that provided a common reference point for understanding the significance of the nation and generalized ideals of the relationship between the state and the people. That common reference point is what I have called the "new cosmology" of the capital: one part Sun Yat-sen ideology, one part rationalized template of what planners considered natural and scientific space and time, and one part reverence of a Chinese "essence" as represented in the rites and aesthetics of the capital. Nanjing, as the embodiment of this new cosmology, did not maintain its central role after 1949. It was deemed too closely tied to the discredited GMD party that had created it, so Beijing became the capital of the People's Republic of China. Yet in the relatively short time that it was the capital, Nanjing had weathered enough debates that it had at least become the GMD's permanent capital.

Nanjing as the Model Capital

When the Nanjing Decade began in 1927, the elites of China commonly assumed that modernization required a new kind of centralized and interventionist state. Many also believed that to strengthen a "backward" nation, a revolutionary transformation of the people had to occur, turning superstitious, selfish subjects into rational, selfless citizens who could be mobilized to meet national goals. Thus, the Guomindang's program of political tutelage was designed to reeducate the people, to unite them and make them loyal to the state (Sun Yat-sen [1923] 1953, 10–13). Urban planning, architecture, and ritual all served important functions in this effort to create citizens. Urban planning was not just supposed to create infrastructure alone, it was also meant to rationalize space so that it would be used more efficiently for the sake of development. The people who occupied the new "rational spaces" would be expected to conform to the new regulated uses prescribed by the plan, and for such conformity the lives of all would be improved. Architects designed their buildings with an eye toward rationalizing the use of space and creating proper frames for modern work. Through ceremony, it was hoped that the people would inculcate the values

of unity, loyalty, and self-sacrifice, which most agreed was necessary to save China from its internal weaknesses and external threats.

In establishing Nanjing as the model capital, planners and ritualists believed that the city would play a pivotal role in promoting the transformation of the people. The capital was not just a place where necessary government buildings would be located. A capital was considered the center of the national imagination. The oft-repeated phrase that the capital was the "focus of the whole nation's eyes and ears" meant that people paid close attention to what happened there. This idea was not just an excuse used by the authorities to clean and beautify the city; it expressed the assumption that what occurred in the capital could influence the beliefs and actions of people elsewhere. People would look to the capital to set the standard for modern national development in all that it entailed: science, industry, politics, education, culture, and more.

Even more important than its role as a model for development was the idea that a capital was essential for forging national unity. Such unity was clearly lacking in 1927 and 1928. In order for Nanjing to assist in the creation of national unity, GMD leaders knew that an appealing set of ceremonies would have to be developed in a way that it seemed natural for patriotic people to want to emulate them across the country. At the same time, to channel patriotic feeling into a sense of loyalty for the state that operated from the administrative center, there had to be something particular to the ceremonies in Nanjing that inspired and directed nationalistic sentiment toward the capital, so that even when performed locally, the rituals would be perceived as extensions of a "central" ritual that tied the people of the country together. Hence, there was a perceived need for a ceremonial center. The Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum seemed to be the perfect vehicle for directing patriotic sentiment to benefit the party-state.

Much like the capitals of China's past, Nanjing served as a microcosm for a collective understanding of how the world was and should be. Rituals were designed to inculcate certain values, but they could only serve their function properly if they took place

in appropriate settings where the physical environment reinforced the belief that the ideals embodied by the actions were natural and correct. However, the particular ways that Nanjing reflected the worldviews of the 1920s and 1930s differed from those of earlier eras. The old cosmology had been discredited, and a new worldview was under construction. GMD leaders established their qualifications to rule in part on the notion that they could harness the power of science to transform the nation, and China's educated elites often assumed that scientific principles had to inform almost all of the practices of the new nation. Thus, even in the construction of the ceremonial center, scientific considerations—in terms of building techniques, design, and materials—had to be on display in order for the site to be taken seriously by a "modern" people. Notions of science thus helped naturalize the performance of rituals, and the juxtaposition of "scientifically" built and designed spaces with "cultural" ritual practices suggested that there was no inconsistency between the two.

During this same period, ideology was widely perceived as a necessary ingredient for mobilizing people in the modern world. Thus, an all-encompassing, scientifically based system of thought also had to be discernible in the ritual-architectural center of the new nation. GMD founder Sun Yat-sen had created what he promoted as just such an ideology, developed with the "specific characteristics of China" in mind. Naturally, the GMD staked its own legitimacy on the promotion of its founder's ideology, with its notion of political tutelage under single-party rule. For this ideal to work, people in general had to accept that the principles of Sun Yat-sen's philosophy, just like a good urban plan, were indeed based on science, and that through science and patriotism the party would put the people before its own interests.

In addition to couching political claims in the language of science and ideology, GMD planners hoped the nation's ritual-architectural center would naturalize new power arrangements by invoking familiar ceremonial forms. By referencing family rituals in the construction of the new state cult in Nanjing, the power of the past was called upon to create a sense of continuity. As mentioned

repeatedly, if people are going to be transformed through ritual, they must first be convinced to participate. There has to be something alluring and inviting about the ritual-architectural event to convince people that it is in fact meaningful. Most families continued to pay respects to ancestors, and it had long been customary for the state in China to make use of ancestral rites as part of its own legitimizing cult. Thus, it was fairly easy for even a "revolutionary" state to see the benefit of using modified versions (absent their "superstitious" elements) of such rites to establish a meaningful, seemingly natural relationship between itself and the people. It was already established in so-called advanced nations that cultural custom and patriotic rituals were essential features of modern nationalism, which turned the nation into an object of seemingly sacred reverence.

But simple emulation of past practices would not be sufficient. The GMD state attempted to revolutionize the relationship between the state and society by creating a state cult around the concept of a "family state," in which all individuals could and would participate directly in the new national rites. While the imperial-era cult was emulated in private homes, the actual rituals conducted in those homes were still considered separate from those conducted by the imperial family. The GMD made the case that all citizens were part of a single national family, so people should put the good of the nation before their own individual and family interests. To Sun Yat-sen, the people of China were a "loose sheet of sand" who had little regard for the public good (Sun Yat-sen 1927, 4–5, 55–65, 191–192). For China to modernize, it would be essential for the power of individuals to be mobilized for the sake of the nation. GMD rituals, while borrowing from imperial practices, were designed for direct mass participation. The spaces constructed in the capital were larger and more open, while the ritual practices promoted by the state also allowed for simultaneous participation by anyone in the country.

The new state cult that was centered on Nanjing also articulated new expectations and responsibilities, which it was hoped would invest people in the notion of political tutelage. There was an implied pact between the state and potential participants: All

Chinese people are citizens of the national family state. Adhere to the discipline prescribed by the party, whose authority was a delegation from the national father, Sun Yat-sen. Do your part, fulfill your functional role in this family-state, and the *nation* will become strong and modern, allowing all to prosper. Sacrifice now for future benefit. The older imperial cult had also called on people to put the greater good of society before their own benefit, and it promised harmonious, steady prosperity in return. The GMD pact was predicated on an ideal of modern improvement, which at some point required a recognizable payoff to remain an effective motivator.

Where Nanjing best succeeded as a model was in the propagation of its national rituals. As described in chapters 4 and 5, national holidays were often celebrated with great fanfare in the capital, and the ceremonies, speeches, and rallies were thoroughly recorded in the newspapers of other cities. Naturally, those reports were usually accompanied by descriptions of local festivities, which indicates that there was great continuity in the methods used to mark "national time." Even in cities led by political rivals, national holidays were celebrated in similar ways. A large part of the reason that even rival cities celebrated GMD-dictated national holidays is because these rituals and rallies quickly came to stand for unity, just as intended. Not to follow the rituals was to be disloyal to Sun's spirit and an open admission that a rival no longer respected the authority of the central government in Nanjing. The rituals had to be followed, although they could also be manipulated to criticize central policies. But in doing so, the rituals were legitimized all the more, as was the capital whose rites were considered central.

Ritualization, Resistance, and Legitimacy

Still, much popular action defied GMD intentions. At one level, the built environment of the capital did not instill a new sense of discipline within *all* the people on the streets or in the new buildings. It did give those who were most adept at reading the new city streets a sense of their own superiority over those who,

for example, stubbornly persisted in using pedestrian lanes for drying chilies. Thus the built environment helped to naturalize the new social hierarchy that emphasized the power of technocrats over the "ignorant" people, although planners didn't design city streets intending to use them as leverage over the common people. They genuinely hoped to change the people and were mostly disappointed with the results. Hence, what might be construed as an old relationship between elites and commoners was reinforced, while the change to that relationship was that "undisciplined" use of the new built environment justified the idea among elites that an interventionist state (as opposed to a supposedly passive imperial one) was necessary to realize the desired changes.

Meanwhile, even though the GMD was rather successful in establishing Nanjing as the nation's ritual center, many participants were insincere. In the early years of the Nanjing Decade, some observers described state ceremonies as "stale" compared to the lunar-calendar festivals that the state tried to eliminate. Given the circumstances, this is understandable. The hegemonic relationship between the older festivals and the state cult had been lost in the collapse of the Qing dynasty. Republican-era attempts to create a new symbolic system involved picking and choosing elements from the past whose older meanings had been undermined. The GMD continued this process, while at the same time taking greater steps to try to eliminate what it considered superstitious practices. The result, to some later observers, made GMD efforts seem like an inauthentic imitation of Confucianism (e.g., Levenson 1968). Others have seen GMD rituals as an attempt to suck the spontaneity out of genuine social movements that existed before 1927. During the Nanjing Decade, however, few critics suggested that the GMD was wrong to promote state rituals—even those that invoked older practices—to create national unity.

Participation in the early celebrations of state shows more of an official character than the organic celebrations of the prohibited lunar festivals did. On the other hand, many among the educated elite believed that a modern nation must have a set of national rituals to promote national ideals. It has been argued in this study

that simply by trying to eliminate the older festivals, the state forced people to consider the differences between the old and the new, which then laid bare the relative artificiality of the new. It takes time for new ceremonies to take on the air of "tradition" and hence to feel more natural. In the meantime, just taking part—whether sincerely or insincerely—gradually changes perceptions and builds acceptance of the myths that the rituals represent. In the early years, then, performance of the rituals mattered more than did believing the messages.

But if participants never feel a personal stake in the symbolic system being constructed, even the passing of time won't lead to its success. Angela Zito (1997) has described how Qing rituals involved the literati elites in ceremonies that legitimized the emperor's authority. Meanwhile, elites and families in general were more explicitly invested in the symbolic system through the medium of ritual itself, as *li* was a fundamental concept of Confucianism that could only be realized through its performance. Literati elites gained social importance through their ability to interpret what authentic *li* "really" was, as well as through various inversions of superior-inferior roles that took place during the ceremonies. At the same time, imperial state practice was also necessary to legitimize literati as interpreters, which meant that the scholars' dedication to *li* precluded a complete separation of literati, as a class, from the throne.

But by the 1920s, a new relationship between the center and elites, as well as between the center and the people, was being established. By 1927, *li* had not been completely discarded, of course, but other forces had to be brought to bear to legitimize the more ambitious exercise of power that the revolutionary state wished to wield. In claiming to lead a revolution, there was a new discursive preference for social mobilization, implying something more active than mere self-cultivation and harmonious living through *li*. The masses had to be awakened in order to take action, end the national humiliation, and create progress through science. "Society" was a new concept, while at the same time there was the notion that society should be motivated to act on behalf of the

larger collective known as the nation (Harrison 2000; Tsin 1999; M. Dong 2002). Regardless of how one felt social action should be realized, mobilization was a common framework for understanding a new set of power relations.

Much as the elites and the imperial state had been mutually dedicated to *li*, the GMD and China's urban elites of the 1920s seemed mutually dedicated to the ideal of awakening the masses and, thus, to some form of social action (Fitzgerald 1996). Because of this dedication, even if it were rhetorical, the GMD in Nanjing could not entirely suppress genuinely popular movements. It was too much invested in the ideal. It is clear that the central GMD did try to harness social action in an attempt to control and limit the unpredictability of mobilized masses. The GMD tried to ritualize social action by establishing explicit rules to circumscribe what was appropriate mass action and what was not. But for ritualized social action to still be recognizable as social action (instead of some other ritual form), it had to incorporate the kinds of practices that people saw as genuine mass action—through mass gatherings, shouting of slogans, and the sponsoring of parades, for example. The writing of ritual rules by the state was nothing new. The scope of acceptable, explicitly "ritual" behavior, however, changed.

Having presented itself as the revolutionary party of the unified masses of China, the GMD encouraged the same repertoire of protest that had been used against the warlords and imperialists. That repertoire of parades, boycotts, and demonstrations would be directed at those whom the state claimed undermined national strength. When it came to social action directed toward the new government, the GMD called for parades of support and participation in officially sanctioned mass organizations, which could offer petitions to the state in order to make grievances known. The GMD state thus replicated and legitimized ritualized forms of protest and dissent in order to bolster its own claims as revolutionary leader, while trying to steer their course at the same time. The state could not crack down on all forms of dissent, even though it often exercised the power of military dictatorship to silence those who directly criticized or challenged party rule. The GMD discouraged

what it considered to be disruptive activities, but it still claimed to be channeling the popular will through its own versions of mass movements. It was an important claim to make if it hoped to naturalize the authority over people's social economy that it also claimed to have as a revolutionary government.

