Governors, Politics and the Colonial Office

Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918–58

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Introduction

Who made policy in the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong? Was it Hong Kong's Governor and his senior civil servants? Or was it the British government through the Secretary of State for the Colonies (hereinafter the "Secretary of State") and Colonial Office officials? How much influence did leading locally domiciled Chinese, Portuguese and Indian and British expatriate businessmen and professionals wield? This book explores the different political factors and forces that lay behind some of the major policy issues which arose in the forty years between 1918 and 1958. It considers the extent to which the Hong Kong government formulated and implemented its own policies rather than those preferred by others.

In December 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration stated that the post-1997 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region would "enjoy a high degree of autonomy". This was later enshrined in Hong Kong's Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.[1] It was the first *de jure* recognition of the autonomy and was a formal recognition of Hong Kong's ability to forge its own policies in many areas. If autonomy, however, had never been formally granted by Britain, how had it come to exist? And, in the absence of any formal definition, what did autonomy mean?

The government of the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong was established through two constitutional documents, the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions. Issued by the British government in the name of the Crown,[2] they remained in force throughout Hong Kong's existence as a British Colony, subject to periodic updating. The Letters Patent allowed for the appointment of a Governor by the Crown as its representative in Hong Kong. He was assisted by civil servants, also known as officials, the most senior of whom were formally appointed by Britain. The Governor governed Hong Kong by powers granted under these two documents. These enabled him to establish a Legislative Council to make and enforce laws "for the Peace, Order and good Government"

of Hong Kong and set out procedural rules on its operation. However, many powers were reserved to the British Crown. Laws enacted had to be referred to London for the Secretary of State to review and certify that they would not be disallowed. The British Parliament or the Privy Council could also enact legislation which would override locally enacted laws. The Governor was also constrained by Colonial Regulations made by the Secretary of State. Although they reinforced his position as "the single and supreme authority responsible to, and representative of, His Majesty,"[3] they also required him to seek the Secretary of State's approval of the annual estimates of revenue and expenditure, supplementary expenditure and the appointment, promotion and posting of his senior officials.

In practice, the British government's ability to exercise control over the Hong Kong government was more nuanced than these formal instruments of power might have suggested. The British government was largely dependent upon information provided by the Governor for its knowledge of what was happening in Hong Kong.[4] Opportunities for manipulation existed through skilful presentation of information or through obfuscation or delay. In respect of approval of the estimates, there was usually little the British government could do. If the estimates were not approved in time, Hong Kong would have been left without a budget.[5] Underperforming personnel was another problem periodically brought to the British government's attention.

With the long distances separating it from most of its colonies, Britain could never have contemplated governing them directly. Instead it did so largely through the Crown Colony system of government under which it exercised firm sovereignty. In a Crown Colony that meant "little more than the body of Colonial Service officers who represented the sovereignty of the Monarch."[6] Britain had to rely upon their expertise for the effective government of its colonies. This was helped by leaders and officials in both British and colonial governments coming from similar social backgrounds and sharing common values. There was an intuitive dependence on the soundness of their judgement and a belief that a Governor's decisions would be made in Britain's best interests. This led to a firm reliance upon what was commonly known as the "man on the spot."[7]

Hong Kong's Governor was also constrained by local political considerations. He had to rule with the advice of his Executive Council and enact laws with the advice of the Legislative Council.[8] The majority of the members of these two bodies consisted of senior civil servants and prominent and influential unofficial members drawn from Hong Kong's business and professional communities, both expatriate British and locally domiciled. Already respected leaders in their own communities,

unofficials held their positions on these councils largely as a result of the Governor's patronage. An exception was made for the General Chamber of Commerce and the Justices of the Peace who, by convention, elected their own representatives who the Governor then nominated as unofficial members. Despite commanding an official majority on the Legislative Council, a Governor was expected to give due weight to unofficials members' views and not to govern with use of the official majority regardless.[9]

Hong Kong's government was legitimately and constitutionally accountable to the British Crown through a Cabinet minister. With the sovereign power's emphasis on oversight, with its controls over personnel and finance, it was not a power relationship from which the growth of a high degree of autonomy could have been expected. The Hong Kong government of the 1970s, however, has been described as exercising "a high degree of relative autonomy both within the territory and from the British government."[10] It was also thought to have exercised "a degree of freedom ... without precedent in British imperial history."[11] As the constitutional instruments under which it governed had not changed greatly over the years, either formally or in intent, how then had the Hong Kong government come to exercise such a high level of autonomy?

Basis of autonomy

There appears to be no widely accepted definition of autonomy.[12] Definitions posited have been developed to try and understand a particular relationship. Examples, in relation to local government, are that autonomy can be measured by the extent to which a local government is free from oversight by a higher tier of government, or is exempt from such oversight.[13] Another is that autonomy is "the freedom to exercise choice in local policy making and the capacity thereby to influence the well-being of local residents"[14] or that it is having "discretion in determining what they will do without undue constraint from higher levels of government, and ... the capacity to do so".[15] These are useful descriptive tools. The Hong Kong government of the period could, in some cases initiate policy and legislation and in others had limited or no capacity to do so. Nor was the well-being of local residents always a high priority. The Hong Kong government was also subject to Britain's oversight and constraint although, in practice, Britain often gave Hong Kong the benefit of the doubt.

Although these definitions help in understanding whether a polity may have exercised autonomy, they do not help explain how that

autonomy might have arisen. The analogy between local government and the Hong Kong government is also not precise. Britain's central government had a very different relationship with its local government than it had with the Hong Kong government. In Britain, the central government governs the whole polity with local government having specific local functions. The government in Hong Kong was its sole government and the British government had no direct governance role. A more helpful analogy might, therefore, be to compare the relationship between the Hong Kong and British governments to that between a government and a body it creates, usually by statute, to undertake a specific function or range of functions. The duties and responsibilities of such bodies might have been narrowly defined, for example, to operate an airport, to manage an industrial estate or to build and operate a railway. Alternatively, they might have been more broadly defined as in the case of a colonial government, created by legal rather than statutory instrument, to govern a colony such as Hong Kong. Regardless of their nature, the tasks involved were complex. The subordinate body needed the authority, the organisational capacity and resources to analyse, plan and implement the policies and programmes arising from its functions. Some freedom of self-determination, however limited or otherwise that may have been, was therefore inherent in the creation of a subordinate body like the Hong Kong government.

Conversely, by establishing a colonial government in Hong Kong, the British government's ability to determine exactly how it governed was diminished. This was not, however, a complete abrogation of responsibility. The British government may have excised a degree of its authority and allocated it to Hong Kong but it still retained a general responsibility over how that authority was exercised. It also retained reserve powers over the Hong Kong government though these were, in reality, seldom used.[16] This constitutional accountability also meant the British government remained politically accountable for the Hong Kong government's actions although, in practice, it was seldom called upon to be so.

