

# *Merchants of Canton and Macao*

Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade

Paul A. Van Dyke



香港大學出版社

HONG KONG UNIVERSITY PRESS



Kyoto University Press

This book has been generously supported by  
Instituto Cultural do Governo da R.A.E. de Macau

Hong Kong University Press  
14/F Hing Wai Centre  
7 Tin Wan Praya Road  
Aberdeen  
Hong Kong  
[www.hkupress.org](http://www.hkupress.org)

ISBN 978-988-8028-91-7

Kyoto University Press  
Yoshida South Campus  
Kyoto University  
69 Konoe-cho Yoshida  
Sakyo, Kyoto 606-8315  
Japan  
[www.kyoto-up.or.jp](http://www.kyoto-up.or.jp)

ISBN 978-4-87698-586-9

© Paul A. Van Dyke 2011

This edition, published jointly by Hong Kong University Press and  
Kyoto University Press in 2011, is sold by Kyoto University Press in Japan  
exclusively, and by Hong Kong University Press in the rest of the world.

All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced  
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,  
including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval  
system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data  
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed and bound by Paramount Printing Company Limited, Hong Kong, China

---

# CONTENTS

List of Tables	vii
List of Appendixes	ix
Preface	xiii
Acknowledgements	xxi
List of Abbreviations	xxiii
Map of the Pearl River Delta	xxxiii
INTRODUCTION	
Capitalism Canton Style	1
CHAPTER ONE	
The Trading Environment	7
CHAPTER TWO	
Contracts and Trade	31
CHAPTER THREE	
Growing Pains, Partnerships and the Co-hong	49
CHAPTER FOUR	
Merchants and the Canton Junks	67
CHAPTER FIVE	
Tan Suqua 陳壽官 and Family 1716–1778	79
CHAPTER SIX	
Tan Hunqua 陳芳觀 and Family 1713–1781	103
CHAPTER SEVEN	
Cai and Qiu Enterprises 蔡邱企業 1730–1784	123

CHAPTER EIGHT	
Beaukeequa 黎開觀 and Family 1726–1758	137
CHAPTER NINE	
Yan 顏 Family 1734–1780s	149
CHAPTER TEN	
Mandarin Quiqua 陳魁官 and Family 1724–1794	169
CHAPTER ELEVEN	
Ye 葉 Merchants and Tacqua Amoy 長茂榮 1720–1804	181
CHAPTER TWELVE	
Zhang 張 Merchants 1721–1780	199
CHAPTER THIRTEEN	
Liang 梁 Merchants 1729–1756	207
CONCLUSION	
The Limits of Commerce	213
Appendixes	227
Notes	433
Bibliography	483
Index	519

---

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1	Comparison of Different Standards Used to Pack Bohea Tea	38
Table 2.2	Asian Bottomry Premiums Recorded by a Swedish Traveler in 1731	46
Table 3.1	Growth of Trade from 1730s to 1760s	50
Table 3.2	Officers of the Co-hong from 1760 to 1771 and Their Responsibilities	57
Table 4.1	Southeast Asian Junk Imports Used Domestically and in the Export Trade	67
Table 4.2	Usages of <i>Gongsi</i> 公司 or <i>Gongbanya</i> 公班牙 ( 衙 ) in Chinese Documents	77
Table 6.1	Amounts and Prices of Tea Entered into the EIC's Books on 28 June 1729	107

---

## LIST OF APPENDIXES

- 1 A Note about Data in the Appendixes
- 2 Contents of 64 Contracts
- 3A Three-Family Trade with the VOC 1758–1772
- 3B Three-Family Percentages of the Canton Trade 1763–1764, 1766–1769
- 3C VOC Export Figures Compared 1729–1793
- 3D *Hong* Merchants Before and After the Establishment of the Co-hong in 1760
- 4A Return Crews, Cargos and Port Fees of 14 Canton Junks Leaving Batavia in the 1750s
- 4B Canton Imports and Ports of Call of an Unspecified Number of Junks in 1761
- 4C Canton Imports and Ports of Call of 33 Junks in 1764
- 4D Canton Imports and Ports of Call of 36 Junks in 1766
- 4E Canton Imports and Ports of Call of 33 Junks in 1767
- 4F Canton Imports and Ports of Call of 41 Junks in 1768
- 4G Canton Imports and Ports of Call of 21 Junks in 1769
- 4H Canton Imports and Ports of Call of 33 Junks in 1770
- 4I Canton Imports and Ports of Call of 21 Junks in 1773 and 14 Junks in 1774
- 4J Distributions of 280 Canton Junk Import Cargos
- 4K Canton Junk Imports Used in the Export Trade and Breakdown of Wood and Drug Imports
- 4L Summary of Cargo Data
- 4M Destinations of 232 Canton Junks
- 5A Tan Suqua's Schedule
- 5B Chetqua's Schedule
- 5C Tinquá's Schedule
- 5D Coqua's Schedule
- 5E Quiqua's Schedule
- 5F Tan Suqua and Family Trade with the DAC 1736–1772
- 5G Tan Suqua and Family Trade with the VOC 1729–1777
- 5H Tan Suqua's Trade with the SOIC in 1752 and Loans Given to Chetqua by the Swedish Supercargoes to Finance the Family Trade 1762–1776

- 5I Tan Suqua and Family Trade with the GIC 1724–1732
- 5J VOC, DAC, EIC and SOIC Factory Rents Paid to Tan Suqua’s Family 1730–1769
- 5K Tan Suqua and Family Trade with the EIC 1753–1777
- 5L Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 5
- 6A Tan Hunqua’s Schedule
- 6B Fat Hunqua’s Schedule
- 6C Tan Conqua’s Schedule
- 6D Tan Hunqua, Fat Hunqua and Conqua’s Trade with the GIC, DAC and VOC 1727–1780
- 6E Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 6
- 7A Gau Semqua’s Schedule
- 7B Cai Hunqua’s Schedule
- 7C Anqua, Tseonqua, Taiqua and Sequa’s Schedule
- 7D Tsjonqua’s Schedule
- 7E Cai-Qiu and Company Trade with the DAC 1739–1772
- 7F Cai-Qiu and Company Trade with the VOC 1757–1784
- 7G Cai-Qiu Loans from Swedish Supercargoes 1765–1772
- 7H Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 7
- 8A Beaukeequa’s Schedule
- 8B Ley Keyqua and Fuiqua’s Schedule
- 8C Beaukeequa’s Trade with the GIC, VOC and DAC 1726–1758
- 8D DAC Factory Rents Paid to Beaukeequa 1752–1757
- 8E Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 8
- 9A Texia’s Schedule
- 9B Swetia’s Schedule
- 9C Ingsia’s Schedule
- 9D Awue’s Schedule
- 9E Limsia’s Schedule
- 9F Waysee’s Schedule
- 9G Hongsia’s Schedule
- 9H Lipsia’s Schedule
- 9I Yan Family Trade with the DAC 1734–1772
- 9J Yan Family Factory Rents Mentioned in the DAC, EIC, and VOC Records 1734–1772
- 9K Yan Family Trade with the VOC 1757–1780
- 9L Short-Term and Long-Term Loans given to the Yan Merchants by the Swedish Supercargos to Finance the Family Trade 1764–1772

- 9M Bottomry Bonds taken out by Hongsia from the Swedish Supercargos to Finance the Canton Junk Trade to Southeast Asia 1762–1774
- 9N Yan Family Junks with Destinations and Sponsors 1765–1772
- 9O Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 9
- 10A Mandarin Quiqua’s Schedule
- 10B Inqua’s Schedule
- 10C Chowqua’s Schedule
- 10D Locqua’s Schedule
- 10E Mandarin Quiqua’s Trade with the GIC, VOC and DAC 1724–1747
- 10F Chowqua and Locqua’s Trade with the GIC, VOC and DAC 1724–1792
- 10G Cargo on Chowqua’s Batavia Junk Captured by Captain McClary in 1782
- 10H Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 10
- 11A Cudgin’s Schedule
- 11B Leunqua’s Schedule
- 11C Tacqua Amoy’s Schedule
- 11D Consentia Giqua’s Schedule
- 11E Tiauqua’s Schedule
- 11F Yanqua’s Schedule
- 11G Cudgin’s Trade with the GIC 1724–1726
- 11H Ye Merchants’ Trade with the VOC 1730–1774
- 11I Ye Merchants’ Trade with the DAC 1734–1799
- 11J Tacqua Amoy’s Trade with the VOC and DAC 1731–1766
- 11K Consentia Giqua’s (Tiauqua) Bottomry Bond with the Swedish Supercargos to Finance Junk *Quionschyn* to Passiack in 1768
- 11L Consentia Giqua’s Junks with Destinations and Sponsors 1764–1772
- 11M Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 11
- 12A Pinky’s Schedule
- 12B Foutia’s Schedule
- 12C Kousia’s Schedule
- 12D Pinky’s Trade with the GIC, VOC and DAC 1724–1738
- 12E Foutia’s Trade with the GIC, VOC and DAC 1727–1762
- 12F Kousia’s Trade with the VOC and DAC 1762–1777
- 12G Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 12
- 13A Emanuel Quiqua’s Schedule
- 13B Attay’s Schedule
- 13C Emanuel Quiqua’s Trade with the GIC, VOC and DAC 1730–1747
- 13D Attay’s Trade with the DAC and SOIC 1734–1752
- 13E Nomenclature Problems in Chapter 13



## C H A P T E R   T W O

---

# CONTRACTS AND TRADE

In this chapter, I analyze trade contracts in Canton, using the 64 examples in the plate section for reference. These documents are little known among scholars, primarily because none of them have survived in China. To my knowledge, the only detailed contracts from the Canton trade are found in foreign archives. They are important, not only because they provide a window into each merchant's operation, but also because they reveal the limits of the system supporting the trade. Contracts help to define the formal and informal legal structures that governed commerce. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the formal structure (written agreements) was important in building foreign confidence and attracting more traders to China. By the late eighteenth century, however, the informal structure (practices) was, in fact, more important for growth.<sup>1</sup>

In an open market like Canton, where everyone outside of China was welcomed regardless of who they were or where they had come from so long as they came to trade (except Russians and Japanese who were under separate trade agreements), trust was essential. Foreigners had to be assured that, if they sent their ships to China, they would be able to sell their arriving cargoes and purchase exports at acceptable prices. Foreign shippers needed a relatively high assurance that their profit rewards in China were greater than the business opportunities in their home ports. If risks were too high and profits too low, they simply would send their ships to other places and invest their money elsewhere. Written contracts helped to provide the level of trust and assurance needed to convince investors that China was among their best choices.

As any student of the trade will know, Chinese officials in Canton had no easy task in balancing foreign demands for more freedoms and Beijing's concerns for more control. The legal status of contracts in Canton was different from how these documents were treated in many Western countries. In the West, contracts might be presented in a court of law as evidence to convince a judge or jury that a breach had taken place and that one party deserved retribution. As long as the contract was written in accordance with the law of the land in which it was enacted, and duly signed and agreed upon by each party, then it became a legally binding agreement with consequences for non-compliance.

In Canton, contracts operated much differently. They were written agreements, but only between the signers. The terms agreed upon in contracts were made irrespective of the laws of China. In fact, many of the stipulations went contrary to Chinese law, such as borrowing money from foreigners and trading in contraband.

In the 1760s, some contracts even had terms written into them that were contrary to the policies of the Co-hong, which was the official governing body of trade. Yet both parties agreed to them. Thus, the first distinction we need to make concerning contracts in Canton is that they were not 'officially' considered to be legal documents. That did not mean, however, that they were entirely without government support.

Even though credit transactions with foreigners were banned officially, governor-generals and Hoppo were well aware that trade would be greatly hindered without them. In order to ensure this did not happen, they needed to honour these private agreements between Chinese and foreigners. When a breach in contract occurred, and one party or the other complained they had been mistreated, security merchants and linguists were sent to investigate. A Mandarin might be sent along to make sure everything was done as requested. When this investigating committee came to visit, it was perfectly acceptable to present, as proof of the breach, the written contracts that had been signed by both parties. It did not matter that the terms of the contract were contrary to the law because the merchants and linguists would censor that part out in their report or, at least, tone it down so it did not implicate them or local officials. After examining the written agreement and questioning both parties, the merchants and linguists then gave their report and offered suggestions to the authorities about how they thought justice could be best served and the matter resolved.

If the governor-general or Hoppo liked the suggestions presented by the investigative committee, they might put it into law with an edict. If they did not like the proposal, they might ask the merchants and linguists to meet again and come up with something more acceptable. All minor disputes were handled in Canton by the local authorities. If foreigners felt they were not receiving justice, they could apply directly to the governor, governor-general or Hoppo for an audience and/or send them a written protest. In either case, linguists had to translate for them (if in person), or the documents had to be translated and written in Chinese before being presented. If the oral or written protests contained any mention of a specific contract, it would be deleted. Only the general information concerning the disputes went forward to a higher level.

In serious cases, where a *Hong* merchant, or several *Hong* merchants, failed and were left owing large amounts to multiple foreigners, the governor-general and/or Hoppo would ask foreigners to assemble a list of all debts owed by these failed merchants and give the lists to the linguists to be translated, with each person's name and the amount they were owed. The written contracts could again be used to convince security merchants or linguists that such a debt was valid. Chinese merchants also could use the written contracts to prove they had fulfilled their part of the bargain and that the claims were unjustified.

Having a written document probably was helpful for small private traders to justify their claims, but the companies could do the same by pulling figures out of the account books and presenting them to the investigating committee. The committee would then contact the accused party to verify the numbers. If there

were disagreements about the amounts owed and which could not be resolved on the spot, then that fact was noted as well. In the end, all that was reported to officials were the legitimate claims (according to the investigative committee's findings), the claims of the petitioners and the accused (if they differed from the legitimate claims), and suggestions about how to settle the matter.

Governor-generals and/or Hoppo would meet with the accused Chinese merchants to hear their defence. It was often the case that the matter already had been thoroughly investigated before that happened. In response, the accused merchants had admitted their guilt and consulted with the investigative committee on how the debts could be settled. Foreigners sometimes demanded an audience to present their cases, which might or might not be granted. If an audience was not forthcoming, then they could send a written complaint or protest, but it would be censored as explained above.

Sometimes a matter was much more serious, resulting in the case being referred to the emperor. If that happened, the same procedure would be followed: an investigative committee formed, information collected, a report given and suggestions offered on how to resolve the matter. A memorial would then be written that included all pertinent information and sent to Beijing. Officials then waited for the emperor's reply. The original contracts were not an official part of any of these investigations either on the local level in Canton or at the Court in Beijing. No reference would be made to them specifically and no explanation of their contents revealed — except perhaps a brief statement mentioning that one party had contracted tea or illegally borrowed money from another party and failed to deliver or repay the debt.

The original written contracts were purposely left out of official proceedings because they could cause problems for local officials in allowing such transactions to occur in the first place. This makes sense when we think about what might happen if they were entered as evidence. Most of these contracts were bilingual. Even if the Chinese texts contained no incriminating evidence, officials could not be certain that the foreign texts were free from damaging references. The problem of having the texts translated from the various foreign languages into Chinese was itself a good reason to omit them. Even if they managed to find someone who could translate Danish, Swedish and Dutch texts into Chinese, how could they be certain the translations were correct? What if someone in Beijing ordered another translation with a completely different outcome?

In the end, these documents really were not important anyway. What the officials needed was a way to establish the legitimate claims and a way to resolve them, both of which the investigative committee could do. It did not necessarily matter how the debts were incurred. The accumulation of debts was itself an illegal act. Just the fact that it had happened was all that was needed to pass sentence on the accused. It did matter, however, that foreign traders were treated fairly (or at least tolerably fair) to make certain they were not discouraged from returning to Canton. Of course, the latter outcome was essential for growth and ensuring that foreign investments continued to flow to China, and revenues from this trade continued to flow to Beijing in increasing amounts.

A failed *Hong* merchant might be reprimanded strongly, put under house arrest, physically punished, chained, imprisoned and/or sentenced to spending the rest of his life in Yili (伊犁, Kulja, present city of Yining 伊宁) for incurring debts. Regardless of the severity of the offence, the contracts he signed with foreigners were never 'officially' entered as evidence of his guilt. This latter factor is probably why none of these documents has been seen in Chinese archives or mentioned in memorials.

Now that I have discussed the informal status of contracts, I turn to a description of their contents. Most of the contracts that have survived from Canton are written in Chinese as well as English, Dutch, Danish, French or Swedish. So far, bilingual contracts from Canton have not been found in Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish or Italian archives. All of the European archives in this second grouping contain letters and correspondences in their respective languages, but bilingual trade documents from the Canton merchant houses are hard to find.

We know, from numerous references, that many persons in the eighteenth century involved in the foreign trade were using written contracts in China. But for whatever reasons, the originals have not survived. Some contracts can be found written in all of the languages above, as copies, but these do not have the Chinese texts or the chops of the merchant houses. They are, nonetheless, valuable for the information they provide.

No Chinese records from the merchant houses in Canton have emerged from any of the archives in Guangdong Province or in China as a whole. The only surviving Chinese records are those that were sent to Beijing and locally produced documents such as gazetteers. The Beijing records and local gazetteers generally only mention merchants when they are somehow involved with activities relating to criminal behaviour, smuggling, international relations, bankruptcies, contributions to government, official appointments, imperial examination graduates, etc. They contain almost nothing about the day-to-day transactions of trade. These collections also have no documents from the merchants themselves, such as the ones discussed below.<sup>2</sup>

From conversations the author has had with some of the descendants of the Canton merchant families, there appears to be no private records or collections that have survived either. City officials, museum curators, librarians and scholars in Canton have confirmed that most of the records from the merchant guilds during the eighteenth century, such as the Jinlun Huiguan discussed in this volume, have also vanished. Fortunately, guilds and temples often made stone steles whereon they inscribed the names of members and contributors. Some of these steles contain Canton merchants' names. Many of these organizations, buildings and steles, however, have now disappeared.

Some family genealogies were assembled by descendants of the Canton merchant families, such as Chen, Pan, Wu, Ye and Yan. However, these documents typically only mention very general details about family members, such as being 'involved in trade' or 'donated money to charity'. They usually have no specific information about trading activities. Moreover, genealogies everywhere usually only

record good things about family members and omit such things as crimes, debts, bankruptcies and failures. Many genealogies of families in Guangdong or Fujian provinces do not go back as far as the eighteenth century. In this study, I have utilized a couple of these documents, but more work could be done in this area.

In order to understand the value of the contracts discussed here, it is perhaps appropriate to say a few words about where information about Chinese merchants can be found. Before the eighteenth century, only Portuguese traded directly and regularly with China, through Macao. Portuguese documents and Chinese records, however, contain very little detailed information about Chinese merchants. Nothing of substance has emerged from archives in Portugal, Spain or the Philippines concerning Chinese merchants in the Pearl River Delta in the eighteenth century. In fact, if Portuguese, Spanish and Chinese records were the only ones we had, it would not be possible to write these family histories. It is unfortunate for the historian, but so far the only substantial data about Chinese merchants in eighteenth-century Canton are contained in other European archives, which is where the contracts in this volume came from.

The 64 contracts reproduced in this volume were written in Dutch, Danish or Swedish. These archives contain more than 100 original bilingual contracts, written in Canton by the merchants themselves. Some of these documents are extensive, comprising several pages spelling out the particulars of trade; many have accompanying Chinese texts. Others, however, are only a single paragraph that mentions what was purchased and a signature or chop from a Chinese merchant acknowledging the agreement.

Appendix 2 lists the basic contents of the 64 contracts reproduced in the plates. These documents, of course, only represent a tiny fraction of the total volume of transactions. They are quite diverse in their contents, but a few general points can be raised about their function and the trade in general.

All export merchandise was shipped free-on-board (FOB). Whatever happened to the products, from the time they left inland producing areas to the time they arrived aboard the ships at Whampoa, was the responsibility of the Chinese merchants (or the inland agents). All transport costs to the ships were the responsibility of the seller. If the products were damaged by a fire, flood or some other disaster before arrival in Canton, regardless of whether they were being stored in the *Hong* merchants' factories or the foreigners' warehouses, or whether the goods sank or were damaged en route between Canton and Whampoa, the *Hong* merchants were responsible. This standard practice was maintained throughout the Canton era.

Chinese merchants employed several means of spreading the risks. They stored goods in many locations throughout the city and suburbs so fire in one location would not destroy their entire inventory. They also tried to transfer some of the risks to the buyers. When negotiating large contracts, they could insist that buyers assume the risks of fire in exchange for a better price. The extract below shows an agreement merchants made with the English East India Company (EIC) in 1756.

1756, Jan 12: Beau Khiqua, Sweetia & Sweequa told us they could not pretend to keep so large a quantity of tea, as we had bought of them at their risque of fire, that they therefore understood it was the companys. After some deliberation we agreed it must be so, but desired they would lodge it for us in different parts of the town, & on the other side of the river, in good & secure places, and take as much care of it as if it was their own, w[hi]ch they promised; we further told them that if any of their teas were stole it must be for their acco[un]t, as were likewise to be the accidents that might happen at shipping it, or upon the river, until it was deliver'd on board, to which they agree'd.<sup>3</sup>

As this statement reveals, the English agreed to stand security in the case of fire but all other risks, including theft, sinking of a chop boat, flood and rain damage, were the responsibility of the Chinese merchants. The Qing government usually supported this FOB policy on exports. The practice made good sense because Chinese merchants had much more control over what happened to the goods while they were in storage in Canton and en route to Whampoa so they also had some means of protecting the goods. After the products arrived aboard the ships, the foreigners gained control of them and the risks of loss and damage were rightfully transferred to them.

Because the Qing government supported the matching of risks with those who were in control of the goods, the agreement above between the three Chinese merchants and the EIC would probably not hold up if a fire occurred. The EIC could still refuse to accept the losses. If that happened, local officials would likely force the Chinese sellers to bear the costs. The EIC officers were undoubtedly aware of the government's stand on these matters when they made this agreement, which helps to explain why they so readily agreed. By conceding to the merchants' demands, the English could negotiate a better price on their tea, and in the end, still refuse to bear the risks, if a fire occurred. They had nothing to lose and everything to gain.

The policy was that imports were shipped to Canton FOB, at the foreigners' risks and expense. Plates 03.03 and 03.04 are contracts for imports and do not mention this FOB policy, but it was commonly understood that this was the case. The contract in Plate 09.06 spells this stipulation out more clearly. Occasionally, import merchandise could not be sold and had to be stored in Canton. If this happened, then the goods needed to be unloaded out of the ships and sent to the factories to make room in the hulls for exports. Import duties would have to be paid, when they were transferred to Canton, but the sale of the merchandise could be negotiated at a later date.

The FOB policy on imports was not as straightforward as that on exports. Even though foreigners were responsible for all risks, duties and transport costs on the goods they brought to China, including fees at the tollhouses, it did not always work this way. The government's policy of matching risks with those in control might again take effect. The chop boats that transported these goods were owned by the *Hong* merchants. The foreigners might send a couple soldiers to accompany

the shipments to Canton, which helped to minimize pilfering by chop boat crews. But if something happened to the goods en route, owing to theft, sinking, water damage or fire, the owners of the chop boats could still be held responsible because they had assumed temporary possession of the goods. The *Hong* merchants also owned the factories where the foreigners lived and where the imports were weighed and stored. If something happened to imports while in those buildings, Chinese merchants might also be implicated because the damage occurred on their property. The foreigners were supposed to pay the duties on imports, but, if they failed to do so, the *Hong* merchant who provided security for the ship had to pay them.

In practice, the shipping of imports into Canton worked fairly smoothly. There were few disputes over who was to pay for damages or duties. Foreigners usually accepted this FOB policy, but there were exceptions. Occasionally, a warehouse caught fire, a chop boat sank or merchandise was pilfered en route, which raised concerns over who would bear the costs. These disputes were of no consequence to Hoppos or customs officers because, in the end, the security merchants would pay the duties and work out the settlements with foreigners. It was the *Hong* merchants and linguists' responsibilities to resolve all of these matters.

Sales of imports may or may not include packaging. Several documents in Plates 04.03 to 04.10, for example, show the Dutch collecting pepper sacks and shipping them back to Batavia. The pepper was shipped to the *Hong* merchants in sacks, but dumped out in their factories where workers repacked the product. Cotton bales, however, were delivered with their bindings intact. Sales of some exports, such as metals used for ballast, might not require packaging, but for most other products — including tea, porcelain and silk — packaging was essential and included in the price. Foreigners could stipulate how they wanted the goods to be packed. Regarding the various kinds of tea, each company maintained different standards.

It was important to stipulate in contracts what type of packaging was desired. Standard-sized tea chests in Canton ranged from very large whole chests, which took two men to carry, to small canisters that were one-sixteenth their size. Any size could be ordered and packed in any manner the foreigners preferred, but these factors needed to be negotiated at the time of purchase. As a general rule, less expensive black teas, such as Bohea, were packed in large whole chests. By the 1820s, whole chests had largely been done away with and much of the trade switched to quarter chests. In the eighteenth century, however, a wide range of large and small chests and canisters were used by each company. The more expensive green teas were packed in smaller containers, ranging in size according to their quality. The most expensive teas were put into small tin canisters and placed in the top layers of the hulls so they would not be crushed by other merchandise.

All of the large tea chests were made of wood and lined inside with lead on all sides, which preserved the tea. The chests had to be strong enough to be stacked in many layers in the hulls without being crushed. The thickness of the lead lining added significantly to their tare weights. Customs duties were determined

by the gross weights of the products prior to being shipped to Whampoa. Customs allowed 10 percent for packaging, and no more. If the empty chests went over that percentage, such as 15 percent of the gross weight, then duties were applied to the package as well.

For example, a tea chest weighing 300 catties was allowed 10 percent for the package, or 30 catties. Customs would charge duties on 270 catties of tea. If the tare weight on that chest was actually 50 catties, and not 30 catties, customs paid no attention to this. Duties would still be charged on 270 catties of tea, when there was actually only 250 catties in the chest. In this case, duties had to be paid on 20 catties which was not for tea but rather for the extra weight of the package. It was thus important to stipulate what the tare weights of the chests should be so that duties were charged only on the product and not on the package.

In other cases, foreigners allowed the chests to be heavier than 10 percent of the gross weights, even though it required paying some duties on the packages. They allowed this because they wanted sufficiently thick lead lining in the chests so the tea was well protected. Many of the Danish Asiatic Company (DAC) tea contracts in Appendix 2 stipulate the tare weights of whole chests to be 48 to 50 catties, and the net weight of tea in each to be from 260 to 280 catties. The empty chests made up about 15 percent of the gross weight. This was done to provide added protection for the tea inside.

All of this is fairly straightforward and makes sense. However, the different net standards that each company maintained for their chests also affected the final prices. Chinese merchants paid all export duties, and supplied all the packages (chests), so they had to build the costs of the extra duties and extra packages into their prices. This is why we see these particulars included in some of the contracts in Appendix 2. Table 2.1 shows some examples of actual net weights of tea chests for several companies.

Table 2.1 Comparison of Different Standards Used to Pack Bohea Tea<sup>4</sup>

Year	Company	Net catties Bohea tea per chest	Number of whole chests needed to pack 500 piculs of Bohea tea
1760s	VOC	295	169
1750s	DAC	280	179
1760s	SOIC	270	185
1740s	CFI	260	192
1780s	EIC	255	196
1720s	GIC	230	217
1730s	EIC	220	227

Key: VOC = Dutch East India Company, DAC = Danish Asiatic Company, SOIC = Swedish East India Company, CFI = French East India Company, EIC = English East India Company, GIC = Ostend General India Company



As the figures in Table 2.1 reveal, it took 58 more chests to pack 500 piculs of Bohea tea when the net weight standard for each chest was lowered from 295 catties to 220 catties. These standards are actual examples taken from the respective companies' records. Therefore they are realistic representations of what the *Hong* merchants had to deal with on a regular basis. Besides the additional costs of duties, the chests and their lead linings, 58 more chests would most likely have required an additional chop boat to carry the goods to Whampoa, which meant another day's labour for the crew of that boat. Chop boats also had to stop at the three customs houses en route to be inspected and then pay a fee at each stop which added to the transport costs.

Obviously, the price of tea would be different for a contract of 500 piculs of top grade Bohea tea packed in 227 chests than if it were for 500 piculs packed in 169 chests, but there were other problems connected to these different standards as well. The packing of tea for each company was done by the same coolies in the same warehouses. On 3 November 1764, for example, the Dutch reported that a total of about 1,200 coolies were employed in Canton packing tea that day in seven different locations. Out of that number, 700 of the coolies were employed by three merchants packing tea for the Dutch East India Company (VOC).<sup>5</sup> Coolies might spend three days packing for the Swedes, four days for the French, a day packing a small order for the Danes, another day packing tea for some private ships, then a week packing for the English, and so on. They might pack the same tea into the same-sized chests, but with different net and tare weight requirements according to each customer's preferences.

Foreign companies were very particular about the packing of their tea. Less tea in each chest meant better preserved tea leaves and less tea dust; more tea in each chest maximized cargo space but at the sacrifice of crushing tea leaves and increasing the powder in the bottom of each chest. Crushed leaves or tea with a lot of dust commanded a lower price in Europe than tea with whole leaves and no dust. *Hong* merchants needed to pay attention to these concerns, otherwise they might be asked to repack the product to meet company specifications.

Some companies mixed other varieties of tea into each chest, and this too needed to be stipulated in the contracts. In Plate 11.08, for example, the Danes packed each chest with one-half Bohea and one-half Congo tea. In Plate 11.14, they stipulated two-thirds Bohea and one-third Congo tea. The Dutch and Swedes regularly mixed their Bohea with a portion of Ankey tea. In some cases, the two teas would be mixed as the chests were being packed, but, in other cases, foreigners wanted one type of tea on the bottom of each chest and the rest of the space filled with another type of tea. In other cases, the mixing of the teas was done en masse with two types being dumped together into a huge pile and mixed before they were packed. This method, however, gave rise to uneven mixtures in each chest.

As might be expected, many times chests were not packed according to the specifications. It was impossible for coolies to keep track of all these different variables so that every company had exactly what they wanted. Packing always took place under the supervision of a couple of officers from the buyers and a

couple of writers (secretaries) from the *Hong* merchant houses. Considering that there might be anywhere from fifty to hundreds of chests being packed at the same time, with hundreds of coolies working in the same large hall, it is obvious that such few officers could not keep watch over every one.

The persons carrying the tea to the packers regulated the number of baskets brought to each chest. However, sometimes they carried the wrong teas making the mixtures incorrect; sometimes they lost count of the baskets making the chest too heavy or too light or the mixture uneven. Occasionally, the chests had to be repacked because the lead lining, or the wooden frame, were later found to be inferior. If any irregularities occurred, buyers had the right, according to their contracts, to demand that a whole batch or part of a batch be dumped out and packed again. Repacking, of course, added much expense and time to a contract, and *Hong* merchants did their best to avoid these delays.

In the event they had to repack a batch of tea, *Hong* merchants might transfer the blame to the coolies and servants in the factory, requiring them to do the repacking on their own time and expense. If the items that needed repacking were porcelain or silk, the *Hong* merchant might require the porcelain dealers or silk weavers to handle the repacking. In all of these situations, of course, there was potential for creating much ill will with the persons who had to bear the extra costs.

Sometimes the officers in Canton were just too busy and too few in number to catch the discrepancies, and the chests were sent to the ships as if they were all in good order. When they arrived in Europe, however, they were inspected again. Buyers would insist on being reimbursed if tea chests were found to be too heavy or too light or containing the wrong mixture of tea (according to a tea tasters' opinion); or porcelain chests were found with inferior products or items that were of the wrong type or colour; or silk fabrics were not embroidered according to the musters or of the wrong colour or were cut too short, etc. The *Hong* merchants might try to pass these costs onto servants or vendors, but, in many cases, they had to absorb these themselves. By the late eighteenth century, claims were being filed every year by every company for goods found to be miss-packed when they arrived in Europe.

In the examples above, some protection was offered to both parties if all of these particulars had been spelled out clearly in contracts. But there were other variables that could affect profits, and that usually did not get stipulated in contracts. Tea that was packed on a hot day, for example, might be contaminated by coolies' sweat dripping into the boxes; or tea that was packed after a very long day might be contaminated when coolies' feet were blistering and exuding blood and puss into the leaves. When it was pouring rain, tea would likely absorb moisture, which meant it might spoil before it reached Europe, or the taste might be affected by the moisture. All of these situations were to be avoided, if possible. Each of the foreign companies had different ideas about how long the coolies could work, and under what climate conditions, before the tea might be damaged.

In several of the DAC contracts in Appendix 2, it stipulates that two coolies

were to pack each whole Bohea tea chest. In the contracts that have survived, I found no mention of weather conditions. But it is clear from many of the companies' journals that they refused to allow packing to proceed on certain days because of the concerns listed above. But even with these precautions, if the tea arrived in Europe and was determined to have been in some way contaminated when it was packed in Canton, owing to any of the factors above, then Chinese merchants were expected to make it right. By the mid-eighteenth century, it was generally assumed by all companies that any tea that could not sell in Europe for the normal going market prices must have been in some way contaminated when it was packed, and so the Chinese merchants must bear the loss. What this meant, of course, was that in practice, Chinese merchants guaranteed the profitable sale of every chest they sold to the companies.

Another variable that affected prices was the advances given for future orders. As revealed in many of the contracts described in Appendix 2, the amount of the advances and when they were to be repaid were important to mention to avoid misunderstandings. Advances were often given in the off-season in January, February or March for products delivered in September, October or November. This planning ahead was necessary so the money could be sent inland and orders placed with producers. Those products were then earmarked for those specific buyers.

Issuing advances was the most effective way to ensure there would be enough products to load the ships when they arrived. If no interest was applied to the advances, then the products could be contracted at lower prices than what normally would be paid in the height of the trading season. If buyers insisted on receiving interest on the advances, then prices were raised accordingly to cover that cost.

Advances were paid using a combination of silver coin and import goods, or paid entirely in silver coin. Advances using only imports were generally not allowed in the eighteenth century. The majority of the advances, usually at least 80 percent, had to be in silver coin. As is the case in several contracts in Appendix 2, sometimes the money was given eight months in advance. In other cases all or part of the funds were delayed until the first ships arrived in the next season with more silver. In Plate 05.11 (No. 12, Appendix 2), for example, the Danes contracted Bohea tea of top grade Tauson, in February 1766, to be delivered towards the end of the year (exact date is unspecified). They gave an advance of silver coin up front which amounted to about 50 percent of the total purchase price; then 4 taels per picul were to be paid in silver when the first ship arrived (around August); and the remainder was paid in silver upon final delivery.

If we compare that contract with another one the Danes made this year, it becomes obvious how important the advances and interest rates were to these agreements. The contract in Plate 05.12 was made by the Danes about a month after the one above for the same type of tea (Bohea of top grade Tauson) and was also due to be delivered towards the end of the year. This time, however, the Danes did not give an advance, but agreed to pay 10 taels per picul (in silver) when the first ship arrived (around August) and the remaining balance upon delivery.

The same tea, purchased with the same currency, having the same exchange rate, packed in the same manner, using the same sized chests, delivered on the same terms, and weighed with the same weights (so the size of the picul would have been identical), cost 2 taels per picul more than the contract above.

This increase in price does not reflect an increase in the market price. It is rather compensation for not giving an advance up front on the second contract. The Chinese merchants had to use their own money (or money they had borrowed), in the amount of 10 taels per picul, to give to the inland tea suppliers to secure this order. They would not be reimbursed for this money until about five months later when the Danish ships arrived. The total piculs ordered were 1,100 so the amount they supposedly advanced to the inland dealers was 11,000 taels. The additional 2 taels per picul came to 2,200 taels. If we read between the lines, we can see what this extra money was for. The Chinese merchants had to use their own money (11,000 taels), for five months, to secure this order. At 4 percent per month for five months, the interest on that money comes to 2,200 taels. This was a very high interest rate for foreigners to pay, but without money to secure the order, the Danes had little choice. It was better to do this than to risk having the ship layover a season owing to insufficient tea to finish its cargo.

For the tea contract above that was made in February 1766, the Danes had borrowed money from Portuguese merchants in Macao at 13 to 15 percent annual interest. This money was then handed over to the Chinese merchants as an advance on their tea. The Danes, however, were unable to find more money for the contracts in March so they had to resort to purchasing the tea at a higher price without providing an advance. The Chinese merchants undoubtedly had to pay a high rate of interest to get the 11,000 taels to secure the tea order and this cost was passed onto the buyers.<sup>6</sup>

Plates 07.05, 07.06, 09.12 and 09.13 are DAC contracts that were made on the same days as the two contracts above for the same type of tea, on the same terms and at the same prices. These examples provide other reasons why we should not take commodity prices at their face value. The 15.8 taels per picul that was agreed to in February (Plates 05.11 and 09.12) was really the same price as 17.8 taels per picul that was contracted in March (Plates 05.12 and 09.13). However, if all we look at are these numbers, we cannot see the true picture. Without any additional information about advances, interest or loans, we would be inclined to believe there was a rise in price from one month to the next. But this was not the case.

If we wanted to estimate what the Danes were paying for tea, and without additional information, we would be inclined to take the average of these two prices, that is, 16.8 taels. In effect, the price should be 15.8 taels, with an advance of 10 taels per picul, and 17.8 taels without an advance. If the Danes had not provided any advances for their tea that year, all of their contracts for this type of tea under the same terms would have been at 17.8 taels per picul, so that was the *real* spot price.

If we compare that price with the 19 taels per picul in Plate 08.01, in 1730, then it looks like the tea price decreased over time.<sup>7</sup> In that year, the VOC contracted 1,000 piculs of first-grade Bohea tea in September, without an advance. At face value, it looks similar to the terms in the DAC contract, in 1766, at 17.8 taels per picul, except that the Danes gave an advance when the first ship arrived, and the Dutch did not.

In addition, there were other factors that affected the final prices, and they need to be considered before we can determine whether one price was higher than another. Almost all products in Canton, for example, were paid for with foreign silver coins, and not with Chinese currency. Therefore, the exchange rates and alloy content of these coins need to be known before we can compare prices. The Dutch used an exchange rate of 1 piaster to 0.74 taels, while the Danes used 1 piaster to 0.72 taels; the Dutch and Danes normally used a silver standard of 94 touch but we would need to know whether there were differences in the alloy content of silver in those years, which would, of course, affect the purchase price.<sup>8</sup>

The Dutch used different weights to measure their tea and their silver than the Danes, and they used a picul that varied in size from 122.5 Dutch pounds to 125 pounds.<sup>9</sup> The contract in Plate 08.01 does not mention the size of the picul so we need to know that information. We also need to know if there were any differences between what the Danes and Dutch considered to be 'first-grade' Bohea tea. Each company maintained its own quality standards, and they did not necessarily correspond with what other companies were doing. Plus, we notice that the Dutch packed the 1,000 piculs of tea in 400 chests, which meant there were, on average, 250 catties of tea in each one. This was a different standard from the 270 to 275 catties that the Danes used. The Danes could use 30 fewer chests to pack the same amount of tea, so, obviously, their price per picul should be cheaper. However, if we take all of these factors into consideration and make the corresponding adjustments, we might find that the 19 taels per picul the Dutch paid for first-grade Bohea tea in 1730 was actually cheaper than the 17.8 taels per picul that the Danes paid in 1766. There is no way to know for certain what the *real* prices were unless we have all the data.<sup>10</sup>

The amount of the advances that were given varied with different products, from one foreigner to the next and from one transaction within one company to the next. They could be 5 to 10 percent of the amount of a contract or as much as 90 to 100 percent. As we see from the examples above, even in the 1760s when advances were regulated and required on certain products, we still see variances in how they were paid.

It was often the case, when purchasing gold, to pay 90 to 100 percent of the contract in advance, and perhaps one or two years before the product was to be delivered. This meant a loss of interest on that money which had to be figured into the final cost. Prices of commodities were adjusted up and down according to the amount of the advances and according to when they were paid, which is why all of these particulars show up in contracts. If the advances were not forthcoming, or were paid late, then these were breaches of contract, which meant *Hong* merchants

could re-negotiate the deal and build in a provision to compensate for the loss. The buyers would probably insist on the same prices as listed in the contract, but *Hong* merchants could negotiate an additional loan at low interest or a better price on another contract to compensate for the breach.

Besides imports and exports, other contracts were drawn up for business loans. These could be loans in either direction, foreigners to Chinese or Chinese to foreigners, but the former were, by far, more numerous. In the eighteenth century, there were two basic types of loans: business loans (Plates 03.05, 09.10 and 09.14) and bottomry loans (Plates 05.07 and 09.09).

Business loans could be short-term (less than a year) or long-term (a year or longer). Interest on short-term loans was calculated by the month and, on long-term loans, usually by the year, but sometimes by the month. As has been pointed out in another study, interest generally was higher for Chinese (1.5 to 2 percent per month or 15 to 20 percent per year) than for foreigners (1 to 1.5 percent per month or 10 to 15 percent per year), but there were exceptions.<sup>11</sup> Plate 09.14, for example, is a contract for a small loan to the DAC from Ingsia at 2 percent interest per month. Tan Suqua also gave the Ostend General India Company (GIC) a small loan at the same interest in 1725 (Chapter 5).

The type of information that appears in business loan contracts includes the amount of money that was borrowed, exchange rate, interest rate and duration of the loan. If for some reason the loans were not repaid on time, then interest was extended. In some cases, the interest rate was set for the length of the loan. In Plate 09.10, for example, 6 percent interest was charged to Chinese for four months, which means the monthly rate was 1.5 percent.

Loans with annual interest were sometimes also recorded in this way. For example, if a year loan was taken out at 20 percent interest, then the principal plus 20 percent was due at the end of the year. What if the borrower could not pay at the end of the year, and asked for an additional 6 months? The loan would then be renegotiated as an 18 month loan at 30 percent interest (12 months at 20 percent and 6 months at 10 percent). If we did not know the length of time on this loan, and only found 30 percent interest mentioned in the records, we might be inclined to think it was 30 percent annual interest, when it was not. The records are full of these types of entries, which is why we cannot always take these numbers at their face value.

Throughout the eighteenth century, foreigners could acquire loans from the Portuguese in Macao or other foreigners in Canton at 10 to 15 percent annual interest. They could then loan that money to Chinese merchants at 15 to 20 percent interest, which attracted many investors to China. Occasionally, foreigners issued loans to Chinese for lower interest. These usually were preferential loans given for the purpose of repaying a favour or compensating *Hong* merchants for a breach in contract, etc. and did not reflect the actual prevailing money market rate.

Bottomry loans (bottomry bonds) were also different for foreigners than for Chinese. Plates 05.07 and 09.09 show two bottomry contracts issued to the Swedish East India Company (SOIC) and DAC by Chinese merchants. The first

was at 25 percent interest and the second at 30 percent interest; this requires further explanation. These loans had an insurance element to them, which makes them different from business loans. In these two cases, the loans would be repaid if the foreign ship made it safely back to its home port. If the ship was lost at sea, the borrower was not obliged to repay the loan or interest. That was the insurance element at work. Knowledge of the ship's safe arrival, however, was not known in China until many months later.<sup>12</sup>

The insurance was only attached to the ship that left China, and not to ships returning there. Under these circumstances, the loan was not normally repaid until 18 or 20 months later. Whether the next company ship arrived 16 months or 22 months later the same interest was due, so the agreements were not tied strictly to an exact length of time.

There were limits to how far one could extend bottomry loans without more interest being added. If the next ship were delayed for three or four months, or failed to show up until the following year, then the receiver of the loan could expect to pay more interest. The rate would have to be negotiated but probably would fall in line with the rate in the contract. In the two cases above, the monthly rates calculate to about 1.25 to 1.5 percent and the annual rates to about 15 to 18 percent. These were reasonable rates that could be applied to any additional interest and added to bottomry loans if the repayment was delayed.

As in the cases above, if an extension were granted, then entries in the foreign ledgers might just raise the total interest due on the bottomry loans. If the 30 percent bottomry loan were extended for another year, then the interest on the loan might be changed to 48 percent (20 months at 30 percent interest plus 12 months at 18 percent interest equals 32 months at 48 percent). As can be seen, without knowing the duration of time, it is impossible to know the *actual* rate of interest.

No junk bottomry contracts are presented in this volume. Those insurance contracts have been discussed in another study.<sup>13</sup> It is important, however, to understand the differences between bottomry on Chinese junks and bottomry on foreign ships, because Canton merchants were involved in both. Moreover, Chapter 4 discusses the cargos and voyages of Canton junks and it is important to know how they were financed. All of this information is needed to better understand how the junk trade might have influenced and affected Canton merchants' operations. I will thus devote some space here to discuss junk bottomry.

Junk bottomry bonds were, as a rule, for an entire voyage, from Canton to Southeast Asia and return. Except for Manila, which had rates of 30 percent or less, junk bottomry contracts on all destinations in Southeast Asia carried a 40 percent rate. This rate seems to have been in effect for most of the eighteenth century, albeit I only have specific data about these credit transactions from the 1750s to the 1780s.

Foreign ships and Macao ships making the same voyages as the Canton junks paid much lower bottomry interest rates. In 1731, a Swedish traveller recorded the following bottomry rates in Asia, for foreign vessels.

Table 2.2 Asian Bottomry Premiums Recorded by a Swedish Traveler in 1731<sup>14</sup>

No.	Route From Madras to the Following Destinations	Rate Percentage	Comments
1	from Madras to Surat and return	16	voyage rate
2	to Surat and remitted there	12	passage rate
3	to China	16	passage rate
4	to Moka & Judda	16	passage rate
5	to Manilla	18	annual rate
6	to Persien & Bissom	16	passage rate
7	from Bengal to China	16	passage rate
8	to Moka & Judda	14	passage rate
9	to Surat and return	16	voyage rate
10	to Surat and return per annum	14	annual rate
11	to Manilla or Bussora	18	passage rate

The rates in Table 2.2 were for foreign ships (meaning they were not Asian junks) sailing from Madras to various destinations in Asia. The time of year, type of vessel, seaworthiness, crew, cargo and other factors were not normally considered when determining bottomry rates on intra-Asian voyages in the eighteenth century.

Unfortunately, the author who compiled this list of rates in Table 2.2 did not offer explanations about the figures so we are left with several questions. Why would a bottomry bond on a voyage to Surat, for example, carry a 16 percent premium (nos. 1 and 9), the annual rate be set at 14 percent premium (no. 10), and the passage rate set at 12 percent premium (no. 2)? Moreover, the annual rate and passage rate from Madras to Manila are the same at 18 percent (nos. 5 and 11). In the early eighteenth century, ships generally made only one voyage per year between India and East Asia so why list it twice? What if the voyage was completed in 10 months or extended to 14 months, would the rate then change? And it is interesting to note that a trip from Bengal to China actually carried a lower rate of 16 percent (no. 7) than the trip from Madras to Manila (nos. 5 and 11). Bottomry rates for foreign ships generally only insured vessels, and did not insure damage or loss to cargo.

Even though the figures in Table 2.2 leave us with more questions than answers, they nonetheless show that foreign bottomry rates varied with destinations. The figures also show that bottomry rates for foreign ships were much lower compared to those of Chinese junks sailing between Canton and Southeast Asia. Other data also show bottomry rates for Portuguese ships based in Macao and other private ships sailing to China to be considerably less than what Canton junks paid.<sup>15</sup> Chinese junk bottomry did not vary with the destination and seems to have been consistent at 40 percent per voyage (with one voyage being made per year) in the mid-eighteenth century.



As examples in Plates 05.07 and 09.09 show, bottomry rates on European ships sailing to and from Asia were much less than what junks paid. These are only two examples out of hundreds in the East India companies' archives that show Europeans taking out bottomry loans to insure voyages between Europe and China. These rates are almost always a fraction of what it cost Canton junks to insure a voyage to Southeast Asia. How do we account for this disparity between foreign bottomry rates and those of Chinese junks?

In the eighteenth century, no statistical data existed of the frequency of junks sinking or being lost for other reasons such as navigational errors, fires or pirate attacks. There was also no data available of the seaworthiness of junks compared to foreign vessels. As pointed out above, cargo, crew and other specifics connected to the operation of the vessels were not taken into consideration. Thus, we can rule out all these factors, because they would not have influenced junk bottomry rates.