The problem for the party-state was not necessarily the attempt to ritualize social action. In fact, GMD rituals and celebrations over time seemed to be losing at least some of their artificiality. Increasing numbers of people were participating actively in these functions at the end of the decade. The main problem for the state was its insistence that legitimacy rested on achieving unanimity. Legitimacy is actually the product of contention. People cared about the struggle over the symbols that the GMD constructed. As long as people believed that it was important to contest the particular meanings and goals ascribed to nationhood in Nanjing, then the capital successfully embodied the imagined nation that transcended the struggles. In other words, people accepted the invitation and indeed were transformed. GMD leaders, because of the way that they made their promises, succeeded more so than previous regimes in transforming people's expectations. People expected more from their government, and it seemed reasonable to most that the government should expect more from them. Ultimately, in the 1940s, the cost of failing to deliver on those promises was high; the changed expectations helped pave the way for the Chinese Communist Party's version of revolutionary nationalism, which had more in common with GMD rhetoric than has been generally recognized.

The presence of protests did not negate the relative success the GMD had in Nanjing. Protests challenged the notion that the party represented the will of a united populace. This was a serious drawback, but only because the GMD had made it clear that it would not allow organized *political* opposition. The dissent that existed, however, generally challenged party policies, not the symbols of nationhood the GMD had established; neither did it attempt to undermine the essential frameworks of power that the GMD embodied in its national rituals. The vast majority of

students protesting Japanese aggression were not trying to bring down the GMD state. Most protestors called for new leadership within the party, whose overall authority was little questioned.

The failure of the GMD was not the failure to continue the radical policies of mass mobilization (as is implied by frequent criticism that GMD ceremonies were "not popular enough"). It was a failure, ultimately, to appease a base of tentative supporters who temporarily lent their support to a nationalistic movement that seemed an improvement over what had come before. The trick had been to inculcate the myths that made that temporary support seem natural and timeless, so that people would forget how tenuous the ties binding the coalition of actors together really were and to replace self-interested support with a myth of transcendent values centered on the party. In the 1940s, the myths surrounding the GMD unraveled quickly, allowing the CCP to present itself as more authentic inheritors of roughly *the same mythical framework*. Then, the CCP proved more successful in inculcating the myths of its own place in the modern nation of China, in no small part because the Communists invested a larger swath of society into those myths.

Capital Legacies

The GMD fled the mainland in 1949, but Nanjing lived on as the capital of the Republic of China (ROC) for decades afterwards, at least on the maps produced in Taiwan. On December 7, 1949, the GMD's National Government declared that Taipei, Taiwan, would serve as a provisional capital of the ROC until the mainland was reclaimed and the government could move back to Nanjing. In Taiwan the cult of Sun continued, with his portrait prominently displayed in public buildings and Chiang's image beside it (and often overshadowing it). Chiang often lamented the loss of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, and Nanjing became the symbol of Sun's patrimony, which would have to be reclaimed from the "Communist bandits" in order to fulfill the national father's wishes. Maps of China hung in schoolrooms across Taiwan, with a conspicuous star over Nanjing connoting the "temporary" circumstance of exile.

The people should remain diligent and be willing to sacrifice, and no one should expect certain civil liberties or democracy until the symbolic star on the map was a reality on the continent (Bergere 1998, 412; Taylor 2006, 96–110).

Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, and the goal of retaking the mainland slowly faded from the ROC's official rhetoric. The government began to invest in the redevelopment of Taipei, which had suffered relative neglect as a provisional capital but now was provided more resources to follow the Nanjing model.[6] In 1972, the GMD state completed construction of the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall in Taipei, to serve as a new focus for the continued reverence of the national father. Upon Chiang's death, the GMD solicited plans for a monumental Chiang Kai-shek memorial hall and public square near the administrative center of the ROC's National Government. Construction of the memorial hall began on October 31, 1976 (Chiang's birthday), and the seventy-meter-tall structure was completed in 1980. The main building is square, made of concrete faced with marble, and topped with an octagonal curved roof with blue-glazed tiles, the same color as those of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. At the top of a flight of eighty-nine stairs (for the number of years Chiang lived), seated inside the great iron doors, is a bronze statue of Chiang that resembles the marble one of Sun in Nanjing. In front of the memorial hall is a massive square over which Chiang's statue looks upon citizens who gather below (*Zhongzheng jiniantang* 1984). In 1987, a National Theater and a National Concert Hall were added on the north and south sides of the square.

With these additions, Taipei nearly achieved the kind of central administrative zone that Nanjing's planners had sought. On the east end stands the Presidential Palace, with yuan and ministry buildings positioned nearby. Within sight of the Presidential Palace is the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, which was supposed to serve as a new ceremonial center for the ROC, along with the kind of cultural facilities that had been called for in the original designs for Nanjing's central district. The GMD also built itself an impressive Party Headquarters in the same vicinity, directly facing

the Presidential Palace and also adjacent to the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. Meanwhile, as the fiction of Nanjing as capital faded, the Taipei Municipal Government gained the authority to turn Taipei into the more livable capital of a newly imagined Republic of China on Taiwan. The municipal government opened up large new parks, constructed a subway system, and began to regulate polluting industries more tightly.

Over on the mainland, the CCP, which moved China's capital back to Beijing in 1949, also utilized ideals of capital aesthetics and national ritual that were similar to those developed in Nanjing, though such continuities have been overlooked. Most analyses of Beijing's Communist transformation describe how imperial space became a "people's space," with more or less emphasis on lingering imperial elements (Sit 1995, 244–258; Steinhardt 1990, 179–184; Wu Hung 2005; Hung Chang-tai 2011, 25–50). Planners in the early 1950s were divided between Soviet advisors, who advocated the use of existing imperial-era structures in and around the Forbidden City as the core of a new administrative center, and Chinese planners, such as architect Liang Sicheng, who argued that it should be constructed on relatively empty land outside the city walls. Mao's decision to place the administrative zone in the imperial center certainly lends credence to the idea that the "old" Beijing heavily influenced the "new." It is not just that the CCP used imperial-era buildings, but by ensconcing themselves in a secretive compound behind the walls of Zhongnanhai, CCP leaders replicated the closed culture of imperial power as well.

Even so, Beijing in the early 1950s saw important changes to its landscape. Soviet influence alone did not dictate the need for new public spaces in Beijing. Nationalist Nanjing had redefined the symbolic roles and aesthetic of a modern Chinese capital. Tiananmen Square was transformed into the type of political and cultural center called for by Nanjing's planners, with monumental palaces to party power, including a massive Great Hall of the People, where the mostly ceremonial National People's Congress meets. Opposite the legislative building lies the National Museum of China, devoted to China's national and revolutionary histories.

Both of these structures were completed in 1959 and built in the "international Soviet" style. Meanwhile, Tiananmen Square itself has also served as the place where CCP leaders oversee military reviews and the masses gather alongside the ten-story Monument to the People's Heroes to celebrate the state. In contrast to Nanjing, however, instead of trying to tap into the charisma of a divine departed leader at his ancestral shrine, the CCP built up its cult of state around a living embodiment of supposed perfection: Mao Zedong. After Mao's death in 1976, the party built a mausoleum to display his remains in the midst of Tiananmen Square, which made it even more consistent with the intent of Nanjing planners (Steinhardt 1990, 179–184; Wu Hung 2005; Sit 1995, chaps. 3–4; Wakeman 1985).

Admittedly the PRC was more successful in constructing its ceremonial center at Tiananmen Square. Its buildings are larger, dwarfing anything constructed in Nanjing in the 1930s. Its streets are wider, allowing many more rows of marching soldiers and tanks. Its public square, greatly expanded in the 1950s, is broader, capable of holding the much larger crowds that participated in CCP-led celebrations of state. The ritual-architectural events in Beijing were and are still staged on a larger scale than anything seen in Nanjing. For the CCP, this was its way of representing mass mobilization. These examples, however, are differences of degree, not kind, when compared to the ritual-architectural spaces created in Nanjing. In the case of the PRC, there were arguably more opportunities for the masses to participate actively in political campaigns, even if liberal democracy was never part of the bargain. Thus, people in the PRC may well have been more receptive to participating in the same kinds of ritual-architectural events that the GMD-led ROC staged in Nanjing. Future research on the attitudes of participants may be able to answer that question more definitively. Overall, the similarities of form are more striking than the differences.

There are many possible explanations for the similarities. The leaders of the two parties were of the same generation that had inherited similar practices and symbols of the late Qing and early republic. They also had similar experiences with May Fourth–era

parades and protests. Plus, they had worked together in Guangzhou to develop the key components of Nationalist ritual before the purge. They were also simultaneous witnesses to the architectural transformations of other capitals around the world. Moreover, many of the architects who had helped to build Nanjing stayed to offer their services to the "new" China. The collapse of the GMD regime did not usher in a whole new architectural profession. And the memories of Nanjing ritual-architectural events, especially ceremonies conducted at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum that continued after 1949, had certainly not faded. Continuity was more than coincidence.[7]

Thus, two capitals came to resemble their predecessor Nanjing, despite sharp distinctions. Both now host large-scale gatherings of the masses, who seem to be genuinely invested in the rituals staged in their architectural spaces. On October 1, 2009, after decades of reform and capitalist pursuits, more than one hundred thousand people participated in a celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the PRC's founding. There were large military and civilian parades, musical performances, and speeches. Millions watched the spectacle on television at home. Despite the problems that people regularly bemoan about the CCP-led government, most seemed proud to participate and happy to watch. As in the public spaces of Nationalist Nanjing, though, there are accretions to the collective memory that defy state intentions. Tiananmen Square continues to attract dissenters and it likely will always be remembered for dramatic protests, including those of June 4, 1989. The police can haul away those who unfurl banners, but they cannot prevent people from making their own associations in the square.

Meanwhile, in Taipei the nature of interactions within its monumental public spaces has moved in new directions. In the 1980s, after building its own grand square dedicated to an unapologetic dictator and one-party rule, the GMD let its monopoly on political power expire. Martial law was finally lifted in 1987. Rival political parties were legalized in 1989. Chiang Kai-shek Square began attracting angry protestors in defiance of government intentions. In 1990, students gathered to demand

free and popular elections. This time the government acquiesced. Popular presidential elections were held for the first time in 1996, and now Taiwan has a thriving liberal democracy. National Day is still celebrated on October 10 with enthusiasm in Taiwan, and rituals to Sun Yat-sen still go on, though the predominant promotion of Sun's ideology has faded and the cult of Chiang has been greatly diminished.[8] Taiwan is in the midst of a new struggle over its political symbols, but the GMD remains very influential, and an indelible mark has been left on the symbolic landscape, even as new opposition parties and the masses leave their own accretions on the collective memory.

In the end, planners can make places, and political parties can hold rituals, but the ways that people use these spaces to struggle over the symbols embodied in them truly make them meaningful. It is the superabundance of meanings that turns mere places into spaces that matter. The irony of contemporary China and Taiwan is that though the GMD may have been more eager to show that Nanjing had an impact on the appearance of and practices within Taipei, it is the CCP that has created the capital, as ritual-architectural event, that now more closely resembles Nationalist Nanjing. Like the GMD-led state in Nanjing, the CCP has persisted in believing that the nation's sacred spaces must be completely free of conflicting views for them to have legitimizing power, whereas in fact it is the shared meanings that emerge out of contestation that create the more lasting living memories that unify what is, in reality, a diverse population. Nanjing was a capital with many ambiguities, so it should not surprise us that the same model could lead to such diverse ends as contemporary Taipei and Beijing. At the same time, because people have a tendency to add new, unexpected meanings to even the most controlled spaces, no one should expect that today's circumstances are the end of the story of Nanjing's legacies as China's first modern capital.

Notes

Introduction

1. The pinyin system is used throughout this study, except in cases of personal names that are more familiar spelled in other ways (e.g., Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek). I have also preserved the original romanization quoted from English-language materials. The Wade-Giles romanization for Guomindang is Kuomintang (or KMT).
2. Gao Shulin and Shao Jianguang 1991; Shi Sanyou 1985. For the classic description of Ming Nanjing in English, see Mote 1977. For Nanjing as the capital of the Taiping, see Withers 1983. For analysis of the role of ritual in rebuilding Jinling (Nanjing) after the destruction of the Taiping Rebellion, see Wooldridge 2007.
3. Books on Nanjing's history designed for a popular audience, usually lacking footnotes and having an anecdotal quality, have been quite common recently. One series called *Keai de Nanjing* (Lovely Nanjing) has proven very successful. Topics in this series have included Nanjing's cultural artifacts, place names, architecture, poets, traffic, and stamps.
4. For a pathbreaking study of Nanjing's modern development, see Luo Ling 1999. On social management policies during the Nanjing Decade, see Wang Yunjun 1999. On the city's political development, see An Jiafang 1988.
5. For excellent recent examples of Chinese-language studies on Sun Yat-sen symbolism and the mausoleum in Nanjing, see Chen Yunqian 2009 and Li Gongzhong 2009. The mausoleum has also attracted considerable attention in Western-language research. See Wang Liping 1996; Harrison 2000; Musgrove 2002; Lai Delin 2005 and 2007; Wagner 2011.
6. For two contrasting views on the role of treaty ports in China, see Murphey 1953 and 1974. Also see L. Johnson 1993 and 1995. For an institutional history of Shanghai during the Nationalist era, see Henriot 1993.
7. Influential studies on the formation of civil society and the public sphere in China include William Rowe's work on Hankou (1984 and 1989) and David Strand's study of Beijing (1989). These works sparked a heated debate about whether or not a public sphere emerged in China before 1949 (Rowe 1990;

P. Huang et al. 1993; Wakeman 1993). Since then scholars have largely tried to evaluate Chinese cities "on their own terms." Among the best efforts to do so are B. Goodman 1995 and Lu Hanchao 1999 on Shanghai and P. Carroll's recent study of Suzhou (2006).