Once created, the subordinate body, in this case the Hong Kong government, had to contend with people and organisations which had an interest in or benefitted from its functions and responsibilities. These stakeholders consequently had an interest in seeking to influence what it did. They may have been closely involved with it through membership of its boards or councils. Taxpayers, who provided its resources, and those who sought its protection, also had an interest in how it operated. Thus different groups emerged with an interest in the Hong Kong government's policies and operations and in how it acquired and used its resources. The Hong Kong government's autonomy, therefore, also

depended upon the extent to which it was able to formulate policies even when these differed from the preferences of such stakeholders. Conversely, a lack of autonomy could also have been due to the extent to which it was subject, or subjected itself to their direction.

Carpenter's theory of bureaucratic autonomy

The analysis in this book is informed by a theoretical framework of the nature and practice of bureaucratic autonomy advanced by Professor Daniel Carpenter.[17] In his work on bureaucratic autonomy, Carpenter examines the historical development of autonomy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries among some US federal government agencies. He seeks to identify why some developed autonomy, as he defines it, and some did not. These organisations, such as the Post Office and the US Drug Administration, were able to decide their own policies, even when elected politicians in the US Congress either opposed them or would have preferred they had done otherwise. He examines factors he thinks contributed to these organisations' ability to develop their own policies even when they were constitutionally subordinate to the US Congress. He posits that autonomous organisations were those that had their own policies, the practical ability to formulate and implement them and a broad network of political support to make their implementation possible. These policies were different from those preferred by their ostensible masters. They also had to have the ability "to analyse, to create new programmes, to solve problems, to plan, to administer programmes with efficiency". The putatively autonomous organisations had also to be recognised as competent and capable of developing and implementing their own policies. There also had to be a widespread belief that only they could provide the services required or implement policies necessary to solve problems. For this to happen, the heads of such organisations needed to have built a coalition of support around their desired programmes.

Carpenter sees autonomy as something not granted but attained by a bureaucracy, largely through the efforts of its own leaders. He argues that bureaucratic autonomy can only exist when

> bureaucrats take action consistent with their own wishes, action to which politicians and organised interests defer even though they would prefer that other action (or no action at all) be taken.

An important element in this thesis is a necessary bias towards action. It is not enough for an organisation's leaders simply to engage in routine administration or to do only what is expected of them. If they only ever

do what those to whom they are accountable would wish, they are not exercising autonomy. Nor is autonomy to be found

> in the ability of bureaus to take clandestine, undetected actions against the wishes of elected authorities ... only a weak autonomy is observed when agencies shirk while administering a law or policy that was of politician's design.

Autonomy develops, he argues, when an organisation's leaders take the initiative. They need a goal or objective for the organisation to achieve and a desire and ability to work to achieve it. This also requires the organisation to have the capacity to "forecast, plan, gather and analyse intricate statistical information and ... execute complex programs". This needs strong leadership by people Carpenter describe as "bureaucratic entrepreneurs." In US federal agencies, these were the innovative senior managers who developed new programmes and built political support for them. This, combined with the capacity and competence of the organisation's staff to plan, initiate and complete projects and maintain them over the longer term, marked out the autonomous organisation. The nature of the bureau was also important. It needed to have a sufficiently strong career structure to attract and retain staff of the right calibre recruited by senior staff in their own likeness. The success of those promoted to leadership roles depended not only on their own merits but also on the success of the organisation upon which their status depended.[18] It was this confluence of individual and organisational goals that motivated them.

Carpenter's framework and the Hong Kong government

There are both similarities and dissimilarities between Hong Kong's colonial government and the agencies Carpenter examines. The Hong Kong government was constitutionally accountable to the British Crown. It was a self-perpetuating bureaucracy whose members were recruited in the same image. It had to contend with stakeholders and political interests in Hong Kong in the shape of the leading Chinese and British elites. It had to manage the constitutional and political relationship with its sovereign master in London, usually through Colonial Office officials. They in turn were subject to control by ministers who were responsible to a cabinet which was answerable to a democratically elected parliament. Political pressure on a Minister in Britain was a factor which Hong Kong could not, in the long term, blithely ignore.

There are three principal differences in the examples in Carpenter's study and Hong Kong's colonial government. Firstly, the Hong Kong

government, although non-sovereign, was the sole government in Hong Kong. It represented the sovereign government and had a duty to uphold that sovereignty. Almost anything Britain wanted done in Hong Kong was executed through the Hong Kong government: a partial exception was the armed services. The Hong Kong government was not, therefore, in the position of some United States federal government departments and agencies, which might have been competing with each other for authority or for resources. Public policy in Hong Kong could only be implemented by the Hong Kong government. This was to result in the Hong Kong government having to do things it either had not initiated or would rather not have had to do.

Secondly, Carpenter's criteria are drawn up in the context of "bureaucratic autonomy in democratic regimes". The apparent conundrum that he addresses is how government agencies made up of, and led by, unelected officials could formulate and secure authority for policy over the heads of elected officials and legislators. The Hong Kong government, in contrast, was a non-democratic minimalist regime governing a largely quiescent and undemanding local population. Links between politicians and Hong Kong's population ranged from minimal to non-existent. As argued above, however, it was still subject to some domestic political pressures although of a somewhat different nature from those in a country with a more representative government such as Britain. Lastly, Hong Kong was not a "modern state". Carpenter argues that

> nothing so distinguishes twentieth-century bureaucratic government from its predecessors as its ability to plan, to innovate, and to author policy.[19]

This was, he believes, an important contributory factor in the development of autonomy in the US agencies he examined. The Hong Kong government of this period was not a modern state by this standard. It lacked expertise in planning, innovation or ability to author policy. This sometimes had to be found elsewhere. It was at times forced by circumstances to attempt these things with varying degrees of success or failure.

Despite these differences, Carpenter's framework still leaves pertinent questions to be asked of the development of proposed new policies in Hong Kong. Whose policies were they? Were they the Hong Kong government's, the British government's or the unofficials'? Did the Hong Kong government have the capacity to formulate and implement new policies? If not, how were they formulated? What were the political factors behind new policies and from where did they emanate, Hong Kong or Britain? An important feature of Carpenter's framework, highlighted in earlier works by other scholars, is the proactive role of the bureaucratic entrepreneur. He was driven by a belief in an idea or a

commitment to further a moral precept.[20] Such an outlook was seldom evident among Hong Kong's colonial officials of this period.[21] Much of their effort went into the maintenance of routine administration. The identification of bureaucratic entrepreneurs is therefore an important question examined in this book and the performance of the Governors of this period is examined with this question in mind.