There was one factor, however, that was consistent with Chinese junks, and that made their voyages different from those of foreign ships. Chinese captains consistently sailed along coastlines and avoided the open sea, whenever possible. Most foreign captains, however, chose more direct routes away from coastlines and across open water.<sup>16</sup> Canton junks often frequented several ports in Southeast Asia, before returning to China (Appendix 4M).<sup>17</sup>

Bottomry rates were often higher for coastal trips because it exposed the vessels to more hazards, such as hitting sunken rocks, running aground on shoals, being driven off course by coastal currents, whirled about by strong eddies, and attacked by pirates.<sup>18</sup> Voyages across the open sea had hazards as well, such as strong winds, excessively high waves and typhoons, but these elements were also present in coastal voyages. Investors clearly considered their voyages to be much riskier than foreign ships and travelling along the coast would have certainly contributed to that perception.<sup>19</sup>

As we have seen, trade contracts were used in Canton to document debt obligations and were used to settle disputes, but we have no examples of them being used as official evidence in a court of law in China. As far as we know, out of the thousands of contracts generated from 1700 to 1842, not one was collected by local officials and sent to Beijing. None of them were reproduced in official reports, gazetteers or even in the extensive study of the trade called *yue hai guan zhi*.<sup>20</sup> They could be used, however, to prove to local officials that the opposite parties had not lived up to their end of the bargain.

These factors help explain the great diversity in the way Chinese merchants signed contracts. All of the following were possibilities: write out everything clearly in Chinese and sign personal names, business names and company chops (Plate 06.12); sign only personal names and/or business names, with a chop (Plate 06.13); sign first name or business name and forget about a chop (Plates 11.01); put a chop on the document and forget about signatures (Plate 11.11); or write some numbers or text and not provide any names or chops (Plate 05.07 and 09.14). *Hong* merchants simply did whatever was necessary to assuage the foreigners' fears and give them confidence that the contract was legitimate and would be carried

out as planned. If something happened where all or part of the agreement was not fulfilled, foreigners had proof (the written document) which gave them recourse to seek justice.

Contracts were also a benefit to the Chinese in that they dictated clearly each party's responsibility and they gave merchants credibility. If a *Hong* merchant had a contract in hand with a foreign company and could show it to inland agents, then he would likely be granted the benefit of the doubt. This factor is probably one of the reasons why some of these documents, especially large tea contracts that involved advances, were written out completely in Chinese. For new merchants and small operators, having a contract in hand was often a necessary prerequisite to gaining access to inland supplies. Thus, it would have been important to spell out everything in Chinese. Having a signed contract was no doubt a great aid for all merchants, large and small, when convincing inland men to give them the products they needed.

Chinese merchants also fell into debt to these inland agents, and, when that happened, a written contract could help hold creditors at bay until funds could be raised to repay them. With respect to private foreign traders, a written contract was almost certainly helpful for Chinese merchants when convincing foreign companies that one of their nationals had violated a previous mutual agreement. The documents helped to provide protection from foreigners failing to meet their agreements or changing the stipulations, and they helped establish credibility with inland suppliers and creditors.

Contracts were important in providing more security and encouraging investors. By themselves, however, contracts were not enough to ensure that the growth of China's trade would continue. The next chapter examines Chinese partnerships, and some of the advantages and problems that arose from them.

## C O N C L U S I O N

---

### THE LIMITS OF COMMERCE

The merchants of Canton and Macao were central to the rise and advancement of international trade and commerce in the eighteenth century. They were the mediators between China's supplies of tea, porcelain and silk and foreign demands for more of those products. Demand for Chinese products in Europe, India, and later the United States, was driving the trade. Without that demand, there would be nothing to write here. The products purchased in China were mainly luxury items and tea, which meant that the trade depended heavily on foreign consumers having expendable incomes. Thus, before the China trade could begin or expand, foreign economies had to first reach a level where a substantial percentage of the population had extra money to spend.

Excess foreign capital was not only essential for driving consumption but also for advancing production in China. Because the trade was very sporadic, in the early eighteenth century, with the total volume of exports rising or falling as much as 60 percent from one year to the next, investing in its expansion was very risky business. Perishable commodities such as tea and raw silk, and to a lesser extent, silk fabrics, declined in value over time. These products could lose upwards of 50 percent of their value if left over from one year to the next. If inland producers pumped out more of those products and not enough ships arrived to purchase them, there was a good chance they would be big losers. Some of these leftover products could be sold on the Chinese market, but some tea varieties and manufactured silk were made specifically for the export market and had little or no demand in China.

Durable goods such as porcelain were less vulnerable to deteriorating in value over time, but that commodity depended heavily on tea consumption. Moreover, the designs that foreigners wanted on their porcelain were often much different from what Chinese consumers wanted. If tea sales declined then export porcelain sales also declined. If the items that were left unsold could not be marketed in China or Asia, then they simply had to be warehoused until another foreign ship arrived to purchase them. The uncertainty of how many buyers would arrive each year made it risky business investing in export porcelain production as well.

In the 1720s and 1730s, Tan Hunqua had tried to even out some of the ups and downs of the market by pushing through reforms. He advocated the squashing or removal of practices that hindered free trade, such as corruption within the customs operation and the taxing of import silver. He promoted openness in exchanges, and he wanted Chinese merchants to enjoy the same freedoms as

foreign traders. If Chinese merchants could reach into the European markets and deal directly with the companies, they could arrange sales in advance. Having the assurance of future sales would in turn encourage Chinese investors to increase output. And by dealing directly with the companies' directors, Chinese merchants could bypass the supercargos in Canton to ensure that the latter men did not secretly undermine the trade for their own personal benefits. After all, supercargos had the freedom to overstep *Hong* merchants by appealing directly to the Hoppos and governor-generals in China, so why should not the Chinese have the freedom to overstep supercargos and deal directly with companies in Europe?

Tan Hunqua's ideas of openness and free trade were far ahead of his time. They went contrary to Beijing's desires of keeping a tight rein on commerce and a short leash on foreigners. China was not ready for such openness and freedom in the eighteenth century, and only adopted some of Tan Hunqua's ideas after it was forced to at the end of the First Opium War. Except for the removal of the 10 percent tax on import silver, which Tan Hunqua successfully negotiated in 1736, he failed to initiate any of the other changes he wanted. His imprisonment and failure discouraged others from trying to introduce similar reforms after him.

The trade continued to be very unpredictable throughout the 1740s and 1750s. In some years, few ships arrived and many goods that were shipped to Canton remained unsold. These years were a great loss to merchants who had to warehouse their leftover goods. In other years, too many ships arrived, and some of them (especially the Swedes) had to layover a season owing to insufficient products to load them. These delays added significantly to foreigners' costs with many more months of salaries having to be paid and the provisioning of the crews, not to mention the loss of future profits that could have been earned on other voyages. Overall, the trade expanded in these decades, but the volatility of the market ensured that production continued to lag behind demand. If something was not done to increase output, the trade would not continue to grow.

If Tan Hunqua's ideas were impractical for the time, then what other reforms could be initiated to bring more stability to commerce? The most effective way for China to increase its output was to have foreigners finance it themselves. They had the means of ensuring that ships would arrive to purchase the additional products, which meant they also had the means to greatly reduce the risks of investing in expansion. To make that happen, however, foreign customers needed to be persuaded to provide larger advances each year.

Overtime, it became clear that Chinese merchants could gain more control over foreign investment capital by forming partnerships. When several merchants negotiated together, they could insist on larger advances in exchange for the assurance of sufficient quantities of goods to load the ships. The money that the groups collected from foreign patrons was sent to key producers in the interior. Inland suppliers earmarked their products to the Canton merchants who supplied the funds; foreigners, in turn, received the goods they wanted which kept ships departing on schedule and thereby helped to maximize their efficiency.

At the same time, demand for Chinese goods continued to grow in Europe, India and the Americas. Competition in home markets kept constant pressure on companies to make sure they had enough silver to send to China each year to place orders for the next year, so their ships would again depart on schedule. Partnerships helped to make all of this happen, because they gave Canton merchants more control over foreign investment capital and inland supplies. As long as there were several Chinese groups in Canton competing with each other, then commodity prices remained competitive and growth was not hindered.

Trading in contraband was a way for Chinese merchants to supplement insufficient working capital. Gold played a very special role in the trade, because it was the only commodity that allowed merchants to realize profits one or two years in advance. This was possible because of the disparity in the exchange rates between gold and silver that existed inside and outside of China. Advances of 100 percent were common on gold contracts, which gave merchants money to use immediately for other trade. By the 1760s, the relationship between gold and silver inside and outside of China narrowed, which resulted in fewer gold exports and fewer opportunities for merchants to gain quick working capital.

It is no small coincidence that the decline of the gold trade coincided with the rise of the opium trade. Opium was the only other commodity that could be easily sold for silver bullion. A quick sale could produce much needed working capital. Unlike, gold, however, opium generally could not produce profits in advance, and sometimes had to be warehoused if prices were too low. And opium carried more risks of getting caught so we find fewer of the top merchants willing to deal in it.

The risks in trading gold were very small to the point that some merchants even wrote out their illegal gold contracts in Chinese. They obviously had little fear of getting caught. As a result, in the early eighteenth century, gold was traded regularly by many of the *Hong* merchants, large and small. By the 1770s, however, the companies had ceased or greatly curtailed their trade in gold, owing to a shrinking of profits. The decline of the gold trade removed one of the options merchants previously had to obtain quick working capital. Understanding these connections between the contraband trade and the capital market is central to understanding the actions of the Canton merchants in the eighteenth century.

Government officials were keen to ensuring that competition prevailed among Chinese merchants so that prices fluctuated with changes in the supply and demand of the market. Competitive prices, in turn, encouraged growth, which protected officials' reputations and future careers. Competition, however, also worked against expansion, because *Hong* merchants used smaller advances as a tool to woo customers away from competitors. If merchants requested too much money in advance from foreigners, they could lose a sale to other merchants who required less in advance.

What was needed was a way to standardize the advances so that all merchants in Canton were required to collect the same amount for each product. If everyone had to provide ten taels per picul on future sales of Bohea tea, for example, then

that would ensure enough capital was sent to the interior to increase production. But this requirement needed to be done in such a way that merchants did not monopolize parts of the market, which would invariably lead to higher prices and reduced growth.

These relationships and connections between risks, inland production, foreign demand and capital, timely voyages, competitive prices, profits and growth are essential to explaining why Chinese officials supported the shrinking of merchant ranks in the 1750s. As long as some level of competition was maintained, the centralization of trade into a few houses helped to even out the ups and downs in the market.

These circumstances led to several partnerships forming in the 1750s and to the six largest houses taking more control over the commerce. The top six men effectively forced Attay and Thequa out of the tea trade in 1754. In 1755, they forced the 100-plus outside merchants to be organized into groups of five, and each group placed under the supervision of a *Hong* merchant. Governor-generals and Hoppos supported these efforts because they helped to ensure that imperial revenues did not decline, but rather increased over time.

The death of Beaukeequa in 1758, and his subsequent bankruptcy, raised many concerns among officials and merchants. The large debts that the remaining merchants would have to absorb weakened them. At the same time, Beijing wanted to ensure that foreigners did not go wandering off to other Chinese ports as Flint had done from 1755 to 1758. The best way to keep them at Canton was to ensure they were being offered competitive prices and being supplied with everything they wanted so their ships left full of cargo and on schedule. This was a very precarious time for local administrators in Canton, who had to balance all these concerns so it did not negatively affect their careers.

Within a few weeks of Beaukeequa's death, three of the largest houses joined together into a consortium (or triple alliance). The group gained control over 38 percent of the market. The merchant ranks continued to shrink over the next couple of years, from about 26 houses in 1757 to 17 houses by the end of 1759. Officials sanctioned this centralization because it was needed to bring more stability to commerce.

The triple alliance, however, threatened other prominent players like Swequa and Poankeequa. Their businesses suffered as the consortium gained greater control over markets. They could not abolish the triple alliance, because it had government support, so they needed to find a way to control and limit it, as much as possible, so it did not negatively affect their profits. The two men found a solution in 1760, with the establishment of the Co-hong.

The Co-hong gained government support because it allowed partnerships to continue, which were necessary for stability, and it gave government the final say in how trade was to be administered each year. The merchant ranks were reduced from 17 to 10 houses. The four largest houses, which included the three-family consortium and Poankeequa, ran the society and stipulated the terms of trade to the other six houses. The prices and terms, however, had to be approved

by government officials before they could be put into practice. This measure gave those officers the assurance that foreigners would be offered competitive prices so that they would not be discouraged from sending their ships to China.

The intense focus on attracting more ships to China so that imperial revenues would continue to increase resulted in policies and practices favouring foreigners to the detriment of Chinese merchants. All foreigners had equal access to markets in China and the assurance of the government that Chinese merchants would not cheat or defraud them. If a problem occurred with a merchant that could not be resolved privately, then foreigners could appeal to local officials for retribution. Chinese merchants, on the other hand, had no support from government in recovering losses from foreigners who failed to live up to their agreements. Chinese were forbidden to communicate with foreign authorities, or establish direct trade with India or Europe so they were greatly hindered in trying to use foreign laws and courts to force the repayment of their moneys owed.

Chinese paid higher interest rates than foreigners, in which officials also did not interfere. Borrowing from foreigners was forbidden, so regulating interest rates was not something they could discuss. Moreover, high interest rates in China kept foreign investment capital flowing into the country so in the interests of growth it was better just to leave the usury market alone. If a merchant failed, and most did, then those men could be blamed for illegally borrowing money, and thereby exonerate officials from any blame for their failures. Of course, officials knew that credit was essential for trade to grow, so they just ignored all of these transactions until they were forced to deal with them in a bankruptcy.

This formula worked fine as long as competition existed among the different factions within the Co-hong. By 1764, however, officials feared that the Co-hong had gained too much power. They responded by giving inland tea suppliers the right to negotiate directly with foreigners for up to 30 percent of total tea exports. These transactions had to be channelled through one of the ten houses within the Co-hong, but the prices and terms could be agreed upon in direct negotiations with foreigners and independently from the *Hong* merchants. This initiative gave government officials a gage to measure what terms and prices might be reasonable. It kept the elected merchants in the Co-hong from monopolizing everything.

The Co-hong worked as intended. Advances were standardized; prices were adjusted according to the supply and demand of the market; and inland production expanded to meet the growing demands. The trade grew each year throughout the 1760s. By the 1770 trading season, the environment had completely changed. Advances were routine and production was now keeping pace with demand. Almost all of the foreign ships were now departing on schedule, and as more continued to arrive, inland producers sent more products to Canton. On 1 May 1770, Cai Hunqua died, which upset the balance within the Co-hong. The triple alliance began to fall apart and then there was no one to oppose Poankeequa. The Co-hong had outlived its purposes, and was now more of a threat to trade than a benefit.

In 1768, Poankeequa suggested to the English that he might be able to arrange the end of the Co-hong, but it did not happen that year. Of course, he knew that the society was becoming less popular with officials, and was likely to be dissolved in the near future. After Cai Hunqua's death, a very different environment emerged, that was being run primarily by Poankeequa. By the end of the 1770 trading season it was obvious that trade and growth would be best served if the Co-hong were removed. On 13 February 1771, the Tsontock declared the end of that society.

Poankeequa was a very enterprising individual and capitalized on the ending of the Co-hong, which he knew foreigners wanted to bring about. At some point before the official dissolution, he convinced the English that, if they contributed 100,000 taels, he could arrange the end of the Co-hong. According to the history books, he apparently paid this sum to bribe officials to end the society, and then afterwards went to the English to collect his money. This story, of course, is in complete contradiction to what we know about the trade and how it operated. The Co-hong was created by the emperor and it could only be removed by him, and no bribes were going to make that happen. Moreover, if bribes were needed to remove it, then all of the foreigners would have been requested to pay, but that did not happen.

Poankeequa told the Dutch shortly after the Co-hong was abolished that he had arranged his retirement from the trade, and that his son would now take over the business. His nephew (rather than son) began taking care of his trade thereafter. Retirement required hefty payments to local officials which raises the question of whether he used the guise of collecting 100,000 taels (to end the Co-hong) to arrange his retirement. That sum would be a nice round figure to effect his removal from trade. The fact that he did not collect money from any of the other foreigners, or even approach them about this bribe, lends credence to the payment being some sort of connivance between him and the English. In reality, he did not leave the trade entirely, but seems to have at least been semi-retired. In 1777, Poankeequa was ordered by the Foyen to resume his former position as *Hong* merchant, and trade in his own name rather than his nephew's. We will likely never know the truth behind the 100,000 taels payment. Circumstances suggest, however, that it could not have been a bribe to remove the Co-hong.

The new competitive environment that emerged after the Co-hong led to the weakening of many houses. Wayqua collapsed in 1772; he was said to have been connected to the Ye family's Fengjin Hang. Tiauqua ran the Ye family trade through the Guangyuan Hang, which failed when he died in 1775. Tiauqua's failure impacted his in-laws in the Guangshun Hang, which failed in 1778. At the same time, Chetqua's former partner in the triple alliance, Semqua of the Yifeng Hang, fell into debt, and the house struggled along until it was closed in 1784. Ingsia was the third member in the triple alliance. He and his partner Kousia failed at the end of 1779. Thus, by the end of the 1770s, the three major houses of the 1740s, 1750s and 1760s were all brought down. As far as the trade was concerned, however, these failures did not matter because others took their place, and the trade moved forward.



Yanqua emerged at about the time of Tiauqua's death. He became a *Hong* merchant in 1792, rose up the ranks quickly, and then retired in 1804. Although granting permission for him to leave was probably heavily influenced by his poor health, it nonetheless required hefty payments to officials. From 1780 to the time of his retirement, many other houses failed, and they simply were replaced with newcomers. Poankeequa and others sought to re-establish the Co-hong, on several occasions, but officials would not allow it. Even without the Co-hong, Poankeequa and his sons remained the dominant voices in the trade after Cai Hunqua's death.

The Co-hong was not allowed again because it had outlived its purposes. Officials began accepting the fact that bankruptcies were a phenomenon of trade that could not be avoided. Debt and bankruptcy, of course, were always strongly discouraged and treated as a criminal offense when they occurred. But the punishments varied with each case. The more severe cases were reported to the emperor for final action.

From the end of the Co-hong in 1771 to the end of the Canton System in 1842, merchants essentially were treated as expendable items. The Co-hong had shown that, if around ten houses were in operation each year (plus or minus two or three), the trade would move forward, despite one, two or three of them going broke. Officials just needed to make sure there were always a few healthy houses to counterbalance the failing ones, and believed they could do that with the tools they had at hand.

Contracts played an important role in advancing trade as well. However, they were not accepted by the Chinese government as legal documents. That did not mean the documents were not binding. Contracts gave stability to the trade by making each party 'unofficially' responsible to fulfil his part. The documents could be presented to Chinese investigative committees as proof of a debt, and they could be shown to the Hoppo or governor-general in case they were in doubt. The documents were not entered as official pieces of evidence in legal cases and thus were not sent to Beijing. This partially explains why none of them have survived in China today. This outcome may be due to the documents being bilingual; officials were not able to clearly decipher the contents of the foreign texts. It also may have been the result of illegal activities recorded in both the Chinese and foreign texts such as loaning money and trading in contraband. Officials would not want the emperor to see these documents because it could implicate them for not preventing such acts.

Besides partnerships, the Co-hong and contracts, another aspect of the trade that played a role in merchants' operations was the junk trade to Southeast Asia. Although only a small proportion of the junk imports, perhaps 10 to 15 percent, was used in the export trade, these products were important to land contracts with foreigners. Tin, sago, rattan and other products were used in the packaging of export teas, porcelain and silk. Numerous products such as wood and dyes were used in the production of export goods. A merchant could lose a contract if he did not have sufficient quantities of sago to pack porcelain or rattan for use as dunnage in the hulls. These products had strong demand in Europe, and substituting other less saleable items would reduce the payload of each ship.

Most of the junk imports were for domestic consumption in China. Betel nut was, by far, the most important Southeast Asian import in terms of weight. It made up, on average, 35 percent of the junk cargos. Various kinds of products followed: wood at 25 percent; sugar at 13 percent; tin, spices and trepang at less than 5 percent each. Most of the other 80 or more products made up only a fraction of 1 percent each. If we ranked the items according to their value, then the distributions would be very different. Items such as birds' nests, sharks' fins, elephant tusks, wood and dyes would rank much higher, with more common items such as betel nut, sugar and tin ranking much lower. Changes in Southeast Asian markets and the loss, capture or damage of a junk could impact directly the solvency of a Canton merchant. Thus, it is important to understand this trade. Hopefully, future research will bring out more about the economies of these products and allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the roles they played in the trade of the merchant houses.

Credit was as important to trade in the eighteenth century as it is today. Borrowing money from foreigners was illegal. It was only tolerated because everyone knew capital and credit were essential to growth. Because it was illegal, no attention was paid to finding a way to equalize interest rates, inside and outside of China. An additional motive for leaving the financial markets alone was that high interest rates were good for growth because they attracted more foreigners to China with funds to invest. More capital, of course, meant more money to finance inland expansion. In that respect, higher interest rates in China were good for trade.

For all of these reasons, we find foreigners in Canton and Macao able to borrow money from other foreigners at 10 to 15 percent annual interest. The Chinese often borrowed the same money from foreigners at 15 to 20 percent annual interest. Foreigners paid from 16 to 40 percent interest for bottomry loans to South or Southeast Asia, with 20 percent being common. Bottomry included insurance so it was naturally higher than regular business loans. Canton junks, however, paid 40 percent interest across the board, regardless of where they went (except Manila, which was cheaper). These bottomry rates were applied to single voyages, so they were not necessarily annual rates (although they could be if the loans were repaid 12 months later).

Many of the factors mentioned above helped China's economy grow in the short-term, and they contributed to changes in international commerce in the long-term. The trade grew decade after decade, which brought more revenues into imperial coffers. As noted, much foreign capital went to expanding inland production. Nothing was done to ensure China remained competitive in world markets. As new centres for porcelain, tea and silk developed worldwide, China lost its monopoly. The revenues collected from the trade, in the form of fees and import and export duties, went to supplement administrative budgets. These moneys were not used to investigate or discover better ways of remaining competitive over time. In this sense, China's economic advantages were static and unchanging factors that were not affected by changes happening outside of China. It was assumed that foreigners would never be able to supersede the quality and efficiency of China's producers. Therefore, there was no need to investigate into those matters.

As for the development of global trade and networks, the Canton System was a key component in those processes. Foreign traders from all countries (except Russia and Japan), whether large or small, could be assured that, if they sailed all the way to her borders, China would welcome them and grant permission to trade. They were guaranteed that all transactions with Chinese merchants would be honoured, that prices would be competitive, and that the ships would be able to leave with a full cargo. High interest rates gave foreign investors incentives to loan money to Chinese merchants to finance more trade. The protections for the unpaid debts of failed merchants gave outsiders assurance they would not be cheated out of their capital.

The junk trade was a particularly lucrative investment for foreigners. Because it was backed by the *Hong* merchants, it was also under the same protection system. Bottomry bonds involved higher risks than business loans because the former were subject to the risks of sea. The profits earned from bottomry loans, however, could be 40 percent or more in one year. As long as investments were spread out over several junks, losing one of them in a storm or pirate attack did not impact heavily on profits. As long as they did not put all their money in one junk, an investor could expect to make at least 30 percent profit on interest each year, which was a greater return than what the trade in many items could generate. With the Hoppos maintaining complete transparency in their trade figures, foreigners could not monopolize any part of the market. This openness helped import and export prices remain competitive, in both the junk trade and foreign trade in Canton.

As a result of all these advantages, more private traders became involved in the trade with China. Commission agents channelled large sums of money into China on their own accounts and on the accounts of absentee investors in India, Europe and elsewhere. Foreigners without financial resources received consignment cargoes on credit. They could leave with their hulls filled despite not having sufficient capital. Chinese merchants would not defraud foreign customers, because that would bring the Hoppos' and governor-generals' wrath down upon them, so there was little to fear. Private traders had a harder time settling past debts of *Hong* merchants. The difficulties in collecting, however, were not irresolvable or to the extreme that foreign investors were discouraged from sending their moneys to China.

As for the Chinese merchants, they had their own strategies to cope with inequalities in the system. Tan Hunqua's experience, in the early 1730s, had shown that appealing to Chinese authorities for retribution, when a breach in contract occurred, was probably not the best way to solve problems. A more effective way was for Chinese merchants to settle debts among themselves — and privately with foreigners. An example can be seen in Chetqua's bailing out of his son-in-law Tiaqua to keep him from bankruptcy. When a house failed, the government would step in and decide who should be responsible for the arrears. Before that happened, however, it was better in some cases for merchants to arrange repayments themselves so that government did not need to be involved.

All of the large merchant houses in the eighteenth century were intensely focused on procuring foreign capital. The intensity does not seem to have been any

different whether they were small or large operators. It was not a good idea to keep large sums of money lying around in Canton; it might tempt local officials, who were always looking for ways to fill insufficient budgets. It is thus not surprising to find merchants converting their money into non-liquid assets, such as real estate, which was not as easily apprehended. As far as minimizing the risks of fire, it was good to store merchandise in several warehouses in various locations. All export merchandise in Canton was contracted and shipped 'free-on-board' (FOB). If a fire or flood happened, all damaged goods were the responsibility of the Chinese merchants (unless special arrangements had been made). Owning extensive real estate was thus a good alternative to having liquid assets.

Renting buildings to foreigners was another way of strengthening friendship and trust, and give merchants access to more working capital. The English East India Company (EIC), Dutch East India Company (VOC) and Danish Asiatic Company (DAC) advanced large sums of money to their factory owners; the rent each year was deducted from the principal or interest that accrued on the money. These arrangements gave the companies assurances that their buildings would be reserved for them each year. They might also get a better rent rate if money was advanced.

The practice of truck was the normal way of doing business in Canton, but it could be very risky for local merchants. It was very destructive to many of them. To make a profit on imports, merchants sometimes needed to warehouse them for long periods until prices recovered, which tied up working capital. Smaller houses could not afford to tie up their money. They had no choice but to sell the imports immediately, at a loss if necessary. They needed money to purchase tea, porcelain and silk to fulfil their contracts.

As Cheong, Ch'en and others have pointed out, this system of truck is what led many Chinese merchants to become indebted to private foreign traders. Chinese borrowed money to cover costs in one year, with the hopes of recovering losses in the next year. If the next season was no different, their trade began a slow decline. All of these transactions were left entirely to the merchants to negotiate and arrange; officials wanted no involvement. As a result, even though it was illegal to borrow from foreigners, merchants had little choice. They could not quit the trade or choose another occupation without permission. If such a change was granted, it meant giving large payments to officials. Officials only would discuss these matters if forced — such as when a bankruptcy occurred. Because loans and debts were illegal, changing the way they were customarily carried out, or introducing regulations to control them, were matters not open for discussion.

Meeting the debts of failed merchants, giving annual presents to superiors, and financing periodical government shortfalls were constant drains on merchants' capital. Some of these matters could be negotiated, such as who would pay what amounts and when. But each of the licensed merchants would likely have to pay some portion of these assessments, regardless of how much debt they were already carrying. Their present financial status (debts) could not be discussed with officials because debts were illegal. As a consequence, merchants had to absorb the additional debt load they were assigned. They often ran to one of the private

traders for another loan to meet their current obligations, and hoped for a windfall in the future.

The unpredictability of the number of ships arriving each year also affected merchants. In the early 1780s, for example, Tsjonqua was carrying an enormous debt load. When his main source of capital, the VOC ships, failed to appear because of war with the English, he was declared bankrupt.

War between Europeans actually had potentially numerous ramifications that could negatively affect Canton merchants' profits. First, it took away income from ships that failed to arrive. Second, it strained companies' silver supplies so ships that did arrive might not have enough silver to purchase return cargos, which meant the Canton merchants would have to advance them credit. Third, it put *Hong* merchants' junk trade to Southeast Asia at risk of capture, especially if there was any suspicion that part of the cargos on those vessels might belong to the enemy (such as the junks bound to/from Batavia, Manila or Macao). Fourth, if there were any reduction in the number of ships that arrived at Canton and/or the overall volume of trade in that year, then the Hoppo and/or governor-general might clamp down on smuggling, and do everything possible to increase the customs duties, including pressuring *Hong* merchants to make up for shortfalls in the imperial revenues.

Fifth, it brought warships to China that had no intention of trading, which was forbidden. If those warships stayed in China, with the intention of escorting the fleet of merchant ships back to Europe after they were done loading, then it could very likely arouse the attention of the emperor and raise questions of smuggling going on in the delta (because they did not go upriver to trade). Sixth, war created much tension between Europeans at Whampoa and Canton, which could very easily erupt into fights, brawls and numerous other forms of deviant behaviour which put security merchants at risk. Sometimes captured enemies were brought to China aboard merchant ships, which raised protests among those nationals for their immediate release and implicated the security merchants. Seventh, it put all shipping at risk in the delta, Chinese and foreign alike, owing to the unpredictability of how war might escalate and involve other nation's vessels (intentionally and by mistake) and/or warships arbitrarily conscripting crew from vessels they encountered. Eighth, if war resulted in a *Hong* merchant failing, then his arrears were distributed to the others for repayment, which could lead to the weakening of their businesses. This was especially the case if war resulted in a reduction in market shares (such as fewer ships arriving), which meant having to assume those debts without gaining any additional income.

Another downside of depending primarily on one company was the need to satisfy foreigners' demands. This meant taking more imports at a good price in exchange for the sale of exports. The Dutch pressured their three partners constantly to accept more VOC imports, such as tin, cloves and nutmeg before agreeing to export contracts and before granting any loans or advances. The English and others, of course, were doing the same. If merchants did not give in to the demands, they did not obtain advances. If that happened, they would suffer

even more due to a lack of capital. Thus, it was better to find some compromise to minimize the damages.

As we can observe from these examples, the Canton merchants were simply spokes on a giant economic wheel. If one spoke weakened or broke, then administrators simply replaced it with another. The wheel (trade) kept turning. Whether the wheel had seven spokes or thirteen spokes did not matter, because it kept moving forward either way. Having about ten active merchants was optimal because then the wheel was well balanced. The wheel had many little cogs (linguists, compradors and pilots) to keep everything turning, and these cogs were likewise replaced as they were worn out.

As long as there were sufficient incentives (high interest rates and competitive prices), foreigners kept bringing more oil (capital) to China to keep the wheel well lubricated. A good part of the imported oil was turned into fuel (inland supplies) to give the machine power. The machine operators (government officials), of course, needed to be paid regularly to keep their families and friends happy. The designer of the machine (the emperor) needed to receive his royalties (fees and duties) on his invention. By the early eighteenth century, precedence had established that the royalties should increase over time, otherwise machine operators would be blamed for not keeping the wheel in good working order. Meanwhile, machine operators needed to be rewarded regularly (with presents) to ensure one spoke was not replaced prematurely with another. No one could become part of the machine or leave it without permission, which was the glue that kept the whole system functioning for decades.

These were the main components of the giant wheel. All of them were necessary to make it work. The intense focus on keeping the machine running smoothly distracted officials to the point that they did not realize foreigners were building trade wheels that one day might compete with China's. All of the output (revenues) from the wheel was used to keep the machine running and to supplement government budgets. The machine was owned and managed by the government, privately operated, and largely financed by foreign investments. Although the trade invigorated many layers of Canton's society for more than 140 years and supported tens of thousands of people in the interior, the main purpose of the machine was to supplement government coffers. This primary goal was the fatal flaw. Individuals operating the machine were sacrificed for the sake of keeping revenues flowing to Beijing. Many merchants became wealthy from the trade, but they eventually became targets of government extractions. The machine might originally have been intended to create economic opportunities and boost local wealth; the reality was that all the excess capital generated eventually became government property, and the profits evaporated.

In the short-term, merchants could use one strategy or another to gain and protect their wealth, but, in the long-term, the odds were stacked against them. *Hong* merchants usually endured for decades, or even a lifetime, before suffering failure. Some merchants enjoyed immense wealth before their final collapse and were able to support several wives and produce a huge family with a

dozen children. In this sense, they were much blessed by the trade, despite their eventual disgraces.

Cudgin and Yanqua learned how to work the system to their own advantage and retire with wealth intact. As for Yanqua, however, it is questionable whether he would have been allowed to retire had his health not been life-threatening. Poankeequa managed to arrange a semi-retirement, but was later recalled to full service as a *Hong* merchant. His son Poankeequa II had a similar experience in the early nineteenth century. They could not feign life-threatening illnesses so they had no choice but to resume their former duties when asked to do so. And as Yanqua's sons learned, even in retirement private wealth was subject to being tapped by the state.

Many of the merchants on the preceding pages eventually failed. They could postpone failure by taking out more loans to keep trade moving forward, but then that made their eventual collapses even more dramatic and destructive to the remaining merchants, who had to assume their debts. Once merchants were on the road to destruction, there was little that could be done to turn their fates around. The establishment of the Co-hong saved Poankeequa and Swequa from disaster in the 1760s, but the latter family eventually failed as well. The experience of the Co-hong showed officials that, as far as state revenues were concerned, it did not matter whether a *Hong* merchant failed so long as there were others to pay their debts and take their place.

There were numerous negative aspects connected to bankruptcy, including endless harassments from creditors, humiliating sessions before local officials, imprisonment, physical beatings and/or banishment to Yili. The stress and mental anguish that fell upon failed men, after being publicly disgraced, led to several of them dying prematurely, either by their own hands or as a result of their depression and deteriorating health. If there were a positive side to all of this, it was that once their wealth was gone, the remaining family members were freed from further impositions and could live their lives in peace (as long as they did not acquire wealth again).

In the next volume, I present more of the Canton merchants' stories in an effort to learn more about the trade. Besides *Hong* merchants, I cover silk weavers, silk painters, embroiderers, as well as more of the small porcelain dealers. I will examine how they coped with the pressures around them, and how their actions may have differed from the merchants covered in this volume. I will also explore one of the few families, the Pans, who managed to survive for more than 100 years with their wealth intact. The secrets of their success shed light on all the men presented above; to some extent, it is a continuation of their stories as well.

---

## NOTES

### PREFACE

1. Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990); and Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997). Ch'en also wrote an extensive chapter about the Hong merchants in Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *Dongya Haiyu Yi Qian Nian* (東亞海域一千年 One Thousand Years of Maritime East Asia) (Taipei 臺北: Yuanliu Chuban Gongsi 遠流出版公司, 2005).
2. Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007).
3. Especially important for this study were Carl T. Smith's unpublished papers entitled '18th Century Chinese Merchants' and '19th Century Chinese Merchants' (no date). He put all Chinese he found in the Portuguese records over his forty-plus years of exploring the archives in Macao into these two papers. Using these sources as a guide, I hunted down the original Portuguese documents that looked relevant to this study. In all cases, however, the information about the Chinese merchants was very brief. For a summary of this research, and the difficulties encountered in using the various language sources, see Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Merchants of Canton and Macao: A Summary of Research Past, Present and Future', unpublished paper.
4. Huang Qichen 黃啟臣 and Liang Chengye 梁承鄴, *Guangzhou Shisan Hang zhi Yi: Liang Jingguo Tianbao Hang Shiji* 廣州十三行之一: 梁經國天寶行史跡 (One of the Thirteen Hongs in Canton) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe 廣東高等教育出版社, 2003); Pan Gang'er 潘剛兒, Huang Qichen 黃啟臣 and Ch'en Kuo-tung 陳國棟, *Guangzhou Shisan Hang zhi Yi: Pan Tongwen (Fu) Hang* 廣州十三行之一: 潘同文(孚)行 (One of the Thirteen Hongs in Canton: Tung-Wan/Tung-Fu Hong Puankhequa I–III) (Guangzhou: Huanan Ligong Daxue Chubanshe 華南理工大學出版社, 2006); Zhang Wenqin 章文欽 et al., eds., *Guangzhou Shisan Hang Cangsang* 廣州十三行滄桑 (The Thirteen Hongs in Guangzhou) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Ditu Chubanshe 廣東地圖出版社, 2001); Huang Qichen 黃啟臣 and Pang Xinping 龐新平, *Ming-Qing Guangdong Shangren* 明清廣東商人 (Guangdong Merchants in the Ming and Ching Dynasty) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Jingji Chubanshe 廣東經濟出版社, 2001); Huang Qichen 黃啟臣, ed., *Guangdong Haishang Sichou zhi Lu Shi* 廣東海上絲綢之路史 (History of Guangdong's Maritime Silk Road) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Jingji Chubanshe, 2003); Zhang Wenqin 章文欽, *Guangdong Shisan Hang yu Zaoqi Zhongxi Guanxi* 廣東十三行與早期中西關係 (Guangzhou: Guangdong Jingji chubanshe, 2009); and Tan Yuanheng 譚元亨, *Shisan Hang Xinlun* 十三行新論 (New studies of the Thirteen Hongs) (Hong Kong 香港: 中國評論學術出版社 China Review Academic Publishers, 2009). The last two books have articles on Tan 譚 merchants in the eighteenth century to which I have not been able to match any merchant names in the foreign records.
5. Liu Yong, *The Dutch East India Company's Tea Trade with China 1757–1781* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).



6. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters, 1762* (Macao: Macau Cultural Affairs Bureau, 2006); Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters, 1763* (Macao: Macau Cultural Affairs Bureau, 2008); and Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters, 1764* (Macao: Macau Cultural Affairs Bureau, 2009). (Hereafter these published *dagregisters* are referred to as CMD 1762, 1763 or 1764).
7. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'The Yan Family: Merchants of Canton, 1734–1780s', *Review of Culture*, International Edition No. 9 (January 2004): 30–85; Paul A. Van Dyke, 'The Ye Merchants of Canton, 1720–1804', *Review of Culture*, International Edition No. 13 (January 2005): 6–47; Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Cai and Qiu Enterprises: Merchants of Canton, 1730–1784', *Review of Culture*, International Edition No. 15 (July 2005): 60–101. New information has also been recently published on the Pan 潘 merchants in Canton in the following articles: Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Manila, Macao and Canton: The Ties That Bind', *Review of Culture*, International Edition No. 18 (April 2006): 125–34; and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'The Ca Mau Shipwreck and the Canton Junk Trade', in *Made in Imperial China* (Amsterdam: Sotheby's, January 2007), 14–5.
8. Cheong Weng Eang, 'The Age of Suqua, 1720–1759' in *Asian Trade Routes*, ed. Karl Reinhold Haellquist (London: Curzon Press, 1991), 217–30.
9. For more details surrounding the problems connected to identifying and matching Chinese names, see information in the appendixes, and Van Dyke, 'Chinese Merchants of 18th-Century Canton and Macao', forthcoming.
10. Carl T. Smith's collection can be accessed online at [http://www.grs.gov.hk/ws/english/ps\\_online\\_cata\\_csc.htm](http://www.grs.gov.hk/ws/english/ps_online_cata_csc.htm). This website, however, only includes names and data that Smith collected up to 1995. He continued to collect information about families in Macao for another ten years. His complete data of Macao families are now available in the Macau Historical Archives. For this study, I depended mostly on Smith's two unpublished papers entitled '18th Century Chinese Merchants' and '19th Century Chinese Merchants', which he gave the author several years ago. According to Smith, these two papers list all the Chinese names he found in Portuguese sources. Considering that Portuguese records contain very little information about Portuguese merchants going to Canton (they were there every year), it is logical that there would also be very little information about Canton merchants with whom they did business.
11. Archives Nationales, Paris (ANP): Colonies (hereafter Col/) C/1/7, 10–6; and Henri Cordier, 'Les Marchands Hanistes de Canton', *T'oung Pao* 3 (1902), 281–315.
12. Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident. Le Commerce a Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and Album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964).
13. Archives du Port Lorient (APL): IP299 Correspondance diverse et documents relatifs à la ville de Lorient. Liasse 31: Lettres de fonctionnaires de la Compagnie en Chine et dans l'Inde, 1754–1762.
14. In a private conversation with W.E. Cheong in 1999, he confirmed there was not much to find in French records. His mentor, Louis Dermigny, who explored the French archives very thoroughly also found very little information about Chinese merchants.
15. See, for example, Philippe de Vargas, ed., *Recit de Trois Voyages a la Chine (1779–1793) par Charles de Constant* (Peking [Beijing]: University Yenching, 1939).
16. Wong Yeetuan is presently a research fellow at the Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies (華社研究中心) in Kuala Lumpur.

## INTRODUCTION

1. By the nineteenth century, tea had become so popular among all classes in Britain that it was thought to be 'indispensible'. 'Spices are luxuries. But in this country [Britain] at least, tea has long ago ceased to belong to this description of commodities;

- it has become an almost indispensable necessary of life, and is, at present, far more extensively used by the lower and middle, than by the more opulent classes'. Maurice Cross, ed., *Selections from the Edinburgh Review, Comprising the Best Articles in that Journal, from its Commencement to the Present Time*, 6 vols. (Paris: Baudry's European Library, 1836), 6: 267.
2. As far as foreigners were concerned, the Flint Affair was the biggest crisis of the 1750s. This incident temporarily interrupted trade and caused merchants considerable trouble and anxiety, but it had little or no impact on day-to-day operations or the way trade was managed. The new edict of 1757 forbade foreigners from going to other Chinese ports. Except for some tightening of existing policies, however, such as the mandatory removal to Macao, the edict changed nothing in Canton other than ensure trade would continue there as usual. As far as Chinese merchants were concerned, the fluctuations in the numbers of ships arriving in China each year, the inability of inland producers to keep up with demand, and Beaukeepqua's death in 1758 and the subsequent distribution of his debts to other merchants, were much more serious and important factors than the Flint affair. *Hong* merchants suffered repercussions from that latter event, with threats, punishments, and tedious visits to the foreigners to settle the matter. But once it was solved, they still had all these other worries hanging over them.
  3. Exports in the 1760s rose steadily from 271,723 piculs in 1763 to 321,662 piculs in 1769, an increase of about 18 percent. Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 146–7.

## CHAPTER ONE

1. For a list of all the *Hong* merchants active in Canton from 1760 to 1843, see Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 13–8.
2. The origins of the term *shi san hang* (十三行, thirteen *hongs*) have been much debated by historians. See for example Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 3–5; and Liang Fangzhong 梁方仲, 'Guangzhou shi san hang mingcheng kao' 廣州十三行名稱考 ('An Investigation of the Name of the Thirteen *Hongs* in Guangzhou'), in Zhang Wenqin 章文欽 et al., eds., *Guangzhou Shisan Hang Cangsang* 廣州十三行滄桑 (The Thirteen *Hongs* in Guangzhou) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Ditu Chubanshe 廣東地圖出版社, 2001), 1–6. Rarely were there thirteen *hongs* and no effort was made by the Chinese government to keep their numbers at thirteen so in practice, it is merely a generic term referring to the *Hong* merchants collectively.
3. Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), 12.
4. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 122–34.
5. *Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee of the House of Commons Appointed to Enquire into the Present State of the Affairs of the East-India Company, and into the Trade Between Great Britain, the East-Indies, and China; and to Report to the House*. (London: Printed for Parbury, Allen, and Co., 1830), testimony of C. Marjoribanks, Esq., 1830.02.18, par. 324, p. 49.
6. British Library (BL), India Office Records (IOR): R/10/4, entry under 1755.08.07, letter dated 6 August 1755, pp. 26–31; and Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), vol. 5.
7. For a detailed description of Americans' dealings with both *Hong* merchants and outside merchants in the 1820s, see Capt. Abel Coffin's testimony before the British Parliament in 1830. *Minutes of Evidence* (1830), 1830, pp. 185–91, 1830.03.02, nos. 1558–919.

8. By the 1820s, this situation had changed. In 1828, Marjoribanks described the inland tea men as follows. 'The tea brokers themselves, I mean the green tea merchants, who deliver their teas to the Hong merchants, are a body of men consisting very nearly of 400. They are men of very small capital indeed; the advances are very much made to them from merchants in Canton. Those persons always show a greater wish to deal with the Company than with individual merchants, from the obvious reason that they consider them a more secure and regular customer, a better customer and a better paymaster.' *Minutes of Evidence* (1830), testimony of C. Marjoribanks, Esq., 1830.02.18, par. 187, p. 23 and par. 204, p. 32.
9. *Minutes of Evidence* (1830), testimony of C. Marjoribanks, Esq., 1830.02.18, par. 187, p. 23 and par. 204, p. 32. In 1830, John Davis testified that 'the Hong are supplied by teamen, who contract for the crops' and that they 'are persons of generally large capital'. This statement, of course, is relative, and needs to be taken in consideration with other evidence. Thomas John Buckton, *China Trade: Containing the Entire Substance of the Evidence Laid Before the House of Commons, in the Session of 1830; Extracted and Condensed, from the Report of the Committee; for Commercial and Political Uses* (Hull: I. Wilson, 1831), 4.
10. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 100; William Hunter, *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton before Treaty Days 1825–1844* (London: 1882; reprint, London, 1885; London, 1911; Shanghai: Mercury Press, 1938), 23; and Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 183 n. 54. For examples of the insignias that could be worn based on rank, see Valery M. Garrett, *Chinese Dragon Robes* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1998). For a list of Hong merchants, in 1807, with the colour of their buttons, see Félix Renouard de Sainte-Croix, *Voyage Commercial et Politique aux Indes Orientales, aux Iles Philippines, a la Chine, avec des Notions sur la Cochinchine et le Tonquin, pendant les Années 1803, 1804, 1805, 1806 et 1807. Par M. Félix Renouard de Sainte-Croix, ancien Officier de Cavalerie au service de France, chargé par le Gouverneur des Iles Philippines de l'organisation des troupes pour la défense de ces iles*, 3 vols. (Paris: Archives du Droit Français, 1810), 3: 100.
11. James Holman, *Travels in China, New Zealand, New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land, Cape Horn, etc. etc.* (London: George Routledge, 1840), 82.
12. Holman, *Travels in China*, 262; and Charles Marjoribanks, *Letter to the Right Hon. Charles Grant, President of the Board of Controul, on the Present State of British Intercourse with China* (London: J. Hatchard and Son, 1833), 25–6.
13. Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters, 1764* (Macao: Macau Cultural Institute, 2009) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1764), xix and 215.
14. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 82, 1773.11.10.
15. For a discussion of the transport of tea from inland to Canton, see Paul A. Van Dyke, 'China Tea and the Southeast Asian Tin Trade in the 18th Century', in *明清廣東海軍與海防* (Ming-Qing Guangdong Navy and Coastal Defense), ed. 澳門大學社會科學及人文學院 (University of Macau, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities) (澳門 Macao: 澳門大學社會科學及人文學院 University of Macau, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, 2008), 222–6.
16. 1773, November 10: 'de kooplieden hun Theen nog niet ontfangen hebbende welders retardements veroorzaakt doordien te Hung Nam alwaar de Theen over Land tot op een Zeeker distantie moeten getransporteerd werden, de Coelies die dat werk moeten verrigten in oppositie zyn gekomen om 2 Casjes [1000th of a tael] pr Catty voor hun arbeid meerder als voor heen te prætendeeren. 2 Mandaryns om de zaak te beslissen ter plaatse gekomen zynde hebben zig de Coelies die ca. 28 a 30,000 man in getal zyn, op de vlugt begeeven; men meent egter zo de kooplieden ons verzeekeren het verschil haast zal beslist zyn en de Thee binnen 3 a 4 dagen afkomen'. NAH: Canton 82, 1773.11.10. Of course, the Dutch had heard this rumour from their merchants, and had no way of

- proving whether or not it was true. In November and December 1773, for example, the Danes were given several different excuses for the delay of the Bohea tea, including the Mandarins commandeering the boats to move troops, an epidemic in the tea land resulting in there not being enough labour to carry the tea, to there not being enough water in the river to transport the goods. Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1170, 1773.11.16, p. 109 and 1773.12.06, p. 116.
17. Several descriptions exist of the route travelled by the human caravan from the Bohea Mountains to Canton. Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *Dongya Haiyu yi qian nian* 東亞海域一千年 (One Thousand Years of Maritime East Asia) (Taipei 臺北: Yuanliu Chuban Gongsi 遠流出版公司, 2005), 331–6; Liu Yong, *The Dutch East India Company's Tea Trade with China 1757–1781* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 68–73; and Van Dyke, 'China Tea and the Southeast Asian Tin Trade in the 18th Century', 222–6. All three of these descriptions are written in English, even though two of them are published in Chinese books.
  18. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/25, 1724.07.30, p. 5.
  19. For numerous examples of these private foreigners being active in the credit market in Canton, see the Jean Abraham Grill collection in the Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM): Godegårdsarkivet, F17.
  20. Officials issued many edicts forbidding Chinese from borrowing from foreigners, but when those illegal loans were revealed, they were honoured. Thus, even though there were no specific laws to protect foreign investment capital, local practice filled in the gap and ensured repayment. For a 1760 and 1780 edict forbidding these loans, see Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 56–7. As late as the 1830s, Chinese officials were still warning *Hong* merchants not to borrow from foreigners, but all of this talk was simply political rhetoric. *Canton Register* (2 May 1837).
  21. 'Voor Ruuwe Zyde 1e & 2e soort, had men hem serieuslyk, onder voor uytverstrecking van 80 PCo in Zuyver Contant ge-eijscht'. NAH: Canton 26, Resolution no. 11 dated 6 August 1763, par. no. 2.
  22. The payments on gold contracts were often made many months in advance. On 6 August 1763, for example, the Dutch contracted for 100,000 taels worth of gold, to be delivered in 500 days from the date of contract (16 December 1764). They paid the full amount upfront, one half in silver coin and the other half in tin, pepper and other imports. Those imports would have to be sold before the Chinese merchants could make the purchase, but they had plenty of time to do that. And in the meantime, they had 50,000 taels in silver coin they could use until the purchase was actually made. In this case, the merchants realized their profits more than one year in advance. NAH: Canton 26, Resolution no. 11 dated 6 August 1763.
  23. Because both gold and opium enabled merchants to gain working capital immediately, it is not surprising to see the opium trade increasing at about the same time that the gold trade began to decline. By the 1760s and 1770s, the price of gold in relation to silver became less favourable than in previous decades, which meant less gold sales and less working capital available to *Hong* merchants. Opium was the only other commodity that could produce quick capital, although not in advance and not always as efficiently or effectively as gold could do in the first half of the eighteenth century. It is thus no small coincidence that the opium market began to solidify in China at this same time (1760s and 1770s). Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 120–6.
  24. The sources for this paragraph are too numerous to list here, but the appendixes, plates and information contained in the chapters provide most of this detail. See also Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 11–2.
  25. BL: IOR G/12/66, 1779.08.20, pp. 57–8. The spelling of the merchants' names was changed to correspond with this study. The original text is as follows:  
The Dutch do business with Yngshaw, Seunqua, Chowqua and Munqua

- The Swedes with Pian Khequa, Shy Kingqua, Munqua & Chowqua  
 The Hungarians with Puan Khequa, Chowqua & Munqua  
 The Danes with Puan Khequa, Yngshaw, Kewshaw, and Seunqua
26. For a brief description of the commission merchants in Canton and Macao, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 156–9.
  27. For an example of an American merchant paying a Canton merchant a year or two later for goods he had acquired on consignment in an earlier voyage, see Capt. Abel Coffin's testimony in *Minutes of Evidence* (1830), pp. 185–91, 1830.03.02, nos. 1558–919. There are many examples of this practice in the American archives.
  28. Capt. Abel Coffin's testimony in *Minutes of Evidence* (1830), p. 186, 1830.03.02, nos. 1570–1.
  29. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 87.
  30. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Bookkeeping as a window into efficiencies of early modern trade in Asia: Europeans verses Americans', forthcoming.
  31. For a lively account of a private Englishman forcibly taking over a Hong merchant's factory in order to collect on debts owed to him, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 97–8.
  32. The Danish Asiatic Company commissioned five ships to China from 1820 to 1833, but their trade was insignificant compared to that of the EIC.
  33. This summary of the smuggling networks in the Pearl River Delta was taken from Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Smuggling Networks of the Pearl River Delta before 1842: Implications for Macau and the American China Trade', Vol. 50, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch*, (2010); 67–97.
  34. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 117–20
  35. Dr. Kerr, *A Guide to the City and Suburbs of Canton* (Hong Kong: Kelly & Walsh, 1918; reprint, San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, Inc., 1974), 15.
  36. This discussion of the consoo fund was pieced together from the following sources: Michael Greenberg, *British Trade and the Opening of China 1800–1842* (Cambridge: University Press, 1951), 52–3; James Bromley Eames, *The English in China. Being an Account of the Intercourse and Relations between England and China from the Year 1600 to the Year 1843 and a Summary of Later Developments* (London: Curzon Press, 1909), 98–100; Earl H. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations 1750–1800* (1936. Reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 140, 212; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 88–102; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 210; Earl H. Pritchard, *Anglo-Chinese Relations during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 111, 141; CMD 1764, Apr 18, pp. 58–9 and Apr 30–May 5, pp. 66–8; Hosea Ballou Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire. The Period of Subjection 1834–1911*, 3 vols. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910; reprint, Taipei: Yung Mei Mei Publishing, 1966), 1: 69, 75; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 16–9, 56–60. Martin and Cheong claim to trace the consoo tax as far back as the 1720s, but it is unclear where this information is coming from. R. Montgomery Martin, *China. Political, Commercial and Social in an Official Report to Her Majesty's Government*, 2 vols. (London: James Madden, 1847), 2: 11; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 210 and 239 n. 82. Foreigners continued to complain about the consoo charge into the 1830s. *Canton Register* (20 December 1836). Robert Morrison, and son John Robert, credited Poankeequa with the establishment of the consoo fund in the 1780s. Robert Morrison, *Notices Concerning China, and the Port of Canton. Also a Narrative of the Affair of the English Frigate Topaze, 1821–22. With Remarks on Homicides, and an Account of the Fire of Canton* (Malacca: Mission Press, 1823), 39–49; John Robert Morrison, *A Chinese Commercial Guide. Consisting of A Collection of Details Respecting Foreign Trade in China*, 1st ed. (Canton: Albion Press, 1834), 33–4, 42. See also the *Chinese Repository* (January 1835), 3: 424–5.