8. Eastman 1974, 272. While Eastman admits that the power of the central government was expanding, he rightly points out that central GMD control over newly "incorporated" provinces still remained tenuous, which raises the legitimate question of whether or not Chiang's wars were worth their cost. My point in this work is not to produce a kind of revisionism that would simply turn GMD "failure" into "success," but to look more closely at how the Nationalist period, with its complicated and contradictory legacies, fit into the long-term processes of nation and state building. For more on the view of continuity across the 1949 divide, see Esherick 1995.
9. This term, "framework," is informed by theories of discourse, power, and practice made popular by Foucault (1977), de Certeau (1984), and Bourdieu (1990), among others (though, of course, these scholars disagree on the particulars). Basically, it refers to the now commonly accepted idea that power is not simply a product of coercion. Instead, power relations within a given society are also constructed through a process of making hierarchies seem natural by establishing what often become unquestioned social boundaries within a larger worldview. Generally speaking, some of the mechanisms scholars have described for establishing such boundaries include discourse, ritual, and the built environment, which will all be touched upon in this work. The framework referred to here, then, was a discursive construction that served to circumscribe an acceptable realm of social action, which facilitated the establishment of a commonly assumed boundary between the so-called awakened and the unawakened. In this case, the framework was the nation, and as the discourse on how power within the nation should be exercised narrowed, assumptions among the elites about the ignorance of the unawakened led to a form of representative government that limited direct representation. However, it is important to note from the outset that such frameworks, boundaries, and commonsense assumptions about such boundaries did not preclude contestation. On the contrary, they could not exist without continuous negotiation to remain effectively recognized as boundaries. For a definition of the idea of "enframing," see Mitchell 1988, 44–45. Catherine Bell (1992) provides a nice introduction to theories of discourse and practice in *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice.*
10. By "ritual," I refer broadly to a mode of culturally codified behavior in which relationships between individuals are objectified and through which people formulate their ideas about social organization (Kertzer 1988). At one level, in this study I will be describing what the GMD hoped to accomplish through the rituals that they promoted in the capital. But at another level, I will be looking at ritual formation as a form of "ritualization," as described by Catherine Bell (1992). In ritualization, certain behaviors are set off as having a particular kind of significance that contrasts with the mundane activities of everyday life. Ritual, broadly conceived, might be found in virtually any form of human interaction, but in ritualization there was a clear effort to mark

certain behaviors as distinct. Once recognized and performed as distinctive rituals, these forms of practice embody particular frames of meaning that not only naturalize hierarchical power structures but also allow for circumscribed modes of contestation within them.

11. This book complements other recent studies in addressing the continuing development of Nationalist attitudes toward rituals and their role in creating modern citizens. Robert Culp (2007) has investigated Nationalist education and found that within schools, the routinization of the practices of mass mobilization led to ambiguous results. Student participants suggested that the rituals they performed increased their "identification with the nation" but did not necessarily "correlate with strong feelings of loyalty to the state or party leadership" (239). Rebecca Nedostup (2009) has described attempts to create a "rational" form of national ritual in Nationalist China through party efforts to eliminate superstitious practices. She finds that these efforts had only modest success in winning popular participation and never fully succeeded in removing the "religious" element from what GMD activists hoped would be secularized state ceremonies.
12. Nanjing was not the first, nor would it be the last, model capital in China. Many contenders for power at the time presented their own versions of the model city, which in each case was supposed to serve as a shining example of how modernization could occur in China. For other histories of "model cities" in modern China, see Stapleton 2000, Shao Qin 2004, and MacPherson 1990.
13. This idea is similar to an argument developed by Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz (1991) about the nature of symbols. Their analysis of the Vietnam Memorial in Washington questions "Durkheim's belief that moral unity is the ultimate object of commemoration." Instead, commemoration of a painful war was designed to "render more explicit, and more comprehensible, a nation's conflicting conceptions of itself and its past" (376). In Nanjing, the GMD's intention in building a capital as a national symbol was clearly to create unity, à la Durkheim's view. I argue that it became a national symbol *anyway* through the social blurring of the GMD's easy comprehension of the symbolism. The unintended contention over the meanings of the symbol actually produced a useful form of legitimacy. Also see Durkheim 1965.

Chapter 1: The Capital Established

1. "Guomin zhengfu dingdu Nanjing xuanyan" (National government's proclamation to establish the capital at Nanjing), April 18, 1927, in *Zhonghua minguo shi dang'an ziliao huibian,* vol. 5, no. 1 (Nanjing: Second National Historical Archives): 1–2. For general narrative histories of the Nationalist Revolution and the Northern Expedition, see Wilbur 1983 and Jordan 1976.
2. For an excellent analysis of the factions and the issues that divided the GMD following Sun's death, see Wang Ke-wen 1985.
3. Throughout this book, the capitalized "Party Leader" refers to the Chinese term *zongli* 總理. *Zongli* was then and is still commonly used to translate "premier" or "prime minister" as the term denoting leaders of parliamentary cabinets. Within the GMD, it referred to Sun's leadership status, which

had been granted for life, and during the Nanjing Decade it came to refer exclusively to Sun Yat-sen as the Guomindang's Party Leader. See the *Ci Hai* 1936, 2285.

4. The official reason given for Nanjing as the capital was that it was safer than other southern cities from attack, especially after Hankou and Hanyang fell to northern forces. See *Shen bao,* December 11, 1911. For the political machinations behind the scenes, see Esherick 1994, 132–133. Also see Fincher 1968; Young 1968; Bergere 1968.
5. Sun Yat-sen's initial demand to Yuan Shikai was that Beijing could not be the capital. Other places could be considered. In the thick of the February struggle, however, Sun insisted that only Nanjing would be adequate. At the time, many had proposed Tianjin as a compromise, but Sun probably did not think that Tianjin would be sufficiently separated from Yuan's power base. After capitulating, Sun went back to proposing several possible sites for a permanent capital, including Kaifeng, Chang'an, Taiyuan, Wuchang, and Nanjing. Compare early demands, as in *Xinwen bao,* January 21, 1912, to those that came later, as in "Sun da zongtong yaowen yaodian huilu" (Collected important letters and telegrams from President Sun), *Xinwen bao,* February 21, 1912. For a lecture on capital possibilities and why Beijing was still considered inappropriate, see Sun Yat-sen, "Zai Beijing canyiyuan huanyinghui de yanshuo" (Speech at the welcoming meeting of the Beijing assembly), August 31, 1912, in Sun Yat-sen 1985, 2:425–426. For more on Sun's views of the capital issue, see Sun Yat-sen 1989, *Guofu quanji,* 3:125–126; and Sun Yat-sen 1990a, *Sun Zhongshan ji wai ji,* 70–71.
6. Report on the "Revolution in China" from Commander-in-Chief Murdock of the Asiatic Fleet to the Secretary of the Navy, January 14, 1912, in USDS, *Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910–1929,* M329, roll 9, 893/1075.
7. "Model Capital at Nanking," 1912. See also a polite letter from Sun Yat-sen to Yuan Shikai (in Sun Yat-sen 1985, 2:106–107) in which he warns that a capital in Beijing would cause bureaucrats to think that the old corrupt ways were still in effect. Change in government could only occur by changing the capital.
8. On Nanjing's physical centrality, see Sun Yat-sen, "Nanjing wei Changjiang zhi yaodi shiyi wei shoudu" (Nanjing occupies important location on Yangzi and is suitable as the capital), October 26, 1912, in Sun Yat-sen 1989, 3:126.
9. The editorialists of the *North China Herald* often complained of the soft response by the foreign powers. One editorial criticized them for not immediately occupying Nanjing "when the outrage occurred" (*North China Herald,* April 16, 1927). The British reportedly favored a more aggressive response, but U.S. president Calvin Coolidge declared on April 25, 1927, that he would not order U.S. military forces to intervene in China's civil war. The others apparently refused to act without the unanimity of all the powers (Powell 1927, 275–276).
10. Chiang Kai-shek made this sentiment very clear when he said, "Nanjing is the GMD government, Wuhan is the CCP government." See "Jiang siling

qingdang hou duiyu shiju zhi yanjiang" (Commander Chiang's speech on the current situation after party purification) in *Geming wenxian,* 9:1318.

11. *Shen bao,* December 7, 1927. The government formed a special court in March 1928 to investigate the incident, but the basic idea was to let it fade from memory. As the incident was so much tied to the GMD divisions that the fourth plenum had just tried to smooth over, all involved felt it best to just forget what happened. See J. Hall Paxton, U.S. vice consul at Nanjing, report to U.S. minister J. V. A. MacMurray, February 29, 1928, USDS, M329, Roll 65, 893.00/9838. Also see *Shen bao,* March 15, 1928.
12. There are two plausible reasons for this discrepancy. For one, the *unbroken* line of Beijing's capital status dated back only to the early Ming, for the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang had located his capital in Nanjing before his successor moved the capital back north. Meanwhile, in an argument full of nationalist fervor, Beijing as capital of the native dynasty of the Ming had more authority than Beijing as the capital of two foreign dynasties, the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu Qing.
13. Zhang Qiyun 1927, 3. In fact, while most agreed that Mongolia and Manchuria were important parts of China, some argued that moving the capital to Nanjing would signal other peoples in Central Asia that China's new government would not try to resume Qing-era rule. Zhang claimed that "if the Republic is to realize a true republic," then the Mongolian and Tibetan "races" should be shown China's good intentions by returning the capital to the interior.
14. Chiang's view was reported numerous times. For examples, see "Jiang wei guodu zao ding" 1928; "Guodu didian bucheng wenti" 1928; *Shen bao,* June 26, 1928. Interestingly, though, Chiang was one of the few people to admit that Sun Yat-sen had not single-mindedly advocated Nanjing as the capital. In a speech, Chiang mentioned that in 1912–1913 Sun had advocated three possible capitals—Nanjing, Lanzhou, or Xi'an—though Chiang intended to emphasize that Sun ultimately chose Nanjing over all other possibilities (Ma Yinbing 1928b).
15. During the rest of the Nationalist era, the northern city was officially known as Beiping. But I will continue to refer to it as Beijing for readers' convenience.
16. "Zai Hubei Tongmenghui zhibu huanying hui shang de biaoshuo," April 12, 1912, in Sun Yat-sen 1990b, 75.

Chapter 2: Visions of Grandeur in the Capital Plan

1. In using the term "technocrat," I refer to the work of William Kirby, who describes how technical experts grew in prominence over the course of the Nationalist era, though never attaining the level of a "technocracy." Kirby effectively argues that science and technology were at the heart of GMD conceptions of modernity, an assertion that Nanjing's planners would certainly have endorsed (Kirby 2000a, 137).
2. J. Hall Paxton, U.S. vice-consul at Nanjing, report to U.S. minister J. V. A. MacMurray, August 17, 1928, USDS, M 329, Roll 83, 893.00/PR Nanking/3.
3. This idea appeared many times. See, for example, *Shoudu shizheng zhoukan,*

July 10, 1928. Also see "Tebie shi zuzhi fa" (Special municipality organization law), July 3, 1928, in *Geming wenxian* 1982, 91:205–235.

4. "Guomin zhengfu tepai Jiang Zhongzheng, Hu Hanmin, Dai Zhuanxian, deng wei shoudu jianshe weiyuanhui xunling" (National Government special representatives Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Hanmin, Dai Zhuanxian and others order for the Capital Construction Committee), in *Geming wenxian* 1982, 91:243–244. Also see "Shoudu jianshe weiyuanhui chengli ji fenqu guihua" (The establishment of the Capital Construction Committee and division plans), Second Historical Archives of China, 2:1228, micro 16J 1138, 0722–0881; and *huiyi* (meeting) sections of *Shoudu jianshe,* October 1928–July 1930. Chiang Kai-shek did not attend meetings regularly, so Kong Xiangxi usually acted as chairman.
5. *Dagong bao,* August 10, 1928; Ma Yinbing 1928a. These funds from the provinces would never materialize, but in 1928 the Municipal Government did not know this would be the case.
6. That was the official explanation of his resignation. Coming so soon after Chiang Kai-shek's own resignation, with the timing of his return so close to the GMD's Fifth Plenum, it is clear that factional interests were being played out.
7. Biography of Lü Yanzhi from a Who's Who entry in *China Weekly Review,* September 1, 1928. Also see Lai Delin 2006, 104–106. Other members of the committee included Wei Yifu, Zhou Xiangxian, Zhuang Jun (University of Illinois), Fan Wenzhao (University of Pennsylvania), Xun Xujia, Xia Guangyu (studied railway engineering and municipal administration in the United States, 1915–1916), Yang Xiaoshu, and Chen Yangjie (head of the Nanjing Public Works Bureau).
8. Cody 2001, chap. 3. "Ginling" is an Americanized spelling for Jinling, another name for Nanjing. On Sun Ke and the foreign advisors, see "Rebuilding Nanking as a Capital IV," *North China Herald,* June 8, 1929.
9. Cody 2001, chap. 5; *North China Herald,* June 8, 1929. Sun Ke, or Sun Fo, was the son of Sun Yat-sen and also trained in the United States. He had received a BA from the University of California–Berkeley in 1916 and an MS from Columbia in 1917. In 1921 he became mayor of Guangzhou and probably met H. K. Murphy for the first time in 1922. Also see Lai Delin 2009, 140; Cody 1989, 271.
10. These kinds of plans are discussed in virtually any issue of *Shoudu shizheng zhoukan*. For examples, see "Jianshe shoudu zhi xiansheng" 1928; Jiang Taihua 1928.
11. Lin Yimin 1929, *lunzhu*, 3. Lin Yimin had also previously served under Sun's mayoralty in Guangzhou as head of the Public Works Bureau (Lai Delin 2009, 142).
12. On June 22, 1929, the original Capital Design and Planning Committee had been renamed and placed under the direct authority of the Capital Construction Committee. See *Shoudu jianshe* 1 (October 1929): *huiyi,* 2. However, the office still worked closely with the Municipal Government and seemed to take orders from the mayor as well.

