

# Europe and China

## Strategic Partners or Rivals?

Edited by Roland Vogt



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## INTRODUCTION

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# Europe and China: A Maturing Relationship?

Roland Vogt

This book deals with the changing relationship between Europe and China. Its central theme is to explore the growing breadth and complexity of this important relationship. Europe and China are increasingly being drawn together not only because of booming trade and economic interdependence, but also because they are playing more active roles in global affairs. Rather than merely describing the instruments and mechanisms of the interactions between both sides, the contributors to this volume critically reflect on several new dimensions of this relationship. What emerges is a picture that is more nuanced but less straightforward than much of the literature on contemporary Sino-European affairs.

For all the majestic rhetoric of a “strategic partnership” between Europe and China—which characterizes official discourse in Brussels, European capitals, as well as Beijing—both sides continue to be “distant neighbors” (Kapur, 1990). They are not each other’s foreign policy priorities and their relations have been, despite being conducted in a largely cordial and constructive manner, recurrently affected by false expectations and missed opportunities. This is a point that reappears in several chapters throughout this book. Europe has not delivered what China hoped for, and China has not changed in a way that Europe wished for. Europe and the European Union (EU) have not become a counterbalancing factor in a multipolar global order—as many in Beijing believed until fairly recently—that could be useful for diminishing or even challenging America’s influence. Likewise, China’s opening of the economy and its growing economic interdependence has not fundamentally altered its political system (see Pei, 2006). European hopes that free trade,

economic interdependence, and the power of the internet would lead to political (i.e. democratic) reforms in China have yet to materialize.

As a consequence of this gap in expectations and perceptions, Chinese and European decision-makers have attempted to put the relationship on a more grounded footing, toning down overambitious expectations and looking for avenues of concrete cooperation. A new and more pragmatic tone is thus beginning to characterize Sino-European relations. Nowadays, China and Europe work together on numerous issues of mutual concern—from the economy to global warming and climate change policies, to energy, policies towards Africa, and numerous diplomatic initiatives in international institutions and other multilateral fora. These and other pertinent topical issues are explored and examined more carefully throughout this volume. Both sides have also found channels to at least discuss more controversial concerns, such as human rights and democracy, the rule of law, the EU's arms embargo, as well as issues pertaining to regional security. This new pragmatism has not always led to palpable achievements but it has enabled a slow move away from trade being the sole and dominating factor of Sino-European ties. Yet for all the progress being made, there are also a number of unresolved concerns that remain to be tackled, such as the disrupted relationship between the Vatican and Beijing that is the theme of Beatrice Leung's chapter.

The book was designed to address and shed light on those issues and challenges that illustrate the growing breadth and complexity of Sino-European affairs that emerged over the last few years. The point of exploring these new dimensions is both to underscore the extent to which Sino-European relations have transformed since the early 1970s and to draw attention to new fields of contestation—regarding energy, climate change, and discrepancies over Africa, among others—that have not been adequately dealt with elsewhere in scholarly literature. As the different contributions to this volume reveal, the growing complexity has not made the management of Sino-European affairs any easier. Not only has the quantity of mutual contacts and interactions changed, but there has also been a desire to bring about a qualitative leap in the relationship. As Europe and China have become more assertive in the pursuit of their interests, more vocal in defending their positions, and more engaged in managing a wide variety of global concerns through numerous multilateral channels, this is more necessary than ever.



## The background

The history of Sino-European relations since the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 holds some important lessons for the current and future state of affairs. While the contexts of the Cold War, Beijing's pre-1971 *de facto* isolation, and China's reclusion from international politics and trade throughout 1966–69 are not at all comparable to today's situation, some underlying dynamics of the relationship remain.

First, Europe has not fully developed a deliberate and sustained policy to deal with China. Britain (until the handover of Hong Kong in 1997), France (until the mid-1950s), and to a minor degree Portugal (until 1999) had at previous times a more direct and immediate interest in China, but this has now largely vanished. The same is true for the former communist countries of Eastern Europe that enjoyed close relations with Beijing until the 1960s. Little remains of their previous engagement with China, but this is largely due to the fact that they did not conduct policy on their own, but had to follow Moscow's line instead (Kapur, 1990; Meißner, 1995; Yahuda, 2008).

The lack of a coherent set of European policies on China continues to be the case today. Nowadays, only Britain, France, Germany, and Italy have a significant and visible presence in China. With few exceptions, other EU member states tend to follow the lead of these four major European powers, given the former's lack of capacity, resources, or economic and diplomatic power in foreign affairs. The China policy of the four big powers is almost exclusively driven by economic and trade interests. Britain and France share with China a permanent seat at the UN Security Council—and thus also entertain a form of diplomatic dialogue that all the other member states of the EU do not have—but this has not translated into the formation of a consolidated set of primordial interests and policies on China. As will be shown below, Europe has had difficulty in framing a viable response to China's "rise" and this not only due to the challenge of finding common ground among the many and diverse member states of the EU. Sino-European ties have become cordial and increasingly multifaceted, but also remain distant as a more substantial convergence of interests, values, and perceptions has yet to occur.