37. BL: R/10/6,1765.12.05, p. 56; CMD 1764, 219
38. Martin, *China*, 2: 11; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 210 and 239 n. 82.
39. BL: IOR G/12/59, 1776.08.20, pp. 54–8.
40. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years*, 140, 212; Pritchard, *Anglo-Chinese Relations*, 111, 141; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 88–102; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 210.
41. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 88–102.

## CHAPTER TWO

1. Hunter mentioned that all of the trade was contracted orally, without any written documents. In describing the purchasing of goods at Canton in the early nineteenth century, he stated that 'no written agreements were drawn up and signed, nothing was sealed or attested'. Hunter, *The 'Fan Kwae'*, 58. Downs also states that 'because nothing like Western commercial law existed in China, contracts were enforceable only at Macao'. Jacques Downs, *The Golden Ghetto. The American Commercial Community at Canton and the Shaping of American China Policy, 1784–1844* (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1997), 95. While it is true that many transactions were done orally, it is also true that written contracts were a regular part of trade at Canton, which is evidenced in the many documents reproduced in the plate section. These are only a fraction of the total contracts that were generated in Canton.
2. As an example of the little information available about merchants in gazetteers, one only needs to do a quick search in the new electronic database entitled 'Zhongguo fang zhi ku' 中國方志庫 (愛如生數字化技術研究中心 Eruson Company, Beijing). This database allows multiple character searches, and displays all of the entries instantly, in all of the gazetteers. Out of more than fifty merchants who were active in Canton in the eighteenth century, only a couple merchants showed up in the Guangdong and Fujian gazetteers. In fact, even very simple searches like *shang ren* 商人, *shang chuan* 商船, *yang hang* 洋行, *hai yang* 海洋, or *shang* 商, *hang* 行, *hao* 號, and *dian* 店, produced very few results connected to Canton or Macao merchants in the eighteenth century. For the nineteenth century, there are many more entries, especially after 1850. Despite many days of searching in this database, I found nothing in these gazetteers about Canton or Macao merchants that was useful for this study. The few men who do appear only have very brief information given about them, which I already had from other Chinese sources.
3. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) R/10/04, 1756.01.12, p. 19.
4. These figures were taken from various records as follows: In 1726, the GIC packed 350 piculs of Bohea tea into 150 chests which averages to 2.33 piculs (or 233 catties, which I rounded to 230) per chest. Stadsarchief (Municipal Archive), Antwerp (SAA): IC 5752, fo. 21, contract with Quicong dated December 11. In 1743, the CFI packed 5,980 piculs of Bohea tea into 2,300 chests which averages to 2.6 piculs (260 catties) per chest. Archives Nationales, Paris (ANP): Colonies (Col) C/1/10 no. 42, doc. dated 1743.09.06. In the 1760s, the VOC packed about 355 to 365 Dutch pounds of Bohea-Congo tea into each of their whole chests. At 122.5 Dutch pounds to 100 catties, which was the standard they used, the net tea in each chest comes to 289 to 300 catties. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters, 1763* (Macao: Macau Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1763), Nov 21, p. 154 and Dec 6, p. 159. In 1766, the SOIC contracted 1,500 piculs of Bohea tea to be packed into whole chests. The tare weights were stipulated in their contracts to be 70 to 71 Swedish lbs. and gross weights 452 to 456 lbs. With a picul being equal to 142 Swedish lbs. these amounts calculated to 270 catties net tea in each, and tare weights of the chests being 49 to 50 catties. Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm. Godegårdsarkivet F17

- (hereafter referred to as NM: F17): pp. T1\_04986–7. In 1736, the EIC packed about 220 to 225 piculs of Bohea tea into 100 chests with 220 to 225 cattles net in each. BL: IOR G/12/41, p. 3. But in 1784 and 1795, the EIC packed about 500 to 510 piculs of Bohea tea into 200 chests, which comes to about 250 to 255 cattles net in each. BL: IOR G/12/80, p. 26 and G/12/110, p. 2.
5. Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters, 1764* (Macao: Macau Cultural Institute, 2009) (hereafter referred to as CMD 1764), Nov 3, p. 243.
  6. The money that was borrowed from the Portuguese in Macao and then given to Chinese merchants in Canton to place these tea orders in February 1766, and the interest rates that applied, can be seen in a document that was reproduced in Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), Plate 4. The Danes had made similar arrangements in other years. All of the companies were going to Macao to borrow money from merchants there, from time to time, and the rates usually varied from 10 to 15 percent throughout the eighteenth century. For examples of the EIC getting money from merchants in Macao in 1764, see BL: IOR R/10/5, several entries pp. 41–116.
  7. Compare also with the contract in 1730 in Plate 10.02.
  8. If the Dutch or Danes paid for the tea with silver coin that was 95 touch (95 percent silver), for example, then the price of tea would need to be adjusted to compensate for its higher silver content. Below is a list of the coins in common usage in China in the eighteenth century, and their touch standards. These figures were taken from Samuel Jackson, *An Authentick Account of the Weights, Measures, Exchanges, Customs, Duties, Port-Charges, &c. &c. and Correct Batty Tables, made use of, and paid at the several Ports of the East-Indies, traded unto by Europeans: Together with an account of all the different coins (both real and imaginary) by which all accompts in Asia are kept: also the coins, weights, names and touches of gold, emperor's and Hoppo's duties on the measurage of European Ships; with the Duties on all goods imported and exported at Canton in China* (London: W. Lear, 1764), 48–9.

Silver coins used in China in the 18th century and their respective silver content (touch)	Touch
English Standard, tho' but 92 ½ Touch, will generally pass for goods at	94
French Crowns for Gold, tho' but 94	95
Mexico Dollars	94
Pillar Dollars	95
Duccatoons	96
Surat Rupees	100

These touch standards are what were normally found in Canton, but sometimes coins were found to be one touch above or below these figures. In 1724, for example, some French crowns were valued at 95 touch while others were found to be 94 touch. 'Only those with three crowns stamped upon them pass current at 95' touch. BL: IOR G/12/08, p. 1437. In September 1732, gold merchants in Canton assayed pillar dollars and found them to be 93 to 93.5 touch and Mexican dollars assayed at 95 touch. In previous years (and in the example above), pillar dollars had greater touch than Mexican dollars. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.09.12, p. 92. In 1780, the EIC reported that 'the new Spanish Dollar distinguished here by the name of head Dollar is only reckon'd 90 touch'. This source explains further that these dollars were always recorded in the company's books as 92 touch, even though they were actually 90 touch. BL: IOR G/12/66, 1780.01.15, p. 190. The alloy content of coins varied with different minting.

For further description of various coins in use in Asia at this time, see C. Scholten, *The Coins of the Dutch Overseas Territories 1601–1948* (Amsterdam: J. Schulman, 1953).

Besides the different touch standards, there was also the problem of different refiners in China assaying silver coins differently. In 1767, for example, the English officers made a comparison of four different types of silver rupees that had been sent from India. They had the rupees assayed in India and compared those results to what refiners in China assayed them at. Four *Hong* merchants were asked to have their refiners examine them. These were the results. BL: IOR R/10/6, 1767.12.21, p. 83.

	Currency	Madras Assay	Cai Hunqua's refiner	Cai Munqua's refiner	Ingsia's refiner	Poan-keequa's refiner
Patna Sonnat	Rupees	96 11/24	100	98 ½	98	99
Banares	ditto	92 17/24	97	97	97 ½	95
Bad Arcots	ditto	93 1/3	95 3/10	95	97	93 ½
Ouzeric	ditto	91 21/24	89	92	92	92

As can be seen, many variables affected commodity prices in Canton.

9. In the early eighteenth century, the EIC also used different sized piculs varying from 132 to 133.5 English pounds. BL: IOR G/12/47, 1739.10.01, p. 21.
10. If we compare these two contracts with the contracts in Plates 09.15 and 11.13 in 1770, which were also for first grade Bohea tea but at 14.8 taels per picul, it looks like the tea price declined steadily from 1730 to 1770 (19 taels in 1730, 17.8 taels in 1766, and 14.8 taels in 1770). But then if we add the contract in Plate 11.11 to the comparison, which was also for first grade Bohea tea in 1760 but at 19.5 taels per picul, then it looks like the price of tea remained fairly constant from 1730 to 1760, but then dropped thereafter. Obviously, the prices are almost meaningless, unless we have all of the data to compare and determine what the *real* prices were in those years.
11. See other examples of interest rates in Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 150–6.
12. For a brief summary of the development of marine insurance (including bottomry) and its usages in Western countries, see Edwin J. Perkins, *American Public Finance and Financial Services 1700–1815* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1994), 282–92.
13. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 150–6.
14. Upsalla University Library (UUB): L182 Ost Ind. Handl. Journaler, skeppsladdningar, kopierad, utdrag och anteckningar för diverse Ostindiska skeppen 1727–1762.
15. The bottomry rate for ships sailing from the United States to China in the 1780s, for example was quoted at 15 percent premium. Perkins, *American Public Finance*, 291.
16. For the Chinese junk routes to Southeast Asia, see Roderich Ptak, *China, the Portuguese, and the Nanyang* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), chapter 8, 'Jottings on Chinese Sailing Routes to Southeast Asia, Especially on the Eastern Route in Ming Times'; Roderich Ptak, *China's Seaborne Trade with South and Southeast Asia (1200–1750)* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 1999), chapter 3, 'The Northern Trade Route to the Spice Islands: South China Sea — Sulu Zone — North Moluccas, (14th to Early 16th Century)'; and James Kong Chin, 'The Junk Trade between South China and Nguyen Vietnam in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries', in *Water Frontier. Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750–1880*, ed. Nola Cooke and Li Tana (Singapore: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 53–66.
17. Many books have now been written on the Chinese junk trade describing how it operated. For a few helpful studies which were used in this summary, see Ng Chin-Keong, *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683–1735* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983); Jennifer Wayne Cushman, *Fields from the Sea: Chinese*



- Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Publications, 1993; reprint, 2000); Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, 'Qing dai zhong ye Xiamen de hai shang mao yi (1727–1833)' 清代中葉廈門的海上貿易 (Xiamen's maritime trade during mid-Qing), in *Zhongguo Hai yang Fa zhan Shi lun Wen zhi* 中國海洋發展史論文集 (Essays in Chinese Maritime History), ed. Wu Jianxiong 吳劍雄, vol. 4 (Taipei Nangang 臺北南港: Academia Sinica 中央研究院, 1994), 61–100; Lin Renchuan 林仁川, *Ming mo Qing chu Si ren Hai shang Mao yi* 明末清初私人海上貿易 (Private Maritime Trade at the End of the Ming and Beginning of the Qing) (Shanghai 上海: Hua dong Shi fan Da xue Chubanshe 華東師範大學出版社, 1987); Liu Shih-Feng 劉序楓, 'Qing zheng fu dui chu yang chuan zhi de guan li zheng ce (1684–1842)' 清政府對出洋船隻的管理政策 (Qing government regulations concerning sea-going junks), in *Zhongguo hai yang fa zhan shi lun wen zhi* 中國海洋發展史論文集 (Essays in Chinese Maritime History), ed. Liu Shih-Feng 劉序楓, vol. 9 (Taipei Nangang 臺北南港: Academia Sinica 中央研究院, 2005), 331–76; and Xin Yuanou 辛元歐, "Shi qi shi ji de zhong guo fan chuan mao yi ji fu ri tang chuan yuan liu kao" 十七世紀的中國帆船貿易及赴日唐船源流考 (A complete account of Chinese Merchant Ships in the 17th century), in *Zhongguo Hai yang Fa zhan Shi lun Wen ji* 中國海洋發展史論文集 (Essays in Chinese Maritime History), ed. Liu Shih-Feng 劉序楓, vol. 9 (Taipei Nangang 臺北南港: Academia Sinica 中央研究院, 2005), 191–257.
18. I am grateful to Ed Perkins for pointing out the differences between bottomry rates on coastal voyages and those on the open sea. For a summary of bottomry in the Atlantic Ocean and the development of marine insurance in the United States in the eighteenth century, see Perkins, *American Public Finance*, 282–92.
  19. For examples of junk bottomry contracts and a discussion of how they worked, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 145–56, and Plates 7, 10 and 11.
  20. Liang Tingnan 梁廷楠, *Yue hai guan zhi* 粵海關志 (Gazetteer of Guangdong Maritime Customs) (1839; Reprint, Guangzhou: Guangzhou Renmin Chubanshe 廣州人民出版社, 2001).

### CHAPTER THREE

1. All figures are from Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident. Le Commerce a Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and Album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), vol. 2, 'Trafic a Wampou'.
2. James Ford Bell Library, University of Minnesota (JFB): Charles Irvine Papers, box entitled 'Letter Books & Account Books', letter to C. Campbell, dated Canton 1746.01.16.
3. JFB: Charles Irvine Papers, box entitled 'Letter Books & Account Books', letter to Gerard Barry, dated Canton 1747.01.26. In another letter addressed to Mr. Nils Ström with the same date, Irvine wrote 'Last year [1745] all marcht. great & small lost money by so few ships arriving & this year [1746] all the great men, except Shouqua, are ruined by too many ships arriving very late; of all which you will undoubtedly be inform'd by your Brother & others whose business it is'. In another letter of the same date written in French and addressed to Mons. W. van Maneil, Irvine explains that several English and Swedish ships did not arrive at Canton until October or November 1746, which was very late in the season.
4. JFB: Charles Irvine Papers, box entitled 'Letter Books & Account Books', letter to C. Campbell, dated Canton 1746.01.16. The nine ships that arrived in 1745 were three French, two English, two Danish, and two Dutch. Dermigny shows a total of 15 ships at Whampoa in 1745, which is counting the ones that did not arrive. He and Morse show four English ships arriving this year, when there were only two. Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident. Le Commerce a Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and

Album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 522; and Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing, 1966), vol. 5 Appendix. The English ships *Dolphin* and *Walpole* are the ones that failed to show up in 1745'. Anthony Farrington, *Catalogue of East India Company Ships' Journals and Logs 1600–1834* (London: British Library, 1999).

5. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/30, 1730.11.02, p. 55.
6. Thomas John Buckton, *China Trade: Containing the Entire Substance of the Evidence Laid Before the House of Commons, in the Session of 1830; Extracted and Condensed, from the Report of the Committee; for Commercial and Political Uses* (Hull: I. Wilson, 1831), 15.
7. Concerns about avoiding demurrage charges can be found almost every year in the EIC records. For a couple examples from the 1730s to the 1750s, see BL: IOR G/12/35, 1733.07.30, p. 14 (shows concerns about there not being enough commodities in port so the ships can leave on time), G/12/50, 1741.11.30, p. 38 (late arrival of silk delayed the loading), G/12/51, 1741.12.28, p. 15 (shows concerns about the scarcity of tea and number of ships to load), G/12/57, 1753.07.17, pp. 4–5 (discusses concerns about the late arrival of silk and delay in dispatching the ships), R/10/4, 1755.08.13, p. 36 (shows fears about rising prices of tea owing to strong demand and not being able to get enough tea to finish loading the ships which will result in paying demurrage fees).
8. In 1741, a Swedish ship could not complete its cargo so it was ordered by the Chinese officials to remove to Macao and winter there until the next season. It not only suffered the expense of paying and provisioning the crew those additional months, but also had to pay port fees again when it went upriver to Whampoa to finish its lading in autumn of 1742. BL: R/10/3, 1742.07.04, p. 34. In January 1748, the Dutch reported that the Swedish supercargos had brought money to Canton that would be invested in goods to be delivered in the next season. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 7, Letter to Gustaaff Willem Baron van Imhoff dated 10 January 1748. On 18 January 1750, the EIC supercargos reported that 'The other [Swedish] ship having been here all the year, and taken part of her cargoe on board the former year, we could not come at any certainty of her cargoe'. BL: IOR G/12/53, 1750.01.16, p. 110. In 1752, the Swedish ship *Hoppet* had to layover a season to finish its cargo. Gothenburg Landsarkivet (GL, Provincial Archive): Öjareds säteris arkiv A406 (hereafter, I will refer to this archive and file as GL: A406). In a letter dated 1755.08.06, the EIC supercargoes reported the following: 'The great number of ships which arrived here ### [illegible in the copy consulted] year (being twenty five sail for Europe) occasioned the very high prices that were given for all sorts of teas, green tea in particular was hardly to be got, and upon the whole ## [illegible in the copy consulted] the demand for both kinds was so great, that a Sweed and Prussian have wintered here not being able to procure proper cargoes'. BL: R/10/4, 1755.08.07, pp. 18–9. In 1759, another Swedish ship laid over the next season to complete its cargo. BL: R/10/4, 1760.04.20, p. 19 and 1760.05.05, p. 27. In January 1761, the Dutch reported that a Swedish ship would have to layover because it could not get enough goods to finish its cargo. NAH: VOC 4384, Report dated 1761.01.11, pp. 540–1. For details of the arrival dates and departures in China of the Swedish ships, see Christian Koninckx, *The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company (1731–1766)* (Belgium: Van Gemmert Publishing, 1980), chart inserted at the back entitled 'Expeditions of the Swedish East India Company'; and Sven T. Kjellberg, *Svenska Ostindiska Compagniern 1731–1813* (Malmö: Allhems Förlag, 1974), 177–84. For the arrivals and departures of the DAC ships, see Erik Gøbel, 'Asiatisk Kompagnis Kinafart, 1732–1833. Besejling of Bemanding' (Ph.D. diss., University of Copenhagen, 1978); and Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1119–43.

9. From 1743 to 1745, VOC ships remained six months in port waiting for their cargo to arrive, and in 1746 the silk was much delayed in arriving. NAH: Canton 4, 6, 10, 14, 69 and 70, see entries in the Resolutions and *dagregisters* dated August to February. For the layover of a Prussian ship, see BL: R/10/4, 1755.08.07, pp. 18–9. In 1758, the detaining of the EIC ships cost the company an extra 5,000 taels. BL: R/10/4, 1759.03.07, pp. 26–8.
10. BL: R/10/4, 1760.01.06, p. 180.
11. NAH: Canton 16, see all documents dated July 1751.
12. NAH: Canton 19, Resolutions dated 28–29 June and 8 July 1754.
13. Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 373 n. 23; Huang Qichen 黃啟臣 and Pang Xiping 龐新平, *Ming-Qing Guangdong Shangren 明清廣東商人* (Guangdong Merchants in the Ming and Ching Dynasty) (Guangzhou 廣州: Guangdong Jingji Chubanshe 廣東經濟出版社, 2001), 44; and Liang Tingnan 梁廷楠, *Yuehaiguan Zhi 粵海關志* (Gazetteer of Guangdong Maritime Customs) (1839; reprint, Guangzhou 廣州: Guangzhou Renmin Chubanshe 廣州人民出版社, 2001), 496.
14. Gothenburg Universitetsbibliotek (University Library) (GUB): H22.4A 'Dagbok för skeppet Prins Carl', 1754.11.18, p. 54.
15. BL: IOR R/10/3, p. 367.
16. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 36–44; and RAC: Ask 1135, 1755.08.14, p. 90. 'Jong Hoecqua, desen man is by ons in deselve vertrouwen als te vooren, maar het schynt als of de kooplieden door den handel der ongeprivilegeerde handelaars grootelyx [?] benadeelt word, waarom men twyffele of desen nieuwen marchiant medt onse Compagnie wel soude mogen negotieeren, vermits alle de hangkooplieden by Schanderen zyn vergadert geweest en daar op besloten een sjap aan den Sjontok te presentieren, ten deerende een versoek dat zylieden aleen, met seclusie van alle boutiquequiers en winkeliers, den handel medt de Compagnie van alle Europeen mogen dryven, egter de vryheyd latende aan die smalle handelaars om medt de Dienaaren van gemelde Compagnie of in de Sogenaamde Particulieren handel te negotieeren, na dat dit criticque geschrift ingedient was; heeft den Viceroy een apostil gegeven en ook op heele Canton gepubliceert dat geene andere met de Europeese Compagnie sal mogen handelen, excepto die der particulieren, souder bewilliging den hangkooplieden medt wie so een Compagnie zy g'intereffeert'. NAH: Canton 20, Resolution dated 24 June 1755. 'Terwyl de toegang van alle negotiantenen boutiquequiers belet, en alleen overgegeven was, aan dese ses Coopliden; als: Bouw quiqua, Cheo Swiqua, Tan Chetqua, Chai Honqua, Swesia, en Poan Keyqua, en dat buyten dien geen Lingua of tolk, veel minder iemand anders, in de factoryen komen'. NAH: Canton 20, doc. dated 2 July 1755. See also NAH: VOC 4386, 1760.08.01, pp. 22–4.
17. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 36–44; NAH: Canton 20, doc. dated 27 June 1755; RAC: Ask 1135, 1755.08.14, p. 90; and *Qing shi lu Guangdong Shi liao 清實錄廣東史料*, 6 vols. (Guangzhou 廣州: Guangdong sheng Chubanshe 廣東省出版社, 1995) (hereafter QSL), 2: 167, doc. dated 1757.12.20. This latter source shows at least 26 houses involved in the trade in 1757. This was not necessarily a large number compared to other years. In 1732, for example, there were only about twelve foreign ships in China (half as many as the 1750s), and there were said to be seventeen houses involved in the trade in the yang hang 洋行. *Qing gong Yue Gang Ao Shang mao Dang an Quan ji 清宮粵港澳商貿檔案全集* Zhongguo Di Yi Li Shi Dang an Guan 中國第一歷史檔案館, Zhongguo gu ji zheng li yan jiu hui bian 中國古籍整理研究會編, 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo shu dian 中國書店, 2002) (hereafter QGY) doc. no. 112 dated 1732.09.01, p. 488. These numbers of houses in operation before 1760 are somewhat deceiving. From the late 1720s to the 1750s there were anywhere from about 30 to 50 Chinese merchants who show up each year in the foreign records trading. Their connections to the trading houses are not always

- clear. Some of them were major traders, whereas others were small dealers. All of them, however, negotiated their trade directly with foreigners, which is why they are recorded in their records. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Chinese Merchants of 18th Century Canton and Macao: A Summary of Research Past, Present and Future', forthcoming.
18. Yang Jibo 楊繼波, Wu Zhiliang 吳志良 and Deng Kaisong 鄧開頌, eds., *Ming-Qing Shiqi Aomen Wenti Dang'an Wenxian Huibian* 明清時期澳門問題檔案文獻匯編 (Collection of Ming-Qing Documents Concerning Macao Affairs), 6 vols. (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1999) (hereafter MQSQ), vol. 1, doc. no. 214, pp. 323–32; and QGY doc. no. 327 dated 1759.10.9, pp. 1801–62.
  19. MQSQ, vol. 1, doc. no. 214, pp. 323–32; and QGY doc. no. 327 dated 1759.10.9, pp. 1801–62.
  20. BL: IOR R/12/6, 1763.11.08, pp. 50–1.
  21. Imperial Commissioners Xin Zhu 新柱 and Zhao Chuan 朝銹 (Zhao Xiu?) were ordered to Guangzhou to assist governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, Li Shiyao 李侍堯, in resolving the bankruptcy and arrears of Beaukeequa. Fu Lo-Shu, ed., *A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644–1820)* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), 216–8.
  22. RAC: Ask 1139–40, 1759-07.20.
  23. The first signs of these three houses working together as a consortium can be seen in the following references. James Ford Bell Library, University of Minnesota (JFB): B 1758 fNe. 'Dagregister in de Ned. Factory Canton 1758' entries dated 4 and 11–12 October, 'Journaal van den Handel in de Jaaren 1758/59' dated 17–18 October, 'Grootboek' p. 9 entry entitled 'Sweetia & Tan Chetqua' dated 17–18 October, and Resolutions No. 4 dated 1758.10.04 and No. 6 dated 1758.10.12. The Dutch supercargos left a letter at Batavia on their way home for the supercargos who were to arrive the next year and clearly state that Cai Hunqua, Swetia and Chetqua were operating together, and each supplying one-third of the contract with the consortium. This letter is in the same collection at JFB and is addressed to 'Aan de Wel Edele Heeren Super Cargas der Generaale Neederlansche Ost Indisch Comp. te Canton in China voor det loopende jaar A° 1759' and dated 'In 't Schip Renswoude geankert leggende onder 't Noorder Eyland den 26 Feb. 1759'. See other letters in this collection as well, and NAH: Canton 24, Resolutions dated 17 and 31 October 1758 and 5 and 25 January 1759. From these references forward, these three houses operated as a unit.
  24. Liang, *Yuehaiguan Zhi*, 496; and NAH: VOC 4384, Trade Report, p. 598.
  25. Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters, 1764* (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2009) (hereafter CMD 1764), Apr 30–May 5, pp. 66–8.
  26. Swequa shows up in the Dutch records throughout the 1750s as a man in a 'pitiable' state, pressed for funds, and always short on credit. By 1760, he and Poankeequa were doing whatever they could to disadvantage others in their desperate attempts to turn their businesses around. NAH: VOC 4384, Trade Report, p. 598. The Dutch and Danes mentioned that Poankeequa and Swequa supplied the Swedes with much of their merchandise in the 1760 season. NAH: VOC 4384, Trade Report, p. 598; and RAC: Ask 1143, 1761.01.12, pp. 139–40. In July 1761, an English officer reported that Poankeequa 'would formerly in my opinion have made a most excellent merchant, had not his circumstances prevented his being trusted equally with some others and I have reason to believe nothing but his distresses have thrown him into the forming this Company!' BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.06.21, p. 9. His 'distresses' undoubtedly include the debts he was now carrying.
  27. The references vary as to who actually created the Co-hong. The English records mention that Swequa was the instigator behind the establishment of the Co-hong in 1760. Other sources credit Poankeequa for its establishment. Both of them were probably behind its creation, because it was in their interests to limit the influence of the triple

- alliance. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 10 and 373 n. 26; and RAC: Ask 1145, 1760.09.15, pp. 53–4. Liang, Cheong, Viraphol and Pan all claim that Poankeequa was the one who was behind the establishment of the Co-hong. Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬, *Guangdong Shisan Hang Kao* 廣東十三行考 (Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton) (1937; reprint, Taipei: 1960; reprint, Guangdong: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1999), 142–3; Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 165; and Sarasin Viraphol, *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652–1853* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 133–4; and Pan Gang'er 潘剛兒, Huang Qichen 黃啟臣 and Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony 陳國棟, *Guangzhou Shisan Hang zhi Yi Pan Tongwen (Fu) Hang* 廣州十三行之一: 潘同文(孚)行 (One of the Thirteen-Hongs in Canton. Tung-Wan/Tung-Fu Hong Puankhequa I–III) (Guangzhou: Huanan Ligong Daxue Chubanshe 華南理工大學出版社, 2006), 9. Pan Zhencheng (Poankeequa) is mentioned as the establisher of the Co-hong in Liang, *Yuehaiguan Zhi*, 496. The Dutch version is as follows: 'Dat zynh. niet had gemanqueert alle daagen by de voornaamste Hangisten rond to gaan, tewijl niemand van haar tot nog toe in onze Factorij had durven komen, except Tswaa Suyqua den eijgenaer en bewoonder van 't voor gedeelte derzelve, een man die nooit credit bij ons heeft gehad, en bovendien de Protecteur der Comp. is & alleen met nog iemand van een diergelijk character Poankeequa genaamt, dezelve, tot nog toe staande heeft gehouden, maar dat zijnh. in alle die tijd de kooplieden Swetia, Tsja Hunqua nog hem Poankeequa had moogen zien, als zijnde de twee eerste expres alle die tijd naar de stad gegaan, om niet alt met op een kwaade presumptie der Chineeze grooten, met d' Europeanen te heulen, bij de kop gevat en mishandelt te werden, en de laaste als president dier wonderlyke maatschappij althoos met derzelve belangen belemmert geweest'. NAH: VOC 4384, doc. dated 1760.08.15, pp. 352–3. See also pp. 364 and 519–20.
28. James Flint was the EIC's interpreter in China. In the mid-1750s, he was commissioned by the English company to sail up the coast of China to try to establish trade at another Chinese port. In 1757, the Qing government made it illegal to trade in other ports. When he sailed up the coast again in 1758, it was this time seen as an act of defiance to the emperor. In 1759, Flint was arrested and put into prison at Qianshan north of Macao. He was released from prison in 1762, ordered to leave China and to never return. For Flint's story, see Morse, *Chronicles*, vols. 1 and 5; Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters, 1762* (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2006) (hereafter CMD 1762), see 'Flint' in index; and Edward Farmer, 'James Flint versus the Canton Interest (1755–1760)', *Papers on China*, Vol. 17 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1963), 38–66.
29. The original distributions of the donations were as follows:

No.	Original Members of the Co-hong in August 1760	Contribution (in Taels)
1	Poankeequa	12,000
2	Cai Swequa (died in 1761, and brother Tjobqua continued)	10,000
3	Cai Hunqua and partner Semqua	10,000
4	Tan Chetqua, son of Suqua (died early 1760)	10,000
5	Swetia	10,000
6	Tan Tinqa (later barred from membership)	8,000
7	Consentia Giqua	3,000
8	The Onqua (died in 1760/1 and son Monqua continued)	3,000
9	Chowqua	4,000
10	Foutia	2,000

No.	Original Members of the Co-hong in August 1760	Contribution (in Taels)
11	Tan Hunqua (represented by Fat Hunqua and son Conqua)	2,000
	Total (original amount was set at 100,000 Spanish dollars)	74,000

In this reference, the Dutch used their exchange rate of \$1 = 0.74 taels. It is unclear who picked up Tan Tinqu's shares after he left the Co-hong. Source NAH: VOC 4386, 1760.08.01, pp. 18–9.

30. 'Sweetia & Chi Honqua are partners in teas, for the year [1760]. The sentiments of the former are difficultly to be discover'd, the reason I believe, because he has none that are fix'd, ever fluctuating as his interest or fears prevail, but always professing a prodigious regard for the English. Chi Honqua I doubt not, is sincerely tired of the existence of the Cong-hong as it does not answer his genius. His former principles of trade, were in making great strokes & therefore painfully suffers subordination to others. He seems however, determined to make the most of his present connections'. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.07.21, p. 10. The Danes, however, were able to discover Swetia's 'sentiments', with regard to the Co-hong. According to them, he, Chetqua and Giqua were all against its establishment. 'Mr. Supercarque Dyssels skrivelse haver JonTock aldeles op hævet dennen [?] frihed med at give 10 of Cantons Hanguister eller kiiobmand, som haver oprettet et handels Companie tilsamme Monopolium allene at handle med Europæerne og at icke end og det allirringeste maa handle om det med er 1 cand. værdir uden med dise 10 pershens somi alle ere forgælded mænd except Svissia og Scheqva som og tillige med Consentia Giqua og ere med komme i dette Compagnie, hvilche haver wæret meget stærck imod dette prevelegium, hwilket er troligt, siden dise 3<sup>d</sup> mænd ere i temmelig reputation og icke haver at befrygte for at komme in handel med Europæerne nu er det læt at slutte hvorledes handelen kand blive for Europæerne dette Aar'. RAC: Ask 1145, 1760.09.15, pp. 54–5.
31. RAC: Ask 1145, 1760.09.23, pp. 64–6. The Danes also contracted with Consentia Giqua, this year, in partnership with the three members of the triple alliance.
32. For the consortium's distribution of VOC trade in 1760, see the *grootboek*, in NAH: VOC 4386; and Appendix 3A.
33. The addition of two other men is why the Danes reported in September 1760 that there were '12 . . . previligerede Haang Mænd' [12 privileged Hong men] who were granted permission to trade with foreigners. RAC: Ask 1145, 1760.09.22, p. 63. On 17 August 1760, the Dutch reported the privileged merchants licensed to trade with foreigners to be eleven in number, but in other places they mentioned ten. NAH: VOC 4384, letter dated 1760.08.17, pp. 359–60 and pp. 346, 357 and 530.
34. Wonsamye and Hongsia show up in the records trading with the foreigners, before and after the establishment of the Co-hong. For a few examples, see BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.04.30; p. 47, 1759.05.17; p. 53, 1759.08.13; p. 94, 1759.08.22; p. 100, R/10/5, 1761.10.27; p. 62 and NAH: Canton 26, Resolution no. 2 dated 11 February 1763. Hongsia's name is spelled 'Yong-ty-yee' (or something similar) in the EIC records, and shows up in the VOC records as 'Jonksia' (or something similar). Wonsamye shows up as 'Uhn-sam-ja' in the Dutch records.
35. The histories of Tan Anqua, Tan Tinqu, Poankeequa and several other merchants of the eighteenth century have also been assembled, and will appear in the second volume of this study.
36. NAH: VOC 4384, pp. 519–20.
37. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1763 (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter CMD 1763), Mar 19, pp. 57–8; Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 153; and Earl H. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations 1750–1800* (1936; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 200. Pritchard claims 'between 1780

- and 1782 the Co-hong was virtually re-established', but Chinese and other records do not show any formal institution, in these years, like that of the 1760s. Earl H. Pritchard, *Anglo-Chinese Relations during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 141.
38. CMD 1764, Aug 21, p. 176.
  39. CMD 1764, Aug 21, p. 176.
  40. 'We have for some time past been in treaty with Puan Kheequa for the purchase of 3000 pecl. of last years Bohea Tea which is in the hands of Wansooniya [Wonsamyel] a country merchant'. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.10.27, pp. 61–2; and 'On turning out the teas of last year in the hands of Wansamia [Wonsamyel] but deliver'd to us by Puan Kheequa we were apprehensive that the merchants had not given it fire enough, which he had contract'd to do, but on Puan Kheequa's taking upon himself the risque in case it did not keep we proceeded in the packing the 200 chests, but we insist'd on the remainder being fir'd again which Puan Kheequa promis'd to do and at the same time told us that this should not stop the loading of the first ships for he would proceed in packing his own tea and accordingly we tar'd this afternoon 200 chests'. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.11.19, p. 62.
  41. Wonsamyel and Tan Tinqu 陳鎮官 had apparently bought the Yee-ho-hang in 1759, which was one of the EIC factories. The two men conducted some trade together. NAH: VOC 4384, pp. 523–4; CMD 1763, see Uhn-Sam-Ja in the index for page numbers; Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 73–4, 87, 91; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 83, 97, 171.
  42. NAH: Canton 26, Resolution No. 11 dated 6 August 1763.
  43. For a discourse over allegations against Poankeequa for trading illegally in the early 1760s, see CMD 1764, Apr 19–30, pp. 59–67.
  44. Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), 146–7.
  45. There are many entries in the foreign records (including all East India companies), to their protesting the establishment of the Co-hong and threatening to never return to China if it remained in effect. They did not follow through with their threats, but rather increased their trade instead. On 10 August 1760, the English recorded the following: 'We repeated our aversion to the association [Co-hong] and assured them [Chinese merchants] that no nation whatsoever could carry on their trade upon so disadvantageous a footing'. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1760.08.10, p. 46. The Dutch protests can be seen in NAH: VOC 4384.
  46. NAH: Canton 25, Resolution no. 7 dated 24 September 1762. See also entries in CMD 1762. In 1760, the three partners borrowed 150,000 taels from the Dutch at 2 percent interest NAH: VOC 4384, doc. dated 1760.08.31, pp. 375–6. Cai Hunqua arranged a similar private loan with the Dutch in 1763. NAH: Canton 26, Resolution no. 12 dated 11 August 1763.
  47. BL: IOR R/10/4, p. 29 in the Lingpo/Chusan section for 1757.
  48. The Dutch *dagregisters* provide a narrative of the advantages Poankeequa enjoyed in the trade in the 1760s. CMD 1762, 1763 and 1764, see Poankeequa in the indexes.
  49. BL: IOR R/10/6, 1768.02.21, p. 93.
  50. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 153; NAH: Canton 80, 1771.02.13; and RAC: Ask 1167, 1770.10.06, p.78.
  51. Alexander Dalrymple, *Oriental Repertory*, Published at the charge of the East-India Company, 2 vols. (London: George Biggs, 1793), 'Some Notes Concerning Trade with China', 2: 319.
  52. Anonymous, *Address to the People of Great Britain, Explanatory of Our Commercial Relations with the Empire of China and of the Course of Policy by Which It May Be Rendered an Almost Unbounded Field for British Commerce*. By a Visitor to China (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1836), pp. 65–6.

53. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Subjection 1834–1911*, 3 vols. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910; reprint, Taipei: Yung Mei Mei Publishing, 1966), 1: 67; Peter Auber, *China. An Outline of the Government, Laws, and Policy: and of the British and Foreign Embassies to, and Intercourse with, that Empire* (London: Parbury, Allen, and Co., 1834), 178; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 164.
54. BL: IOR G/12/31, 1731.07.10, pp. 10–3.
55. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 248–52; BL: IOR G/12/40, p. 96; and J. van Goor, ed., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 1737–1743*, Vol. 10 (The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2004), 136. In January 1737, the Danes took out a bottomry loan from the English supercargo Andreas Reid for 1,500 taels at 50 percent interest (to be paid on account in London 30 days after the ship arrived safely in Copenhagen) to cover the payment they gave to Tan Hunqua. RAC: Ask 1116, 1736.12.18, 1737.01.07 and 1737.01.15. In January 1738, the Dutch mentioned that the French paid the 1,500 taels per ship to Tan Hunqua. NAH: VOC 2410, *dagregister*, 1738.01.08–09. The English had originally refused to pay, but by January 1736, entries appear in the EIC records showing that they were charging the amount to each of the ships. But there were conditions applied. ‘The Hon<sup>ble</sup> the East India Company tales 1500 for the Normanton’s quota of the 15,000 tales paid by the 10 European ships here to satisfy the Tsongton’s Pay de Casa & others for their charges & trouble in soliciting the Remission of the 10 PCent Duty; Ton Honqua having given his obligation to refund the money to the supra cargo’s of next years shipping, if any demand be made upon them for their arms or ammunition’. BL: IOR G/12/41, 1736.01.08.
56. To point out a couple other examples, there was nothing Poankeequa could do about 30 percent of the trade being handed to the inland merchants in 1764, and there was nothing he could do to convince officials to re-establish the Co-hong again later, when several houses were being threatened with bankruptcy. The Mandarins refused these pleas because they wanted to ensure competition prevailed, and no amount of bribing would change their minds. It was permissible for officials to accept a ‘present’ from foreigners, as appreciation for removing the society, but not acceptable for them to alter the operation of trade for the sake of a bribe, which would certainly bring condemnation down upon them. Thus, the more logical explanation is that they had already decided to end the Co-hong before Poankeequa approached the foreigners, and that as far as the Chinese officials were concerned, the 100,000 taels was considered a ‘reward’ or ‘present’ from the English, and not a bribe.
57. ‘Poankeequa geeft te kennen: de negotie te quiteeren en zyn huys aan zyn zoon over te laten, het welk in ’t wezentlyke geen verandering zal veroorzaaken, alzoo hy altoos de directie zal hebben, en het oog op de zaak zal blyven behouden, willende alleen de negotie abandonneeren om volgens zyn voorgeeven van de Mandaryns ontslagen te wezen, dat altoos een groote lastpost voor hem geweest, naedemaal hy voor het gerungste dat er voorviel altoos ten antwoord moest staan, en aan de Mandaryns oplossing van zaaken geeven’. NAH: Canton 80, 1771.03.09. Other entries show Kensiangua (or Kingsiangqua) trading on Poankeequa’s behalf beginning in 1771, as follows: ‘Nae verloop van eenige dagen quam Kingsiangqua die de zaaken in het huys van Poankeequa derigeert’ (Canton 34 Resolution no. 6), and entries in Canton 80, 1771.08.16.
58. BL: IOR G/12/62, 1777.06.03, pp. 11–2.
59. BL: IOR G/12/58, 1775.07.04–05, pp. 25–30.

## CHAPTER FOUR

1. Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton. Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 19.



2. John Crawford estimated the crew of the smallest ocean-going Chinese junks at about 90 men. John Crawford, quotation in *A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical, and Historical, of Commerce and Commercial Navigation*, by J.R. McCulloch, 2 vols. (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1844), vol. 1, pp. 253–7. In 1830, James Holman visited Canton and went aboard a Siam junk. He estimated the size of most Canton junks to be 250 to 400 tons capacity with crews of 80 to 100 men. James Holman, *Travels in China, New Zealand, New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land, Cape Horn, etc. etc.* (London: George Routledge, 1840), 252. In 1847, Captain Kellett purchased the Canton junk *Keying* and sailed it to the United States and Britain. This junk was thought to have been about 100 years old. If this age is correct, then it would have been one of the junks operated by the Canton merchants in the eighteenth century, and very relevant to this study. Kellett mentioned that the *Keying* was a junk of the second rate, but did not list the tonnage in his pamphlet. Contemporary accounts of its size vary widely from 300 to 800 tons burthen, but it was probably somewhere in the range of 500 to 600 tons. Kellett mentioned that in order to raise the matted sails, 80 men were needed, but half that number of men would suffice if the capstan was used to assist. From this account we can imagine that at least 80 men would probably have been a normal size of a crew (to ensure they always had a sufficient number of men to raise, and lower sails), and other information given here and elsewhere show crews being 80 to 100 or more men. Capt. Kellett, *The Chinese Junk 'Keying,' being a full account of that vessel, with extracts from the Journal of Capt. Kellett* (New York: Israel Sackett, 1847), 10 and 19; and Capt. Kellett, *A Description of the Royal Chinese Junk, Keying*. (London: 1848), 10 and 19. (Many thanks to Tony Edwards for bringing these publications to my attention). An article in the *Canton Register* also shows Canton junks having crews of 80 to 100 men. *Canton Register* (1829.06.18). In the 1750s, the Dutch recorded the minimum number of men aboard the Canton junks of 250 tons that arrived there to be about 100 men, which agrees with the size of the crews of Fujian junks as well. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Operational Efficiencies and the Decline of the Chinese Junk Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: The Connection', in *Shipping Efficiency and Economic Growth 1350–1800*, ed. Richard Unger (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 223–46.
3. For a discussion of the connection between tin and the tea trade, see Paul A. Van Dyke, 'China Tea and the Southeast Asian Tin Trade in the 18th Century', in *Ming Qing Guangdong hai jun yu hai fang 明清廣東海軍與海防* (Ming-Qing Guangdong Navy and Coastal Defense), ed. 澳門大學社會科學及人文學院 (University of Macau, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities), (澳門 Macao: 澳門大學社會科學及人文學院 University of Macau, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, 2008), 222–6.
4. In 1736, for example, merchants were sent to Macao searching for enough sago to finish packing English East India Company (EIC) porcelain. 'Sagoo being very scarce in Canton we desired some of the merchants to send to their correspondents at Maccao to get wt. [what] they could for us'. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/40, 1736.08.22, p. 41. They finally found enough sago to finish the packing: 'We have rec'd several small parcels of sago at times from different merchants to fill up our hollow chinaware'. BL: IOR G/12/40, 1736.10.01, p. 49. All of the East India companies were using sago to pack porcelain for most of the eighteenth century. The Danish Asiatic Company's (DAC) ships sailing from Tranquebar to China often stopped in Malacca to buy sago, which they brought to Canton to use in the packing of porcelain. For one such example, see Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1155, 1765.08.30, p. 48.
5. English visitors to Batavia in 1735, for example, found there 'severall servants with goods from the Canton merchants'. BL: IOR G/12/39, 1735.05.28, p. 3. These servants or agents of the Canton merchants also travelled to those ports on Portuguese ships from Macao. The Dutch in Batavia reported in 1743 that 'alswel omdat men verscheyde

- Chineesen van Canton met de Portugeese scheepen alhier heeft sien aankomen'. J. van Goor, ed., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 1737–1743*, Vol. 10 (The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2004), 1743.04.05, p. 1039. It was just as important to have agents in these ports as it was for East India companies to keep persons in Canton or Macao to purchase the cargos needed for the ships when they arrived.
6. 'De *supercarga's* zijn gemachtigd om het derde schip [Nieuw-Walheren], dat hen naar Batavia mee terug zal nemen, te laden met thee op vracht voor 4 rsd per pikol. De Chinezen betalen 3 rsd aan de jonken en 3 1/3 rsd aan de Macaose vrachtschepen. Het derde schip [Nieuw-Walheren] was 145 voet groot' [italics in original]. J. E. Schooneveld-Oosterling, ed., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 1743–1750*. Vol. 11 (The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1997), 1743.12.31, p. 48. At an exchange rate of 1 rixsdollar to 0.54 Chinese taels, the freight rates would be 4 Rx = 2.16 tls., 3.333 Rx = 1.8 taels, and 3 Rx = 1.62 tls.
  7. 'Om reeden de Cantonse Kooplieden, indt hebben willen resolveeren, om indt het schip Nieuw-Walheren, thee op vracht, na Batavia over te senden, teegens 4 RD<sup>s</sup> de picol; /: Volgens de geende ordre van haar hoog Edl<sup>s</sup>; onder voor geeven, dat zy Lieden c<sup>a</sup> 6 PC<sup>o</sup>\_, hoppo-geld [customs duties], meer zouden moeten betaalen dan Wanneer die indt Joncken werd over gesonden /: behalven dat zy dan nog de vragt indt deselve, voor 3 Rd<sup>s</sup>, en minder, de picol'. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 2, Resolution dated 1744.01.31. 'Chinase Jonken gestelt heeft, waar door ze 't voordeel zullen genieten van jyst 6 PC<sup>o</sup> Hoppo-Rechten van alle uytgaande goederen als voorheen te betaalen'. NAH: Canton 224, Report dated 1763.12.04, p. 89. 'Goederen die per jonken of Portugeesche scheepen verzonden werden betalen wel 6 pr ct minder aan Hoppo rechten, als wanneer die met Europeesche Scheepen verzonden werden (Res 13 Oct 1763, 2 Ch BB 1764)' [these references are listed in the original entry]. NAH: VOC 4556, entry under 'Jonken'.
  8. Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), 148 and Plate 5.
  9. Van Dyke, 'Operational Efficiencies, 223–46.
  10. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'New Sea Routes to Canton in the 18th Century and the Decline of China's Control over Trade', in *Studies of Maritime History 海洋史研究*, ed. Li Qingxin, Vol. 1 (Beijing 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2010), 57–108. A contemporary traveller in the mid-eighteenth century also saw the main reason for junks not being able to compete with foreign ships to be because the former made only one voyage per year whereas the latter made several voyages per year. He claimed that this was the reason why foreigners could ship Southeast Asian products to China much cheaper than junks. Sir William James Tyrone Power, *Recollections of a Three Years' Residence in China; including Peregrinations in Spain, Morocco, Egypt, India, Australia; and New Zealand* (London: Richard Bentley, 1853), 122–5.
  11. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 145–6.
  12. In 1786, for example, the Hong merchant Poankeequa commissioned John Woolmore to sail to Manila to procure 'a cargo of rice from thence on account of the great scarcity occasioned by the dry weather'. BL: IOR G/12/82, 1786.11.14, p. 136.
  13. John Crawford, quotate in *Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to enquire into the present state of the affairs of the East-India Company, and in the Trade between Great Britain, the East-Indies, and China; and to report to the House* (London: Parbury, Allen, and Co., 1830), 1830.03.25, p. 466, No. 3673a; 1830.03.29, pp. 508–9, No. 3849a, and John Crawford, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochinchina* (London: Henry Colburn, 1828; reprint, New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 2000), 362.
  14. *Canton Register* 1829.06.18, article entitled 'Chinese Junks'.