13. This vision is reconstructed from various sections of *Shoudu jihua* 1929. For airports, 85–90; the railway station, 73–78; river ports, 79–84; Pukou, 141–144; the road system, 37–46; asphalt paving, 47–52; building standards, 33–36.
14. *Shoudu jihua* 1929: the road system, 37–46; parks, 61–66; districts, 153–170; suburban roads, 53–56; running water, 91–102; electricity, 103–104; communications facilities, 111–114; industry, 133–140; public housing, 119–124.
15. *Shoudu jihua* 1929: on the Central Administrative Zone, 25–28; on architecture, 33–36; public squares are included in the section on parks.
16. Speech by Wang Zhengting in "Liu shizhang jiuzhi jinian hao" 1928. For more on the common view that roads were keys to development, see Carroll 2006, chap. 2, and Kristin Stapleton's description of the work of the National Road Building Association in the 1920s (2000, 231–233).
17. On the occupational districts that evolved in Chinese cities, see A. Wright 1977, 55–60; Knapp 2000, 47. Victor Cunrui Xiong notes that, in terms of the functional segregation of its wards, Sui-Tang Chang'an was less officially regulated than earlier Chinese capitals but that nonetheless the wards "evolved into areas differentiated by geographical location, the social status of the inhabitants, population density, and even function" (Xiong 2000, 233–234). For Qing Beijing, see Steinhardt 1990, 9–10.
18. Proximity to the palace did not always translate into higher position in the hierarchy. Position in the cosmological scheme of the cardinal powers also influenced location. Thus, the servants who did not live in the palace could live behind it in old Beijing, occupying positions in the cosmologically exposed northern part of the city but thereby remaining usefully close to the palace to fulfill their tasks. For more on cosmology and the capital in imperial China, see Wheatley 1971; A. Wright 1977; Zito 1997.
19. *Shoudu shizheng* 1929, 43–45. In *Nanking: The Capital of China* (1930), the importance of police to all municipal programs was made clear: "Its functions pertain to the protection of peace and order, maintenance of public morals, prohibition of objectionable undertakings, household inspection." It served as the "limbs" of every other government bureau (79). Also see *Shoudu shizheng zhoukan,* September 10, 1928.
20. "Yingchen dadao jiangxing kailu dianli," August 6, 1928. Also see Fang Xiangdong 1987, 57. Sun Yat-sen is known by a number of different names. Yat-sen is the Cantonese pronunciation of one of his literary names (*hao*) that he adopted as an adult, Yixian (逸仙), which became his most popular moniker in the West. Zhongshan (中山) is another *hao* for Sun Yat-sen that was and is more commonly used in China.
21. *Shoudu shizheng zhoukan,* January 1, 1928. The frustrations of the Municipal Government over this issue can be read in virtually every edition of the *Shoudu shizheng zhoukan,* especially in 1928. Almost every week, new proclamations declared that this time the government was serious about tearing down obstructions.
22. Paxton report to MacMurray, September 14, 1928.

Chapter 3: Administrative Aesthetics and Architectural Revolution in the Capital

1. For an excellent overview of the establishment of architectural education in China, see Ruan Xing 2002, 30–47. Also see Lai Delin 2007, 95–101; Rowe and Kuan 2002, 24–54; and Chen Congzhou and Zhang Ming 1988, 225–226.
2. See Ruan Xing (2002). Ruan describes how many of the architects trained in the United States were strongly influenced by the Beaux-Arts education they received there, which had many affinities with Chinese educational and design practices. When these architects began to teach students in China's own architectural programs, the Beaux-Arts influence spread even further. For more on this influence, see Cody, Steinhardt, and Atkin 2011. See also Du Yangeng 1936. For more on roofs as "Chinese hats," see Rowe and Kuan 2002, 87–106.
3. Lü Yanzhi 1929, 23–24. Compare to Albert Speer's vision for German National Socialist monuments (Speer 1970, 55–56).
4. "Shoudu zhongyang zhengzhi qu" 1929, 1. This could conceivably have been a crude ruse on the part of the committee to save money, since a third-place design would only earn 1,000 yuan, as opposed to the 1,500 and 2,000 yuan for second- and first-place works, respectively ("Pingxuan zhongyang zhengzhi qu" 1929, *gongdu,* 7).
5. Shu Bade (Heinrich Schubart) 1929, *gongdu* 39–41. Schubart was a German consultant hired by Chiang Kai-shek to work for the Capital Construction Committee (Cody 2001, 191).
6. This is a good example of what Ruan Xing has described as the "affinities" between earlier Chinese building and design practice and what the contemporary international standards of modern architecture were, particularly in the Beaux-Arts mode (Ruan 2002).
7. For more on the tension between "traditionalism" and modernism in modern Chinese architecture, see Rowe and Kuan 2002.
8. Fan Wenzhao (Robert Fan) received a bachelor's degree from St. John's in 1918 and a master's degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1922 (Su Gin-djih 1964, 133, 137; Ma Chaojun 1937b, 83–84). He had also worked for Sun Ke in Guangzhou, assisting in overseeing the construction of the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall (Cody 1996, 354).
9. Ma Chaojun 1937b, 84. During the Japanese occupation, the Examination Yuan housed Wang Jingwei's puppet government. See Chen Jimin 1993, 48–50; Lu Haiming and Yang Xinhua 2001, 44–48.
10. "Nanjing shi Guan Yue miao diaocha biao" (Nanjing municipality's investigation of the Guan Yue temple), June 22, 1935, Neizheng bu Archives, *chun fang* 12, *juan* 528, Second Historical Archives, Nanjing. Also see Nedostup 2009, 264.
11. Guo Yangmo studied engineering and construction at Cornell and Harvard before graduating from MIT with a master's degree in 1919 (Lai Delin 2006, 41).
12. "Zuigao fayuan xinwu" (New building for the Supreme Court), *Jianzhu yuekan* 1:8 (June 1933), 5. Also see Zhang Yan 2000, 144–145; Lu Haiming and

Yang Xinhua 2001, 83–84. Later the clock would be removed, leaving only a blank concrete disk. Now, interestingly, some of the building's occupants believe that the disk symbolized the "mirror of justice, merely reflecting the truth of what appears before it." Personal interview conducted by the author on May 3, 1997.

13. Su Gin-djih 1964, 133, 137. Zhao Shen designed a number of buildings in Shanghai, Nanjing, and New York. He also won a contest (similar to the one for Nanjing) to design the Civic Center in Shanghai in 1930 and earned Second Honorable Mention in a competition to design the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum (Lai Delin 2006, 204–205; also MacPherson 1990, 52).
14. Ma Chao-chun 1937a, 47–50. The decision to dispense with the Chinese-style roof was certainly an economic one, though commentators then and now tend to emphasize the boldness of the architect's vision. Li Haiqing has described how the design by Zhao Shen's firm was chosen. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs originally approved a design in mid-1931 by architect Yang Tingbao for the main building that was more consistent with the national style, including the grand Chinese-style roof. After the Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931, the ministry decided it would be too expensive to build the roof, and after a remuneration dispute with the manager of Yang's firm it switched to the more economical design of Zhao Shen's firm (Li Haiqing 2001, 189–199).
15. "Shoudu guomin zhengfu waijiao bu ban'gong dalou ji guanshe" (Capital city National Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs main building and official residence), *Zhongguo jianzhu* 3:3 (August 1935), 4–16.
16. Ibid., 4.
17. E. Lee 1937, 133. Also see Nanking Woman's Club 1933, 18. For Nationalist China's budgetary problems during the period, see Eastman 1974, 185–186. There had been another attempt to construct a Central Administrative Zone near the Ming Palace ruins in 1935. The party headquarters would be placed in a new building to the north of Sun Yat-sen Road, while the National Government complex would lie south of it. (Note that the GMD would occupy the powerful northern position.) Nevertheless, the government again had trouble purchasing the land, and squatters on old Manchu lands (claimed as national land by the government in 1927) could not be removed, so this second attempt ultimately failed as well (*Shen bao,* June 14, 1935; September 22, 1935; *North China Herald,* September 25, 1935; March 10, 1937).
18. On capitol and capital, see Vale 1992, chap. 1.

Chapter 4: The Necropolis of Nanjing

1. See Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," "Ethos, World View, and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols," and "Ideology as a Cultural System," in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973), as well as "Art as a Cultural System," in *Local Knowledge* (1983).
2. Nancy Shatzman Steinhardt (1990) shows that while Chinese capitals always exhibited some variation from the pattern of the ideal, common elements persisted from one capital to another. In fact, the more recent imperial capitals conformed most closely to the classical ideal.

3. Chen Hengming 1986, 177–179. On Sun's own desires to immortalize himself with his tomb, see Wang Liping 1996, 26. Also see Musgrove 2002, chap. 4. For more on contestations over Sun Yat-sen's varied legacy in the construction of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, see Wagner 2011.
4. "De yi Keli guanyu Sun Zhongshan bingshi baogao" (Report by the German doctor, Keli, on Sun Yat-sen's illness and death), March 20, 1925, in Xu Youchun and Wu Zhiming 1989, 6.
5. *North China Herald,* February 24, 1912; *Minli bao,* February 16, 1912; Sun Yat-sen 1985, 2:94–97. It is worth noting that the "Purple" of Purple Mountain in Chinese (*Zijin shan* 紫金山) is a near homophone of the "Forbidden" of the Forbidden City (*Zijin cheng* 紫禁城). They simply differ in the tones of the second character. The suggestiveness of this close pronunciation was certainly not lost on Sun or GMD planners.
6. Wang Liping makes this point about the importance of the term *ling* for designating a sacred space (1996, 33). Here I argue that the *ling* was also significant for its particular nature as a site devoted to commemorating the dynastic family of the imperial era. For more on the form and structures of a *ling,* see Wang Boyang 1998. Also see Wu Hung's excellent work on tombs over a broad span of the imperial era (2010).
7. Xu Youchun and Wu Zhiming 1989, 90–91. For more information on the design competition, see Lai Delin (2005; 2007, chaps. 2 and 3).
8. "Zongli zangshi choubei weiyuanhui guanyu lingmu jianzhu xuanjiang zhengqiu tu'an tiaoli" (The Funeral Preparation Committee's regulations regarding awards for the design search), May 15, 1925, in Xu Youchun and Wu Zhiming 1989, 90–94.
9. Ibid. I have developed the point about greater emphasis on visual elements and the performance of state ritual under the public gaze elsewhere (Musgrove 2002, chap. 4; 2007, 1–19). Also see Li Gongzhong 2009, chap. 4.
10. "Zongli lingguanhui guanyu yuanlin gaikuang zhi jishu" (Record of the Party Leader Mausoleum Management Committee concerning the park situation), October 1931, in *ZSLDA* 1986, 194–195.
11. As described in chapter 1, in 1928 the Nationalist government renamed the northern city Beiping. But for the sake of reader convenience, I continue to refer to the city as Beijing here.
12. Ye Chucang and Liu Yizheng, 1935, 261. Note that Wang Jingwei, who was prominent in the creation of Sun's public will, was frozen out of the prestigious act of carving an inscription for the mausoleum. For more information on the struggle over the inscriptions and carvings, see Wagner 2011, 255–256. During the Cultural Revolution, all but the Outline of National Construction were removed from the hall (Fan Fangzhen 2004, 102).
13. Ling Hongxun 1925, 101. For more on the symbolism of the bell shape, particularly its symbolic resonances to both the U.S. Liberty Bell and the Chinese *muduo,* used to make announcements to "All under Heaven," see Wagner 2011, 243–245; Lai Delin 2007, 161–170.
14. "Guofu zunzhong jinian zhou" (National Government observes weekly commemoration), *Shen bao,* January 1, 1930; Bergere 1998, 421; Harrison

2000, 157–158; Lai Delin 2007, 108–112. For an excellent overview and analysis of the construction of the cult of Sun Yat-sen, see Chen Yunqian 2009.