By and large, Europe's policy, both at the national governmental and the EU levels, is a combination of frequently unpremeditated responses to domestic electoral or lobby pressures in Europe, the necessities of business and trade, and reactions to Beijing's own behavior. The outcome is a contradictory set

of policies and initiatives: Europe wants to be a “strategic” partner to China, but it is not able to persuasively define its interests in the region, let alone its strategic ones. Europe puts pressure on Beijing over human rights and the lack of democracy and the rule of law, but seeks its approval for business deals and privileged diplomatic ties. Europe talks about engagement and partnership, but analysts and the public alike are becoming more fearful of Beijing’s influence and power (Glaubitz, 2004; Hook, 2004). Europe keeps an arms embargo in place over concerns of human rights abuses in China, but allows arms exports to other parts of the world (such as Saudi Arabia) with similarly worrying human rights situations.

China has also struggled with articulating a cohesive policy towards Europe. It frequently states that it would like Europe to play a more active role in global affairs (potentially even so as to balance US influence), but Beijing has proven adept at playing off individual European countries against each other in the pursuit of short-term commercial and other political interests. China signed on to the “strategic partnership” with the EU, but has not been willing to compromise on a number of European concerns: the protection of intellectual property rights, the abolition of illegal state subsidies and restrictions to access the Chinese market (especially for European financial and legal services), as well as China’s poor record on human rights and civil liberties, the death penalty, and its support of unsavory regimes in North Korea, Burma, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

Second, Europe and China have never been each other’s foreign policy priorities. Europe concentrates most of its foreign policy activity on Europe and its immediate neighborhood, as well as on the transatlantic alliance with the US. Russia and the Middle East also figure in Europe’s key external relations, but relations with China come a distant third. The same is true for China, which focuses its foreign policy most intensely on its Asian neighbors and the US. The “secondary” nature (Yahuda, 1995) of Sino-European relations is only partially a result of the fact that Europe and China do not share common borders and do not have military and strategic interests in each other’s regions. It is also a reflection that both sides—at least on a governmental level—share little in terms of values, beliefs, ideas, common historical bonds, political preferences, and outlooks on how societies should be run. The language and cultural gap is an additional hurdle that does not make it easier for decision-makers to clearly articulate and convey their views.

The pattern of subordinating Sino-European ties to other, more vital, geostrategic considerations was already established during the Cold War. Europe broadly followed what the US wanted, in spite of its divergence from Washington's trade embargo on China in the 1950s (Yahuda, 2008) and Europeans' ongoing efforts to strike commercial deals with China that sometimes hurt American interests. The fact that Britain and the Scandinavian countries recognized the PRC in 1950 was not a deviation from this trend, but rather an attempt to form a pragmatic relationship with Beijing (Brødsgaard and Rowinski, 2001; Yahuda, 2008). The end of the Korean War in 1953, the defeat of French forces in Indo-China in 1954, and the British withdrawal from "east of Suez" in 1971 (except for Hong Kong) all diminished Europe's direct strategic interests in East Asia and almost completely reduced its ability to project military power in the region. Since then, a new period has set in that had not existed since the early 19th century, as direct military confrontation ceased to be an element of Sino-European relations.

In consequence, from the 1960s onwards, governments in Western Europe made their first attempts to engage with the government in Beijing and work towards the normalization of ties. De Gaulle and Edgar Faure succeeded in establishing full diplomatic relations between Paris and Beijing in 1964 (Kapur, 1990). West Germany sought to sign a trade agreement in the same year and potentially even establish diplomatic ties, but the latter was met with US opposition (Shambaugh, 1996). Although Bonn had the distinct advantage of not having diplomatic ties with Taiwan, it failed in its endeavor to secure the trade agreement (Kapur, 1990). Britain stepped up its efforts to secure a manageable relationship with Beijing. These were the trickiest interactions, given Britain's presence in Hong Kong and its need to have open contacts with Beijing. Although London was keen to expand its trade with China, it feared for the stability of Hong Kong, especially after the 1967 riots and the ransacking of its representation in Beijing (Carroll, 2007; Tsang, 2004; Welsh, 1997).

The admittance of the PRC to the United Nations in 1971 and China's opening to the West after 1972 signaled the end of the era in which Beijing's foreign policy was conducted in the spirit of revolutionary Maoism and a self-imposed reluctance to be an active participant in world politics (see Liu, 2001; Ma, 2004), which had achieved remarkably little (Gelber, 2007). While Mao Zedong's opening toward the US and Western Europe occurred within the context of the heightened tensions of the Sino-Soviet split (Lüthi, 2008),

Beijing's animosity and distrust of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was not a retreat from the Cold War mindset, but almost an affirmation of it. Its engagement with the West was aimed at weakening the Soviet Union and its influence, as well as to enable China's return to the status of a great power (Segal, 1986), a point that Li Wang emphasizes in his chapter on the changing Chinese perceptions of Europe.