The Hong Kong government and autonomy

The issue of autonomy has not been specifically addressed by most works on the Hong Kong government during the period under review. They have, however, recognised that there was more to the relationship between the Governor and London, and between the Governor and the unofficials, than a formal description of the constitutional relationship might have suggested. This was brought out by Mills, a visiting academic from the US, whose work was based on both documentary evidence and extensive interviews of people he met when he visited Hong Kong in the mid-1930s.[22] A record of who he met in Hong Kong is not readily available but his writings would tend to be corroborated by the work of another more general observer of the relationship between the Colonial Office, its colonies and their unofficials, Cosmo Parkinson. He spent thirty-six years in the Colonial Office and was Permanent Undersecretary from 1937 to 1942. His memoirs provide insight into how Colonial Office officials understood the workings of this tripartite relationship. It reflected the limits of both the Colonial Office to instruct Governors, and the need for Governors to be sensitive to the views of unofficials.[23]

In the early 1960s, G. B. Endacott wrote about the Hong Kong government in the years following the re-establishment of British administration in 1945 as if it was already acting with a degree of autonomy. He discussed the nature, work and scope of the Hong Kong government as if it was largely, though not entirely, an internally self-governing body. He made little reference to it having to seek authority for its actions from London. He did not appear to have believed that much policy, beyond proposed constitutional reform, originated from Britain. His general unstated thesis was that Hong Kong was the author of its own policies and, more pertinently, that it chose for itself how to operate its own government structure.[24]

Dr Norman Miners work, *Hong Kong Under Imperial Rule,* is perhaps recognised as the most definitive study to date on the workings of the Hong Kong government in the thirty years before 1941. This is a work of masterly description and provides the reader with a thorough understanding of the period. Steve Tsang, in *A Modern History of Hong*

Kong,[25] does not explicitly examine the question of the development of Hong Kong's autonomy. It is clear, however, from his arguments and from his presentation of Hong Kong's history in the period after the Second World War that he attributes the development of the Hong Kong government's policies and practices to its officials, particularly its Governors. He considers that their individual backgrounds and the different experiences they brought to bear were important factors influencing their policy choices. He presents Hong Kong's first post-Second World War Governor, Sir Mark Young as a forward-looking and progressive Governor to whom he attributes the institution of all reforms during his tenure. He thinks, too, that his successor, Sir Alexander Grantham, established himself as "one of the greatest Governors" and describes him as "progressive, dedicated to Hong Kong and willing to defend what he saw as the best interests of the colony". Tsang argues that Grantham's views of what was appropriate for Hong Kong differed from Young's because of his very different colonial experience. This, he believes, led him to oppose the constitutional reforms that Young had supported.

Scott implies that the Hong Kong government's relative autonomy in the 1970s "both within the territory and from the British government" arose as a result of a tacit compromise between the government and the population. This was that social services provided by government and continued economic growth gave the population hope that their standard of living would continue to rise. Another element was that government bolstered their position through the provision of improved social services and through incorporating elites at local district levels into the government apparatus and by

> a set of ideological propositions which proclaimed that government in Hong Kong was conducted only on the basis of "consultation and consent".

In practice it was government who interpreted what constituted consent, albeit on the basis of extensive formal and informal consultation.[26] The question of what prompted the provision of social services then arises and what role this capacity played in the development of the Hong Kong government's autonomy.

Goodstadt has specifically addressed the development of the Hong Kong government's autonomy.[27] He portrays this as a steady march towards autonomy from Britain conducted with almost ruthless efficiency. He considers that this was due, in part, to Colonial Office officials becoming increasingly distracted by the rapidly growing number of colonies seeking independence during the 1950s; to the dwindling expertise in colonial matters which resulted; and to the advantage then taken by Hong Kong officials to push for more informal devolution of

power from Britain. He did not specifically define autonomy. Implicit is the concept of the Hong Kong government being able to decide for itself what it wanted to do, even when the British government, or its officials, would have preferred it had done otherwise. Again, implicit in his text is the political inability of British ministers and officials to impose their will and, conversely, the political ability of the Hong Kong government to impose theirs. The issues examined below seek to explore in greater depth why in some cases, the Hong Kong government was able to decide policies for itself and in others it was not.

Goodstadt marks out Grantham as a principal architect in the early development of the Hong Kong government's autonomy. It was Grantham who was "ruthless in managing his nominal masters in London". It was

> [h]is determination to expand Hong Kong's autonomy without too much regard for constitutional niceties [which] created a political and policy framework that was to dominate the political landscape until the arrival of Christopher Patten as Governor in 1992.[28]

This book will examine the extent to which Grantham was the mainstay of the early development of the Hong Kong government's autonomy. It will ask if the Colonial Office did display a falling away of interest in its charges and the extent to which Hong Kong government officials took up this slack. It will consider whether Grantham established anything as grand as a "political and policy framework" of such lasting eminence. It will argue that Grantham was not always the apparent author of policies that have been associated with him. A senior colleague remarked that Grantham's approach to issues was to side with the strongest side. The validity of this observation will be tested in this book which will, *ipso facto*, also test the validity of Goodstadt's and Tsang's views that he was a great Governor.

The forging of autonomy

This book will consider the ability, or otherwise, of the British Crown Colony government of Hong Kong to decide for itself how to govern Hong Kong. It will examine how the relationship between the Hong Kong and British governments and the unofficials worked in practice. It does not seek to examine the rights and wrongs of such a system: it seeks merely to examine and understand how it worked. A central theme is that the Hong Kong government's autonomy emerged as issues of contention which arose between it, the British government and the unofficials were mediated and resolved. Examining the factors that

were behind the resolution of these issues help provide an understanding of how Hong Kong's autonomy developed. This book will examine how some such issues arose; what impact political and organisational structures had on how these issues were mediated and resolved; how important the leading personalities involved were; and what influence stakeholders had on the outcome. Events and issues examined are those which resulted in change, or where change was proposed, and which affected, or could have affected, the way in which the Hong Kong government operated or responded. It does not seek to provide a comprehensive history of such events; for that the reader must look elsewhere.

Firstly, Chapter 2 will examine the actors in this story. It will set out the roles of the Governor, his officials, the Secretaries of State and the Colonial Office officials. It will examine how they played their roles and the factors that impinged upon them. Chapters 3 to 10 will examine cases which arose between 1918 and 1958. Chapter 3 will examine issues which arose between 1918 and 1930. It will examine the belated introduction of factory legislation and legislation concerning the registration and eventual abolition of the system of *mui tsai*, a traditional Chinese form of female child servitude. It will examine the interplay of the Hong Kong government and the unofficials and the role of Colonial Office officials. It will consider the effect, detrimental to the development of autonomy, of ignoring the impact of British public opinion. It will also examine how residential rents came to be controlled in the face of both strong support for and objection to such action. Chapter 4 will examine how the Hong Kong government's lack of policy formulation capacity over such a fundamental issue as its currency resulted in it relying on expertise elsewhere in the form of the Chief Manager of The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (the "Hongkong and Shanghai Bank") and on experts in the British Treasury. It will consider, too, how recovery of a small degree of autonomy was achieved when some capacity was eventually created to implement the British government's desired policy over registration of *mui tsai*. The role of external influence was also visible in the part played by Hong Kong's first Financial Secretary, Sidney Caine, in the formulation and promotion of a policy to introduce income tax. In Chapter 5, it will be argued that autonomy increases when the exercise of sovereignty over the subordinate organisation is threatened. This will be studied against the backdrop of Britain's loss of Hong Kong to the force of Japanese arms and pressure from the United States and Chinese governments for its return to China after Japan's defeat. It will also be shown how, under such circumstances, the desire to ensure the recovery of sovereignty was greater than the British government's ability to change the way it exercised it.

