

WATCHING OVER HONG KONG

Private Policing 1841–1941

Sheilah E. Hamilton



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Introduction

It is no exaggeration that the average law-abiding person in Hong Kong encounters private security personnel on a daily basis. For most people these meetings are much more frequent than their interactions with officers of the Hong Kong Police or the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).¹ Except for small or old buildings, most domestic and industrial premises in Hong Kong employ watchmen or guards. On entering these premises, residents and visitors alike are usually monitored by close circuit television (CCTV) surveillance devices. Nor is this use of surveillance restricted to people of a particular class or financial standing. Occupants of low-cost housing schemes in ‘problem’ new towns such as Tin Shui Wai are as likely to be scrutinized as those living in the opulent houses on the Peak. Only the calibre of the security service will be different.

In common with other developed countries around the world, the private security industry in Hong Kong has grown dramatically during the last 40 years, not only in terms of the people employed, which in 2007 was approximately three times the number of public police, but also with respect to the prevalence of electronic devices which are routinely accepted as a part of modern living.² The old metal key has given way to electronic door codes that must be entered before gaining access to the lobby of many residential blocks, and people using lifts need to remember that their every act may be recorded by strategically positioned CCTV cameras. Additionally, many CCTV cameras have been installed above major highways throughout the territory to monitor traffic flow for officers of the Police and Transport Departments. This adds another way that the public, or at least their vehicles, can be observed.³

This does not mean that Hong Kong has become an Orwellian nightmare or that Big Brother monitors every act committed by the average citizen, but there can be no doubt that we are now observed at work, home and leisure in ways that would have been unthinkable a few years ago. Even at airports,



Figure 1.1 CCTV camera on guardhouse of Legislative Council Chambers.

private security personnel scrutinize transparent bags containing passengers' toothpaste and other toiletries before allowing their owners to embark. With so many people involved in the private security business, several questions spring to mind. For instance, what are the necessary qualifications and training for people who can pry into parts of our homes, offices and even the shopping malls where large sections of Hong Kong's people go to unwind? What legal powers do security guards have over members of the public? What, if any, control does the government exert over personnel working in different parts of the security industry and has this control changed over time as living has become more complicated? How do 'sworn' police officers view those who seem to police the public more frequently than the 'proper' police? Because of Hong Kong's colonial past, one final question is: how have the views of early British and Hong Kong Governments influenced the development of the private security industry in Hong Kong? It is this last question that forms the basis of this book.

What Does Private Security/Private Policing Really Mean?

Until thirty years ago, little had been written about private policing or the private security industry. As time passed and relevant material became available, academic researchers considered the subject to be worth more

consideration. However, this increased interest brought an unusual challenge since some authors appeared to find difficulty in defining what was meant by ‘private security’, ‘the private security industry’, ‘private policing’ and other related terms. As the private security industry matured and attracted more attention, these difficulties with terminology seemed to increase. Since it is important to understand these terms at the beginning of the book, some of the key words will be examined. In their recent study entitled ‘Private Security’, George and Button chose the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as the source of their definition of ‘Security’ and this very adequately covers the main alternative meanings.

Security

The condition of being protected from or not being exposed to danger ...
 The condition of being protected from espionage, attack or theft. Also, the condition of being kept in safe custody ... The provision or exercise of measures to ensure such safety ... Freedom from care, anxiety, or apprehension; a feeling of safety or freedom from danger ... Freedom from doubt; confidence, assurance ... The quality of being securely fixed or attached, stability.⁴

When writing about the emerging subject in 1971, Kakalik and Wildhorn held a simple view and argued that:

Private police and private security forces and security personnel are used generically in this report to include all types of organizations and individuals providing all types of security related services, including investigation, guard, patrol, lie detection, alarm, and armoured transportation.⁵

Nearly three decades later in 2000, George and Button differentiated the ‘private security industry’ from ‘private security’ as follows: while the private security industry ‘encompasses all those individuals and organizations that produce and provide “private security” products and services’, private security ‘comprises the products and services themselves’.⁶ Seven years earlier, Trofymowych attempted to divide the private security industry into two sections, ‘manned security’ and ‘security hardware’ with the former being defined as the

provision of personnel who perform policing functions such as guards, patrol persons, floor detectives, investigators, escorts, couriers, alarm respondents, auditors and security consultants.⁷

This description may lead the reader to contemplate the meaning of ‘policing’, particularly when qualified by ‘private’. Even this is not without its problems since it is generally agreed that defining ‘police’ is easier than ‘policing’. According to Reiner, ‘Policing is an aspect of social control processes which occurs universally in all social situations in which there is at least the potential for conflict, deviance, or disorder.’ However, ‘While policing may be universal, the “police” as a specialized body of people given the primary formal responsibility for legitimate force to safeguard security is a feature only of relatively complex societies’.⁸ In most developed societies policing is no longer the province of the public police and, in a growing number of countries, the number of people employed in private policing far exceeds those in public police forces.

This distinction between private and public, often referred to as the public/private dichotomy, has been the subject of intense debate for many years. Fortunately, in the context of this current study, the distinction is more straightforward because, during the period under review, Hong Kong was a British colony with most of the funding supplied by the government or the private sector. There were exceptions and these will be dealt with at the appropriate time.

Possibly one of the clearest modern definitions of ‘Private Police’ appears in a recent book by Sarre and Prenzler who consider it to mean:

those persons who are employed or sponsored by a commercial enterprise on a contract or ‘in-house’ basis, using public or private funds, to engage in tasks (other than vigilante action) where the principal component is a security or regulatory function.⁹

Despite differing views about the most appropriate definitions, there is general agreement that major changes have occurred recently in the realm of policing throughout the world and these have resulted in the greater importance of private policing and increased use of professionals in the private security industry. Some researchers, including Lim and Nalla, when discussing modern private police in Singapore, intentionally used the terms ‘Private Policing’ and ‘Private Security’ interchangeably.¹⁰ In this they have continued the practice of Kakalik and Wildhorn three decades earlier, one that will also be followed in this book. Because the main period covered by this book is 1841–1941, its subject matter relates primarily to the humble watchman and guard rather than the ‘high tech’ aspects of the industry such as CCTV, fingerprint scanners and iris pattern recognition equipment since these advances simply did not exist. Until recently, the private security industry in Hong Kong, like so many aspects of the territory, relied almost entirely on its people. The introduction

to the local market of anything more complicated than a simple locking device only occurred during the last 40 years whilst the first modern commercial cash-in-transit service started in 1960.¹¹

Thus, in the context of this current study, the terms 'Private Policing' and 'Private Security' will be used to describe personnel engaged in any form of security other than (i) sworn police officers, or staff of the other Hong Kong disciplined services such as the Prisons Department, Customs and Excise Department, Immigration Department etc; (ii) personnel employed in the various arms of the British military including the Naval Dockyard Police; (iii) the Royal Hong Kong Regiment (The Volunteers) and (iv) the Triads, who may be regarded as a very effective, albeit illegal, method of private policing

Modern Financial Returns from Private Security

Worldwide the modern private security industry is a multi-billion dollar business encompassing much more than the human element and relying increasingly on sophisticated surveillance devices, armour-plated vehicles and micro-electronic identification instruments for the protection of people, property and premises. To comprehend the size and value of the industry, it is generally agreed that the main international private security companies are Group 4 Securicor (G4S) and Securitas AB with the former employing 470,000 personnel worldwide, 160,000 in Asia including 4,700 in Hong Kong and a workforce of 974 on the Chinese mainland.¹² G4S reported a turnover of £4,353.6m during 2006, an increase of £308m over the previous year. Securitas AB, the other major player with 215,000 employees in more than 30 countries, reported a growth in sales of 6 percent in 2006 compared to the previous year.¹³

In Hong Kong, firms engaged in any aspect of private security must possess a valid licence issued by the Security and Guarding Services Industry Authority (SGSIA) before they can work legally. By March 2007 almost 900 valid licences had been issued; a figure providing a reasonable estimate of the number of firms engaged in one or more areas of the private security industry.¹⁴

Britain's Last Major Colony

Even before its return to China in 1997, the idea of Hong Kong as a 'colony' struck many inhabitants as inappropriate, or even worse. To avoid causing offence, the 'colonial' adjective was removed from prominent Hong Kong Government signs and some books written about Hong Kong became much

more critical of its ‘colonial’ past. However, regardless of whether one disapproves of or (less likely) agrees with the concept of colonization, its existence is a historical fact. Equally indisputable is the fact that colonial powers brought with them certain customs including laws, language and systems of education. Some of these were amended to suit local needs. For instance, the legal system that was introduced in Hong Kong during the 1840s was basically English Law with local Chinese characteristics. However, not all institutions brought to the colonies mirrored those of the colonial power. The police force in Hong Kong is a prime example. The system of paramilitary policing in the 1840s was regarded as being more like that of the Royal Irish Constabulary than the system found in the local municipal police forces in British cities although the importance of the Irish influence has since been disputed.¹⁵

So, where did Hong Kong fit when it came to regulation of the private security industry? Did it follow Britain’s example where, until the present millennium, regulation was so limited that anyone with a criminal record could open a security company with impunity?¹⁶ Or did the proliferation of ordinances and regulations introduced into Hong Kong throughout its development intrude into the guarding business in Britain’s last major colony?¹⁷

This book will trace the development of private security in Hong Kong during the former British colony’s first hundred years from 1841, when the British acquired the island of Hong Kong from the Chinese, until 1941, when the Japanese occupied the territory. It will examine the interaction between the Hong Kong Government and the various types of early local private policing, some of which were unique to Hong Kong. It will illustrate the close and sometimes uncomfortable association between the colonial powers in Hong Kong and the various groups of private security personnel who operated throughout the first century of Hong Kong’s existence. It will examine the genesis of these organizations and the complex ways in which the Hong Kong Government permitted these private security personnel to control the non-European population at the least possible cost to the Exchequer. We will see that, far from the non-interventionist approach in Great Britain, Hong Kong’s watchmen and guards were strictly controlled and the first Watchmen Ordinance of 1928 existed until 1950 only to be replaced six years later by the Watchmen Ordinance of 1956 which, in turn, remained in force until 1995 when it was superseded by the more modern Security and Guarding Services Ordinance.

Previous Literature concerning Hong Kong's Security

Public Security in Hong Kong

Until the early 1980s, very little had been published about any kind of security in Hong Kong, public or private. A few police officers wrote accounts of their time in the Hong Kong Police Force but these tended to be anecdotal or highly specialized. Thus, whilst Andrew's experiences as a *Hong Kong Detective* between the two World Wars make interesting reading, it is a highly personal view of police work portraying a rather romanticized version of life in the force from 1913 to 1938. Mr. Andrew's more recent claim to fame is his remarkable longevity, having survived to the great age of 106.¹⁸ He also appears in this study because of his duties in charge of the District Watch Force in the late 1920s and mid-1930s. At the other end of the spectrum is Morgan's description of the *Triad Societies in Hong Kong*, regarded as a classic in its field and still available nearly 50 years after its publication in 1960. Between 1933 and 1935, the *South China Morning Post* published a long-running series written by Jarrett entitled 'Old Hong Kong' and this included several articles dealing with the police and piracies. Years later Luff produced some intriguing articles about the early days of the Hong Kong Police as part of a series called 'This Hong Kong' which appeared in the *China Mail* between 1958 and 1959.

However, it was not until 1982 that *The Royal Hong Kong Police (1841–1945)* by Criswell and Watson was published. The inclusion in the title of the regal prefix is difficult to understand since Queen Elizabeth II did not confer the 'Royal' designation until 1969 in recognition of the work done by police officers during the riots of 1967. Regardless of the anticipatory nature of its title, the book was the first published definitive study of the development of the police force in Hong Kong and received an enthusiastic endorsement from Roy Henry, the commissioner of police. The year 1983 saw the publication of *Asia's Finest*, written by journalist and long-time Hong Kong resident Kevin Sinclair. Despite its considerable and well-deserved popularity, it cannot be regarded as a serious academic study of the force. Moreover, this was never the intention. Sinclair described it as 'An illustrated account of the Royal Hong Kong Police' and made no claim that it was anything more formal. The popularity of the original book, together with the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, set the scene for the sequel, *Asia's Finest Marches On*, by Sinclair and Ng. Ward's *Sui Geng: The Hong Kong Marine Police 1841–1950* appeared in 1991 and, like its land-based relative, received a glowing official endorsement.

In recent years, specialized areas of policing in Hong Kong have been addressed in different ways. Some have been papers such as *The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947* by Miners at a 1988 conference on ‘Policing the Empire’ whilst others were dissertations in postgraduate courses by locally-based students in the fields of Criminology, Public Order, Security Management and Law.¹⁹ Research projects also formed a major part of the middle and higher management training schemes organized by the (then) Royal Hong Kong Police for its officers and dealt with matters of contemporary concern to police chiefs of staff. However, unlike theses and dissertations for higher degrees, these internal reports are not available for outside scrutiny.

Private Policing in Hong Kong

The question ‘What books have been written about private policing or private security in Hong Kong?’ can be answered in one word: None. However, it would be wrong to imply that all aspects of private security in Hong Kong have been neglected. Additionally, the extent of this coverage depends on the definition of ‘private security’. The following comments relate only to books and other publications in English. Some works listed have referred to material in Chinese sources but these have been few and relate mainly to the Nam Pak Hong and the Po Leung Kuk.²⁰

It can be argued that the district watchmen formed one of the earliest organized groups of private security personnel in Hong Kong. In the early 1970s, Lethbridge wrote about the District Watch Committee for the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (HKBRAS)²¹ and this was included in his book *Hong Kong: Stability and Change*. Although describing the district watchmen and their duties, the main thrust was the political significance of the District Watch Committee rather than a commentary on the watchmen. Lethbridge also mentioned the private detectives employed by the Tung Wah Hospital and the Po Leung Kuk, some of whom were district watchmen and were noted by Sinn in her book *Power and Charity: The Early History of the Tung Wah Hospital*.²² District watchmen also figure in the main reference books about Hong Kong by Munn, Carroll, Tsang, Eitel, Norton-Kyshe, Sayer, Endacott and Miners but the watchmen make little more than a brief appearance in these works. In 1979 Hayes contributed a short article to the HKBRAS about the background of the Nam Pak Hong merchants in early Hong Kong and the formation of their security force was mentioned briefly. Many of the standard historical texts about Hong Kong refer to D’Aguilar’s comically nicknamed ‘Bamboo Ordinance’ but this legislation seems to have been included because of the odd behaviour of Major-General D’Aguilar

rather than the watchmen themselves. None of these authors placed the different groups of private security personnel in the context of the colony's need for a comprehensive security system comprising both the public and private aspects. Finally, the growing and changing use of its own security people within different departments of the Hong Kong Government has, to the author's knowledge, never been explored.

