Hong Kong Internment, 1942 to 1945

Life in the Japanese Civilian Camp at Stanley

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New Introduction

Soon after I began my research in 1970, I read in a Hong Kong newspaper, the *South China Morning Post*, that a lady who had been interned in Stanley Camp was in Hong Kong from Australia for the publication of her autobiography. The lady was Mrs. Jean Hotung Gittins, daughter of Sir Robert Hotung, well-known philanthropist and multi-millionaire businessman.[1] The report said that Mrs. Gittins would be signing copies of her autobiography, *Eastern Windows — Western Skies*. As she signed my copy of the book, I mentioned to her that I was interested in Stanley Camp and said I would like to talk with her. She readily agreed, and our subsequent meeting was the beginning of a lifelong friendship.

I spent a lot of time with Jean on several of her visits to Hong Kong from her home in Australia, and I visited her twice in Melbourne before her death in 1995. She had an excellent memory and was usually able to answer without hesitation my many questions about Stanley Camp. Furthermore, she was forthcoming, very certain of herself and strongly opinionated. Some of the former internees I interviewed were clearly hesitant at times to answer my questions; Jean never was. She also involved me with her extended family in Hong Kong, and from them I also learned a lot about the war years.

As a Eurasian, Jean did not have to enter Stanley Camp. As far as I know, no other member of the large Hotung family did so. Jean did so voluntarily in January 1942. Her father, Sir Robert, went to Macau and spent almost all the war years there. Jean's decision to enter Stanley Camp was remarkable because in most other places in the Far East, such as China, Singapore, The Philippines and Indonesia, people entered internment only because they were forced to do so. Jean's unusual decision reflected the common thinking in Hong Kong, namely that the war would not last long and internees would be treated, if not well, at least satisfactorily. In her book she explained the several reasons why she entered Stanley Camp. Her husband, Billy Gittins, had fought with the Hong Kong Volunteers against the Japanese and was imprisoned in a POW camp in Sham Shui Po, Kowloon.[2] Jean had made three very difficult attempts to visit him, but only on one occasion had she even seen him, in the distance, and they were unable to communicate. These attempts were harrowing and exposed her to danger, so she decided it was useless to try. She thought that if she went into Stanley Camp, there was the possibility of an

exchange of prisoners and she might be able to join her two children, who had been sent to Australia in May 1941.

Jean Gittins was an inspiration to me. Another lady who influenced my writing more recently is Bernice Archer, though I did not meet her until 1991, when she visited Hong Kong to research Stanley Camp.[3] At that time Archer was preparing a special study which she wrote in 1992 as part fulfillment of a B.A. at Bristol Polytechnic. She continued her research, and in 1996, she and Kent Fedorowich, of the University of the West of England, Bristol, published a 17-page essay in the *Women's History Review* entitled 'The Women of Stanley: Internment in Hong Kong, 1942–1945'. They pointed out that previous research into civilian internment in the Far East had largely omitted the experiences of women. Their study of women in Stanley broke new ground and showed that internment allowed the women to 'loosen . . . pre-war social and gender constraints' and 'actually promoted self-assurance, individual freedom, and a variety of cohesive female group identities'.[4]

Archer's expanded research led to a Ph.D. at the University of Essex and, in 2004, she published *The Internment of Western Civilians under the Japanese 1941–1945: A Patchwork of Internment.* When I began reading this book, I was immediately struck by a quotation on page three:

> Japan went to war with virtually no policy for the treatment of prisoners, especially enemy civilian internees.

Archer follows this statement with a quotation from a Japanese historian, Utsumi Aiko, who wrote, 'It could . . . be said that this problem was not even one of great concern for the Japanese Government.'[5] In the original introduction to my thesis, I had written:

> the Japanese, in their meticulous planning for establishing their empire, neglected to formulate plans for dealing with enemy civilians. Their treatment varied so greatly from place to place and was so inconsistent even within one place, that there must have been no general guidelines laid down by Tokyo.[6]

I was very pleased to see the quotation by Utsumi, dated 1986, and from a Japanese historian no less, exactly confirming what I had written in 1973. Everything that I have read since also confirms what I wrote some thirty years ago.

In her 2004 book, Archer noted two waves of books about internment: the first, soon after the war and mainly by missionaries, and the second and bigger wave, which is still going on, from the 1980s up to the present.[7] It is still going on because children who were interned are now writing their memories, and some relatives of former internees like Greg Leck, or people who have just become interested like Archer, are researching and writing about civilian internment.

From 1970 to 1972, I interviewed 23 former Stanley internees. Time and again I was told that after being released from the Camp, they wanted to forget the bad memories and live for the present and future, which is exactly what most of them did. But by the 1970s, enough time had passed to soften the bad memories, and many of the former

internees were retired or at least getting on in years. Many of them had more time than when they were working or raising families, and they were feeling a desire and in some cases a need to talk, if not to write, about their wartime experiences.

Archer confirms this, pointing out that many internees suffered from the trauma of imprisonment. One of the early reactions to trauma is avoidance, which at least partly explains the paucity of writings in the late 1940s and 1950s. The internees who returned to their home countries naturally became busily involved restarting their lives, in many cases rejoining family members who spent the war years at home and were not interned. In the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as other countries, even relatives of the internees were usually not interested in the internees' experiences and did not encourage them to talk about their internment. Most people's war experiences centred on Europe. To most Americans, the war in the Pacific mainly meant Pearl Harbor in 1941 and Hiroshima in 1945, and there was not much general knowledge or interest in what else had happened in the Pacific, unless people had family members who were directly involved as, for example, combatants or internees.

The political situation after the Second World War, Archer also notes, did not encourage the internees from Asia to write about their experiences. Soon after the end of the war, the Cold War began, and Japan emerged as an ally of the Western powers against the communist block. Thus the Japanese were to be treated as 'friends' and the bad memories of the war not dwelt upon. This perhaps also may partly explain why in the peace treaties signed with Japan in 1951, no mention was made of compensation for civilian internees. At that time there were no organizations of former civilian internees or any demand for compensation. Today, there are active organizations such as, for example, ABCIFER (Association of British Civilian Internees Far East Region) in the United Kingdom. There was also the feeling that Japan's economic recovery might have been hindered had compensation been demanded. While small amounts were paid to some governments, such as to the Hong Kong government, almost nothing reached the former internees. The Korean War, which began in 1950, took attention away from memories of internment.

In the 1980s, however, the tide turned. More books were published and research increased. There were many reasons for this. More emphasis began to be put on social history, particularly the history of less famous people than political or military leaders. Minority groups, including women and children, received more attention. The internees fit well into these new categories. Archer refers to 'psychological factors' which encouraged writing and research.[8] Such things as the anniversaries of the end of the war — the fortieth in 1985 and the fiftieth in 1995 — resulted in increased publicity for all aspects of the conflict. Wreath-laying, flag-raising, speeches and other celebratory actions brought back memories. Furthermore, many internees were getting on in years. Retirement meant that they had more time to think about their past. Possibly failing health made some want to see that their experiences were remembered before it was too late. Sometimes children played a part in asking their aging parents about their wartime experiences, which often had not been talked about much before.

With the increased writing in the 1980s and thereafter, the fading memories of internees were perhaps influenced by what they read or heard without their even realizing it. I believe this makes my interviews, research and thesis in the early 1970s of special value. I might even claim that my work was in a sense 'fresher', being closer to the actual time of interment and hence more reliable.