Throughout the 1970s, but especially since Mao's death in 1976 and the advent in 1978 of Deng Xiaoping's policy of incremental reform (Fewsmith, 2008), the relations between China and Europe have grown both in scope and intensity. Trade and economic exchange became the core of this relationship. China needed technology and access to capital, and Europe, caught in the economic doldrums of 1970s stagflation, was keen to expand into a new market. Relations between China and the European Communities were established in 1975 and have expanded ever since. As is revealed throughout this book, numerous dialogues, summits, and encounters between decision-makers and parliamentarians have been set up that manifest the growing density of contacts. Yet the optimism that followed China's economic reforms after 1979 was severely dampened by the regime's crackdown on student protestors on Tiananmen Square in June 1989. As Xinning Song points out in his chapter, it was not until the mid-1990s that a sense of normalcy returned to Sino-European relations.

The most significant critical juncture in the relations between Europe and China came about in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as China's phenomenal economic growth and transformation began to fundamentally reshape the loci of power in the world (see Gittings, 2006). China emerged as a major pillar for growth and prosperity in Europe. Europe needs China as an export market for its goods and services and as a purveyor of inexpensive consumer goods. China, in turn, needs Europe as a provider of investment, as a high-value export market, and as a source of advanced technology. Even China's membership in the World Trade Organization in 2002 did not dispel lingering concerns in Europe over the protection of intellectual property rights, the safety of "made in China" products, and issues of unfair competition due to state subsidies and an undervalued Renminbi. Yet, on the whole, trade between Europe and China has become too beneficial for both parts to let these issues get in the way of what is an otherwise a friendly and lucrative relationship. This largely complementary symbiosis, coupled with a complete absence of competing strategic and military interests or territorial claims,

is what turned a page in their mutual relationship. China is often at odds with the US, Japan, Russia, or India over issues which directly affect its role and ambitions in Asia. China's relations with Europe, by contrast, are surprisingly smooth. Throughout the 2000s, a flurry of diplomatic activity led to the signing of numerous accords between European governments and the EU on the one hand and Beijing on the other that cover almost every policy field. Regular summits were established and bilateral and multilateral dialogues on human rights were created. China's growing openness, prosperity, and influence have begun to attract European media attention and have led to a higher rate of migration of Europeans to China and of Chinese to Europe. Yet the quantitative increase in encounters and interactions has so far not made both sides less "distant" and less "secondary" to each other.

This leads to the third underlying dynamic of this relationship: a pervasive gap in understanding, misperceptions, and outright wishful thinking. The "rise" of China has struck a chord in Europe. Political and economic decision-makers, as well as the public, oscillate between admiration of China's achievements (which is frequently coupled with criticism of their own slow decision-making procedures) and fear of China's competitive edge, its growing influence, and its authoritarian ways. Europeans know that the "Chinese world is already here" (Araújo and Cardenal, 2011), but worry about what this will mean for them. Europeans wish that China's liberalization will translate into political openness and predictability, but fear that Beijing's power may expedite the advent of a "post-liberal" order based on state capitalism, authoritarian government, and conformism.

The diverging historical trajectories of Europe and China amplify the discrepancies of how both sides view each other. For many Chinese, the 19th century was a shameful period of humiliation at the hands of the European imperial powers. China's newfound strength and influence therefore generate legitimate support among the Chinese public, but paradoxically also fuel fears in Europe and elsewhere of China becoming a revisionist, nationalist, and ultimately hostile rival.

Despite these fears, there is little evidence to suggest that China is openly revisionist. As Breslin (2009: 818, 822) argues, China has made the most "headway" "through working within existing frameworks and norms" and by constructing an image of itself as a "responsible great power" . . . that does not threaten the interests of others, does not challenge the existing global order, and provides an opportunity for continued regional (and

indeed global) economic prosperity.” Whether this is credible or not, given Beijing’s recent aggressive posturing with Japan, its hard-line stance on the South China Sea and its continuing failure to condemn North Korean aggression, among other examples, remains to be seen. Over the last two decades, China has come to accommodate itself with the dominance of the US (Jia, 2005), although this may be changing. Beijing has concentrated its policy efforts almost exclusively on domestic economic development. In its quest for preservation of the regime and of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese leadership recognized that “tangible and continued economic prosperity has become the avenue to reaching that goal” (Wang, 2005). Despite all the hype about China’s growing influence, Pei (2009: 35) believes that the rise of Asia is far from certain and that China’s domination of Asia is “not likely,” given the enormity of its domestic challenges. Knowing about the fragility of its own domestic political and economic structures (Shirk, 2008), as well as about the fears of China throughout Asia (see He, 2007), “Beijing appears to be betting its future on its efforts within the current international political and economic system” (Wang, 2005: 672). Indeed, China has gone on a “charm offensive” (Kurlantzick, 2007) particularly in Asia, but also in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere, to assuage fears about its motives and expand its influence through persuasion, trade, and “soft power.” In Europe, this has yet to yield positive results, as public opinion on China continues to become more negative.

If doubt can be cast on China’s willingness to challenge the status quo, then this might also mean that established preconceptions that China’s rise will follow previous patterns of great power transition might not hold true. As Deng (2008: 6) argues, “[g]iven the scale of and the speed of [China’s] rise, conventional wisdom would have us expect a hostile balance of power characterizing China’s international relations.” But this setting is generally absent and Beijing is determined to prevent any emergence of an anti-China international coalition. Seen against this background, it is not surprising that China is often pragmatic, accommodating, and cooperative in its affairs with Europe—as was recently displayed by China not vetoing the no-fly zone over Libya—even when it might not be fully satisfied with all aspects of the current international order. Also, it is unsurprising that Europe is engaging with China rather than trying to inhibit its growth, even when Europeans harbor residual fears about Beijing’s ultimate motives. Europe stands to gain much more from a confident and economically developed China than from a poor and isolated one.