15. Alexander Dalrymple, *Oriental Repertory*, 2 vols. (London: George Biggs, 1793), 281–90.
16. The previous estimate of the junks making up 25 percent of the total in the six years 1763–4 and 1766–9 was based on documents that put the total of junks arriving in those years at 175, and their average cargos at 2,500 piculs each. New data presented in Appendixes 4A–4L, however, shows this estimate to be too low. Other documents show that were there were a total of 209 junks arriving in those years, and they carried an average cargo of 2,750 piculs each. This brings their percentage of total trade to 31 percent. For the old figures, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 146–7; and notes in Appendix 3B.
17. This discussion about the Batavia massacre was pieced together from the following sources. NAH: Canton 191, *General Rapport*; BL: IOR G/12/50, numerous entries from July to September 1741; Fei Chengkang, *Macao 400 Years* (Shanghai: The Publishing House of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 1996), 134–5; Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company* (Providence: Foris Publications, 1988), 94–5; Leonard Blussé, Jan Oosterhoff and Ton Vermeulen, ‘Chinese Trade with Batavia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Preliminary Report’, in *Asian Trade Routes*, ed. Karl Reinhold Haellquist (London: Curzon Press, 1991), 231–45; Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch’eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 1: 274–81; and William Rummelink, *The Chinese War and the Collapse of the Javanese State, 1725–1743* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), 126–9. In July 1741, the Danes in Canton received a letter from Batavia stating that 70,000 Chinese had lost their lives in the massacre. RAC: Ask 1120, 1741.07.17, pp. 129–32. For the number of junks visiting Batavia each year up to 1754, see George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630–1754* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 136–41. For the Chinese side of the discussion over what to do about trade with the Dutch at Batavia after the 1740 massacre, see Jennifer Wayne Cushman, *Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Publications, 1993; reprint, 2000), 129–31.
18. BL: IOR G/12/07, 1704.08.16, pp. 1024–5 and G/12/08, pp. 1309–29. The crew of Leanqua’s captured junk consisted of about 100 men.
19. BL: IOR G/12/26, 1727.04.22, p. 1.
20. BL: IOR G/12/26, 1727.09.15, p. 23.
21. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.09.02, p. 85.
22. BL: G/12/44, 1738.09.01, p. 38.
23. 1738, Sep 13: ‘Deesen dag werd men van Macao berigt dat door de zwaare storm winden, welke op den 6 dese alhier hebben gewaaid een Schip van die plaats en drie jonken waren verongelukt’. NAH: VOC 2438, 1738.09.13.
24. RAC: Ask 1158, 1767.11.01 and Ask 1159, 1767.11.01; and NAH: Canton 76, 1767.11.01.
25. 1769, Jun 6: ‘Volgens Brieven van Canton de 3 Courant [3 June] is aldaar g’arriveerd de Jonk Wansaij van Cancau te rug met zyn volle Lading zo als dezelve van hier vertrokken was, voorgeevende wegens de meenigveeldige troubles aldaar ontstaan, zonder te zeggen het eygentlyke van de zaak, zyn lading niet had konne verkoopen nog ontladen, hy genoodsaakt er geweest vrugteloo te rug te keere direct op hier . . . de Capt. van gem. Jonk rapporteerd: dat de jonke Honka en Eckthaay, in ’t laast van February jongstleeden van Canton na Batavia vertrocken, in ’t begin van April, wegens contrary zuyde winden op de kusten van Cancau gedreven en daar eenige tyd opgehoudde waren, egter zedert de wind na ’t Noorde gekeerd zynde was hy van meening zy hun rys zullen voort gezett hebben; ook dat de Jonk Wingchong Ao. Passo van hier pr. Batavia vertrocken, wegens contrary winden genoodzaakt Cochinchina binne te loopen en daar te overwinteren zyn reys niet zal vervordere maar wederom op hier te rug komen; verders geeft hy van

27 Jonken, na versheyde Havens van hier vertrocken'. NAH: Canton 78, 1769.06.06. But later the Dutch learned that *Honka* and *Ecktay* also laid over in Cochin China. 'Men heeft narigt dat de Jonken Honka en Eckthaay van hier na Batavia gedestineerd, door contrary wind genoodzaakt zyn geweest Cochin China binne te loopen alwaar ze zulle overwinteren in de aanstaande Mousson hun reys vervorderen'. NAH: Canton 78, 1769.07.05.

26. RAC: Ask 1132, 1753.09.27.

## CHAPTER FIVE

1. An earlier version of Tan Suqua's history is available online at National University of Singapore (NUS), Asia Research Institute (ARI), Working Papers Series (WPS), no. 50, Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Tan Suqua and Family: Merchants of Canton 1716–1778' (posted in September 2005), [http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/publication\\_details.asp?pubtypeid=WP&pubid=307](http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/publication_details.asp?pubtypeid=WP&pubid=307). Many changes and additions have been made to Suqua's story in this chapter.
2. Cheong and Ch'en wrote their histories of the Guangshun Hang at about the same time so they were not able to benefit from each other's research. Cheong Weng Eang, 'The Age of Suqua, 1720–1759', in *Asian Trade Routes*, ed. Karl Reinhold Haellquist (London: Curzon Press, 1991), 217–30; and Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 268–72. Cheong later expanded the study of the Guangshun Hang. Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 134–44. Unfortunately, he did not make use of Ch'en's research in this study either so there is much retracing of old ground.
3. Chen Tingfeng is the name that appears on the chop he stamped on an SOIC contract in 1744 (although he signed his name as Chen Shouguan). Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), Plate 19; and James Ford Bell Library, University of Minnesota (JFB): Charles Irvine Papers.
4. Stadsarchief (Municipal Archive), Antwerp (SAA): IC 5752, Resolution no. 2 entitled 'Canton Anno 1726'. When the French went to Amoy in 1716, they found there 'un riche marchand de Canton, nommé *Changchua*' [italics in original]. I have not been able to make any connection between this man and Suqua, as the records for this early period are incomplete. Pierre Mortier, *Nouveau Voyage au tour du Monde* (Amsterdam, 1728), 202. This reference is also reproduced in Le Gentil, *Nouveau Voyage au tour du Monde*, 3 vols. (Paris: Flahault, 1727), 1: 290.
5. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 79, passim and Canton 241, Report dated 24 January 1779, pp. 27–9. There is some confusion in the secondary literature of the identities of these men. For an explanation and a list of other Chens involved in trade see Appendix 5L.
6. See references in Appendix 5B. The reference to the Renhe Hang being connected to the Chens presents somewhat of a problem because later, in the early nineteenth century, this firm was owned and managed by the Pan 潘 family. Unfortunately, the name only appears once in the eighteenth century (1753, see Appendix 5B), and then does not re-emerge until eighty years later. They could be entirely different businesses.
7. British Library (BL): India Officer Records (IOR) G/12/20–5; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 135, 144–5; and Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 1: 167.
8. BL: IOR G/12/21; and Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 118–20.
9. BL: IOR G/12/08, 1723.05.29, p. 1417.

10. BL: IOR G/12/08, 1723.07.10, pp. 1417, 1421–2.
11. BL: IOR G/12/25, 1724.07.30, p. 5. Armenians were involved in the trade already by the 1690s, and continued to be suppliers of credit to the *Hong* merchants throughout the eighteenth century. Carl T. Smith and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Armenian Footprints in Macau', *Review of Culture*, International Edition No. 8 (October 2003), 20–39; and Carl T. Smith and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Four Armenian Families', *Review of Culture*, International Edition No. 8 (October 2003): 40–50.
12. The entry in the GIC journal reads as follows:  
 '1727, Jan 13: Fonds Debit aen Souqua alias Comcha  
 tails 2044 t'mont' van syn obligatie geteckent by de  
 SuperCarges daeto 4 January 1725. Tael's 1460.000  
 Voor Intrest van 20 Maendes a 2 PC' t maen 584.000 2044.000'  
 SAA: IC 5695, 1727.01.13 and another identical entry dated 1727.01.16. See also SAA: IC 5752, Resolution dated 1727.01.14 and IC 5757, 1727.01.14.
13. The contracting of the loan with Suqua (he is called 'Chinqua' in 1724) and the settling of the loan can be found in various entries in SAA: IC 5682 and 5757. For other examples of Chinese advancing credits to the foreigners and being repaid a couple years later, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 150–6; and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690–1845' (PhD dissertation, University of Southern California, 2002), 380–408.
14. This was the 10 percent tax mentioned in Chapter 3, which Tan Hunqua helped remove in 1735–36. There were logical reasons for wanting to tax import silver. For a brief explanation, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 118–9.
15. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 135; Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 183; and SAA: IC 5757, 1726.08.17 and other entries.
16. SAA: IC 5757, 1726.12.21.
17. Supercargo Hewer, of the GIC, said this French ship came from Pondicherry and had a burden of 600 tons. SAA: IC 5757, 1729.12.21 and IC 5710<sup>bis</sup>, letters dated 26 November and 26 and 29 December 1726. The name of the ship, which was damaged by storm, was the *Pondichéry*. Philippe Haudrère, *La Compagnie Française de Indes au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2005), 2: 698; and Catherine Manning, *Fortunes a Faire. The French in Asian Trade, 1719–48* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 1996), 236.
18. SAA: IC 5757, 1729.12.22.
19. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 184.
20. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 198.
21. BL: IOR H/MISC/75 Thomson's Journal 1732, p. 140.
22. BL: IOR G/12/26, 1727.06.23, p. 9.
23. Paul Hallberg and Christian Koninckx, eds., *A Passage to China*, by Colin Campbell (Gothenburg: Royal Society of Arts and Sciences, 1996), *passim*.
24. Some of the GIC sponsors were encouraged to invest in Swedish and Danish voyages to China after the the GIC voyages ceased. Koninckx points out, however, that the idea of the Swedish Company being 'merely a continuation of the Ostend Company must be categorically rejected'. Christian Koninckx, *The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company (1731–1766)* (Belgium: Van Gemmert Publishing Co., 1980), 51, 194–5. As far as the volume of trade at Canton, the arrival of the Dutch, Danish and Swedish ships more than made up for the loss of the GIC trade.
25. For a summary of the new regulations and tightening of control in Canton and Macao, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Chapter 6, 'Administrative Initiatives and Shortcomings', 95–115.
26. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 201–6; and Hallberg and Koninckx, eds., *A Passage to China*, 142–3. Naish was also later investigated by the company in allegations of conducting

- illegal trade. Sir John Comyns, *Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer*, 2 vols. (London: A. Strahan and W. Woodfall, 1792), 2: 462–5, case 209.
27. For some of the charges against Tan Hunqua, see *Qingong Yue Gang Ao Shangmao Dang'an quan ji* 清宮粵港澳商貿檔案全集, ed. Zhongguo di yi li shi dang an guan 中國第一歷史檔案館 and Zhongguo Gu ji Zheng li Yan jiu Hui bian 中國古籍整理研究會編. 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo Shu dian 中國書店, 2002) (hereafter QGY), doc. no. 114 dated 1732.09.02, p. 493. More details about this incident can be found in Chapter 6.
  28. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 208–10.
  29. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 208–11; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 137; and Hallberg and Koninckx, eds., *A Passage to China*, 141–2.
  30. BL: IOR G/12/35, 1733.11.23, pp. 95–8.
  31. BL: IOR G/12/35, 1733.12.02, p. 107.
  32. BL: IOR G/12/36, 1734.12.27, p. 152; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 209–17. For a detailed account of how difficult it was for Suqua's partners to continue the trade without him, see Hallberg and Koninckx, eds., *A Passage to China*, *passim*. The EIC supercargoes left a letter with Suqua's son at the end of the 1734 season to give to the next EIC officers to arrive, so they were apparently planning on doing more business with him. BL: IOR G/12/38, 1735.07.22, pp. 9–10.
  33. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 208–11, 217. The reference BL: IOR G/12/38, dated 22 July 1735, on p. 9 mentions that the Hoppo 'died about three months ago', which would put his death sometime in April.
  34. BL: IOR G/12/31, pp. 35–7; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 139–40, 183 n. 54; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 257–9.
  35. BL: IOR G/12/38, 1735.08.30, p. 39, 'Consultation'.
  36. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 233–4.
  37. BL: IOR G/12/40, p. 83 and other entries; and numerous entries in Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1116–20 and Lintrup 5893.
  38. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 252–61; and NAH: VOC 2410, *dagregister*, 1737.01.07 and 1738.01.18.
  39. BL: IOR G/12/46, 1739.12.26, p. 71.
  40. BL: IOR G/12/44, 1738.08.04, p. 9, 'Chetquas silks were very good'; Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 270–1; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 138–9.
  41. BL: IOR G/12/48, 1739.12.09, p. 7.
  42. BL: IOR G/12/51, 1742.11.04, p. 114.
  43. In 1724, the English supercargoes mentioned that they presented Suqua with a 'silver repeating watch ... for his trouble in our long stay in his house'. BL: IOR G/12/25, 1724.08.04, p. 6. As counter examples, the smaller houses mentioned in later chapters (such as some of the Ye, Zhang and Liang merchants) did not invite foreigners to feasts, did not provide them with temporary housing, and did not rent them apartments or factories.
  44. The events of the 1743 fire were pieced together from the following sources. Archives Nationales, Paris (ANP): Colonies, C/1/10, pp. 54–5; NAH: Canton 2, 69, *passim*; Jens Boje, *Journal paa den anden Reyse til China med Skibet Dronningen af Danmark, indeholdende de Merkværdigste Ting, som fra Reysens Begyndelse Anno 1742, og til dens Ende 1744* (Copenhagen: Christoph Georg Glasing, 1745), 54–5; Leo Heaps, ed., *Log of the Centurion*, by Captain Philip Saumarez (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974), 248; George Anson, Esq., *A Voyage Round the World in the Years M, DCC, XL, I, II, III, IV (1740–1744)* 3 vols. ([London?]: John Wilson, 1790; reprint, Philadelphia: D.N. Goodchild, 2002), 3: 485–8; Glyndwr Williams, ed., *A Voyage Round the World in the Years MDCCXL, I, II, III, I*, by George Anson (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 361–3; Pehr Osbeck, *Dagbok öfver en Ostindisk Resa åren 1750, 1751, 1752* (Stockholm:

1757. Reprint, Rediviva Publishing House, 1969), 133; Carl Gustav Ekeberg, *Capitaine Carl Gustav Ekebergs Ostindiska Resa, Åren 1770 och 1771* (Stockholm: Henr. Foug, 1773; reprint, Stockholm: Rediviva, 1970), 116–7; and *The Saturday Magazine*, Supplement No. 342 (October 1837), 171–2.
45. For more extensive coverage of fires in Canton, see Paul A. Van Dyke, ‘Fires and the Risks of Trade in Canton 1730s–1840s’, in *Canton and Nagasaki Compared 1730–1830. Dutch Chinese, Japanese Relations*, ed. Evert Groenendijk, Cynthia Viallé and Leonard Blussé. *Intercontinenta* No. 26 (Leiden: Institute for the History of European Expansion, 2009), 171–202; and Patrick Conner, ‘The Fires of Canton in “Export” Paintings’, *Arts of Asia* vol. 38 No. 6 (Nov–Dec 2008), 110–23.
46. Williams, ed., *A Voyage Round the World*, 362; and ANP: Col/C/1/10, pp. 54–5.
47. Williams, ed., *A Voyage Round the World*, 362. One pound to three taels is the exchange mentioned by Pritchard. Earl H. Pritchard, *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations 1750–1800* (1936; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 115; and ANP: Col/C/1/10, pp. 54–5.
48. RAC: Ask 1124, 1747.01.03. Suqua seems to have been a part-owner of the Danish factory up until 1743. Textia and Simon were the other owners. At some point at the end of the 1743 season, Simon left the trade and his name disappears from the records (it is unknown why). Beginning in 1744, Suqua appears to have rebuilt the factory himself as Textia’s name is no longer mentioned in connection to the Danish factory. In 1751, the Danes rented from Mandarin Quiqua and then Beaukeequa the next year. Suqua tried to woo the Danes back to his factory in 1755, but lost out again to Beaukeequa, who had a new building available at a good price. See Appendix 5J and RAC: Ask 1135, 1755.08.15, p. 91.
49. NAH: Canton 6, Resolution dated 22 March 1747.
50. Van Dyke, ‘Fires and the Risks of Trade in Canton 1730s–1840s’, Table 1.
51. Compradors were licensed provision purveyors who took care of the foreigners’ domestic needs. For a description of their lives and duties, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Chapter 4.
52. NAH: Canton 3, Resolution dated 4 October 1744.
53. Chen Zhenguan was also known as Tan Tinqu. In order not to confuse him with the other Tan Tinqu mentioned in these chapters, I will use the Mandarin spelling and pronunciation of his name.
54. JFB: Charles Irvine Papers.
55. JFB: Charles Irvine Papers. In a Portuguese document dated 27 October 1770, Chetqua, Suqua and Tinqu show up as Xequa, Siqua and Tequa, respectively. Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon (AHU): 0379, cx. 6, Doc. 18, 1770.10.27 ‘Rezumo particular do Commercio da China com as Naçoens Europèas’.
56. The VOC ship *Geldermalsen* loaded many gold shoes and bars in Canton in 1752, and much of it was supplied by Suqua. NAH: Canton 7, docs. dated 1752.11.07, 1752.12.31 and 1752.03.03. The ship sank on its way back to Holland and was later found and salvaged in the 1980s by Mike Hatcher. Consequently, we have actual specimens showing how considerable this gold trade was. The *Geldermalsen* was just one of many ships that were taking gold out of China each year. Colin Sheaf and Richard Kilburn, *The Hatcher Porcelain Cargoes: The Complete Record* (Oxford: Phaidon Christie’s, 1988). A gold contract from 1760 with the VOC which involved Suqua’s son Chetqua can be seen in Plate 03.10. Yellow and crimson silks were forbidden to sell, but they were exported regularly as well (Plate 05.10). Chetqua was caught trying to ship some of these items to the Danish ships in 1767. RAC: Ask 1160, 1767.12.23 and 1767.12.26.
57. NAH: Canton 19, Resolutions dated 28–29 June and 8 July 1754.
58. NAH: Canton 20, Resolution dated 24 June 1755 and Canton 22, Resolution dated 2 July 1756.

59. In an entry dated 4 December 1757, the English recorded the following, which suggests that Suqua was now eighty years old: 'The Hein sent this morning for Suquan, Sequan and Yongquan, and told the two former that they must be sure to clear all accounts with us, before we went away, and that Suquan must alter the Hall he built for us, some way or other. He then acquainted Yongquan that the Tsongtoc had said, an old man of 80 years / Suqua we suppose / had informed him before he came away from Canton he was the cause of our continuing the trade here; He told the Hien therefore to advise him to quit Limpo, and to give them ten days after we go away to settle his affairs'. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1757.12.04, p. 49. In the 1778 Trade Report (NAH: Canton 241, p. 28), the Dutch officers wrote that Suqua had died 'at the beginning of 1760' and in the *dagregister* in VOC 4388, entry dated 5 September, they mentioned Suqua died on 5 March. This latter reference, however, seems to imply 1761 rather than 1760. Another Dutch reference dated 1 August 1760 states the following: 'Den Koopman Tan Soequa was op de eerste dag van 't nieuwe jaar overleeden, maar zyn erfgenaamen continueerden de negotie onder de Naam van de Zoon Tan Chetqua' (NAH: VOC 4386, 1760.08.01, pp. 4–5). This confirms that he died in early 1760 ('on the first day of the New Year'), but the exact day is a question. If this is a reference to the Chinese New Year, it would be 17 February 1760, otherwise 1 January. I have used 5 March as his death date because that was mentioned a month later, but we will never know for certain unless we can match it with a date in a genealogy or Chinese record. Jörg puts the death of 'Soequa' in 1766, based on another VOC source. But this reference is either referring to someone else, or a mistake, because Suqua died much earlier. NAH: VOC 4388, *dagregister* entry on 5 September and Canton 241, p. 28; C.J.A. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 118. Cheong shows Suqua's death to be in 1759, but provides no source. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 372.
60. Two of the other heads of houses also died around 1761, Swequa (Jufeng Hang 聚豐行) and the father of Monqua (Wanhe Hang 萬和行).
61. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 268–9; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 141; Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters. 1764* (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2009) (hereafter CMD 1764), 24 Jun, p. 108.
62. BL: IOR R/10/6, 1761.07.21, p. 9.
63. For the average export cargos per ship of each company in the 1760s, see Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 146–7.
64. Provision prices (including live animals) and wages in Canton from about 1700 to 1830 have been collected and are available online at the International Institute of Social History's (IISG) website ([www.iisg.nl](http://www.iisg.nl), look for the wages and prices data files for China).
65. NAH: Canton 26, Resolution no. 49 dated 30 November 1763 and Canton 31, Resolution no. 26 dated 18 December 1768. At this time, there was another Tan Quiqua (Chen Guiguan 陳貴官) who ran Poankeequa's junk factory and served as a writer in his house. They both appear in the records as Quiqua so care needs to be taken not to confuse them.
66. NAH: Canton 29, Resolution no. 28 dated 15 December 1766. The identity of this Houqua is unclear. There were several men with similar names. One of Cai Hunqua's sons was called Hauqua; the chief writer in Tiauqua's house was Hoyqua/Huiqua; both Poankeequa and Monqua had writers in the 1770s with names of Hanqua and Houqua (respectively); and a man who later became a *Hong* merchant was called Howqua (Lin Shimao 林時懋). 'Lim Hauqua' shows up regularly in the Swedish records, but there is no mention of him being Chetqua's writer. The name is sometimes shown without the last name Lim, which means it could also be 'Zey Hauqua' (Cai Hunqua's son), who traded with the Swedes.
67. NAH: Canton 77, 1768.03.13.



68. NAH: Canton 74, 1765.07.04.
69. BL: IOR G/12/29, 1730.12.15, pp. 61–2.
70. On 1 November 1722, English officers in Canton recorded that the merchants and mandarins ‘in sending their teas last year to Batavia they suffer’d so much, that if the Portugueze woud carry it Freight free, and to be sold for their acco<sup>s</sup>, clear of all other charges, we verily believe they wou’d not send it’. BL: IOR G/12/23, 1722.11.01, p. 39. On 12 August 1723, the English recorded again that the Canton merchants ‘having been such severe sufferers by what they have sent to Batavia these two or three years past, that they have not gather’d & cur’d any more [tea] than what they thought they cou’d dispose of here’. BL: IOR G/12/21, 1723.08.12, p. 45. In 1830, an English merchant John Deans still found Batavia tea to be ‘an inferior sort, suited to the taste of the Chinese settlers’. Thomas John Buckton, *China Trade: Containing the Entire Substance of the Evidence Laid Before the House of Commons, in the Session of 1830; Extracted and Condensed, from the Report of the Committee; for Commercial and Political Uses* (Hull: I. Wilson, 1831), 16.
71. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.07.24, pp. 51–2; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 212.
72. George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630–1754* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 140.
73. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 212; NAH: VOC 4375, p. 37, 1730.12.18 and 1731.01.01.
74. NAH: Canton 26, Resolution no. 2 dated 11 February 1763.
75. Van Dyke, ‘Port Canton’, Appendixes N–Q. Chetqua and other *Hong* merchants regularly supplied goods to the junks to carry to Southeast Asia, and bought their return cargos. For one example of Chetqua supplying tea to the junks sailing to Cochin China and Batavia, see NAH: Canton 26, Resolution no. 2 dated 1763.02.11. And for a reference to Chetqua purchasing junk imports, see Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters, 1763* (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter CMD 1763), 23 Sep, p. 126.
76. Van Dyke, ‘Port Canton’, Appendix T: ‘Loans Given to Foreigners by Chinese in Canton, 1737–1768’; and RAC: Ask 1148a–b and 1149, 1762.12.16.
77. NAH: Canton 128, p. 17. For other SOIC tin transactions, see Christian Koninckx, *The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company (1731–1766)* (Belgium: Van Gemmert Publishing Co., 1980), 240–1.
78. NAH: Canton 32, doc. no. 1 dated 1769.04.30 and Canton 78, entry under 1769.01.03.
79. RAC: Ask 1160–1, several entries 1767.12.20–26.
80. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 136–7; and BL: IOR R/10/6 pp. 58–9. The name of the brother who died in May 1768 is not mentioned in this source. In a report dated 24 January 1779, the Dutch listed all of the brothers and the only option seems to be Poqua. All the brothers are listed in this document with their sons. We know the other brothers were active in the trade in the 1770s so by deduction, Poqua would be the obvious choice. There are many references stating that Chetqua was the eldest son of Suqua, but in this 1779 list, Poqua is put at the top, Chetqua second, and the other sons follow in their proper order. This suggests that Poqua may have been the eldest, but for some reason, was not active in the trade. A small porcelain merchant with the name Poqua, shows up in the records in the 1770s, but no connection has been made between this man and the Guangshun Hang. NAH: Canton 241, Report dated 24 January 1779, pp. 27–9. Another Poqua appears in 1764 trading with the Dutch, but he was said to be Fat Hunqua’s son (see Chapter 6).
81. NAH: Canton 77, 1768.03.07–09, 1768.03.26, 1768.11.01, Canton 78, 1769.04.04 and Canton 79, 1770.03.29–30.
82. NAH: Canton 78, 1769.11.30. For examples of what this clock may have looked like, see the Qing emperors’ collections of western instruments in Liu Lu 劉潞, ed., *Qing gong Xiyang Yiqi* 清宮西洋儀器 (Scientific and Technical Instruments of the Qing Dynasty) (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1998).

83. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 120–34.
84. NAH: Canton 79, 1770.01.10.
85. On 13 March 1771, the Dutch recorded: ‘Overleed Tan Chetqua, welk stervall geen de minste verandering in dat huys verwekt naedemaal hy zedert 2 a drie jaaren genoegsaam buyten staat is geweest eenige Zaaken te verrigten, zynde door zyn broeder Tinqu a gederigeert die zulks blyft continueeren niet nog 2 van zyn broeders’. NAH: Canton 80, 1771.03.13; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 153.
86. The Danes mentioned that Chetqua’s ‘oldest brother’ took over the firm after Chetqua’s death, which would be Tinqu. ‘Schæcqua er ved døden afgangen. Mens Handelen bliver ved hands aldste broder forrestaaet som forsen. I övrigt er alting i Canton paa samme ford som tilfore’. RAC: Ask 1169, 1772.08.24.
87. BL: IOR R/10/7, 1771.11.20, pp. 59–66.
88. ANP: Col/C/1/16, pp. 79–81.
89. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1774.11.24, pp. 77–8.
90. In a letter written by James Maule in Canton to Jean Abraham Grill in Stockholm, which has two dates written on it, 10 December 1775 and 31 December 1776, Maule wrote: ‘Tan Tenqua är Död ... hans Broder Kåqua som är en ganska habile man succederar honom’. Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm. Godegårdsarkivet Archive (NM): F17, pp. T1\_02620–3. The Dutch and English both mentioned his death on 17 December 1775. ‘Bekoomen tyding als dat den Koopman Tinqu a is overleeden, naar lang gesickkelt te hebben en genoeg zaam den geheelen handeltyd, sukkelendelt is geweest en de affairs door zyn broeder is narigt en ook zal blyven continueeren, zo als men susteneerd’. NAH: Canton 84, 1775.12.17. ‘Den Koopman Tinqu a voor 14 daagen overleeden zijn, de heeft zijn Naastvolgende Broeder genaamd Kooqua’. NAH: Canton 237, Report dated 31 December 1775, p. 122; and BL: IOR G/12/58, 1775.12.17, p.141. Cheong mentions his death to be 15 December, but the more likely date, according to references above, is 17 December. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 85. In January 1771, the Dutch mention that Tan Tinqu a’s son ‘Jemqua’ was helping in the trade, but I have no other references to this man. NAH: Canton 80, 1771.01.14. He may have been the same person as ‘Yanqua’, who the Danes list in 1777 as Chetqua’s son. RAC: Ask 1178, 1777.02.24.
91. RAC: Ask 1178, 1777.02.24; NAH: Canton 241, Report dated 24 January 1779, pp. 27–9; ANP: Col/C/1/16, pp. 86–8; NM: F17 pp. T1\_02620–3; and BL: IOR G/12/61, 1777.02.14, p. 5. The EIC records also show in 1779, ‘Sinqua, Tyqua, and Anqua’ being members of Coqua’s family, and are probably some of the same sons mentioned in this paragraph. BL: IOR G/12/66, p. 156.
92. BL: IOR G/12/60, letters nos. 52 and 70 and G/12/61, pp. 5–6 and G/12/62, 1777.05.22, p. 10.
93. BL: IOR G/12/62, 1777.12.23, p. 88 and 1778.01.25, p. 122.
94. NAH: Canton 87, 1778.04.04 and 1778.04.12; and Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬, *Guangdong Shisan Hang Kao* 廣東十三行考 (Study of the Thirteen Hong of Canton) (1937; reprint, Taipei: 1960; reprint, Guangdong: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1999), 279–80. In 1778, the Danes mentioned that his debt with the Dutch amounted to 53,320 taels, but a VOC report shows it to be 44,850 taels. RAC: Ask 1179, 1778.09.22; and NAH: Canton 241, ‘Generaale Staat Rekening’.
95. ANP: Col/C/1/16, pp. 79–84; BL: IOR G/12/59, 1776.02.08, p. 8 and G/12/60–2 passim. This Portuguese financier in Macao was probably Joaquim Lopez da Silva. He gave many loans to the Swedes in the 1760s, some of which were at 12 percent annual interest. NM: F17 pp. T1\_05605 and T1\_06495–6517; and NAH: Canton 241, Report dated 24 January 1779.
96. BL: IOR G/12/64, 1778.09.27, p. 26 and G/12/66, 1779.12.27, pp. 161–2 and 1780.01.15, p. 192.

97. Cheong put Coqua's debt with the French at \$271,786, but did not provide a source for his information so I could not confirm the figure. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 143–4, 184 nn. 67–8. But I confirmed from French records in Paris that Coqua still owed the French a debt of 150,000 taels (about Spanish \$208,000) in 1787 and considering that payments were being made each year Cheong's figure sounds plausible. ANP: Col/C/1/16, pp. 86–8. For Coqua's debt to the inland tea men, see Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 71; and BL: IOR G/12/66, 1779.10.24, p. 59.
98. Ch'en and Cheong list different amounts for his debts. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 271; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 143. A long discussion of Leslie's debts can be found in BL: IOR G/12/69.
99. BL: IOR G/12/66, 1779.10.14, p. 24 and G/12/68, 1780.04.05, pp. 132–4.
100. NM: F17 pp. T1\_02404–14; ANP: Col/C/1/16, pp. 86–8; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 143–4, 184 nn. 67–8.

## CHAPTER SIX

1. It has been suggested by several authors that Tan Hunqua was the same person as Tan Kanguan 譚康官. Information presented here, however, argues that he was from the Chen family and his name was Chen Fangguan 陳芳觀 (see Appendix 6E for details).
2. A Constantin Plaché shows up in the VOC records, which could be the person Tan Hunqua was involved with. Plaché was a free citizen (*vrijburger*) in Batavia. He was captain of a ship that traded between Surat, Solor, Malacca, Timor, Macassar and Larantuka from 1714 to 1716. It had a crew of 52 men. Plaché seems to have been involved with other private traders in those places, including Dutch and Portuguese. W.Ph. Coolhaas, ed., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie 1713–1725*, Vol. 7 (The Hague: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1979), 231–2, 337. In 1733, a man by the name of Constantino Placé shows up in a Portuguese document concerning a matter involving the orphan João Baptista Monteiro in Macao. Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Lisbon (AHU): Macau, 0240, cx. 3, doc. no. 74, 1733.01.07.
3. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): VOC 4374. Letter dated 29 December 1729 to VOC directors in Holland from Tan Hunqua (Sjin Honqua) and Chinqua in Canton.
4. Stadsarchief (Municipal Archive), Antwerp (SAA): IC 5757, 1726.08.16.
5. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/26–28, numerous entries; and Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing, 1966), 1: 183–96.
6. NAH: VOC 4374, 1729.08.03–05. The first SOIC ship to arrive in 1732 received a similar reception. The Swedes were welcomed to Macao by an associate of the Canton merchant Pinky, and they had all of these matters expedited within even shorter time. Paul Hallberg and Christian Koninckx, eds., *A Passage to China*, by Colin Campbell (Gothenburg: Royal Society of Arts and Sciences, 1996), 83.
7. For a discussion of the establishment of trade at Canton in the early eighteenth century, see Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), Chapter 1 and p. 17; and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690–1845' (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 2002), Chapter 1.
8. NAH: VOC 4374, Resolution dated 9 August 1729.
9. BL: IOR G/12/30, 1730.07.20, p. 18; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 198.
10. BL: IOR G/12/31, 1731.07.17, p. 33.
11. A considerable amount of gold was imported from Cochin China, and then re-exported, so not all of that metal was indigenous. For an example of the Cochin

- Chinese junks bringing gold to Canton, see BL: IOR G/12/38, 1735.08. 31, p. 45 and 1735.09.09, p. 54.
12. BL: IOR G/12/31, 1731.08.07, p. 55.
  13. BL: IOR G/12/31, 1731.10.17, pp. 162–3.
  14. There are no entries for Tan Hunqua or his partner in the 1730 *grootboek*. NAH: VOC 4375.
  15. BL: IOR B.61 Court Minutes 1730–2, pp. 89–91. The directors' answer to these letters is in BL: IOR E/3/105 Despatch Books 1730–2, pp. 387–8.
  16. BL: IOR G/12/28, 1728.06.28, p. 17.
  17. NAH: VOC 4374, entries entitled 'Thee Boey debit aan Tanhonqua en Chinqua' and 'Thee Boey Debit'.
  18. This information is from the letters in Plates 06.01 and 06.02, which are from NAH: VOC 4374.
  19. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 204.
  20. *Qinggong Yue Gang Ao Shangmao Dang'an Quan Ji* 清宮粵港澳商貿檔案全集 Zhongguo Di yi Li shi Dang an guan 中國第一歷史檔案館, Zhongguo Gu ji Zheng li Yan jiu Hui bian 中國古籍整理研究會編, 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo Shu dian 中國書店, 2002) (hereafter QGY), doc. no. 114 dated 1732.09.02, p. 493.
  21. BL: IOR G/12/31, 1731.07.19, p. 34.
  22. NAH: VOC 4376 and Plates 06.03 and 06.04.
  23. NAH: VOC 4376, *dag verhaal* and *journaal*, passim; and BL: IOR G/12/31, 1731.07.29, p. 46.
  24. NAH: VOC 4376, *dag verhaal*, 1731.08.05; and BL: IOR G/12/31, 1731.07.29, p. 46.
  25. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 206.
  26. NAH: VOC 4376, *dag verhaal* and *journaal*, passim.
  27. For the story of one Dutch supercargo, Roelof Blok, and the fortune he made in Asian trade (including private transactions in Canton), see Yvonne M. Prins, 'Relaties, Rijkdom en Macht. Roelof Blok (1712–1776) een VOC - dienaar' (M.A. thesis, Dept. of History, Leiden University, August 1996).
  28. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, passim.
  29. NAH: VOC 4376 and Plates 06.03 and 06.04.
  30. The controversy was pieced together from the following sources, NAH: VOC 4376 *dag verhaal* and *journaal*; Hallberg and Koninckx, eds., *A Passage to China*, 142–3; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 183–210. The letter Tan Hunqua wrote to the EIC in January 1732 has not survived. But there is an entry in the EIC Court Minutes dated 1732.08.04 as follows: 'Letter Ton Honqua and Chinqua Merchants at Canton date 3 January 1732 was now read'. BL: IOR B/62, p. 80.
  31. NAH: VOC 4376. Much of this discussion can be found in the *dag verhaal* and *journaal*, but it is also discussed in several of the Resolutions (such as the one dated 16 October 1731).
  32. NAH: VOC 4376 and Plates 06.01 to 06.04. I am indebted to Prof. Su Ching 蘇精, fellow researcher at National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan, for helping me to decipher the stamp impressions on Tan Hunqua's letters.
  33. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 206.
  34. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.06.25, p. 9, 1732.06.27, p. 16 and 1732.07.08, p. 31.
  35. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.07.13, pp. 39–40.
  36. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.07.17, p. 44.
  37. It is unclear who the 'Xunhu' refers to, but the 'Fouyen' (Fuyuan) is the governor of Guangdong Province. An imperial decree dated 2 September 1732 states that these two officials were E Mida 鄂彌達 and Yang Yongbin 楊永斌. QGY doc. no. 114 dated 1732.09.02, p. 493.
  38. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.09.26, p. 101.

39. Tan Hunqua had apparently been imprisoned in 1728 as well. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 204–11, 217.
40. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 217.
41. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 217.
42. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 248–52; Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1116, 1736.12.18, 1737.01.07 and 1737.01.15; NAH: VOC 2410, *dagregister*, 1738.01.08–09.
43. 'Tan Honqua som er en af de ældste og meest Renumerede kiöbmænd udj Canton . . . De ældste og renomereste kiöbmænd her ved stædet'. RAC: Lintrup 5893, 1737.01.06; and RAC: Ask 1116, 1736.12.15 and day 18.
44. RAC: Ask 1116, 1737.01.21–22.
45. NAH: VOC 4386, 1760.08.01, pp. 18–9, 135–6. See discussion in Chapter 3 and notes for a brief explanation of the contributions required of all members when the Co-hong was established.
46. Numerous entries in NAH: VOC 4376, 4378; and Hallberg and Koninckx, eds., *A Passage to China*, 98, 147.
47. Numerous entries in RAC: Ask 1119–20 and Lintrup 5893; and Gothenburg Landsarkivet (Provincial Archive). A406 refers to: Öijareds säteris arkiv A 406 (hereafter GL: A406).
48. RAC: Ask 1118, 1738.09.25, p. 164
49. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1756.03.22, p. 33; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 25.
50. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1763 (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter CMD 1763), Jun 2, p. 66; and Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1764 (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2009) (hereafter CMD 1764), Mar 28, p. 42 and Apr 4, p. 44.
51. QGY doc. no. 501 dated 1780.11.22 pp. 2688–700 and doc. no. 522 dated 1784.09.03, pp. 2787–94. The name Chen Shiji appears as one of the beneficiaries on a stele in 1769. Tan Lihua, Cao Tengfei and Xian Jianmin, eds. 譚棣華, 曹騰駢, 洗劍民編, *Guangdong Beike Ji 廣東碑刻集* (Collection of Stone Steles in Guangdong) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Higher Education Press 廣東高等教育出版社, 2001), 12–3. (Thanks to Prof. Zhang Wenqin 章文欽 of Zhongshan University for showing me this reference.)
52. 'Congo Thee á Th. 18 van Poqua (anders Fet Hunqua zoon)'. NAH: Canton 27, Resolution no. 1 dated 22 June 1764.
53. RAC: Ask 1156a, 1766.07.21, pp. 68–9.
54. BL: IOR G/12/68, 1780.04.01, pp. 118–9; Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 257; and Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 272–3.
55. RAC: Ask 1158, 1767.11.01; Ask 1159, 1767.11.01; and NAH: Canton 76, 1767.11.01.
56. Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', Appendixes O, P and Q.
57. RAC: Ask 1157–61, 1767.12.10–11; NAH: Canton 76, 1767.12.11; and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Fires and the Risks of Trade in Canton 1730s–1840s', in *Canton and Nagasaki Compared 1730–1830. Dutch Chinese, Japanese Relations*, ed. Evert Groenendijk, Cynthia Viallé and Leonard Blussé, *Intercontinenta* No. 26 (Leiden: Institute for the History of European Expansion, 2009), 171–202.
58. Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', Appendixes N to S; Paul A. Van Dyke, 'A Reassessment of the China Trade: The Canton Junk Trade as Revealed in Dutch and Swedish Records of the 1750s to the 1770s', in *Maritime China in Transition*, ed. Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin-keong (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004), 159; and Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 155–6.
59. NAH: Canton 241, p. 136. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 272–3; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 86, 257; and Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬, *Guangdong Shisan Hang Kao 廣東十三行考* (Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton) (1937; reprint, Taipei: 1960; reprint, Guangdong: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1999), 278–80.

60. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 272–3; and BL: IOR G/12/72, 1781.09.25, p. 107.
61. See Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Chapter 6, 'Administrative Initiatives and Shortcomings'.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

1. This chapter was originally published as Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Cai and Qiu Enterprises: Merchants of Canton 1730–1784', *Review of Culture*, International Edition No. 15 (July 2005): 60–101. It is republished here with permission from the *Review of Culture*. Many changes and additions have been made to the study here.
2. It has been suggested recently by several authors that Tan Hunqua was the same person as Tan Kangguan 譚康官. Zhang Wenqin 章文欽, *Guangdong Shi San Hang yu Zao Qi Zhong Xi Guan Xi* 廣東十三行與早期中西關係 (Guangzhou 廣州: Guangdong jingji chubanshe 廣東經濟出版社, 2009), p. 315; and articles in: Tan Yuanheng 譚元亨, *Shi San Hang Xin Lun* 十三行新論 (Hong Kong 香港: Zhongguo ping lun xue shu chu ban she you xian gong si 中國評論學術出版社 China Review Academic Publishers, 2009). This connection seems to come from his last name being spelled 'Tan' in the foreign records. This appellation, however, is from the Fujianese dialect and is the same as the Cantonese Chan or Mandarin Chen 陳. His name was Chen Fangguan 陳芳觀 and in the Fujian dialect this is pronounced Tan Hunqua. *Qing Gong Yue Gang Ao Shang Mao Dang an Quan Ji* 清宮粵港澳商貿檔案全集, ed. Zhongguo Di yi Li shi Dang an guan 中國第一歷史檔案館 and Zhongguo Gu ji Zheng li Yan jiu hui 中國古籍整理研究會, 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo shu dian 中國書店, 2002), doc. no. 114 dated 1732.09.02, p. 493. See Appendix 6E for more details about Tan Hunqua's identity.
3. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 19, passim and VOC 2410, *dagregister*, 1737.12.15, Resolution dated 1737.03.08 and VOC 4375, *Grootboek*, 'Felix', p. 15; Rigsharkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1117, 1121, passim; Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 72 n. 81; Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 261; and Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing, 1966), 1: 234, 258.
4. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/38, 1735.08.30, p. 39 and G/12/41, 1736.08.02, p. 31.
5. RAC: Ask 1117, 1737.09.17, 1737.11.06 and other entries. For other examples of 'Felix Hunqua' (in various spellings) see entries in RAC: Ask 1121.
6. Cynthia Viallé and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters. 1764* (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2009) (hereafter CMD 1764), Apr 11, p. 55. In 1761, the Dutch opinion of Semqua was no different: 'Tsja Hunqua . . . zyn confrater Semqua half blind onder 't bestier van een yvrig, maar afgeleeft man, en een parthy negligante dienaars in zyn huys hun det waar door teffens de goederen zo men zelf dien aangaande niet een ongewoone ja byna een onmoglyke op letten hied besteed, geenzints, na behooren, bezorgt werden'. NAH: VOC 4384, Report dated 1761.01.11, pp. 599 (old pp. 194–5).
7. NAH: Canton 22, Report dated 1756.06.30 and CMD 1764, Feb 10–18, pp. 22–3. I am indebted to Dong Shaoxin 董少新 at Fudan University for finding this reference to Cai Tinghu. *Panyu Xian zhi / Panyu Shi Di fang zhi Bian zuan Wei yuan hui* 番禺縣誌 / 番禺市地方編纂委員會 (Guangzhou 廣州: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe 廣東人民出版社, 1998), 195.
8. 'Verneemen wyders hoedanig het met het Huys van Tsia Hunqua gesteld was, dat zo als Inksia ons verzeekerd alles wel is, en de Negotie door des overleedene 2de Zoon Tsey Anqua met Semqua & Comp. op dezelve voet, als b 't leeven van Tsia Hunqua zoude

- gecontinueerd werden'. NAH: Canton 79, 1770.07.27. Jörg mentions that Anqua was Hunqua's eldest son so there seems to be some discrepancies in the records. C.J.A. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 71.
9. NAH: Canton 22, Report dated 1756.06.30.
  10. NAH: VOC 4384, Report dated 1761.01.11, p. 624 (old p. 245).
  11. A Chinese document from 1747 mentions a merchant in Macao by the name of Cai Taiguan 蔡泰觀, which is the correct last name and a first name that corresponds with 'Taiqua'. This reference is five years before Hunqua's son (Taiqua) appears in the foreign records so it is unclear whether he is the same person or someone else. There was also a Macao merchant, Cai Baoguan 蔡寶觀, mentioned in the same document. His first name, however, does not correspond with any of the sons of Cai Hunqua. Fei Chengkang, *Macao 400 Years* (Shanghai: The Publishing House of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 1996), 143; *Xiangshan Xian Zhi (xin xiu) 香山縣志 (新修)* (Xiangshan County Gazetteer), 2 vols. (1828; reprint, Taipei: Xuesheng Chubanshe 學生出版社, 1985) (hereafter XSXZ(XX)), 1: 693.
  12. NAH: Canton 25, Resolution no. 1 dated 17 September 1762, Canton 26, Resolution no. 2 dated 11 February 1763; and Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1763 (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter CMD 1763), Nov 10, p. 150.
  13. Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm. Godegårdsarkivet Archive (NM): F17, pp. T1\_05145–7, T1\_06430–3, T1\_06460–1 and T1\_06624.
  14. CMD 1763, Nov 10, p. 150. We know the managers of five of the junk factories in the 1760s, and Semqua is not among them. The manager of the Chapgi Hang is unknown. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690–1845' (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 2002), Appendixes O, P and Q; and Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), 153–6. This junk factory next to the Dutch factory was outfitting junks for many years. On 10 November 1785, the Dutch mentioned that the building had caught fire and was full of merchandise. The fire was put out before major damage was done. NAH: Canton 91, 1785.11.10. The Chapgi Hang is also mentioned in the *Yuehaiguan Zhi*. Liang Tingnan 梁廷楠, *Yuehaiguan Zhi 粵海關志* (Gazetteer of Guangdong Maritime Customs), 5 vols. (1839; reprint in 1 vol., Guangzhou 廣州: Guangzhou Renmin Chubanshe 廣州人民出版社, 2001), 496. At some point the Dutch factory also became known in Chinese as the Chapgi Hang (Jiyi Hang 集義行). Morrison shows that name in 1823. Robert Morrison, *Notices Concerning China, and the Port of Canton. Also a Narrative of the Affair of the English Frigate Topaze, 1821–22. With Remarks on Homicides, and an Account of the Fire of Canton* (Malacca: Mission Press, 1823), 15. See also J.F. Davis, *A Commercial Vocabulary* (Macao: Honorable Company's Press, 1824), 25–6.
  15. NAH: Canton 20, Report for 1754 is under the date 1755.06.24 and see also VOC 4384, Report for 1760.
  16. NAH: Canton 22, Report dated 1756.06.30 and VOC 4384, Report for 1760; and RAC: Ask 1135, 1755.08.14, p. 90.
  17. NAH: Canton 25, Resolution no. 15 dated 29 November 1762.
  18. CMD 1763, Dec 6, p. 159; CMD 1764, Feb 10–18, pp. 22–3 and Jul 10, p. 129, and Canton 74, entries in November and December; and *Panyu Xian Zhi 番禺縣志*, 195. The women, of course, were not allowed to go out in public, and forbidden to have contact with foreigners.
  19. NAH: Canton 75, passim; and RAC: Ask 1155–6b, passim.
  20. NAH: Canton 79, 1770.03.31; NM: F17 p. T1\_02002; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 262, 269. 'Teegens den Avond bekommen een Brief van den Comperadoor Attacq van Canton, met narigt Tsia Hunqua op den 1<sup>ste</sup> deeze S'avonds ten 6 uuren overleeden was, en

- eenige uren daarna een van Mons. Vigny, fransse SuperCarga, met de Confirmatie van gemelde Sterfgeval; verders dat zo hun werd verzeekerd, het Huys in goede stat is, & door een van zyn Zoons zal gecontinueerd werden'. NAH: Canton 79, 1770.05.03. The English officers recorded the following on 19 August 1768. 'We have not been able to do any business with Si Hunqua, Chetqua & Yngshaw on account of the Death of Si Hunqua's daughter'. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1768.08.19, p. 23.
21. NAH: Canton 79, 1770.07.27.
  22. NAH: Canton 79, 1770.05.10, 1770.08.04 and 1770.09.14.
  23. NAH: Canton 34, Resolution no. 6, par. no. 5
  24. BL: IOR R/10/7, 1771.03.08, p. 75, and 1771.11.20, p. 59.
  25. BL: IOR R/10/7, 1773.09.02, p. 25; 1773.09.26, p. 37; 1774.01.05, p. 93.
  26. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 261–4; and several Resolutions in NAH: Canton 34. 'Overleed Tan Chetqua, welk stervall geen de minste verandering in dat huys verwekt naedemaal hy zedert 2 a drie jaaren genoegsaam buyten staat is geweest eenige Zaaken te verrigten, zynde door zyn broeder Tinqa gederigeert die zulks blyft continueeren niet nog 2 van zyn broeders'. NAH: Canton 80, entry under 1771.05.13.
  27. BL: IOR R/10/7, 1773.01.21, p. 179 and R/10/9, 1773.01.25–27, pp. 184–5.
  28. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1774.02.19–20, pp. 4–6 and 1774.08.06, p. 26.
  29. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1774.09.13, p. 44 and 1774.09.27, p. 54.
  30. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1774.10.15–16, 1774.10.22, pp. 58–61 and 1774.10.22–30, pp. 61–8.
  31. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1774.11.09, p. 68.
  32. NAH: Canton 84, 1775.02.16.
  33. NAH: Canton 240, Report dated 31 January 1778.
  34. NAH: VOC 4394, journal entry dated 24 Sep. shows the factory rent for 1762 to be 1,332 taels.
  35. NAH: VOC 4556, entry under 'Factorij'.
  36. NAH: Canton 83, 1774.08.11 and Canton 236, General Report 1774, pp. 135–44.
  37. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 264; and NAH: Canton 84, 1775.02.19.
  38. NM: F17, pp. T1\_02052–6.
  39. NM: F17, pp. T1\_02397–403, T1\_02400–3 and T1\_02633–7.
  40. Jörg mentions that Taiqua died in 1776, but another reference shows him dying in 1775. On 8 September 1775, the Dutch wrote: 'Laaten aan den Koopman Tsjonqua zynde de Broeder van den overleedenen Thayqua [Taiqua] uyt het Huys I-phong weeten de hy de op gisteren ontfangene kasjes Hysant schin . . .' NAH: Canton 84, 1775.09.08; and Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 71.
  41. In Morse, who is quoting from the English sources, it is mentioned in 1780 that 'Seunqua's' (Tsjonqua) father died in 1774, but other sources clearly show that his father Hunqua had died in 1770. The 1774 reference is perhaps referring to Anqua who died in 1774 or early 1775. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 55. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 264; and NAH: Canton 84, 1775.09.08; NM: F17, pp. T1\_01999–2007.
  42. BL: IOR G/12/18, pp. 122–7, G/12/60, Letter no. 40 dated 13 November 1777; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 84–5; Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident: Le Commerce a Canton au XVIII<sup>e</sup> Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and Album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 2: 894–900; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 185–90, 259–60.
  43. NM: F17, pp. T1\_02054–6 and T1\_02400–3; NAH: Canton 243, *Generaale Staat Reekening*, pp. 38–41; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 46, 54. Cheong mentions that Tsjonqua ('Chao-fu') was in debt '\$603,061 in 1779' but does not give the source. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 261.
  44. NAH: Canton 40, Resolution no. 2 dated 1777.03.01, par. no. 3.
  45. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 46, 55–6; and NM: F17, pp. T1\_01143–6.
  46. NM: F17, pp. T1\_01143–6; Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade*, 39–40; and NAH: Canton 44, Resolutions no. 12 dated 1782.10.07 and no. 14 dated 1782.11.12. In the



- 1760s, there was a Canton junk named *Tayon* (Taian 泰安) that operated out of the Yan family's Taishun Hang (泰順行, see Appendix 9M and 9N), but we have no way of knowing whether it was the same junk in 1782. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'A Reassessment of the China Trade: The Canton Junk Trade as Revealed in Dutch and Swedish Records of the 1750s to the 1770s', in *Maritime China in Transition 1750–1850*, ed. Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin-keong (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004), 151–67; and Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', Appendix Q.
47. 'Sy Anqua [Tsjonqua] has been employed by the Dutch Council to procure a considerable quantity of goods to be shipped for Batavia on junks belonging to this port. We have not failed to represent to the merchants the consequences that may happen should any English ship meet with them, but they all declare, it is not in the power to put a stop to such proceedings, as Sy Anqua is become perfectly desperate by his situation. We have considered that even should he apply to the government on this subject, it would be difficult to make them comprehend the matter, and we judge likewise it would not have any effect, as the Hoppo is desirous of encreasing the duties by every means in his power'. BL: IOR G/12/77, 1783.02.08, p. 12.
  48. NAH: Canton 45, Resolution no. 6 dated 1783.11.22 and Canton 245, Report for 1783 document entitled 'Waare Rendement van alle de Koopmanschappen', pp. 8–9.
  49. 'Se Unqua [Tsjonqua] has been obliged to dispose of the Dutch Factory, / his last remaining property / by order of the Hoppo, to pay the emperor's duties, he is therefore to be considered as completely ruined. Pinqua one of the new Hong Merchants has purchased it for Tales 16600'. BL: IOR G/12/77, 1783.02.21, pp. 19–20.
  50. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 267–8.
  51. NM: F17, pp. T1\_02404–7.
  52. For details about Tsjonqua's debts, see Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 54; NAH: Canton 47, 246, 248, 250, passim and VOC 4433, par. no. 41 of the Trade Report; and Archives Nationales, Paris (ANP): Colonies/C/1/16, pp. 82–8.
  53. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 54; NAH: Canton 47, 246, 248, 250 and VOC 4433, par. no. 41 of the Trade Report. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, reimbursements for rubbish teas appear in the EIC Diaries and Consultations almost every year.
  54. NAH: Canton 246, Report dated 1 February 1785; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 267–8.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

1. There has been some confusion over Beaukeequa's identity. For details see Appendix 8E.
2. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): VOC 4377; Gothenburg Landsarkivet (Provincial Archive) (GL): Öjareds säteris arkiv A 406; and Gothenburg Universitetsbibliotek (Gothenburg University Library) (GUB): H22.1.
3. 'Contracted with Beau Kiqua for the following silks' Stadsarchief (Municipal Archive), Antwerp (SAA): IC 5757, 1727.01.11–12.
4. 'Aan Mr. boy QuyCa op avanse van besprooke seyde', SAA: IC 5698, 1727.08.13.
5. Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 155.
6. Paul Hallberg and Christian Koninckx, eds., *A Passage to China*, by Colin Campbell (Gothenburg: Royal Society of Arts and Sciences, 1996), 102–3.
7. NAH: VOC 4377, 1732.09.03.
8. Hallberg and Koninckx, eds., *A Passage to China*, 120–2.
9. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/33, 1732.09.23, p. 99. The second half of this extract is a copy of the original contract Beaukeequa signed. There are therefore no Chinese characters. The Hong 'Soon Hong' would be the Fengshun Hang (豐順行), and his name Ley Khi Qua, is probably Li Kaiguan (黎開觀). But his brother, who was a silent partner and does not always show up in the records, also went by Ley Key Qua (黎啟觀, see Appendixes 8A and 8B).

10. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.06.29, pp. 17–8.
11. NAH: VOC 4375, Factory Inventory dated 1 January 1731.
12. James Ford Bell Library, University of Minnesota (JFB): Charles Irvine Papers, box 1, letter addressed to ‘Gentlemen’ dated 1733.01.29.
13. BL: IOR G/12/35, 1733.12.05, p. 109; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 155–6.
14. BL: IOR G/12/37, pp. 6–39.
15. BL: IOR G/12/36, 1734.12.27, p. 152.
16. BL: IOR G/12/38, 1735.08.18, p. 34. Texia (Yan Deshe, Chapter 9) also appears in the EIC records in 1736 as ‘Tiqua’. Amoy Tiqua, however, was not Texia, but rather Beaukeequa’s partner.
17. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 80–1, 155–9; Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch’eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 1: 222. There is also an ‘Amoy Tayqua’ who appears in the records at this time, trading with the Danes. See entries in Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1117 and 2191. Many of the Dutch and Danish records for 1734 have not survived and there is no mention of Beaukeequa in the ones that have. His name does not appear again until 1748. The pawnshop reference appears after Beaukeequa died in 1758. *Qingong Yue Gang Ao Shangmao Dang’an Quan ji* 清宮粵港澳商貿檔案全集, ed. Zhongguo Di yi Li shi Dang an guan 中國第一歷史檔案館 and Zhongguo Gu ji Zheng li Yan jiu hui 中國古籍整理研究會, 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo Shudian 中國書店, 2002) (hereafter QGY), doc. no. 327 dated 1759.10.09, p. 1859.
18. For the numbers of ships and approximate tonnages, see Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l’Occident. Le Commerce a Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and Album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), vol. 2, ‘Trafic a Wampou’.
19. The only figures that have survived from the SOIC of the Chinese merchants’ trade are from 1752, and they show that Beaukeequa supplied the Swedes with 6,500 taels of Bohea tea. GL: A406.
20. RAC: Ask 1132, 1753.08.18, p. 90. At 20 percent simple interest per year on the principle, the actual rents calculate as follows:

Year	Principle (taels)	Formula	20% interest (taels)	Actual rent paid (taels)
1	3,600	no interest 1st yr		600
2	3,000	600 x 1 year	600	1,200
3	2,400	480 x 2 years	960	1,560
4	1,800	360 x 3 years	1,080	1,680
5	1,200	240 x 4 years	960	1,560
6	600	120 x 5 years	600	1,200
Total	3,600		4,200	(average 1,300 per year) 7,800

21. NAH: Canton 20, Report for 1754 under date 1755.06.24.
22. ‘On our arrival at Batavia we were informed that there was a large quantity of Bohea Tea there which the Dutch did not care to purchase, and on enquiry we found that the Government of that place had laid an additional duty on all teas that shall be sent home on private account as also that Bohea tea has sold very low in Holland for several seasons past, which was the reasons why the private merchants there would not purchase it’. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.06.26, p. 6. ‘On our arrival here [Batavia] we were informed that there was about six thousand small chests of Bohea tea at this place, part of which was brought by a Manilla ship from Macao, and the rest by the China junks,

- and that the Government of this place had laid an additional duty on the exportation of it from hence on private acc[oun]t and as it has sold at very low prices in Holland for several seasons past, the private traders would not offer any price for it'. The English officers examined the tea to see if it would be worthwhile purchasing it, but found it to be of an 'inferior sort' and the price too high so they proceeded to Canton instead. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.07.09, pp. 7–8. And for the reshipment of this tea back to Canton and Teunqua's purchase of it, see BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.10.31, pp. 65–6.
23. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.11.15, p. 9.
  24. Archives Nationales, Paris (ANP): Colonies, C/1/10, p. 91.
  25. QGY no. 327 dated 1759.10.9, p. 1859.
  26. 'Mons. Beauqueiqua er nu den meest Renomerte kiömand herpaa stæden'. RAC: Ask 1137, 1757.09.22, p. 77.
  27. RAC: Ask 1138, 1758.09.11; JFB: B 1758 fNe; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 157–9.
  28. JFB: B 1758 fNe, *dagregister*, 1758.09.30.
  29. JFB: B 1758 fNe, *dagregister*, many entries, but the reference to Swetia being responsible for finishing Beaukeequa's contracts is under the date 3 December 1758. See also Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 80–1, 120 n. 2, 149, 155–9; Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬, *Guangdong Shisan Hang Kao* 廣東十三行考 (Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton) (1937; reprint, Taipei: 1960; reprint, Guangdong: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1999), 94–5, 104, 257–8. A Chinese document dated 9 October 1759 shows Beaukeequa's debt to be 56,200 taels but it is unclear how much of that was owed to the government and how much was owed to foreign creditors. QGY doc. no. 327 dated 1759.10.9, p. 1858. He owed the English translator James Flint (Hong Ren 洪任) 50,000 taels. Fu Lo-Shu, ed., *A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644–1820)* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), 216. As mentioned above, Beaukeequa had other debts as well.
  30. JFB: B 1758 fNe, *dagregister*, 1758.12.28.
  31. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.01.02, p. 2 and 1760.05.09, p. 29; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 155–9; Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 182–5; and JFB: B 1758 fNe, *dagregister*. The latter document has several references to Beaukeequa and the settling of his debts, but in particular, see entries under 18–19 January 1759. In order to push for a timely repayment of Beaukeequa's debts, the Dutch wrote a protest in Portuguese, and then sent it to Macao to translate into Chinese, which the linguists delivered to the governor-general in Canton. JFB: B 1758 fNe, *dagregister*, 1758.12.28–29, 1759.01.05, 1759.01.18 and doc. entitled 'Aan de Wel Edele Heeren Super Cargas der Generaale Neederlansche Ost. Indisch Comp', 1759.02.26, p. 165.
  32. RAC: Ask 2210–1; and QGY doc. no. 280 dated 1757.02.08 pp. 1424–9 and doc. no. 327 dated 1759.10.9, p. 1859.
  33. RAC: Ask 1138, 1758.10.15.
  34. RAC: Ask 1141–2, 1759.09.21, par. nos. 13–4. According to a VOC document from 1758, Beaukeequa's debt with the Dutch was 12,301.837 taels. Of this amount, 10,157.320 taels was tea that Beaukeequa, Ley Keyqua and Fuiqua had contracted with the VOC but had not yet delivered. The remaining 2,144.517 taels was for tea that Beaukeequa and Tan Anqua had contracted but had not yet delivered. The three parties agreed to pay as follows:

Ley Keyqua	5,078.660
Fuiqua	5,078.660
Tan Anqua	2,144.517
Total taels	12,301.837

- JFB: B 1758 fNe, undated document entitled ‘Explicatie der inleggende Verbandshrift over Thail 12301.837 door de Chineezen Lijkeequa & Fuijqua uitgesteld’.
35. RAC: Ask 1138–42, numerous entries about Beaukeequa’s death and debts in September and October 1738; and QGY doc. nos. 280, 327.
  36. For a discussion of the Danish factory rents during the time Poankeequa owned it (1763 to 1805), see Paul A. Van Dyke, ‘Poankeequa: Merchant of Canton 1748–1788’, forthcoming.
  37. RAC: Ask 1139–40, 1759.07.20.
  38. RAC: Ask 1138, 1758.10.15; Ask 1139, 1759.07.20; and Ask 1141–2, 1759.09.21, par. nos. 13–4; and *Ming Qing Shi Liao Geng Bian* 明清史料庚編, 2 vols. (Taipei 臺北: Zhonghua shu ju Ying yin Chu ban 中華書局影印出版, 1987) (hereafter referred to as MQSL), 694.

## CHAPTER NINE

1. This chapter was originally published as Paul A. Van Dyke, ‘The Yan Family: Merchants of Canton, 1734–1780s’, *Review of Culture*, International Edition No. 9 (January 2004), 30–85. I thank the *Review of Culture* for permission to publish it here, with many changes and additions.
2. The Taishun Hang also appears as the ‘Tising’, ‘Tái-hsing’ or ‘Tayshon’ Hang in the foreign records. Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), pp. 39, 71 n. 69, pp. 82, 147, 154, 186 n. 113, pp. 249–50; Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm. Godegårdsarkivet Archive (NM): F17, pp. T1\_00239, T1\_04045–62, T1\_05145–7 and T1\_05369; Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch’eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 1: 247, 255; and Paul A. Van Dyke, ‘Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690–1845’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 2002), Appendixes O, P, and Q. I am much indebted to Professor Zhang Wenqin 章文欽 of Zhongshan University in Guangzhou for help in finding these names in the Yan family genealogy.
3. *Yanshi Jiapu* 顏氏家譜. Textia (Yan Deshe, Chapter 9) appears in the EIC records in 1736 as ‘Tiqua’ so care needs to be exercised not to confuse him with Amoy Tiqua. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/38, 1735.08.14, p. 31 and 1735.08.18, p. 34.
4. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 255.
5. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 258.
6. When combining all of the Chinese merchant names from all of the records (British, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Belgian, French and Chinese), it becomes clear that there were forty to fifty men trading with foreigners from the 1720s to the 1750s. The Chinese source is referring to the major licensed houses. Paul A. Van Dyke, ‘Chinese Merchants of 18th Century Canton and Macao: A Summary of Research Past, Present and Future’, forthcoming.
7. *Qing gong Yue Gang Ao Shang mao Dang an Quan ji* 清宮粵港澳商貿檔案全集, ed. Zhongguo Di yi Li shi Dang an guan 中國第一歷史檔案館 and Zhongguo Gu ji Zheng li Yan jiu hui 中國古籍整理研究會, 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo Shu dian 中國書店, 2002) (hereafter QGY), doc. no. 112 dated 1732.09.01 p. 488.
8. Before leaving China each year, the Danes left their furniture and other inventories with Textia and Simon which is another indication of their uninterrupted commerce, despite the missing figures. Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1119, 1120 and 1121.

9. National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 1, 2, 69, passim; RAC: Ask 1118, passim; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 148, 251.
10. NAH: Canton 69, entries under 1743.12.07–08 and later entries; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 81.
11. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1763 (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter CMD 1763), Mar 1, p. 24.
12. RAC: Ask 1116.
13. The 1748 bottomry contract is reproduced in Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), Plate 39.
14. RAC: Ask 891, 1126, 1128, 2194–204, passim; NAH: Canton 3, 5, 9–13, 70, passim; Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 288 and 5:1, 2, 8; Charles Frederick Noble, *A Voyage to the East Indies in 1747 and 1748* (London: T. Becket and P.A. Dehondt, 1762), 289; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 149.
15. RAC: Ask 891, 1123–4, 2194–202, passim; and NAH: Canton 12–3, passim.
16. RAC: Ask 896, 1129–31, 2205–6; BL: IOR G/12/56, 1751.07.26, p. 3; Gothenburg Landsarkivet (Provincial Archive). Öijareds säteris arkiv (GL): A 406; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 149; and *Yanshi Jiapu*.
17. NAH: Canton 7 doc. dated 1751.11.30 and Canton 16 docs. dated 1751.07.12 to February 1752; CMD 1763, see Hunksia in index; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 140; and Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 273.
18. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 149; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 273; and GL: A406.
19. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1755.11.15, p. 9.
20. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.07.16, pp. 73–4 and 1759.07.21, p. 80; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 123 n. 59 and 291 n. 29; and RAC: Ask 1135, 1755.08.14, p. 90. From his many visits to the tea lands, Ingsia (spelled Youngshaw) explained to the English chief Pigou how the different varieties of tea were made. Frederick Pigou, Esq. 'An Account of the Tea Tree', in *The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, for the Year 1802* (London: R. Wilks, 1803), pp. 763–70. In 1762, the Dutch also mentioned that Swetia had sent his brother to the tea lands to make the purchases. NAH: Canton 25, Resolution no. 15 dated 29 November 1762.
21. 'Betreffend de Coopman Swietsia [Swetia] oordeelen wij desselfs staat in so verre securu te weesen om met den selven te hunnen negotieeren indien wij alleenig op zijn vermogen willen letten, Edog desselfs wijnige attentie in den Inkoop sijner gerequireert werdende producten en generaliter sijn geringe agting voor de negotie, waar door alles door sijne bediendens g'administreert werden doet ons voor een goede Leverantie bedugt weesen en kunnen uijt hoofde van dien daar toe niet wel aanraden: daar in boven sijn veele Chineesen van gedagten, dat desselfs alte groote aankleeving en agting voor sijn naastbestaande den Coopman Jonksia [Hongsia] hem nog door den tijd in een belaaglijke staat sal brengen als sijnde reets verschijde saaken door desselfs toedoen tot sijn nadeel voorgevallen. Sijn Ed: heeft voorleden maand April een Sjap met de titul van Mandarijn voor 3000 Thajljen van den Keijser g'obtaineert'. NAH: Canton 22, Resolution dated 2 July 1756 (in the copy of the report left for the supercargoes from previous season).
22. 'Hwad Bodmerierne widkomma så berättas att Hongσίας affairer äro nu på swaga fötter stadde, och att han förlorat ansenligen på ett par år; detta war en swär tidning som Thequa gifwit mig; och får jag se huru dess affairer gå till hösten; Hr. Dumond wille gifwa Hongsia på Bodmerie på samma fot som H. Michel tillförene giordt nem. att Switzia [Swetia] eller Ingsia teknade tillika med Hongsia, men den sednare afslög det helt och hollit denna war mig äfwen en mycket angenäm tidning; ty det är naturligt att Ingsia wet Hongσίας affairars beskattenhet; och om de warit goda, skulle han ey

- nekat att teckna; i synnerhet som de hade mycket pg. förnäden till Ecktays [name of a Canton junk] utredning'. NM: F17, pp. T1\_00722–6, copy of letter to Michael Grubb dated 19 March 1764. There are other such examples in this collection.
23. RAC: Ask 1135, 2209b; and NAH: Canton 15, 16, 19, 22, 71 and VOC 4387, 4388, passim; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 273; GL: A406; NM: F17; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 86, 100.
  24. See Appendixes 9A–9C; GL: A406; Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 79 and appendixes at the end of volumes 1 and 5.
  25. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1762.01.18, p. 135.
  26. RAC: Ask 1141–2, 1146. The 1759 bottomry contract with Swetia can be found in Ask 1142, pp. 103–4.
  27. RAC: Ask 1148a, p. 136. Short-term loans of 2 percent interest per month were common in Canton throughout the eighteenth century. For more extensive coverage of bottomry contracts, business loans and interest rates, see Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', Chapter 8.
  28. RAC: Ask 1148a, p. 136.
  29. CMD 1763, Mar 16, p. 31; and *Yanshi Jiapu*.
  30. RAC: Ask 1134. 'Gik för sig, de Mr. Svisia bragte os det store Siap, den vi i nogle Dage hav ventet efter, vi blev geleidet af nogle Chineisk kiöbmænd paa Vyer som Mr. Svisia broder Mr. Aveau [Awue] med flerer, som fuldte os til Wampou Toldstæd, og der for ladede os, og drog hver til sit Hiem, vi kom om bord om aftenen kl. 10, hvor vi fandt alleting i seigklar stand for i morgen vidre vores Reyse at fortsett'. Thanks to Erik Gøbel of the Danish National Archives for helping me with this text. RAC: Ask 1144, 1759.01.11.
  31. RAC: Ask 1135, 1755.08.14, p. 90. The Danes mentioned again in 1757 that he was ranked among the privileged Hong merchants. 'Thi accorderede ieg nogle dage efter med Mr. Awüs kiöbmand og Haang eller privilegerit Handelsmand, om Ite og beste Sort Taisan Thee Bohee'. RAC: Ask, 22 Sep 1757, pp. 70–1.
  32. NAH: VOC 4382, *Grootboek*, entry under 'Awue'; and James Ford Bell Library, University of Minnesota (JFB): B 1758 fNe, passim.
  33. NM: F17, pp. T1\_03926–31, 'C.Thams remarquer öfwer div. Theë i Canton åhr 1758'.
  34. CMD 1763, Apr 11, p. 39 and Sep 10, p. 119.
  35. 'Til Tranquebahr, og ikke komme her meere, men der attage Lodning; og som vi har faart at viede at Mr. Avue [Awue] sætter med een temmelig quantitet Thee for sig selv, og i Commission for Landmænde ne'. RAC: Ask 1143, 1760.10.11, p. 67.
  36. CMD 1763, Sep 30, pp. 129–30.
  37. CMD 1763, Oct 8, p. 131.
  38. CMD 1763, Mar 20, p. 33.
  39. RAC Ask 1157, 1767.12.28, pp. 133–4.
  40. Morse, *Chronicles*, vols. 2 and 5, passim. Huang and Pang have assembled a list of all the English cargos that Ingsia (Yngshaw) was known to have supplied. These figures, however, were taken from Morse, *Chronicles*. Huang Qichen 黃啓臣 and Pang Xinping 龐新平, *Ming-Qing Guangdong Shangren* 明清廣東商人 (Guangdong Merchants in the Ming and Ching Dynasty) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Jingji Chuban She 廣東經濟出版社, 2001), 250–9.
  41. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 274; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 152, 158, 159, 168, 186, 189.
  42. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 135–7.
  43. NAH: Canton 28, Resolution no. 16 dated 1765.12.06 and Canton 74, 1765.11.27.
  44. NAH: Canton 29, 32, 75–7, passim. On 8 June 1763, the Dutch mentioned that Ingsia had two cousins who kept house for them in the off-season. CMD 1763, Jun 8, p. 69.
  45. NAH: Canton 81, 1772.03.13.
  46. NAH: Canton 39, Resolution no. 29 dated 16 November 1776, Resolution no. 31 dated 8 December 1776. There are many other examples of Kiouqua/Keequa acting as Ingsia's writer in NAH: Canton 40–2 and VOC 4415, 4418, 4419, passim.

47. *Ming Qing Shiliao Geng Bian* 明清史料庚編 (Collection of Ming-Qing Historical Materials), 2 vols. (Taipei: Zhonghua Chuju 中華書局, 1987) (hereafter MQSL), 530; NM: F17, pp. T1\_00722–6 and T1\_05145–7; Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 145–50; and Li Tana and Paul A. Van Dyke, ‘Canton, Cancao, Cochinchina: New Data and New Light on Eighteenth-Century Canton and the Nanyang’, *Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies*, Vol. 1 (2007): 10–28.
48. NAH: Canton 81, 1772.12.11.
49. NAH: Canton 240, Report dated 31 January 1778, p. 149.
50. NAH: Canton 25, Resolution no. 5 dated 19 September 1762.
51. NAH: VOC 4556, two separate entries under ‘Commercie Dienaren’. See also VOC 4394.
52. RAC: Ask 1170, 1773.08.15.
53. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 186, 189.
54. Archives Nationales, Paris (ANP): Colonies, C/1/12, pp. 104–6.
55. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1774.10.24, pp. 63–5. Ingsia had offered 8,000 Spanish dollars for another large pearl but was outbid by other *Hong* merchants.
56. NAH: Canton 84, 1775.01.04.
57. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 26–7; and ANP: Col/C/1/16, pp. 86–8.
58. NAH: Canton 41, Resolution no. 16 dated 16 September 1778.
59. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 152–3.
60. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 97–8.
61. Ch’en, *Insolvency*, 275; and NAH: Canton 89, 1780.11.18.
62. RAC: Ask 1141<sup>(sb)</sup>, 2214.
63. Fu Lo-Shu, ed., *A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644–1820)* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), 280; Liang Tingnan 梁廷楠, *Yuehaiguan Zhi* 粵海關志 (Gazetteer of Guangdong Maritime Customs) (1839; reprint, Guangzhou: Guangzhou Renmin Chubanshe 廣州人民出版社, 2001), 491, 496; and Ch’en, *Insolvency*, 322. Plate 10.09 shows the inside of Chowqua’s factory, with his writers attending to the packing of tea and one of them could very likely be Ponqua.
64. The names on the steles have been reproduced in Guangzhou Shi Wenhua ju 廣州市文化局, *Guangzhou Jin lun hui guan Zheng ti Yi wei Bao hu Gong cheng ji* 廣州錦綸會館整體移位保護工程記 (Beijing 北京: Zhongguo jian zhu Gong ye Chu ban she 中國建築工業出版社, 2007). Heli Hao appears on p. 155, fifth row from the top, first name from the left after the donation.
65. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 89.
66. NAH: Canton 82, 1773.02.07.
67. NAH: Canton 25, Resolution no. 15 dated 29 November 1762; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 123 n. 59.
68. Many entries in the following sources NAH: Canton 34, 35, 80 and VOC 4406, 4408, 4410, *passim*.
69. NAH: Canton 88, 1779.03.30; and Ch’en, *Insolvency*, 278. Plate 02.01 shows the location of the Armenian factory in 1748. By the 1770s and 1780s, however, when numerous depictions of the the factories were painted they do not show an Armenian factory. The Armenians were still present in Canton at this time so perhaps they moved into the Chow Chow factory, which was where many private traders took up residence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
70. BL: IOR G/12/76, 1782.09.03, p. 78.
71. NAH: Canton 82, 1773.02.07–08.
72. NAH: Canton 82, 1773.02.07–08; and BL: IOR R/10/9, 1773.02.08, pp. 197–8.
73. NAH: Canton 88, 1779.03.26.
74. RAC: Ask 1190; Ch’en, *Insolvency*, 278–80; Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬, *Guangdong Shisan Hang Kao* 廣東十三行考 (Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton) (1937; reprint,

- Taipei: 1960; reprint, Guangdong: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1999), 221; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 114; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 82.
75. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 278; BL: IOR G/12/79, 1784.09.02, p. 47; and *Yanshi Jiapu*.
76. NAH: Canton 80, 1771.01.05; and *Yanshi Jiapu*.
77. Besides Ni Hongwen mentioned above, there were a couple other merchants with the name 'Wayqua'. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 186–92; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 85; and Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 153 and Plate 25.
78. NAH: Canton 34, 35, 36, 79, 80, 82 and VOC 4408, *passim*.
79. NAH: Canton 82, 1772.12.22.
80. NAH: Canton 36, Resolution dated 11 March 1773.
81. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 278. The 'Conqua' mentioned here is a different person from Tan Conqua in Chapter 6, as the latter died in 1781. BL: IOR G/12/79, 1785.11.07, p. 80.
82. NAH: Canton 7, doc. dated 1751.11.30, Canton 16, docs. dated 1751.07.12 and days 17–18, 23, 1751.08.25 and day 30, 1751.10.02, and Canton 22, Report dated 1756.06.30 which is included in Resolution dated 1756.07.02. I found no person in Texia's family genealogy that matches Hongsia's criteria (name or approximate age). Hongsia should have been in his forties, fifties or sixties from 1760 to 1774, when he disappears from the records. Perhaps he was a more distant relative. *Yanshi Jiapu*.
83. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.05.17, p. 53; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 83, 121 n. 16; Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 91; and CMD 1763, see Hunksia in index.
84. For a list of 37 Canton junks and their owners, managers, sponsors, bottomry bonds, and other transactions, see Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', Appendixes O, P and Q; and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'A Reassessment of the China Trade: The Canton Junk Trade as Revealed in Dutch and Swedish Records of the 1750s to the 1770s', in *Maritime China in Transition 1750–1850*, ed. Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin-keong (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004), 151–67. I later found references to other Canton junks bringing their total to over forty. From at least the 1750s to the 1830s, there were thirty or more junks operating out of Canton each year. For an 1833 reference to thirty-plus seagoing junks based in Canton, see Edmund Roberts, *Embassy to the Eastern Courts of Cochín-China, Siam, and Muscat; in the U.S. sloop-of-war Peacock*, David Geisinger, Commander, during the Years 1832–3–4 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1837), 121–2.
85. NM: F17, pp. T1\_01764–5.
86. 'Hongsia ar en gammal skålm' (Hongsia is an old trickster). NM: F17, pp. T1\_02052–60.
87. For a more detailed analysis of the junk bottomry contracts, see Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', Chapter 5. Two of Hongsia's bottomry contracts (in Chinese) for Canton junks he sponsored are reproduced in Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Plates 10 and 11.
88. Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', Chapter 5.
89. The receipt for shipping sandalwood and mahogany wood aboard junk *Sihing* is reproduced in Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Plate 5.
90. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Plates 10 and 11.
91. NM: F17, pp. T1\_00273, T1\_02052–3, T1\_06223–4.
92. NM: F17, pp. T1\_06223–4.
93. A recent study has shown that the Canton junks that sailed to Southeast Asia each year in the eighteenth century probably had a crew size of 100 men. Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Operational Efficiencies and the Decline of the Chinese Junk Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: The Connection', in *Shipping Efficiency and Economic Growth 1350–1800*, ed. Richard Unger (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 223–46.
94. The information about Captain Lipsia and the other Canton junks was taken from CMD 1763, see index for junk names; NAH: Canton 74, 127, 130, 131, many entries too numerous to list here; and Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', Appendixes O, P and Q. On 31 May 1765 the Dutch heard that junk *Sihing* (spelled *Sweehing*) might have diverted



- its route to Cochin China, which was a common stop-over en route to Batavia. In 1763, a Canton-Batavia junk (possibly *Sihing*) with a Dutch jack was seen near Siam, and other records show them stopping in Cochin China. CMD 1763, Jul 13, pp. 72–3; and Van Dyke, ‘A Reassessment of the China Trade’, 151–67. A drawing made by a Swedish passenger in 1747/1748 of a Canton-Batavia junk sailing under a Dutch ensign can be seen in Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Plate 9. *Sihing* may have been the small junk owned by Chowqua mentioned in Chapter 10.
95. A couple Batavia receipts also show the VOC receiving empty pepper sacks from the Canton junks *Ecktay* and *Samkonghing* in May and July 1766. NAH: Canton 130, nos. 15 and 16.
  96. For a discussion of the junk trade and Chinese community at Batavia, see Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company* (Providence: Foris Publications, 1988); and Leonard Blussé, ‘Chinese Trade with Batavia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Preliminary Report’, in *Asian Trade Routes*, ed. Karl Reinhold Haellquist (London: Curzon Press, 1991), 231–45. Souza also has a list of the numbers of Canton junks that frequented Batavia from 1684 to 1754. George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire. Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630–1754* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 136–41.
  97. NAH: Canton 32, Resolution no. 1 dated 1769.04.30 and Canton 78, 1769.01.07 and days 09, 22, 26, 1769.07.05 and day 14.
  98. For a discussion of the Canton junks, see Van Dyke, ‘Port Canton’, Chapter 5.

## CHAPTER TEN

1. An earlier version of Mandarin Quiqua’s history is available online at the *Chinese Business History* website, under ‘Working Papers’, Paul A. Van Dyke, ‘Mandarin Quiqua and Family: Merchants of Canton 1724–1794’ (2006), <http://www.umassd.edu/cas/history/cbh/workingpapers.cfm>. Since that paper was written, many changes and additions have been made.
2. Cheong suggests that Mandarin Quiqua may have been the Quanzhou merchant who had established a business in Manila called *Qouycong*. According to Cheong, this man had moved to Amoy in the early 1720s, and shortly thereafter the name *Qouycong* appears in Canton connected to Mandarin Quiqua. Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 159–60. The GIC records confirm the connection between Mandarin Quiqua and the name *Qouycong* by 1724. Stadsarchief (Municipal Archive), Antwerp (SAA): IC 5684, 5740; and Plantin-Maretus Museum, Antwerp (PMA): 479 ‘Boek Gehouden in Canton’. Morse also mentions that Mandarin Quiqua came from Amoy. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch’eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 1: 183. But for reasons discussed in Appendix 10H, I have omitted the Manila connections owing to a lack of evidence to confirm the links.
3. Morse, *Chronicles*, 1: 183.
4. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/30, 1730.11.02, p. 55.
5. BL: IOR G/12/31, 1731.08.15, p. 63; G/12/33, 1732.08.21, p. 79 and 1732.09.09, p. 89. Some of the gold delivered in 1732 was found to be deficient when it was examined at Fort St. George, India, and Mandarin Quiqua was reluctantly persuaded to give the EIC a refund in 1733. BL: IOR G/12/35, 1733.12.01, p. 106.
6. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.07.02, pp. 22–3.
7. BL: IOR G/12/36, 1734.07.25, p. 15 and G/12/37, pp. 6–8, 38–9.
8. The GIC sent no more ships to China after 1732. BL: IOR G/12/26; and National Archives, The Hague (NAH): VOC 2410, Resolution dated 1737.03.11.

9. BL: IOR G/12/51, 1742.07.22, p. 39; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 44.
10. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.07.04, p. 27 and G/12/44, 1738.08.06, p. 12.
11. BL: IOR G/12/51, 1741.12.28, p. 15; G/12/51, 1741.12.28, p. 15; G/12/55, 1751.08.02, p. 8; G/12/56, 1751.07.26, p. 3 and 1751.12.21, p. 90; Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1121, 1742.12.30, p. 142 and Ask 1135, 1755.08.14, p. 90; NAH: Canton 2 Resolution dated 1743.08.29, Canton 9 doc. dated 1748.09.04, Canton 19 doc. dated 1754.07.08, Canton 20 doc. dated 1755.06.24 and Canton 22 Resolution dated 1756.07.02; Gothenburg Landsarkivet (Provincial Archive). Öijareds säteris arkiv (GL): A 406, passim; Archives Nationales, Paris (ANP): Colonies, C/1/10, entry dated 1743.09.06, p. 42; and *Qing gong Yue Gang Ao Shang mao Dang an Quan ji* 清宮粵港澳商貿檔案全集, ed. Zhongguo Di yi Li shi Dang an guan 中國第一歷史檔案館 and Zhongguo gu ji Zheng li Yan jiu hui 中國古籍整理研究會, 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo shu dian 中國書店, 2002) (hereafter QGY): doc. no. 280 dated 1757.02.08, pp. 1428–9. In 1755, an ‘Inqua’ appears in the Swedish records and in 1758 an ‘Iqva’ is mentioned in the Danish records. Both entries show the man trading in porcelain. Because of the eight-year gap between 1747 and 1755 when no name like Inqua appears, and because these later references show the man trading in porcelain, he was probably a different person. Gothenburg Universitetsbibliotek (University Library) (GUB): H22.4A; and RAC: Ask 2211–3.
12. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1759.01.02, p. 2 and 1760.05.09, p. 29; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 155–9; Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 182–5; and James Ford Bell Library, University of Minnesota (JFB): B 1758 fNe, *dagregister*. The latter document has several references to Beaukeequa and the settling of his debts, but in particular, see entries under 18–19 January 1759. In order to push for a timely repayment of Beaukeequa's debts, the Dutch had to write a protest in Portuguese, and then send it to Macao to translate into Chinese, which the linguists then delivered to the governor-general in Canton. JFB: B 1758 fNe, *dagregister*, entries under 28–29 December 1758 and 5, 18 January 1759 and document entitled ‘Aan de Wel Edele Heeren Super Cargas der Generaale Neederlandsche Ost. Indisch Comp’, 1759.02.26, p. 165.
13. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.07.21, p. 10.
14. In July 1763, the Dutch reported that Chowqua and the five other small merchants had gathered at a local temple to discuss ending the Co-hong. They drank a concoction of sacrificial blood from two pigs and two goats mixed with wine and vowed to force the trade open or quit altogether. They were unsuccessful. *Hong* merchants could not leave the trade without permission so the bond was of little consequence. But the men were certain to have contributed to the eventual collapse of the Co-hong in 1771. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters. 1763* (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter CMD 1763), Jul 13, p. 72.
15. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters, 1762* (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2006) (hereafter CMD 1762), Sep 29, p. 30.
16. Paul A. Van Dyke, ‘Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690–1845’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 2002), Appendixes O and P; Paul A. Van Dyke, ‘A Reassessment of the China Trade: The Canton Junk Trade as Revealed in Dutch and Swedish Records of the 1750s to the 1770s’, in *Maritime China in Transition 1750–1850*, ed. Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin-keong (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004), 151–67; and CMD 1762. Ch'en also found in the English records that Chowqua was sending ‘a junk or two to trade with South-East Asia’. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 294.
17. RAC: Ask 1173, 1775.07.15; and ANP: Col/C/1/12, p. 105.
18. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 33–4; RAC: Ask 1179; and NAH: Canton 41, Resolution no. 16 dated 16 September 1778 and several documents and entries in Canton 46 and 89.
19. RAC: Ask 1175, 1777.01.01; and NAH: Canton 86, 1777.02.08.

20. BL: IOR G/12/66, 1779.10.14, p. 23, 1779.08.20, p. 57 and 1780.01.15, p. 193; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 45. Cheong mentions that Chowqua was now senile. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 88.
21. RAS: Ask 1185, 1781.12.30; CMD 1763, Apr 1, p. 36; and NAH: Canton 46, Resolution no. 1 par. beginning with 'De vierde of laaste' and doc. no. 13 'Specifiquc Lyst van .... Zyde Stoffen'.
22. RAC: Ask 1173, 1775.07.15, f. 57 and Ask 1200, 1786.12.24, f. 85–6. For Geowqua's story and trade with Chowqua, see Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Merchant of Canton: Geowqua 伍喬官 1772–1798', forthcoming. This paper was presented at a conference entitled 'Between Local and Global, Canton Port in Early Modern Times' organized by the History Department, at Zhongshan University, in December 2010.
23. BL: IOR G/12/73, 1781.12.13, p. 43. There are several other entries in this file that discuss this event. Two other private ships were also sold this year to Portuguese, owing to the great advantages Macao now enjoyed in the Asian carrying trade while the English and Dutch were at war.
24. BL: IOR G/12/76, 1782.06.25, p. 33, 1782.09.08–09, pp. 84–5 and 1782.09.18, p. 103; Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 79–80.
25. NAH: VOC 4433, and Canton 45, Resolution no. 6 dated 1783.11.22 and Canton 245. There was a junk named *Tayon* (Taian 泰安) in Canton in the 1760s, which may be the same junk, or perhaps the predecessor to the one mentioned here. Van Dyke, 'A Reassessment of the China Trade', 160; and Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', Appendix Q.
26. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 114.
27. The VOC trade figures often include factory expenses, wages, advances, interest payments, etc., in their numbers so it is difficult to know the exact amount of the cargos. Ch'en mentions that Chowqua had 'been ailing for a couple of years' prior to his death in 1789, and that he usually had one eighth of the EIC trade. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 294; Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 97; and ANP: Col/C/1/16, pp. 86–8.
28. Other chest numbers in this painting correspond with numbers in this journal, but they were packed on different days. The chest numbers suggest the painting may have been completed on three different days from 22 November to 24 December.
29. NAH: Canton 51, Resolutions no. 3 dated 1789.08.27, no. 5 dated 1789.09.07, no. 10 dated 1789.11.20, no. 16 dated 1789.09.08 and several Resolutions in Canton 52; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 294. Ponqua had the same last name as Inqua, but it is unknown whether they were related.
30. Ghent Universiteits Bibliotheek (University Library) (GHL): Ms 1985. This document is a copy of the VOC *dagregister* for 1791. NAH: Canton 53–4. It has numerous entries to Locqua. See also BL: IOR G/12/103, 1792.10.31, pp. 120–1.
31. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 291. Iqua was exiled to Yili on 2 September 1791 as punishment for his debts. See also entries to Locqua in GHL: Ms 1985.
32. GHL: Ms 1985.
33. GHL: Ms 1985.
34. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 322–7.
35. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 295.
36. Another merchant by the name of Loqua became a *Hong* merchant in 1802, but he was a different person. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, pp. 339–45.

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

1. This chapter was originally published as Paul A. Van Dyke, 'The Ye Merchants of Canton 1720–1804', *Review of Culture*, International Edition No. 13 (January 2005), 6–47. I thank the *Review of Culture* for permission to reproduce it here. Since that article was written, many changes and additions have been made.

2. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/8, 21–2, 24; and Appendixes 11A and 11G. Cheong states that the name of Cudgin and Leunqua's firm was the 'Kuang-yüan Hong'. This is perhaps the result of taking Consentia Giqua's firm and projecting it back in time. As new information will show here, Leunqua's business was the Duanhe Hang. Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 39, 45, 70 n. 64, 81, 86, 145. On 30 June 1732, the English stated that 'hearing a very good character of Leunqua who lives in the Hong (Cudgen formerly lived in)', which suggests that the former had taken over the latter's firm. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.06.30, p. 19. See also Plates 11.03, 11.04, 11.21 and 11.22.
3. BL: IOR G/12/8, 22; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 144–5; and Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 1: 167.
4. Stadsarchief (Municipal Archive), Antwerp (SAA): IC 5757, 1726.08.16 and 1726.08.22.
5. SAA: IC 5757, 1726.09.27.
6. In the reference above, the Foyen is probably the viceroy (governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces). The term usually refers to the Fuyuan 撫院, governor of Guangdong Province. It is unclear which official is being referred to here.
7. BL: IOR G/12/26–27.
8. BL: IOR G/12/31, numerous entries mention Leunqua but see 8–10 July in particular; and Paul Hallberg and Christian Koninckx, eds., *A Passage to China*, by Colin Campbell (Gothenburg: Royal Society of Arts and Sciences, 1996), 152.
9. SAA: IC 5695, 1727.01.15 and 5740, 1726.08.19. On 2 September 1734, the EIC supercargoes mentioned that 'Leunqua offering us a house on very easy terms we agreed with him for one at two hundred tales'. BL: IOR G/12/37, p. 53.
10. BL: IOR G/12/37, 1734.08.13, pp. 38–9; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 45, 48, 184 n. 72.
11. Cheong shows Leunqua being active as early as 1728, which I had adopted in an earlier version of the Ye history. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 70 n. 64, 145; and Van Dyke, 'The Ye Merchants of Canton', p. 12. Upon further investigation, the earliest reference I have found to him in the EIC records is 1729 where he shows up as 'Leonqua, Cudgins partner'. BL: IOR G/12/28, 1729.11.13, p.45.
12. BL: IOR G/12/33, 1732.06.30, p. 19.
13. BL: IOR G/12/38, 1735.08.30, pp. 39–40.
14. BL: IOR G/12/38, 1735.08.31, p. 45.
15. Rigsarkivet (National Archive), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1118, 1738.12.07, pp. 228–9; National Archive, The Hague (NAH): VOC 2438, *dagregister*, 1738.12.07; and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690–1845' (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 2002), 350–1.
16. RAC: Ask 1118, 1739.01.09–10, p. 277.
17. NAH: Canton 2, 69, 70, *passim*.
18. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 146; and NAH: Canton 2, 69, *passim*. In Chapter 8 we saw that Beaukeequa had a partner by the name 'Amoy Tiqua'. I have been unable to make any clear connections between this man and Tacqua Amoy, although it is possible they were the same person.
19. Gothenburg Landsarkivet (Provincial Archive). Öjareds säteris arkiv (GL): A406, *passim*; RAC: Ask 1130 p. 169 and Ask 1131 p. 168. The latter two references have Tacqua Amoy's chops, but no signatures.
20. Cheong mentions that Giqua was connected to Leunqua's firm in 1750 and 1752, but he has confused the names of their businesses, stating that Leunqua's firm was the

- Guangyuan Hang. We know now that his firm was the Duanhe Hang. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, pp. 81, 82 n. \* and 146; and numerous entries in the following sources: RAC: Ask 1121, 1124–8, 2195–204; GL: A406; and Nordic Museum Archive, Stockholm (NM): Godegårdsarkivet Archive F17, pp. T1\_00052, T1\_05116–23, T1\_06563, T1\_06575. There is no mention of Leunqua in the VOC Resolutions from 1745 (NAH: Canton 4–5) or after, but he appears in 1744. NAH: Canton 70, *dagregister*, 1744.08.14 and 28 and numerous other entries, and Canton 3, Resolution dated 1744.08.26.
21. Thanks to Professor Su Ching 蘇精, fellow researcher at National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan, and Li Qingxin 李慶新 of Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences for helping me to decipher the characters on Tacqua Amoy's chop.
  22. Tacqua Amoy and Tan Conqua offered 1,000 piculs of Bohea tea to the Danes in 1737, which they purchased for 12 taels per picul. RAC: Ask 1117, 1737.09.17, p. 98.
  23. The DAC supercargoes wrote: 'med Sr. Lehonquas Compagnion Teiqua Amoy sluttet om 100 kister Thee Bohee' ('contracted 100 chests of Bohea tea with Mr. Lehonqua's companion Teiqua Amoy'). RAC: Ask 1121, 1742.09.18, p. 88.
  24. Sometimes he appears simply as Giqua. In the 1740s and 1750s there was another merchant with that name so care must be taken not to confuse them. RAC: Ask 1121, 1139–41.
  25. Cheong mentions that Giqua's 'Hong was razed by a fire' in 1756, but does not provide the source. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 147. There is a reference to a fire this year in the EIC records dated 10 April 1756, which reads as follows: 'A fire happen'd near Geequa's which we got extinguished by means of the Companys Engines, but not until it had consumed upwards of 30 small houses. This is the sixth fire that has happen'd since our arrival'. BL: IOR R/10/4, 1765.04.10 p. 36. This reference does not indicate that Giqua suffered damage in the fire, but only that the fire happened near his place so it is uncertain whether he was a victim.
  26. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1763 (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter CMD 1763), n. 29, pp. 174–5; and VOC 4386 and 4387, pp. 735–55.
  27. NAH: Canton 26, Resolutions no. 49 dated 1763.11.30 and no. 50 dated 1763.11.30, and entries in VOC 4387; and Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 14, 20, 296.
  28. CMD 1763, Jan 17, p. 12, Mar 9, p. 27.
  29. NM: F17 pp. T1\_01764–5.
  30. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.07.21, p. 10.
  31. CMD 1763, Mar 4, p. 24, Mar 9, p. 27, and Mar 16, pp. 31–2.
  32. RAC: Ask, 1149, 1762.12.16, pp. 142–3, 153.
  33. CMD 1763, Mar 14, p. 30.
  34. CMD 1763, Feb 21, p. 21.
  35. NAH: Canton 74, 1765.04.26.
  36. In an earlier version of the Ye history published in Chinese, the translator mistakenly listed Huiqua as a member of the Ye family. I was unaware of this translation being done until it had already been published as a chapter in a book. The translation contains many errors. Tan Yuanheng 譚元亨, *Shi san hang xin lun* 十三行新論 (New studies of the Thirteen Hongs) (Hong Kong 香港: 中國評論學術出版社有限公司 China Review Academic Publishers Ltd., 2009), chapter entitled '廣東葉氏商人, 1720–1804' (Guangdong Ye Merchants).
  37. NAH: Canton 74, 1765.07.04.
  38. See many entries in NAH: Canton 74; and RAC: Ask 1154, 1156a, 1165.
  39. For one example of these post-mortem references to merchants, see Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters*, 1762 (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2006) (hereafter CMD 1762), Sep 19, p. 18 and n. 48, p. 97. Names often show up in

- the foreign records ten or even twenty years after the person died and are talked about as if they were still alive. These are references to their houses rather than persons.
40. RAC: Ask 1116, 1736.12.07, p. 62.
  41. NM: F17; and Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', Chapter 5.
  42. NM: F17; and Van Dyke, 'Port Canton', Chapter 5.
  43. NAH: Canton 74, 1765.07.04.
  44. The amount requested of the Hong Merchants by the court was 200,000 taels. Zhuang Guotu, *Tea, Silver, Opium and War: The International Tea Trade and Western Commercial Expansion into China in 1740–1840* (Xiamen: Xiamen University Press, 1993), 40–6; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 93; and Huang Qichen 黃啟臣 and Pang Xinping 龐新平, *Ming-Qing Guangdong Shangren 明清廣東商人* (Guangdong Merchants in the Ming and Ching Dynasty) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Jingji Chubanshe 廣東經濟出版社, 2001), 407–9.
  45. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 84–5; Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident. Le Commerce a Canton au XVIII Siècle 1719–1833*, 3 vols. and Album (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 2: 894–900; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 185–90, 259–60.
  46. BL: IOR R/10/9, 1772.01.29, pp. 8–9; RAC: Ask 1168; Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 181; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 260–1.
  47. RAC: Ask 1170–1; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 260–1; and Archives Nationales, Paris (ANP): Colonies, C/1/16, p. 80.
  48. BL: IOR G/12/58, 1775.07.03, p. 23 and R/10/9, 1775.07.03, p. 19; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 261.
  49. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 260–1; RAC: Ask 1170–2, 1178; and ANP: Col/C/1/16, pp. 86–7.
  50. NM: F17, p. T1\_06345–6; and Archives du Port Lorient (APL): IP299 'Correspondance diverse et documents relatifs à la ville de Lorient'. Liasse 31: 'Lettres de fonctionnaires de la Compagnie en Chine et dans l'Inde, 1754–1762', letter dated 31 December 1760. Dermigny lists this reference under file IP277. Cheong quotes from this letter and shows the correct date but has it listed under file IP/179. Dermigny, *Le Commerce à Canton*, 2: 834; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 121 n. 20. There are perhaps several copies of these letters. The letter used in this study is in IP299. For an index of the documents in the Archives du Port Lorient, which includes a brief description of these letters on page 73, see A. Legrand and Félix Marec, *Inventaire des Archives de la Compagnies des Indes* (Paris: Imprimerie de la Marine, 1978).
  51. The different Howquas can be found in the following sources: Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 261, 280; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 89; RAC: Ask 1173–6, 1180, 1182, 1185, 2244, passim; and NAH: Canton 29, 37, 39, 81, 85 and VOC 4412, passim.
  52. NAH: Canton 40, Resolution no. 5 dated 1777.03.05; RAC: Ask 1207, 1792.04.06, and other entries; entries in G/12/94, 96–7, 102–4; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 301, 312–7; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 91. In the 1740s, there is another 'Yamqua' who shows up in the SOIC records, but his Chinese name was Cai Yanguan 蔡炎官. NM: F17 pp. T1\_03891–4. A copy of this document is reproduced in Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005; reprint, 2007), Plate 18.
  53. RAC: Ask 1207, 1792.04.06, p. 77.
  54. RAC: Ask 1207; G/12/103, 1792.09.21, pp. 38–9; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 301, 312–7; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 91.
  55. On a stele from 1764 in the silk guild Jinlun Huiguan in Canton there is an entry showing Yicheng Hao 義成號, which is suspiciously similar to Yanqua's Yicheng Hang 義成行. Guangzhou shi wenhua ju 廣州市文化局, *Guangzhou Jin lun hui guan Zheng ti Yi wei Bao hu Gong cheng ji 廣州錦綸會館整體移位保護工程記* (Beijing 北京: Zhongguo Jian zhu Gong ye Chubanshe 中國建築工業出版社, 2007), p. 155, fourth row from the top, fourth name from the right. As Plates 06.12, 06.13 and 11.03 show, hao 號 and hang 行 in a business name were sometimes used interchangeably. In those

- documents, Fat Hunqua wrote the business name Yuanlai Hang 遠來行, but then used the chop of the Yuanlai Hao 源來號. Of the 26 American ships that were in China in 1802, Yanqua did not secure any of them, so his trade with them appears to have been minimal at best. Canberra, National Library of Australia (NLA): Pierre Bernard Milius, 'Voyage aux Terres Australes (1800–04)', handwritten manuscript on microfilm, pp. 74–6. It is unfortunate that we do not have complete information about Yanqua's trade with the Americans. Given that he donated a life-size stature to one of the Americans, we would expect to find him trading extensively with them. But I only found two references in the American archives to him from 1801 and 1802. Rhode Island Historical Society (RIHS): Mss 336, Carter-Danforth Papers, vol. 11, Journal 1801–04, pages are not numbered in this booklet, see page dated 'Canton Oct. 1801' with first entry being 'Bought of Yamqua', and his signature 官任 to the right; and Amos Porter, *The China Journal of Amos Porter 1802–1803* (Greensboro: Greensboro Historical Society, 1984), 33.
56. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 312–7; and Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬, *Guangdong Shisan Hang Kao* 廣東十三行考 (Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton) (1937; reprint, Taipei: 1960; reprint, Guangdong: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1999), 290–2, 386.
  57. Zhuang, *Tea, Silver, Opium and War*, 41. The Dutch recorded the contribution in 1787 to be 400,000 taels and that it was to support the troops in Taiwan. NAH: Canton 93, 1787.08.20.
  58. This summary of the difficulties in the 1780s and 1790s, was pieced together from the following sources: G/12/108, 1794.03. 14, p. 33, 1794.12.17, pp. 117–8, 1795.01.20, p. 197; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 93, 108, 294–9, 307–11; and Xing Yongfu 邢永福, et al., *Qing Gong Guangzhou Shisan Hang Dang'an Jingxuan* 清宮廣州十三行檔案精選 (A Selection of Qing Imperial Documents of the Guangzhou Shisan Hang) (Guangzhou 廣州: Guangdong Jingji Chubanshe 廣東經濟出版社, 2002), doc. no. 58, pp. 158–9.
  59. NLA: Milius, 'Voyage', p. 76.
  60. Yanqua's silk contract with the SOIC in 1802 is reproduced in Van Dyke, 'The Ye Family', p. 30, Illustration 8.
  61. The Jinlun Huiguan in Canton, stele dated 1820, has an entry showing a *lun ju ren ji* 倫聚仁記, but there is no way to know if it has any connection to Yanqua's former business. Guangzhou shi wenhua ju, *Guangzhou Jin lun hui guan*, p. 164, column on far right, fourth name from the bottom.
  62. BL: IOR G/12/142, pp. 213–4.
  63. BL: IOR G/12/142, p. 215.
  64. BL: IOR G/12/145, pp. 210–1.
  65. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 405–6; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 307–17; Ann Bolbach White, 'The Hong Merchants of Canton' (Ph.D. diss., Dept. of History, University of Pennsylvania, 1967), 93–4; Liang, *Guangdong Shisan Hang Kao*, 300–1; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 91–2.
  66. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 122 n. 44; Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 21, 39, 312–7; and Liang, *Guangdong Shisan Hang Kao*, 386; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 3:55, 194.
  67. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 123 n. 48; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 312–7.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

1. Stadsarchief (Municipal Archive), Antwerp (SAA): IC 5740, 1724.12.28, p. 23.
2. SAA: IC 5709, 1730.12.26; and National Archives, The Hague (NAH): VOC 4376, 1731.12.31.
3. NAH: VOC 4377, 1732.08.13; and Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 1118, 1738.08.27 and 1739.01.09–10; and Paul Hallberg and Christian Koninckx, eds., *A Passage to China*, by Colin Campbell (Gothenburg: Royal Society of Arts and Sciences, 1996), 83–4.

4. SAA: IC 5757, 1726.09.18.
5. Numerous entries in SAA: IC 5709, 5752, 5757.
6. There were also Zhang men involved in the junk trade between Siam and Canton in the 1730s. The problem of Siam traders exporting copper resurfaced again in 1744. *Qing shi lu Guangdong Shi liao* 清實錄廣東史料, 6 vols. (Guangzhou 廣州: Guangdong sheng Chubanshe 廣東省出版社, 1995) (hereafter QSL), 1: 501–2, doc. dated 1744.11.03; and *Ming Qing Shi liao Geng bian* 明清史料庚編, 2 vols. (Taipei 臺北: Zhong hua Chu ju Ying yin Chu ban 中華書局影印出版, 1987) (hereafter MQSL), 514.
7. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/35, 1733.09.03 p. 48.
8. BL: IOR G/12/56, 1734.12.27, p. 152.
9. BL: IOR G/12/54, 1750.09.26, p. 19.
10. The 1727 reference in the GIC records to 'Foetqua' can be found in SAA: IC 5753, 1727.11.10.
11. Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1966), 5: 91; and Henri Cordier, 'Les Marchands Hanistes de Canton', *T'oung Pao* 3 (1902): 306; and Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 121 n. 20.
12. Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 91; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, p. 121 n. 20. Cheong mentions that Foutia was in financial trouble by 1755, and that he passed on a debt of \$53,000 to Kousia. He gives Cordier's article, 'Les Marchands Hanistes de Canton', p. 299 as the source of this information. But I found no such entry on this page or in this article. Cordier used the same French documents in the Archives Nationales, Paris, 'Archives des Colonies: Chine, 1732–1803' as were used in this study. I did not find a reference to this debt in those records either. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, p. 253.
13. BL: IOR R/10/5, 1761.07.21 p. 10.
14. Ch'en Kuo-tung Anthony, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*, 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1990), 275–6.
15. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 44–7, 5: 159 and appendix; and Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 276.
16. NAH: Canton 82, 1773.02.07–08; BL: IOR R/10/9, 1773.02.08, pp. 197–8; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 173.
17. NAH: Canton 82, 1773.02.07–08.
18. Ch'en, *Insolvency*, 276; Carl T. Smith and Paul A. Van Dyke, 'Armenian Footprints in Macau', *Review of Culture*, International Edition No. 8 (October 2003), 34; and Morse, *Chronicles*, 5: 168, 179 and appendix. See also entries in NAH: Canton 87–8.
19. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 44–7.
20. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 44–5.
21. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 54–8.
22. Morse, *Chronicles*, 2: 44–5.

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1. For the story of the Liangs of the nineteenth century, see Huang Qichen 黃啟臣 and Liang Chengye 梁承鄴, *Guangzhou Shisan Hang zhi Yi: Liang Jingguo Tianbao Hang Shiji* 廣州十三行之一：梁經國天寶行史迹 (Guangzhou 廣州: Guangdong Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe 廣東高等教育出版社, 2003).
2. Examples of other Liangs include Liang Guofu 梁國富 in 1757 and Liang Guang 梁珽 in 1826 who were compradors; Atchon (Liang Yazhang 梁亞章) was comprador in the Dutch factory in Canton from 1806 to 1810; Liang Wenling 梁文苓 was involved in the junk trade between Canton and Vietnam in 1771; Liang Jie 梁傑 appears in the records as a linguist in 1794 to the EIC; and Liang Yaxin 梁亞信 appears in 1800 as a



- merchant dealing with the Portuguese. *Qing gong Yue Gang Ao Shang mao Dang an Quan ji* 清宮粵港澳商貿檔案全集, ed. Zhongguo Di yi Li shi Dang an guan 中國第一歷史檔案館 and Zhongguo Gu ji Zheng li Yan jiu hui 中國古籍整理研究會, 10 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo Shudian 中國書店, 2002) (hereafter QGY), doc. no. 281 dated 1757.02.25 p. 1590; Yang Jibo 楊繼波, Wu Zhiliang 吳志良, and Deng Kaisong 鄧開頌, eds., *Ming-Qing Shiqi Aomen Wenti Dang'an Wenxian Huibian* 明清時期澳門問題檔案文獻匯編 (Collection of Ming-Qing Documents Concerning Macao Affairs), 6 vols. (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1999) (hereafter MQSQ), vol. 1, doc. no. 254, pp. 397–8. Lau Fong 劉芳 and Zhang Wenqin 章文欽, eds., *Qingdai Aomen Zhongwen Dang'an Huibian* 清代澳門中文檔案匯編 (A Collection of Qing Chinese Documents Concerning Macau), 2 vols. (Macau: Aomen Jijin Hui 澳門基金會, 1999), doc. nos. 435–7, 530, 1390; and entries in National Archives, The Hague (NAH): Canton 370.
3. Besides these mirrors, the Dutch also brought other mirrors (including some 'very large' ones), a large gold clock and some Spanish dogs to sell in Canton as luxury items. In later years, they tended to avoid trading in these novelty items owing to the trouble they caused to the Hong merchants. NAH: VOC 4378, Resolution dated 1733.12.23 and *dagregister* entries dated 1733.12.18–20, 23 and 1734.01.04.
  4. NAH: VOC 4378, *dagregister* entry dated 1733.11.06.
  5. British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR) G/12/43, 1737.07.10.
  6. NAH: Canton 13, Resolution dated 1750.11.25.
  7. NAH: Canton 1–13, 69, *passim*.
  8. NAH: Canton 69, entries under 1743.12.07–08 and 13. The Dutch rented a factory from a 'Tan Conqua' for 900 taels in 1747. This man could be Emanuel Quiqua's partner, but it is unclear. NAH: Canton 6, Resolution dated 1747.03.22. See also discussion of the different Tan Conquas in the records in Appendix 6E.
  9. Cheong mentions Emanuel Quiqua being active at this time, and that he sometimes appeared as partners with Cai Hunqua. Up until now, that was about the only information we have had about these Liang men. Cheong Weng Eang, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade, 1684–1798* (Copenhagen: NIAS-Curzon Press, 1997), 39, 40 and 44.
  10. There are many Liangs listed on steles in the silk guild Jinlun Huiguan in Canton (Plate 09.16), but none of the names match exactly with the Liangs in this chapter. A close match to Liang Diguang is on a stele dated 1732, which shows a Liang Diyao 梁帝堯. Guangzhou shi wenhua ju 廣州市文化局, *Guangzhou Jin lun Hui guan Zheng ti Yi wei Bao hu Gong cheng ji* 廣州錦綸會館整體移位保護工程記 (Beijing 北京: Zhongguo Jian zhu Gong ye Chu ban she 中國建築工業出版社, 2007), p. 151, 28th column from the left of the page, 10th name down after the contribution.
  11. An 'Attay' worked as a comprador for the SOIC from 1751 to 1753; another 'Attay' (or 'Attey') was a comprador for the DAC from 1746 to 1755; and an 'Attay' served as a comprador for the VOC from 1760 to 1784. These men are all different from Liang Diguang. Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé, *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters, 1763* (Macao: Cultural Institute, 2008) (hereafter CMD 1763), pp. 137–8; and numerous entries in the following sources: NAH: VOC 4391, Canton 79–90; Rigsarkivet (National Archives), Copenhagen (RAC): Ask 889b–901; and Gothenburg Landsarkivet (Provincial Archive). Öijareds säteris arkiv (GL): A406.
  12. NAH: Canton 69, entries under 1743.12.07–08.
  13. NAH: Canton 9, 13 and 69, *passim*.
  14. NAH: Canton 5, Resolution dated 1746.10.17.
  15. Gothenburg Universitetsbibliotek (University Library) (GUB): H22.4A 'Dagbok för skeppet Prins Carl', 1754.11.18, p. 54.

## INDEX

- Agar agar, agal agal (Hooy Tsjoy, Hai Cai)  
海菜 73, 264, 272–3, 276, 279–80,  
283–5
- Agents as commission merchants 20, 107,  
131, 221
- Agents in Canton 11, 94, 107, 450–1 n. 5
- Agents in China's interior *see* Chinese  
inland merchants
- Agents in Europe 114
- Agents in Macao 75, 107, 151, 358, 450–1 n.  
5
- Agents in Southeast Asia 69, 74–5, 96,  
164–5, 450–1 n. 5
- Agents of change 1
- Ajou (Tan Quiqua's partner) 304
- Ajou, Ajouw (Yan Limsia's partner) 160,  
364–5
- Alloy content (including references to  
'touch') 43, 104, 139, 228, 232–3,  
235–8, 241, 243, 246–9, 440–1 n. 8,  
Plate 08.02
- Alum 9
- American(s) xiii, xvi–ii, 6, 12, 21, 23, 27,  
28, 192, 197, 228, 325, 435 n. 7, 438 n.  
27, 479–80 n. 55
- Amoy 277, 281, 311, 349, 384, 415, 453 n. 4,  
474 n. 2
- Amoy Joss *see* Ni Inqua and 170, 385
- Amsterdam 103, Plate 06.05
- Ang Siequa *see* Junk captain and 263
- Ang Songnan *see* Junk captain and 263
- Anglo-Dutch War, Fourth (1780–1784) 133,  
136
- Animal bones 68, 284, 287
- Animal horns 67–8, 275, 282, 285–6
- Animal meat (salted or dried) 9, 265, 275,  
278, 282, 285
- Animal sinews 265, 275, 284
- Animal skins, hides 67–8, 72, 208, 265, 269,  
272–3, 275, 281, 283, 285
- Anqua (Leanqua/Linqu's partner) 20, 75,  
415
- Anqua *see* Cai Anqua, Tan Anqua or Tan  
Hanqua
- Anson, Commodore 88, 209
- Apostels 265, 285
- Aqua *see* Cai Fuguan
- Areca *see* Betel nut
- Armenian Ignace Narcipe 377
- Armenians xiii, , 17, 20, 80, 83, 104, 145,  
160, 210, 377, 454 n. 11, 472 n. 69
- Arrack *see* Betel nut (if measured by the  
picul, and if measured by the bottle, keg,  
barrel, etc. then it is a liquor).
- Asafetida 267, 285
- Atack (Lu Yade) 呂亞德 (Comprador)  
89–90
- Atchon (Liang Yazhang) 梁亞章  
(Comprador) 481 n. 2
- Attay (Comprador) 482 n. 11
- Australia, Australian(s) xvii, xxi–ii, 71
- Awue, Avou *see* Ma Guohu or Yan Awue
- Ayao xvi
- Ballast 37
- Banca Straits 75, 175
- Bankruptcies, business failures 2, 7, 14, 17–8,  
23, 27, 29, 32–5, 54–5, 59, 66, 76, 81,  
94, 100–2, 119, 121, 126, 131–3, 136–7,  
144–7, 152, 158–9, 161–2, 166, 174–5,  
177–9, 188, 190–6, 199–200, 204–5,  
216–7, 219, 221–5, 302, 392, 442–3 n. 4,  
445 n. 21, 449 n. 56
- Baodiguan 保帝官 *see* Liang Attay
- Baoshun Hang 寶順行 202, 420–1
- Batavia 37, 49, 69–70, 74–6, 94–7, 102–4,  
108–9, 125, 133–4, 143, 163–5, 173,

- 175, 191, 223, 228, 261, 263, 266–74, 279, 281–3, 290, 323, 329, 350, 366–9, 376–9, 383, 396, 445 n. 23, 450 n. 5, 451 nn. 6 and 7, 452 n. 17, 452–3 n. 25, 458 nn. 70 and 75, 460 n. 2, 466 n. 47, 467 n. 22, 473–4 n. 94, 474 nn. 95–6, Plates 04.01–10, 05.04
- Beans 282, 285
- Beau Hunqua *see* Cai Hunqua and 330, 344
- Beaukeequa *see* Ley Beaukeequa
- Bêche-de-mer *see* Trepang
- Beijing (Peking) 2–4, 8, 18, 22, 31, 33–4, 47, 56, 59, 62, 64, 74, 82–6, 92, 104, 109–10, 112–3, 120, 124, 129, 139, 155, 175, 182–3, 192, 194, 197, 214, 216, 219, 224, 325, 399
- Belgium, Belgian, Flemish records, sources and archives (*see* Flemish, Flemings for references to people) xiii, xvi, 34, 343, 469 n. 6
- Bengal 46, 73
- Benjamin (product) 284
- Betel nut (bing lang) 檳榔 (same as Arrack when measured by the picul) 68, 220, 267, 269, 271, 273–4, 278, 280, 282, 286
- Birds, Exotic 208
- Birds' feathers and skins 208, 272
- Birds' nests (edible) 72, 220, 265, 267, 270, 272, 274, 276, 279–81, 283, 284
- Bissom 46
- Blok, Roelof 461 n. 27
- Bocca Tigris (Humén) 虎門 112, 165, 175, 185, 200, 232, 235–7, 243, Plate 05.07
- Bohea Mountains (Wuyi Shan) 武夷山 14–6, 159, 437 n. 17
- Bombay 139
- Bookkeeping 7, 25–6
- Borneo 70
- Bottomry loans *see* Insurance
- Bribes *see* Connivance fees
- Bussora 46
- Cai Anqua 蔡 (son of Cai Hunqua) 99, 123–32, 135–6, 157, 191, 297, 300–1, 307, 327–31, 335–6, 340, 342, 344–5, 360, 375, 413, 463–4 n. 8, 465 n. 41, 466 n. 47
- Cai Baoguan 蔡寶觀 (in Macao) 464 n. 11
- Cai Chaofeng 蔡朝鳳 (Ye Leunqua's guarantor) 184, 399–400, Plates 11.21–2
- Cai Cinqua (Cai Hunqua's grandson) 335
- Cai Fuguan 蔡福官 (Oqua) 346, 426
- Cai Guohui 蔡國輝 *see* Cai Swequa and 346–7
- Cai Hunqua 蔡 4, 20, 53–5, 57–8, 60–2, 91–2, 96–9, 102, 115, 121, 123–8, 131–2, 134–5, 137, 151–2, 156–8, 162, 171, 176, 178, 190, 217–9, 230–2, 248, 250–1, 261, 292, 295, 297–300, 306–7, 322, 327–30, 335–6, 338–47, 349–50, 356, 358–61, 366, 375, 440–1 n. 8, 444 n. 16, 445 n. 23, 445–6 n. 27, 446–7 n. 29, 448 n. 46, 457 n. 66, 463 nn. 5–6, 464 nn. 8 and 11, 465 nn. 20 and 41, 482 n. 9, Plates 03.01, 03.03–6, 03.08–10, 07.02–4, 11.16
- Cai Monqua (Cai Wenguan) 蔡文官, (Cai Shiwen) 蔡世文 (Cai Teunqua's son) 20, 57, 100, 119, 134, 163, 174, 177, 191, 193–4, 203, 262, 331, 334, 347, 360, 366–8, 381, 387, 389–91, 394, 413, 416, 437–8 n. 25, 440–1 n. 8, 446 n. 29, 457 nn. 60 and 66, Plates 07.07, 10.07, 10.12
- Cai Ruiguan 蔡瑞官 *see* Cai Swequa
- Cai Sequa (Cai Hunqua's son) 123–4, 131, 134–5, 327, 331, 335–6
- Cai Shiwen ) 蔡世文 *see* Cai Monqua
- Cai Swequa (Cai Ruiguan) 蔡瑞官, Cai Guohui) 蔡國輝 (Cai Tjobqua's brother) xv, 20, 54–7, 62, 117, 126, 146, 187, 216, 225, 262, 331, 346–8, 402–3, 444 n. 16, 445 nn. 26 and 27, 446 n. 29, 457 n. 60
- Cai Taiguan 蔡泰觀 (in Macao) 464 n. 11
- Cai Taiqua 蔡 (Cai Hunqua's son) xv, 99, 123–6, 128–32, 136, 156, 158, 188, 300–1, 327–31, 333, 335–6, 339–40, 344–5, 347, 360, 464 n. 11, 465 n. 40
- Cai Taiqua's cousin (uncle?) 125
- Cai Teunqua (Tionqua, Cai Yongjie) 蔡永接 (Cai Monqua's father) 262, 347, 366 The following references may also refer to him 126, 143, 162, 316–7, 467–8 n. 22
- Cai Tinghu 蔡廷瑚 123–6, 131, 331, 463 n. 7

- Cai Tjobqua (Yokqua, Cai Yuguan) 蔡玉官 (Cai Swequa's brother) 132, 157, 163-4, 262, 366, 368, 432, 446 n. 29
- Cai Tjobqua's writer 432
- Cai Tseonqua (Cai Hunqua's son) 123-4, 331, 335-6
- Cai Tsjonqua (Cai Xiangguan) 蔡相官, (Cai Zhaofu) 蔡昭復 20, 100, 123-4, 131-6, 174, 176-7, 223, 327, 331, 336-7, 339, 344, 346, 360, 387, 390-1, 465 nn. 40-1 and 43, 466 nn. 47, 49 and 52, Plates 07.07, 10.07
- Cai Wenguan 蔡文官 *see* Cai Monqua
- Cai Xiangguan 蔡相官 *see* Cai Tsjonqua
- Cai Yongjie 蔡永接 *see* Cai Teunqua
- Cai Yuguan 蔡玉官 *see* Cai Tjobqua
- Cai Zhaofu 蔡昭復 *see* Cai Tsjonqua
- Cai Zouguan 蔡諷觀 *see* Junk captain and 97
- Caliatour 267, 285
- Cambodia (Jianpuzhai) 柬埔寨 (Kampo-tsja) 69, 76, 119, 163, 191, 269-72, 274-9, 282-3, 290, 367, 377, 413
- Campbell, Colin 105, 138-9, 200, 313, 322, 326, 344, 414, 425, 442 nn. 2 and 4
- Camphor 72, 88, 268-9, 272, 276, 285
- Cane 285, 287
- Caneel *see* Cinnamon
- Cankauw, Kankouw (place between Tsin Tack Moen and Siam) 267-74, 277, 290
- Capitalism 1
- Captains, Chinese 47, 69, 71, 74, 95, 97, 133-4, 159, 163-5, 369
- Captains, Foreign 27, 47, 52, 75, 98, 158, 175, 203, 383, 396, 435 n. 7, 438 n. 27-8, 450 n. 2, 452 n. 25, 455 n. 44, 460 n. 2, 473 n. 94
- Cardamon 267, 270, 272-3, 275-6, 278, 280, 283, 285
- Cassia *see* Cinnamon
- Caucan, Caukan *see* Palembang
- Caucong *see* Palembang
- Cauw 272, 285, 287
- Cawsanqua 414
- Cay Sonykoua 345
- Ch'en, Kuo-tung Anthony xvii, xviii, xxi, 29-30, 101, 193-4, 196, 222, 322-5, 343, 347, 382, 416-7, 433 n. 1, 453 n. 2, 460 n. 98, 475 n. 16, 476 n. 27
- Chambers, John 308-9
- Chan, Gregorio (Poankeequa's partner from Manila) 178
- Chang Mao Rong Hao 長茂榮號 186, 401, Plate 11.06
- Chang Maorong 長茂榮 *see* Tacqua Amoy
- Changchua (rich Canton merchant) 311, 453 n. 4
- Chapgi Hang *see* Jiyi Hang
- Che Honquoi *see* Cai Hunqua and 344
- Chen Anguan 陳安觀 *see* Tan Anqua
- Chen Chongyi 陳崇義 315, 327
- Chen Dengguan 陳澄官 *see* Tan Tinqu (1)
- Chen Guiguan 陳貴觀 *see* Tan Quiqua (1)
- Chen Jieguan 陳捷官 *see* Tan Chetqua
- Chen Jiuguan 陳九觀 315
- Chen Junhua 陳鈞華 *see* Tan Locqua
- Chen Keguan 陳科官 *see* Tan Coqua
- Chen Kuaiguan 陳快官 *see* Tan Mandarin Quiqua
- Chen Kuiguan 陳魁官 *see* Tan Mandarin Quiqua
- Chen Qiwu 陳起鳴 *see* Tan Chetqua and 296, 311
- Chen Quiqua *see* Tan Quiqua (1-2)
- Chen Shiji 陳世積 *see* Tan Conqua (1)
- Chen Shiyng 陳世英 315, 327
- Chen Shouguan 陳壽官 *see* Tan Suqua
- Chen Suguan 陳蘇官 *see* Tan Sauqua
- Chen Taiqua *see* Tan Taiqua
- Chen Tengguan 陳騰觀 *see* Tan Tinqu (2)
- Chen Tiande 陳天德 *see* Tan Chowqua and 387, 391
- Chen Tingfeng 陳廷鳳 *see* Tan Suqua
- Chen Tingguan 陳汀官 313, 315
- Chen Wenkuo 陳文擴 *see* Tan Chowqua and 171, 387
- Chen Yingjie 陳應節 *see* Tan Tinqu (3)
- Chen Zheng 陳正 261, 315
- Chen Zhenguan 陳鎮官 *see* Tan Tinqu (3)
- Chen Zuguan 陳祖官 *see* Tan Chowqua
- Chen 陳 (unspecified clan name) 6, 34, 95, 313-5, 324-5, 397, 453 n. 5, 463 n. 2
- Cheong, Weng Eang xv, xviii, 29, 87, 100, 138, 146, 182, 193, 222, 312-4, 322, 325-6, 342-3, 347, 354, 382, 397, 414, 416, 418, 434 n. 14, 438 n. 36, 445-6 n. 27, 453 n. 2, 457 n. 59, 459 n. 90, 460 n. 97-8, 465 n. 43, 474 n. 2, 476 n. 20,

- 477 nn. 2, 11 and 20, 478 n. 25, 479 n. 50, 481 n. 12, 482 n. 9
- Chesia (Ni Inqua's partner) 385–6
- Chetai *see* Li Chetai
- Chetqua *see* Tan Chetqua
- Chi Hunqua *see* Cai Hunqua and 344
- Chin Ching Hang 399
- Chinaware *see* porcelain
- Chincheu *see* Quanzhou
- Chinese government 1–2, 7, 9–10, 14–5, 17–8, 22–4, 28, 31–2, 34, 36, 55, 58, 60–1, 63–4, 74, 80, 84, 113–4, 144–5, 147, 197, 199, 204, 216–7, 219, 221–2, 224, 435 n. 2, 446 n. 28, 466 n. 47, 467–8 n. 22, 468 n. 29
- Chinese inland merchants to/from China's interior, including those who came to Canton each year (neidi shangren) 內地商人, and Canton agents who went to the interior 9, 12–4, 16, 18–9, 21, 24, 35, 42, 48, 51, 56–9, 87, 100–1, 151, 154–5, 160–1, 165, 170, 181, 262, 314, 436 n. 8, 447 n. 34, 448 nn. 40–1, 449 n. 56, 460 n. 97
- Chinese inland production, producers, suppliers 2–4, 13, 18, 35, 41–2, 48, 50–1, 53–8, 71, 87, 91, 126, 138–9, 142, 146, 160, 166, 173, 178, 181, 201, 213–7, 220, 224, 435 n. 2
- Chinese painter Leonqua 186
- Chinese painter of mirrors 155
- Chinese painter of porcelain 11, 51
- Chinese painter of silk xiv, 225
- Chinese painter unspecified 11, 186
- Chinqua (Tan Suqua's bookkeeper) 80, 85, 87, 292, 294, 309, 312–3, 454 n. 13
- Chinqua *see* Chinqua (Tan Suqua's bookkeeper), Than Chinquan (Tan Hunqua's partner) or Tan Conqua (1)
- Chinson Province 161
- Choi *see* Cai 蔡
- Chonqua (Tan Conqua (1) and Yan Limsia's guarantor) 320, 365
- Chonqua, Chongqua, Chouqua *see* Tonqua (Tan Chowqua's partner) or Zhang Pinky or Conqua (silk merchant)
- Chonqua, Chouqua (unidentified) 320, 365
- Chop boats 15, 36–7, 39, 129
- Chouqua *see* Zhang Pinky and 199
- Chowqua II *see* Tan Locqua
- Chowqua *see* Tan Chowqua
- Chua Teinqua 343
- Chunghou Hang (name of English factory in 1740) 356, 372
- Chungqua *see* Conqua silk merchant and 326
- Chunqua xvi
- Chuy Honqua *see* Cai Hunqua and 344
- Chwanchu *see* Quanzhou and 141
- Cinnabar Plate 04.04
- Cinnamon (cassia, caneel) 283, 286, 396
- Cinqua (Macao Cinqua) *see* Cai Cinqua
- Civil and military degrees 7, 13–4, 87, 124, 397
- Clocks and watches 21, 98, 208, 276, 284, 455 n. 43, 458 n. 82, 482 n. 3
- Cloth 73, 134, 208, 284
- Clothing 14, 197
- Cloves (*see also* spices) 24, 189, 223, 233, 239, 264, 268, 287, Plates 05.03, 08.09, 08.11
- Coccia *see* Zhang Kousia
- Cochin China (Annan Guo) 安南國 69, 76, 96, 118–9, 125–6, 139, 163–4, 191, 267–84, 287, 290, 367–8, 376–9, 381, 413, 452–3 n. 25, 458 n. 75, 460 n. 11, Plate 08.02
- Cochineal 284, 287
- Coffee 285
- Co-hong (Gonghang) 公行 2–5, 9, 11–2, 18, 29, 32, 49, 56–66, 91–2, 116–8, 120, 130–2, 135, 137, 146, 154–7, 166, 172–4, 187, 192, 202–5, 211, 216–9, 225, 227, 252, 261–2, 315, 324–5, 347, 417, 426, 445–6 n. 27, 446–7 n. 29, 447 nn. 30 and 34, 447–8 n. 37, 448 n. 45, 449 n. 56, 462 nn. 45 and 14, Plates 03.01, 05.11, 07.05, 09.12
- Coiqua, Cuiqua, Cuqua *see* Tan Mandarin Quiqua, Than Chinquan (Tan Hunqua's partner), Ley Beaukeequa or Ye Consentia Giqua and 51, 107, 316, 326, 348, 354, 383, 415
- Commission merchants *see* Agents
- Compradors (maiban) 買辦 xviii, 3, 29, 89, 207, 224, 426, 456 n. 51, 481 n. 2, 482 n. 11, Plate 08.04

- Connivances and Connivance fees (including bribes, kickbacks, and other illegal forms of disbursements) 3–4, 10, 25, 60, 62–6, 81, 105, 107, 109–10, 113, 155, 203, 218, 449 n. 56
- Conqua (Poankeequa I's clerk and nephew) 326, 334
- Conqua (silk merchant) 326
- Conqua (unidentified) 162, 473 n. 81, 482 n. 8
- Conqua *see* Conqua (silk merchant), Robin Conqua or Tan Conqua (1–2)
- Consentia Giqua *see* Ye Consentia Giqua
- Consentia Huiqua *see* Huiqua
- Consoo 公所 (including *consoo* tax, fund and building) 7, 29, 61, 137, 146, 438 n. 36
- Contracts *passim* and Appendix 2
- Coolies 14–6, 39–40, 159, 235, 240, 245, 251–2, Plates 09.01, 12.03
- Copenhagen xxii, 153, 323, 449 n. 55
- Copper Plate 04.04
- Coral 21, 160, 208, 364
- Cordier, Henri xvi, 346–7, 382, 481 n. 12
- Cotton (also spelled Kapoc, Cabock) 15–6, 22, 60, 72, 82, 231, 233, 265, 267, 270, 272, 274, 277, 279, 281, 283–5, Plates 03.04, 03.10
- Couchoane Hang *see* Guangshun Hang
- Court of law (*see also* Laws) 31, 47, 217, 426 (Macao)
- Court *see* Imperial Court
- Cowshaw *see* Zhang Kousia
- Craic Songkoa 345
- Cunqua *see* Conqua or Tan Conqua (1–2)
- Curcuma Plate 07.03
- Customs (Yuehaiguan) 粵海關 7, 10–1, 22, 28–9, 37–9, 70, 106, 113, 131, 204, 213, 223, 346, 451 n. 7
- Customs boats 29
- Customs confiscations 204
- Customs duties 37–8, 70, 106, 113, 131, 213, 223, 451 n. 7
- Customs houses (tollhouses, Shuikou) 28, 39, 97, 210, 471 n. 30 (Toldstæd)
- Customs officers 10–1, 28–9, 37
- Dafeng Hang (Thatfong Hang) 達豐行 57, 77, 97, 261, 314–5, 367–8, Plate 03.07
- Dalrymple, Alexander 62, 73, 255
- Danish (DAC) directors in Copenhagen 185
- Danish Asiatic Company (DAC), people, trade and officers *passim*
- Danish language, records, sources and archives xiii, xv, xvi, xxii, 33–5, 38, 87, 115, 118, 126, 142, 151, 154, 160, 172, 177, 184–6, 193–4, 209–10, 227, 231–52, 322–3, 326, 343, 345, 347, 354, 382, 414–7, 467 n. 17, 471 n. 30, 469 n. 6, 475 n. 11
- Danish private traders 158
- Danxia Mountains 丹霞山 14–6
- Daxing Gongsi 大興公司 76, 97
- Deans, John 458 n. 70
- Dehe Hang 德和行 169, 384, Plate 10.12
- Denmark xvi, 242
- DeVisme, Mr. 98
- Diamonds 21, 208
- Directors (of companies) unspecified 20, 25–7, 109, 120, 214, Plates 06.01–5
- Dong Shaoxin 董少新 463 n. 7
- Dragonsblood (a dye) 265, 271, 276, 285, 287
- Drums 159
- Duanhe Hang 端和行 116, 181, 184–8, 192, 318, 342, 398–401, 477 n. 2, 477–8 n. 20, Plates 11.03–4, 11.21–2
- Dumond, Mr. 470 n. 22
- Dunnage 67–8, 219
- Dutch (VOC) directors in Amsterdam 84, 101, 103, 105, 107–11, 460 n. 3, Plates 06.01–05
- Dutch colours (flags, ensigns) 175
- Dutch East India Company (VOC), people, trade and officers *passim*
- Dutch language, records, sources and archives xiii–xvi, 24, 33–5, 69, 116, 118, 126, 132, 155–7, 161–2, 171–2, 177, 185, 193, 207, 209–10, 227, 230–3, 237–41, 244–6, 252, 277, 313–4, 322–3, 325–6, 343–4, 347, 354, 382, 415–7, 432, 445–6 n. 26–7, 447 n. 34, 448 n. 48, 450 n. 2, 457 n. 50, 459 n. 85, 462 n. 58, 465 n. 40, 467 n. 17, 469 n. 6, 473 n. 84, 475 n. 16
- Dyer, Richard 106–7
- Dyes 67–8, 219–20, 265, 271, 276, 284–7
- Dyssel, Mr. 447 n. 30

- E Mida 鄂彌達 461 n. 37
- Eauw Jak *see* Junk captain and 264
- EIC Court Minutes 105, 461 nn. 15 and 30
- Elephants' tusks *see* Ivory
- Elliston, Edward 106–7
- Elphinstone, Capt. 98
- Emanuel (Cai Tjobqua's writer) 432
- Emanuel Quiqua *see* Liang Emanuel Quiqua
- Embroiderers *see* Silk Embroiderers
- Emperor 8, 33, 62–6, 74, 82, 85–6, 98, 100–1, 108–10, 112, 115, 132, 134–6, 144, 146–7, 175, 182–3, 195–6, 202, 218–9, 223–4, 446 n. 28, 458 n. 82, 466 n. 49, 470 n. 21 (Keijser)
- Emperor's duties 134, 136, 144, 146, 466 n. 49
- Emperor's mother 8
- England 99, 109, Plate 06.07–08
- English (EIC) cargos 20, 55, 90, 174, 184
- English (EIC) committee in Canton 10, 23, 62, 86, 100, 195, 203
- English (EIC) directors in London 84, 101, 105, 108–9, 111, 153, 461 n. 15
- English Blockade 136
- English colours (flags, ensigns) 75
- English East India Company (EIC), people, trade and officers *passim*
- English import products 83, 97, 128, 156–8, 166, 194
- English interpreter, translator 446 n. 28, 468 n. 29
- English language, records, sources and archives xiii, xiv, xv, 6, 13, 34, 67, 98, 100, 124, 126–7, 132, 161–2, 171–2, 185, 199, 207, 227, 292, 313, 319, 326, 343–4, 354, 382, 415, 437 n. 17, 445 n. 27, 465 n. 40, 468 n. 29, 475 n. 16
- English occupation of Manila 74–5
- English private traders 125, 131, 158, 175, 203, 390, 438 n. 31
- English private traders 125, 131, 158, 203, 438 n. 31
- English, Pidgin 13, 98, 100, 124, 127
- Erlai Dian 而來店 154, 262, 363–4
- Erreboot, Mr. 182
- Eryi Hang 而益行 193–4
- Ewe Wern Hang *see* Yuyuan Hang and 421
- Ewe Yuern Hang *see* Yuyuan Hang and 421
- Expendable income 1–2, 213
- Faa Samqua *see* Gau Semqua
- Factories, unspecified 6, 8–10, 35–7, 40, 68, 75, 87–8, 90, 113, 143, 145, 174, 203, 438 n. 31, 451 n. 43, 464 n. 14, 472 n. 69
- Factory, American 192
- Factory, Armenian 143, 472 n. 69
- Factory, Cai Hunqua's 127
- Factory, Cai Monqua's 119, 174
- Factory, Chonqua's 174
- Factory, Chow Chow 423, 472 n. 69
- Factory, Danish (DAC) 88–9, 144, 149, 155, 174, 222, 229, 310, 353, 372–3, 456 n. 48, 469 n. 36
- Factory, Dutch (VOC) 74, 88–90, 104, 123, 125, 130, 133–4, 145, 157, 200, 209–10, 222, 310, 322, 444 n. 16, 445–6 n. 27, 464 n. 14, 465 n. 34–5, 466 n. 49, 467 n. 11, 476 n. 27, 481 n. 2, 482 n. 8
- Factory, English (EIC, including Chunghou Hong in 1740 and Long Hing Hong in 1755) 75, 88, 94, 104, 112, 118, 143, 149, 172, 183, 208, 293, 296, 310, 448 n. 41
- Factory, Flemish (GIC) 182–3, 229
- Factory, French (CFI) 88, 183
- Factory, Gau Semqua's 123, 125
- Factory, Ley Beaukeequa's 143–4, 146, 353, 372, 456 n. 48
- Factory, Liang Attay's 88–9, 209
- Factory, Liang Emanuel Quiqua's 88, 211
- Factory, Poankeequa I's 457 n. 65, 469 n. 36
- Factory, Portuguese 87, 209
- Factory, Robin Quiqua's 209
- Factory, Shy Kinqua's 203
- Factory, Swedish (SOIC) 88, 143, 310
- Factory, Tan Chowqua's 160, 174, 176, 472 n. 63
- Factory, Tan Conqua's (1 or 2) 482 n. 8
- Factory, Tan Coqua's 193
- Factory, Tan Hunqua's 108–9
- Factory, Tan Mandarin Quiqua's 456 n. 48
- Factory, Tan Suqua's 88–9, 310, 372, 456 n. 48
- Factory, Tan Tinqu'a (3) 448 n. 41
- Factory, Tan Tionqua's 88
- Factory, Yan Ingsia's 155, 157, 372–3
- Factory, Yan Limsia's 161, 203
- Factory, Yan Swetia's 144, 153, 353, 372–3