Even in the 1970s, when I interviewed former internees, several confirmed that in retirement and with their children grown up, they had more time to think about the past. One very kind lady even arranged a luncheon at her home for about ten former internees to meet me and we spent the whole afternoon talking about their experiences. I recall that I turned off the small tape-recorder I was using because so many were talking at the same time! These women obviously had not had such a chance to meet and talk about their internment before and were clearly excited by this chance to do so. This meeting was a wonderful and memorable occasion, and I believe the women enjoyed themselves as much as I did. No tears were shed and lots of laughs ensued, showing how the passage of time had affected them. It was also, for my research, particularly good to have several former internees present at once because when one could not recall a name or incident, usually others did.

As mentioned above, another facet touched upon by Archer was the change in historical perspectives in the 1970s and 1980s as the study of history was broadened to include what she refers to as 'history from below', meaning that of ordinary people and not just leaders.[9] At the same time the growth of feminism encouraged women to research and write about internees' wartime experiences. Previously, research into women's roles in the Second World War was mainly about women working in factories to aid the war effort or women in the military. Such broadening meant more and more material coming out about internment, a phenomena which is fortunately continuing.

Still another influence, in the 1990s, particularly, was the media. Events such as the hostage crises in the Middle East and upheavals in Eastern Europe, involving civilians and especially women and children, rekindled memories for the internees of their experiences. It made them more willing to talk and write about their lives which, they were beginning to realize, also had significance and should not be forgotten.[10] I would claim that even Hollywood and television played a part, a quite important part. Films such as *The Bridge on the River Kwai* in 1957 and *King Rat* in 1965 made people more aware of prisoners in Asia. The former film, though largely fictional and filmed in Sri Lanka rather than in Thailand, the location of the River Kwai, was especially popular and widely seen, winning an Academy Award for Alec Guinness as best actor. The marching song from the film, *Colonel Bogey's March*, would be recognized by most people. Kevin Blackburn, a lecturer in history at the School of Arts, Nanyang University, Singapore, wrote in the *Journal of the Australian War Memorial* that in creating Changi Prison Museum, tourist officials in Singapore were strongly influenced by the book and the film *King Rat* to give tourists what they expected to see in the museum. Historical truth was left behind to a great extent, even to omitting completely mention of several hundred civilian internees in Changi Prison from 1942 to 1944. Blackburn wrote, 'The omission

suggests that Singapore's tourism authorities wished to convey . . . the images found in *King Rat*'.[11] Later, Archer visited the museum, and upon discovering the omission, alerted the authorities and things were corrected. In 2005 I visited the museum and found it excellent, certainly far superior to anything found in Hong Kong.

Much of the continued interest in the internment camps is due to the desire of descendants of internees wishing to find out about the experiences of their family members. However, when I wrote my thesis, my purpose was to tell the story of Stanley Internment Camp and not the stories of individuals interned there. In the original preface to my thesis, I wrote:

> There are, perhaps surprisingly, very few names herein. Only the main individuals are identified. This has been intentional for several reasons. Being an event of fairly recent history, many of the internees are still alive, and to avoid causing possible embarrassment to any of them has been a constant consideration. Furthermore, as some of the material has been obtained in personal interviews, the confidence and good faith of the writing has necessitated discretion. It would have been an easy, though very time-consuming, task to list the names of the hundreds of people who played their parts in this drama, but for what good purpose? This could only cause confusion or tedium for the reader, or even possibly resentment from those who recalled the events from the past. But most important, a plethora of names is not necessary.[12]

By 'a plethora of names is not necessary', I meant that I would give only the names of people I felt were especially important in the Camp. If computers had been available thirty years ago, I might have listed all the names and as much information about each as I could find. I must admit there are now times I regret not keeping notes on more individuals, particularly as I have been asked on many occasions to provide information about individual internees by descendants or researchers. Fortunately there are several lists of internees who were in Stanley at various times, both those compiled by in the 1940s and more recently.

One writer today, Tony Banham, in his remarkable book *Not the Slightest Chance: The Defence of Hong Kong, 1941*,[13] does give the names of almost all the Allied personnel involved in the fighting against the Japanese in Hong Kong in December 1941. There are more than 10,000 names! In 2006, Banham's book on the sinking of the *Lisbon Maru* contains every possible name he could find. And, I am happy to say, he also keeps track of every Stanley internee he comes across.

Another excellent book also published in 2003, is Philip Snow's *The Fall of Hong Kong,*[14] This very well-researched book is an excellent account of the period in Hong Kong leading up to the Japanese attack, the war years and the years immediately after the war. I found it particularly illuminating because of the information about Franklin Gimson, the colonial secretary, who was an internee in Stanley Camp from March 1942 to August 1945.[15] He was the highest ranking British civilian official in Hong Kong after Sir Mark Young, the governor, was taken away from Hong Kong by the Japanese to Taiwan in September 1942.[16]

One more book which merits special mention is Greg Leck's *Captives of Empire: The Japanese Internment of Allied Civilians in China 1941–1945*.[17] Leck's grandfather, Oliver 'Nutty' Hall served in the Chinese Maritime Customs and was interned in Shanghai. The book, 'a weighty tome' (Leck's words, personal communication), consists of 738 pages, 20 maps, over 650 illustrations, 66 colour sheets and lists of some 13,544 internees. Nearly two hundred pages are devoted to the lists, in fine print, giving names, ages, nationalities as well as additional information, from some nineteen camps. The longest, forty pages, is of Stanley Camp internees. There are sections on various aspects of the camps, such as housing, food, medical care, and entertainment, as well as descriptions of each camp. Without doubt this book is going to be the 'bible' for internment camps in China for a long time to come.

If I were to rewrite my thesis, the biggest change would be my treatment of the colonial secretary, Franklin Gimson. In the early 1970s, I found surprisingly little archival material about him. Most of my information about him came from interviews with former internees and the writings of John Stericker.[18] None of the people I interviewed thirty years ago had much good to say about Gimson. They all seemed to feel he was too weak and ineffectual, being especially not forceful enough with the Japanese. Typical of the people I interviewed were three women. One said that Gimson was 'terrified of doing anything' and spoke angrily about 'Gimson's lot', meaning the government servants who worked under Gimson in the Camp and who, she claimed, decided after the war who received awards such as MBEs. Another woman, when I mentioned Gimson's name, said, 'That one? That Boy Scout?' in a forceful and derogatory tone. Still another woman, even though she had problems with Gimson, said more kindly, 'Gimson was just not effective.'[19]

My impression thirty years ago of Gimson was mainly formed by those I interviewed. One woman I did not interview, however, who wrote at length about Gimson, was Dorothy Jenner, an Australian who became very well-known in Australia after the war as a radio broadcaster. Professionally she used the name Andrea. Her autobiography published in 1975, entitled *Darlings, I've Had a Ball!,* has a chapter giving one of the most interesting accounts of internment in Stanley Camp.[20] Even in the Camp she seemed to have a ball at least some of the time. She mentions in her book that she kept a diary which she hid in her shoes. The diary is now in the National Library of Australia. While her writing is exaggerated and inaccurate in some ways (e.g. the Stanley Camp chapter begins with the words, 'There were eight thousand of us in Stanley Camp', the reality being more like three thousand), the book is very amusing and readable.[21]