For Europe, China's rise presents both a significant economic and diplomatic challenge. European policy-makers' own experience with international cooperation, institutionalization, and multilateral negotiations (especially within the EU) convinced them of the benefits of a supranational and consensual approach to international politics. Engagement with China is not only the only realistic and viable alternative for Europe, but is also regarded as the most preferable one. Europe is not interested in conflict with China and it does not possess the means—military, diplomatic, or economic—to conduct anything other than a policy of engagement with Beijing. In the wake of the 2008–09 global financial crisis, European leaders have slowly come to recognize that they need China more than China needs them.

Europe's intensifying contacts with China are accompanied by ambiguity and uncertainty about what China's rise will mean for Europe and its prosperity. There is genuine fear among Europeans that China's rapid economic development will benefit them in the short run and hurt them in the long run, as China becomes less of a customer for European products and services and more of a competitor. There is also fear that China challenges the normative premises on which the European "method" of integration is founded: democratic governance, the rule of law, institutionalized cooperation, and "effective multilateralism". There is anxiety that Europe's cumbersome but democratic decision-making processes are too slow and inefficient to respond to China's ability to embark on rapid social, economic, and technological development. In short, there is a perception in Europe that China's rise is tantamount to Europe's relative decline (see Jacques, 2009).

For Europeans, these perceptions about China are not without consequence. As Katzenstein and Checkel (2009) suggest, Europe is, like China, a "civilizational polity," but one that made a successful transition from a "would-be to an actual polity." While European states are growing together in ever more complex webs of interdependence, Europe lacks "internal characteristics that can generate a strong sense of collective self." Rather, "one source of its identity lies in its relations with other international actors" (Katzenstein and Checkel, 2009: 224). It is in this sense that China is emerging as one of Europe's new "others." The rise of China makes Europeans increasingly reflect on their own future and the sets of values, norms, and principles Europe should stand for. As such, China's rise could indeed become a catalyst of European integration.

## The new complexities

In 1967, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber published the bestseller *Le défi américain* (*The American Challenge*). His political treatise coined—perhaps more than other works—the European response to America’s geopolitical, economic, and political challenge. It set out to make the case for Europe’s continuing political, economic, and monetary integration as a way to safeguard Europe’s prosperity vis-à-vis the relative decline brought about by American hegemony, military prowess, and economic vibrancy.

Today, over 40 years later, Europe is again confronting a new and rapidly growing competitor: China. Yet a new articulation of a European response to this challenge, along the lines of Servan-Schreiber’s book, has not come about. The remarkable rise of China has expedited the transformation of the international order and the global economy. Although export-oriented European economies benefit handsomely from China’s economic growth, China’s rise is also coming at the expense of Europe’s relative decline. In 2009, China became the world’s leading exporter, ahead of Germany. Since the early 2000s, China overtook first France, then Britain, and later Germany in economic size and has now dislodged Japan as the world’s second largest economy. China is now a more prominent and powerful player on the global diplomatic stage, which defends its interests vigorously even in the face of European opposition and concern. In addition, China’s presence is now increasingly felt in regions that Europe once considered to be its own “backyard,” notably Africa.

The global financial crisis of 2008–09, with its grave consequences for Europe’s long-term economic health, further widened the gap between Europe and China. Europe’s priorities of attending to fiscal austerity, debt reduction, welfare reform, and cuts in defense spending stand in stark contrast to the frothy growth and rapid socio-economic transformation that characterizes contemporary China.

Yet while the rise of China is attracting attention everywhere around the world, Europe is finding it surprisingly difficult to map out how to come to terms with Beijing’s political and economic strength. Whereas American scholarship is awash with books on China’s increasing clout, “Europe’s response has been low-key, fragmented, and incoherent” (Jacques, 2009: 344). Given the extent to which the eastward shift in global political and economic influence is bound to affect Europe in the future, it is astonishing



to see how little time, effort, and political capital European decision-makers invest in policy towards China. This may be an outcome of the fact that by and large European businesses tend to do well out of their trade with China. It may also be a consequence of Europe's lack of strategic perceptiveness and insight, as well as its preoccupation with the transatlantic alliance, Russia, and its immediate North African and Middle Eastern neighborhood. It is also a sign of "navel-gazing"—an inward-oriented policy mindset that is pervasive in Brussels and European capitals.

One major achievement has been that EU member states, including Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, have woken up to the realization that they are hardly in a position to conduct a viable China policy on their own. This has strengthened the role of the EU, through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in the management of affairs with Beijing. National delegations still head to Beijing for state visits and trade deals, but much of the active development of policies regarding China is now being conducted in Brussels in close coordination with British, French, and German interests. So while Europe has found new mechanisms for the conduct of its China policy, it has yet to fill these with life. The biggest challenge is now to define what European interests in China are and how these should be pursued.