Since the introduction of the Security and Guarding Services Bill (No. 97 of 1994), two Hong Kong Police officers studying Security Management chose private security as topics for their dissertations.²³ Additionally, some projects undertaken by police officers as part of the force's management courses have dealt with private security matters.²⁴

Other Literature about Private Policing and Private Security

Unlike the situation in Hong Kong, the attention of several British academics has been drawn to the topics of 'private security' and 'private policing' during the recent past. The early contribution of Draper in 1978 should not be overlooked and this most readable of books emphasized the dearth of previous interest in the subject as well as stimulating the reader to know more. South's book *Policing for Profit: The Private Security Sector* examined the subject from a criminologist's perspective and remains one of the important early works. Another important book is Johnston's *The Rebirth of Private Policing* which examined the interaction between the public and private forms of policing and also identified the 'in between' category that he named 'hybrid policing'.²⁵ This book, together with his later contribution, 'Policing diversity: the impact of the public-private complex in policing', are landmark works for those interested in the subject. Although much of Johnston's findings are specific to modern Britain, these issues are also worth considering in relation to private security in Hong Kong during its formative years. During the 1990s, new scholarly works by criminologists appeared with amazing rapidity and are too numerous to mention here. However, no review would be complete without the inclusion of *Private Security and Public Policing* (1998) by Jones and Newburn, 'the first empirical study of its kind to examine the growth of "private" policing and its relationship with, and implications for, the public police service'.²⁶ These authors stressed the problems inherent in writing about private security in the UK because of the difficulties in defining the terms 'public' and 'private' in the context of policing and endorsed the position taken by Johnston with respect to the importance of 'hybrid policing' in the modern setting. Two new books have already become household names

to those interested in private security issues. *Private Security*, by long-time campaigner Bruce George, MP and Mark Button, appeared in 2000 whilst a companion volume, *Private Policing*, by Button was published two years later. Both works have added substantially to an understanding of the subject.

A sizable body of literature dealing with the private security industry in the United States and Canada appeared during the last 40 years starting with the government-sponsored Rand Report.²⁷ The extent of this national coverage is not surprising given the prevalence of private policing in America since the days of Wells Fargo's stage coaches,²⁸ its importance during the Civil War and the part played by private security companies in strike breaking.²⁹ Nemeth's classic, *Private Security and the Law*, is now in its third edition and a useful addition is Pastor's *The Privatization of Police in America* based on his PhD thesis that he defended the day before the terrorist attacks in September 2001. However, for the purposes of this current study, the most relevant authors are Canadians Shearing and Stenning, particularly their early paper 'Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications', their collection of contributions by major international authors in *Private Policing* and Shearing's paper 'The relation between public and private policing'.³⁰

Given the political sensitivity of the subject, it comes as no surprise that almost nothing has been published internationally about private security on the Chinese mainland. However, an important paper by Professor Guo Taishing of the Department of Public Order and Crime Prevention, Security University, PRC appeared in 1999 entitled 'Private Security in China: A Note on Recent Developments'.³¹ Elsewhere in Asia, Kuo considered the work attitudes of private guards in the southern part of Taiwan and Lee examined the 'Historical Development of Private Policing in Korea during the Pre-Modern Era'.³² Recently Yoshida and Leishman addressed the importance of private and 'plural' policing in Japan in Jones and Newburn's *Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective* whilst a modern perception of Singapore's private security personnel was described by Nalla and Lim.³³ The growing importance of private policing in Australia has been studied by academics Sarre and Prenzler and their prolific work has added a new and much-needed dimension to the subject.

The long history of watchmen providing important security for villages and towns in mediaeval England is an almost obligatory part of any book about private policing in Britain and the Americas as are the reasons for the introduction of the 1829 Metropolitan Police Bill. However, although of general interest, these will not be repeated here since the topics have been dealt with comprehensively elsewhere.³⁴

Format

In this introduction we have seen that, in common with other modern societies, private security occupies an important part in the lives of most people living and working in Hong Kong. Private policing impinges on all but a few, even though the average resident is unaware of the extent of its control. Based on the large number of personnel involved in the industry, it is an area that should not be ignored. Different authors have been attracted to various aspects of private security for their own reasons. Sometimes it was central to their studies whilst on other occasions it was merely peripheral.

This current work will map the first hundred years' development of the human side of private policing in Hong Kong — the watchman, guard and gatekeeper — with particular reference to the influence exerted by different arms of the Hong Kong Government in the running of such operations. Since most of the material will be dealt with chronologically, Chapter 2 begins by examining the precarious state of security, both public and private, that existed in Hong Kong during the early 1840s and persisted until the mid-1860s. Chapter 3 investigates the District Watch Force and shows how the Hong Kong Government was an omnipresent power in this supposedly private security organization. In Chapter 4 the three other local bodies employing security personnel are considered. Once again it will become apparent that, with the exception of the Nam Pak Hong, the Hong Kong Government was able to maintain control of the security personnel in these private organizations. Chapter 5 looks at the place of non-constabulary security staff within the Hong Kong Civil Service and shows how, in departments that would not normally be regarded as requiring internal security, considerable power was given to menial staff over members of the public simply by the Hong Kong Government passing the necessary legislation. Here it is suggested that this is one of the earliest examples of what, in modern parlance, is known as 'hybrid policing'. This chapter also draws attention to the multi-national make-up of the security 'forces' within different government departments. The question of anti-piracy guards and watchmen is investigated in Chapter 6, particularly the important part played by the Hong Kong Police in providing registered watchmen, first for ships and then for shore duties. It will be clear from the statistics that, for many years, officers of the Hong Kong Police were actively involved in operating a commercial security undertaking of considerable size. This part of the study concludes by examining the stated reasons for introducing the first Watchmen Ordinance and its ramifications, particularly with respect to the control exerted by the Hong Kong Government over the majority of the colony's Indian community. Chapter 7 takes us to the New Territories

and examines the ways that the Hong Kong Government and village private security were intertwined from the turn of the nineteenth century. Finally, Chapter 8 considers Shanghai and shows that the Shanghai Municipal Police had been intimately involved with the provision of private security personnel to the commercial sector of the Settlement long before their opposite numbers in the Hong Kong Police.

Throughout the hundred years and different areas that are investigated, a recurring theme will be seen. This is the added control that the Hong Kong Government was able to exert over ordinary Hong Kong residents by the actions of private security men or hybrid police in the different government departments. Usually this additional control involved the Exchequer in minimal expense. Sometimes, as with the gunpowder storage dépôt, it provided the government with a substantial income. However, this extra power that the government exerted was usually directed at specific racial groups and classes within the community. Thus, whilst most European Hong Kong residents were rarely affected by the existence of these private security forces or the background government registration, these matters were central to the lives of many Indian and Chinese members of the population.

Many authors from Bernard in 1844, Eitel in 1895, Endacott in 1958 up to the recent studies of Munn and Carroll have described the events leading to the departure of the British, first from Canton to Macao in early 1839 and from Macao to Hong Kong later the same year. Similarly, the complex issues surrounding the antagonism between Britain and China, including the diametrically opposite views held by these two countries with respect to trade, that resulted in the First Anglo-Chinese or ‘Opium War’ of 1839–1842, have been dealt with exhaustively elsewhere and need not be repeated here.³⁵ However, no history of early Hong Kong, even one dealing with a specific matter like private security, should ignore the most relevant events leading to the birth of the colony. This is because the events and the personalities involved in these incidents were of considerable importance. Much of this study deals with these matters in chronological order since, inevitably, some earlier events had a direct influence on what followed. However, the book will not be structured only according to sequential governors. Whilst it is true that certain administrators, particularly those in the early years, contributed significantly to the development of private security in Hong Kong, this contribution was not restricted to governors.

9

Conclusion

If a time-traveller, returning to Hong Kong in the 1840s, had bumped into Messrs. D’Aguilar, Caine and Gutzlaff and told them that, 170 years later, private policing was such an accepted way of modern life that more than 83,000 Hong Kong women possessed the Security Personnel Permits (SPPs) necessary for them to work in the territory’s private security industry, these Victorian gentlemen would have been utterly flabbergasted. If they had then been informed that this large number of ‘female’ SPPs was three times that of the entire force of uniformed officers of both genders in the Hong Kong Police, they would have been shocked. And, undoubtedly, smelling salts would have been needed to revive the trio on hearing that over 275,000 SSPs had been issued to Hong Kong people wishing to work in the private security business.¹

There is no doubt that modern private policing affects a growing number of people in developed countries, including Hong Kong, and this has been particularly noticeable in the new millennium since the terrorist attacks in New York, Bali, Madrid and London. Worldwide, private security in its many guises is a complex and highly lucrative business, at least for those operating or investing in large, successful, multinational companies. However, some of Hong Kong’s private security personnel are among the territory’s most poorly paid workers, a fact that has not escaped the local government’s attention and prompted a campaign to encourage Hong Kong employers to provide reasonable wages in the absence of a legal minimum pay structure.² In other parts of the world, particularly the UK, concern about the private security industry’s remit has extended far beyond the financial aspect to include some fundamental, ethical questions about employing private policing personnel in war zones such as Iraq.³

Throughout the preceding chapters, a pattern has emerged as regards the Hong Kong Government’s view of private watchmen and that is a pattern of control. Chinese watchmen employed by British and foreign merchants who settled in Hong Kong after 1841 were part of the local landscape, some having

followed their employers from Macao. Private security was needed at this time because there was no public police force and the military were unable to prevent thefts from residences and business houses. However, Chinese watchmen were not the only people involved in private policing work during the colony's early days. Jardines' armed sepoy guards protected its premises and this East Point Police was essential to ward off pirates who attempted to plunder the company's house on the outskirts of the new settlement. Although there are no reports that Hong Kong authorities attempted to influence Jardines' Indian guards, the government definitely sought to control Chinese watchmen working for other Europeans, and even eliminate the system. Whilst it was forced to engage private watchmen to guard its own premises, the government was unwilling to legitimise their presence. This need for personnel to protect government buildings could have been used to press the Home Government for an efficient police force but another view must be considered. After all, if a few Chinese watchmen were sufficient to guard official premises in Hong Kong, politicians in London might have viewed a costly police force as an unnecessary luxury. Elliot's unpopular decisions had ensured that Hong Kong was not the British Government's favourite place in the 1840s and Governor Pottinger's requests for well-trained British officers to police Hong Kong were refused because of costs. Yet, despite the administration's inability to provide Hong Kong with an effective police force in the 1840s, it was the stated opinion of its top officials that the use of private watchmen should be stopped as soon as possible.⁴ We may wonder at this ambiguity. Why did the private watchmen receive such bad press? Perhaps, if the Hong Kong Government could rid the colony of these men, this could be used as a further justification for the speedy arrival of the small number of British policemen from the Metropolitan Police Force.

Maybe the Chinese watchmen *really* were useless. However, being unsuccessful at preventing crime is not the same as being actively involved in it. At this time, Chinese watchmen appear to have been victims of a smear campaign because, although there was no proof that they had been working with criminals, they were viewed as accomplices in robberies. Whilst no criminal cases were brought to court where a watchman was convicted of such wrongdoing, the perception persisted that private watchmen were to blame for the spate of robberies in private residences. It would be naive to suggest that every Chinese private watchman was a paragon of virtue and honesty, but there is no doubt that these men received considerably more attention than other workers. The fact that Gutzlaff was instructed to examine only the character of watchmen — not bakers, tailors or builders — illustrates the prevailing antagonism towards this particular group of Chinese men.

Quite sensibly, watchmen had been exempted from the provisions of Caine's first curfew of 1842 since, if watchmen were forbidden to go outside, they would not be able to patrol the grounds of a house. The apparent inclusion of Chinese private watchmen in Caine's second curfew again shows how the colonial authorities exerted their influence thereby preventing these men from being effective at their task. Emphasizing the deficiencies of this group of workers seems to have been paramount rather than a desire to improve the existing system and enable the watchmen to work as an effective team rather than inefficient individuals. And, of course, D'Aguilar's 'Bamboo Ordinance' is another example of governmental control directed specifically at private watchmen.

District Watch Force

The District Watch Force of 1866 was a far cry from the organization envisaged by the Chinese merchants who wanted their business premises protected by their own race. Its birth and long history have been described in Chapter 3 and need not be repeated. However, the main features of this organization are worth considering from the perspective of official control. The merchants could not have foreseen a situation where head district watchmen reported daily to the captain superintendent of police, particularly when these same merchants were paying for the scheme. The men who approached Governor MacDonnell for permission to form this 'force' had demonstrated that they were no fools when it came to timing and strategic planning, but they were no match for the more seasoned political players among the government. The award of the small annual grant to the District Watch Force may be viewed in different ways. Whilst the grant may have allowed the Force to function more easily by alleviating 'cash flow' difficulties, it also provided the government with more hold over the operation of the District Watch Force, thereby increasing the potential for further control over this group of men. Although there is no reason to believe that the Hong Kong Government officials had considered this aspect when the District Watch scheme was introduced, what emerged in 1866 was a system that provided government authorities with additional control over grass-roots Chinese residents using Chinese men who were paid almost entirely by Chinese merchants. Why, then, did the administration consent to the Chinese merchants' suggestion to form their own Watch Force? Whilst it is tempting to believe that the plan was approved merely because MacDonnell thought it was a good idea, there may have been another, more calculated reason why the government agreed to the merchants'

proposal. The Chinese elites had become more numerous and increasingly affluent with the result that they paid more taxes into the colony's coffers.⁵ It would have been unwise to upset this group of people unnecessarily.⁶ Thus, the more pragmatic members of government may have believed that giving the Chinese merchants a certain amount of control over their own security force was a small price to pay to avoid future trouble. There were probably several explanations. Economy was surely one and we can almost hear the voice of the former Governor Davis when speaking about the introduction of the Peace Officer scheme that 'Another advantage attending the enactment under notice is its economy'.⁷ In modern management terminology, this could be regarded as a 'win-win' result for both the Chinese merchants and the Hong Kong Government. The merchants would gain 'face' since they had been able to persuade the government to agree to some of their terms. The Chinese shopkeepers could be assured that their area would be free from the attentions of the regular police except when serious crimes occurred, the government would gain extra hands that would leave their own men with more time to patrol the Central business district and, lastly, Smith, Lister and their colleagues could expect a less critical local community.

However, as time passed, control over the District Watch Force increased. The transfer of the entire District Watch Force to sanitary duties for three years must rank as one of the most highhanded and shortsighted schemes conceived by a Hong Kong Government official or, in this case, an officer acting for the government, particularly as it resulted in more crime during these years. Had it not been for the subordinate position of power occupied by the Chinese merchants and their inability or unwillingness to refuse, it is doubtful whether other employers would have agreed to these changes. The pressing need for better sanitary conditions does not lessen the unfairness of the Chinese merchants' having to pay the wages of these 'reassigned' district watchmen whilst the government contributed a mere \$1 per person per month. The rules and punishments reminding district watchmen that their sanitary duties were of equal importance to their security function highlight the imbalance of power that existed whilst the registrar general's terse rule regarding the transfer of district watchmen confirms that the goal posts in this game could be moved at will and this movement could occur even after the last goal had been scored.⁸

The passing of the District Watch Ordinance and the formation of the District Watch Committee enabled the government to continue its influence over the Force. Lockhart's pro-Chinese stance only made it easier for this control to be seen as altruistic by the members of the Chinese elite who benefited from membership of this and similar committees. The colonial

administration could stop the annual grant and this power was used when the District Watch Force was considered to have grown too rich. Transferring this allowance to an expense under the police vote may be seen as further formalizing police control over the District Watch Force.