The ability of a bureaucratic entrepreneur to define a distinctive policy, to develop the capacity to implement it and to build a coalition in support of it will be reviewed in Chapter 6 through the examination of the introduction of an unpopular income tax after 1946. The growing influence of stakeholders as a result of a financial dispute with the British government will also be examined. This theme will be analysed in more depth in Chapter 7 when unofficials took the lead in manoeuvring the British government into abandoning proposals over an issue as fundamental as constitutional reform. In Chapters 8 and 9 the implications of the Governor's failure in the role of bureaucratic entrepreneur will be examined through his inability to effectively address the problems of low-cost housing and squatter resettlement. How the resulting policy voids created by his inaction were filled from outside the bureaucracy will be explored. This will also show how autonomy was recovered through creation of capacity to address these policy areas effectively and how this eventually helped provide the platform for the emergence of the Hong Kong government's future high degree of autonomy. Chapter 10 will show that *de facto* financial autonomy was being exercised in the years before it was formally granted and how this vindicated the legitimising role of the unofficials in the Legislative Council.

This is a book about the role of the Hong Kong government, the Colonial Office and the unofficials in the formulation of public policy in Hong Kong. It is an examination of government processes in an era when the mass of the population was excluded from the formulation of public policy. It thus focuses to a large extent on official sources to understand what happened and why it happened. It does not seek to delve into the rights and wrongs of the policies concerned. The aim of this book is to attempt to understand how the Hong Kong government's autonomy began to emerge even when the British government did not explicitly grant any. It is not a story of a linear movement towards this state. Nor is it a story of the conception and execution of a plan to reach this goal. Rather, it is the story of the emergence of autonomy in spite of the Hong Kong government's initial inability to plan, in spite of its belief and claims that it had no capacity to either introduce new measures or implement them, and in spite of being pushed and prodded by external agents to do what it eventually did.

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Conclusions

There was no clear linear progression in the development of the Hong Kong government's autonomy. There were too many variables for this to have happened. There were moments when it was able to exercise a degree, even a high degree of autonomy, and others when it was not. Much depended on the circumstances of the time, the political pressure that was brought to bear and how those in authority responded to it. The exercise of autonomy was as much the result of changing political pressures as it was of the personalities and the beliefs of the principal actors involved, in Britain as well as Hong Kong, and their willingness and determination to act upon them.

Carpenter sets out a clear exposition of the conditions necessary for government agencies to develop autonomy in a democratic political system. The Hong Kong government, however, was not democratically elected but was answerable to a British government that was and, in addition, it had to take account of local political opinion reflected by the unofficials. Nor was it, like the United States government agencies Carpenter studied, competing with other government agencies for power or resources. This concluding chapter will consider, therefore, what issues and factors, including those set out by Carpenter, were relevant to the development of the Hong Kong government's autonomy in this somewhat different milieu. Firstly, however, this chapter will examine whether Hong Kong's constitutional subservience to the British Crown had a major impact on the development of its ability to exercise autonomy.

Hong Kong's colonial relationship with Britain

Hong Kong's relationship with Britain provides only a limited context to understanding the changing power relationship between the two governments. Constitutional subordination provided the institutional framework within which the British government established a comprehensive

series of reporting requirements and approvals. The formal appointment of the Governor, senior civil servants and unofficials by the Secretary of State on behalf of the Crown all provided an opportunity for Britain to exercise power over the colonial government. The workings of this relationship, within the rubric of colonial regulations, provided a framework within which political power could be exercised.

In practice, however, politics was the principal determinant of the balance of political power between the two governments. In some cases, it was politics in Britain that enabled the home government to prevail, as in the case of *mui tsai;* in others, it was local politics that enabled the Hong Kong government to determine the outcome, as in the case of the proposed municipal council. In others, the outcome was the result of more nuanced forces. The directive on housing, for example, was a consequence of the interplay of political forces in both places. This relationship, therefore, provided the context but not the driving force behind the nature and development of the power relationship between the British and Hong Kong governments.

Whose policies prevailed?

It is remarkable how few policies examined originated from the Hong Kong government: indeed, nearly all originated from elsewhere. The policy to regulate *mui tsai* was dictated by Churchill and Passfield to an unwilling Hong Kong government; the local government's preference was not to interfere. In 1946, Young was similarly told that he had to consult and plan for constitutional reform. The Secretary of State also instructed a not unwilling Governor to establish a Housing Authority and Hong Kong was given little option but to pay a defence contribution. Nor was it just from the sovereign power that policies emanated. The Hong Kong government under Stubbs and Clementi was strongly influenced by Chinese elite pressure over *mui tsai*. It was unofficial opposition, initially to the Young Plan and then eventually to any constitutional reform, which pushed Grantham to abandon constitutional change. More positively, one Urban Council unofficial, in the absence of direction from the Hong Kong government, took the lead in the early development of a permanent squatter resettlement policy.

The British government, in the form of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and his senior Colonial Office officials did not seek to "control" the Hong Kong government. It was expected to conduct its business in accordance with a set of common values tacitly understood by politicians and officials on both sides. Colonial Office officials tended to act more as supervisors and gave much credence to the views of the "man

on the spot". The various approvals requested by Hong Kong governors were often readily agreed to by the Secretary of State.[1] The British government usually sought to impose its will only when domestic political pressure brought matters to ministers' attention and made it in their interests to act. Their intervention could then be decisive.

There were occasions, however, when policies were unique to the Hong Kong government. In 1936, Caldecott amended the law regarding *mui tsai* even when all Chinese unofficials opposed him. Northcote took care to win political support from Legislative Council unofficials for the implementation of the Woods Commission Minority Report recommendations when the Colonial Office had not expected him to do so. Young also developed his own detailed plan for a municipal council and defended it against attack from the Secretary of State. MacDougall persuaded the Colonial Office to allow the Hong Kong government to support the Lee Hysan housing scheme and ensured that the government had an effective policy to clear and resettle squatters from the main urban area in 1948. These all happened under the strong leadership of a governor or senior cadet.