- Factory, Yan Texia and Huang Simon's 149–50, 172, 372–3
- Factory, Ye Consentia Giqua's 192
- Factory, Ye Cudgin's 183
- Factory, Ye Leunqua's 183
- Factory, You Hunqua's 208
- Factory, Zhang Kousia's 203
- Falai Hang 發來行 116, 120, 318–9
- Falconar, Capt. 175
- Fan Leunqua *see* Ye Leunqua and 414
- Fat/Fet Hunqua *see* Tan Fat Hunqua
- Fazakerley, William 84, 105–7, 113
- Felix *see* Gau Semqua
- Fengjin Hang (Hongsin, Fongzun Hang) 豐晉行 191–2, 218, 367–8, 412–3, 415–6
- Fengshun Hang 豐順行 137, 349, 413, 466 n. 9, Plates 08.05–06
- Fengyu Hang 豐裕行 80, 85, 87, 91, 262, 293–4, 297, 347, Plate 05.02
- Fengyuan Hang 逢源行 262, 347
- Fiador *see* Security merchant
- Fires (and risks thereof) 21, 35–7, 47, 51, 53, 75, 88–91, 101, 118, 150, 161, 174, 203–4, 209, 222, 249, 295, 455 n. 44, 456 n. 45, 464 n. 14, 478 n. 25
- Fish (salted or dried) 270, 272–3, 275, 278, 280, 283, 285
- Fish glue 285
- Fitzhugh, William 118
- Flag boats 28–9
- Flemish, Flemings (*see also* Belgium, Belgian and Ostend) xiii, 17, 81, 83
- Flint stones 72
- Flint, James (including 'Flint Affair') 56, 216, 435 n. 2, 446 n. 28, 468 n. 29
- Flood 35–6, 222
- Fohien, Fewen, Fouyen, Foyen *see* Governor of Guangdong Province
- Fongzun Hang *see* Fengshun Hang
- Fort St. George 474 n. 5
- Fowshaw *see* Zhang Foutia
- France xviii
- Free-on-Board (FOB) 21, 25, 35–7, 89, 222, 231–3, 235–49, 251–2
- French East India Company (CFI), people, trade and officers *passim*
- French language, records, sources and archives xv–xvi, 34, 100, 134, 171–2, 174, 176, 185, 193, 203, 209, 228, 345–6, 354, 415–6, 434 n. 14, 442 n. 3, 460 n. 97, 469 n. 6, 481 n. 12
- Fruit (candied, dried, etc.) 72, 268, 282, 284
- Fuiqua *see* Ley Fuiqua
- Fujian junks 68, 181, 450 n. 2
- Fujian Province xvii, 35, 56–7, 65, 68, 75, 80, 104, 140–5, 147, 169–70, 173, 181, 323, 348, 352, 399, 415, 439 n. 2, 450 n. 2
- Fujianese language (Minnan Hua) 閩南話 323, 380–1, 413, 463 n. 2
- Fuqua xvi
- Furniture (for export) 9, 11, 68
- Galingale 154, Plate 07.03
- Gamboge 285
- Gan Jiang River 贛江河 14, 16, 159
- Gau Semqua (Qiu Kun) 邱崑 (坤) xv, 12, 20, 57–8, 60, 91, 115, 121, 123–8, 130–2, 135–6, 157, 163, 171, 178, 218, 230, 232, 236–7, 261, 297, 300–1, 307, 327–8, 331–6, 339–42, 345–7, 359–60, 366, 368, 375, 381, 417 (Samqua), 446 n. 29, 463 nn. 6 and 8, 464 n. 14, Plates 03.02–03, 03.10, 07.01–03, 07.05–06
- Gi-fong Hang *see* Yifeng Hang
- Giqua *see* Ye Consentia Giqua
- Godfrey, Mr. 106
- Gold 9, 18–9, 43, 60, 67, 86, 91, 98, 104–5, 139, 170, 184, 200–1, 215, 232–3, 437 n. 22–3, 440 n. 8, 456 n. 56, 460–1 n. 11, 474 n. 5, 482 n. 3, Plates 03.10, 05.05, 08.02
- Goldsmiths 11
- Gom lack 283, 286
- Gomi Gutti, Gomme Gutta, Gom Gutta, Gutte jon, Longu, etc. (tang won, Teng Huang) 藤黃 270, 276, 279, 283, 285
- Gongbanya 公班牙 (衙) 76–7
- Gonghang 公行 *see* Co-hong
- Gongs 159
- Gongsi 公司 (Chinese name for 'company') 76–7, 97, 369
- Gonqua *see* Shy Kinqua II
- Gordon, Robert 118
- Gothenburg 132, Plate 05.07
- Gou Tocqua (Yan Swetia's agent in Macao) 358



- Governor of Fujian Province (Fuyuan) 撫院 (Foyan) 141
- Governor of Guangdong Province (Fuyuan) 撫院 (Fohien, Foyen, Fouyen, Fewen) 7–8, 32, 82–3, 100, 112, 182, 201, 218, 461 n. 37, 477 n. 6
- Governor-general of Batavia 323
- Governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces (Zongdu) 總督 (Tsontuck, Tsing Touc, Tituck, Chuntuck, John Tuck or Viceroy) 3, 7–8, 10–2, 15, 26–7, 32–3, 57–9, 62–4, 71, 81, 85, 100, 104, 112–3, 128–9, 132, 136, 140, 182, 184, 194–5, 201, 214, 216, 218–9, 221, 223, 444 n. 16, 445 n. 21, 449 n. 55, 57–9, 457 n. 59, 468 n. 31, 475 n. 12, 477 n. 6, Plates 10.07, 11.17
- Grand Chop (Da Chuan Pai) 大船牌 (exit permit required of all ships) 99, 161–2, 175, Plate 08.04
- Granite slabs 72
- Gregorio *see* Chan, Gregorio
- Grill, Jean Abraham xix, 229, 308–9, 345, 375–6, 379, 381, 437 n. 19, 459 n. 90, Plate 11.10
- Grubb, Michael 162, 308–9, 375–6, 470–1 n. 22, Plate 13.03
- Guangchang (Quonschong) 廣昌 188
- Guangdong Province xvii, 35
- Guangshun Hang 廣順行 5, 55, 57, 80, 91, 93, 97–102, 126, 132, 158, 161, 192, 218, 254, 261, 293, 295–9, 302–3, 311, 416, 418, 453 n. 2, 458 n. 80, Plate 03.07
- Guangyuan Hang 廣源行 59, 93–4, 99, 131, 188, 190–3, 218, 262, 402–5, 417, 477–8 nn. 2 and 20, Plates 03.07, 11.05, 11.07–8, 11.13, 11.16
- Guilds 9, 11–2, 29, 34, 160, 479 n. 55, 480 n. 61 (Jinlun Huiguan), 482 n. 10
- Gurkhas 194
- Hahr, Hindrick, Jacob or Isaac (it is not always clear which one is being referred to) 131, 308–9, 375–6
- Hainan Island 海南島 67, 368
- Hamilton, Capt. 75
- Hanko 345
- Hanqua (Poankeequa's writer) 457 n. 66
- Hanqua *see* Cai Anqua or Tan Hanqua
- Haukoa 345
- Hauqua *see* Cai Anqua or Tan Hanqua
- Hawkesbill Quiqua 397
- Heli Hao 合利號 160, 364, 472 n. 64, Plates 09.07, 09.16
- Henan Island 河南 144, 150
- Hengli Hao 恒利號 208, 427, Plate 13.01
- Herbs *see* Medicine
- Hewer, Robert 81–2, 104, 182, 200, 454 n. 17
- Heyqua *see* Huiqua and 193, 344, 416–7
- Hides *see* Animal skins/hides
- Hiep *see* Ye 葉 and 402, 414
- Hifong Hang *see* Yifeng Hang
- Holland (including Netherlands) xvi, xxi, 105, 109, 111, 113, 127, 456 n. 56, 460 n. 3, 467–8 n. 22, Plates 06.01–4, 06.07–8
- Hong merchants *passim*
- Hong Soon Hong *see* Fengshun Hang and 139
- Hongsia *see* Yan Hongsia
- Honqua *see* Cai Hunqua, Robin Hunqua, Tan Hunqua, Tan Fat Hunqua or Ye Leunqua
- Hooy Tsjoy *see* Agar agar and 272, 276
- Hoppo (Hubu) 戶部 or (Jiandu) 監督 (also called the Quanpou) 3, 7, 8, 10–2, 24–7, 32–3, 37, 57–60, 64–5, 71, 84–7, 97–101, 104–6, 108–13, 128–9, 133–4, 136, 139–40, 144, 158, 161–2, 175–6, 178, 195, 214, 216, 219, 221, 223, 440 n. 8, 451 n. 7, 455 n. 33, 466 nn. 47 and 49, Plates 06.07–08, 07.07, 08.04
- Hoppo's books 25
- Hoppo's tolls 162, 440 n. 8, 451 n. 7
- Houde Hang (Houta Hang) 厚德行 154, 187–8, 262, 363–4, 402, 415, Plates 09.03, 09.05, 11.02, 11.05, 11.08
- Houqua, Howqua (Tan Chetqua's writer) 93
- Houqua, Howqua (unidentified) 457 n. 66, 479 n. 51
- Houqua, Howqua *see* Cai Anqua, Lin Howqua or Wu Houqua
- Hoyqua *see* Huiqua and 191, 193, 344, 415–7, 457 n. 66

- Hu Wenzhong 胡文中 Plate 11.20
- Hu Wongqua *see* Junk captain Xu Wangguan
- Huang Simon (Huang Ximan) 黃錫滿 20, 88, 115, 124, 149–50, 159, 165, 171, 185, 240, 244, 310, 344, 356–7, 369, 371–2, 456 n. 48, 469 n. 8, Plates 09.01–02, 10.03
- Huangpu 黃埔 *see* Whampoa
- Huiqua, Consentia Huiqua (partner and writer in Ye's Guangyuan Hang) 188, 190–3, 197, 344, 402, 404–5, 408, 412–3, 415–8, 457 n. 66, 478 n. 36
- Humen 虎門 *see* Bocca Tigris
- Hungarian 20, 174, 437–8 n. 25
- Hunqua *see* Cai Hunqua, Tan Hunqua, Tan Fat Hunqua, You Hunqua (Liang Emanuel Quiqua's partner) or Ye Leunqua
- Huyqua *see* Huiqua
- I-ch'eng Hang *see* Yicheng Hang and 406
- Ifon, Ifong, Iphong Hang *see* Yifeng Hang
- Imperial Commissioners *see* Xin Zhu and Zhao Chuan
- Imperial Court (Beijing) 3, 14, 33, 74, 82, 86, 105, 112, 155, 192, 194, 478–9 n. 39
- Imperial exams 126, 144
- Imperial ministers 3–4, 82, 92, 109, 183
- Incense (Joss sticks) 72
- India xviii, xxii, 2, 20–2, 27, 46, 49, 55, 75, 82–3, 117, 142, 182, 210, 213, 215, 217, 221, 346, 440–1 n. 8
- Indigo 268, 286
- Ingsia *see* Yan Ingsia
- Inland merchants *see* Chinese inland merchants
- Inland production *see* Chinese inland production
- Inqua (unidentified) 384, 475 n. 11
- Inqua *see* Ni Inqua
- Insurance (including marine/bottomry loans and insurance) 1, 44–7, 52, 73, 75, 96, 119, 125–6, 150–1, 153, 155, 162–3, 191, 220–1, 234, 242, 244, 308, 355, 376–9, 398, 412, 441 nn. 12 and 15, 442 nn. 18–9, 449 n. 55, 470 n. 13, 471 nn. 26–7, 473 nn. 84 and 87, Plates 05.08–09, 09.09
- Interest (Lixi) 利息 (with rates of 01–09 percent) 42, 44–5, 60–1, 81, 96, 100, 112, 126, 151, 153, 155, 157, 163, 177, 189, 199, 231, 242, 244, 308, 375–6, 448 n. 46, 471 n. 27, Plates 03.05, 09.10, 09.14
- Interest (Lixi) 利息 (with rates of 10–20 percent) 17, 42, 44–6, 93, 96–7, 99–100, 119, 130, 143, 151, 153, 155, 157–8, 192, 203, 220, 308, 341–2, 375–6, 417, 440 n. 6, 441 n. 15, 459 n. 95, 467 n. 20
- Interest (Lixi) 利息 (with rates of 21–30 percent) 44–5, 96, 151, 155, 221, 234, 242
- Interest (Lixi) 利息 (with rates of 31–50 percent) 45–6, 96, 119, 125, 151, 153, 155, 163, 191, 220–1, 308, 449 n. 55
- Interest (Lixi) 利息 (with rates unspecified) 1, 17–9, 25, 41–5, 52, 57, 60, 69, 81, 89, 96–7, 101–2, 109–10, 112, 118–9, 130–1, 133–4, 145, 153, 155–6, 163, 190, 192–3, 199, 203–4, 217, 220–2, 224, 229, 232, 261, 376–8, 440 n. 6, 441 n. 11, 471 n. 27, 476 n. 27, Plate 13.04
- Iqua *se* Wu Iqua
- Iqua (unidentified) 475 n. 11
- Irvine, Charles xvii, 50, 90, 140, 442 n. 3–4
- Italian(s) 17, 34
- Ivory (including elephants' tusks) 67–8, 220, 267, 270, 272–3, 276, 279–80, 283, 285, 287
- Jacqua (Ni Inqua's partner) 385–6
- Jamqua, Jemqua *see* Oemjamqua, Tan Yanqua or Ye Yanqua
- Japan, Japanese xxii 31, 185, 208, 221, 261
- Java, Javat 70, 165, 267–8
- Jeancri *see* Tan Tinqu (3)
- Jefong, Jifong Hang *see* Yifeng Hang
- Jews 17
- Jiangxi Province 江西省 196
- Jinlun Huiguan 錦綸會館 (silk guild) 34, 160, 479 n. 55, 480 n. 61, 482 n. 10, Plate 09.16
- Jiyi Hang (Chapgi) 集義行 125, 464 n. 14
- Johore 75, 415
- Jon Qveiqvoa (same as Young Quiqua) *see* Tan Chowqua

- Jongsha see Yan Hongsia and 162, 366
- Jörg, Christiaan 457 n. 59, 463–4 n. 8, 465 n. 40
- Joseph Lim (inland tea merchant) 12, 58, 160, Plate 07.01
- Joss (unidentified) 95
- Joss paper see spirit money and 72
- Joss see Ni Inqua and 170
- Joss sticks see incense and 72
- Juchang (Soychong) 聚昌 188
- Judda 46
- Jufeng Hang 聚豐行 117, 262, 346–7, 457 n. 60
- Junior Quiqua see Tan Chowqua
- Junk captain Ang Siequa 263
- Junk captain Ang Songnan 263
- Junk captain Cai Zouguan (Tsoa Tsoaqua) 蔡誠觀 97, Plate 04.01
- Junk captain Eaw Jak 264
- Junk captain Kin Joeko 263
- Junk captain Kung Tjoequa 264
- Junk captain Lie Thehoe 264
- Junk captain Lim Hoanko 264
- Junk captain Lim Honko 264
- Junk captain Lim Tsingo Plate 04.10
- Junk captain Nio Hapko 263
- Junk captain Ong Katko 264
- Junk captain Tan Hiequa 164, Plate 04.03
- Junk captain Tan Peeko 133–4, Plate 04.09
- Junk captain The Ingko 264
- Junk captain Tjoa Pinko 264
- Junk captain Tuong Koko 264
- Junk captain Wen Xionguan (Wang Honqua) 溫雄官 Plate 04.02
- Junk captain Xu Wangguan (Hu Wongqua) 許旺官 164, Plate 04.08
- Junk captain Yan Lipsia (Yan Lishe) 顏立舍 149, 163–6, 355–6, 369, 473 n. 94, Plates 04.04–07
- Junk *Eckhing* 119, 299, 367–8, 376–9
- Junk *Ecksun* (Yishun) 益順 119, 367–8, 377, 379
- Junk *Ectay* (Yitai Zhou) 益泰鷓 76–7, 126, 164–5, 367–8, 376–9, 452–3 n. 25, 470–1 n. 22, 474 n. 95, Plates 04.04–07
- Junk *Fathing* (Faxing) 發興 380
- Junk *Fongschyn* (Hongzun, Fengshun) 豐順 367–8, 377, 379, 413
- Junk *Fongzun* 412
- Junk *Hangzaychou* (Kengzaizhou) 坑仔鷓 119
- Junk *Hapsien* 134
- Junk *Hapsoen* 263
- Junk *Hingtai* (Hengtai) 恒泰 (managed by Wu Heguan in 1765) 163, 367–8, 377, 379
- Junk *Hipsching* (Xiesheng) 協盛 119
- Junk *Hongsin* see Fengjin Hang
- Junk *Hongzun* see Junk *Fongschyn* and 413
- Junk *Honka* (Huangzai) 黃仔 76–7, 97, 452–3 n. 25, Plate 04.01
- Junk *Hopo Siam* 95
- Junk *Inaangtjauw* 263
- Junk *Ken Wantijouw* 263
- Junk *Keying* 450 n. 2
- Junk *Kimfong* 367–8, 377–80
- Junk *Kingsan* 263
- Junk *Koe Kieaww* 264
- Junk *Kom Kaijtijon* 264
- Junk *Lockquan* (Lockcun, Lukun) 鹿坤 380–1
- Junk *Muntingchew* 119, 125
- Junk *Ojoe Poen Tijouw* 264
- Junk *Quimcontay* 367–8, 377–9
- Junk *Quionschyn* 191, 412, 415
- Junk *Samhonkien* 263
- Junk *Samjeck* (Sanyi) 三益 76, 367–8, 377–9, 413, Plates 04.11–12
- Junk *Samkonghing* (Sanguangxing) 三廣興 367–8, 376–9, 474 n. 95
- Junk *Santay* (Sintay, Xintai) 新泰 368, 379–81
- Junk *Sienthay* 264
- Junk *Sihing* (Sweehing, Ruixing Zhou) 瑞興鷓 70, 76, 163–4, 367–8, 376–7, 379, 473–4 nn. 89 and 94, Plates 04.02–03
- Junk *Sintay* see Junk *Santay*
- Junk *Soeij Hiena* 264
- Junk *Soenian* 264
- Junk *Songgia* see Junk *Songzay* and 413
- Junk *Songzay* (Songgia, Songzai) 宋仔 413
- Junk *Souhin* 264
- Junk *Sweehing* see Junk *Sihing*
- Junk *Taingsanschyn* 367–8, 376–7, 379
- Junk *Tao Soenie* 264
- Junk *Tayan* see Junk *Tayon* and 380–1

- Junk *Tayli* (Taili) 泰利 368, 378–81  
 Junk *Tayon* (Taian) 泰安 368, 378–81, 465–6 n. 46, 476 n. 25  
 Junk *Tayong* 70, 133–4, 176, Plates 04.09–10, 10.08  
 Junk *Tian Tjoen* 264  
 Junk *Tioengfat* (Zhangfa) 張發 380–1  
 Junk *Tongfat* see Junk *Tioengfat*  
 Junk trade and traders xiii, xiv, xvii, 5–6, 15–6, 21–2, 45–7, 49, 55, 59, 66–77, 91, 94–7, 102–4, 114, 117–21, 123, 125–6, 133–4, 139, 143, 145, 149–50, 152–4, 156–7, 159–60, 162–5, 167, 172–6, 181–2, 190–3, 201, 207, 210, 219–21, 223, 227–8, 254–5, 261, 263–90, 299, 308, 314, 341, 350, 361, 367–9, 376–81, 390, 396, 412–3, 415, 426, 441 nn. 16–7, 442 n. 19, 450 n. 2, 451 nn. 6–7, 10 and 14, 452 nn. 16–8, 23 and 25, 457 n. 65, 458 n. 75, 460–1 n. 11, 464 n. 14, 465–6 nn. 46–7, 467–8 n. 22, 470 nn. 21–2, 473 nn. 84, 87, 89 and 93–4, 474 nn. 95–6 and 98, 475 n. 16, 476 n. 25, 481 nn. 6 and 2  
 Junk *Wansay* 76, 452 n. 25  
 Junk *Wansun* same as *Winchon* (Yuanshun Zhou) 源順鵬 76, 164, 367–8, 377–9, 452 n. 25, Plate 04.08  
 Junk *Winghing* 467–8  
 Junks, Grounded 75, 134, 281  
 Junks, Sunken or lost 75, 163–4, 191, 377, 413, 415, 412  
 Juun Luun Hang see Yuanquan Hang and 387, 391–2
- Kampo-tsja see Cambodia  
 Kankouw see Cankauw  
 Kellet, Capt. 450 n. 2  
 Kemeys, Reginald 107  
 Kensiangua, Kingsiangqua (Poankeequa I's nephew) 65, 449 n. 57  
 Ketqua (Tan Chowqua's partner) 171, 387–8  
 Ketqua see Tan Chetqua  
 Kewshaw see Zhang Kousia  
 Kickbacks see Connivance fees  
 Kilns 51  
 Kin Joeko see Junk captain and 263  
 Kinqua/Kingqua see Shy Kinqua  
 Koonqua (Tan Hunqua's nephew) 104, 316  
 Koonqua (Yan Ingsia's writer) 156  
 Kooqua see Tan Coqua and 416  
 Kouwkan see Palembang  
 Kuangyuan Hang see Guangyuan Hang  
 Kulja see Yili  
 Kung Tjoequa see Junk captain and 264
- Labin Quiqua, Labin Quayqua see Robin Quiqua and 88, 209  
 Lacquerware and shops 11, 68, 188, 211  
 Langhu Village 朗湖村 196  
 Larantuka 460 n. 2  
 Laws (see also Court of law) 14, 31–2, 47, 58, 217, 437 n. 20, 439 n. 1  
 Laws, Sumptuary 14  
 Lay Khi Qua see Ley Beaukeequa or Ley Keyqua and 139  
 Layover (including abbreviation LO) 2, 42, 52–3, 76, 82, 91, 214, 367–8, 377–81, 413, 443 n. 8, 444 n. 9  
 Le Hongqua see Ye Leunqua and 414  
 Lead 37–40, 65, 67–8, 82, 117, 128, 166, 184, 216, 223, 231, 233, 238–41, 268, 270, 285, 287  
 Leanqua, Linqa, Leunqua, Leonqua (Anqua's partner in 1710s and 1720s) 20, 75, 414–5, 452 n. 18  
 Leunqua, Leunqua see Ye Leunqua or Chinese painter Leonqua  
 Leslie, Abraham 101, 158, 460 n. 98  
 Lethieullier, Mr. 139  
 Ley Beaukeequa (Li Kaiguan) 黎開觀, (Li Guanghua) 黎光華 5, 20, 29, 53–5, 57, 61, 91, 95, 105–8, 125–6, 136–47, 149–53, 171, 173, 178, 183, 200, 216, 237–9, 262, 292, 295, 348, 352–4, 356, 358–9, 366, 372, 397, 435 n. 2, 444 n. 16, 445 n. 21, 456 n. 48, 466 nn. 1, 3–4 and 9, 467 nn. 16–7 and 19, 468 nn. 26, 29, 31 and 34, 469 n. 35, 475 n. 12, 478 n. 18, Plates 03.02, 08.01–09, 08.11, 12.01  
 Ley Fuiqua (Li Jie) 黎捷 137, 144, 348, 351–2, 468 n. 34  
 Ley Hunqua see Ye Leunqua and 343  
 Ley Keyqua (Li Qiguan) 黎啟觀 (Ley Beaukeequa's brother) 137, 142, 144, 239, 348, 351–3, 466 n. 9, 468 n. 34

- Ley Zhaokui (Li Zhaokui) 黎兆魁 (Ley Beaukeequa's son) 137, 144, 348, 352  
 Ley Zhaopeng (Li Zhaopeng) 黎兆朋 (Ley Beaukeequa's son) 137, 144, 348, 352  
 Li Chetai 李 177  
 Li Guanghua 黎光華 *see* Ley Beaukeequa  
 Li Kaiguan 黎開官 *see* Ley Beaukeequa  
 Li Qiguan 黎啟觀 *see* Ley Keyqua  
 Li Qingxin 李慶新 xxi, 478 n. 21  
 Li Shiyao (Governor-general) 李侍堯總督 132, 445 n. 21  
 Li Tana 李塔娜 xvii, 71  
 Li Xianggong 李相公 *see* Lisjoncon  
 Liang Attay (Liang Diguan) 梁帝官, (Baodiguan) 保帝官 5, 54, 57, 88–9, 207, 209–11, 216, 262, 427–8, 431, 482 n. 11, Plates 13.03–04  
 Liang Diguan 梁帝官 *see* Liang Attay  
 Liang Diyao 梁帝堯 482 n. 10  
 Liang Emanuel Quiqua (Liang Yongli) 梁永利 5, 88, 186, 207–11, 252, 327, 354, 397, 401, 427, 430, 432, 482 n. 8–9, Plate 13.01–02  
 Liang Guang 梁琬 (Comprador) 481 n. 2  
 Liang Guofu 梁國富 (Comprador) 481 n. 2  
 Liang Jie 梁傑 (linguist) 481 n. 2  
 Liang Wenling 梁文苓 (junk trader) 481 n. 2  
 Liang Yaxin 梁亞信 481 n. 2  
 Liang Yazhang 梁亞章 (Comprador) *see* Atchon  
 Liang Yongli 梁永利 *see* Liang Emanuel Quiqua  
 Lie Thehoe *see* Junk captain and 264  
 Liell, Mr. 139  
 Lim Hoanko *see* Junk captain and 264  
 Lim Honko *see* Junk captain and 264  
 Lim Tsingo *see* Junk captain  
 Lime 279, 285  
 Limpo *see* Ningbo  
 Limsia *see* Yan Limsia  
 Lin Howqua (Lin Shimao) 林時懋 177, 457 n. 66, 479 n. 51  
 Lindahl, Olof 132, 134  
 Linen 160, 165, 178, 284, Plate 04.04, 04.06, 07.02  
 Linguists (tongshi) 通事 xvii, 3, 8, 25, 32, 37, 141, 161, 184, 207, 224, 284, 468 n. 31, 475 n. 12, 481 n. 2, Plate 08.04  
 Lipsia *see* Junk captain Yan Lipsia  
 Lipsia *see* Yan Lipsia  
 Liquorices 165  
 Lisbon 87  
 Lisjoncon (Li Xianggong) 李相公 15, 164, 173, 175, 366–7, Plate 10.05  
 Liu, Yong xiv, 416  
 Loans *see* Insurance and Interest  
 Lochop (Weaver) 175  
 Lock quan (place in Philippines) 274–7, 290  
 Locqua *see* Tan Locqua  
 London xviii, 105, 111, 139, 449 n. 55  
 Long Hing Hong (name of English factory in 1755) 293, 296, 310  
 Longquiqua 348, 351  
 Longu *see* Gomi Gutti and 276  
 Looting *see* Theft  
 Lou chon (place near Manila) 277, 290  
 Lu Guanheng 盧觀恒 *see* Lu Mowqua  
 Lu Mowqua (Lu Guanheng) 盧觀恒 196  
 Lu Yade 呂亞德 (Comprador) *see* Atack  
 Lu 盧 324  
 Lun Ju Ren Ji 綸聚仁記 480 n. 61  
 Lunju Hao 綸聚號 195  
 Lunqua (Tan Conqua (1)'s partner) 320  
 Lunshaw *see* Yan Limsia  
 Lyqua 349  
 M. Quiqua or Man. Quiqua *see* Liang Emanuel Quiqua or Tan Mandarin Quiqua  
 Ma Guohu 馬國胡 (Yan Hongxia's associate) 163, 346–7, 366–7, 383  
 Ma Tiguan 馬雜官 (Liang Attay's associate) 210, 428, 430, Plate 13.03  
 Macao Anqua, Hauqua *see* Cai Anqua and 330, 335, 345, 457 n. 66  
 Macao Cinqua *see* Cai Cinqua and 335  
 Macao Fuqua xvi  
 Macao Giqua *see* Ye Consentia Giqua and 415  
 Macao Samqua *see* Gau Semqua and 328  
 Macao Taiqua, Tayqua *see* Cai Taiqua  
 Macao xiv, xvi–vii, xxi–ii, 4, 9, 12, 20–1, 28–9, 35, 42, 44–6, 65, 69–70, 74–5, 82, 88, 90–1, 95, 98, 100, 103–4, 107, 110, 125, 128, 134, 142, 151, 158, 173, 175, 190, 192, 200, 207, 211, 213, 220, 223, 228, 261, 312, 314, 317, 327–8, 330,

- 335–6, 345–7, 358–9, 397, 415, 426,  
433 n. 3, 434 n. 10, 435 n. 2, 438 n.  
26, 439 n. 1–2, 440 n. 6, 443 n. 8, 446  
n. 28, 450 nn. 4–5, 451 nn. 5–6, 452 n.  
23, 454 n. 25, 459 n. 95, 460 nn. 2 and  
6, 464 n. 11, 467 n. 22, 468 n. 31, 475 n.  
12, 476 n. 23
- Macassar, Macasser, Manka-sa (near Batavia)  
69, 267–8, 278–9, 282–4, 290, 460 n. 2
- Madras 46, 139, 440–1 n. 8
- Mafed 276, 285
- Ma-foe (soap-cooker) 283, 285
- Mafu (for women's hair) 270, 281, 285
- Magistrate of Guangzhou Prefecture  
(Quanchifeu, Quonchefeu) 82
- Magistrate of Macao 澳門同知 346
- Magistrate of Nanhai County 南海縣  
(Namhay) 7–8
- Malacca, Malacka 68, 269–71, 290, 450 n. 4,  
460 n. 2
- Malay, Malaysia 71–2, 368, 434 n. 16
- Mandarin language xv, 9, 456 n. 53, 463 n.  
2
- Mandarin Quiqua *see* Tan Mandarin Quiqua
- Mandarin Suqua *see* Tan Suqua
- Mandarins (Guanyuan) 官員 (generic term  
for government officials) 3, 13, 32, 61–6,  
80, 87, 101, 115, 124, 131, 134, 139–41,  
182–3, 185, 195, 203, 335, 399, 414,  
436–7 n. 16, 449 n. 56, 458 n. 70, Plate  
06.09
- Manderine Ciqua 95
- Manila (place-name) 21, 45–6, 69–70, 74–5,  
142, 187, 220, 223, 273–4, 277, 279–81,  
290, 327, 367, 397, 451 n. 12, 467 n.  
22, 474 n. 2
- Manila (Ye Consentia Giqua's partner) 402,  
415
- Mantack Hang *see* Wende Hang
- Manuel Quiqua (rhubarb dealer) 432
- Manuel Quiqua *see* Liang Emanuel Quiqua  
and 397
- Maosheng Gongs 茂勝公司 76, 369
- Maoxing Hang 茂興行 80, 91, 297–8
- Martin, R. Montgomery 29, 438 n. 36
- Mats (all types) 67, 271–2, 274, 281
- Maule, James 459 n. 90
- McClary, Capt. 175
- Mechanical gadgets 208
- Medicine (herbs) 58, 165, 208–9, 270, 279,  
283, 285, 287
- Mekong 69, 71, 290
- Michel, Mr. 470 n. 22
- Milburn, William 284, 286, 288–9
- Milius, Pierre Bernard 195, 479–80 n. 55
- Milphat tri *see* cotton
- Ministers *see* Imperial Court ministers
- Minnan Hua 閩南話 *see* Fujianese language
- Minqua *see* Tan Minqua
- Mirrors 111, 155, 208, 482 n. 3
- Moka 46
- Monopolies, Monopolizing, Monopolistic  
1–4, 24–5, 49, 56, 58, 60, 84–5, 108–11,  
118, 216–7, 220–1, 447 n. 30, Plate  
06.08
- Monqua, Munqua *see* Cai Monqua and 389
- Monsoon 70, 72, 88
- Morse, Hosea Ballou xviii, 311–2, 325, 442 n.  
4, 465 n. 41, 474 n. 2
- Mossel, Jacob (Governor-general of Batavia)  
263, 323
- Mother of pearl (*see also* Pearls) 67, 268,  
270, 274, 276, 281, 285, 287
- Mowqua *see* Lu Mowqua
- Musk 165, Plate 04.02–03, 4.06, 04.10
- Muslims xiii, 17, 20, 80, 83, 145, 210
- Myrrh 267, 285
- Nachoda *see* Junk captain (Chuanzhu 船主  
in Chinese) and 263–4
- Naish, James 84–5, 104, 454 n. 26
- Namhay, Namhoyen *see* Magistrate of  
Nanhai County
- Napoleonic Wars 28
- Netherlands *see* Holland
- New Guinea Straits 70
- Neyschong *see* Yichang
- Ngan Hongsia *see* Yan Hongsia and 5
- Ngan *see* Yan 顏
- Ni Banguan 倪榜官 *see* Ni Ponqua
- Ni Bingfa 倪秉發 *see* Ni Ponqua
- Ni Hongwen 倪宏文 *see* Ni Wayqua
- Ni Inqua (Ni Yongguan) 倪永官 (Tan  
Mandarin Quiqua's partner) 169–72,  
251, 297, 383–8, 476 n. 29, Plates  
10.03–04, 12.03
- Ni Pengguan 倪鵬官 *see* Ni Pinqua

- Ni Pinqua (Ni Pengguan) 倪鵬官 160, 242, 364, Plates 09.07, 09.16
- Ni Ponqua (Ni Bangguan) 倪榜官, (Ni Bingfa) 倪秉發 160, 177–8, 392, 472 n. 63, 476 n. 29
- Ni Wayqua (Ni Hongwen) 倪宏文 132, 160, 192, 218, 415–6, 473 n. 77
- Ni Yongguan 倪永官 *see* Ni Inqua
- Ningbo (Limpo) 277, 457 n. 59
- Nio Hapko *see* Junk captain and 263
- Norwegians xvi, 17
- Nutmeg (*see also* spices) 189, 223, 233, 239, 264, 268, 283, 287, Plates 05.03, 08.09, 08.11
- Oemjamqua 385–6
- Old Quiqua *see* Tan Mandarin Quiqua Pan Qiguan 潘啟官 *see* Poankeequa I
- Olibanum 267, 281, 284
- Ong Katko *see* Junk captain and 264
- Ong Thequa *see* Ong Tsanqua
- Ong Tsanqua (Tan Hunqua and Gau Semqua's silent partner) 125–6, 131, 163, 328, 330–1, 333, 366–7
- Opium War, First 214
- Opium xix, 10, 18–9, 60, 72–3, 98, 214–5, 346, 437 n. 23
- Oqua *see* Cai Fuguan
- Oranges 396
- Ostend Company records 209
- Ostend General India Company (GIC), people, trade and officers *passim*
- Outside merchants (Hangwai Shangren) 行外人 5, 9–13, 16, 24, 54, 67, 69, 154, 186, 216, 435 n. 7
- Paint (commodity) 68
- Painter *see* Chinese painter
- Paintings (object) 76, 176–7, 476 n. 28
- Palanquins and sedan chairs 157, 159, 184
- Palawan 70
- Palembang (Caucan, Caukan, Kouwkan, Caucong) 69, 96, 267–71, 273–4, 277, 280–1, 290, 367, 376, 381
- Pan Wenyan 潘文巖 *see* Poankeequa I
- Pan Youdu 潘有度 *see* Poankeequa II
- Pan Zhencheng 潘振承 *see* Poankeequa I
- Parks, Capt. 158
- Parsees xiii, 17, 20, 145
- Passack, Passiack (place between Cochinchina and Cambodia) 69, 125, 163, 191, 271–81, 284, 290, 367–8, 377–9, 381, 398, 412–3
- Pawnshop 141
- Peabody Essex Museum 197
- Peanuts 270, 282, 285
- Pearls (*see also* Mother of pearl) 21, 158, 160, 208, 364, 472 n. 55
- Peking city *see* Beijing and 399
- Peking gold 139, Plate 08.02
- Pepper (*see also* spices) 60, 70, 82, 118, 125, 134, 208, 210, 231, 241, 264, 267, 270, 272, 273, 275, 278, 280, 282, 284, 437 n. 22, Plate 03.04
- Pepper sacks 37, 164–5, 473–4 n. 94, Plates 04.03, 04.05–06, 04.08, 04.10
- Perfume 283, 285
- Persian 46
- Pewter 366
- Philippines 35, 67–70, 74
- Phyllis *see* Gau Semqua and 328, 332
- Pidgin English *see* English, Pidgin
- Pilot (yinshuiren) 引水人 xvii, 207, 224
- Pinky *see* Zhang Pinky
- Pinqua *see* Ni Pinqua, Yang Pinqua or Zhang Pinky
- Pirates 47, 221, 368
- Plaché, Costantin 103, 460 n. 2
- Plant, Mr. 112, 139
- Plumbs 396
- Poankeequa I (Pan Qiguan) 潘啟官, (Pan Zhencheng) 潘振承, (Pan Wenyan) 潘文巖 20, 29, 54–66, 92, 97, 119, 129, 135, 137, 142, 145–6, 163, 178, 203, 216–9, 225, 231, 255, 261, 299, 314, 326, 361, 366–7, 387, 389, 397, 438 n. 36, 440–1 n. 8, 444 n. 16, 445 nn. 26–7, 446 n. 27 and 29, 447 n. 35, 448 nn. 40, 43 and 48, 449 n. 56 and 57, 451 n. 12, 457 nn. 65–6, 469 n. 36, Plate 03.07
- Poankeequa I's nephew *see* Kensiangua
- Poankeequa II (Pan Youdu) 潘有度 193–4, 196, 225, 406
- Poloma *see* Thread and 276
- Pondicherry 454 n. 17
- Ponqua *see* Ni Ponqua
- Poor Robin Hunqua 326

- Poqua *see* Tan Poqua (1–2)
- Porcelain (chinaware) xiv, 1, 8, 11–5, 37, 40, 51, 68–9, 79, 84, 86–7, 91, 97, 123–4, 142, 154, 165, 171–5, 182, 184, 186–8, 190, 197, 199–205, 207–11, 213, 219–20, 222, 225, 255, 307, 326, 340, 396, 416, 426, 450 n. 4, 458 n. 80, 475 n. 11, Plates 04.01–04, 04.06–08, 10.01, 10.05, 11.07, 11.10, 12.05
- Portugal 35
- Portuguese language, records, sources and archives xiv, xvi, 6, 34–5, 112, 187, 228, 346, 456 n. 55, 460 n. 2, 468 n. 31, 475 n. 12
- Portuguese xiii, 6, 17, 28, 35, 42, 44, 55, 70, 80, 83, 87–8, 90, 97–8, 103–4, 109, 125, 142, 151, 175, 207, 254–5, 314, 346, 426, 440 n. 6, 459 n. 95, 460 n. 2, 476 n. 23, 481–2 n. 2
- Poyang Lake 鄱阳湖 14, 16
- Pratt, Mr. 112, 139
- Pribel, Mr. 107
- Pritchard, Earl H. 29, 313–4, 416, 418, 456 n. 47
- Private records 34, 345
- Private traders, trade and transactions 1, 4, 6, 12, 17–28, 32, 48, 55, 61, 70, 75, 85, 95, 100–1, 110, 113–4, 117–8, 120, 125, 131, 134, 145, 158, 164, 174–6, 182, 190, 201, 203, 210, 221–2, 345, 437 n. 19, 438 n. 31, 448 n. 46, 460 n. 2, 461 n. 27, 467–8 n. 22, 472 n. 69
- Promissary note Plate 10.06
- Prussia and Prussian(s) xiii, 20, 53, 144, 190, 443 n. 8, 444 n. 9, Plate 10.08
- Puqua (Tan Conqua (1) and Yan Limsia's guarantor) 320, 365
- Putchuck (Mu Xiang) 木香 276, 281, 285
- Qianlong Emperor (r. 1736–1795) *see* Emperor
- Qiu Kun 邱崑 (坤) *see* Gau Semqua
- Qouycong Hang 474 n. 2
- Quanchifeu *see* Magistrate of Guangzhou Prefecture
- Quanchifeu, Quonchefeuf *see* Magistrate of Guangzhou Prefecture and 82, 129
- Quanpou *see* Hoppo and 134, 176
- Quanzhou 泉州 (Chincheu) 137–8, 140–1, 150, 183, 193, 349, 415, 474 n. 2
- Quinqua *see* Shy Kinqua and 156
- Quiqua, Quyuqua *see* Beaukeequa, Chowqua, Liang Emanuel Quiqua, Hawkesbill Quiqua, Poankeequa I, Robin/Labin Quiqua, Tan Mandarin Quiqua, Tan Quiqua (1–2) or Ye Cudgin
- Quisa *see* Ye Cudgin and 141
- Quongschyn Hang *see* Guangshun Hang
- Quonschong *see* Guangchang
- Radix china 154, 165, 191, 208 Plate 04.04, 04.06, 07.03
- Rattan (all varieties) 68, 72, 219, 219, 266–7, 269, 271–5, 278, 280–2, 287
- Rattan mats 272, 274, 281
- Rattan, Binding (strips, used to for dunnage, binding and making mats) 68, 219, 266–7, 269, 271, 273, 275, 282
- Reimbursements (for fees, duties and miss-packed goods) 9, 26, 40, 42, 99, 115, 126–7, 133, 466 n. 53
- Renhe Hang 仁和行 80, 91, 297–8, 453 n. 6
- Retire, retirement (from trade) 65–6, 123, 131, 140, 144, 147, 150, 182–3, 195–7, 218–9, 225, 414
- Rhubarb (Da Huang) 大黃 9, 12, 58, 154, 161, 165, 199, 210, 396, 417, 432, Plate 04.04, 04.06, 04.10, 07.03
- Rice 67, 71–2, 90, 265, 272, 274, 280, 285, 451 n. 12
- Rice tax 266
- Rije, Hendrik 210
- Robbery *see* Theft
- Robin Conqua 326
- Robin Hunqua 326
- Robin Quiqua (same as Labin Quiqua) 88, 209, 297
- Robin/Robben (same as Labin) 326
- Rubies 208
- Ruixing Gongsi 瑞興公司 76
- Rupees 440–1 n. 8
- Russia, Russians 31, 221
- Sago 67–8, 209–10, 219, 246, 276, 279, 284, 287, 450 n. 4
- Sai Chiong *see* Cai Anqua



- Sailors, Chinese 67, 75  
 Sailors, Dutch 97  
 Sailors, Norwegian xvi  
 Salt 15, 67, 202, 426  
 Salt junks 67  
 Salt merchants 202, 426  
 Samqua (unidentified) 128  
 Samqua, Semqua *see* Gau Semqua and 345  
 Sandalwood *see* Wood, Sandal-  
 Sappanwood *see* Wood, Sappan-  
 Say *see* Cai and 344  
 Sea cucumber *see* Trepang  
 Sea gros, zee gros 267–8, 285  
 Security merchant (Bao Shang) 保商 (same  
 as fiador) 7, 9, 22–4, 32, 37, 82, 99, 108,  
 126, 175, 194, 223, 255, 311, 346, 350,  
 354  
 Seenshaw (Yan Limsia's partner) 161, 365  
 Senior Quiqua *see* Tan Mandarin Quiqua  
 Sequa, Seequa (Tan Conqua (1) and Yan  
 Limsia's guarantor) 320, 365  
 Sequa, Seequa *see* Tan Sequa or Cai Sequa  
 Sequan 457 n. 59  
 Seunqua, Se Unqua, Si Unqua *see* Cai  
 Anqua or Cai Tsjonqua and 331, 344  
 Seven Years' War 54, 75  
 Sey Hunqua *see* Cai Hunqua and 345  
 Seyqua (Robin's partner) 326  
 Sharks' fins 72, 220, 267, 285  
 Sharks' skins 268  
 Shi Mengjing 石夢鯨 *see* Shy Kinqua I and  
 156  
 Shi Zhonghe 石中和 *see* Shy Kinqua II and  
 387  
 Ship *Abbekerk* (VOC) 258  
 Ship *Admiraal de Suffren* (VOC) 259  
 Ship *African* (VOC) 259  
 Ship *Alblasserdam* (VOC) 260  
 Ship *Anson* (EIC) 311  
 Ship *Apollo* (GIC) 200, 393, 423  
 Ship *Arent* (GIC) 309, 352, 393–4, 407, 423  
 Ship *Barbesteyn* (VOC) 259  
 Ship *Beemster Welvaren* (VOC) 257  
 Ship *Berckhout* (VOC) 135, 259  
 Ship *Beverwijk* (VOC) 259  
 Ship *Blitterswijk* (VOC) 259–60  
 Ship *Block* (VOC) 257–8  
 Ship *Bodt* (VOC) 257  
 Ship *Bredenrode* (VOC) 259  
 Ship *Breslaw* (VOC, under Prussian colours)  
 258, Plate 10.08  
 Ship *Buitenleeven* (VOC) 258  
 Ship *Calmar* (SOIC) 53  
 Ship *Canaan* (VOC) 258  
 Ship *Canton* (VOC) 259  
 Ship *Ceres* (EIC) 99, 311  
 Ship *Ceres* (VOC) 257–8  
 Ship *Christiansborg Slott* (DAC) 151, 304,  
 321, 338, 353, 369, 395, 409, 411,  
 430–1  
 Ship *Christoffel Columbus* (VOC) 260  
 Ship *Concordia* (GIC) 309, 321, 352, 393–4,  
 423–4  
 Ship *Coxhorn* (VOC) 256, 306, 321, 352,  
 393, 407–8, 424, 430  
 Ship *Cron Printzen* (DAC) 176, 304, 353,  
 370, 396, 409–11, 431  
 Ship *Cron Printzen af Danmarck* (DAC)  
 96, 155, 304–5, 321, 339, 353, 370–1,  
 395, 409–11, 431, Plates 05.09, 09.09,  
 10.09–10  
 Ship *Damsigt* (VOC) 256  
 Ship *Dannemark* (DAC) 396, 410  
 Ship *Delft* (VOC) 260  
 Ship *Disco* (DAC) 396, 410  
 Ship *Dolphin* (EIC) 442–3 n. 4  
 Ship *Dolphyn* (VOC) 258  
 Ship *Draak* (VOC) 259  
 Ship *Dronning af Danmarck* (DAC) 304,  
 321, 353, 369, 409, 411, 431, Plates  
 06.12–13, 11.09  
 Ship *Dronning Juliana Maria* (DAC) 304–5,  
 338–9, 353, 370–1, 396, 409–11, 425,  
 Plates 11.05, 11.08  
 Ship *Dronning Sophia Magdalena* (DAC)  
 96, 155, 244, 304–5, 339, 353, 370–1,  
 395–6, 409–10, Plate 09.14  
 Ship *Druifje* (VOC) 256, 306, 352, 393,  
 407–8, 424, 430, Plate 11.01–02  
 Ship *Earl of Ashburnham* (EIC) 129  
 Ship *Elisabeth* (GIC) 309, 393–4, 407, 423  
 Ship *Enigheten* (SOIC) 53  
 Ship *Europa* (VOC) 257  
 Ship *Fredensborg Slott* (DAC) 305, 339, 371,  
 395–6, 410–1, 425

- Ship *Fyen* (DAC) 151, 304, 321, 338, 353, 369, 409, 411, 430–1
- Ship *Ganges* (VOC) 258
- Ship *Geldermalsen* (VOC) 456 n. 56
- Ship *Generaal Maatsuiker* (VOC) 259
- Ship *Glatton* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Goede Trouw* (VOC) 259
- Ship *Gotenborg* (SOIC) 185, Plate 11.04
- Ship *Götha Leyon* (SOIC) 53
- Ship *Gouverneur Generaal de Klerk* (VOC) 259
- Ship *Graeve Mottkes* (DAC) 305, 338, 370, 409, 411
- Ship *Griffin* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Grosvenor* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Harrison* (EIC) 141
- Ship *Herstelder* (VOC) 257
- Ship *Hertog van Lorreyman* (GIC) 309, 352, 393, 423, 430
- Ship *Holland* (VOC) 257
- Ship *Honcoop* (VOC) 258
- Ship *Hoog Carspel* (VOC) 258
- Ship *Hoppet* (SOIC) 53, 93, 210, 308, 431, 443 n. 8
- Ship *Horsendon* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Horssen* (VOC) 259
- Ship *Houghton* (EIC) 141
- Ship *Indian* (VOC) 257
- Ship *Java* (VOC) 258
- Ship *Jonge Hellingman* (VOC) 257
- Ship *Jonge Hugo* (VOC) 257
- Ship *Kiøbenhavn* (DAC) 304, 321, 369, 409, 430–1
- Ship *Knappenhoff* (VOC) 256, 306, 352, 393, 430, Plate 08.05–06, 13.01
- Ship *Kongen af Danmark* (DAC) 150, 153, 231, 304–5, 321, 338–9, 369–71, 393, 395–6, 409–11, 424–5, 430–1, Plates 03.07, 08.08, 09.01–02, 09.15, 11.13
- Ship *Kroonenburg* (VOC) 256
- Ship *Leeuw* (GIC) 309, 352, 393, 407, 423
- Ship *Leijduin* (VOC) 256, 306, 352, 393, 407–8, 411, 424, 430
- Ship *Leyden* (VOC) 259
- Ship *Lord Anson* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Maria Cornelia* (VOC) 260
- Ship *Marquis de Prié* (GIC) 309, 321, 352, 393–4, 407, 423–4
- Ship *Mars* (DAC) 396, 410–1
- Ship *Meerwijk* (VOC) 260
- Ship *Middelburg* (VOC) 258
- Ship *Morgenster* (VOC) 257
- Ship *Nagelboom* (VOC) 260
- Ship *Neerlands Welvaren* (VOC) 259
- Ship *Nieuw Walheren* (VOC) 451 n. 6–7
- Ship *Norfolk* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Northumberland* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Oost Capelle* (VOC) 257
- Ship *Oosterbeek* (VOC) 256, Plate 07.04
- Ship *Oosthuizen* (VOC) 260
- Ship *Osterley* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Oude Amstel* (VOC) 256, Plate 09.08
- Ship *Overduin* (VOC) 258
- Ship *Pacific* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Paerl* (VOC) 258
- Ship *Pollux* (VOC) 259
- Ship *Pondichéry* (CFI) 454 n. 17
- Ship *Potsdam* (VOC, under Prussian colours) 258, Plate 10.08
- Ship *Prime* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Prince of Wales* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Princes Lowise* (DAC) 304–5, 321, 353, 370–1, 409–11, 425, 431
- Ship *Princes van Oranje* (VOC) 257
- Ship *Princesse Charlotte Amalia* (DAC) 396, 410–1
- Ship *Prins Carl* (SOIC) 53, 96
- Ship *Prins Friderich* (DAC) 417, Plate 09.11
- Ship *Prins Friderich af Danmark* (DAC) 96, 305, 338–9, 370–1, 395–6, 410, 425, Plate 05.08
- Ship *Printzen af Danmarck* (DAC) 242
- Ship *Renswoude* (VOC) 445 n. 23
- Ship *Riksens Ständer* (SOIC) 53
- Ship *Rochford* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Roosenburgh* (VOC) 260
- Ship *Royal Duke* (EIC) 311
- Ship *Schagen* (VOC) 260
- Ship *Schelde* (VOC) 260
- Ship *Sleswig* (DAC) 304, 321, 338, 369, 393, 409, 411, 424, 430–1
- Ship *Slooten* (VOC) 256
- Ship *Sophia Albertina* (SOIC) 96, 234, Plate 05.07
- Ship *St. Catharina* (Portuguese) 125
- Ship *Stockholms Slott* (SOIC) 53