With the passage of years and the acquisition of government land for premises to accommodate both district watchmen and police officers, this association became ever closer. Undoubtedly it benefited the government and the Chinese elites who served on the District Watch Committee but the ordinary small shopkeeper was probably less enthusiastic. Whenever there was a situation requiring local knowledge, the district watchmen could be (and were) removed from their primary function. Thus, the precedent set by Chadwick in connection with their transfer to sanitary duties was repeated many times on smaller scales and for shorter periods. Each time the services of the watchmen were required to help with non-security duties such as acting as enumerators for censuses, assisting with plague work and even regulating residents queuing for water, they were withdrawn from their original duties — that of guarding the business premises of the Chinese merchants who paid their wages. Thus, the influence wielded by the government over the district watchmen was no fleeting thing — it existed from the formation of the Force in 1866 and continued until the occupation by the Japanese in 1941.⁹

Detectives of the Tung Wah Hospital and Po Leung Kuk

The maximum number of men employed in the District Watch Force was 140 whilst, at the other end of the numerical spectrum, were the detectives engaged by the Tung Wah Hospital and the Po Leung Kuk Committees. No more than six detectives ever worked for the Tung Wah at one time whilst the Po Leung Kuk had only two men engaged in investigative work. However, the existence of even these few posts was enough to bring forth a storm of protest from the European community and, together with the government's own desire to monitor the actions of the unofficial detectives, this was sufficient to ensure regular interaction if not co-operation between the colonial authorities and the Chinese detectives in the Tung Wah Hospital and the Po Leung Kuk. In the case of the Tung Wah Hospital detectives, it was the committee members who initiated the control since they wished the government to be responsible for the detectives' wages. Nevertheless, in so doing, they opened the door for future control. The result was a system whereby the Hospital Committee guaranteed the character of the Tung Wah Hospital detectives while the government paid

for their work and offered the Hospital Committee the assistance of the District Watch Force that, ironically, was a private organization funded by Chinese merchants. The interaction went even further since any alleged victims or suspects in kidnapping cases had to be handed over to the registrar general. It was a complex tangle of local private security, public police, the Protector of the Chinese, the harbour master, the Law Courts and the Tung Wah Hospital Committee members.

In much the same way that the few Chinese detectives employed by the Tung Wah Hospital caused consternation amongst the European population during the 1870s, the same mistrust surfaced two decades later with respect to the two Chinese detectives working for the Po Leung Kuk. Of course, it was not merely the detectives' duties but the whole question of the Po Leung Kuk that upset some of the foreign community and resulted in the commission of enquiry culminating in Whitehead's strenuous efforts to ensure that Francis' method of controlling the detectives became a reality.¹⁰ Thus, the small band of security personnel working for a private organization, the Po Leung Kuk, was subject to extensive government control even though it was not paid from government funds.

Hong Kong's 'Hybrid Police'

Chapter 5 dealt with the development, within different government departments, of several parallel systems of what may be referred to as hybrid policing. In this way the colonial authorities were able to extend their control over ordinary Hong Kong residents without the use of sworn police officers. The security men employed as forest guards, watchmen at the reservoirs and gatekeepers of the various hospitals, had no special training and were permitted to exercise this control merely because of government decree. However, the existence of these security posts had the effect of extending the scope of government control, particularly over the local Chinese population.¹¹ These men enforced rules laid down by their employer, the Hong Kong Government. Sometimes formalized by ordinance, these rules impacted on the daily life of the local man-in-the-street, man-in-the-forest or even the man using public buildings. Importantly, from the view point of officials concerned with budgets and staff estimates, this additional government hegemony was achieved without any corresponding increase in the size of the police force since these hybrid policing posts were scattered throughout the civil service with 150 men in various non-constabulary security duties throughout the Hong Kong Government by 1941.¹²

Most of the government security personnel's responsibilities were not dissimilar to those of the regular police during the same period. This is particularly noticeable with the forest guards who worked alone and with sworn police constables in catching villagers who cut down trees for firewood. Under certain ordinances, the powers of the watchmen and gatekeepers were far-reaching as was their ability to evict undesirables from government buildings and 'other places'. Despite the low opinion of some departmental heads regarding the effectiveness of government's hybrid policemen in the Botanical and Afforestation Department and the Sanitary Department, the fact remains that the power to control members of Hong Kong's public was given to low-ranking, usually poorly paid, civil servants who were not sworn constables or even special constables. That some watchmen and guards did not use this enthusiastically, does not negate its existence.

Private Policing in Twentieth Century Hong Kong

By the twentieth century, the government's involvement in operating some privately funded local security schemes as well as the use of hybrid police personnel within its different departments had become the norm and, during World War I, the captain superintendent of police was active in organizing groups of predominantly Indian guards and watchmen for anti-piracy duties on board ocean-going ships and river craft. These duties escalated and, by the 1920s, the police chief was running a medium-sized private security 'firm' supplying guards and watchmen to both ships and land-based commercial operations (Table 6.1). Until 1927, when the Watchmen Ordinance was first mooted, it is unclear what official financial reward the police gained from this undertaking. Whilst stipulating the amount to be deposited by the ships' owners with the colonial treasurer for the hire of security personnel, the rules under the 1914 Anti-Piracy Ordinance (Appendix 14) did not confirm the pay received by guards or watchmen since it was only inferred, not stated, that the entire amount deposited with the colonial treasurer would be passed onto the guards and watchmen. Similarly, no reference appears in the regulations of any allowance being paid to the police for operating the scheme. Perhaps there was no pecuniary advantage and the reward was simply the knowledge that ships were provided with suitable men. Still another possibility is that, because the scheme was run on a relatively *ad hoc* basis, the question of fees to the government for its operation had not been addressed.

Although the official stated reason for introducing the new legislation in 1928 was the increased size of the Watchmen scheme, given the political

climate existing in Hong Kong during the middle and late 1920s, particularly the belief that seditious behaviour was endemic amongst the colony's Indian residents, it is likely that intelligence gained from the enforced registration of all foreign (non-Chinese) watchmen would have been most attractive to the Hong Kong Government. The regulations made under the Watchmen Ordinance of 1928 are important in this current study because of the control they provided over both police and private watchmen.¹³ Unlike those under the 1914 Anti-Piracy Ordinance that noted only the amount to be deposited with the colonial treasurer, the 1928 Regulations were specific about the salary awarded to police watchmen, regardless of whether they were of Chinese race or 'other police watchmen' (§10). A massive nineteen regulations were listed concerning various aspects of private and police watchmen's employment. Whilst police supervision was obligatory for police watchmen, official control was not restricted to them but was extended, to a lesser extent, to men choosing to be private watchmen (Appendix 16).

The 1928 Watchmen Ordinance that had generated so much opposition from Hong Kong's Indian community remained in operation until after civil administration was restored at the end of the Pacific War and two different official explanations were given for its demise in 1950. One was the extra work for police officers operating the scheme but the specific exclusion of Chinese watchmen from its provisions was an anachronism cited as the main reasons for its withdrawal. How ironic to recall that, when the bill was introduced, the exclusion clause was justified because it was inappropriate to include Chinese watchmen as well as being difficult to operate the scheme if the Chinese were registered.¹⁴ Again the wheel had turned full circle.

Although it became unpopular with the police after World War II, the 1928 Watchmen Ordinance operated throughout its lifetime with only a few minor amendments. Its registration clauses targeted men working in one specific occupation — private security. Additionally, although *all* foreign watchmen had to be registered, provide fingerprints and be photographed, in practical terms this meant that Indians were the focus of the legislation. Thus, two decades before Hong Kong's adult population was required by law to possess Hong Kong Government identity cards, a large number of Indian men had to agree to be photographed and provide their fingerprints before they could work as watchmen.¹⁵

Two years after the introduction of the 1928 Watchmen Ordinance Regulations, they were extended to the village scouts and guards in the New Territories (Appendix 20) and, in the same way that the mainly Indian private watchmen were subject to police control, similar restrictions applied to their

Chinese counterparts in the New Territories. Additionally, although the Hong Kong Government did not pay the village guards' wages, these men were forced to carry their licence books containing thumbprint and photograph at all times and present them to any police officer for inspection.¹⁶ The village guards may have received no funding from the government but the regulations stipulated that they had to 'attend at such times and places as may be directed by the Inspector General of Police' and 'take part in such parades, instructions and musketry as may be prescribed by the Inspector General of Police'.¹⁷ In this way, government control over the private security men of the New Territories exceeded that of private watchmen in Hong Kong and Kowloon since only police watchmen, not private watchmen, had to attend official parades, instruction and musketry and revolver practice organized by the police.¹⁸ Was the official intention to extend government control over the New Territories' population using the village guards and village scouts? There can be little doubt that, by establishing a pyramid with the Hong Kong Police at the top, the village guards and village scouts immediately below and the New Territories villagers at the base, the government expanded its influence over a large number of Chinese people at the lowest possible cost to the Treasury with respect to money and manpower.

Although the 1928 Watchmen Ordinance and the rules made under it were repealed in 1950, this was not the last legislation Hong Kong saw concerning private watchmen. For six uncomfortable years no registration or other government control existed over watchmen of any race operating in the colony. The consequences of this 'vacuum' were considerable. However, the background to the new legislation introduced in 1956 falls outside the scope of this book and will not be addressed other than noting its importance when understanding the most recent legislation that now affects more than 275,000 people who are eligible to work in the territory's private security industry by virtue of possessing the necessary permit.¹⁹

The Shanghai Experience

The International Settlement of Shanghai was a true municipality governed on municipal lines from its earliest days as a foreign port. This meant that actions of any person employed by the Shanghai Municipal Council were (or could be) the Council's responsibility and, conversely, the Council was required to consider residents' opinions. Since the Settlement's governing body was composed of the city's own ratepayers, not some Whitehall appointee, this was important when it came to accountability. After all, the Municipal Councillors

were members of the community and not career diplomats. This accountability manifested itself in small but important ways such as listening to and acting on clients' complaints about proposed increased fees for supervising Shanghai's watchmen in 1914.²⁰

Despite the many differences in governing Hong Kong and Shanghai, one similarity is obvious. This relates to the control that the authorities exerted over their respective Indian communities who worked as private or police watchmen. Given the regular interchange of information between Hong Kong and Shanghai, it is reasonable to suggest that the colonial administration would have considered the workings of the watchmen schemes in Shanghai before introducing the Watchmen Ordinance that finally became law in 1928. By then the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Shanghai Municipal Council had been running forces of Indian and Chinese watchmen for some 20 years with all the challenges that this involved. Rates of watchmen's pay as well as the administrative charges for operating the scheme were formalized in Shanghai before 1910 and were taken over by the Shanghai Municipal Council in 1914, several years before the Hong Kong Government became involved in a similar scheme.

Just as there were similarities in the way that Indian watchmen were treated in Hong Kong and Shanghai, there were notable differences in how the administrators of the two ports controlled their respective Chinese watchmen. Unlike their opposite numbers in Hong Kong who chose to disregard the colony's Chinese watchmen for the purpose of registration, Shanghai's authorities included Chinese watchmen in their mandatory registration system and were able to build up a fingerprint record of watchmen of all nationalities. In the International Settlement, potential watchmen's fingerprints were checked before any man was registered in that capacity. It is worth noting in the context of social control that, by opting to exempt Chinese watchmen from compulsory registration, the Hong Kong Government overlooked or chose not to use a potential method of establishing an early database of 'fingerprints' since each Hong Kong watchmen's licence book included the thumbprint of its holder. Since only Chinese men who chose to register as police watchmen would have been issued with a licence book containing a thumbprint, only a few Chinese watchmen would have been subject to this checking procedure. When considering this omission, it is worth recalling the words of the attorney-general who maintained that, not only would the compulsory registration and supervision of all Chinese watchmen in Hong Kong be more than the police could handle, 'it would also be undesirable'. Almost certainly, the nature of this 'undesirability' was influenced by the recent social unrest in the colony during and after the seaman's strike.

One of the most striking similarities between the two cities is that police officers in both the Crown colony of Hong Kong and the Treaty Port of Shanghai spent an awful lot of time and effort dealing with private security personnel in the form of watchmen. **They, in fact, watched the watchmen!**

And they were not alone since a similar system operated in the Straits Settlements with only a few minor differences in terminology. Thus, it seems that problems arising from ‘private policing’ terms are nothing new and existed long before they were identified by modern researchers.

This book has endeavoured to portray the long and sometimes complex history of various types of early private security personnel employed in Hong Kong during the first century of the colony’s existence. Whilst these were much less sophisticated times, there was considerable interaction between the Hong Kong Government and the grassroots guard or watchman from the time the first settlers landed at Possession Point in 1841 and this persisted throughout the first 100 years resulting in added government control over certain strata of Hong Kong society.

Notes

Chapter 1 Introduction

1. In February 2007 the Hong Kong Police (HKP) employed 27,375 disciplined officers and 4,884 civilian staff whilst the ICAC employed 1,314 staff. HKSAR Government departmental statistics.
2. In May 2007 an estimated 80,000–120,000 people worked in Hong Kong's private security industry although 276,927 valid Security Personnel Permits had been issued by the Security and Guarding Services Industry Authority. Personal communication: Mr. Dave Slater, CPB, HKP — May 2007.
3. In 1998 Transport officials claimed that cameras 'can track a vehicle from Kennedy Town [in the west] to Quarry Bay [in the east] with only a few meters of missed coverage'. *Sunday Morning Post*, 20 September 1998, 9.
4. George and Button, *Private Security*, 7.
5. Ibid, *Private Security*, 8.
6. Ibid, *Private Security*, 7.
7. Ibid, *Private Security*, 8.
8. Reiner, *The Politics of the Police*, 7.
9. Sarre and Prenzler, *The Law of Private Security in Australia*, 4.
10. Nalla and Lim, 'Students' Perceptions of Private Police in Singapore', *Asian Policing*, 2003 1(1), 27–47.
11. (i) The Hongkong Banking and Payroll Association is described in the *China Mail*, 19 July 1960 and 12 August 1960; (ii) In 1891, Chubb & Sons supplied 200 brass padlocks to the government for Victoria Gaol. *Hongkong Hansard*, 22 May 1891, 178.
12. G4S Annual Report for 2006.
13. Securitas AB Annual Report for 2006.
14. Personal communication: Mr. Dave Slater, CPB, HKP — May 2007.
15. (i) Criswell and Watson, *The Royal Hong Kong Police (1841–1945)*, 8. (Henceforth 'RHKP'). (ii) Miners, 'The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 18, No. 3 (October 1990), 296–315. (iii) Cartwright questioned the importance of the Irish influence in 'The evolution of the Hong Kong Police as a British Colonial Police Force 1898–1941' (MA, University of Leicester, 1995).
16. The Private Security Industry Act 2001 in the UK has improved this situation.
17. (i) Although Hong Kong became an SAR of the PRC on 1 July 1997, 'colony' is used throughout because it is accurate for the years under examination. (ii) Between 1844 and 1863 a total of 183 new ordinances were passed (Laws of Hong Kong, 1988).
18. *OffBeat*, Issue 676, April 2000.