The changing nature of the European actors involved in policies towards China is in and of itself reflective of a broader transformation in international affairs. In Sino-European affairs, the range and depth of the issues of common concern have rapidly increased. The nature of contacts has changed, moving away from bilateral encounters to more multilateral ones. But the forces of globalization have also hollowed out the assumption of much of international relations theory that foreign policy is conducted solely by states that act as unitary actors. All the contributions in this volume clearly attempt to move beyond this assumption.

Europe is not one bloc and neither is China. "Europe" is a complex amalgam of interplaying levels of decision-making: the EU and its manifold institutional configurations, the different member states, economic and other lobby groups, parliamentary coalitions, civil society groups, NGOs, and public opinion. The same is true for China. "China" is not only composed of the Beijing government, but is fragmented among the many factions inside it. As Jakobson and Knox (2010) have shown, numerous new actors have emerged in Chinese foreign policy. Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan play unique roles in the conduct of Chinese external relations. So-called "netizens" and more

vocal media outlets have emerged as important catalysts of Chinese foreign policy behavior. The present volume attempts to usher this pluralism of actors and multiplicity of interests closer to the center of the analysis of Sino-European relations.

### **The highlights of the book**

This book adds to the growing range of scholarship on Sino-European relations (Casarini 2009; Friedrich, 2000; Heberer, 2002; Kerr and Liu, 2007; Shambaugh, Sandschneider, and Hong, 2008; Wiessala, Wilson, and Taneja, 2009). Some of this literature is geared towards exploring individual dimensions of this relationship, such as Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summits (Yeo 2003; Gaens, 2008), security and defense matters (van der Putten and Chu, 2010; also Umbach, 2002), issues pertaining to trade and investment (Shan, 2005), as well as more novel comparative approaches like the one comparing the demands for autonomy by cultural minorities in both Spain and China (Yeoh, 2009). Some of this literature has come of age (Dent, 1999; Shaw, 1986), while other, more historically oriented works (Kapur, 1990) continue to resonate with contemporary developments. The impact of the 2008–09 global financial crisis has made it even more pressing to direct renewed scholarly attention at making sense of the shifts in the development of Sino-European relations. The crisis has greatly augmented Beijing's influence and visibility on the global economic and political stage and has arguably also emboldened China to pursue its interests in a more assertive manner.

This volume is designed to tackle the new issues and dimensions in Sino-European affairs that have not received adequate scholarly attention. It is composed of two parts: Part I deals with Sino-European relations as such, while Part II focuses on novel individual issues and concerns that have recently emerged as major discussion points in the relationship.

In chapter 1, Xinning Song concentrates on the prospects for partnership and friction in Sino-European relations. His research casts doubt on Europe's stated intention to develop a "strategic partnership" with Beijing. Arguing that a strategic partnership requires some form of common strategic interests, Song is doubtful that Europe shares any common strategic interests with China, thereby rendering the whole ambition of a "strategic partnership" largely devoid of meaning. According to Song, the absence of a strategic partnership between Europe and China does not automatically have to

lead to conflict. But it will mean that an upgrading of Sino-European relations will prove more difficult and tedious than is envisaged by EU foreign affairs officials, and he illustrates this by looking at the difficult discussions about lifting Europe's arms embargo on China. It is thus not unreasonable to assume that Sino-European affairs will—despite the rhetoric and for the foreseeable future—continue to be “secondary.”

Following on from this, Chengxin Pan elucidates in chapter 2 the disparity between European self-understanding as a “normative power” and the demands of *Realpolitik* with Beijing. Pan elucidates the discursive construction of the EU as a normatively progressive actor which upholds human rights, democracy, and the rule of law and how this is crucial to its definition of its Self. This form of constructed identity is tested, however, in the EU's contact with Beijing. Pan casts serious doubt about the “open-ended” and “experimental” nature of the EU's self-understanding as a normative power. He cautions about the unintended consequences of this form of Self/Other construction, warning that the EU could be drawn into conflicts and responsibilities with China that it did not wish for and that it cannot shoulder.

Roland Vogt argues in chapter 3 that domestic developments in Europe are imperative to understanding the constraints and limitations European decision-makers face in formulating policies towards China. He argues that a broader trend in Europe towards “post-materialist” issue and identity politics is slowly eroding the autonomy decision-makers have traditionally enjoyed on foreign policy. The key argument is that the politicization of foreign policy in Europe is making it increasingly hard for European decision-makers to exercise leadership for building a Sino-European partnership. Vogt also illustrates the impact public opinion—and the largely negative public perceptions of China in Europe—has on European decision-makers to pay attention to the state of relations with China. He suggests that European leaders have few incentives to invest their political and personal leadership capital into relations with China, thereby exacerbating a crisis of indecision and lack of leadership that characterizes Europe's difficulties in coming to terms with a more assertive China.

By contrast, Li Wang examines the changing perceptions of Europe in China in chapter 4. He argues that Europe had a very significant impact on China from the 19th century onwards. By taking a historical perspective, Wang sheds light on what he calls “a gap in terms of perceptions and cognition” in Sino-European relations. Frequent misperceptions and

misunderstandings of each other are rooted not only in diverging historical experiences, but also in the inability of decision-makers on both sides to understand the domestic contexts in which they operate.