Touring the Far East as a war correspondent for a Sydney newspaper in 1941, Jenner was caught in Hong Kong when the Japanese attacked, being one of those who had gone to the airport to fly out on 8th December when the Japanese bombs destroyed the plane she expected to fly out on. She ended up spending the entire three and a half years in Stanley Camp. She was the subject of a cartoon (see p. 97) drawn in the Camp in 1943, showing her cleaning a toilet wearing a 'suntop' and shorts made from a flour sack with the words 'Australian best flour' on her bottom. In regard to Gimson, Jenner

6 Dorothy Jenner's police pass, signed by the Commissioner of Police Pennefather-Evans, later her fellow internee.

7 Dorothy Jenner's shoes and diary, which she hid in the very thick soles made of car tyres.

did not appreciate him, to put it mildly. She wrote, 'the most senior Englishman in the Camp was a very nasty piece of work called Franklin Gimson . . . the ultimate colonial snob. He didn't like Australians, me in particular'.[22] She claimed that after the war when she was suggested for an OBE, she was rejected twice because Gimson 'bad-mouthed' her, so she had to wait for her OBE until 1968. One of the former internees I interviewed in 1970 also mentioned Gimson's role in deciding on awards and its being unfair.[23]

Jenner's main problem with Gimson concerned repatriation. After the first repatriation of Americans in 1942, Jenner asked Gimson to put forward her name for the next repatriation as she had been an American citizen for fifteen years before the war. She wrote, 'Mr. Gimson received my suggestion very coldly and that was that.'[24] In his diary, Gimson mentioned Jenner several times, and, not surprisingly, not in a positive way.[25] In another incident, Jenner wrote that she had a letter of introduction to Mr. Hattori, the Camp Commandant, in 1943 (in her book she spelled his name 'Hatori'), from an Australian friend who had known Hattori when he was consul general in Melbourne before the war. As a result, Jenner used this connection to befriend Hattori in the Camp. On 12 August 1943, Gimson wrote that he went to see Hattori in the headquarters and found Jenner already there. Gimson assumed she was discussing with Hattori matters concerning the Australians, but he wrote, 'I heard Mrs. Jenner dealing with other matters which really did not concern her at all.' Later the same year, in December 1943, Hattori told Gimson that Mr. Zindel, the Red Cross delegate in Hong Kong, had asked the Swiss ambassador in Tokyo if Mrs. Jenner could have priority for repatriation as a war correspondent. The answer had been 'no'. Later Gimson wrote that he learned that Jenner was trying to get Mrs. Selwyn-Clarke to contact the British government in the U.K. for Jenner in order for her to sue the government for not assisting her repatriation. He described this in his diary on 14 December 1943 as a 'fantastic proposal'.

With such obvious differences in their personalities, Jenner being very flamboyant and not seeming to care what she did or said, as is clear in her book, and Gimson being so circumspect in all ways, it was hardly surprising the two did not get along, to put it mildly. However, he was not the only one who found Jenner trying. In one of my interviews, in 1970, a lady told me that Jenner was 'very amusing until she got boring with her jokes'. The lady did, however, praise Jenner for refusing a request from the Japanese to broadcast a rosy picture of the Camp.[26]

As mentioned above, thirty years ago my main source of written material was John Stericker's writings. Since that time many more materials have emerged, notably in Rhodes House, Oxford, including Gimson's diary. In addition, there are copies of some of his papers in the University of Hong Kong Library.[27] These written sources have caused me to change my impression of Gimson, making it much more favourable. I think it worthwhile to discuss how and why my impression of him has changed so much. After reading materials which were not available thirty years ago, I now feel that Gimson was greatly misunderstood by the internees. In the first place, his attitude towards the colony of Hong Kong was vastly different from that of most internees. He came to Hong Kong from six years of service in Ceylon, where the colonial government showed concern not only for British subjects but also for the native population and the Ceylonese played a much more important role in the government than did the Chinese in Hong Kong. Before 1941, it was widely felt in Hong Kong that the government existed mainly to help trade and thus the British merchants. The merchants thought that Hong Kong should be like a treaty port of China, where the non-Chinese had special rights, and they considered that they could control policy through the Legislative Council or by

influence in London. Gimson wrote in his report that some merchants even thought that if Japan assumed control, Hong Kong should be declared an open area and commerce unaffected![28] Such attitudes came into sharp conflict with his ideas. Furthermore, it was unfortunate for Gimson that he arrived in Hong Kong when he did. Philip Snow in *The Fall of Hong Kong* writes, 'Gimson . . . arrived (with spectacular timing) on the day before the invasion'.[29] In his report Gimson wrote, 'I arrived in Hong Kong . . . on December 6th 1941, the day before the war started . . . I had therefore little personal acquaintance of its people and its customs.'[30]

After the unbelievably (to the internees) rapid surrender of Hong Kong on Christmas Day 1941, the internees had no trust or faith in the Hong Kong government. In addition to the surrender, there were other reasons for the internees to dislike the government. In an excellent 14-page article, Alan Birch discussed reasons for anti-government feelings in Stanley Camp. Birch, a reader in history at the University of Hong Kong, spent Michaelmas Term 1972–73, at St Anthony's College, Oxford, where he did most of the research for this article. At the time Gimson was still alive and answered several important questions for Birch, who credited Gimson with maintaining the continuity of the British rule of law over British civilian subjects in the Camp. Gimson had to struggle very hard to do this as there was much opposition. Birch cited three major reasons: the trauma of defeat, a number of scandals and controversies involving the government in the pre-war period, and the refusal of the government to declare Hong Kong an open city when Japan attacked.[31]

Following the surrender to Japan, Gimson was allowed to remain in urban Hong Kong and did not move into Stanley Camp until March 1942, nearly two months after the majority of the internees. He was not involved in the enormous problems of settling into the Camp from the end of January through February, cleaning up after the horrific fighting of December 1941 and organizing housing and food, for example. He did, however, visit the Camp from time to time, and by the time he moved in, basic organization had been accomplished and life had settled down. As he saw the situation upon his move into the Camp, however, one of his first tasks was to gain control of the Camp for 'His Majesty's representatives', a task which required, he wrote, 'considerable finesse'.[32]

An election had been held in Stanley on 24 January 1942, for a temporary committee. The overwhelming majority of those elected were merchants and businessmen.[33] Ben Wylie[34] of the *South China Morning Post* served as chairman and other members included D. L. Newbigging of Jardine Matheson, L. R. Nelson, a New Zealand businessman, a minister, a solicitor, a merchant and three doctors. Only two government officers were elected, the defence secretary, J. A. Fraser, and the financial secretary, H. R. Butters. According to *SCMP: The First 80 Years*, Gimson considered Wylie his 'leading opponent by becoming spokesman for a group who considered that government officials no longer had a mandate to rule'.[35] One of Wylie's colleagues wrote that Wylie's 'quarrels with Gimson in Stanley were no mere tiff, but strong-felt opposition to the representative of a discredited government'.[36] Nevertheless, Wylie was held in high esteem in Hong Kong, was a Justice of the Peace (JP) and in 1956, the government named a road after him in

Kowloon, Wylie Road, which runs through King's Park.[37] Significantly, Gimson never was given such an honour.