15. Consul Walter Adams to J. V. A. MacMurray, September 26, 1929, USDS, *Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910–1929,* M329, Roll 127, 893.44, Sun Yat-sen/71.
16. Henrietta Harrison has also described the interment ceremony of 1929 within the context of GMD attempts to control symbols and rituals (2000, chap. 6). While some overlap is inevitable, I have emphasized different aspects of the ceremony in order to explore the idea that, although the GMD clearly wanted to control these symbols of nationhood as Harrison has illustrated, there was something appealing to participants in the ritual-architectural event as well that enabled this ceremony and others like it to provide a sense of investment in these rituals. Also see Chen Yunqian 2009, 116–146; Li Gongzhong 2009, chap. 5; and Wagner 2011, 259–263, for additional views.
17. *Dagong bao,* May 27, 1929; also see "Yingchen shiji" 1930, 372–373. Wagner notes that this event was similar in some ways to the funeral train that carried Abraham Lincoln to his final resting place in Illinois, though the Chinese planners did not mention it as an influence (2011, 259–260). A precedent for the propaganda trains that was more recent to the GMD was that of the "agit trains" of the Soviet Union (Tumarkin 1983, 68).
18. For more on the transformation of *ji* (祭 sacrifice) to *gongji* (公祭 public sacrifice), see Lai Delin (2005 and 2007).
19. See, for example, the odes in *ZSLDA* 1986 by the National Government (393), the Legislative Yuan (394), the Judicial Yuan (394–395), and Song Ziwen (397).
20. "Guomin zhengfu zhuxi ji wu yuan yuanzhang deng jiwen" 1929, 393. Zhong shan 鐘山 and Zijin shan 紫金山 refer to the same set of peaks east of the city walls. Zhong shan is a Han dynasty (206 BCE–202 CE) name for the area. Zijin shan was first used in the Eastern Jin (317–420), reportedly because purple-tinged clouds regularly appeared around its top (Ji Shijia 1993, 453).
21. There are conflicting reports on the condition of Sun's body. The eulogist quoted above said that he looked as if alive. Most observers indicated that he looked a little purple colored, but otherwise he seemed well preserved (see, for example, Han Zhengli 1984, 52). Nevertheless, the official decision was that the body was not preserved well enough for display and hence it was placed in the sarcophagus ("Feng guan dianli" 1930, 383–384).
22. J. V. A. MacMurray to Secretary of State, June 24, 1929, USDS, M329, Roll 127, 893.44, Sun Yat-sen/61.
23. For more on imperial rituals, see Watson and Rawski 1988. For the "orthodox" version of the rituals performed in households, see Ebrey 1991. Also see C. K. Yang 1991, 38–48.
24. For interesting analyses of the interplay of imperial-era state ritual and local practices, see McDermott (1999b) and David Faure (1999). McDermott describes the expansion of ritual practices, which had been the exclusive domain of officials, to public ceremonies performed by local communities to honor the emperor during the Ming. But the material focus of the ritual was

on a tablet of imperial instructions, not on an actual spirit tablet, as would be the case in ancestral rites. As such, a fundamental distinction was maintained between the imperial family and individual families, even as the state was clearly incorporating wider popular participation in "state ritual."

25. "Zongli lingguanhui chengli tonggao" (Announcement on the establishment of the Party Leader Memorial Park Management Committee), July 3, 1929, in *ZSLDA* 1986, 403; Ye Chucang and Liu Yizheng 1935, 258–259.
26. *Shen bao,* September 26, 1934; Pan Guxi 1995, 101–102. For more on GMD efforts to suppress what it considered superstitious Buddhist practices, see Nedostup (2009).
27. *Shen bao,* May 11, 1931; *North China Herald,* September 8, 1931; Wang Jianguo 1997, 38–43. For more on the importance of physical education in Nationalist China, see Morris 2004.
28. Ye Chucang and Liu Yizheng 1935, 283. For more on Yang Tingbao's impact on the architectural profession in China, see Ruan Xing 2002 and 2011; Lai Delin 2007, 188–190.
29. These were not reproductions of imperial objects. Having once stood in the old summer palace of the Qing dynasty, they made their way to Nanjing by way of the French, who had looted the palace in 1860. The French donated them to the government for use in honoring the departed head of state (Ye Chucang and Liu Yizheng 1935, 284). On Tan's tomb, see also *Shen bao,* January 10, 1933; Yang Guoqing 1998, 140–143; Yang Tingbao 1997, 53–57; Zhang Yan 2000, 107.
30. He Xiangning, who along with Song Qingling stayed in China after 1949, was buried beside her husband by the People's Republic of China on September 6, 1972 (Ji Shijia 1993, 148). Also see Yang Guoqing 1998, 104–108.
31. Wagner offers more detail on the uses of the mausoleum after the Nanjing Decade (2011, 264–267). For example, he describes a ceremony by Wang Jingwei's occupation government on April 5, 1942, to inter the entrails of Sun Yat-sen, which had originally been removed in the process of trying to preserve his body. He also shows how the Communists removed some of the more overt GMD symbols, but how these were carefully reconstructed during the reform era in an effort to woo the people of Taiwan.
32. For example, in February 1953 Mao visited the mausoleum, where he bowed and sat silently for a few minutes (Shi Ping 1988, 3).

Chapter 5: Lessons in Allure

1. Academia Historica: Guoshiguan, Commemorative Holidays Files 0516.26/2780-3 (1927.12.21–1930.12.31). Also see "Chinese Change of Calendar" 1929; *Dagong bao,* December 30, 1929.
2. In fact, in Nanjing the police increased patrols to protect merchants who were carrying large amounts of cash during this period (*Nanjing wanbao,* January 24, 1930). Also see *Dagong bao,* February 15, 1930; Bredon 1930.
3. In the early years of the Nanjing Decade, this procedure for the ritual at the mausoleum was often described in the newspapers. However, it eventually became so routine that the step-by-step description was replaced with the

simpler statement, "The ritual was conducted according to the rites" (*xing li ru yi*). See, for example, "Shoudu qingzhu yuandan zhi shengkuang" 1931. For more on the development of the "public sacrifice" ceremony, see Lai Delin 2005, 39–41.

4. Susan Glosser has noted the promotion of Sun Yat-sen as a "meta-ancestor" in its marriage regulations and prescriptions for family rituals (2003, 82–90). Also, Nedostup has described attempts to centralize and homogenize private funeral rituals and ancestral rites, though the results were mixed (2009, 251–253).
5. One could say there was a kind of east-to-west axis of authority as well in the complex running from the governor-general's second building (literally called the Ertang) through the Ceremonial Hall to the Provisional President's Office Building. However, the principal buildings all faced south, which meant that there were several parallel axes of building rows, which indeed conformed to imperial-era convention.
6. The relative newness and potential usefulness of an auditorium as a public space in modern China were recognized at the time. It was no coincidence that a memorial hall dedicated to Sun Yat-sen constructed in Guangzhou and designed by Lü Yanzhi was in fact a large auditorium and gathering space for giving and listening to speeches (Lai Delin 2009, 161–163). For an analysis of the ambiguous ability of such spaces to be both egalitarian and hierarchical in a quite different cultural context, see Sinnott 1963, 45.
7. September 18, the day the Manchurian Incident began, subsequently became another National Humiliation Day, with solemn commemorations and mass rallies. At such rallies it was quite common for local participants, even in the capital, to send resolutions to the central government calling for negotiations to end and war with Japan to begin (e.g., "Ju guo yi zhidao nian guonan," *Shen bao,* September 19, 1932). Of course, some resolutions were coordinated from the center in order to put more diplomatic pressure on Japan while continuing to pursue the official policy. However, lists of such proposals, as found in the article cited, show that there was often disagreement within mass organizations, as some resolutions supported party policy and others were critical. Overall, the actions of officially sanctioned mass organizations reveal that both the party and the people were divided on what policies to pursue.
8. "1929 nian yuandan 'shoudu' yuebing dianli jihua," Ritual Bureau of the National Government Military Consultant Office to Executive Yuan, December 31, 1931, Second Historical Archives 2:4127; Shen bao, October 10, 1929; December 31, 1930; *Dagong bao,* January 2, 1929.
9. During holiday commemorations, simply the presence of airplanes flying overhead, usually dropping propaganda leaflets on colored paper, merited newspaper attention. In addition to descriptions cited above, see, for example, *Shen bao,* March 13, 1929; October 10, 1929; March 10, 1930. For military reviews in the early republic, see Harrison 2000, 107–108.
10. There were influential factions within the Guomindang, such as the Blue Shirts, who favored fascist methods for China. Fascist inspiration arguably could be seen in the New Life Movement, with its promotion of "traditional,"

quintessentially "Chinese" values and the militarization of society. The Blue Shirts were, in fact, promoters of mass organizations and the use of rallies. But the Blue Shirts "infallible" commander, Chiang Kai-shek, though he too admired fascist Germany and Italy, never let them become dominant within the government (Eastman 1974, chap. 2; Wakeman 2000, 141–178).

11. Academia Historica: Guoshiguan, Commemorative Holidays Files 0516.26/2780-3 (1927.12.21–1930.12.31). Sometimes local governments disagreed with some of the party's proposals. For example, the Shanghai Municipal Government forbid the lighting of firecrackers during New Year because they were considered wasteful and a fire hazard, in direct contradiction to the central party's encouragement of their use (Chen Shuping 1931; *North China Herald,* January 6, 1931).
12. Capital New Year Celebration Rally Preparation Committee official letter to National Government Civilian Official Office, December 25, 1930, Academia Historica Archives, 0516.26/2780-3: 043–045.
13. For the patriotic use of lantern parades in the early republic, see Harrison 2000, 96–97, 116–117. On the role of parades in manipulating and controlling space (for example, in including and excluding certain social groups) in other contexts see Hayden, 1995; Sibley 1995. On how individuals and social groups make use of parades for their own purposes in defiance of controlling attempts, see Newman 1998.
14. Rebecca Nedostup has described three stages of the GMD's assault on superstitious practices, including those associated with the "abolished calendar": from activist attacks from 1927 to 1930, to "preoccupied tolerance" from 1930 to 1933, to resumption of attacks during the New Life Movement from 1934 to 1937 (2009, 196–197). Despite the renewed virulence of the rhetoric, however, newspaper accounts from the latter years show that the state was still inconsistent in its enforcement, and hence the practices largely continued. On the persistence of "abolished" New Year, see "Ni guo ni de xin linian, wo guo wo de jiu linian" 1936; also Nanjing wanbao, January 24, 1936; *North China Herald,* February 1, 1933.
15. *Shen bao,* August 28, 1934; April 5, 1937; *Nanjing wanbao,* April 5, 1936. For more on the ambiguous and conflicting attitudes of GMD officials concerning Tomb Sweeping Day and the expansion of Confucius birthday celebrations, see Nedostup 2009, 263–271, and 2008, 372–380. Also see Carroll 2006, 99–170, for an excellent analysis of the changing fortunes of Confucius commemorations and the Confucian Temple in Suzhou.
16. This point is consistent with Henrietta Harrison's description of how the ceremony to inter Sun's remains in 1929 constructed a social hierarchy that in her analysis fixed interpretations of symbols to benefit the Nationalist state. However, going further, she states, "The citizens who in the early Republic had made themselves visible through their participation in organizations and associations were now transformed into the 'masses' whose political will was utterly subordinate to the party. The absence of alternative interpretations of the funeral reflects what was in effect the absence of the common man" (2000, 229). This statement seems to exaggerate the power of the state to fix meaning,

though in comparison to earlier freer forms of republican ceremonial, it seems apt. Here I tie GMD rituals to the built environment of Nanjing, and later in the chapter I evaluate how effectively those meanings were fixed.

17. For a description of the consolidation of China proper under the Kang Xi emperor, see Spence 2002, 120–182.
18. Harrison describes popular symbols and practices of the early republic as being those that were "empty of political content" (2000, 107). Her point is that a flag alone or the mere performance of a ritual of sacrifice to martyrs in general need not be construed as being tied to any particular political platform. Symbols and rituals like these had broad appeal, with much room for multiple interpretations. In a later chapter she implies that GMD symbols and rituals lost much of their broad appeal because of the overt attempt to limit the meaning of these symbols.
19. My use of the term "ritualization" is informed by Catherine Bell, who describes ritualization as "a strategic *way* of acting," which at one level refers to the fact that social groups understand some actions as more important than others. Ritualization is the process by which practices take on greater importance in a given culture. Furthermore, it is a "strategy for the construction of a limited and limiting power relationship. This is not a relationship in which one social group has absolute control over another, but one that simultaneously involves both consent and resistance, misunderstanding and appropriation" (Bell 1992, 7–8).
20. These conclusions are drawn from a survey of coverage of New Year's Day, National Day, and other holidays in newspapers such as *Dagong bao* (Tianjin), *Hankou minguo ribao* (Hankou), *Chengdu kuai bao* (Chengdu), *Guomin gongbao* (Chengdu), *Henan minbao* (Kaifeng), and *Yuehua bao* (Guangzhou).
21. On the general popularity of cinema, particularly in Shanghai, see L. Lee 1999, chap. 3. On documentary films used to promote the GMD state, see M. Johnson 2008.
22. For example, on January 1, 1931, after Chiang's forces beat back a serious challenge by the Northern Coalition, the celebrations were often described as "unprecedented" in enthusiasm (e.g., "Shoudu qingzhu yuandan zhi shengkuang" 1931). Even larger celebrations followed in the wake of Chiang's victory over the southwest provinces in fall 1936, as will be described in chapter 6.

Chapter 6: Views from the Street

1. Eigner 1938, 189. The article was written in November 1937, as the Japanese began to press their assault up the Yangzi River.
2. The Confucius Temple District by the Qinhuai River had long been known for its floating world (literally and figuratively) of courtesans and less noble entertainments. See Zhu Ziqing and Yu Pingbo 1924. For a lively description of Qinhuai culture, see Ye Zhaoyan 1998, 3–34.
3. The city government promised to use kinder and gentler methods in April 1930, when Wei Daoming replaced Liu Jiwen as mayor (*Shen bao,* April 8, 1930). If "unauthorized" persons built huts and houses along trunk lines,

however, they were still forced to tear down their houses for road construction, which led to continuing protests (e.g., *Nanjing wanbao,* July 21, 1937). The city always claimed to be "aggressively pursuing" road construction, but the roads constructed, as listed in Ma Chaojun 1937b, show that the majority of new roads were in the undeveloped portions of the city. On the stoppage of construction in the southern part of the city, see Shao Long 1933.