19. Chu, ‘Hong Kong Triads: An Economic Analysis of Organised Crime’ (PhD, University of Exeter, 1996); Cox, ‘Policing Underground Railways: A Comparison between the Systems Operated in London and Hong Kong’ (MA, University of Leicester, 1995); Kerrigan, ‘Police Accountability: The Role of The Complaints Against Police Office’ (MSocSci, University of Hong Kong, 1992); Kerrigan, ‘Policing a Colony: The Case of Hong Kong 1844–1899’ (PhD, Cardiff Graduate Law School, University of Wales, 2001).
20. Hayes’ article about the Nam Pak Hong in the *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (henceforth ‘JHKBRAS’), 19 (1979), 216–6, includes the rules of the organization in the original Chinese (224). See also *One Hundred Years of the Tung Wah Hospital 1870–1970*.
21. Lethbridge, ‘The District Watch Committee: The Chinese Executive Council of Hong Kong?’, *JHKBRAS*, 11 (1971), 116–41.
22. The book was based on Sinn, *The Tung Wah Hospital, 1869–1896: A Study of a Medical, Social and Political Institution in Hong Kong* (PhD thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1986).
23. Murphy, ‘Control of the Security Industry in Hong Kong’ (1996) and Creed, ‘A Study of Contract Uniformed Security Guarding’ (1996).
24. Lee *et al.*, ‘Liaison with Security Companies’, Intermediate Command Course 5/90; Williamson and Kan, ‘Watchman Registration and Watchman Arms Licensing’, Planning and Research 6/80; Chan ‘Motivation of Watchmen’, Senior Staff Course 5/86.
25. ‘Parapolice’ was used to describe private security in Britain, ‘Police Patrols to go Private’, *The Guardian*, 17 July 1998, 1.
26. Jones and Newburn, *Private Security and Private Policing* (inside front cover).
27. The first major study of private security in the USA was by the Rand Corporation in 1969 and reported in 1971 by Kakalik and Wildhorn who revised their findings in 1977 because of the 1970 census data. See Shearing and Stenning, ‘Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications’, in Tonry and Morris (eds) *Modern Policing: Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research*, 3 (1981), 199. See also Lipson, *On Guard: The Business of Private Security*, 20–40, for a historical view of private security in the USA.
28. In 1852 Henry Wells, founder of the American Express Company, was joined by William G. Fargo resulting in ‘Wells Fargo’. See Draper, 16; Lipson, 22.
29. The author recalls being told by her father, who worked in the Ford Motor Company in New York during the late 1920s, that Ford security personnel confiscated any newspapers belonging to the workers. See also Weiss, ‘From “Slugging Detectives” to “Labor Relations”: Policing Labor at Ford, 1930–1947’, in Shearing and Stenning (eds), *Private Policing*, 110–30. See Lipson, 23–31 for an account of Allan Pinkerton’s career and the Pinkerton men in strike breaking.
30. Shearing, ‘The Relation between Public and Private Policing’, in Tonry and Morris (eds), *Modern Policing: Crime and Justice; a review of research*, 15, 333–434.
31. Guo Taisheng, ‘Private Security in China: A Note on Recent Developments’, *Security Journal*, 12 (1999), 43–6.

32. Hsin-Mei Kuo http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0629103-204502; Lee Chang-Moo, *Asian Policing*, Vol. 3 (2005), 46–66.
33. Nalla and Lim, ‘Students’ Perceptions of Private Police in Singapore’.
34. Draper, *Private Police*; Rawlings, *Policing a Short History*; Nemeth, *Private Security and the Law*.
35. Bernard, *Narrative of the Voyages and Services of the Nemesis from 1840 to 1843*, 2 vols.; Eitel, *Europe in China*; Sayer, *Hong Kong 1841–1862*; Endacott, *A History of Hong Kong*; Cameron, *An Illustrated History of Hong Kong*; Munn, *Anglo-China*; Carroll, *Edge of Empires*.

Chapter 2 Early Settlement of Hong Kong

1. Eitel, *Europe in China*, 99–104. Eitel was a German scholar, linguist, missionary, Hong Kong civil servant and historian.
2. Bernard, *Narrative of the Voyages and Services of the Nemesis from 1840 to 1843*, Vol. 1, 288. (Henceforth ‘Narrative’); Eitel, *Europe in China*, 70–4 and 123; Endacott, *A Biographical Sketch-book of Early Hong Kong*, 8–9. (Henceforth ‘Sketchbook’).
3. Wu Yang Sheng, *Canton, City of the Rams*.
4. Bernard, *Narrative*, Vol. 1, 287–8; Munn, ‘The Chusan Episode: Britain’s Occupation of a Chinese Island, 1840–46’, *Journal of Imperial & Comparative History*, 25, No. 1, 1997, 82–112.
5. Eitel, *Europe in China*, 121–2.
6. (i) Elliot received dispatches from Britain on 29 July 1841 informing him of the British Government’s displeasure at the terms of The Convention of Chuenpi and advising him of his replacement by Sir Henry Pottinger. See Eitel, *Europe in China*, 177. (ii) Sayer, *Hong Kong 1841–1862*, 78–80.
7. Endacott, *Sketchbook*, 7; Munn reports that the orders to evacuate Chusan ‘came like a thunderbolt’, Munn ‘The Chusan Episode: Britain’s Occupation of a Chinese Island, 1840–46’.
8. Bernard, *Narrative*, Vol. 1. Chapters 15 and 16 provide a report of the hostilities and the dilemma faced by Keshin.
9. *Chinese Repository*, June 1841, 351. See also Sayer, *Hong Kong 1841–1862*, 87; Eitel, *Europe in China*, 174; Hong Kong Civil Service List for 1935, 44.
10. Sayer, *Hong Kong 1841–1862*, 92–4; Eitel, *Europe in China*, 123–4; Norton-Kyshe, *The History of the Laws and Courts of Hong Kong*, Vol. 1, 4. (Henceforth ‘History’).
11. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 5–6; *Canton Register*, 9 February 1841, 25.
12. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the *muitsai* question.
13. Tarrant, *Hong Kong Part I, 1839–1844*, 100.
14. Sepoy: an Anglo-Indian term for a native soldier.
15. Endacott, *Sketchbook*, 55–9; Eitel, *Europe in China*, 179, 181.
16. *Canton Register*, 4 May 1841, 105; Sayer, *Hong Kong 1841–1862*, Vol. 1, 103; reproduced in Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 6–7.

17. Ward, *Sui Ging*, 3. The Marine Magistrate's Warrant was published in the *Canton Register*, 10 May 1842, 98.
18. Endacott, *Sketchbook*, 60.
19. The Army lost around 50 men per month to alcohol poisoning, malaria and other diseases. *Canton Press*, 20 August 1842; between June and August 1843, the 55th Regiment lost 100 men. Bernard, *Narrative*, Vol. 2, 75; he also noted that the troops were afflicted with sickness before they reached Hong Kong and that eight days in Canton had 'sowed the seeds of ague and dysentery'. Soon after the troops arrived in Hong Kong, 1,100 men were on the sick list. Bernard, *Narrative*, Vol. 2, 63; A Public Health Committee was appointed on 16 August 1843 but 'no effective measures were undertaken', Eitel, *Europe in China*, 192; See also Sayer, *Hong Kong 1841–1862*, 137.
20. D'Aguilar to Pottinger, 22 January 1844, Pottinger to D'Aguilar, 26 January 1844 and Pottinger to Stanley 30 January 1844 all in CO129/5, 76–81. See also Crisswell and Watson, *RHKP*, 13.
21. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 11; *Canton Press*, 15 January 1842.
22. *The Friend of China and Hongkong Gazette*, 13 October 1842, 117. (Henceforth 'Friend of China').
23. Similar phraseology was used in Imperial Chinese edicts. A reply from the Qianlong Emperor to Lord Macartney written in 1793 ended with the words 'Trembling obey and show no negligence. A special mandate', Morse cited in Hutcheon, *China-Yellow*, 105.
24. Munn, 'Scratching with a rattan', *Hong Kong Law Journal*, 25 (1995), 230.
25. Blue Books, *Gaol Returns*, 1844, 161 and 1852, 237.
26. *Historical and Statistical Abstracts of the Colony of Hong Kong 1841–1930*.
27. Eitel, *Europe in China*, 203; *Canton Press*, 6 May 1843.
28. *Canton Press*, 20 May 1843.
29. *Friend of China*, 13 October 1842, 117.
30. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 29.
31. The concept of a modern public police force had only existed in Britain since 1829 when the Metropolitan Police Act was passed. At this time, however, the idea of public police forces was not accepted throughout the entire country, Rawlings, *Policing: A Short History*.
32. Malcolm to Stanley, 22 December 1843: CO129/4, 332–4; Pottinger, *Sir Henry Pottinger: First Governor of Hong Kong*, 111; See also Crisswell and Watson, *RHKP*, 14.
33. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 25.
34. *Friend of China*, 6 July 1843; Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 25.
35. He was referred to as the 'dreaded Major Caine', 'Rev. James Legge', *JHKBRAS*, Vol. 11 (1971), 174; Crisswell and Watson, *RHKP*, 11.
36. Tarrant, *Hong Kong Part 1 1839–1844*, 70–1. Tarrant, a longtime critic of Caine, was dismissed from the Civil Service in 1847 for alleging that Caine's comprador had acted improperly by using Caine's name to obtain payment from stallholders. In 1859 Tarrant was found guilty of libeling Caine, sentenced to one year's

- imprisonment and fined £50. See Endacott, *Sketchbook*, 130–4 and Munn, *Anglo-China*, 300–1.
37. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 29.
 38. The author is indebted to Dr. Christopher Munn for this information.
 39. See Reid's description of Gutzlaff in Keswick, *The Thistle and the Jade*, 135. Also *Friend of China*, 5 March 1844. However, his mistranslation later embarrassed the government when he indicated in an official document that unpopular fees for registration tickets would cost labourers \$1/month, and not the \$1 p.a. Munn, *Anglo-China*, 128.
 40. *Friend of China*, 12 March 1844; Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 42.
 41. *Friend of China*, 24 April 1844. Two Registration Ordinances were introduced in 1844. The first, No. 16 of 1844, which was to apply to locals and foreigners alike, caused considerable rancour amongst European and Chinese sectors of the population. An amended version, No. 18 of 1844, was passed in November 1844, enacted on 1 January 1845 and exempted most Europeans and prosperous Chinese from the need for registration. See Eitel, *Europe in China*, 222–6.
 42. *Hongkong Government Gazette*, 6 May 1871, 199. (Henceforth 'HKGG').
 43. *China Mail*, 22 May 1845.
 44. When opportunities for criminal behaviour cease to exist in one place, the behaviour does not disappear but moves to a more suitable location. Bennett and Wright, *Burglars on Burglary: Prevention and the Offender*, 50–3.
 45. *China Mail*, 22 May 1845.
 46. D'Aguilar acted as governor four times between August 1844 and December 1847: *Hong Kong Civil Service List for 1935*, 44. Until 1859, the governor's post was combined with that of superintendent of trade. He was also responsible for the new Consular Service in China. Eitel, *Europe in China*, 187.
 47. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 176–7.
 48. Perhaps not the exact words.
 49. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 87.
 50. *Friend of China*, 6 June 1846; Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 97.
 51. According to Gao Hwei-shung, during times of peace in old Guangzhou (Canton), 'the people of the city needed no other protection than that of the watchman who made the rounds of an assigned area once every watch hour', *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, Vol. 10 (1926), 335.
 52. See Dray-Novey's description of watchmen in 'Spatial Order and Police in Imperial Beijing', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 52, No. 4 (November 1993), 885–992.
 53. Milne described how 'The noise, which disturbs the slumbers of the foreigner, is made by striking the cylinder over the watchman's arm, or the gong swung across a pole and supported upon the shoulders of him and his comrade', 'Notices of a seven month residence in the city of Ningpo, April 10th 1843', *Chinese Repository*, Vol. XVI (February 1847), No. 2, 61.
 54. Cranmer-Byng, *An Embassy to China: being the journal kept by Lord Macartney during his embassy to the Emperor Ch'ien-lung*, 158.
 55. Lanning and Couling, *The History of Shanghai*, 292.

56. Tarrant, *Hong Kong Part 1, 1839–1844*, 115; Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 54.
57. ‘Nuisances’ had a wide meaning in Victorian Britain and referred to any noxious item that offended any of the senses. Later chapters will show the importance of different types of ‘nuisances’.
58. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 57.
59. Hong Kong Government Ordinances will be referred to according to their original number not the revised number used in the Laws of Hong Kong.
60. *Hongkong Register and Government Gazette*, 27 August 1844.
61. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 58; Hong Kong Civil Service List for 1935, 44.
62. As if trying to distance himself from D’Aguilar’s eccentricities, Davis stressed that the new ordinance had been passed ‘during my absence in the North on a visit to the Consular Ports ...’ Davis to Stanley, 28 October 1844, CO129/7, 143.
63. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 57.
64. Stanley to Davis, 21 February 1845, CO129/7, 145–6.
65. *Laws of Hong Kong, Chronological Table of Ordinances*, 1.
66. HKGG, 13 April 1872, 215.
67. Camic, ‘The Enlightenment and Its Environment: A Cautionary Tale’, *Knowledge and Society: Studies of the Sociology of Culture Past and Present*, Vol. 4, 1983, 162–3.
68. Crisswell and Watson, *RHKP*, 13.
69. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 41.
70. Davis to Stanley, 3 April 1845: CO129/11, 224; Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 76; Crisswell and Watson, *RHKP*, 13.
71. See Hsiao, *Rural China Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century*, 6, 26–9 and 43–5; Ting, ‘Native Chinese Peace Officers in British Hong Kong, 1841–1861’, in *Between East and West: Aspects of Social and Political Development in Hong Kong*; Munn, *Anglo-China*, 123.
72. Davis to Stanley, 12 February 1844: CO129/6, 110.
73. Davis to Stanley, 28 January 1845: CO129/11, 71–3.
74. Davis to Stanley, 8 March 1845: CO129/11, 160 (Letter reproduced at Appendix 3).
75. Ting, ‘Native Chinese Peace Officers in British Hong Kong, 1841–1861’, 151.
76. *Ibid.*, 155.
77. Munn, *Anglo-China*, 124 and Chapter 7.
78. See Crisswell and Watson, *RHKP*, 150; Miners, ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947’, *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History*, 18, No. 3 (October 1990), 305.
79. In 1857 many Europeans were poisoned by arsenic in their bread. Alum, the Chinese owner of the E-sing bakery that supplied bread to the European population, was tried but found not guilty of poisoning. He was re-arrested for being ‘a suspicious character’, jailed and then banished for five years. Etel, *Europe in China*, 311–2. Rev. Legge, Chinese scholar and longtime resident of Hong Kong, had eaten the bread and described the incident in 1872. *JHKBRAS*, Vol. 11 (1971), 185.
80. This aspect of their work is described in the annual report of the secretary for home affairs, 1968–69, 35, 141.