The temporary committee only served for less than one month, an election for a more permanent British Communal Council taking place on 18 February. This time more government officers were elected. Though still not resident in the Camp at that time, Gimson became a part of this council as a partner of the chairman. Not long after, he became the chairman and then wisely moved to establish his position as the top representative of the internees, showing that Hong Kong was a British territory 'temporarily occupied by the Japanese'.[38]

Gimson had difficulties, of course, in dealing with the Japanese, and he also had great difficulties handling the internees with their great expectations and many demands. There were times when some internees ignored his advice, which was extremely annoying and frustrating for him. For example, Gimson mentioned people in Hong Kong outside the Camp, especially Chinese and Indians, who sent food parcels to some of the internees, describing such actions as 'a debt that can never be repaid'.[39] He told them that he knew the kind donors were sometimes punished by the Japanese for their generosity towards the internees, so he told the recipients not to acknowledge receipt by sending messages and thereby possibly causing problems for the senders. Some internees paid no attention to Gimson's advice. One can surmise they probably wished to thank their friends and, more likely, ask for more parcels or for specific needs. Gimson wrote that such disobedience in ignoring his advice was 'typical of the attitude of many internees who appeared to be incapable of appreciating the wide-spread supervision of activities' by the Japanese outside the Camp.[40] One person who experienced Gimson's wrath was Jean Gittins, and possibly it was she he had in mind when he wrote the above criticism. In March 1942, it was possible for the internees to send parcels through the Stanley Camp Welfare Office to the POW camp in Kowloon. As mentioned earlier, Jean's husband, Billy, was in camp there, and Jean was able to put together a parcel for him, including a roll of toilet paper. She decided to include a message in the toilet paper roll, and with the help of a friend, a University of Hong Kong professor, she hid her message in the roll, spending hours unrolling and re-rolling it. The day after she handed in the parcel to the Camp Welfare Office, she was summoned there and confronted by Gimson. He asked her if she had concealed a message and she admitted she had. She then had to unroll the toilet roll. Gimson was furious and asked how she could be so selfish as to expose the Camp to possible reprisals. He asked her if she had no consideration for the women and children who were already suffering. She wrote, 'he went on and on and said . . . I would be let off with a caution, but, should I attempt anything else, my name would be posted on every notice board so that everyone in the camp might know what a selfish person I was.' She took back the message and left. 'I was in disgrace, but I was unrepentant,' she wrote, '. . . had my scheme worked, the result would have been worth every bit of the effort.'[41] While one can understand Gimson's anger, it does not speak well of him that he was described as 'furious' and going 'on and on'.

Reading Gimson's diary, one is struck by how often he refers to the problem of internees not understanding the difficulties of dealing with the Japanese. Many internees thought that Gimson could do much more for them than he could, and they felt he should have been more demanding in all respects, from improving their food to asking for special favours. This point appears many times in his diary. Gimson had learned his lesson early on, soon after the surrender of the Japanese when he was living in the city. When the first people were interned in the hotel-brothels on 5 January 1942, Gimson did protest. He wrote, 'Protests I made to the Japanese were couched in language which later I should have refrained from using and which in consequence resulted in my imprisonment for 36 hours. My release was obtained through the kind intervention of Mr. Kimura of the Japanese Consular staff. If this vituperative form of communication had been used later in the period of occupation when the Kempetai were in control, I should probably have been executed.'[42] In September 1943, Gimson noted that he was pleased to be able to read to members of the British Community Council a letter from Mr. Hattori, of the Japanese Foreign Affairs Department, about the difficulties he (Hattori) was working under, in regard to food and medical supplies. Gimson wrote, 'The contents of the letters merely emphasised statements which I had been making continually but which had not been generally accepted or perhaps understood. Now that the viewpoint of the Japanese is given in writing, perhaps internees will appreciate the mentality of the enemy which we are fighting.' The following year, in April 1944, Gimson was approached by some internees asking him to appeal to the Japanese for a favour. He knew it would not be granted and the internees also knew that, but they wanted Gimson to bear the responsibility for the refusal. Again, in February 1945, he wrote that some internees wanted him to put forward protests to the Japanese regardless of the consequences.

Many internees clearly did not appreciate the simple fact that Gimson himself, like them, was a prisoner and the Japanese were 100 percent in control. Many appeared to think that Gimson was still, for all intents and purposes, colonial secretary and in a position of power. Of course, he really had no power. The more I read Gimson's diary (and there are hundreds of pages), the more sympathetic I became towards him. While struggling with the enormous pressures of confinement, loss of power and decision-making, occasional illness, the problems all internees faced of separation from loved ones, and so on, as mentioned earlier, Gimson had to contend with some very demanding internees. Although I gained the impression he was very discrete in writing his diary and his feelings about many internees, twice in December 1943, he allowed himself to note that even while trying to enjoy a few minutes reading in the sunshine, he was interrupted by internees. On 23 August 1943, the date of Sir Vandeleur Grayburn's death notice, an especially long and weary day for him, he was 'pestered' at 8.15 p.m. by internees. On 7 December 1944, Gimson noted in his diary that after attending a lecture by a man who had the experience of having been in a POW camp that 'one of the difficulties of this (Stanley) camp is that it is composed of both men and women of varying social status' as contrasted with a POW camp of men only of 'more or less the same social upbringing and background'.

In March 1945, it was not surprising that Gimson was beginning to lose patience after so many months of internment and so many requests of all sorts from the internees. He wrote that in calming a woman working in welfare who had been criticized by her fellow internees, it was obvious she was unable to handle criticism and to realize that 'anybody who is doing nothing (i.e. some internees) imagines that they are at full liberty to criticise, hinder and frustrate anyone who is doing something. I think this statement summarises the attitude of many internees'. I would go so far as to say that many internees were unreasonable and unfair to Gimson. For example, on 25 July 1945, less than three weeks before the surrender of Japan, a plane flew over the Camp and a number of bombs fell on St Stephen's College. Though luckily the bombs failed to explode and no one was killed, three people were admitted to hospital suffering from shock. Gimson visited the bungalow near which the bombs had fallen and later was busy at the Japanese headquarters dealing with this incident. On 26 July, the Japanese pressured Gimson to sign a certificate stating that the plane was American. Some internees had claimed the plane was Japanese. It was not until 2.15 a.m. that negotiations, no doubt very difficult, finished and Gimson signed the certificate. He noted in his diary on 30 July that an internee had expressed disappointment that Gimson had not extended any sympathy to the victims of the raid. He wrote that the internee 'little knew that all my time had been spent in many matters arising out of the bombing'.

Without doubt one of Gimson's strongest points was his thinking of long-term, postwar matters, unlike the internees. He was obviously very perceptive. Most internees were understandably almost totally concerned about their daily lives, and worried about food, their loved ones, either in camp or elsewhere, and the loss of their homes, livelihoods and businesses, i.e. immediate worries. Gimson, on the other hand, having just arrived in the colony and with no personal ties of any kind to Hong Kong, had different concerns. No doubt it helped that in camp he had a personal assistant (or valet), who had previously worked at Government House, to take care of many of his personal needs.[43] Although very busy every day with administrative work, meeting with the Japanese and especially dealing with internees' problems and requests, he was able to find time to think about the postwar period in Hong Kong, which itself was indicative of his intellect and ability to not only dwell on the immediate problems. His thinking ahead was his greatest attribute and what makes me admire him today. However, he and a small group of other internees were not alone in thinking of the postwar period. Even away from Hong Kong, at the Colonial Office in London, it was becoming understood that Hong Kong needed to change. In *The Fall of Hong Kong*, Philip Snow wrote that Bishop Ronald Hall, who had been in the United States in December 1941 when Hong Kong surrendered, soon after visited the Colonial Office in London and urged that the Hong Kong civil service be opened to all British subjects, both Chinese and Eurasian. Others shared the Bishop's views. Furthermore, the Colonial Office was aware that a British re-occupation of Hong Kong after the Japanese surrender was not a certainty. Both China under the Kuomintang and the United States made clear that Hong Kong should be returned to China. The Colonial Office realized that reforms in Hong Kong

would help protect British rule.[44] Gimson knew of these matters, being aware of much that was going in London through secret contacts made with Stanley Camp by the British Army Aid Group (BAAG).[45] In his diary Gimson wrote that the Chinese would have to play a bigger role in Hong Kong and that Europeans would have to cooperate more with them. He called for an elected Chinese representative to the Legislative Council. He urged bankers to play a more active role in financing commercial enterprises, which would include those run by Chinese. He even wrote in April 1944 that the standard of living of upper-class Europeans would have to be 'considerably reduced'. These were not subjects most internees cared about or wanted to hear about, being much more interested in mundane matters like housing, food and repatriation. When he was unable to help with these matters, he was criticized.