4. Kwong 1937, 226. Archival records indicate that government ministries were left to their own devices when it came to purchasing land and building their offices. Technically, government agencies were required to coordinate their work with the Capital Planning Bureau, but this did not happen. See "Waijiao bu Nanjing bangongchu xingjian" (Construction of the Nanjing office for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Academia Historica, danwei: 303000000B, danghao: 0450.20/2300.01-01, Micro: roll 137, 0539–0695, and 01-02, 0696–0842.
5. *Nanjing wanbao,* July 13, 1937; July 14, 1937. Also see Lipkin 2006, chap. 3. As Lipkin describes, the new housing remained partially empty, despite the high demand for low-income housing in the city, in part because the subdivisions were so peripheral as to make it impossible to keep up the economic life of these citizens. Public transportation, Mayor Ma Chaojun admitted, was not affordable to the poor and working classes of the city (1937a, iv). Thus low-income families had to live close to their fields, as their economic daily rounds had to be conducted on foot.
6. Though its offices were located in the heart of this district, the city government failed to curb prostitution. In its efforts to clean up the area, they made prostitution illegal, thus losing tax revenue but not really ending the practice. On February 7, 1934, *Shen bao* proclaimed prostitutes and beggars as two of four things to be found in abundance at the capital. The other two were organizations and officials. More than ten years after the Municipal Government launched its first campaign to root out prostitution, a local newspaper reported that there were more than two thousand (then unlicensed) prostitutes still in the city (*Nanjing wanbao,* July 28, 1937). For analysis of municipal antiprostitution drives, see Lipkin 2006, chap. 5. Opium suppression campaigns were also very common and usually focused their activities on the Confucius Temple District (e.g., *Nanjing wanbao,* June 3, 1936).
7. "Dual city" is a term used to describe uneven development in newly industrializing cities (King 1990; Abu-Lughod 1980).
8. Kidnapping for ransom was a serious problem in Nanjing, perhaps made worse by the fact that GMD agents had themselves engaged in such tactics earlier in Shanghai. Unruly, often demobilized "counterrevolutionary" soldiers had been a growing problem in the outskirts of the city, where they had been known to rob travelers. Sometimes they caused trouble in the city as well. Executing a few of them served to show people that the government was doing something about it (e.g., *Nanjing wanbao,* September 11, 1929; November 2, 1929; November 23, 1929).
9. Numerous petitions of this sort can be found in the Second Historical Archives in Nanjing. See "Nanjing shi wei gaishan shirong ji jianzhu jiguan

deng zhengshou tudi" (Nanjing municipal land levies for the purpose of improving the city appearance and construction organizations), Second Historical Archives of China, 2:1326, micro 16J 1139, 3553–3681; "Nanjing zhongyang zhengzhi quyu guihua ji zhengshou tudi" (Plans and land levies for the Nanjing Central Administration District), Second Historical Archives of China, 2:1233, micro 16J 1138, 1007–1122.

10. Select Central University students were even occasionally invited to participate in government meetings (*Nanjing wanbao,* January 18, 1930). In general, throughout China student activists, as social elites, felt a special privilege to engage in public dialogue with the government, and this sentiment was more keenly felt at Central University. For analysis of students as a social group and the political culture of a shared but contested discourse of power between students and the state, see Wasserstrom 1991. It should also be noted that despite dramatic scenes of student protests, there were also many thousands of students who were not engaged in open contestation with the state. For more on students as a disillusioned segment of society, see Yeh 1990.
11. For accounts of nationwide student protests in late 1931, see Israel 1966, 47–78; and Wasserstrom 1991, 171–199. My purpose here is not to discuss the intricacies of the student networks as described so effectively in these two studies. Instead I want to describe the relationship between various forms of resistance and the capital as a symbolic space.
12. Eastman 1991, 45–47. Eastman, famous for his "abortive revolution" thesis, admitted that the mood of the country was optimistic in late 1936 and early 1937. However, he then explains that the "new mood of the nation . . . had been generated largely by superficial and possibly transient phenomena" (49). I do not disagree. My argument here, though, is that such moods are always transient. The power of ritual and symbols is that they provide a sense of continuity that promotes a sense of the naturalness of power. Such sense allows regimes to survive periods of unpopularity on the hope that the principles for which they claim to stand are realized from time to time, so that people still feel they gain something from tacit participation.
13. In his study of the formation of a "Cult of Chiang" on Taiwan, Jeremy Taylor notes that Chiang seemed to have ambiguous feelings toward "cults of personality," but that "there was a clear desire on the part of Chiang Kai-shek to be glorified" (2006, 100).

Conclusion

1. Nurhachi (r. 1616–1626) and Hong Taiji (r. 1626–1643) were buried in Shenyang.
2. *Shen bao,* January 31, 1932; December 1, 1932. For more on the designation of auxiliary capitals under the Nationalists, see Liu Lu 2002, chap. 2.
3. "Jiang Jieshi: Xin shenghuo yundong zhi yaoyi—zai Nanchang xingying kuoda jinian zhou yanci" (Chiang Kai-shek: The main meaning of the New Life Movement—enlarged weekly memorial speech given at the Nanchang base), February 19, 1934, in *Zhonghua minguo shi dang'an ziliao huibian* (Collection of archival materials on the history of the Republic of China)

(Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe), 5–1:5, 753–762; *North China Herald,* February 12, 1936.

4. The quote from a Foreign Service officer given in Lloyd Eastman's work is apt for this perception: "The shadow of Chiang Kai-shek extends over this whole scene. . . . Where his interest touches, there you will find a certain governmental activity; elsewhere, if not paralysis, at least a policy of drift" (1974, 278; original source: Gauss to Johnson, September 16, 1934, State Department 893.00/12842, 1).
5. The capital question came up yet again at the end of the war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek once again argued, however, that there could only be one permanent capital for the GMD: Nanjing (Wang Ke, n.d.).
6. For general overviews of Taipei's development, see Huang Yuyuan, Wang Guofan, and Chen Sanjing 1981–1983; Wei Dewen 2004.
7. Those who stayed in China after 1949 included Yang Tingbao and Zhao Shen, two of the most prominent architects who designed buildings for the GMD state (Ruan Xing 2011; Lai Delin 2006, 171–173, 204–205).
8. On the "de-Kuomintangizing" of Taiwan, see Corcuff 2002, 75–83. Also see Allen 2007.

Index

Bold page numbers refer to figures.

agriculture, 156
airport. *See* Ming Palace Airport
allure: of rituals, 174–175, 193, 253–254; of ritual spaces, 16, 167–168
architects: Chinese, 66, 89–93, 104, 131, 262, 264, 284n7; foreign, 66–67, 91; foreign training, 66, 89–90, 91–92, 104, 108, 274n2
architectural frames, 15, 167
architectural styles: Art Nouveau, 91, 107–108, 116; in Central Administrative Zone plans, 100–103, **101**, 116; Chinese, 68–69, 90–91, 93, 102, 111–112, 123, 160; Chinese modernist, 70, 116, 123–124, 186–187; international style, 93, 116, 119; modern, 91, 93, 103; modified Chinese, 116, 119; of Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, 130, 133–134; Western neoclassical, 91, 102, 103, 116, 123, 186, 208, 218
architecture: imperial conventions, 110; superabundance of meanings, 15–17, 265. *See also* ritual-architectural events
architecture of Nanjing: architects, 93; continuity with past, 111, 115, 117–118, 119; foreigners' views, 121; historical references, 110–111; materials, 102, 117, 132–133; revolutionary, 18–19, 89–93, 103, 117–118, 123; styles, 19, 68–69, 70, 100–103, **101**, 123–124; universities, 116, 218; Western influences, 110, 123. *See also* government buildings; *and specific buildings*
athletic fields, 157, 184–188, 190, 191, 222

Bank Circle. *See* Xinjiekou Circle
banks, 169, 208
beautification, 65, 68. *See also* City Beautiful movement
Beijing: location, 42–43, 52; name change to Beiping, 50, 51; Nationalist capture, 41; protests, 228, 229, 264; Tiananmen Square, 262–263, 264
Beijing as capital: arguments for maintaining, 42–43, 45, 47, 49–50, 52; corruption, 46–47, 49–50; districts, 75; Forbidden City, 33, 50, 97, 262; foreign legations, 45, 48; legitimacy, 246–247; of Ming, 4, 246, 271n12; opposition, 33–34, 35, 43, 45–47, 52–53; of People's Republic, 2, 251, 262–264, 265;

of Qing, 33, 46, 97; of Republican China, 1–2, 24, 30–34, 41, 51, 247; ritual-architectural events, 263, 264; Sun's opposition, 32–33, 47, 52–53, 270n5, 270n7; of Yuan, 42, 46
Beijing Chamber of Commerce, 50
Beijing University, 224
Bourdieu, Pierre, 15
Boyd, Andrew, 97
Boy Scouts, 234–235, **234**
buildings: entrance orientations, 109–110; functional separation, 113; meanings, 15; refurbished, 107. *See also* architecture; government buildings

Cai Yuanpei, 28, 225
calendars: lunar, 168, 169–170, 172–174, 191–192, 193–194; national, 168–174, 177, 189, 201, 241. *See also* holidays
capital cities: auxiliary, 248; central locations, 11–12, 53; districts, 75–76, 79; ideal, 11–13; influence on national well-being, 53–54; legitimacy, 20, 23, 126, 246–247; monuments, 163, 250; moving, 59–60; nationhood symbols in, 10–11; permanence, 245–246; political decisions, 23, 51–52; of Republican China, 30–31, 32–34; spatial hierarchies, 126, 273n18; Taipei, 260–262, 264–265; tombs of leaders, 129–130; urban planning, 59; walls and gates, 74, 76; Western, 97, 245–246, 249–250. *See also* Beijing as capital; Nanjing as capital
capital cities, imperial: Beijing, 4, 33, 42, 46, 97, 246–247; buildings, 12; central locations, 11–12, 126; Chang'an, 69, 75; cosmology and, 11–13, 53, 75–76, 126; of Ming, 4, 12–13, 34–35, 43–44, 246, 271n12; Nanjing, 4, 34–35, 43–44; of Qing, 33, 46, 246–247; ritual spaces, 12–13, 126; roads, 74; spatial hierarchies, 75–76, 126; of Tang, 69, 75; of Yuan, 42, 46
Capital Construction Committee (Shoudu jianshe weiyuanhui), 62–63, 81, 96, 99, 272n12
Capital Design and Planning Committee (Guihua shoudu tu'an weiyuanhui), 66–67, 68–69, 272n12
Capital Plan. See city plan, Nanjing
CCP. *See* Chinese Communist Party
Central Administrative Zone: architectural styles, 100–103, **101**, 116; buildings, 96, 98–99, 100–103; in city plan, 71, 76, 79, 89; construction costs, 99; construction halt, 119, 120, 122; cultural buildings, 96, 116; goals, 89; locations proposed, 94–95, **94**, 99–100, 104, 275n17; planning competition, 94–99, **98**; published plan, **99**, 100–103; roads, 96–97
Central Athletic Complex, 157, 185–188, **186**, **187**
Central Military Academy, 175, 216
Central Museum, 116
Central Railway Station, 205
Central University: architecture program, 93; auditorium, **219**; buildings, 116; gate, **219**; location, 206; protests, 218–220, 221, 223–225, 226; student attitudes toward government, 227, 283n10
Chang'an, 69, 75
charisma, 13–14, 128
Chen Mingshu, 225
Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi): on Beijing, 50; birthday, 235–238; Boy Scout review, 234, **234**; Capital Construction Committee,

62–63; compared to Mao, 263–264; death, 261; marriage, 41; military academies, 159, 216; military headquarters, 25; military reviews, 183; at Nanjing, 26, 37; Nanjing as capital, 41, 49, 51, 247, 284n5; offices, 119–120; on personality cults, 283n13; political rivals, 3, 56, 138, 142, 161, 197–198, 200, 223, 233; popularity, 237, 238–239; protests and, 221–224, 228–229; residence, 78, 157; resignation, 225, 227, 228; retirement and return, 39, 41; ritual honoring Sun, **176**; speeches, 51, 197–198, 199; Sun's funeral and, 142, 144, 145, 148–149; Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum construction and, 132; travels as commander-in-chief, 248–249; Xi'an Incident, 232, 233, 237, 238–239. *See also* Guomindang; National Government
Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall (Taipei), 261–262
Chinese Communist Party (CCP): Beijing as capital, 2, 251, 262–264, 265; nationalism, 259, 260; relations with GMD, 25, 28–29, 39, 232, 236–237, 238; Soviets and, 39; in Wuhan, 28–29, 39
cities: modernization, 5–6; treaty ports, 5, 91, 92; urban history, 4–5; walls, 126. *See also* capital cities; urban planning
City Beautiful movement, 68, 102–104, 123
city plan, Nanjing: administrative district, 71, 76, 79, 89, 100–103; business districts, 76, 95; development, 66–68; differences from reality, 204, 212–216; implementation challenges, 2–3, 18, 212–213, 241; industrial zones, 77, 79; ports, 76–77; residential areas, 70, 73–74, 77–78, 79; roads and streets, 70, 71–75, **72**, 204, 211; vision of future, 69–72, 79, 87, 88; zoning districts, 75, 76–79, **77**, 95, 213, 215. *See also* urban planning of Nanjing
collective identity, 17–18, 23, 130, 152
Confucianism, 14, 29, 123, 124, 256, 257
Confucius, birthday of, 192
Confucius Temple District, 170, 192, 208, **209**, 215–216, 281n2, 282n6
corruption, 46–47, 49–50, 119
cosmology: building structures reflecting, 111; in imperial capitals, 11–13, 53, 75–76, 126; Nationalist view, 157, 163, 251, 253
crime, 217, 282n7
Culp, Robert, 221

Dai Jitao, **162**, 163
December Ninth Movement, 228, 229, 232
democracy: future, 116; petitions and resolutions, 181, 217–218, 223–224, 227, 279n7; ritual participation, 180; Sun's reforms, 3; in Taiwan, 264–265
Dickens, Charles, 250
diplomatic corps, 45, 139–140, 145, 147–148, 164–165
discipline, 123, 124, 230, 231, 240, 242, 255–256
Drum Tower Traffic Circle, 206, **207**, 210