The ability of the unofficials in the Executive, Legislative and Urban Councils to influence or even author policy was also an important influence. Sometimes the unofficials operated quite blatantly in their own interests as, for example, in seeking to pursue constitutional reform to create a Legislative Council within which they could exercise more power. Their lack of enthusiasm for the Hong Kong government to embark on a policy of building low-cost housing most probably delayed the introduction of a Housing Authority. Influencing events more indirectly, were "activists" such as the Haslewoods, Miss Picton-Turbervill, the pressure groups in Britain backing them and, to a lesser extent, Bishop Hall in Hong Kong. They mobilised public opinion in Britain in innovative ways and brought pressure to bear upon the Hong Kong government, mostly indirectly, through the British government.

Policy formulation and implementation

A recurring theme was the Hong Kong government's initial belief that it had no capacity to implement proposed new policies followed by the discovery that it had more potential to develop such a capacity than it thought it had. Once required to implement new policies, it was often able to do so quite successfully. There are two main aspects of this capability to consider. Firstly, there was the capacity to formulate policy in new policy areas and the ability, as Carpenter says, "to analyse, to create new programmes, to solve problems, to plan". This was, perhaps the weakest aspect of the Hong Kong government's performance. Carpenter

thinks "nothing so distinguishes twentieth century bureaucratic government from its predecessors as its ability to plan, to innovate, and to author policy".[2] It was almost the lack of these capabilities that defined the Hong Kong government during this period. It held a very pessimistic view of its ability to attempt most things new. Both Stubbs and Clementi were convinced that the state had no capacity to regulate *mui tsai* and had no confidence in the effectiveness of a new inspectorate to implement regulations. There was an infinite belief in the immutability of Chinese mores and none whatsoever in the government's ability to act as an agent of social change and development. The government and the unofficials both gave lack of capacity as a reason for being unable to implement proposed new policies. It was one reason why Clementi believed he was unable to regulate *mui tsai* and Young's opponents adduced this as a reason for not introducing income tax. Young had to reassure the unofficials that that capacity could and would be created. Grantham also gave lack of capacity as an excuse for inaction on proposed constitutional reform.

A capacity to generate new policy proposals did exist within the civil service. Some senior and middle-ranking civil servants, concerned over Hong Kong's housing situation, submitted their recommendations to senior levels within government, proposing the building of permanent multi-storey housing blocks. In late 1949, the Deputy Director of Public Works was advocating the establishment by government of a housing trust as the only way to tackle the housing problem. After MacDougall's departure, however, Grantham seemed unable to pull together views expressed by civil servants and to develop a cohesive and viable housing policy. The loss of MacDougall's guidance was exacerbated by the absence of any institutional planning mechanisms which would have helped create the potential capacity preferred to formulate policy in new areas; there were no standing government planning or co-ordination committees nor standing policy committees which would play such an important part in policy co-ordination in later years.[3] It took, for example, the steadying hand of the Secretary of State and the Colonial Office before a firm housing policy was established.

The second aspect was the capacity to implement new policies efficiently and effectively. It was remarkable how well the Hong Kong government could implement new policies even if it was not adept at formulating them. Despite Stubbs and Clementi's forebodings, Peel established an inspectorate that, in spite of some criticism, was reasonably effective in administering the *mui tsai* regulations and enabled Hong Kong to provide Britain with authoritative-sounding statistics with which to confound its critics. That success was one reason why Caldecott and Northcote were able to proceed with their own distinctive policies.

MacDougall created the capacity for the British Military Administration to tackle the intractable problems facing it. In 1948, he was also able to ensure the effective formulation and implementation of a squatter clearance and resettlement policy. Under post-war Financial Secretaries, Hong Kong's finances were put on a more even footing and regular surpluses were accumulated. Even Grantham, once he had been given policy direction over housing, eventually managed to establish a Housing Authority, although it took him nearly four years to do so. This reflected the abilities of the cadets, and subordinate officers, to apply themselves effectively to a task even if they were less adept at formulating new policies in the first place.

Implementation was weak, however, when it required inter-departmental co-ordination. The 1951 squatter resettlement policy was stymied by poor implementation: the rigid lines of departmentalism prevented the effective inter-departmental co-ordination on which its success depended. Conversely, the implementation of the policy to resettle squatters in permanent multi-storey accommodation through the work of a single department was extraordinarily successful and rapidly became an international byword on the issue. Effective implementation allowed Holmes, as Commissioner for Resettlement, to eventually regain effective control of squatter policy from the Urban Council once he had shown that government, through the work of his department, had the capacity to build multi-storey resettlement blocks quickly and manage them efficiently.

Although government had policies imposed upon it from elsewhere, the creation of the capacity to implement them gave it the means to help make these polices its own. The act of creation of that capability forced it to study issues and thereby become more knowledgeable about them. Practical experience increased its ability and confidence in handling these issues. This, in turn, gave the government a certain authority in discussions with the Secretary of State and the Colonial Office which helped it respond as it wished rather than continue to be dictated to.

Legitimacy

Why were new policies imposed upon the Hong Kong government despite it having shown neither an ability to formulate them nor the demonstrated capacity to implement them? Firstly, the Hong Kong government was the only instrument through which the British government could exercise its sovereignty: it had no ready alternative means of doing so. The Hong Kong government was also not competing with other agencies for legitimacy as was the case in the United States. If it was having problems with issues it should have been facing up to—challenges over

public order, safety and public health as in the case of squatters—it was the only body available to tackle them. There were no alternatives. If the government lacked the capacity to tackle new issues, then that capacity had to be created.

Secondly, it was the only body with access to the resources needed to tackle such problems. The Hong Kong government did not enjoy a "strong organisational reputation" nor had it consistently displayed "demonstrated capacity".[4] It was, however, the only body with the necessary powers and access to funds to tackle issues on a suitable scale. This was especially so for housing and squatter resettlement. The early attempts by the Hong Kong Housing Society and the Hong Kong Model Housing Society showed the difficulties of raising private finance to tackle the housing problem. Only the Hong Kong government could establish a fund, such as the Development Fund, from which loans could be made to the Housing Society and the Housing Authority on terms favourable enough to make low-cost housing projects viable. Only the colonial government could seek grants or loans from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, and only the government had the authority to clear squatters, make land available for their resettlement and, with the support of unofficials on the Legislative Council sitting as the Finance Committee, fund the construction of permanent multi-storey resettlement blocks to rehouse them.