81. See Chapter 5.
82. *Hongkong Register*, No. 19, 17 May 1850, 74.
83. ‘Society for Protecting the Good’, Munn, *Anglo-China*, 122.
84. *Friend of China*, 10 July 1844; Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 54.
85. *Ibid.*
86. Eitel, *Europe in China*, 211. In 1872, Legge described Davis’ book as ‘still the most readable and entertaining work on the country’. *JHKBRAS*, Vol. 11 (1971), 182.
87. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 54–5.
88. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 76.
89. Woosnam to Caine, 26 July 1843: CO129/10, 486a.
90. See Chapter 6.
91. *China Mail*, 22 May 1845.
92. Norton-Kyshe, *History*, Vol. 1, 75–6.
93. Eitel, *Europe in China*, 234.
94. No. 14 of 1845, Section 3, §7. The earlier ordinance included similar wording regarding watchmen asleep at their posts. Ordinance No. 5 of 1844, §1.
95. *Daily Press*, 18 January 1867: ‘Chinese watchman at Messrs. Pustan & Co Godown found guilty and fined \$10 or 1 month in gaol’; *Daily Press*, 13 January 1878: ‘Indian watchman at the Hung Hom docks fined \$2 or 10 days imprisonment in default’.
96. Keswick, *The Thistle and the Jade*, 198; White, *Turbans and Traders*, 13–5.
97. Eitel, *Europe in China*, 203.
98. The author wishes to thank Dr. W. K. Chan for making this letter available.
99. ‘Princely Hong’ was the synonym for Jardines, Keswick, *The Thistle and the Jade*, 35.
100. *The Hongkong Register*, 24 June 1845.
101. *Ibid.*, 13 June 1853.
102. *Friend of China*, 2 January 1856.
103. *The Daily Press* of 15 June 1843 reported the case of two Chinese watchmen who were severely wounded with knives whilst trying to apprehend robbers. The editor added that ‘very few of the many outrages daily perpetrated among the native population ... are brought to the attention of the authorities, for reasons which are apparent’.
104. *China Mail*, 29 October 1872.
105. *Ibid.*, 27 December 1877, 25 January 1878, 31 January 1878.
106. *Ibid.*, 9 February 1878.
107. *Ibid.*, 3 December 1878.
108. *Daily Press*, 10 August 1878.
109. *China Mail*, 9 August 1878.
110. Jarrett, *South China Morning Post* (henceforth ‘SCMP’), 2 August 1933.
111. Davis to Stanley, 17 May 1844: CO129/6, 88.
112. Hao, *The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West*, 73.

113. Michie, *The Englishman in China during the Victorian Era*, Vol. 1, 127.
114. Hao, *The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West*, 91.
115. Ibid, 102.
116. Sir John Pope Hennessy's speech to the Legislative Council, HKGG, 4 June 1881, 385–92.
117. Wood, *No Dogs And Not Many Chinese: Treaty Port Life in China 1843–1943*, 255–6.
118. 'Farmer' is a misnomer since opium was not grown in Hong Kong but merely stored and distributed. A better description is 'holder of the opium monopoly'. George Duddell acquired the first opium monopoly in 1845 but all subsequent opium farmers were Chinese.
119. Cheung, 'The Opium Monopoly in Hong Kong' (MPhil, University of Hong Kong, 1986).
120. Originally in 'Minutes of evidence taken before select committee on commercial relations with China', British Parliamentary Papers — China, 38 (1847), 161–2.

Chapter 3 The District Watch Force

1. Undated Minute made available by Margaret Leeds, formerly research officer with the Royal Hong Kong Police.
2. Jardines' sepoys may be regarded as the first group of non-Chinese private security personnel.
3. Walter Deane, a cadet officer proficient in Cantonese, became captain superintendent of police in July 1868. A language school for European and Indian policemen to learn Cantonese was opened in 1869 but attendance was voluntary and the response poorer than Deane had hoped. Crisswell and Watson, *RHKP*, 52–3.
4. *China Mail*, 8 February 1866; *China Mail*, 22 February 1866; Norton-Kyshe, *History*, 2, 86.
5. Minute by Cecil C. Smith, 22 December 1871: CO129/156, 117; Sayer, *Hong Kong 1841–1862*, 477.
6. The Victoria Registration Ordinance 1866 also divided the town into nine districts and compelled Chinese householders to register their names and addresses with the registrar general. It also required registration of all Chinese servants, including watchmen, employed by Europeans. See Sayer, *Hong Kong 1862–1919*, 21.
7. 'Cadet officer' denotes an administrative grade in the Hong Kong Civil Service. See Lethbridge, 'Hong Kong Cadets, 1862–1941', *Hong Kong: Stability and Change*, 31–51. All cadets learnt Cantonese before working in the Hong Kong Government. Smith was one of the first three cadets appointed in April 1862.
8. Annual Report of the Registrar General for 1867, *Blue Book*, 1867, 248, §20 – §21.
9. *Blue Book*, 1867, 248, §25.

10. Ibid, §24.
11. Ibid, §27.
12. Annual Report of the Registrar General for 1868, *Blue Book*, 1868, 250, §25.
13. Minute by Smith, 22 December 1871: CO129/156, 116.
14. Ibid, 117.
15. May's evidence at page 11 of the Report of the Police Commission, 27 June 1872: CO129/164, 290.
16. Minute by Smith, 22 December 1871: CO129/156, 117–8.
17. *Hongkong Government Gazette*, 6 January 1872, 2, §F. (Henceforth 'HKGG').
18. *HKGG*, 6 January 1872, 3, §H.
19. Report of the Police Commission, 27 June 1872: CO129/164, 290 (20, §60).
20. Ibid, 290 (32, §60).
21. Bernard, *Narrative*, 2, 75.
22. In 1881 the population was estimated to be 160,402 compared with 119,321 in 1861 and 32,983 ten years earlier. Endacott, *An Eastern Entrepôt*, 132–3.
23. In the 1880s the Chinese population in Singapore hindered the advance of Western sanitary methods by refusing to comply with regulations introduced by the Municipal Branch. Yeoh, *Contesting Space: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment in Colonial Singapore*, 117 and 119–25;
24. Yeoh's views are extreme. Someone may believe that good health is the result of balance within the body without necessarily accepting that living next to filth is of no consequence.
25. In 2007 untreated sewage continues to be discharged into Victoria Harbour.
26. Bloomfield states that Chadwick's salary was £10,000 on a *pro rata* basis plus expenses.
27. *Blue Book*, 1870, 206.
28. Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*, 42.
29. Chadwick, *Mr Chadwick's Reports on the Sanitary Conditions of Hong Kong*, 41, §274–§280. (Henceforth 'Chadwick's Reports').
30. Ibid, 42, §282.
31. Notification No. 144, *HKGG*, 21 April 1883, 363–4.
32. Ordinance No. 7 of 1883, §2.
33. Government Notification No. 223, *HKGG*, 23 June 1883, 538–44.
34. Yeoh, *Contesting Space*, 110.
35. *Blue Book*, 1857, 94; *Blue Book*, 1906, J136 and *Blue Book*, 1907, J148.
36. Government Notification No. 223, *HKGG*, 23 June 1883, 544, §10.
37. *Chadwick's Reports*, 42, §286.
38. Government Notification No. 223, *HKGG*, 23 June 1883, 543, §40.
39. Annual Reports of the Captain Superintendent of Police for 1883 and 1884. Government Notification No. 54, *HKGG*, 16 June 1884, 64 and Government Notification No. 106, *Supplement to the HKGG*, 7 March 1885, 213.
40. *Chadwick's Reports*, 42, §275.
41. *HKGG*, 31 October 1885, 930. Ordinance No. 7 of 1866, Section 14, referred to the ability of the registrar general to make rules and regulations to be observed by watchmen.

42. Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 152.
43. Lethbridge, ‘The District Watch Committee: The Chinese Executive Council of Hong Kong?’ in *Hong Kong: Stability and Change*, 109.
44. Registrar General’s Report for 1891, *Hongkong Government Legislative Council Sessional Papers*, No. 19/92, 241. (Henceforth ‘RG’s Report’ and ‘HKGLCSP’).
45. RG’s Report for 1892, *HKGLCSP*, No. 20/93, 256–7.
46. *Ibid.* 257.
47. RG’s Report for 1893, *HKGG*, 10 March 1894, 160.
48. *Colonial Estimates for 1870–1873*, miscellaneous expenditure.
49. *Colonial Estimates for 1870–1873*, Police expenditure.
50. Police Annual Report for 1897, *HKGG*, 12 March 1898, 234.
51. Successive years Registrar General’s Reports published in the *HKGC*.
52. RG’s Report for 1900, *HKGG*, 11 May 1901, 928.
53. RG’s Report for 1902, *HKGG*, 15 May 1903, 681.
54. RG’s Report for 1903, *HKGG*, 20 March 1904, 899–900; *Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for 1936*, 89.
55. RG’s Report for 1904, *HKGG*, 31 March 1905, 362.
56. RG’s Report for 1899, *HKGG*, 26 May 1905, 810.
57. Secretary for Chinese Affairs Report for 1915, *Administrative Reports 1915*, C6, §36. District watchmen had been in Kowloon since 1913 in connection with registration duties. (Henceforth ‘SforCA’s Report’).
58. *Hongkong Hansard*, 9 October 1913, 71.
59. SforCA’s Report for 1913, *Administrative Reports 1913*, C7, §27.
60. This same wording appeared in successive *Colonial Annual Reports* under the section ‘Criminal and Police’.
61. SforCA’s Report for 1919, *Administrative Reports 1919*, C7, §37.
62. SforCA’s Report for 1922, *Administrative Reports 1922*, C7, §34; Murphy received the King’s Police Medal in 1925, specialized in detective work and retired as assistant superintendent in 1937.
63. Stubbs to Churchill, 18 March 1922, CO129/474: 221; See also Chan, *The Making of Hong Kong Society*, Chapter 5.
64. Stubbs to Churchill, 18 March 1922: CO129/474, 221.
65. Stubbs to Churchill, 18 March 1922: CO129/474, 221 (enclosure).
66. Between 1912 and 1925, Claud Severn administered the colony ten times during the absence of Governors Sir Francis May and Sir Reginald Stubbs. *Hong Kong Civil Service List for 1935*, 46–7.
67. Severn to Churchill, 22 August 1922: CO129/476, 96–8.
68. Edwin Hallifax, CMG, CBE, was a cadet officer who held the post of secretary for Chinese affairs for more than 20 years until 1933. *The Hong Kong Civil Service List for 1947*, 49.
69. Severn to Churchill, 22 August 1922: CO129/476, 96–8.
70. *Ibid.* 98.
71. SforCA’s Report for 1924, *Administrative Reports 1924*, C7, §34.

72. Police Report for 1923, *Administrative Reports 1923*, K22.
73. Ordinances No. 4 of 1889; No. 14 of 1889; No. 17 of 1891; No. 8 of 1895; No. 9 of 1900; No. 32 of 1929; No. 2 of 1933.
74. SforCA's Report for 1925, *Administrative Reports 1925*, C7, §34.
75. SforCA's Report for 1926, *Administrative Reports 1926*, C6, §35.
76. SforCA's Report for 1929, *Administrative Reports 1929*, C3, §14.
77. See Chapter 1.
78. Hallifax, Messer and Hutchison, 'Report on the searching of passengers on arrival at and departure from Hongkong', 17 March 1917, *HKGLCSP*, No. 8/17, 44.
79. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 6 November 1930, 235.
80. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 6 November 1930, 236.
81. RG's Report for 1894, *HKGG*, 13 April 1895, 306; Police Report for 1929, *Administrative Reports 1929*, K15.
82. RG's Report for 1899, *HKGG*, 26 May 1900, 810.
83. SforCA's Report for 1929, *Administrative Reports 1929*, C3, §15.
84. SforCA's Report for 1938, *Administrative Reports 1938*, C5, §27.
85. SforCA's Report for 1939, *Administrative Reports 1939*, C5, §24.
86. See Carroll, *Edge of Empires*.

Chapter 4 Other Local Private Security Forces

1. *A Glimpse of the Past*, 9.
2. *The China Directory*, 1867.
3. Hayes, 'The Nam Pak Hong: Commercial Association of Hong Kong', *JHKBRAS*, 19 (1979), 216–26.
4. *Centenary Publication of the Nam Pak Hong 1868–1968*. See also 'Special Publication to Commemorate its 86th Anniversary and the Completion of the New Building', referred to in Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 221.
5. Tsai, *Hong Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842–1913*, 62–4.
6. District watchmen were exempted from requiring licences under successive 'Arms and Ammunition' ordinances but this did not extend to the watchmen of the Nam Pak Hong.
7. A Nam Pak Hong Building exists in Bonham Strand West in 2007.
8. Hayes, 'The Nam Pak Hong: Commercial Association of Hong Kong', *JHKBRAS*, 217–8.
9. A letter from the commissioner of police to the colonial secretary in July 1956 mentioned 'another reputable watchmen's organisation is that of the Bonham Strand Merchants' Guild, a force that has been operating for a number of years, and commenced before the war'. They may have been descendants of the original Nam Pak Hong watchmen. Commissioner of Police to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 7 July 1956, Ref: P.H.Q. L/M 862/56.