Eastman, Lloyd E., 217, 283n12
economic development, 76, 79, 88, 103–104, 169, 214–215
education, 14, 138, 157, 269n11. *See also* Central University
Eigner, Julius, 1–2, 3
elites, 172, 256, 257, 258
Examination Yuan, 107, 226, 274n9

family, national, 193, 249
family rituals, 127, 152, 253–254
family state, 202, 254–255
Fan Wenzhao, 104, 272n7, 274n8
Feng Yuxiang: civil war, 138, 142; criticism of Nanjing municipal government, 84–85; defeat, 198; Northern Expedition, 41; support of Nanjing, 39; veneration of Sun, 50–51, 139; Wuhan government and, 38, 43; Xu Fanting and, 231
festivals, 172–173, 189, 192, 193–194, 201, 235–236, 256–257. *See also* holidays
Fitzgerald, John, 8, 9
fortune-tellers, 169–170, 192
frameworks, 8, 268n9. *See also* architectural frames
Funeral Affairs Preparatory Committee, 129, 130–131, 132, 134–135, 140, 144
funerals: family, 152; state, 152; of Tan Yankai, 159–160. *See also* Sun Yat-sen, funeral of

Geertz, Clifford, 13–14, 125
GMD. *See* Guomindang
Goodrich, Ernest P., 66–67, 69
government buildings: aesthetics, 111–112, 113–115, 116, 122; construction costs, 48; land purchases, 282n4; locations, 120; messages, 118–119, 120–121, 122–124; outer walls, 116–118. *See also* Central Administrative Zone; National Government complex; and *specific buildings*
Guangzhou: foreign architects, 91; municipal government, 61, 66–67; Nationalist governments, 35, 41, 198, 223, 225; as revolutionary center, 44; Sun Yat-sen memorial hall, 279n6
Guling, 248
Guomindang (GMD): branch offices, 195; branch political councils, 56; civil wars, 3, 38–40, 138, 142, 198–199, 200; construction of history, 171, 196–197; dissent, 56, 197–199, 217, 258–260; efforts to transform people, 8, 16–17, 122–124, 171–172, 251–252, 258, 259; elites, 172; factions, 25–27, 28–29, 37, 38–41, 56, 196, 220, 279–280n10; failure, 260; flag, 27, 28, 128; legitimacy, 8–10; modernization, 172; political victory, 242; popular support, 10, 232–233, 260; post-party purification, 54; priorities, 119, 126; relations with Communists, 25, 28–29, 39, 232, 236–237, 238; rituals, 16, 17, 167, 170–171; single-party rule, 8, 16, 103, 231–232, 240, 253; social policy, 7–8, 25, 78; state rituals, 195–196; Sun's funeral preparations, 129, 130–131, 132, 134–135, 140, 144; in Taiwan, 251, 260–262, 265. *See also* Chiang Kai-shek; Nanjing as capital; National Government; Northern Expedition; state-society relations
Guomindang (GMD) headquarters: in former Jiangsu Provincial Assembly building, 105, 119–120, 142–144, 177, **180**; plans, 19, 71, 96, 98, 100–102, 275n17; protests at, 225–226; state rituals, 177; in Taipei, 261–262
Guo Moruo, 121
Guo Yangmo, 107–108, 274n11

Harrison, Henrietta, 9, 171, 201, 280n16, 281n18
He Minhun, 60, 63–64
He Xiangning, 161, 278n30
He Yingqin, 237
holidays: abolition of traditional, 172–173, 191–192, 193–194,

201, 280n14; Chiang Kai-shek's birthday, 235–238; didactic lessons, 197; entertainment, 189–191, 234–235, 236; functions, 171–172; national, 138–139, 170, 175–184, 195–202, 241, 255, 279n7; National Day, 170, 175, 182–184, 189, 195, 233–235, 265; New Year's, 170, 172–173, 175, 182, 189–192, 195, 239; regulations, 172–173, 175, 189; speeches, 196–198, 199; Sun Yat-sen's birth and death days, 136, 170; Tomb Sweeping Day, 173, 192. *See also* calendars; rituals
Hong Lanyou, 100
housing: in city plan, 70, 73–74, 77–78, 79; model village, 157; new, 214, 215, 282n5; for officials, 73–74, 77–78, 79, 157; public, 7–8; shortages, 47–48, 57, 215; straw huts, 214, 281–282n3; suburban, 73–74, 78; torn down for road construction, 73, 81–82, 83–86, 281–282n3
Huang Yuyu, 98
Hu Hanmin, 28, 37, 144, 161, 198

ideology, 53, 253. *See also* Three Principles of the People
imperial capitals. *See* capital cities, imperial
imperial rituals, 13–14, 126–127, 130, 151, 152–153, 254, 257, 277–278n24. *See also* rituals
imperial tombs, 34–35, 95, 128–129, 156, 246–247
Israel, John, 223, 229

Japan: Nanjing occupation, 165, 274n9; Nationalist policies toward, 181, 218, 220–221, 222–223, 233; Nishihara loans, 220; protests against, 220–228, 259–260; troops in northern China, 46, 228; Twenty-One Demands, 170; war with, 106, 158, 248. *See also* Manchuria
Jiang Jieshi. *See* Chiang Kai-shek
Jiangsu Provincial Assembly building, 105, 119–120, 142–144, 177, **180**
Jinan Incident, 46
Jones, Lindsay, 15, 16, 167

lantern parades, 190–191, 234–235
legitimacy: of authority, 36–37; of capital cities, 20, 23, 126, 246–247; from conflict, 20–21; of Guomindang, 8–10; of Nanjing as capital, 18, 20–21, 23–24, 245–246, 247–249; of National Government, 188, 200, 205, 217–218, 231–232, 259; rituals and, 126–127, 153
Liao Zhongkai, 161
Li Liejun, 43, 45, 48
ling, 129, 130, 131, 133–134, 276n6
Lin Yimin, 68–69, 272n11
Lipkin, Zwia, 7–8
Liu Jiwen, 60, 64–66, 80–81, 83–84, 85–86, 87, 94
Luoyang, 33, 236–237, 248
Lü Yanzhi, 66, 68, 131–134, **131**, 136–138, 279n6

Ma Chaojun, 208–209
Manchuria: Beijing's proximity, 42, 52; Japanese invasion, 174, 181; Japanese occupation, 222; Japanese threat, 42
Manchurian Incident, 187, 222, 279n7
Manchus, 33, 34, 47, 195. *See also* Qing dynasty
Mao Zedong, 2, 262, 263–264. *See also* Chinese Communist Party
masses: festivals and entertainment, 173, 189–191; in People's Republic,

263; revolutionary struggles, 29; social groups, 8. *See also* rituals, mass participation; state-society relations
mass rallies: anti-Japanese, 222; for Chiang's release, 239; establishment of Nanjing government, 27–28, 37; on holidays, 181, 182–183, 184, 187–189, 195; resolutions, 181, 279n7; slogans, 27, 28, 56, 188–189; spaces, 184, 185–186, 187
May Fourth Movement, 14, 185, 263–264
McCrosky, Theodore T., 66
middle class, 79, 87
military: parades, 172, 182–184, **183**, 188; presence in Nanjing, 216–217, 225. *See also* National Revolutionary Army; Northern Expedition
Ming dynasty: capitals, 4, 12–13, 34–35, 43–44, 246, 271n12; navy, 43–44; tombs, 34–35, 95, 128–129, 156
Ming Palace Airport, 172, 182–184, 185, 208, 236, 238–239
Ming Palace ruins, 104, 182, 208
Ministry of Communications building, 106–107, **106**, 120–121
Ministry of Foreign Affairs building: coffered ceilings, 113–115, **114**; construction, 108, 120–121; exterior plan, 109–110, **109**; facade, **108**, 111–112; interior plan, 112–113, **112**; protests in compound, 221, 224, 225; roof, 108, 111, 275n14; style, 108–109
Ministry of Railways building, 104–106, **105**, 120–121
modernization: of China, 5–6, 14, 172; goals in 1920s, 70–71; of Nanjing, 1, 2, 6–7, 34, 65, 211–212; science and, 253
Moller, Irving C., 66
Mongolia, 42–43, 52, 271n13
Mongols, 34, 42, 46, 95
Murphy, Henry K., 66–67, 69, 158–159, 165

Nanchang, 25, 248
Nanjing: agency of residents, 17; business districts, 208; capture by GMD, 26; Japanese occupation, 165, 274n9; maps, 204; older neighborhoods, 70, 213, **214**, 215–216, **215**; population, 211, 212–213; ports, 70, 77, 81, 170, 206; resistance to regulations, 20, 173, 240–241, 255–256; Sun Yat-sen's inauguration, 30; utilities, 211–212, 213, 241; walls, 74, 76. *See also* housing
Nanjing as capital: central location, 35, 43–44; changes, 6–7, 205–215, 241; conditions in 1928, 56–59; construction, 18, 48, 250–251; debates on establishment, 1–2, 18, 39, 41–50, 51–53; designation (1927), 24, 26–28; establishment (1928), 2, 50–51; foundation myth, 18, 23–24, 32, 36, 37, 54; of imperial kingdoms, 4, 34–35, 43–44; lack of facilities, 42, 45, 47–48, 247; legacies, 4–5, 260–265; legitimacy, 18, 20–21, 23–24, 245–246, 247–249; ministries moved from Beijing, 50; as model, 11, 16–17, 34, 35, 58–59, 61–62, 251–255; modernization, 1, 2, 6–7, 34, 65, 70–71, 122, 211–212; national conferences, 57–58; optimism, 58–59, 60, 64; political background, 24–29, 31–32, 37, 39–42, 51–52; reconstruction efforts, 58, 64–66, 68; selection, 24, 37, 41–42; symbolism, 2, 3, 14–15; temporary (1911–12), 31–34. *See also* city plan; rituals; Sun Yat-sen, capital selection and

Nanjing as nationhood symbol: acceptance, 203, 245; achievements, 3, 20–21; cultural buildings, 96; GMD goals and, 16–17, 19, 252; location of government offices, 76; political importance, 14–15; Sun's hopes, 2, 3, 34–35; Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and, 126, 145
Nanjing Decade: achievements, 7; challenges, 2–3; negative views, 6–7
Nanjing Incident, 26, 38, 270n9
Nanjing Municipal Government: bureaus, 62, 63; efficacy, 63; establishment, 61; GMD control, 63; land acquisition, 84, 213; mayors, 60, 62, 63–66, 80–81, 83–84, 85–86, 208–209; modernization goals, 83; public housing, 7–8; Public Works Bureau, 61, 66, 75; reconstruction efforts, 58, 64–66, 68; relations with people, 82–83; revenues, 63–64, 213; road widening and building condemnation, 73, 81–86, 213, 217; social policy, 7–8, 78; street cleanup efforts, 81, 82
Nanjing University, 206, **207**, 218
Nanking Woman's Club, 121
National Assembly, opening of, **184**
National Assembly Hall, 96, 115–116, **115**
National Capital Design and Technology Expert Commission, 69, 272n12
National Capital Planning Office, 100, 104
national family, 193, 249
National Geographic, 1–2, 205, 211
National Government: achievements, 7; bureaucracy, 107, 113; calendar, 168; cosmological outlook, 157, 163, 251, 253; finances, 104, 119; foreign policy, 7, 218, 220–221, 222–223, 233; foreign recognition, 45; founding (1927), 24, 26–29, 37; legitimacy, 188, 200, 205, 217–218, 231–232, 259; officials, 7, 73–74, 77–78, 79, 157, 247; popular support, 57, 203, 205; priorities, 89, 104; provinces controlled, 56, 194, 200; repression, 3, 6, 8, 26, 217, 224; temporary offices, 47; unification of country, 2, 235; urban administration, 61–63. *See also* government buildings; Guomindang; state-society relations
National Government complex: auditorium, 177, 179–180, **180**; buildings, 120, 177–179, 279n5; Ceremonial Hall, 179–180; gate, 120, 177, **178**; Great Hall, 177–178; location, 104; Presidential Palace, 119–120, 177
national holidays. *See* holidays
Nationalist Party. *See* Guomindang
National Revolutionary Army (NRA), 24, 25, 40, 41, 50, 64, 158. *See also* military; Northern Expedition
nationhood symbols: in capital cities, 10–11; construction, 9–10; contested, 10, 20; political importance, 14–15; purposes, 269n13; Sun Yat-sen as, 53, 139, 153, 163–164, 203. *See also* Nanjing as nationhood symbol
Nedostup, Rebecca, 153, 172
New Life Movement, 192, 248, 279–280n10
newspapers: censorship, 217; editorials on student protests, 226; foreign, 57; holiday commemorations, 196, 197, 198–200; official, 226; traffic accident reports, 210
Northern Expedition, 2, 24–25, 32, 41, 50–51, 125–126, 188, 220
Number One Public Park, 185

parks, 184–185, 189–190, **207**. *See also* Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park
Party History Building, 116, **117**, 208
Paxton, John, 85
peasants, 79, 173
police, 78, 211, 216, 217, 221, 226, 273n19. *See also* Public Security Bureau
political participation, 9, 221
power relations, 13, 52, 122–123, 153, 258, 268n9. *See also* state-society relations
Presidential Palace, former, 119–120, 177
propaganda: on holidays, 176, 177; nationalist, 221; train, 140–142, **141**, 277n17
Propaganda Bureau, 175, 188
prostitution, 7, 65, 216, 282n6
protests: anti-Japanese, 220–228, 259–260; in Beijing, 228, 229, 264; in Nanjing, 6, 40, 218–228, 241–242; in northern China, 229–230, 232; responses, 6, 221–224, 225, 227, 228–229, 231–232, 258–259; ritualization, 258–259; spaces used, 20, 204–205; student, 205, 218–230, 232, 242, 259–260, 283n10; in Taipei, 264–265; violent, 225–227, 228
Provisional President's Office Building, 179, **179**
PSB. *See* Public Security Bureau
Public Athletic Field (Gonggong tiyuchang), **184**, 185, 190, 191, 222
Public Security Bureau (PSB), 40, 63, 81, 175, 216
public spaces: in administrative district, 96; Central University, 218–220, 221; in Nanjing city plan, 71; protests in, 20, 204–205. *See also* ritual spaces
public transportation, 57, 70, 205–206, **206**, 282n5
Public Works Bureau, 61, 66, 75
Pukou, 35, 38, 70, 77, 78, 140, 142
Purple Mountain (Zijin shan): Ming dynasty tombs, 34–35, 95, 128–129, 156; name, 277n20; national park, 71, 78; reforestation, 154–155. *See also* Central Administrative Zone; Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum; Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park