Reuben Wong sheds light on the role of the US in the conduct of Sino-European relations in chapter 5. Wong suggests that Europe's policy choices are severely constrained by US preferences and interests in Asia. In fact, Sino-European relations continue to be "derivative" of China's and Europe's relations with the US. Despite the fact that European and American interests in China do not necessarily overlap, Europe needs to balance its preferred policies by taking US preferences into consideration. Wong analyzes a range of "lenses" which inform US and European thinking on China and which indicate the potential reasons for the discrepancies of assessments and China policies on both sides of the Atlantic.

Part II deals with the new dimensions and contested issues in Sino-European relations. It examines a broad range of subjects that are indicative of the extent to which Sino-European relations are no longer dominated by trade, but are increasingly dealing also with human rights and religious freedom, energy, and environmental protection, among others.

Ting Wai assesses in chapter 6 the impact of Europe's advocacy of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law on China. Discrepancies over human rights have long been a thorn in Sino-European relations. While claiming that Europe's efforts have had only very limited effects on the actual human rights situation inside China, its pressure is nonetheless important for the subsequent development of sensitivity for the protection of human rights and the legal mechanisms to achieve them. In this sense, Ting reckons that the EU should ultimately engage itself further in the development of civil society in China, by training legal practitioners and focusing on grassroots level organizations. The quest for the EU is not to alienate, placate, or shame China, but to bind it into international institutions and common norms on human rights, thereby exerting pressure on Beijing to change its ways and using incentives to foster progress in the protection of human rights.

In chapter 7, Linda Jakobson and Jacob Wood examine China's increasingly active engagement in Africa. Over the last decade, China has become a major global player in Africa. Africa not only provides essential resources to support China's rapid economic growth and energy needs, but it also is becoming an important diplomatically in China's ambition to play a more prominent international role. The EU, the former European colonial powers

in Africa, and the major European donors of development assistance see China's influence with mixed feelings. They generally welcome increasing trade with Africa and diminishing poverty levels in some African states, but are wary of China's influence on the domestic politics of African regimes. The fear is that the "good governance" and human rights agendas which Europe has pursued for the last 15 years are eroding due to Chinese influence. Jakobson and Wood explore the triangular relations between China, Africa, and EU and see the need for further coordination and cooperation between Europe and China on African affairs.

Turning away from the normative-ideational aspects of Sino-European relations, Richard Balme and Steve Wood shed light on two other important new elements of the relationship: climate change and energy, respectively. Over the last few years, both issues have increasingly become decisive factors in Chinese and European foreign policy-making. Balme's research in chapter 8 explores the negotiations for a new international agreement on global climate change, and China's and Europe's contributions to these negotiations. The current global climate change negotiations are geared toward finding a new framework agreement on greenhouse gas emissions that will replace the Kyoto protocol. For the EU, success in these negotiations underpins its self-understanding as a leader in both "effective multilateralism" and environmental protection. For China, global climate change poses a serious challenge to the country's mode of economic development. Balme reveals the extent to which Europe and China seem able—despite coming from very different backgrounds—to accommodate their interests and engage in cooperative management of global risks.

Wood examines in chapter 9 how Europe and Taiwan are responding to their need to secure safe and environmentally sound access to energy. Taiwan and numerous European states have declared their intention to become "non-nuclear" states and have adopted discursive positions which have made a return to nuclear power increasingly hard. Yet, as Wood's comparative assessment reveals, both Taiwan and Europe are confronted not only with growing demand for energy but also increasing competition for the same energy sources. Energy, which has served as a driver of European integration, has now become a main element in the EU's conduct of external relations. Its relationship with Russia, the Middle East, Central Asia, and increasingly Africa is influenced by energy considerations. The EU dilemma is that it needs energy from undemocratic states to whose mode of governance it is

normatively opposed. Taiwan, in turn, is highly dependent on energy imports and is facing increasingly stiff Chinese competition for energy resources. Its dilemma is between securing stable energy sources (by going back to nuclear energy) or giving up its popular policy of phasing out nuclear energy.

The last part of the volume turns its attention to a complex bilateral relationship, which attracts too little scholarly attention. In chapter 10, Beatrice Leung examines the complexity of Sino-Vatican relations and the special role of Hong Kong and Macau for the Vatican's access to China. The Vatican is the only European nation-state that does not have diplomatic relations with Beijing. Leung's chapter skillfully shows how a docile Macanese church is played off by Beijing against a more assertive church in Hong Kong. Her analysis not only illustrates the important role of individual leaders in the conduct of Sino-Vatican relations, as well as in the internal dynamics between the Beijing, Hong Kong, and Macau triangle; it also indicates the degree to which historical legacies and identities frame the Hong Kong church's position vis-à-vis Beijing.

# Notes

## Chapter 1

1. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the policy paper on EU in 2003 was the guideline for the next five years, i.e. up to 2008 (MFA, 2003).
2. Some Chinese academics argued accordingly that if there is no fundamental strategic conflict it will be very difficult to define the common strategic interest.