10. Hayes, ‘The Nam Pak Hong: Commercial Association of Hong Kong’, *JHKBRAS*, 218.
11. *Hong Kong Colonial Report for 1900*, No. 340, 16, §12.
12. Miners, ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947’, 304. In 1863 and 1864 there were 114 and 126 Chinese policemen respectively. *Blue Books* 1863 and 1864, Civil Establishment, 180 and 192.
13. Between 70 and 80 members of the Hospital Committee wore elaborate ceremonial robes, some with peacock feathers attached to their buttons. *China Mail*, 14 February 1872; Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 50.
14. Lethbridge, *Hong Kong: Stability and Change*, 52–70. (Henceforth ‘Stability and Change’); Sinn, *Power and Charity*; Sinn, *The Tung Wah Hospital 1869–1896, A Study of a Medical, Social and Political Institution in Hong Kong* (PhD thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1986).
15. Government Notification No. 464, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Tung Wa[h] Hospital, *HKGG*, 5 December 1896, 1147–72. The original I Ts’z temple was a reception centre for the tablets of deceased persons. Later it was used to store coffins prior to shipment and for housing the terminally ill. See Lethbridge, *Stability and Change*, 57; Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 18–9.
16. Lethbridge, *Stability and Change*, 56.
17. In *Ah Ku and Karayuki-san: Prostitution in Singapore 1870–1940*, 32–3, Warren notes that 76,657 Chinese migrated to Singapore between 1871 and 1874. Many would have travelled via Hong Kong.
18. Report of the Captain Superintendent of Police for 1868, *HKGG*, 17 April 1869, 211. (Henceforth ‘Police Report’).
19. Police Report for 1870, *HKGG*, 24 June 1871, 281–3.
20. Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 105.
21. Police Report for 1870, *HKGG*, 24 June 1871, 281.
22. Miners, ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947’, 301.
23. Police Report for 1871, 27 June 1872: CO129/164, 290 (16), §49.
24. We are reminded of Gutzlaff’s investigations into the character of the colony’s watchmen in 1844.
25. *The Daily Press*, 15 May 1873; Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 104–5; Smith, *A Sense of History: Studies in the Social and Urban History of Hong Kong*, 81.
26. See Endnote 13.
27. *The Daily Press*, 21 May 1873.
28. *The China Punch*, 8 July 1873, 4 and 10; *China Punch*, 2 August 1873, 10. *The China Punch* was the brainchild of W. N. Middleton, appeared irregularly between 1872 and 1876 and ceased publication when Middleton left Hong Kong in November 1876. An incomplete bound copy is in the Hong Kong Club library.
29. Harbour Master’s Report for 1873, *HKGG*, 28 March 1874, 138.
30. Harbour Master’s Report for 1874, *HKGG*, 27 March 1875, 123.
31. Smith, *A Sense of History: Studies in the Social and Urban History of Hong Kong*, 81.

32. Government Notification No. 464, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Tung Wa[h] Hospital, *HKGG*, 5 December 1896, 1156.
33. Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 69–72.
34. *Ibid*, 43.
35. *Ibid*, 98–9.
36. *The Daily Press*, 24 May 1873.
37. Tung Wah Board of Directors, 1870–1970, *One Hundred Years of the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, 1870–1979*, 2 volumes, 37–9 (seventeen rules relate to the doorkeeper); See South, *Policing for Profit*, Chapter 4 for duties of modern ‘in-house’ security personnel.
38. The English translation uses ‘surgeon’, which would have been an anathema to traditional Chinese because of their abhorrence for cutting human flesh. The characters in the Chinese version are more appropriately translated as ‘doctor’ or ‘medical master’. ‘Surgeon’ was probably used in the translation because of its contemporary use in titles like the *Colonial Surgeon*. The author wishes to thank Dr. Philip Beh for this information.
39. Ordinance No. 3 of 1870, §XIV, *HKGG*, 2 April 1870, 151–3.
40. Census returns for 1876, *HKGG*, 24 February 1877, 82; Lethbridge, *Stability and Change*, 71. This problem was not restricted to Hong Kong. In 1868, 1,644 of the 2,061 prostitutes working in Singapore’s 349 brothels were Chinese and by 1887 there were more than 3,000 licensed Chinese prostitutes, all Cantonese, some sold at a young age and sent to Nanyang whilst others were born in Singapore. Warren, *Ah Ku and Karayuki-san: Prostitution in Singapore 1870–1940*, 43–4.
41. Lethbridge, *Stability and Change*, 79. Lethbridge also suggests that respectable Chinese men did not bring their wives and families because of this vice, although the high cost of accommodation was another deterrent.
42. Lum notes that in southern China girls were also purchased as potential wives for the sons of the family. This avoided paying a dowry to the bride’s family and lessened conflict between the wife and her mother-in-law. Lum, *Philanthropy and Public Welfare in Late Imperial China* (PhD thesis, Harvard University, USA).
43. For a description of the *muitsai* system see Miners, ‘The Attempts to Abolish the Mui Tsai System in Hong Kong 1917–1941’, in *Between East and West: Aspects of Social and Political Development in Hong Kong*, edited by Sinn, 117–31.
44. Eitel, *Europe in China*, 547.
45. Lethbridge, *Stability and Change*, 78.
46. *Ibid*, 79.
47. Francis’ suggestions appear in *Hongkong Government Legislative Council Sessional Papers* for 1893, 625, lxxxi. Henceforth ‘HKGCLSP’. See also Po Leung Kuk, *Centenary History of the Po Leung Kuk Hong Kong, 1878–1978*, 41–2.
48. Government Notification No. 318, *HKGG*, 5 August 1882, 653–4.
49. Lethbridge, *Stability and Change*, 82.
50. *HKGCLSP* for 1893, Appendix 14, 625, xviii.
51. Lethbridge, *Stability and Change*, 84.

52. Ibid.
53. *Hongkong Hansard*, 25 April 1892, 120–1.
54. Chater did not indicate his specific objections during the bill's first reading on 11 April 1892.
55. *Hongkong Hansard*, 11 April 1892, 118. This was not the first allegation of its kind. In *The China Punch* of 11 April 1874, an article appeared at page 11 accusing the ‘Tai-wah’ Hospital of similar wrong-doings: ‘But then we know that the Institution was never meant for a Hospital, that it was only a cloak for a Chinese Secret Society’.
56. *Centenary History of the Po Leung Kuk Hong Kong, 1878–1978*, 54–5.
57. Airlie considered Lockhart ‘the obvious candidate for the job’, *Thistle and Bamboo*, 67.
58. Lethbridge, *Stability and Change*, 86. See also the many acrimonious exchanges between Lockhart and Whitehead during meetings of the Legislative Council when the Po Leung Kuk Incorporation Ordinance was read for the first and second times; *Hongkong Hansard*, 25 May 1893 and 2 June 1893, 83–95.
59. Evidence given by Major-General Gordon, captain superintendent of police, to the Po Leung Kuk Enquiry, *HKGLCSP* for 1893, 625, 65–6.
60. *Centenary History of the Po Leung Kuk Hong Kong, 1878–1978*, 62.
61. Ibid, 64–72.
62. *Hongkong Hansard*, 15 March 1894, 25.
63. Ripon to Robinson, 22 December 1893, *HKGLCSP* for 1894, 129.
64. Section 19 of the original ordinance.
65. *HKGG*, 17 March 1894, 215.
66. *Hongkong Hansard*, 15 March 1894, 26.
67. The first was the District Watch Committee in 1882. It may be argued that although the Tung Wah Hospital Committee had existed since 1872, it only became Lockhart's third Chinese board after the commission of enquiry of 1896.
68. *Hongkong Hansard*, 15 March 1894, 26. Thomas Whitehead remained in Hong Kong as manager of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China until 1902 when he returned to Britain to take up a similar position in its London office. In 1920 he retired as general manager of the bank and died in May 1933 at the age of 82. After retirement he was a prominent benefactor and endowed a total of four beds at hospitals in Stirling, Edinburgh and Perth. Following his death a large part of his estate was bequeathed to General Baden-Powell and the Boy Scout movement. I am indebted to Elma Lindsay, history officer for Stirling Council, Scotland, for locating the photograph and permitting its reproduction.
69. Po Leung Kuk Report for 1897, *HKGLCSP*, 18/98, 213.
70. The author wishes to thank Pauline Poon for this information. 1966 is the latest year for which the account books of the Po Leung Kuk are open to the general public.

Chapter 5 Government ‘In-House’ Security or ‘Hybrid Policing’

1. Johnston, *The Rebirth of Private Policing*, Chapter 6; George and Button, *Private Security*, 55.
2. Woosnam to Caine, 26 July 1843: CO129/10, 486a.
3. *Blue Books*, 1860–1865, Revenue and Expenditure.
4. *Blue Book*, 1855, Civil Establishment, 204.
5. Eitel, *Europe in China*, 203.
6. *Ibid*, 328.
7. §6, Ordinance No. 12 of 1856, *HKGG*, 14 June 1856, 6.
8. This latter offence was incorporated into the 1932 Summary Offences Ordinance using almost identical wording.
9. Johnston, *The Rebirth of Private Policing*, Chapter 6.
10. §1 Ordinance No. 8 of 1870.
11. *HKGG*, 20 August 1870, 398–9, §4.
12. *Ibid*, §5.
13. Ordinance No. 8 of 1870 was superseded in 1936 by the ‘Pleasure Grounds and Bathing Places Regulations’ (No. 29 of 1936).
14. *Blue Book*, 1859, Civil Establishment, 128; *Blue Book*, 1867, Civil Establishment, 188; *Blue Book*, 1866, Civil Establishment, 184–5.
15. Ordinance No. 8 of 1870 gave these men more powers. Gatekeepers could deny entry to anyone thought to be damaging, injuring or spoiling anything belonging to the government within the hospitals or their grounds.
16. *China Mail*, 22 May 1845.
17. *Blue Book*, 1875, Civil Establishment, 90.
18. Such anomalies were not restricted to the Medical Department.
19. Currencies used in Hong Kong were the subject of controversy. See Endacott, *An Eastern Entrepôt*, 201–22.
20. *Blue Book*, 1880, Civil Establishment, I40–1.
21. *Blue Book*, 1903, Civil Establishment, J104–J105.
22. *Blue Book*, 1906, Civil Establishment, J128–J129; *Blue Book*, 1925, Civil Establishment, J106.
23. *Blue Book*, 1934, Civil Establishment, J126; *Blue Book*, 1937, Civil Establishment, J87; *Blue Book*, 1939, Civil Establishment, J87.
24. Until 1920 these Indian constables appeared in successive *Blue Books* under Medical Department. Between 1921 and 1926 they only appeared in the Estimates under ‘Police’ but after 1927 the Estimates contained less information and police officers loaned to other departments were not listed as a separate category.
25. Having non-Chinese men in principal Waterworks’ security posts continued until the next century. In the early 1900s the Government Civil Hospital and Victoria Hospital for Women had Indian watchmen or gatekeepers and in 1920, the watchman at Tai Tam Reservoir was Joseph Bowen who had been employed since 1897.
26. *Blue Book*, 1864, Civil Establishment, 138.
27. *Blue Book*, 1866, Civil Establishment, 136.

28. He died in April 1897 aged 59 and is buried in the Colonial Cemetery (Section 23, No. 5904). From the insignia on his headstone (Figure 5.1), he was a Freemason.
29. *Blue Book*, 1897, Civil Establishment, I28. Until December 1888, when promoted to be watchman of the new Tai Tam Reservoir, Lewis occupied the watchman's house on Pokfulam Reservoir Road. Much later, this building served as the Pokfulam Country Park Management Centre of the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department until March 2005. Although the building and the attractive internal wooden rafters had survived for more than 130 years, unfortunately its condition has been allowed to deteriorate since 2005. Figure 5.2 shows the outside of this building in 1998.
30. Tai Tam Reservoir 1888, Shaukiwan Reservoir 1901, Aberdeen Reservoir 1901, Tai Tam Filter Bed 1889, Pokfulam Filter Bed 1890. *Blue Books* for appropriate years. For a history of Hong Kong's Waterworks, see Clementi's speech, *Hong Kong Hansard*, 5 September 1929, 134–51.
31. Eitel, *Europe in China*, 342.
32. Waterworks Ordinance No. 16 of 1890, §24.
33. Regulation under authority of section 23 of Ordinance No. 16 of 1903, §41, amended 12 May 1911; Government Notification No. 136, *HKGG*, 12 May 1911, 195.
34. *Blue Book*, 1867, Civil Establishment, 170–1. In the 1878 *Blue Book*, the wages of lower ranking government servants were reported in dollars not pounds and the pay of the security man at the signal station became \$72 per annum (£1 = \$4.8). However, as early as 1863, dollars were used in the Annual Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure.
35. Commissions of enquiry followed the disastrous fires at Happy Valley racecourse in 1918, the Wing On Godown in 1947, the Jumbo Floating Restaurant in 1971, the Seawise University in 1972 and the Garley Building in 1996 as well as the chaotic opening of the new airport at CLK in July 1998.
36. *Daily Press*, 18 January 1867.
37. *China Mail*, 17 January 1867.
38. *Daily Press*, 18 January 1867.
39. Legge, *James Legge Missionary and Scholar*, 173–4.
40. *China Mail*, 25 January 1867.
41. Macdonnell to Buckingham, 10 June 1867: CO129/122, 159.
42. *Blue Books*, 1868 and 1869, Net Revenue and Expenditure, 28 (both years).
43. *Colonial Estimates*, 1870.
44. *Blue Books* for respective years, Civil Establishment, Harbour Master's Department.
45. *Annual Report of the Director of Marine for 1963–64* (Hong Kong Government Printer, 1964), 33. This report includes an interesting history of the gunpowder dépôt; *Blue Book*, 1877, Revenue and Expenditure.
46. Harbour Master's Report for 1889, *HKGG*, 31 May 1890, 494.
47. *Director of Marine's Annual Report for 1963–64*, 33.

48. A Volunteer Fire Brigade and Chinese Fire Brigade had existed since 1856. *China Mail*, 76th Anniversary Number, March 1921.
49. *Colonial Annual Report for 1901, Hong Kong*, 18.
50. *Blue Books* for appropriate years, Civil Establishment, Police (Fire Brigade subsection).
51. Fire Brigade Annual Report for 1887, *HKGLCSP*, No. 11/88, 186.
52. *Blue Book*, 1900, Civil Establishment, I88; *Blue Book for 1899*, Civil Establishment, I86.
53. Sayer, *Hong Kong 1841–1862: Birth Adolescence and Coming of Age*, 80.
54. £300 was allocated in the 1860 Estimates for tree planting.
55. Chambers, ‘Agriculture and Fisheries Department’, *The Government and the People*, 53.
56. Ibid. During Sir John Pope Hennessy’s governorship, tree-planting expenditure increased from \$700 in 1877 to \$10,000 in 1881. *HKGG*, 4 June 1881, 389.
57. The modern watchman in commercial, industrial or residential premises has no more legal powers of arrest than the ordinary citizen and must obtain the assistance of a sworn police officer before an arrest can be made.
58. *Blue Books*, 1863 and 1864, Civil Establishment, 180 and 192 respectively.
59. The number ‘8’ in Cantonese is considered lucky because of its sound “Baht” which means wealth.
60. This is the same year that \$10,000 was spent on tree planting.
61. Botanical and Afforestation Annual Report for 1880, §26, *HKGG*, 11 March 1882, 272. (Henceforth ‘Botanical Report’).
62. Since goats were not native to Hong Kong, this superabundance was probably due to their being brought to the colony by Indian troops and then abandoned. White, *Turbans and Traders*, 108.
63. Botanical Report for 1882, §31, *HKGG*, 14 April 1883, 348.
64. Botanical Report for 1883, §77–§78, *HKGG*, 24 May 1884, 474.
65. Botanical Report for 1885, §35–§36, *HKGLCSP*, No. 27/86, 208.
66. *Blue Book*, 1884, Civil Establishment, I160–I161 and I23–I24.
67. Botanical Report for 1885, §36, *HKGLCSP*, No. 27/86, 208.
68. Botanical Report for 1887, *HKGLCSP*, No. 13/88, 215.
69. Ibid.
70. Botanical Report for 1889, *HKGLCSP*, No. 5/90, 180.
71. Botanical Report for 1890, *HKGLCSP*, No. 26/91, §37, 323.
72. *Blue Book*, 1892, Civil Establishment, I32.
73. *Blue Book*, 1905, Civil Establishment, J82–J85.
74. Rules made by the governor under section 3 of the New Territories (Regulation) Ordinance, 1899, *HKGG*, 24 February 1905, 166.
75. Botanical Report for 1904, *HKGG*, 7 April 1905, 421.
76. Rules made by the governor under section 3 of the New Territories (Regulation) Ordinance, 1899, *HKGG*, 24 February 1905, 166, §10.
77. Possibly the villagers did not understand their rights under the new forestry licences. Police Report for 1904, *HKGG*, 17 March 1905, 306, §5.