In his 1945 report, Gimson stated that he was very aware of the internees' feelings about him, and he took pains to explain his position and justify his actions in the Camp. He wrote that he made mistakes, admitting creating the impression of not appreciating the incredible work which had been done during the period before he entered the Camp.[46] For him to admit this, I feel, shows a sense of character not evident to the internees at the time and certainly not appreciated by them during the years of confinement. In countering the internees' feeling that he was too weak in dealing with the Japanese, he claimed that many internees felt one should only deal with Orientals with 'abuse and bluster'.[47] This he believed to be wrong, pointing out that he had six years' experience living in Ceylon and dealing with Orientals. On another occasion he wrote that several of the internees who were demanding a more forceful approach managed to obtain a meeting with the Japanese commandant. During the meeting, the internees used terms of abuse and told the commandant that they were 'housed like pigs and fed like swine'. The commandant was horrified by their behaviour and thereafter would only talk with Gimson.[48] Earlier, in his diary on 5 June 1943, he noted, 'we cannot achieve anything by bullying them (the Japanese) and can only achieve results by diplomatic means'.

More criticism of Gimson came from some internees who felt he was too friendly towards the Japanese commandant, playing bridge with him and spending time in his headquarters. In the book *Prisoner of the Turnip Heads*, the author, an internee and later an assistant superintendent of police, wrote that Gimson's playing bridge with the commandant did cause 'some adverse comment if only because Gimson would be sure of a decent meal'.[49] It seems to me that Gimson was perhaps wisely taking advantage of the commandant's enjoyment of bridge to befriend him and thereby gain better treatment for the Camp. On another occasion, an American leader, a businessman, who had been used to dealing forcefully with Chinese before internment caused problems when he tried to deal forcefully with the Japanese in the Camp. After the American was allowed to leave Stanley Camp for Shanghai, other leaders of the American community apologized to Gimson for his poor behaviour.[50] These examples show that there probably was a lot of misunderstanding on the part of some internees towards Gimson, including some of those I interviewed in the 1970s. Many internees simply expected too much of Gimson and were probably jealous of him as well.

The two major problems of food and housing caused tremendous difficulties, which was clear from my original research and interviews and reinforced by reading Gimson's diary and report. However, he was willing to use not only government servants but also leading businessmen to help him deal with these problems and make the situation less fraught. While moving to gain control of the Camp, he did show appreciation for the anti-government feelings of many internees as mentioned above. In his diary on 7 June 1943, he showed disappointment and contempt for some businessmen by writing that he could not conceive the 'youth of England sacrificing themselves so Hong Kong merchants can collect dividends' and the following day he mentioned the 'egotistic materialism' of Hong Kong. Nevertheless, he wisely used men from Jardine Matheson and Butterfield & Swire, leading British companies, to handle food supplies and accommodation, and in his report he used phrases in regard to these businessmen such as 'admirable work' and their overcoming difficulties 'with tact and humour'.[51] In other words, he did not allow the anti-government feelings and his dislike of some businessmen to interfere with using capable people to try to improve conditions in the Camp. This is surely admirable.

Furthermore, I now feel that Gimson was more 'sensitive' and less of the cold, unemotional bureaucrat, which was the impression I had formed from my interviews with former internees. Now, having read his diary and other papers, I have changed my opinion. Although his diary is a fairly straightforward account of people he dealt with and problems he faced, there are times when a sense of underlying humour as well as his emotions come through. For example, on 2 June 1943, during the time of repatriation, one internee told Gimson that he did not want to be repatriated as God had told him he should die in Hong Kong. Gimson wrote in his diary, 'I stated that I was not in such intimate communication with the Diety as he was and therefore must bow to the dictates of the Temple of Power in ordering him to leave.' On another occasion, on 19 April 1944, some of the doctors asked for extra food for themselves, and he wrote, 'Doctors seem to be opening their mouths rather wide in more ways than one.' He even showed a bit of vanity when in January 1944, there were electricity cuts causing him delay in the morning. On 6 January 1944, he noted, 'I cannot shave until well after 8 o'clock with the result that I shall be late for office'. Later in 1944, on a Sunday in June, he wrote, 'today I had truly a day of rest and am always thankful for a Sunday on which I manage to avoid all work'. Still later in 1944, on 4 December, he gave a lecture in his block on elephant catching in Ceylon. This seems a surprisingly light topic for him and perhaps indicative of another side of his personality, a lighter side. He wrote that the lecture was 'the first of the series . . . to while away the hours of darkness before going to bed. The lecture was well-attended and seemed to be quite popular.'

An unusual story which put Gimson in a very human light was told in *SCMP: The First Eighty Years*. A reporter, Dick Cloake, told of writing a skit for a Camp performance, including a take-off of Gimson. Cloake wrote that Gimson had a stutter and a limp (interestingly, the only reference I have ever found to these characteristics). At the actual performance Gimson himself limped onto the stage in a pre-arranged finale. Cloake did not report that this brought the house down, but no doubt it did. 'It showed Gimson had

a sense of humour,' recalled Cloake.[52] Still another side of Gimson I found commendable in his diary was a liberal trait. In November 1944, a police sergeant wanted to marry a girl who claimed to be pure European but whom some strongly suspected to be Eurasian. The commissioner of police told Gimson that the sergeant would not be able to remain in the police force. Although Gimson felt he had to support the commissioner, on 15 November he wrote, 'my sympathies are strongly with the sergeant', adding two days later, 'I am sorry for him and I consider that if he would place his case before the Secretary of State, the marriage would be permitted together with his retention in the police force.'

Dr. S. Selwyn-Clarke, who knew Gimson personally, surprisingly did not write anything about Gimson's personal side in his autobiography, *Footprints*. Even though his wife, Hilda, and daughter, Mary, were internees in Stanley Camp while he himself was a prisoner for many months in Stanley Prison next to the Camp, the doctor did not even mention Gimson until after the Japanese surrender, writing, '. . . Mr. Gimson . . . at once . . . applied himself with exemplary energy to the task of getting the wheels of government turning again. His personal problem was peculiar, for his original arrival in Hong Kong to take up office had been only a few days before the Japanese attack. Even so, when Rear Admiral Harcourt arrived to effect the liberation of the colony, Mr. Gimson was able to greet him with an organized administration.'[53] It may well have been that the doctor, being concerned with medical matters, had little contact with Gimson.