## Chapter 2

1. For their helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter, I wish to thank Roland Vogt, Song Xinning, Reuben Wong, David Fouquet, Frans-Paul van der Putten, Steve Wood, Kam Louie, Jean-Pierre Cabestan, and the two anonymous reviewers.
2. As Diez (2005: 623) notes, a “large part of the discussion about the EU as a civilian and normative power has focused on whether or not those terms adequately describe the EU’s international behavior.” See also Wood (2009a), Giegerich and Wallace (2004), Manners (2002), and Maull (1990).
3. This list was compiled by Shambaugh et al. (2008: 308–309) based on direct quotations from *EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities* (European Commission, 2006).
4. For example, Shambaugh (2008: 140) notes that Chinese analysts have a strong propensity to project their own ambitions and preferences onto Europe and European actions. See also Cabestan (2007: 133).

## Chapter 5

1. The Scandinavian countries, Albania, and France were important exceptions that did not toe the line of either Washington or Moscow regarding the diplomatic recognition (or isolation) of the PRC.
2. The impact of Germany’s Asian concept paper on Paris, London, and Brussels was confirmed in interviews the author conducted with the Office for the French EU presidency in the Quai d’Orsay (September 2000) and Cabinet of the Minister of Defence (March 2001). The latter expressed that the “Asian policy” put forth in the German, French, British (Conservative Party), and Commission papers in 1993–94 “was essentially about China” (see Wong, 2006: 29).

3. Chinese officials feel that the Bush administration “took 15 months to establish its China policy, while the Obama administration only took 15 days.” Interview with Chinese diplomat, Washington DC, June 2, 2009.
4. Cabestan (2008) expresses more reservations about Europeans’ ability to stay out of any cross-Straits conflict, given the close French involvement in modernizing Taiwan’s air force in 1989–93.

## Chapter 6

1. The Zangger Group is composed of member-states that possess nuclear technology. Member-states have to abide by the regulations of the Zangger Group if they wish to export the nuclear technology.
2. The seven pilot provinces are Yunnan, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Shandong, Liaoning, Henan, and Jiangxi.
3. Xu was released in late August 2009, apparently under pressure from President Obama who plans to visit China in autumn 2009.
4. Liu Xiaobo (1989: 255) more than 20 years ago proposed a “radical” view. Hong Kong spent more than a century to become a modern and civilized society. If Hong Kong as a colony needed to have 100 years, in order to “change the blood” of China, the nation needs to be a colony of the West for 300 years. This is of course a very sensational way of expressing his ideas, but it clearly demonstrates Liu’s thought that China needs to reform by eliminating many of its “bad elements” while at the same time learning from the West.

## Chapter 7

1. Chinese peacekeepers in Africa include medical personnel, engineers, police, and experts. They are distributed across six missions: MINURSO, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMIL, UNMIS, and UNOCI (United Nations, 2010).
2. South Africa is the one nation among the top five that is not a major oil exporter (Sandrey, 2006).
3. On December 27, 2007, Malawi established diplomatic ties with the PRC, reducing to four the number of African countries maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan: Burkina Faso, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland. In addition, the Taiwan government operates four quasi-official liaison missions in Africa: one in Nigeria (in Abuja) and three in South Africa (in Pretoria, Cape Town, and Johannesburg).
4. The author is grateful to Daojiong Zha (Beijing University) for initially (October 2007) drawing attention to a rough breakdown of Chinese actors in Africa into four groups. The elaboration that follows, expanding the breakdown into five categories, is based on research interviews conducted with officials and researchers working on China-Africa issues in Beijing in 2007.
5. Author’s research interviews with officials working on African issues in Beijing during 2007. On September 21, 2009, an article in the *New York Times* entitled “China Spreads Aid in Africa, With a Catch,” reported on the recent corruption case in Namibia over China’s low interest loan with Namibia which involved



a Chinese state-controlled cargo scanner company run by President Hu's son. According to the article, this case illustrates the "aura of boosterism, secrecy and back-room deals that has clouded China's use of billions of dollars in foreign aid to court the developing world."

6. The author's off-the-record conversations with officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC and Chinese researchers at universities and research institutes in Beijing in October and November 2007.
7. The author's off-the-record research interviews during 2007 and 2008, see note 6.
8. Interview with He Wenping, Beijing, February 26, 2008.

## Chapter 8

1. I wish to thank Yun Yan (School of Humanities, Tsinghua) for her assistance, as well as Bram Buijs (Clingendael) for the detailed and very useful comments and suggestions.
2. The fact was initially announced by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency for 2006, and confirmed with more reliable margins for 2007 (see PBL Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency 2007; 2008).
3. Comprehensive studies of the EU and its member states climate change policy are provided by Harris (2007), see in particular Lacasta et al. (2007), Adelle et al. (2009), and also Bureau (2009).
4. Targets are set for the average of national annual GHG emissions during the five-year period 2008–12 and compared to the 1990 levels of emissions.
5. These data exclude emissions from land use, land use change, and forestation (LULUCF).
6. A 40% cut in GHG emissions compared to 1990 by 2020 by developed countries (previously 25–40% range), a financial contribution of 1% of GDP by developed countries to mitigation and adaptation (previously 0.5–1% range) (Buijs, 2009: 103).
7. Full text available at [http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/t20090521\\_280382.htm](http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/t20090521_280382.htm).
8. A detailed account of policy development and implications at the domestic level is provided by the chapter by Jakobson et al. (2009).
9. This point should be kept in mind in the discussion about carbon emissions included in Chinese exports and on the relevance of a broader tax to control for carbon leakage.
10. This embarrassment is relative, as there is no regime of sanctions beyond public blaming. The US and even the EU accommodated this situation of large polluters for decades without major troubles. Carbon emissions however became another negative factor of China's international image, together with human rights, industrial jobs relocation, export products safety, and increase of military spending, at a time where the Chinese leadership and public opinion were expecting the Beijing Olympics to project a positive image of China to the world.