There was also the question of why the imposition of these polices on the Hong Kong government did not derogate from its authority. The Hong Kong government was in the unusual position that no other political body or party or other sovereign power had any interest or desire to usurp or takeover its political power or authority. There was no opposition waiting in the wings for an opportunity to become the lawful government. There was no nationalist party agitating for independence as there was in other British colonies after 1945. The only possible alternative would have been if Hong Kong had reverted to China to be ruled by the Chinese government of the day. There was, however, no serious or popular agitation for this. As a result, if a serious issue needed to be addressed and if the Hong Kong government was not satisfactorily addressing it, it had then to be pushed or prodded into doing so. This was the pattern which emerged under Stubbs, Clementi, Peel and Grantham. It was this which helped create the Hong Kong government's capacity to implement new policies which, in turn, gave it the experience and expertise to begin to formulate further policies in these areas. This, in turn, enhanced its reputation for the effective provision of services and allowed it to exercise an increasing level of autonomy from Britain and from the unofficials.

Importance of the unofficials

The role of the unofficial, especially after 1945, was important for three reasons. Firstly, because the unofficials in the Legislative Council had power and had shown they were prepared to use it. They obtained control over government expenditure in 1920 when Stubbs created an unofficial majority in the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council.[5] In 1940, its unofficial members had shown they were prepared to use this power when they declined to vote $10,000 for the evacuation of European women and children from Hong Kong.[6] After 1946, they made very clear that they were not prepared to approve expenditure on items arising from the aftermath of the war which they thought should be borne by Britain. This had pushed even Young, who was otherwise prepared to stand up to the unofficials if he thought he was right, to agree that such expenditure be placed in a suspense account until agreement with Britain had been reached. This would have increased the unofficials' sense of what they could achieve *vis-à-vis* not only the Hong Kong government but also the British government. It was also the implicit power of the unofficials on the Finance Committee which helped Grantham in his annual negotiations over the defence contribution.

Secondly, the unofficials had a motive to wield this power. In the years immediately after the war, there was an underlying uncertainty over Britain's commitment to remaining in Hong Kong.[7] Britain had been loath to make any public announcement on the future of the colony for fear of triggering a request from the Chinese government to start negotiations over the colony's future.[8] If the unofficials had doubted Britain's determination to remain, they may have been encouraged to be more belligerent than they otherwise might have been. This was clearly the case during the July 1947 Legislative Council housing debate when one unofficial remarked that he had "never heard a debate in which more spirit was displayed".[9] Conversely, in 1949, Britain's manifest commitment to Hong Kong's defence would have constrained them from objecting in principle to making a contribution to the cost of Hong Kong's defence.

Thirdly, the unofficials were allowed to exercise their power and influence over government policy. If the various Governors discussed here are to be broadly classified, then Stubbs, Clementi and Grantham considered unofficials' views to be immutable while Peel, Northcote and Young considered them malleable. Stubbs and Clementi considered themselves unable to tackle the Chinese elites over *mui tsai;* Peel and Northcote managed to win their support and Caldecott simply disregarded them. Young persuaded some unofficials to support his income tax proposals and he was prepared to tackle them on the issue

of constitutional reform. Grantham, however, acquiesced to their views and allowed them to lead the debate. His unwillingness to grasp the nettle over government provision of low-cost housing before receipt of the Secretary of State's instructions may have been due to the decided lack of unofficial interest in such a move. His willingness to allow Clague such a free hand in the development of proposals for squatter resettlement amounted almost to a derogation of gubernatorial authority to the Urban Council. The conclusion is that political support was an essential part of the process of policy development: the problem was that while some Governors sought the political support of the unofficials other Governors lent them their political support instead.

The culmination of these developments was the eventual realisation by Colonial Office officials that authority on financial matters had shifted from the Secretary of State to the unofficials. This was compounded when they realised they were unable to do anything to reverse this. No matter what formal regulations were in place, it was the unofficials who now had the final word. This was the culmination, and probably unintended consequence of granting them financial authority in 1920, the Colonial Office's attempts from the 1930s to improve the quality of financial management in colonies like Hong Kong and the Colonial Office's insistence in 1948 that Hong Kong build up its reserves.[10] The Secretary of State's financial authority had been rendered obsolete and irrelevant.

Political pressure from Britain

In Britain, political support and pressure upon the British government to implement policies in Hong Kong was issue specific; the abolition of *mui tsai,* for example and, somewhat more obliquely, for the provision of low-cost housing. There was no general pro-Hong Kong lobby. These were issues over which a British government was very susceptible to pressure; they could not defend the Hong Kong government's inaction against allegations of slavery nor defend the colony's dismal housing conditions. Faced with such criticism, political pressure led the British government to use its powers over Hong Kong to insist upon implementation of policies in these areas. Conversely, when there was no political pressure from Britain, the ability of British officials alone to impose their will on a reluctant, even recalcitrant Hong Kong was seriously constrained. This was shown over discussions on how much Hong Kong should contribute to the cost of its defence.

How could political pressure from Britain override opposing political views in Hong Kong? There were two reasons. Firstly, a Governor was unable to resist specific instructions from a Secretary of State

backed by British domestic political pressure and by wider international concern. This could have brought him close to recall. Secondly, despite the Chinese elites' seemingly unwavering support of traditional Chinese customs, many were educated in the British liberal tradition both in Hong Kong and at leading British universities.[11] They were perfectly aware of the opprobrium that was attached to the keeping of *mui tsai*. Even although they tried to argue this was done with the best interests of the girls in mind,[12] they would most likely have been aware how indefensible such arguments would have been in Britain. Similarly, state provision of housing for the less well-off was a major plank in the policies of the newly elected Labour government after 1945.[13] Unofficials in Hong Kong, with their knowledge of Britain and British policies, would most likely have been aware of the difficulty of maintaining obdurate resistance to the public provision of housing in Hong Kong for the less well-off.

Leadership

The hand of a strong leader can be found in the development of most of these policy proposals. Some proved themselves very effective at building political support for their proposed policies. Northcote built up a political coalition among the unofficials in support of the Minority Report recommendations. He made some concessions but his main proposals were supported. Young also showed this approach could work with his strenuous efforts to win political support for his income tax proposals. MacDougall showed how, within the administration, he could formulate and win support for his proposed policy on squatter clearance.

Leaders were not always to be found within the bureaucracy. Some unofficials were able to exert influence over policy when policy voids appeared. These were created when the Hong Kong government failed to address pressing issues until they had reached crisis proportions. This was the case most explicitly after the Shek Kip Mei fire. The government's tentative approach allowed Clague, long a critic of the implementation of the Hong Kong government's squatter resettlement policy, to adroitly step in and persuade the Chairman of the Urban Council to establish a committee under his chairmanship. He acted, as one would have expected an entrepreneur to act, swiftly and skilfully, taking advantage of an opportunity which presented itself and then stoutly defending his position.

Grantham avoided entering the policy debate over the kind of constitutional reform, if any, which would be best for Hong Kong. He restricted his role to the management of process rather than the development of policy. Grantham gave his backing to policy proposals

because the unofficials wanted them or because others had cold feet. He supported what was proposed but did not propose what was not supported; he did not lead the debate. In the absence of a leader within the Hong Kong government, others emerged, in this case the unofficials in the Legislative Council of whom Landale, the senior unofficial in Grantham's time, may have played a leading role.