I began this section on Gimson by saying that thirty years ago my impression of Gimson was not very good. Today I am aware of his great skill in maintaining the position of the British government in Hong Kong and to the best of his ability dealing with the difficult Japanese. In so doing, he alienated many of the internees, but that is hardly surprising. In 2004, Steve Tsang published *A Modern History of Hong Kong* and in this book he wrote, 'Gimson was a courageous and far-sighted official who represented the best in the British Empire' and also 'Gimson reclaimed British sovereignty over Hong Kong by sheer courage, stamina and dedication'.[54] Tsang, of course, wrote from a distance, relying on historical records and looking primarily at the political side of Gimson, and thus his very favourable conclusion is understandable. The historian Oliver Lindsay, in *At the Going Down of the Sun*, quotes an American who wrote in a letter, 'Gimson is a man of firm character; he has a good mind and great patience'.[55] The British government recognized Gimson's contributions by awarding him a knighthood and appointing him as governor of Singapore in 1946. Arriving as he did on the eve of the Japanese invasion and coming into a situation in Hong Kong where the government was largely mistrusted and criticized, Gimson faced an unbelievably difficult situation. John Stericker, who became administrative secretary of the Camp, put it well when he wrote in his book, *A Tear for the Dragon*, 'I know what a strain and responsibility was thrown on that one man (Gimson), with nearly three thousand starving people on one side of him and the obstinate, impossible, and callous Japanese on the other'.[56] Gimson handled himself very well. It is unfortunate and sad that his name is forgotten in Hong Kong. In Singapore, 2005, I did come across his name in the YMCA on a plaque in the lobby, more than I have ever seen in Hong Kong. It would be excellent if someday someone would write a biography of Gimson, no doubt the most important Stanley internee.

As with Franklin Gimson I found little archival material about another very important man, though not an internee, Rudolph Zindel, and the wartime work in Hong Kong and in Stanley Camp of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. It is not surprising that I did not find much information about the ICRC's work in Hong Kong during the war years because the ICRC archives up to 1945 were not opened to the public until 1996. Caroline Moorehead, a writer on human rights and associate producer of a BBC television series on the Red Cross, wrote in her book, *Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross* (1998): 'I was fortunate enough to be the first person granted unconditional access to virtually all papers up until the end of the Second World War.'[57] This book gives us a better understanding of the ICRC and how Stanley Camp was affected by the Geneva Convention. It also gives much information about Zindel, the ICRC delegate in Hong Kong, 'delegate' being the title used by the ICRC for its highest ranking representatives.

With the surrender of Hong Kong and the imprisonment of both POWs and civilian internees, the ICRC needed someone in Hong Kong to act for them. Zindel was a Swiss businessman resident in Hong Kong in 1941. Born in Sargens, St. Gallen, Switzerland in 1900, he had worked for Arnhold Trading & Co. in China for some twenty years. The ICRC in Geneva found out about Zindel from his uncle in Switzerland. The uncle described his nephew as competent, serious, hard-working and with an honest and open nature and healthy spirit. At the outbreak of war in 1941, there was only one ICRC delegate in Asia, Dr. Fritz Paravicini in Tokyo. In March 1942, the Japanese government had informed the ICRC that it would recognize a delegate in Shanghai, and the ICRC appointed Edouard Egle, a director of Siber Hegner & Co., importers and engineers. The ICRC also wanted to appoint delegates in such places as Bangkok, Singapore, Borneo and the Dutch East Indies, but the Japanese refused to recognize any except those in Japan, Shanghai and, eventually in June 1942, Zindel in Hong Kong.

One of the great difficulties for most people, non-Japanese at least, is trying to understand why so many Japanese behaved so cruelly during the Second World War. Another source of puzzlement is Japan's attitude towards the ICRC. Until the early 1930s, Japan had been a very enthusiastic supporter of the ICRC. As far back as 1877, following the Meiji Restoration of the 1860s and Japan's copying of things European, a philanthropic society had been established to take care of wounded soldiers. In 1886, this society became the Japanese Red Cross Society, and Japan signed the Geneva Convention, which caused the ICRC 'incredulity — the first pagan nation to sign' (see note 57). During the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–05, the Japanese treatment of Russian POWs was excellent. Of 60,000 Russian prisoners taken by the Japanese, only 18 officers and 595 men died during captivity. Officers imprisoned in Japan were even given personal servants and taken to visit hot springs. By 1916, when the American Red Cross had 31,000 members, the Japanese Red Cross had 1.8 million members. In 1934, Tokyo hosted the Fifteenth International Red Cross Conference. Over 250 foreign delegates were welcomed by the empress, showing how influential the Japanese Red Cross was. At the conference, a draft convention on the treatment of civilians during

war, called 'The Tokyo Draft', was accepted, though not officially approved. Moorehead wrote that following the success of this conference, 'to the foreigners . . . Japan was a progressive, highly efficient nation, committed to humanitarianism' (see note 57). However, Moorehead also pointed out that the impression gained by non-Japanese delegates was 'all something of a sham'. In 1931, Japan had attacked China, and the following year established the puppet state of Manchukuo and subsequently withdrawn from the League of Nations. These momentous events were not even mentioned at the conference.

As the Japanese military gained control of the Japanese government, it also gained control of other facets of life in Japan including the Red Cross. There was a notable swing to 'looking after soldiers, not reaching for humanitarian ideals'. Japanese Red Cross doctors and nurses were pressed into service with the army. Senior Red Cross Japanese with sympathy for Geneva were silenced, often being given unimportant jobs. The Japanese military had little use for the ICRC. Furthermore, the foreign section of the Japanese Red Cross was taken over by people who only spoke Japanese.

The Japanese military disdain for the Red Cross became very apparent once war broke out, which was mentioned in my original thesis. For example, during the battle of Hong Kong in December 1941, the Japanese soldiers paid little attention to Red Cross insignia. On 19 December, at the Salesian Mission on Hong Kong island, Japanese soldiers faced Medical Corp officers with Red Cross identification cards and St. John's Ambulance personnel wearing Red Cross badges on their sleeves. These were ignored and the men bayoneted or shot. A few days later, on Christmas Day, at St Stephen's College, Stanley, doctors and nurses were slaughtered, the nurses wearing Red Cross armbands.[58]

In February 1942, in reply to letters from the ICRC concerning the Geneva Conventions, the Japanese government replied that although Japan had signed but not ratified the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-war Convention, it was willing to apply *mutatis mutandis* to all prisoners and also to internees. Although this sounded good at the time, it soon became clear that Japan really meant it would do whatever it liked, and this was a disaster both for POWs and internees. The ICRC representative in Singapore during the war, H. M. Schweizer, a Swiss businessman, reported that any mention to the Japanese of the Geneva Conventions produced anger. A furious Japanese colonel told Schweizer, 'You ask too much. You must not be impertinent with the Imperial Army.'

In May 1942, five months after the surrender of Hong Kong and four months after internment of civilians in Stanley Camp, the Japanese finally gave permission for Egle from Shanghai to visit Hong Kong. Together with Zindel and T. Oda of the Foreign Affairs Bureau, Egle visited Stanley Camp in July 1942. Egle's subsequent report to the ICRC was so censored and rewritten by the Japanese; it made Stanley Camp out to be like a summer holiday camp, reporting that people were in bathing suits or shorts, sunbathing, reading, or lawn-bowling. He mentioned that there were lots of books and a hospital with as many nurses as patients. The report was greeted in Europe with disbelief, and rightly so. Other reports from escapees described the rapes and killings during the

battle, the bad food rations in Stanley Camp, disease and overcrowded conditions. On a copy of Egle's report which reached the British Foreign Office in London, someone wrote: 'we have to take Egle's reports with *pounds* of salt' (see note 57). Unfortunately such reports cast doubts on both Egle and Zindel in spite of all the salt.