- Ship *Tiger* (GIC) 309, 352, 393, 407, 423  
 Ship *Triton* (VOC) 258  
 Ship *Velzen* (VOC) 256, Plate 05.06  
 Ship *Voorberg* (VOC) 257–8  
 Ship *Voorduin* (VOC) 256, 352, 393, 408, 411, 430  
 Ship *Voorschoten* (VOC) 259  
 Ship *Vredenburg* (VOC) 259  
 Ship *Vreedenhoff* (VOC) 258  
 Ship *Vryheid* (VOC) 158, 257  
 Ship *Walpole* (EIC) 442–3 n. 4  
 Ship *Weldhoen* (VOC) 257  
 Ship *Willem de Vijfde* (VOC) 257  
 Ship *Winchelsia* (EIC) 311  
 Ship *Worcester* (EIC) 311  
 Ship *York* (private) 175  
 Ship *Ypenroode* (VOC) 256, 306, 352, 393, 430, Plate 08.05–06, 13.01  
 Ship *Zeeland* (VOC) 260  
 Ship *Zeepaard* (VOC) 258  
 Ship *Zeeploeg* (VOC) 258  
 Ship *Zeeuw* (VOC) 258  
 Ship *Zoutman* (VOC) 259  
 Ship *Zuiderburg* (VOC) 260  
 Ships, American 289, 441 n. 15, 479–80 n. 55  
 Ships, Danish (DAC) xvi, 24, 41–3, 50, 53, 84, 92, 96, 115, 124, 150–3, 155–7, 171, 176, 185, 189, 201, 209, 228, 231–2, 234–7, 241–5, 247–8, 251–2, 254–5, 289, 304–5, 321, 338–9, 353, 369–72, 393, 395–6, 409–11, 417, 424–5, 430–1, 438 n. 32, 442 n. 4, 443 n. 8, 449 n. 55, 450 n. 4, 454 n. 24, 456 n. 56  
 Ships, Dutch (VOC) 24, 53, 69–70, 74, 84, 104, 108, 111, 115, 133–4, 136, 152, 158, 161–2, 170, 176, 200, 203, 223, 228–9, 231–2, 239–40, 246, 253–61, 289, 306–7, 321, 339–41, 352–3, 373–5, 393–5, 407–8, 411, 424–5, 430, 442 n. 4, 444 n. 9, 445 n. 23, 449 n. 55, 451 n. 6–7, 454 n. 24, 456 n. 56  
 Ships, English (EIC) 6, 24, 26, 28, 50, 52–3, 92, 99, 104, 106, 109, 112, 115, 124, 129, 134, 140–2, 152, 156, 171, 174, 177, 195, 254–5, 289, 311, 442–3 n. 3–4, 444 n. 9, 449 n. 55, 454 n. 24, 466 n. 47  
 Ships, Flemish (GIC) 20, 83–4, 138, 169, 182, 199–200, 228–9, 309, 321, 352, 393–4, 407, 423–4, 430, 474 n. 8  
 Ships, French (CFI) 20, 53, 82–3, 115, 138, 254–5, 289, 442 n. 4, 449 n. 55, 454 n. 17  
 Ships, Grounded 75, 82–3  
 Ships, Hungarian 174  
 Ships, Leaking 26, 82  
 Ships, Portuguese (Macao) 45–6, 69–70, 75, 125, 143, 165, 175, 228, 426, 433 n. 3, 434 n. 10, 450–1 n. 5, 451 n. 6, 476 n. 23  
 Ships, Private (non-company) 1, 15, 27–8, 39, 46, 82, 138, 142, 175, 182, 254–5, 460 n. 2, 476 n. 23  
 Ships, Prussian 53, 144, 443 n. 8, 444 n. 9, Plate 10.08  
 Ships, Spanish (Manila) 467 n. 22  
 Ships, Storm damaged 82, 454 n. 17  
 Ships, Sunken or lost 75, 456 n. 56  
 Ships, Swedish (SOIC) 50, 53–5, 84, 92, 96, 138, 140, 185, 210, 234, 254–5, 289, 308, 431, 442 n. 3, 443 n. 8, 454 n. 24, 460 n. 6  
 Shrimp (dried) 268, 275, 280, 285  
 Shy Kinqua I (Shi Mengjing) 石夢鯨 20, 156, 194, 202–4, 320, 356, 360, 387, 421–2, 437–8 n. 25  
 Shy Kinqua II (Shi Zhonghe) 石中和 (also called Gonqua) 387  
 Si Hunqua *see* Cai Hunqua and 344  
 Sia *see* Cai 蔡 and 344  
 Siam (Xianluo Guo) 暹羅國 (Thailand) 67, 69, 72, 95–6, 156, 163, 191, 200, 267–71, 274–84, 290, 361, 367–7, 380–1, 413, 426, 450 n. 2, 473–4 n. 94, 481 n. 6  
 Sichuan Province 四川省 192  
 Silk contracts 92, 105, 117, 152, 184, 222, 467 n. 3, 480 n. 60  
 Silk dealers 11, 138, 151, 195, 199  
 Silk embroidered 40  
 Silk embroiderers xiv, 225  
 Silk guilds 11–2, 34, 160, 479 n. 55, 480 n. 61 (Jinlun Huiguan), 482 n. 10  
 Silk illegal 91, 98, 456 n. 56, Plate 05.10  
 Silk Nanking variety 151

- Silk Painters xiv, 225  
 Silk Production 13–4, 51  
 Silk shop/boutique 11, 195, 326  
 Silk textiles/fabrics (Si Chou Fang Zhi Pin)  
 絲綢紡織品 25, 40, 53, 58, 72, 87, 97,  
 106, 124, 138, 142, 154, 182, 185, 209,  
 213, 234, 236, 240–1, 248, 252, Plates  
 05.10, 06.13, 09.03–04, 11.09, 13.01–02  
 Silk unprocessed, raw (Sheng Si) 生絲 18,  
 21, 25, 53, 72, 87, 104–5, 125, 156, 161,  
 177, 213, Plate 03.02  
 Silk unspecified 1, 8, 11–2, 14, 37, 40,  
 80, 85–6, 91, 123, 151, 160, 170, 175,  
 184–5, 187, 193, 195, 199, 201, 203,  
 208, 211, 213, 219–20, 222, 255, 416,  
 443 n. 7, 444 n. 9, 455 n. 40, 466 n. 3  
 Silk weavers xiv, 11, 40, 51, 154, 175, 182,  
 225  
 Silk worms 51  
 Silva, Joaquim Lopez da 100, 459 n. 95  
 Simon, Simoon *see* Huang Simon and 344  
 Sinqua *see* Chinqua (Tan Hunqua's partner),  
 Tan Sinqua  
 Sioukoa, Souykoa *see* Tan Suqua or Cai  
 Hunqua and 345  
 Sizia *see* Yan Swetia and 358, 381  
 Smit, Corporal Paulus 90  
 Smith, Rev. Dr. Carl T. xiv, xvi, 346, 426,  
 433 n. 3, 434 n. 10  
 Snails (dried) 284  
 Solor 460 n. 2  
 Songkoa 345  
 Sonykoa, Sonykoua 345  
 Southeast Asia (unspecified) xiii, xiv, xvii, 5,  
 22, 45–7, 55, 59, 66–71, 74–6, 91, 94–7,  
 102, 109, 117, 120, 139, 145, 149, 152,  
 154, 156, 159, 163–5, 173, 190, 207,  
 210, 219–20, 223, 355, 376, 441 n. 16,  
 451 n. 10, 458 n. 75, 473 n. 93  
 Soychong *see* Juchang  
 Soyonkoa 345  
 Spain xviii, 35, 74  
 Spanish dogs 482 n. 3  
 Spanish in Manila 74–5  
 Spanish language, records, sources and  
 archives 6, 34–5, 187  
 Spanish xiii, 6, 17, 80, 83, 142, 327  
 Spelter (Zinc) 9, 58, 89–90, 97, 163, 165,  
 208, Plates 03.01, 04.01, 04.07  
 Spices and spice trade (*see also* pepper,  
 cloves and nutmeg) 15, 24, 68, 208,  
 220, 286, 434 n. 1  
 Spirit money (Joss paper) 72  
 Stahlhank, Capt. Plate 11.04  
 Stainforth, Capt. 203  
 Stark, Mr. 139  
 Stealing *see* Theft  
 Sticklac 284  
 Stin Honqua *see* Tan Hunqua and 106–7  
 Stockholm xix, 229, 459 n. 90  
 Stolen *see* Theft  
 Storms (including typhoons) 16, 47, 75–6,  
 82, 221, 452 n. 23, 454 n. 17  
 Su Ching 蘇精 xxi, 461 n. 32, 478 n. 21  
 Suchin Chinqua (porcelain dealer) 15  
 Sugar 9, 67–8, 72, 220, 265, 268–9, 271,  
 273, 275, 278, 280, 282, 286, 396  
 Sugar, Candied 72, 268–9, 271, 273, 275,  
 278, 280, 286, 396  
 Sugar, Powdered 265, 269, 275, 278, 282,  
 286  
 Suicheng Hang 遂成行 199, 419, Plate  
 12.03  
 Suiho Hang 258  
 Suiho Hang 358  
 Sullock, Sublak (place near Manila) 273–81,  
 290  
 Suonqua *see* Tan Suonqua  
 Suqua *see* Tan Suqua  
 Suquan 457 n. 59  
 Surat 46, 60, 232, 270, 440 n. 8, 460 n. 2  
 Suyqua (Tan Hunqua's partner, possibly Cai  
 Teunqua) 316–7  
 Suzhou 170  
 Sweden xvi, 131, 234, 414  
 Swedish East India Company (SOIC),  
 people, trade and officers passim  
 Swedish language, records, sources and  
 archives xiii, xv–xvi, 33–5, 57, 69, 96,  
 116, 118–9, 126, 133, 154, 163, 171–2,  
 183, 185–6, 191, 193, 195, 209–10, 227,  
 234, 343–5, 347, 354, 381–3, 416–7,  
 426, 457 n. 66, 469 n. 6, 473 n. 84, 475  
 nn. 11 and 16

- Swedish map 123, 143  
 Swequa *see* Cai Swequa  
 Swetia *see* Yan Swetia  
 Sy Anqua *see* Cai Anqua and 344  
 Sy *see* Cai 蔡 and 344  
 Syqua (Tan Chowqua's partner) 387, 390
- Tacqua Amoy (Chang Maorong) 長茂榮  
 xiv, 179, 181–2, 186–7, 189, 197, 247,  
 399, 400–1, 411, 415, 477 n. 18–9, 478 n.  
 21–3, Plate 11.06
- Tacqua *see* Cai Taiqua, Tacqua Amoy or Yan  
 Textia
- Taihe Hang 泰和行 5, 55, 57, 59, 91, 99,  
 101, 115, 126, 133, 149, 152–3, 155–8,  
 160–2, 165–7, 254, 261, 344, 356–61,  
 363, Plates 09.01–02, 09.04, 09.13
- Taiqua Amoy *see* Tacqua Amoy  
 Taiqua *see* Cai Taiguan, Cai Taiqua, Tacqua  
 Amoy, Tan Taiqua or Ye Tiaqua
- Taishun Hang (Tayschoen Hang) 泰順行 (*see*  
 also Tising Hang) 149, 156, 164, 172,  
 176, 356, 358, 360–1, 368, 380, 465–6 n.  
 46, 469 n. 2
- Taising Hang *see* Tising Hang and 356
- Tan Anqua (Chen Anguan) 陳安觀 53, 56,  
 91, 120, 142, 144, 239, 262, 292, 295,  
 314–5, 344, 348, 351, 353, 447 n. 35,  
 468 n. 34, Plate 08.09
- Tan Chetqua (Chen Jieguan) 陳捷官, (Chen  
 Qiwu) 陳起鳴 (Tan Suqua's son) xv, 20,  
 55, 57–60, 79, 86–8, 90–4, 96–9, 101–2,  
 128, 152–3, 156, 158, 161, 163, 188,  
 190–2, 218, 221, 230–5, 241–2, 248–51,  
 261, 291–2, 294–6, 300, 304–8, 310–4,  
 328–31, 333–4, 336, 339–40, 345–6,  
 358–61, 366–7, 373, 375, 385–6, 418,  
 444 n. 16, 445 n. 23, 446 n. 29, 447 n.  
 30, 455 n. 40, 456 nn. 55–6, 457 nn. 59  
 and 66, 458 n. 75 and 80, 459 nn. 85–6  
 and 90, 464–5 nn. 20 and 26, Plates  
 03.01, 03.03–10, 05.02–3, 05.06–2,  
 09.06, 09.10, 11.14–6
- Tan Chin Ching *see* Tan Chetqua  
 Tan Chinqa *see* Than Chinquan (Tan  
 Hunqua's partner) or Tan Conqua (1)
- Tan Chowqua (Chen Zuguan) 陳祖官,  
 (Chen Wenkuo) 陳文擴, and possibly  
 (Chen Tiande) 陳天德 (Tan Mandarin  
 Quiqua's son) xv, 20, 74, 100, 116, 134  
 (Tsjoouqua), 144, 160, 169–79, 194,  
 203, 245, 262, 337–8, 360, 383, 385–8,  
 391–2, 394–7, 437–8 n. 25, 446 n. 29,  
 472 n. 63, 473–4 n. 94, 475 n. 14 and  
 16, 476 nn. 20, 22, 27, Plates 07.07,  
 10.04–07, 10.09–14
- Tan Conqua (1) (Chen Shiji) 陳世積 (Tan  
 Fat Hunqua's son) 89, 103, 116–21, 262,  
 315, 318, 320–2, 325–7, 334, 365–7,  
 447, 473 n. 81
- Tan Conqua (2) (Liang Emanuel Quiqua's  
 partner) 186, 208–9, 211, 327, 401, 411,  
 427–8, 478 n. 22, 482 n. 8
- Tan Coqua (Chen Keguan) 陳科官 (Tan  
 Suqua's son) 79, 99–102, 119, 132, 136,  
 158, 174, 193, 291–2, 296, 301–2, 307,  
 309, 311–4, 360, 387, 406, 416, 418,  
 459 n. 91, 460 n. 97
- Tan Cunque *see* Tan Conqua (1–2)
- Tan Fat Hunqua (Chen Xionguan) 陳雄官  
 (father of Tan Conqua and same family  
 as Tan Hunqua) 87, 103, 116–8, 120–1,  
 184–6, 200, 235–6, 246, 262, 315–9,  
 321–3, 325–7, 342–3, 399–400, 446–7 n.  
 29, 458 n. 80, 462 n. 52, 479–80 n. 55,  
 Plates 06.11–13, 11.03
- Tan Hanqua, Hauqua (Tan Suqua's grand-  
 son) 79, 99, 292, 296, 302, 314, 459 n.  
 91 (Anqua)
- Tan Hiequa *see* Junk captain
- Tan Hunqua (Chen Fangguan) 陳芳觀 (same  
 family as Tan Fat Hunqua) xv, 5, 20,  
 64, 81, 84–6, 95, 101–17, 120–1, 123–4,  
 135, 137, 140, 146–7, 149–50, 170,  
 213–4, 221, 262, 314–6, 319, 321–7,  
 331–2, 342–4, 354, 384, 446–7 n. 29,  
 448 n. 55, 454 n. 14, 455 n. 27, 460 nn.  
 1–3, 461 nn. 14, 30 and 32, 462 n. 39,  
 463 n. 2, Plates 05.01, 06.01–10
- Tan Kangguan 譚康官 323–4, 460 n. 1, 463  
 n. 2
- Tan Leunqua *see* Ye Leunqua and 399, 414
- Tan Locqua (Chen Junhua) 陳鈞華 (Tan  
 Chowqua's son, he is also known as  
 Chowqua II) 169, 177–9, 383, 387, 392,  
 394–7, 476 nn. 30–1, Plate 10.15–16
- Tan Mandarin Quiqua (Chen Kuiguan) 陳  
 魁官, (Chen Kuaiguan) 陳快官 51,

- 105, 108, 167, 169–73, 178–9, 244–5, 251, 314–5, 354, 383, 385–7, 392–3, 397, 414, 432, 456 n. 48, 474 nn. 1–2 and 5, Plates 10.01–03, 12.03
- Tan Minqua (Tan Suqua's grandson) 79, 99, 292, 300, 302, 314
- Tan Peeko *see* Junk captain
- Tan Poqua (1) (Tan Suqua's son) 79, 97, 99, 292, 312, 314, 458 n. 80
- Tan Poqua (2) (Tan Fat Hunqua's son) 118, 120, 458 n. 80, 462 n. 52
- Tan Quiqua (1) (Chen Guiguan) 陳貴觀 (Poankeequa I's partner) 314, 457 n. 65
- Tan Quiqua (2) (Tan Suqua's son) 79, 93, 97–9, 102, 161–2, 291–2, 303, 306–7, 312–4, 336, 365–6
- Tan Sauqua (Chen Suguan) 陳蘇官 315
- Tan Sequa (Tan Suqua's grandson) 79, 99, 292, 297, 302, 314
- Tan Sinqua (Tan Suqua's grandson) 292, 302–3, 314, 459 n. 91
- Tan Suonqua (Tan Suqua's grandson) 79, 99, 292, 302, 314
- Tan Suqua (Chen Shouguan) 陳壽官, (Chen Tingfeng) 陳廷鳳 xv, 5, 20, 44, 51, 53–4, 77, 79–105, 108, 112–4, 121, 123–5, 135, 137–8, 140–1, 149–51, 170, 178, 181–2, 200, 233, 253–5, 261, 291–3, 295, 297–8, 300–1, 303–15, 344, 346, 348–9, 356, 358, 372, 397, 418, 446 n. 29, 453 nn. 1–2 and 4, 454 n. 13, 455 nn. 32 and 43, 456 nn. 48 and 55–6, 457 n. 59, 458 n. 80, Plates 03.02, 05.02–03, 05.05
- Tan Taiqua 陳 (Tan Suqua's son) 79, 97, 99, 292, 301–2, 312–3, 344, 418, 459 n. 91 (Tyqua)
- Tan Theonqua, Teongqua (Tan Suqua's grandson) 79, 99, 292, 302, 314
- Tan Tinqua (1) (Chen Dengguan) 陳瞪 (登) 官 (Tan Suqua's son) 79, 90, 93, 97–9, 102, 105, 128, 130, 158, 192, 233, 291–2, 296, 300–3, 306–7, 309, 311–4, 328, 330, 334, 336, 456 nn. 53 and 55, 459 nn. 85–6 and 90, 465 n. 26, Plate 05.03
- Tan Tinqua (2) (Chen Tengguan) 陳騰觀 (1720s and 1730s) 20, 94–5, 103, 105–8, 113, 138, 140, 200, 312–3, 315, 456 n. 53, Plates 05.04, 08.04
- Tan Tinqua (3) (Chen Zhenguan) 陳鎮官, (Chen Yingjie) 陳應節 (Jeangri) 57, 89–90, 120, 155, 200, 262, 313–5, 446–7 nn. 29, 447 n. 35, 448 n. 41, 456 n. 53
- Tan Tongqua (Tan Suqua's grandson) 79, 99, 292, 300, 302, 314
- Tan Toyqua (Tan Mandarin Quiqua's son) 383, 387
- Tan Yanqua (Tan Suqua's grandson) 79, 99, 292, 296, 302, 314, 459 n. 90
- Tan Yanqua, Jamqua (Tan Suqua's grandson) 292, 296, 302, 314, 459 n. 90
- Tan 譚 324
- Tang Won *see* Gomi Gutti and 285
- Tanhonqua *see* Tan Hunqua
- Tanzinqua 356
- Tayho Hang *see* Taihe Hang and 356
- Tayqua *see* Taiqua
- Tayschoen Hang *see* Taishun Hang
- Taywoe Hang *see* Taihe Hang
- Tchang Kiai-youen *see* Zhang Kousia
- Tea Ankay (An Xi Cha) 安溪茶 25, 39, 210
- Tea Ankay (Anquei) Congo (An Xi Gong Fu Cha) 安溪工夫茶 243
- Tea Bing (Ping cha) 坪茶 238, 245
- Tea Black, course (Hong Cha) 紅茶 37, 107
- Tea Bohea (Wu Yi Cha) 武夷 (夷) 茶 18, 25, 37–9, 41, 43, 55–6, 94–6, 106–7, 116, 118, 124, 127, 133, 142–3, 146, 154, 156, 160, 173, 176, 189, 191, 208, 210, 215, 231–52, 436–7 n. 16, 439–40 n. 4, 441 n. 10, 448 n. 40, 467 nn. 19 and 22, 478 nn. 22–3, Plates 03.08, 05.02–04, 05.11–12, 07.05–06, 08.01, 08.07, 08.09, 08.11, 09.01, 09.07, 09.12–13, 10.02–04, 10.10, 11.05, 11.13, 12.03
- Tea Bohea Congo (Wu Yi Gong Fu Cha) 武夷工夫茶 154, 248, 250–1
- Tea Chiauson (another spelling for Souchon?) 238
- Tea Congo (Gong Fu Cha) 工夫茶 39, 54, 133, 160, 177, 208, 210, 238, 246–51, 439–40 n. 4
- Tea Congo-Peco (Gong Fu Bai Hao Cha) 工夫白毫茶 188

- Tea Green, fine (Lu Cha) 綠茶 37, 51, 55, 83, 94, 106–7, 146, 170, 186, 237, 436 n. 8, 443 n. 8
- Tea Hyson (Heyson) Skin (Pi Cha) 皮茶 238
- Tea Hyson, Heyson (Zao Chun Cha) 早春茶 or (Xi Zhu Cha) 熙珠茶 12, 87, 177, 238, Plate 07.01
- Tea Imperial (Kijzer) (Yuan Zhu Cha) 圓珠茶 or (Da Zhu Cha) 大珠茶 237, 245
- Tea Kampoy (Jian Bei Cha) 揀焙茶 178, 396
- Tea missing or stolen 129
- Tea Padri (Patri) Ziou Zioun (Seng Ren Que She Cha) 僧人雀舌茶 or (Bao Que She Cha) 包雀舌茶 238
- Tea Padri Soutchion (Seng Ren Xiao Zhong Cha) 僧人小種茶 12, Plate 07.01
- Tea Peco (Bai Hao) 白毫 88, 133, 178, 186, 237–8, 323, 396, 417
- Tea Rubbish, inferior, junk, damaged, adulterated, miss-packed, etc. 16, 95, 99, 127, 135, 466 n. 53, Plate 08.10
- Tea Singlo, Songlo (Song Luo Cha) 松羅茶 87, 107, 163. 232–3, 238, 240, 245–6, Plates 09.12. 10.04
- Tea Souchon (Xiao Zhong Cha) 小種茶 133, 173, 178, 193
- Tea Soulong (another spelling for Singlo, Songlo?) 178
- Tea Tauson, Touchon (another spelling for Souchon?) 41, 154, 243, 248–51, Plate 09.13
- Tea trees 51
- Tea Tunkay (Tun Xi Cha) 屯溪茶 163, 232
- Tea unspecified (Cha Ye) 茶葉 1–2, 8, 10–6, 21–3, 25, 29, 33, 36–43, 48, 51, 53–4, 56–8, 68, 70, 72, 80, 83–9, 91–7, 99–101, 105–7, 111, 117–9, 123, 125–6, 128–9, 133–5, 139, 142–3, 151–7, 159–61, 165–6, 170–4, 176, 182, 184, 187–9, 191, 193–4, 199, 202–3, 208–9, 211, 213, 216–7, 219–20, 222, 231, 235, 241, 255, 434 n. 1, 436 nn. 8 and 15, 436–7 n. 16, 440 nn. 6 and 8, 443 nn. 7–8, 446–7 n. 29, 450 n. 3, 458 nn. 70 and 75, 460 n. 97, 467–8 n. 22, 468 n. 34, 470 n. 20, 472 n. 63
- Tea Zioun Zioun (Que She Cha) 雀舌茶 186, 247, Plate 11.06
- Teinquá see Chua Teinquá, Tan Teinquá or Ton Tinquá
- Tekqua 400
- Temple 34, 150, 475 n. 14
- Teowqua see Ye Tiauqua and 404, 416–7
- Teowqua see Ye Tiauqua and 416
- Tetshaw see Yan Textia and 344
- Teunqua, Tionqua see Cai Anqua 335, Cai Teunqua 347, 366, Cai Tsjonqua 337 or unidentified 143, 162, 467–8 n. 22
- Textia see Yan Textia
- Teyqua see Taiqua and 344
- Thailand see Siam
- Tham, Christian 185, 345, 377, 471 n. 33, Plate 11.04
- Than Chinquan (Tan Hunqua's partner) 84–5, 104–8, 112–3, 316–7, 324–6, 460 n. 3, 461 nn. 17 and 30, Plates 05.01, 06.01–05, 06.07
- Thatfong Hang see Dafeng Hang
- Thayqua see Taiqua
- The Ingko see Junk captain and 264
- Theft, Stolen, Stealing, Robbery and Looting 21, 36–7, 88, 113, 129
- Theonqua, Teongqua see Tan Theonqua
- Thequa see Ong Tsanqua
- Thomking (Semqua's writer) 128
- Thread, Yarn (poloma) 67, 270–1, 273, 276, 281–2, 284, 286
- Tianbao Hang 天寶行 207
- Tianshun Hang 天順行 137, 349–50
- Tiauqua see Ye Tiauqua
- Tidewaiters 29
- Timor 269, 273, 275, 460 n. 2
- Tin (Xi) 錫 15, 22, 24–5, 37, 60, 67–8, 70, 73, 96, 102, 134, 152, 219–20, 223, 230, 232–3, 241, 264, 269, 271, 273, 277–8, 280, 282, 284, 286, 294–5, 297–8, 317, 329, 332–3, 350, 357–8, 363, 365, 386, 406–7, 423, 428, 437 n. 22, 450 n. 3, 458 n. 76, Plates 03.03, 03.10, 09.06
- Tin Ca Low (place in Cochin China or Cambodia) 282–3
- Tinquá see Tan Tinquá (1–3) or Ye Tiauqua
- Tintuck (Tan Coqua's partner) 303
- Tiquá see Taiqua or Yan Textia and 344

- Tising Hang (*see also* Taishun Hang) 169, 172, 176, 356–7, 372, 388, 469 n. 2
- Tituck (an official in Fujian) 140
- Tjayhonqua *see* Cai Hunqua and 343
- Tjoa Pinko *see* Junk captain and 264
- Tjobqua *see* Cai Tjobqua
- Tju-hot (place in Cochin China) 277–9, 290
- Tollhouses *see* Customs houses
- Ton (another spelling for Tan 陳)
- Ton Hunqua/Honqua *see* Tan Hunqua
- Ton Teinqua 117, 356, 358
- Ton Tonqua (Tan Suqua's partner) 80, 85–6, 292, 294, 312
- Tonchon *see* Yaochang
- Tongqua *see* Tan Tongqua
- Tonqua (Tan Chowqua's partner) 387–8, 392
- Torriano, Mr. 106, 170
- Tortoise shells 67, 72, 282, 284, 287
- Touch *see* Alloy content
- Tower of London 139
- Toyqua *see* Tan Taiqua, Tan Toyqua or Ye Tiauqua
- Tranquebar 450 n. 4, 471 n. 35
- Trebaert 82
- Trepang (Tripang, bêche-de-mer or sea cucumber) 68, 72, 220, 264, 267, 270, 272–3, 276, 279–80, 283, 286
- Truck (system of tying export purchases to import sales) 7, 21–3, 83, 97, 158, 194, 222
- Tsanqua *see* Ong Tsanqua
- Tseonqua *see* Cai Tseonqua
- Tsey *see* Cai 蔡 and 330, 463 n. 8
- Tshae Syangkoa *see* Cai Tsjonqua and 337
- Tsi *see* Cai 蔡 and 344
- Tsin Tack Moen, Tsin Tac Moen (place between Cambodia and Cankauw) 269–77, 282–4, 290
- Tsioukoa *see* Cai Tsjonqua and 346
- Tsjon Tsjow Tshiet (Cantonese name for Autumn Equinox, 22 September) 239–40
- Tsjonqua *see* Cai Tsjonqua
- Tsoa Tsoaqua *see* Junk captain Cai Zouguan
- Tsoi Hunqua *see* Cai Hunqua and 344
- Tsontuck, Tsontock, Tsing Touc, Tsongton, Tsontoc, Tsjonton *see* Governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces
- Tsou Geth (Cochin China) 274–7, 290
- Tucksia *see* Yan Texia
- Tuong Koko *see* Junk captain and 264
- Turner, Whichcott 85, 139
- Tutenague 396
- Typhoons *see* Storms
- Tyqua *see* Taiqua and 292, 344, 401, 415, 418, 459 n. 91
- Tzy *see* Cai 蔡 and 344
- Umbrellas 72
- Varnish 67–8, 278, 282, 285, 287
- Vermicelly 72
- Vetriol Plate 04.10
- Viceroy *see* Governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces
- Vigny, Mr. 464–5 n. 20
- Wajang 277
- Wan Guo Liu Xiang 萬國流香 (Tan Hunqua's business slogan) 111
- Wang Honqua *see* Junk captain Wen Xiongguan
- Wanhe Hang 萬和行 457 n. 60
- War Mandarin 124
- War xix, 28, 54, 74–5, 133–4, 136, 175–6, 214, 223, 476 n. 23
- Warships 223
- Watches *see* Clocks and watches
- Wax 67–8, 265, 267, 270, 273, 276, 279, 281–2, 284–5, 320
- Wax candles 68, 284
- Wax oil 265, 285, 287
- Wayqua (unidentified) 415–6, 473 n. 77
- Weaver *see* Silk Weaver
- Wende Hang (Mantack Hang) 文德行 77, 164, 367–8
- Wessell, Abraham 106–7
- Weyshaw *see* Yan Waysee
- Whampoa (Huangpu) 黃埔 16, 25–6, 28–9, 35–6, 38–9, 52, 68, 82, 89, 159, 175, 207, 223, 232, 235–7, 243, 246–7, 251–2, 442 n. 4, 443 n. 8



- White Cloud Mountains (Bai Yun Shan) 白云山 149, 159  
 Wiezook 265, 286  
 Wine 111, 475 n. 14, Plate 06.06  
 Women, Chinese (including references to wives, concubines and daughters) 59, 74, 88, 93, 109, 126–7, 149, 157, 190, 224, 418, 464 n. 18, 464–5 n. 20, Plate 09.18  
 Womens' house 88, 126–7, 153  
 Wong Yeetuan 黃裕端 xvii, xxi, 71, 434 n. 16  
 Wonsamye (inland tea merchant) 56–8, 155, 160, 262, 447 n. 34, 448 nn. 40–1  
 Wood (all varieties) 67–8, 70, 72, 82, 152, 163, 208, 219, 220, 241, 263–4, 267, 269, 271–5, 278, 280, 282, 286–7, 473 n. 89  
 Wood, Agala 286  
 Wood, Amboyna 287  
 Wood, Black 269, 271, 273–4, 278, 280, 282, 286  
 Wood, Cong Tsju Hung 271, 275  
 Wood, Dyed 272  
 Wood, Eagle 269, 280, 287  
 Wood, Ebony 72, 264, 267, 286  
 Wood, Kong Huing 269, 287  
 Wood, Mahogany 70, 473 n. 89  
 Wood, Red 269, 271, 273–4, 278, 280, 282, 287  
 Wood, Rose- 287  
 Wood, Sandal- 70, 72, 82, 152, 163, 241, 264, 267, 269, 271, 273, 275, 282, 287, 473 n. 89, Plate 09.06  
 Wood, Sappan- 208, 264, 267, 269, 271, 273, 275, 278, 280, 282, 287  
 Wood, Sweet Plate 04.06  
 Wool and woollens (Mao Fang Zhi Pin) 毛紡織品 23–5, 83–4, 128, 152, 156–7, 166, 184, 194, 203, Plate 09.06  
 Woolmore, John 451 n. 12  
 Writers (Shu Ji) 書記 (including references to clerks and secretaries) 14, 40, 57, 65 (Poankeequa I's), 93 (Chetqua's), 116 and 120 (Leunqua's), 124 and 127–8 (Semqua's and Anqua's), 156 (Ingsia's), 160 (Ingsia's and Chowqua's), 161 (in Guangshun Hang), 174 and 176–7 (Chowqua's), 178 (Locqua's and Geowqua's), 184 (Leunqua's), 190 (Giqua's), 193 (Monqua's and Coqua's), 235 (Leunqua's), 312 (Chetqua's), 318, 323 and 325 (Leunqua's), 360 (Ingsia's), 392 (Locqua's), 400 (Leunqua's), 417–8 (Tiauqua's), 432 (Tsjobqua's), 457 n. 65–6 (Poankeequa I's, Tiauqua's, Monqua's and Chetqua's), 471 n. 46 (Ingsia's), 472 n. 63 (Chowqua's)  
 Wu Bingjian 伍秉鑑 *see* Wu Houqua  
 Wu Geowqua (Wu Qiaoguan) 伍喬官 or (Wu Guozhao) 伍國釗 (Wu Houqua's relative) 134, 156, 175, 177–8, 195, 325, 360, 387, 390–1, 471 n. 46, 476 n. 22, 477 n. 46, Plates 07.07, 10.12  
 Wu Guozhao 伍國釗 *see* Wu Geowqua  
 Wu Haoguan 伍浩官 *see* Wu Houqua  
 Wu Heguan 伍和觀 (manager of Junk *Hingtai* in 1765) 367  
 Wu Houqua (Wu Haoguan) 伍浩官, (Wu Bingjian) 伍秉鑑 325  
 Wu Iqua (Wu Zhaoping) 吳昭平 177, 476 n. 31  
 Wu Qiaoguan 伍喬官 *see* Wu Geowqua  
 Wu Zhaoping 吳昭平 *see* Wu Iqua  
 Wuyi Mountains 武夷山 *see* Bohea Mountains  
 Wuyuan County 婺源縣 196, Plate 11.20  
 Wychefou (a government official) 129  
 Wyqua (Geowqua's writer) 178  
 Wyshe, Wysee *see* Yan Waysee  
 Xequa *see* Tan Chetqua and 296, 346, 456 n. 55  
 Xiangshan County 香山縣 (China) 426  
 Xiao Seguan 蕭色官 (Liang Attay's associate) 210, 428, 430  
 Xin Zhu 新柱 (Imperial commissioner sent to Canton) 445 n. 21  
 Xinfeng Hang 信豐行 209, 262, 429  
 Xu Wanguan 許旺官 *see* Junk captain  
 Xu 徐 324  
 Xunhu (a government official) 112  
 Yamqua, Yanqua *see* Oemjamqua, Tan Yanqua or Ye Yanqua  
 Yan Awue 顏 (Avou) 57, 120, 149, 151, 153–5, 161, 165, 187, 240–1, 247–8,

- 262, 355, 369–70, 372–3, 282–3, 471  
nn. 30–2 and 35, Plates 09.03, 09.05,  
11.05, 11.08
- Yan Chuoting 顏綽亭 *see* Yan Textia
- Yan Deshe 顏德舍 *see* Yan Textia
- Yan Hongsia (Ngan Hongsia, Yan Xiangshe)  
顏享舍 xiv–v, 5, 53, 56, 59, 149, 151–3,  
162–6, 191, 262, 349–50, 355–6, 359,  
366–7, 375–6, 381, 413, 447 n. 34, 470  
nn. 21 and 22, 473 nn. 82 and 86–7
- Yan Ingsia (Yan Yingshe) 顏瑛舍, (Yan  
Shiyi) 顏時瑛 (Yan Textia's son) xv,  
20, 44, 92–3, 98, 100, 125, 130, 132–3,  
136, 149, 151–64, 166–7, 174–5, 188,  
190, 204–5, 218, 232, 242–4, 249–51,  
255, 261, 297, 299–301, 306–7, 328–31,  
334–6, 339–40, 355, 360–1, 363,  
371–6, 382, 387, 390, 417, 437–8 n. 25  
(Yngshaw), 440–1 n. 8, 463 n. 8 (Inksia),  
464–5 n. 20 (Yngshaw), 470 nn. 20 and  
22, 471 nn. 40, 44 and 46, 472 n. 55,  
Plates 03.09, 09.09–10, 09.12–15, 10.07,  
11.14–16
- Yan Ingsia's 顏瑛舍 cousin 156, 193  
(Poankeequa II's), 202, 326 (Poankeequa  
I's), 360 (Ingsia's) 471 n. 44
- Yan Liangzhou 顏亮洲 *see* Yan Textia
- Yan Limsia (Yan Linshe) 顏琳舍, (Yan  
Shilin) 顏時琳 (Yan Textia's son) 149,  
152, 159–62, 166, 203, 242, 355–6, 360,  
364–5, 382, 422, Plates 09.07, 09.16
- Yan Linshe 顏琳舍 *see* Yan Limsia
- Yan Lishe 顏立舍 *see* Junk captain Yan  
Lipsia
- Yan Qizhan 顏淇瞻 *see* Yan Textia
- Yan Ruishe 顏瑞舍 *see* Yan Swetia
- Yan Shichen 顏時琛 (Yan Textia's son) 356
- Yan Shicong 顏時聰 (Yan Textia's son) 356
- Yan Shiheng 顏時珩 (Yan Textia's son) 356
- Yan Shili 顏時理 (Yan Textia's son) 356
- Yan Shilin 顏時琳 *see* Yan Limsia
- Yan Shiqiu 顏時球 (Yan Textia's son) 154,  
355
- Yan Shirui 顏時瑞 *see* Yan Swetia
- Yan Shishan 顏時珊 (Yan Textia's son) 356
- Yan Shixuan 顏時璿 (Yan Textia's son) 356
- Yan Shixun 顏時珣 (Yan Textia's son) 154,  
355
- Yan Shiyao 顏時瑤 (Tan Textia's son) 356
- Yan Shiyi 顏時瑛 *see* Yan Ingsia
- Yan Swetia (Yan Ruishe) 顏瑞舍, (Yan  
Shirui) 顏時瑞 (Yan Textia's son) xv, 36,  
53–7, 59, 91–2, 94, 96, 120, 125, 142–5,  
149, 151–5, 161–2, 166–7, 230–2, 238,  
240–2, 247–8, 250, 261, 292, 295,  
297–8, 306, 311, 328–9, 331, 333–4,  
339, 348, 350–1, 353, 355, 358, 360,  
366, 370–3, 381–2, 444 n. 16, 445 n.  
23, 446–5 nn. 27 and 29, 447 n. 30, 468  
n. 29, 470 nn. 20–2, 471 n. 26, Plates  
03.01, 03.03–06, 03.08, 03.10, 08.08,  
09.04, 09.06, 09.08, 09.10, 09.18
- Yan Textia (Ngan Textia, Yan Deshe) 顏德舍,  
(Yan Qizhan) 顏淇瞻, (Yan Chuoting)  
顏綽亭, (Yan Liangzhou) 顏亮洲 xv,  
20, 87–8, 90, 115, 124–5, 149–51,  
156–7, 160–2, 164–6, 171–2, 178, 185,  
200, 240, 244, 261, 292, 295, 310,  
331–2, 344, 348–9, 355, 369–72, 382–3,  
456 n. 48, 467 n. 16, 469 nn. 3 and 8,  
473 n. 82, Plates 09.01–02, 09.18, 10.03
- Yan Waysee (Yan Textia's son) 149, 159–62,  
304, 355–6, 365, 382
- Yan Xiangshe 顏享舍 *see* Yan Hongsia
- Yan Yingshe 顏瑛舍 *see* Yan Ingsia
- Yang Bingguan 楊丙官 *see* Yang Pinqua
- Yang Cengong 楊岑龔 *see* Yang Pinqua
- Yang Pinqua (Yang Bingguan) 楊丙官, (Yang  
Cengong) 楊岑龔 15, 134, 177, 188,  
194, 387, 391, 466 n. 49, Plate 07.07,  
10.12
- Yang Yongbin 楊永斌 461 n. 37
- Yang 楊 324
- Yaochang (Tonchon) 徭昌 188, Plate 11.07
- Yarn *see* Thread
- Ye Chaoguan 葉朝官 *see* Ye Tiauqua
- Ye Chunyi 葉純儀 *see* Ye Consentia Giqua
- Ye Consentia Giqua (Ye Yiguan) 葉義  
官, (Ye Chunyi) 葉純儀 (Ye Tiauqua's  
father) 93–4, 115, 154, 156, 164,  
181–4, 186–93, 197, 199, 201, 208, 231,  
245–50, 262, 331, 333, 366, 398, 402,  
408–9, 412–3, 415–8, 446 n. 29, 447 nn.  
30–1, 477 nn. 2 and 20, 478 nn. 24–5,  
Plates 03.07, 11.01–02, 11.05, 11.08,  
11.10–12, 11.14–15

- Ye Cudgin 葉 (same family as Ye Leunqua and Consentia Giqua) 20, 80, 83-4, 104, 143, 147, 149-50, 181-4, 193, 225, 197, 354, 397-9, 407, 414, 477 nn. 2 and 11
- Ye Guangchang 葉光常 *see* Ye Yanqua
- Ye Huaqi 葉花谿 *see* Ye Yanqua
- Ye Leunqua (Ye Longguan) 葉隆官, (Ye Tingzi) 葉廷梓 (same family as Ye Cudgin and Giqua) 115-6, 120, 181-8, 192-3, 197, 199-201, 246, 248, 251, 318, 323, 325, 342-3, 356-7, 398-9, 401, 403, 409, 414-5, 477-8 nn. 2, 8-9, 11 and 20, Plates 06.11, 11.03, 11.09, 11.21-22
- Ye Longuan 葉隆官 *see* Ye Leunqua
- Ye Tiauqua (Ye Chaoguan) 葉朝官 (Ye Consentia Giqua's son and Tan Chetqua's son-in-law) 93-4, 99, 131, 181, 190-3, 197, 218-9, 221, 249-51, 262, 297, 313-4, 331, 344, 398, 402, 404, 408, 410, 412, 415-8, 457 n. 66, Plates 11.13, 11.16
- Ye Tingxun 葉廷勳 *see* Ye Yanqua
- Ye Tingzi 葉廷梓 *see* Ye Leunqua and 184, 399, Plate 11.09
- Ye Yanqua (Ye Renguan) 葉仁 (任) 官, (Ye Shanglin) 葉上林, (誤: Ye Tingxun) 葉廷勳, (字: Ye Guangchang) 葉光常, (號: Ye Huaqi) 葉花谿 181, 193-7, 219, 225, 398, 405, 410, 479-80 n. 55, 480 nn. 60-1, Plates 11.17-20
- Ye Yiguan 葉義官 *see* Ye Consentia Giqua
- Ye Zhende 葉振德 414
- Yeeyune *see* Yuyuan Hang and 423
- Yefong Hang *see* Yifeng Hang
- Y-fung Hang *see* Yifeng Hang and 345
- Yichang (Neyschong) 裔昌 188
- Yicheng Hang 義成行 193-5, 406-7, 479 n. 55
- Yicheng Hao 義成號 479 n. 55
- Yifeng Hang 義豐行 5, 55, 57-8, 60, 91, 99, 101, 115, 123, 125-36, 157, 176, 218, 254, 261, 328-31, 333-5, 337, 342, 345-7, Plates 07.07, 10.12
- Yifon, Yifong Hang *see* Yifeng Hang
- Yili (伊犁, Kulja, present city of Yining 伊宁) 34, 132-3, 136, 158-60, 204-5, 225, 360, 363, 382, 476 n. 31
- Yimqua *see* Ye Yanqua and 194, 405
- Ying Shun Long Ji 盈順隆記 103, 111, 117, 316
- Yip *see* Ye 葉 and 414
- Yokqua *see* Cai Tjobqua
- Yongquan 457 n. 59
- Yong-ty-ye *see* Yan Hongsia and 162, 447 n. 34
- You Hunqua (Liang Emanuel Quiqua's partner) 208, 427
- Young Hunqua *see* Cai Hunqua and 124, 322, 347
- Young Quiqua *see* Tan Chowqua
- Young Ton Honqua *see* Tan Hunqua and 343
- Yowqua (Yan Limsia's partner) 365
- Yu Yuen Hang *see* Yuyuan Hang and 421-3
- Yuanlai Hang 源 (遠) 來行 116-7, 120-1, 262, 318-20, 323, 325, 342, 479-80 n. 55, Plates 06.11-13, 11.03
- Yuanlai Hao 源 (遠) 來號 116, 318, 479-80 n. 55, Plates 06.12-13, 11.03
- Yuanquan Hang 源泉行 172-3, 176-9, 262, 387-90, 392, 397, Plates 10.09-11
- Yuencsien Hang *see* Yuanquan Hang and 387, 390
- Yuyuan Hang 裕源行 202, 205, 262, 420-3, Plates 12.04-05
- Zay, Zey *see* Cai 蔡 and 345
- Zey Hauqua *see* Cai Anqua
- Zey Hauqua/Houqua *see* Cai Anqua and 335, 345
- Zey Hunqua *see* Cai Hunqua and 345
- Zhang Foutia (Zhang Fushe) 張富舍, (Zhang Shixun) 張世勳, (Zhang Fuguan) 張符官 xiv, 5, 116, 199, 202, 204-5, 262, 420-1, 424-5-6, 446 n. 29, 481 nn. 10 and 12, Plates 12.04-05
- Zhang Fuguan 張符官 *see* Zhang Foutia
- Zhang Fushe 張富舍 *see* Zhang Foutia
- Zhang Haoguang 張浩光 426
- Zhang Hongchao 張宏超 (Comprador) 426
- Zhang Kousia (Zhang Tianqiu) 張天球 5, 20, 133, 136, 158, 160-1, 166, 174, 199, 202-5, 218, 262, 364-5, 420-1, 425-6, 437-8 n. 25, 481 n. 12
- Zhang Luhe 張履和 (salt merchant) 426

- Zhang Pinky (Zhang Zuguan) 張族官 xiv, 5, 74, 185, 199–202, 204–5, 252, 418–21, 423–6, 460 n. 6, Plates 12.01–03
- Zhang Shixun 張世勳 *see* Zhang Foutia
- Zhang Wenqin 章文欽 xxi, 312, 347, 382, 462 n. 51, 469 n. 2, Plates 09.17, 11.18
- Zhang Zhuan 張專 (Siam trader) 426
- Zhang Zuguan 張族官 *see* Zhang Pinky
- Zhao Chuan (Xiu?) 朝銹 (Imperial commissioner sent to Canton) 445 n. 21
- Zhengfeng Hang 正豐行 169, 172, 262, 384, 385–8, 397, Plates 10.03–04
- Zhenli Hao 震利號 262, 366
- Ziequa *see* Seyqua (Robin's partner) and 326
- Zigyn Hang *se* Ziyuan Hang
- Zinc *see* Spelter
- Zinqua (Ni Inqua's partner) 385–6
- Ziyuan Hang (Zigyn Hang) 資元行 137, 144, 146, 262, 349–52, Plate 08.07
- Zu Binggui Hoppo 祖秉圭總督 85–6, 105, 108–9, 112–3
- Zuo 左 324