It was also not in the nature of the Hong Kong government's leading civil servants, the cadets, to promote new policies or to be politically adventurous by expanding government activities into new areas. They were not the kind of proactive leaders who would "take action consistent with their own wishes".[14] They saw their role as administering a colony, maintaining public order, ensuring justice was administered, public works constructed and maintained and that regulations were enacted and enforced. Many cadets appeared to see this as their main function and were almost unable to see beyond their day-to-day responsibilities.[15] The Hong Kong government did not, therefore, cultivate the type of personnel who were, by nature, entrepreneurs. Such people when they appeared, such as Lockhart and MacDougall, were exceptions. However, events showed that, once cadets had to take on and implement new policies, they were generally capable of doing so provided they were implemented within the one department; inter-departmental co-ordination was not a strong point.

The other category of leader was the "social activist" like the Haslewoods in the *mui tsai* case and Bishop Hall in the case of housing. By astute manipulation of the democratic system in Britain, Hall and the Haslewoods managed to achieve changes to the Hong Kong government's policies. In both cases, this involved applying, or threatening to apply, pressure upon the British government over issues which it was unable to defend. This also showed how susceptible a democratic government was to public opinion and the very limited direct impact that public opinion still had upon the Hong Kong government. This impact could, of course, have been considerably reduced if Governors had recognised the need to address such issues promptly and decided for themselves how to respond rather than waiting to be told what to do.

As both Northcote and Young showed, however, a Governor's leadership could play a decisive role in the development of new policies. Whether or not this happened was greatly dependent upon the personality and outlook of the Governor of the day, how he chose to respond to issues as they arose and how he responded to the political views of the unofficials. Some had a very clear conception of what they wanted and were prepared to work to build the necessary political support to achieve it. Others, like Stubbs and Clementi, also knew what they wanted but were unable to counter political support for change in Britain, nor

did they understand the impact that domestic political views could have upon the British government. They also underestimated their ability to change the views of unofficials and leading local elites in Hong Kong. A Governor like Grantham was not prepared to advocate change in the face of opposition from unofficials as had Young. Similarly, the personalities and political views of respective Secretaries of State also had a bearing. Creech-Jones' strongly held views over housing prevailed but were not shared by Lyttelton. Lyttelton was under no political pressure over the issue and was, by inclination, content to leave most matters to Grantham whom he trusted implicitly. Had the personalities been different, so might have been the outcome.

Sovereignty and the autonomy of crisis

The Hong Kong government was the representative of Britain, the sovereign power. If Hong Kong's position as a British colony was challenged, then the Hong Kong government's first duty was to preserve Britain's sovereignty.[16] This did not happen often. The threat posed by United States pressure to return Hong Kong to China after the war allowed the Hong Kong Planning Unit considerable freedom to plan for the post-war re-establishment of the Hong Kong government as it had existed before 1941. A challenge also occurred under the British Military Administration when faced with the dire circumstances it met upon its arrival in Hong Kong in September 1945. It was able to act under minimum supervision from the Colonial Office in order that it might quickly and effectively re-establish law and order, paving the way for the return of British civil administration and thereby the exercise of Britain's sovereignty. MacDougall also realised the need for speedy action to remedy the multiple problems faced by the post-war colony. The same factor also held sway after 1949 when the uncertainties over communist intentions towards Hong Kong influenced Colonial Office thinking towards constitutional reform. This allowed Grantham and the unofficials more leeway in their argument that constitutional reform should be diluted and then abandoned. However, autonomy of this nature lasted only as long as did the perceived crisis and was not a basis for the development of a more sustainable form of autonomy.

A sense of crisis also constrained the ways in which the British government was able to exercise its sovereignty. The British government felt unable to impose its policies upon the Hong Kong government when its own position there was perceived to be under threat and it had to rely on the Hong Kong government for the retention of its sovereignty. Reforms of the post-war Hong Kong civil service contemplated in the Colonial Office in 1942 were never introduced; the re-establishment of

British sovereignty after Japan's defeat was more pressing. In 1952, it had to accept that constitutional reform would not go ahead as originally envisaged; the retention of British sovereignty in the face of a possible threat from the newly installed communist Chinese regime overrode any desire for reform. However, conversely, when the retention of Hong Kong's British sovereignty depended on British action, and the expenditure of British resources, the balance of power shifted to Britain and Hong Kong had to agree to make a contribution towards the cost of its defence. Again, such factors held sway only as long as the crisis did.

The autonomy of the Hong Kong government

A reputation for the capacity to formulate and implement new policies effectively was not a necessary precursor for the adoption of new policies by the Hong Kong government. Indeed, the opposite was usually the case. Government was often required, as a result of external political pressure, to implement new policies without showing it had the proven ability to do so. That capacity, to implement new policies successfully, was created as a consequence. Incremental development of these new policies and programmes then began to develop in ways analogous to the Carpenter model. The intrinsic abilities of the cadets engendered new capabilities which allowed them to further develop policies on their own volition and achieve a degree of autonomy.

The Hong Kong government did not seek autonomy. It did not proactively develop brave new policies to address the challenges of a rapidly changing Hong Kong yet it was the only body which could tackle the pressing social problems that Hong Kong faced. It did not of its own volition seek to address them but had to be cajoled into doing so. Only then did it discover a capacity it never believed it had. This gave it the ability and confidence to decide for itself what it wanted to do and enhanced its scope for action independently of either the British government or organized interests in Hong Kong. Therein lay the origins of autonomy.

Notes

Chapter 1 Introduction

1 Article 3 (2) of the *Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong,* in Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong* (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), p. 353; and Article 2 of *The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing [H.K.] Co. Ltd., 1991), p. 5.

2 Steve Tsang, ed. *A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Government and Politics* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995) pp. 19–30.

3 *Colonial Regulations 1935*, amended 1945 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945), Regulation 105.

4 Lennox A. Mills, *British Rule in Eastern Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 391–92.

5 Norman Miners, *Hong Kong Under Imperial Rule 1912–1941* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 50–51 and p. 109.

6 J. M. H. Lee, *Colonial Development and Good Government* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 72.

7 See Miners, op. cit., pp. 50 and 284; Mills, op. cit., pp. 392 and 397; and Lee, op. cit., pp. 55, 60, 73 and 220.

8 Royal Instructions 29 and 3 in Tsang, op. cit., pp. 27 and 23 respectively and Letters Patent in ibid., p. 19.

9 Sir Cosmo Parkinson, *The Colonial Office from Within, 1900–1945* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1946), p. 139; Mills, op. cit., p. 397.

10 Scott, op. cit., p. 324.

11 Leo Goodstadt, *Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between Public Interest and Private Profit in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), p. 49.