The three ICRC delegates as well as other Red Cross representatives in the Far East and Southeast Asia had a very difficult time. The ICRC wanted lists of prisoners and internees. It wanted to visit camps and send in food, medical supplies and parcels. To ICRC questions, a standard answer from the Japanese was, 'the time has not yet come to contemplate the carrying out of this scheme'. The Japanese did not trust the neutrality and impartiality of the ICRC. Ironically, the idea of reciprocity, i.e. that good treatment would be given to Japanese POWs in exchange for good treatment of Allied POWs, did not apply in Asia, for the simple reason that so few Japanese soldiers surrendered; rather, they fought to the death or committed suicide. Some even killed themselves after the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945. Many Japanese soldiers, renamed 'surrendered enemy personnel', chose suicide rather than return home having been defeated. In the Japanese mind, to surrender was a disgrace, an act of shame, leading perhaps to the idea that prisoners and internees did not necessarily deserve good treatment.

As mentioned above, the ICRC was eager to send parcels into the camps. Again, the Japanese were uncooperative. Some camps, particularly in the Dutch East Indies, had no parcels for the entire three years of internment. Zindel did manage to get Red Cross parcels into Stanley Camp on three occasions, which are described in detail in my original thesis. In Singapore at Changi men's camp, there were two batches of parcels, but one parcel had to be shared between five or six people. As the parcels were mostly from the American Red Cross, the twenty Americans in the camp received one parcel each. In Changi women's camp, there was a Red Cross representative, an internee named Ethel Mulvaney, whose husband was a doctor in Changi POW camp a few miles away.[59]

Gimson, while sympathetic towards Zindel, was at the time only aware of Zindel's situation in Hong Kong. He could have had no idea of the even greater difficulties which representatives of the ICRC were having in places like Singapore, Borneo and the Dutch East Indies. As explained above, the Japanese allowed only three ICRC delegates — in Japan, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Other people, not delegates, did represent the ICRC in other places, Bangkok, Singapore, Manila, Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies. Those people, mostly Swiss nationals, however, had even more difficulties than the delegates as they were not officially recognized by the Japanese military government. Schweizer in Singapore had been approached by the ICRC to be a delegate, but he had not been formally appointed before the surrender to the Japanese. Nevertheless, he tried to help the POWs and internees in Singapore, and at one time, in 1943, following the sinking of Japanese ships in Singapore harbour, he was arrested. He was lucky to escape death. Likewise in Bangkok, Werner Salzmann, another Swiss businessman, became an unofficial delegate. In 1943, risking death, he managed to get a secret report back to Geneva about the terrible conditions on the 'death line' along the River Kwai. He also

managed to get some relief, a little food and drugs, to the POWs. In December 1943, the 'most serious and most tragic incident' in ICRC history occurred in Borneo. The unofficial representative there was Dr. Matthaeus Vischer, a Swiss medical missionary. He and his wife, Betsy, were accused by the Japanese of 'criminally' seeking to learn the number of prisoners in Borneo as well as their name, age, race and condition of health, and they were also accused of trying to send food to the prisoners. Such activities were, of course, standard ICRC activities. The Japanese military did not consider them acceptable. Vischer and his wife were tried and beheaded. Twenty-four others who were said to have helped the Vischers were shot. Charles Roland, in his 2001 book about POWs in Hong Kong and Japan, *Long Night's Journey into Day*, wrote that if the Vischers' activities were judged criminal, then all Far East ICRC representatives were felons in Japanese eyes.[60]

Without doubt the Stanley Camp internees expected far too much from Zindel and the ICRC. The internees, quite understandably, did not realize or appreciate the insurmountable difficulties of dealing with the Japanese, particularly the military authorities. Gimson mentioned in his report that many internees criticized Zindel. Wright-Nooth, in *Prisoner of the Turnip Heads*, wrote that Zindel 'never impressed us with his efforts on our behalf and was quickly nicknamed "Mr. Swindle" ', but he added, 'there were no grounds for saying he ever cheated the internees'.[61] This unkind nickname was perhaps only used because the word 'swindle' so obviously rhymes with 'Zindel'. However, others, including doctors, also had little good to say about Zindel. Roland, mentioned above, gives quotations about Zindel from two doctors who knew him during the occupation. Selwyn-Clarke, the director of medical services, wrote that Zindel's appointment as Hong Kong ICRD delegate was approved by the Japanese only in June 1942, at which time Selwyn-Clarke passed most of his welfare duties on to Zindel. Selwyn-Clarke wrote: 'Although I was glad to do so, I gained the impression that he had heard rather too much about Japanese severity to act with the necessary boldness on behalf of the prisoners and internees. And from what I was told after the end of the war my foreboding was justified.'[62] Another doctor, K. H. Uttley, who was at Bowen Road Hospital for POWs, wrote in his diary after Zindel visited the hospital on 19 August 1942, 'he looked (at the hospital) for about ten seconds and then pushed off . . . the Japanese have only appointed as Red Cross representatives such men as they can intimidate into saying what they wish them to say.' Roland comments, rightly I feel sure, 'This could be correct but certainly was unkind towards men doing difficult and largely thankless jobs.'[63]

Gimson was sympathetic towards Zindel, perhaps because he appreciated from his own dealings with the Japanese at least some of the constraints Zindel lived with in dealing with the Japanese. Gimson wrote that Zindel told him after the Japanese surrender that he was suspected of espionage and compelled to act with great circumspection. This point was also recognized by a POW in Kowloon who wrote in a diary that in the end the prisoners seemed to recognize Zindel's effort despite Japanese obstruction. On 18 August 1945, Zindel 'got quite a cheer from the boys when he came into camp today'.[64]

Without doubt Zindel did accomplish much on behalf of the Stanley internees as well as the POWs in Hong Kong, and probably he could not have done much more. After the war, Zindel sent an eleven-page report to Geneva from Hong Kong in October 1945. He wrote:

> I found the Japanese in general, and the Japanese military authorities in particular, extremely sensitive to anything implying criticism . . . it required a special effort on my part to get close even to a comparatively small portion of the prisoners-of-war in the camps. If I continued my camp visits under such humiliating circumstances, it was because of the knowledge that, had I left the camp under protest, my future activities on behalf of the prisoners-of-war would have come to an abrupt end.

Zindel also explained that he had been kept under constant supervision, he was shadowed, suspected of being a spy, and he discovered that a dossier was being built up on him. His servants were questioned as well. He explained that with the Japanese he tried to be patient and circumspect but never servile or intimidated. He received a letter from Kay Neckerman, Danish consul to Hong Kong, which said: 'Few people are able to realize the difficulties you have been up against . . . to me it is absolutely clear that you have achieved much more than anyone could expect . . . and I do hope you get the recognition you deserve'. Whether Zindel did receive recognition, I have not found any record of such.

Although my thesis was about one camp, Stanley, there must be some mention here of other camps. In the final chapter of my thesis entitled 'A Summing Up', I did make some comparisons of Stanley with other civilian camps in Southeast Asia and the Far East, coming to the conclusion that Stanley Camp was one of the 'better' camps. This I would still maintain.