78. Botanical Report for 1908, *Administrative Report 1908*, L9.
79. Botanical Report for 1939, *Administrative Report 1939*, N4 and N16; Report of the Commissioner of Police for 1939, *Administrative Report 1939*, K9, §34.
80. Annual Report of the Colonial Veterinary Surgeon for 1893, *HKGCLCSP*, No. 20/94, 282.
81. Annual Report of the Colonial Veterinary Surgeon for 1894, *HKGCLCSP*, No. 28/95, 435.
82. Annual Report of the Colonial Veterinary Surgeon for 1896, *HKGCLCSP*, No. 24/97, 412.
83. Miners, ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947’, 310.
84. For a description of the complex background to the building and early operation of the Kowloon-Canton Railway see Phillips, *Kowloon-Canton Railway (British Section): A History*.
85. It was the brainchild of the British railway engineer, Macdonald Stevenson.
86. Phillips, *Kowloon-Canton Railway (British Section): A History*, 13–19.
87. Several KCR annual reports refer to accommodation built specifically for railway watchmen: *Kowloon-Canton Railway (British Section) Annual Reports* for 1931, 2, §9 and 1933, 3, §23.
88. *Blue Book*, 1911, Civil Establishment, J222–J232. Only the posts of watchmen and gatemen are included since ‘Guard’ has a special meaning in railway terminology.
89. 1910 estimates showed that two watchmen were required for the branch line between Fanling and Sha Tau Kok at 40¢ each day. Phillips, 87.
90. ‘These figures include Police paid for by the Railway, Private Firms, and other Government Departments’. *Administrative Report 1908*, 11. The Estimates for 1914 show that five policemen were employed at \$193 per annum each and the Estimates for 1916 refer to these policemen as Indians constables 1st class at \$186 per annum plus free quarters and electricity.
91. *Hongkong Hansard*, 20 August 1914, 86–7.
92. ‘Retrenchment in staff [of the KCR] has been effected by the abolition of a number of posts of watchmen, drivers, brakemen, fitters and coolies’. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 16 September 1936, 226; See also Estimates for 1937, 81.
93. *Hong Kong Daily Press*, 14 September 1925 and 17 September 1925.
94. *Blue Books* 1923–1936, Civil Establishment, KCR sub-section.
95. South listed typical duties of modern ‘in-house’ security personnel: (1) Control and direct and indirect supervision and surveillance of the workforce; (2) Control of access to site premises, both entry and exit, involving the recording of arrival and departure of vehicles, as well as ensuring that visitors are helpfully guided to their destinations whilst ensuring that intruders are discouraged; (3) Finally, general responsibility to ensure the security, securing, surveillance and recording of the site premises. *Policing for Profit*, 57.
96. Ordinance No. 8 of 1870, §IV.
97. In his Botanical Report for 1886, the superintendent referred to ‘arrests for infringement of what I might call *forest laws*’. [emphasis added]
98. Particularly Ordinances No. 12 of 1856 and No. 8 of 1870.

99. Munn, *Anglo-China*, 3.
100. CO129/164, 290 (16, §49).
101. Cited in Rawlings, *Policing: A Short History*, 118.

Chapter 6 Pirates, Ships Guards and Shore Watchmen

1. Lo *et al*, *Hong Kong and its external communications before 1842*, 106–18; Criswell and Watson, *RHKP*, 6; Ward, *Sui Geng: The Hong Kong Marine Police 1841–1950*, 6–7; Hutcheon, *China-Yellow*, Chapter 9 ; Nolde, ‘A Plea for a Regional Approach to Chinese History: The Case of the South China Coast’, *JHKBRAS*, 6 (1966), 12–4.
2. Ward, *Sui Geng*, 8; Hutcheon, *China-Yellow*, 210.
3. Davis to Grey, 4 January 1848: CO129/23, 23.
4. Eitel, *Europe in China* ; Sayer, *Hong Kong 1841–1862*, 270.
5. Michie, *The Englishman in China during the Victorian Era*, Vol. 1, 299–307.
6. No. 15 of 1927, passed in October 1927, *HKGG*, 14 October 1927, 430–1; Ordinance No. 1 of 1868 remained in force with some amendments for more than a century and was not repealed until 1971.
7. Blue, ‘Piracy on the China Coast’, *JHKBRAS*, 5 (1965), 72.
8. Michie, *The Englishman in China during the Victorian Era*, Vol. 1, 299.
9. *Hongkong Hansard*, 15 October 1900, 6.
10. Ward, *Sui Geng*, 82.
11. A comparison of the ease with which the terrorists were able to board the four planes on 11 September 2001 is all too apparent.
12. *Hongkong Hansard*, 9 October 1913, 72.
13. May to Harcourt, 2 May 1914 (enclosure): C.O.129/410, 427.
14. See *The China Mail*, 28 and 29 April 1914 and the *North-China Herald*, 16 May 1914, 520–1.
15. Reportedly Dias killed twelve pirates.
16. *HKGG*, 28 August 1914, 342–6. See also *Hongkong Hansard*, 6 August 1914, 82–3. *HKGLCSP*, No. 11/1914, 41–3.
17. Piracy Prevention Regulations, §5 and §30. *HKGG*, 18 September 1914, 377–83.
18. *Hongkong Hansard*, 20 August 1914, 86–7.
19. Ibid, 27 August 1914, 93. Kwangchow-wan was a French-leased territory in Guangdong province north of Hainan and 230 miles from Hong Kong. *The Directory and Chronicle of China, Japan etc.* (1928), 838.
20. Although radiography was used to detect art frauds in the 1890s, portable machines were not available to X-ray luggage till very much later.
21. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, the Madrid railways in 2004 and the London underground system in 2005, together with the foiled attack at Heathrow airport in 2006 resulted in stricter checking procedures of carry-on luggage on flights throughout the world. The checking of twenty-first-century passengers’ personal items is normally performed by private security staff with

- powers to detain anyone suspected of carrying any dangerous items on their person, in their hand luggage or even someone with more than 100ml of any kind of liquid. In this, the officials are repeating the duties of their predecessors, albeit with considerably more vigour, ‘attitude’ and X-rays.
22. Figures from successive Police Annual Reports. Henceforth ‘Police Reports’.
 23. Police Report for 1919, *Administrative Report 1919*, K4.
 24. Police Report for 1924, *Administrative Report 1924*, K4.
 25. Police Report for 1927, *Administrative Report 1927*, K33.
 26. Police Report for 1927, *Administrative Report 1927*, K33.
 27. *Hongkong Government Gazette*, 7 October 1921, 394.
 28. The author gratefully acknowledges the considerable help given by Charlotte Bleasdale of John Swire and Sons (HK) Ltd in providing the two photographs of the *Sunning*.
 29. *HKGLCSP*, No. 3/1927, 57–69.
 30. *Ibid*, 96–105.
 31. *SS* – Steamship and *SL* – Steam Launch.
 32. The Canadian Pacific S.S. Co., Peninsular & Oriental S.S. Co., British India Steam Navigation Co., Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., and China Navigation Co. Ltd.
 33. In 1930 the title Captain Superintendent of Police was changed to Inspector General of Police.
 34. Police Report 1930, *Administrative Report 1930*, K13–K14.
 35. Vaid, *The Overseas Indian Community in Hong Kong*, 1–16. Vaid suggests that these desertions were fuelled by resentment after the loss of the *Nerbudda* when the British officers escaped in the one sea-worthy boat leaving the 240 Indians soldiers to swim. Most were later rescued but their abandonment caused ill-feeling between the Indian troops and their British officers.
 36. *Ibid*, 17.
 37. *Friend of China and Hongkong Gazette*, 15 June 1843; *Hongkong Register*, 17 December 1844.
 38. The project took ten years to complete.
 39. *Daily Press*, 23 December 1902.
 40. *Daily Press*, 27 December 1902.
 41. *Daily Press*, 23, 24 and 27 December 1902; *China Mail*, 22 December 1902.
 42. Police Report for 1902, *HKGG*, 27 March 1903, 409, §6.
 43. May to Harcourt, 1 December 1914 (Moberly’s enclosure dated 13 November 1914): CO129/415, 22–3.
 44. May to Harcourt, 1 December 1914: CO129/415, 20.
 45. May to British Consul, Manila, 14 October 1914: CO129/413, 558; May to Harcourt, 1 May 1915: CO129/422, 37.
 46. For background to this incident on the eve of the 5th Light Infantry’s departure for Hong Kong, Turnbull, *A History of Singapore 1819–1975*, 129–30.
 47. May to Harcourt, 25 February 1915: CO129/420, 519 and 526.
 48. *Ibid*, 522.

49. Following the mutiny of the Indian soldiers of the 5th Light Infantry in Singapore in February 1915, all Indian residents of Singapore had to be registered, a decision ‘which caused considerable ill-feeling among a basically loyal section of the community’. Turnbull, *A History of Singapore 1819–1975*, 130.
50. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 27 October 1927, 122.
51. The attorney general’s estimate of more than 600 watchmen is considerably greater than the 407 ‘Shore Guards’ listed in the Police Report for 1927.
52. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 27 October 1927, 122.
53. *Ibid.*, 123–4.
54. *Daily Press*, 28 October 1927. The Hong Kong Ship Watchmen’s Union was registered in April 1960. This union changed its name to Watchmen’s General Union in 1963 but was deregistered in 1965 and ceased to exist as a union. Personal communication Miss Doris Ng, Labour Department, Registry of Trade Unions (letter dated 30 June 1998).
55. *Daily Press*, 4 November 1927; *Hong Kong Hansard*, 3 November 1927, 131.
56. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 15 March 1928, 9–10.
57. Universal registration of adults in Hong Kong did not occur until 1949 when the Registration of Persons Ordinance, 1949 (Cap. 177) was introduced in response to the ‘unsettled conditions’ worldwide and ‘particularly in China’. Under its provisions all persons aged twelve years and above, except for those in special categories such as the Police or the military, had to register for identity cards within seven days of their arrival in the colony. The ordinance stipulated that applicants for registration were required to submit to the recording of fingerprints and the taking of photographs. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 3 August 1949, 224–8. It was believed that registration was virtually complete by September 1951. *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Registration for 1954/55*, 1.
58. *Daily Press*, 6 April 1928.
59. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 27 October 1927, 122.
60. The NYK Shipping Line employed Japanese watchmen in the 1930s. Personal communication, Jason Wordie, 30 September 1998.
61. Elphick states that at this time in Hong Kong ‘Japanese firms were fronts for espionage activities and subversion, as were educational and cultural institutions’. Elphick, *Far Eastern File*, 86.
62. Following anti-Japanese riots in Hong Kong and Kowloon culminating in the murder of five members of a Japanese family in Kowloon in September 1931 (*Hong Kong Daily Press*, September 1931, 23–9), respectable firms such as hotels and shops as well as brothels operated by Japanese may have preferred employing Japanese watchmen. Attempts to obtain relevant information about Japanese watchmen in Hong Kong from two Japanese consuls in Hong Kong were unsuccessful.
63. Letter dated 21 April 1952 from Professor (later Sir) Lindsey Ride to Mr. D. W. MacIntosh, Commissioner of Police.
64. Commissioner of Police to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 7 July 1956 (Ref: PHQ L/M 862/56).

65. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 9 August 1950, 258, §34.
66. Lion Rock is one of the natural features on the Kowloon hills separating the New Territories from urban Kowloon.
67. Later Taikoo Dockyard and Engineering Company of Hong Kong Ltd.
68. *Hong Kong & Directory* for 1922–41.
69. Hutcheon, *Wharf: The First Hundred Years*.
70. *Hongkong Hansard*, 16 April 1908, 29.
71. *Hongkong & Directory 1941*, 110 and 471.
72. Figure 6.3 shows a view of the Butterfield and Swire Dockyard at Quarry Bay. One of the buildings housed the security staff. Photograph by courtesy of Charlotte Bleasdale, John Swire & Sons, Hong Kong.
73. Personal communication, Charlotte Bleasdale, John Swire & Sons, (HK) Ltd. Letter dated 4 November 1996.

Chapter 7 Security in the New Territories

1. See Wesley-Smith, *Unequal Treaty, 1898–1997: China, Great Britain and Hong Kong's New Territories*.
2. Extracts from papers relating to the extension of the Colony of Hong Kong: Lockhart to Colonial Office, 8 October 1898, *HKGG*, 8 April 1899, 535.
3. Airlie, *Thistle and Bamboo*, 95–6.
4. *HKGG*, 8 April 1899, 535–52. Lockhart also recommended the construction of a railway between Canton and Kowloon, a project that had been ‘mooted for a long time’ but had been abandoned even though a survey of the country had been carried out. See also Phillips, *Kowloon-Canton Railway (British Section): A History*.
5. Chamberlain to Blake, 6 January 1899, *HKGG*, 8 April 1899, 535.
6. See Airlie, *Thistle and Bamboo*, 82–4 for background to the animosity between Black and Lockhart.
7. Chamberlain to Blake, 6 January 1899, *HKGG*, 8 April 1899, 535.
8. *HKGG*, 8 April 1899, 546.
9. *Ibid*, 547.
10. *HKGG*, 10 March 1900, 339.
11. *Hongkong Hansard*, 13 April 1899, 35–7; *HKGG*, 8 April 1899, 547.
12. No. 11 of 1899, §7; *The Hongkong Government Gazette Extraordinary*, 18 April 1899, 616.
13. From §8 of the ordinance it is clear that the payment of the watchmen was by ‘contributions’.
14. *Hongkong Hansard*, 20 October 1910, 113.
15. The Boy Scout Movement began in Hong Kong in 1909.
16. *Hongkong Hansard*, 22 October 1914, 116–7; *Hongkong Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure*, 1915, Police, 54; The governor’s speech of October 1913 introducing the Estimates of Expenditure for 1914 did not mention the introduction of the new scheme and there was no approved estimate for the village scouts in 1914.