12 See, for example, Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich, "The Concept of Autonomy in International Law", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 74, No. 4, (1980), pp. 858–89; G. L. Clark, "A Theory of Local Autonomy", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 74, No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 195–208; H. Wolman and M. Goldsmith, "Local Autonomy as a Meaningful Concept", *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Sep 1990),

p. 3; Zeng Huaqun, "Hong Kong's Autonomy: Concept, Development and Characteristics", *China: An International Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (September 2003), p. 315; and J. Richardson, "Dillon's Rule Is from Mars, Home Rule Is from Venus: Local Government Autonomy and the Rules of Statutory Construction", *Publius*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2011), pp. 662–85.

13 Gordon L. Clark, op. cit., pp. 198–201.

14 H. Wolman and M. Goldsmith, op. cit., pp. 3–17, quoted in G. A. Boyne, "Central Policies and Local Autonomy: The Case of Wales", *Urban Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1993), pp. 87–101.

15 H. Wolman, R. McManmom, M. Bell and D. Brunori, "Comparing Local Government across States", in M. E. Bell, D. Brunori and J. Youngman, *The Property Tax and Local Autonomy* (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy); quoted in J. Richardson, "Dillon's Rule Is from Mars, Home Rule Is from Venus: Local Government Autonomy and the Rules of Statutory Construction", *Publius*, Vol. 41, No. 4, (2011), pp. 662–85.

16 Miners, op. cit., p. 74.

17 Daniel P. Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001).

18 Ibid., pp. 4–21.

19 Ibid., pp. 5 and 14.

20 Herbert Kaufman, *The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 161–74; James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 183 and 227; and Carpenter, op. cit., Chapter 3.

21 For the difficulties faced by the British government in trying to persuade colonial service officers to innovate and plan and promote development in the colonies see Lee, op. cit., pp. 35–39; J. M. Lee and Martin Petter, *The Colonial Office, War and Development Policy* (London: University of London, for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1982), pp. 170–72; D. J. Morgan, *The Official History of Colonial Development,* Vol. 1, *The Origins of British Aid Policy, 1924–1945* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980), pp. 183–84.

22 Mills, op. cit., pp. vii–viii.

23 Parkinson, op. cit., Chapter 6, pp. 136–54.

24 G. B. Endacott, *Government and People in Hong Kong, 1841–1962* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964). See particularly Chapters XIV and XV.

25 Steve Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004).

26 Scott, op. cit., p. 324.

27 Goodstadt, op. cit.

28 Ibid., p. 56.

Chapter 2 Governor, Cadets, Unofficials and the Colonial Office

1 Sidney James Webb, Lord Passfield, OM, PC was born in 1859 and educated in London and overseas. He became a civil servant in the War Office in 1878, joined the Colonial Office in 1881 and resigned from the civil service

75 See, for example, T 225/775, letter from Bancroft, Treasury to Trafford-Smith, Colonial Office dated 16 September 1952 in which Bancroft considered the surplus Hong Kong was due to make was "extremely comfortable". See also note dated 8 July 1953 on Hong Kong's forecast surplus of HK$20.4 million on total estimated revenue of HK$176.9 million.
76 CO 1030/392, minute from Howard-Drake to Mackintosh dated 5 October 1955, para. 11.
77 Ibid., series of minutes starting from Howard-Drake to Macintosh dated 5 October 1955, and including minutes from Hulland to Ashton dated 29 May 1956, from Ashton to Hulland and Johnston dated 10 July 1956, from Johnston to Melville dated 14 July 1956 and from Vile dated 27 August 1956; and minute from Howard-Drake to Mackintosh dated 5 October 1955.
78 Ibid, minute from Ashton to Hulland and Johnston dated 10 July 1956, para 8 (a).
79 Ibid., minutes from Ashton dated 10 and 24 July 1956; minute from Melville dated 16 July 1956; letter from Hulland, Colonial Office to Russell-Edmunds, Treasury dated 7 September 1956 and letter from Russell-Edmunds, Treasury to Hulland, Colonial Office dated 2 November 1956.
80 Hong Kong Hansard, address by the Governor, Sir R. B. Black, 6 March 1958, p. 46.
81 HKRS 229/2/1, dispatch from Secretary of State to Governor, Hong Kong dated 14 January 1958.
82 CO 1030/392, minute from Vile dated 27 August 1956.
83 HKRS 229/2/1, minute from the Acting Financial Secretary to the Governor dated 30 April 1957.
84 CO 854/84, circular dispatch to colonial Governors dated 10 June 1932; Miners *Hong Kong Under Imperial Rule,* pp. 122–24; and CO 854/104, circular dispatch from the Secretary of State dated January 1937. Also reproduced in Jeffries *The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service,* pp. 243–47.

Chapter 11 Conclusions

1 Miners, op. cit., pp. 40, 278 and 284.
2 Carpenter, op. cit., pp. 5 and 14.
3 Scott, op. cit., p. 163 claims "the strengthening of the state machinery at the centre ... gave the state civil capabilities which it had never before possessed". Grantham's, Nicoll's and Black's seeming inability to co-ordinate policy formulation and implementation effectively was an example of what could happen if the centre was unable to exercise such control.
4 Carpenter, op. cit., p. 14.
5 Hong Kong Hansard, address by the Governor, Stubbs, on a motion by Colonial Secretary dated 29 January 1920, pp. 3–4.
6 Ibid., proceedings of the Finance Committee, pp. 111–18, dated 25 July 1940.
7 CO 537/3702, letter from Grantham to Sidebotham dated 19 May 48.
8 Whitfield, op. cit., p. 99.

9 Hong Kong Hansard, speech made by the Hon Leo d'Almada e Castro during motion debate 10 July 1947, p. 242.
10 HKRS 41/1/2768, telegram from Secretary of State to Governor, Hong Kong dated 15 March 1948.
11 For example, M. K. Lo trained as a solicitor in England; S. W. T'so was educated in England; Shouson Chow was educated in the US and Chau Tsun-nin was educated at Oxford University.
12 Smith, op. cit., pp. 96 and 98.
13 See, for example, Correlli Barnett, *The Lost Victory* (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 152–55 and David Kynaston, *Austerity Britain 1948–51: A World to Build* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007) pp. 101–2 and *Smoke in the Valley* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), pp. 42–43 and pp. 318–26.
14 Carpenter, op. cit., p. 4.
15 CO 825/42/15, undated typewritten memo by Sidney Caine, c. Jan–Feb 1942 and the two articles in *The Times* of 31 July and 1 August 1942 by MacDougall.
16 Sir Henry Taylor, a noted mid-nineteenth-century senior Colonial Office official, referring to a colonial Governor's role stated "I think ... that the essential object was and is to uphold authority". From Sir Henry Taylor, *Autobiography 1800–1875,* 2 Vols., 1885, quoted in Hall, op. cit., p. 106.

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