11. The National Leading Group on Climate Change is headed by Premier Wen Jiabao, with Vice Premier Zeng Peiyao and State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan serving as the deputy directors of the Group.
12. “Deutsch-Chinesische Perspektiven zur Energie- und Klimapolitik—Konferenz zu Erneuerbaren Energien und Energieeffizienz” (German-Chinese Perspectives on Energy and Climate Policy—Conference on Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency), Beijing, January 31, 2008.
13. The project was implemented at three levels: the national level, Designated Operational Entities (DOE), and wider stakeholders’ level. Activities included: CDM Impact Assessment, Policy and Regulatory consulting and stakeholder training, a two-year capacity building program for the National CDM Centre, a 2.5-year training program and capacity building for potential Chinese Designated Operational Entities (DOE), CDM Roadshow with two EU-China CDM Conferences in Beijing and Chengdu and ten capacity-building and awareness-raising seminars in provinces, and EU-China CDM Business Facilitation.

## Chapter 9

1. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office in Canberra, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) in Bonn, all interview partners, Roland Vogt and Wayne B. Cristaudo (both at the University of Hong Kong), and William Wang.
2. Unlike enquiries in the US (e.g. Yergin, 1980).
3. Interview with the author, BoE, Taipei, November 2007.
4. Calculated at the exchange rate: 1 US\$ = 32 NT\$.
5. Interview with the author, Taipower, Taipei, November 2007.
6. Interview with the author, BoE, Taipei, November 2007.
7. Information provided to the author by Taipower, Taipei, November 2007.
8. 1 KL = 6.289 barrels.
9. Information provided to the author by the MoEA, Taipei, November 2007.
10. Information supplied to the author by the BoE, Taipei, November 2007. The crude oil reserve is multiplied by the refining ratio, which was 0.83, and then added to oil product to reach a total sum.
11. Information supplied to the author by the BoE, Taipei, November 2007.
12. Interview with the author, BoE, Taipei, November 2007.
13. Interview with the author, European Representation in Taiwan, Taipei, November 2007.
14. Interview with the author, BoE, Taipei, November 2007.
15. Interview with the author, BoE, Taipei, November 2007.
16. Interview with the author, Atomic Energy Council, Taipei, November 2007.
17. Interview with the author, BoE, Taipei, November 2007.
18. When MOFA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Transport Ministry, MOEA, BoE, Taipower, and others attended the NEC, the AEC was not on the guest list.

19. Interview with the author, Taipower, November 2007.
20. Information confidentially provided to the author.
21. Interview with the author, American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, November 2007.

## Chapter 10

1. Revealed by Fr. Jose Calle S. J., who accompanied Cardinal Sin in the latter's meeting with Zhao Ziyang in November 1987.
2. Private interview, Macau, May 13, 2009.
3. Ye Xiaowen is the head of the Religious Affairs Bureau of the China's Council of the State.
4. Interview with Cardinal Zen, Hong Kong, April 28, 2009. For the papal letter see Libreria Editrice Vaticana (2007).
5. Interview, Sydney, May 2004.
6. The speech was in Chinese and translated into English by the author (see Leung, 2004: 113–136).
7. Interview with Bishop Zen, Hong Kong, July 2004.
8. For the preparation of the Hong Kong Catholic Church to the rule in Hong Kong SAR see Leung and Chan (2003: 107–124).
9. The trip was reported in Macau Diocesan official post (see *Shengqi*, 2007).
10. The author got the report of a couple of priests from mainland, that they were instructed not to go to Hong Kong but to Macau for a short stopover, if they wished on their overseas visits.
11. It was revealed by the director of Macau Ricci Institute, Fr. Louis Sequiera S.J., when he was interviewed in May 1999.
12. Last year the Trappist Sisters had been admitted by the Macau church authority to have their new branch in Macau. The new monastery was set up on June 20, 2009.
13. Macau Inter-University Institute (IIUM) was renamed as St. Joseph's University on December 1, 2009.
14. Reported by an informant in the Hong Kong diocese and confirmed by Cardinal Zen in March 2007.
15. Interview with a senior priest, Macau, September 2007.
16. Interview with the investigator (who did not agree that it would be dangerous to have communists in a Catholic University), Macau, February 2009.
17. For Cardinal Zen's retirement see *Kung Kao Po* (2009a).
18. For John Tong's own speech on his succession to Cardinal Zen see *Kung Kao Po* (2009b). For an interview on Tong's succession to the combative Cardinal Zen see *Kung Kao Po* (2009c).

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