17. *Hongkong Hansard*, 9 October 1913, 73.
18. Telegram, 1 July 1915, CO129/423, 3.
19. HM King George V's message to his people, 31 October 1915, CO129/424, 522.
20. Crisswell and Watson, *RHKP*, 106.
21. Police Report 1925, *Administrative Report 1925*, K21–K22.
22. Police Report 1926, *Administrative Report 1926*, K18.
23. Ibid, Verey pistols are used to fire flares.
24. Notification No. 111, *HKGG*, 21 February 1930, 90.
25. The Local Communities Ordinance (No. 11 of 1899) allowed the government to exert control over New Territories' watchmen even though their wages were met from private funds.
26. The title Captain Superintendent was changed to Inspector General in 1930.
27. Appendix 20, §1.
28. Chapter 6 showed that registration of all adults in Hong Kong, regardless of race, did not occur until 1949. Police officers and military personnel were exempt from the requirements of this ordinance (Cap. 177) because they already carried a form of identification that could be checked.
29. Appendix 20, §4.
30. Minute: Commissioner of Police to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 17 April 1950, Public Record Ref. No. 1/6073. The title Inspector General of Police was changed to Commissioner of Police in 1938.
31. Hayes, 'The Village Watch in the Hong Kong Region', *JHKBRAS*, 22, 1982, 294–7.
32. Watson, *Emigration and the Chinese Lineage: The Mans in Hong Kong and London*.
33. Extracts from papers relating to the extension of the Colony of Hong Kong, HKGLCSP, No. 9/99, Appendix 5, 203–7.
34. Watson, *Inequality among Brothers: Class and Kinship in South China*, 94. (Henceforth 'Inequality'); Baker, *A Chinese Lineage Village: Sheung Shui*, 79. (Henceforth 'A Lineage Village').
35. Watson, *Inequality*, 94–6.
36. Watson, *Inequality*, 95; Baker, *A Lineage Village*, 80. However, Faure maintains that the watch-keepers' functions in Sheung Shui were more complicated than Baker suggested and that they were not hired by the village but charged a fee on the basis of the amount cultivated and the number of animals owned. Since Faure referred to Japanese yen, this may have changed by the 1960s. Faure, *The Structure of Chinese Rural Society*, 212.
37. Watson, *Inequality*, 94–5.
38. Baker, *A Lineage Village*, 80–1.
39. Watson, *Inequality*, 96.
40. Police Reports of 1947 to 1957 mention village guards. The early reports praise the contribution made by these men and the 1948/49 report stresses the co-operation between the village guards and the Village Penetration Patrol units of the Hong Kong Police. Some reports listed the number of village guards whilst others

merely mentioned the number of weapons on loan to the villages. In 1954/55 a maximum number of 556 village guards are listed and after 1957 they cease to appear as a category in police reports.

41. Police Report for 1899, *HKGG*, 10 March 1900, 339.
42. Watson, *Inequality*, 87.
43. *Hongkong Hansard*, 19 June 1893, 98–9.
44. Police Report for 1893, *HKGLCSP*, No. 2/94, 66, §8.
45. Police Report for 1934, *Administrative Report 1934*, K19–K20.
46. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 3 November 1927, 129–30.
47. Government Notification No. 694, *HKGG*, 25 November 1927, 505, §3.
48. Police Report for 1934, *Administrative Report 1939*, K25.
49. The exact date of this note is not known. Someone with a keen sense of humour added a pencilled comment that this was ‘About a catty a day’!

Chapter 8 Watchmen in Shanghai

1. Dr. D. J. Dillon’s talk at the 50th meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, 13 February 1998. Lees later became chief of San Francisco’s Police.
2. Blair became chief constable of the Metropolitan Police.
3. ‘Police Patrols to go Private’ and ‘Off-beat solution’, *The Guardian*, 17 July 1998, 1 and 18; ‘Police Chief calls for civilian on the beat’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 17 July 1998, 8.
4. Although never a British colony, scholars in the 1990s continued to refer to Shanghai as ‘a semi-colonial city’ and ‘not formally a colony’. See Yeung, *Shanghai: Transformations and Modernization under China’s Open Policy*, 2 and Clifford, *Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Revolutions of the 1920*, xi. (Henceforth ‘Spoilt Children’).
5. ‘A stranger ... arriving in the foreign Settlement, would scarcely realize that he was not in a British territory as in Hongkong or Singapore’. Teichman, *Affairs in China*, 151.
6. A regional administrator.
7. See Johnson, *Shanghai: from Market Town to Treaty Port, 1074–1858*, Chapter 7. (Henceforth ‘Shanghai’).
8. *Report of the Hon. Mr Justice Feetham to the Shanghai Municipal Council*, Vol. 1, 27. (Henceforth ‘Feetham’s Report’ and ‘SMC’).
9. Lanning and Couling, *The History of Shanghai*, 282 (henceforth ‘History’); *North-China Herald*, 27 December 1851 (henceforth ‘NCH’), cited in Johnson, *Shanghai*, 248.
10. *Feetham’s Report*, 29–30.
11. Ibid, 51. See also Bickers, *Britain in China*, 125.
12. A telegram was sent from the SMC chairman to recognize Hong Kong’s 50th Jubilee. *Hong Kong Government Gazette*, 2 December 1893, 1185. The legal status of the SMC was denied because of the views of HM’s legal officers in Hong

- Kong to whom the 1854 Land Regulations had been referred: Maclennan, *The Story of Shanghai: from the opening of the port to foreign trade*, 101.
13. *NCH*, 29 January 1916, 223.
 14. The 1907 *Hongkong Blue Book* appeared in the *NCH*, 4 July 1908, 37–8; The Marine Enquiry into the *Tai On* piracy was reported fully in the *NCH*, 16 May 1914, 520–1. The weekly edition of the *NCH* carried a regular ‘Hong Kong Letter’.
 15. The SMC always contained many more Britons than any other nationality.
 16. See *Feeham’s Report*, Vols. 1 and 2, but also Maclennan, *The Story of Shanghai*; Lanning and Couling, *History*; Teichman, *Affairs in China*; Johnstone, *The Shanghai Problem*; Wei, *Shanghai: Crucible of Modern China*; Clifford, *Spoilt Children*; Johnson, *Shanghai*.
 17. In 1854 the American consul established a Consulate in Hongkew but in 1863 an agreement was reached for the amalgamation of the British and American Settlements. *Feeham’s Report*, 44–5.
 18. Lanning and Couling, *History*, 283.
 19. *Feeham’s Report*, 25; Wei, *Shanghai: Crucible of Modern China*, 32.
 20. *Feeham’s Report*, 27 describes the distinction between ‘Settlement’ and ‘Concession’.
 21. Johnstone, *The Shanghai Problem*, 74.
 22. Lanning and Couling, *History*, 292.
 23. *Feeham’s Report*, 27–8. Further amendments were made to the Land Regulations in 1869.
 24. Johnson, *Shanghai*, 326.
 25. Lanning and Couling, *History*, 321; Clifton’s Hong Kong Police salary in June 1853 was £100 p.a. Hong Kong Government *Blue Book*, 1853, 102. Shanghai’s complex currency arrangements during the early years are described by Lanning and Couling, *History*, 392–9. SMC annual reports used both dollars (\$) and Taels (Tls), the local currency.
 26. Lanning and Couling, *History*, 321; the Landrenters’ decision was carried by a majority of 18 to 15. ‘Landrenters’ — foreign settlers who leased or ‘rented’ land from the Chinese.
 27. *NCH*, 29 January 1916, 223.
 28. Wei, *Shanghai: Crucible of Modern China*, 100.
 29. Maclennan, *The Story of Shanghai: from the opening of the port to foreign trade*, 63.
 30. Report of the Captain Superintendent of Police, Shanghai Municipal Council Annual Report, 1866, 18. (Henceforth ‘Police Report’ and ‘SMCAR’).
 31. Wei, *Shanghai: Crucible of Modern China*, 101; Police Report, SMCAR, 1884, 43–4.
 32. *Feeham’s Report*, 52. Figure for 1935 in *New Frontiers, Imperialism’s New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953* by Bickers and Henriot (eds), 60.
 33. Police Report, SMCAR, 1866, 18.
 34. See Chapter 2.

35. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1884, 43–4.
36. In 1937, the Chinese nationals considered Sikh policemen of the SMP to be ‘symbolic of the most sinister aspect of imperialism’. Wakeman, ‘Policing Modern Shanghai’, *China Quarterly*, No. 115, September 1988, 413.
37. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1905, 23.
38. *Feetham’s Report*, 47.
39. Letter from Sir Havilland de Sausmarez, Chairman of the SMC, to HM Judge, *The Municipal Gazette*, 31 March 1910, 142.
40. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1906, 39.
41. Hong Kong did not have too many Indians. In 1927 there were insufficient Indians in Hong Kong for work as watchmen and 130 Indian men were imported from Singapore to make good the shortfall. *Hong Kong Administrative Report* 1927, K33.
42. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1907, 11.
43. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1908, 12.
44. *NCH*, 4 July 1908, 30–1.
45. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1910, 36. Drunkenness among Sikhs was a perennial problem and police courts dealt with many cases of Indian watchmen and unemployed Sikhs charged with being drunk and disorderly; See *NCH*, 28 January 1910, 225; 5 October 1912, 70; 24 March 1913, 590.
46. *NCH*, 31 December 1909, 801–2.
47. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1911, 33.
48. Airlie, *Thistle and Bamboo*, 126.
49. *NCH*, 31 December 1909, 802.
50. Weihaiwei men were also employed in the Hong Kong Police, initially as anti-piracy guards.
51. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1911, 33.
52. There were discipline problems with Weihaiwei men who joined the Hong Kong Police in 1923, their performance being ‘disappointing’. *Hong Kong Annual Police Reports* for 1924 and 1925. See also Miners, ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947’, 310.
53. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1912, 27A.
54. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1913, 35A.
55. *The Municipal Gazette*, 23 October 1913, 239 and 25 December 1913, 295; Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1913, 35A.
56. *NCH*, 3 January 1914, 21.
57. *The Municipal Gazette*, 5 February 1914, 25.
58. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1916, 26A.
59. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1917, 27A.
60. Title changed to Commissioner of Police in 1919, *SMCAR*, 1919, 44A.
61. The populations of the Foreign Settlement of Shanghai and Hong Kong in 1930/1931 were similar. In 1930 there were 1,007,868 people in Shanghai (*Feetham’s Report*, 50 and 53) whilst the official 1931 census for Hong Kong indicated 849,751.

62. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1916, 24A.
63. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1915, 24A; Wakeman describes how a decade later ‘a special Indian section’ was set up within the SMP’s Special Branch for ‘collecting information on Indian seditionist movements’, Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai 1927–1937*, 142–3.
64. See similarities in Chapter 6.
65. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1920, 49A.
66. Ibid, 53A. Chapter 6 showed that, with the 1928 Watchmen Ordinance, the Hong Kong Government also introduced a method of recording the fingerprints of all non-Chinese watchmen. Since Chinese watchmen were exempt from mandatory registration, their fingerprints were not collected, a major difference from the situation in Shanghai.
67. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1921, 41A.
68. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1922, 57A. A new police *Gurdwara* was opened in mid-1916, *SMCAR*, 1916, 23A. Because of its municipal status, Shanghai could not pass legislation in the same way as a colony.
69. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1924, 37.
70. The arming of Hong Kong’s Chinese policemen caused considerable disagreement until the early 1920s when they attended musketry and revolver courses and were issued with revolvers. During Hennessy’s governorship, Chinese constables were armed but the weapons were withdrawn when Hennessy left in 1882. Miners, ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947’, 307–9.
71. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1929, 58.
72. Annual Report for 1925, Hongkong, 2.
73. The ‘May Thirtieth’ incident of 1925 culminated in SMP officers firing at a large group of Chinese demonstrators outside the Louza Police Station in the International Settlement. Four demonstrators, including two students, were killed instantly and eight people died later. Clifford, *Spoilt Children*, Chapter 6. See also Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1925.
74. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1925, 31.
75. Clifford, *Spoilt Children*, 108–9 and 301.
76. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1925, 31.
77. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1929, 58 and 61.
78. *Feeham’s Report*, 51.
79. Wei, *Shanghai: Crucible of Modern China*, 105–6. See also, Ristaino, ‘The Russian diaspora community in Shanghai’, in Bickers and Henriot (eds), *New Frontiers, Imperialism’s New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953*, 148.
80. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 27 October 1927, 123–4.
81. HKGLCSP, 1931, No. 5/31, Appendix C. Three Chinese ‘watchwomen’.
82. *Hong Kong Government Administrative Report for 1931*, 33.
83. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1931, 53.
84. Police Report, *SMCAR*, 1942, 101.

85. Henriot, ‘Little Japan in Shanghai: an isolated community 1875–1945’, in Bickers and Henriot (eds), *New Frontiers, Imperialism’s New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953*, 148.
86. Miners, ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947’, 310.
87. Henriot, ‘Little Japan’, 148.
88. Miners, ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947’, 310.
89. This typifies the many differences in the administration of the two cities.

Chapter 9 Conclusion

1. As mentioned in Chapter 1, (i) the Hong Kong Police employed 27,375 uniformed officers in February 2007 and (ii) 83,256 valid female Security Personnel Permits (SPPs) had been issued at May 2007 out of a total of 276,927 SPPs.
2. For some inexplicable reason, cleaning staff and security personnel were bracketed together in this attempt to get Hong Kong employers to pay adequate wages.
3. *Guardian Unlimited* — 31 October 2006: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329614907-103550,00.html>.
4. Appendix 4.
5. The Chinese in Hong Kong contributed 90 percent of the 1881 government revenues. Governor Hennessy’s speech on the census in the *HKGG*, 4 June 1881, 390.
6. In 1866 an estimated 111,482 Chinese people lived in Hong Kong, 130,168 in 1876 and 150,690 in 1881. The number of Chinese Trading Hongs rose from 215 in 1876 to 395 in 1881. *Historical and Statistical Abstracts of the Colony of Hong Kong 1841–1930*, 4 June 1881, 385–92.
7. Davis to Stanley, 28 January 1845: CO129/11, 71–3.
8. Appendix 9, §10; *HKGG*, 31 October 1885, 930.
9. Organization of the District Watch Force changed after World War II with watchmen’s wages being the Hong Kong Government’s responsibility, not the Chinese merchants’.
10. The Po Leung Kuk’s *raison d’être* was to provide a refuge for females, principally those abducted for prostitution. Because of its nature, some secrecy could be expected. However, Whitehead was concerned with the ‘non-transparent’ nature of the Po Leung Kuk’s business acumen rather than how the victims’ status was determined. Despite having used the term ‘secret society’, he never intended his fellow Legislative Councillors to think that the Po Leung Kuk was on a par with other secret societies, which usually meant the Triads.
11. Departmental security personnel were usually poorly paid though sometimes their wages were not much different from those of constables in the regular police force.
12. Chapter 5 and Appendix 12.
13. Appendix 16.
14. *Hong Kong Hansard*, 9 August 1950, 258, §34.

15. Registration of Persons Ordinance, 1949 (Cap. 177); *Hong Kong Hansard*, 3 August and 17 August 1949, 224–8 and 236–7.
16. The argument that applied to the Indian watchmen refers equally to the Chinese men who were village scouts and village guards.
17. Appendix 20, §4.
18. Appendix 16, §9.
19. See Endnote 1.
20. *The Municipal Gazette*, 5 February 1914, 25.

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