Qing dynasty: Beijing as capital, 33, 46, 97, 246–247; fall of, 14, 30, 32, 53, 233; municipal governments, 61; rituals, 13–14, 126–127, 195, 257; Taiping rebellion, 4, 56

railroads: Central Railway Station, 205; foreign investment, 105–106; Ministry of Railways building, 104–106, **105**, 120–121; propaganda train, 140–142, **141**, 277n17; Sun's plans, 35
rallies. *See* mass rallies
refugees, 213
Republican China: Beijing as capital, 1–2, 24, 30–34, 41, 51, 247; calendar, 168–169; capital selection, 30–31, 32–34, 270n5; Second Revolution, 35, 56; Yuan as president, 2, 30, 32–34, 35, 47, 51. *See also* National Government
Republic of China (ROC), 260–262, 264–265
Rites of Zhou, 126
ritual-architectural events: allure, 253–254; in Beijing, 263, 264; in imperial capitals, 126–127; invitations, 167–168; meanings, 15–16; in Nanjing, 19, 239–240, 264; participants, 151, 202–203, 263

ritualization, 197, 258–259, 268–269n10, 281n19
rituals: adapting, 201–202; allure, 174–175, 193, 253–254; ancestral, 127, 152, 153, 173–174, 177, 254; architectural frames, 167; centering function, 194–196, 200–201, 233, 239–240; continuity with past, 253–254; creating, 16, 127, 167, 168, 174–175, 184, 254, 256–257; historical memory, 171; imperial, 13–14, 126–127, 130, 151, 152–153, 254, 257, 277–278n24; legitimacy created, 126–127; meaning, 268n10; military parades, 172, 182–184, **183**, 188; in Nanjing, 17, 19–20, 168, 175–184, 188–189, 239–240, 252–253; participants, 180, 256–257, 259; resistance to new, 173–174; social meanings, 125; spaces and, 126; state, 167, 170–171, 174–184, 188–189, 192–193, 195–202, 252–253; at Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, 134, 139–140, 152, 176–177, **176**, 249, 278–279n3; Sun Yat-sen veneration, 138–139, 170–171, 176–177, 190. *See also* funerals; holidays
rituals, mass participation: control by GMD, 9, 150–151, 153–154; encouraging, 255; entertainment, 19–20; on holidays, 174–175, 181–185, 187–191, 195, 239; motives, 202–203; at Sun's funeral, 150–152, **150**; symbolism, 193, 245; throughout China, 195, 255. *See also* mass rallies
ritual spaces: allure, 16, 167–168; construction, 124; contested meanings, 265; hierarchy, 192–193, 202; of imperial capitals, 12–13, 126; interpretation, 202; streets as, 190–191; at Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, 19, 130–131, 136
roads: in Central Administrative Zone, 96–97; in city plan, 70, 71–75, **72**, 204, 211; condition in 1928, 57; housing displaced by, 73, 81–82, 83–86, 281–282n3; in imperial capitals, 74; new, 65, 208–210, 213; objections to construction and widening, 81–83, 213, 217; secondary, 73–74, 210; sidewalks, 210–211; traffic accidents, 210; trunk lines, **72**, 73, 209, 211. *See also* Sun Yat-sen Road
ROC. *See* Republic of China

science: astronomy, 156–157; calendar, 168–169, 172; modernization and, 253; New Culture, 14. *See also* urban planning
Second Revolution, 35, 56
Shanghai: commercial strength, 44, 48; foreign architects, 91; foreign press, 38, 57; GMD control, 25–26, 31; municipal government, 61, 280n11; Nanjing's proximity, 35, 44, 247; student groups, 223–224
social groups. *See* elites; masses; middle class; working classes
social segregation, 79, 256
Song Meiling, 41, 157, **176**
Song Qingling, 41, 128, 148, 149
South Gate, **214**
Soviet Union: advisors, 25, 28, 39, 262; capital, 59; Chinese Nationalist factions and, 38, 39; fear of invasion by, 42–43; Lenin's Tomb, 36, 128
spaces: hierarchies, 75–76, 126; rationalizing, 251. *See also* public spaces; ritual spaces
sports fields. *See* athletic fields
state-society relations: efforts to transform people, 8, 16–17,

122–124, 171–172, 251–252, 258, 259; family state, 202, 254–255; government buildings and, 116–118, 122–124; mobilization of society, 257–258; modernizing, 123–124; party dominance, 280n16; petitions, 217–218, 223–224, 227; political participation, 221, 280n16; political tutelage, 16, 78, 96, 103, 151, 194, 221, 251, 253–255; ritualization, 258; ritual participation, 150–152, 153–154, 188–189, 193, 202, 245; unity, 177, 251. *See also* protests
streetscapes, 205–211, 214–215, 255–256. *See also* roads
student protests. *See* protests
Sun Chuanfang, 40
Sun Ke, 63, 66–67, 149, 223, 272n9, 274n8
Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan): birth and death days, 136, 170; deathbed instructions, 36, 49, 80, 127–129; democratic reforms, 3; eclectic influences on, 29; on foreign capital and expertise, 67; last will and testament, 28, 129, 136, 138, 181; legacy, 95–96, 136, 164, 203; names, 273n20; as Nationalist leader, 18, 27–28, 29, 36, 37, 128; on national reconstruction, 35–36; as national symbol, 53, 139, 153, 163–164, 203; portraits, 27–28, 37, 138, **141**, 142, 146, 181; as provisional president, 30, 32, 34, 119–120, 168; on railroads, 105; recorded speeches, 141–142; remains, 50–51, 80, 140–142, 145–146, 277n21; rituals honoring, 138–139, 170–171, 176–177, 190; state cult, 19, 139–140, 165, 170–171, 193, 260; symbols created by, 27–28, 128; veneration, 138–139, 144–145, 151, 153; at Whampoa Military Academy, 159; writings, 25, 27, 29, 35–36, 135–136, 164. *See also* Three Principles of the People
Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), capital selection and: deathbed instructions, 36; influence on selection of Nanjing, 14; opposition to Beijing, 32–33, 47, 52–53, 270n5, 270n7; on possible capitals, 270n5, 271n14; reasons for support of Nanjing, 2, 34–35, 37; support of Nanjing invoked by GMD leaders, 30, 37, 48–49, 51
Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), funeral of: in Beijing (1925), 147, 149; eulogies, 144–145; events elsewhere in China, 151–152; foreign representatives, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 164–165; interment ceremony, 51, 80, 140, 147–152, 155; lying in state, 142–145, **143**; mass participation, 150–152, **150**; preparations, 129; procession, 146–147, **147**, **148**, 150; propaganda train, 140–142, **141**, 277n17; sealing of coffin, 145–146
Sun Yat-sen Gate, 73, 177, 208
Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum: administrative zone and, 71, 76, 79, 95; after Nanjing Decade, 165, 278n31; architectural style, 130, 133–134; construction, 80, 126, 132–133, 136–138, 164; costs, 164; design contest, 130–131; designers, 66; *ding* vessel, **162**, 163; exterior plan, 136, **137**; grounds, 132, 136, 154; importance, 163, 164–165, 192; inscriptions, 134–136, 276n12; interior plan, 131–132; interment ceremony, 51, 80, 140, 147–152, 155; materials, 132–133; pilgrimages to, 139, 152, 165, 223; planning, 71, 129–131; praise of,

164, 165; protests at, 20, 227–228, 230–231; rituals, 134, 139–140, 152, 176–177, **176**, 249, 278–279n3; ritual spaces, 19, 130–131, 136; sacrificial hall, 130, **131**, 132, 133–136, **133**, **134**, **135**, 148–149, **148**; statues, 134, **134**, 136, **149**, **176**; Sun's instructions, 36, 49, 50, 80, 127–129; symbolism, 19, 76, 126, 127, 136; tablet pavilion, 162–163; tomb, 131–132, **131**, 149, **149**; visits by public, 190
Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall (Taipei), 261
Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park: athletic complex, 157, 185–188, **186**, **187**; botanic gardens, 156; cemetery, 157–158; as cultural center, 155–156; establishment, 154; model village, 157; observatory, 156–157; pagoda, 158–159, **158**; pavilions, 155; Sun's spiritual presence, 155; tombs of GMD leaders, 159–161, 163, 249; trees planted, 154–155
Sun Yat-sen Presidential Office Building, 179, **179**
Sun Yat-sen Road (Zhongshan lu): construction, 18, 83–86; intersection with Central Avenue, 76; objections to construction, 81, 84–86; plans, 73, 80–81, 83; praise of, 86; protests, 225; streetscape, 206–208, **207**; Sun's funeral procession, 146–147
Sun Yuyun, 33
superstition, 14, 172–173, 189, 193–194, 280n14
Supreme Court building, 107–108, **118**
symbolism: of government buildings, 120–121, 122–123; of mass rituals, 193, 245; of Nanjing as capital, 2, 3, 14–15; of Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, 19, 76, 126, 127, 136
symbols: flags, 27, 28, 128; of Guomindang, 27–28, 128; of imperial bureaucracy, 125; meanings, 125–126; new, 27–28, 127, 128. *See also* nationhood symbols

Taipei, Taiwan, 260–262, 264–265
Taiping rebellion, 4, 56
Taiwan, 251, 260–262, 264–265
Tang dynasty, 69, 75
Tang Shengzhi, 39, 40
Tan Yankai: calligraphy, 136; funeral, 159–160; life, 161; tomb, 159–161, **159**, **160**
Three Principles of the People: development, 35, 253; education in, 138; goals, 128; influence on Nanjing city plan, 69, 95–96; mausoleum inscriptions, 136; as Nationalist ideology, 29, 54; promotion, 253
Tianjin, 46, 61, 91, 141, 229
time, 168, 170. *See also* calendars
transportation. *See* public transportation; railroads; roads
Tsin, Michael, 8, 9
Turkey, Ankara as capital, 45, 59–60

United States: architects trained in, 66, 89–90, 91–92, 104, 108, 274n2; diplomats, 85, 139–140; urban planners trained in, 66, 67–68; Washington, D.C., 97, 134, 249–250
urban planning: of capital cities, 59; City Beautiful movement, 68, 102–104, 123; goals, 67–68, 71; parks, 184–185; scientific, 75, 79, 87, 88, 103
urban planning of Nanjing: committees, 62–63, 66–69, 81, 96, 99, 272n12; foreign consultants, 66–67, 69, 274n5;

goals, 2, 6, 55–56, 59, 60, 69–70, 87–88, 212, 251–252; modernization, 18, 212; public spaces, 71; state control of space, 79; technocrats, 18, 55–56, 66, 67–68, 87–88. *See also* Central Administrative Zone; city plan

Vale, Lawrence J., 51

Wang, C. T., 45
Wang Jingwei: Chiang and, 41; Communists and, 39; GMD factions and, 39, 161; Guangzhou government, 41, 223; Nanjing government, 165, 278n31; on student protests, 220; Sun and, 127–128, 276n12
Wang Zhengting, 220, 221
warlords, 7, 47, 84, 198, 220
Washington, D.C., 97, 134, 249–250
Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N., 223
Western powers: architectural styles, 91, 102, 218; capital cities, 97, 245–246, 249–250; legations in Beijing, 45–46; relations with China, 45–46, 49
Whampoa Military Academy, 136, 159
working classes, 78, 79, 113. *See also* masses
Wuchang Uprising, 170, 233
Wuhan: Communists, 28–29, 39; GMD leaders in, 25–26, 27, 28, 37, 38–39; revolutionary central government, 31
Wumiao Temple, 107
Wu Zhihui, 43

Xiaguan, 70, 77, 81, 170, 206
Xi'an (Xijing), 248
Xi'an Incident, 232, 233, 237, 238–239
Xinjiekou Circle (Bank Circle), 73, 76, 170, 190, 191, 206–208, **208**
Xu Fanting, 230–231

Yang Tingbao, **159**, 160, 185–187
Yangzi River, 35, 44, 70, 213, 248
Yan Xishan, 41, 42, 50–51, 139, 198
Ye Chucang, 82
Yuan Shikai, 2, 24, 30, 32–34, 35, 47, 51, 56

Zhang Xueliang, 42, 231, 232, 236–237, 238
Zhang Zuolin, 38, 42
Zhao Shen, 108–109, 275nn13–14
Zhou li (Zhou rituals), 12
Zhou period, 11–12
Zhu Shenkang, 98
Zhu Yuanzhang, 4, 12–13, 34–35, 156, 271n12
Zito, Angela, 13, 126–127, 257

About the Author

Charles Musgrove is an assistant professor of history at St. Mary's College of Maryland. He earned a PhD in history at the University of California, San Diego, after conducting research in the archives, libraries, and on the streets of Nanjing and Taiwan. He is author of a number of articles on the historical implications of architecture, monumentality, and space in modern Nanjing. *China's Contested Capital* is his first book.