Much more information is now available about other camps. For instance in Greg Leck's *Captives of Empire,* was the first description I had seen of the Canton Internment Camp. Most of the internees in Canton were missionaries and a few educationalists, numbering only about sixty, just over half of whom were repatriated in 1943. This camp is of particular interest because it must have been, as Leck writes, the 'best' camp in all of China and Hong Kong.[65] He describes how until March 1944 Chinese servants paid by the Japanese did almost all the work, e.g. cooking, serving the food, collecting the garbage, cutting grass, sweeping walks, and so on. There is no mention of punishments, or slappings (except for one Japanese guard who beat up Chinese labourers but not internees) and certainly no executions of internees as at Stanley Camp. An extraordinary photograph from Presbyterian archives taken after the war shows healthy-looking, well-dressed internees posing with the Japanese guards in civilian dress.[66] What a contrast with other camps, especially those in the Dutch East Indies!

In my thesis I wrote that the Stanley internees 'were in many ways fortunate'.[67] I based this upon the fact that there was always some food served every day, there were skilled medical personnel available, the Camp was run for the most part by the internees themselves and not by the Japanese, families remained intact, the sexes were

not separated, children were an integral part of the Camp, and most people did not 'give up', even as the years rolled by. I wrote that a 'relatively normal'[68] situation prevailed — classes, church services, elections, births, funerals — all took place. But, of course, the barbed wire was there, and there was physical abuse as well as the horrifying executions. As a result of the incarceration for three and a half years, internment in Stanley Camp, while in many ways better than many other camps, was a 'dreadful experience'.[69] Tony Banham, in *The Sinking of the Lisbon Maru,* wrote this about Stanley Camp:

> . . . Stanley would not be a bad camp, as camps go. Rations were never as generous as the internees needed, and the overcrowding was a constant trial, but there was little sadism on the Japanese side and diseases would never take control to the extent that they did in the POW camps.[70]

Although my reading and research since 1973 have reinforced my conclusion that Stanley Camp was one of the 'better' camps, I now realize even more how fortunate were the internees in Stanley. I mentioned in my thesis that probably British Borneo was the worst example of civilian internment, where there was no medical care and women were separated from the men and children from their fathers. I would now change this conclusion and say that the worst camps were in the Dutch East Indies (D.E.I.), today Indonesia. In my thesis I did not mention the D.E.I., which I now know had the greatest number of camps, the greatest number of internees, and by far the worst treatment. In *The Internment of Western Civilians under the Japanese 1941–1945,* Archer gives a figure of 'over 130,000 Allied civilians'.[71] More than 100,000 were in the D.E.I., where on the island of Java alone were some 83,000 civilian internees and on Sumatra 13,000.[72] Most of the writing and research on the camps was in Dutch, whereas today there are many books about the D.E.I. camps written in English and showing very clearly the horrors of the camps there. Terrible physical punishments were common, e.g. beatings, torture, imprisonment in cages and head-shaving of women. There were also executions of civilian internees, and housing, food and medicine were all much, much worse than in Stanley Camp. Women and men, including wives and husbands, were separated. Boys over thirteen years of age were taken forcibly from their mothers in the women's camps to a men's or boys' camp. Naturally such forced separations were heart-rending. Ernest Hillen, ten years old and interned with his mother and older brother, wrote, 'the awful rumour had come true . . . thirteen-year-olds were . . . to be trucked away to no one knew where'.[73] Later even eleven-year-olds were taken away, and 'the lower the cut-off-age fell, the harder wailed the frantic mothers bunched at camp gates seeing their children hauled away. Once a group of them dared to protest, and were beaten and locked up'.[74] Nothing like that happened in Stanley Camp.

One of the best books about the D.E.I., published in 1996, is *The Defining Years of the Dutch East Indies, 1942–1949*, edited by Jan A. Krancher, himself an internee as a child. This book is particularly interesting and illuminating because it is a compilation of twenty-four experiences of internees. Most books about internment are individual stories, and I have listed some of these in my new bibliography. In his memoir Ernest

Hillen's memory and insights are remarkable; for example, after being moved from camp to camp, common to D.E.I. internees, he wrote, 'I had no wish to become friends — friends went away'.[75] Or, before a move and having been counted twice, he noted, 'Maybe arithmetic was taught badly in Japan, for whenever they counted us, they almost always made mistakes, and had to begin over again.'[76] Another book, *Java Nightmare*, was written by an English woman, Daphne Jackson, who married Charles Jackson in 1930, also English and a rubber plantation superintendent. They were interned separately, and in spite of dreadful experiences, both returned to Java after the war, he in 1947 and she in 1948, remaining there until they retired to England in 1949. Another small but very impressive book by Paula Gomez, *Let It Be*, was published in Dutch in 1975 and translated into English in 1993. Gomez was born in the D.E.I., and was a child in internment. Her mother had died during the internment and her father had been killed during the Indonesian uprising against the Dutch after the war. She returned to visit Indonesia from the Netherlands after thirty years, and in her book she quite magically weaves her experiences in internment with her feelings and experiences returning after so many years.

One book that is quite different from the rest is not a memoir but a book about literature, a history of Dutch colonial literature. *Mirror of the Indies* by Rob Nieuwenhuys is of interest because it includes discussion of internment literature. The author himself was an internee, born in 1908 in Java, and he was a teacher at the University of Batavia before the war. His book is particularly interesting for several reasons. He considers the motivations of former internees who write about their experiences, for example, H. L. Leffelaar, born in 1929 and interned with his mother. Leffelaar wrote that what motivated him to write was 'the desire to free himself from his war experiences, not by forgetting or hiding them but by reviving them instead'.[77] Nieuwenhuys also discusses internment writing which was controversial and unpopular with most Dutch people, for example, writing about 'good' Japanese, as Nic Beets did, using the pseudonym L. A. Koelewijn. In his collection of short stories entitled *A Day at a Time*, an interpreter named Tamagashi is portrayed as 'an individual Japanese with human features', a character no doubt based on someone the writer met during his internment.[78] Another, and more unusual, reason Nieuwenhuys' book is of interest is that he discusses a well-documented book entitled *Batavia Signals: 'Berlin'*, which exposes bad Dutch treatment of German internees in the early months of the war before the surrender to Japan in March 1942.[79] Nieuwenhuys also wrote essays about the D.E.I., and published anthologies of Dutch colonial literature and a book of photographs. Like many internees in the Far East, Nieuwenhuys was unable to write about his harrowing internment experiences for many years, not until 1979.

Agnes Newton Keith's *Three Came Home* is mentioned briefly in my thesis. As far as I know, this is the only book about civilian internment in the Far East which became a bestseller and a Hollywood movie. The 1950 film starred the famous American actress Claudette Colbert as Agnes and Patrick Knowles as Harry, her husband. Agnes, an American, was married to Harry Keith, an Englishman and director of agriculture

in British Borneo. Agnes Keith had lived there since 1934 and previously published the bestselling *Land Below the Wind* about her life in Borneo. Her writing of that book helped her during internment as it had been translated into Japanese and she was known by some of her Japanese captors, who as a result treated her with favour.[80] In *Three Came Home*, Keith writes of internment horrors: the separation of families, the lack of medicine, an appalling massacre of European men, women and children who had retreated from British Borneo to Dutch Borneo, and the beheadings of several men. Nevertheless, the book is a tribute to survival and a call for lasting peace. She wrote, 'when we work as hard in peacetime to make this world decent to live in, as in wartime we work to kill, the world will be decent, and the causes for which men fight will be gone'.[81] Like Daphne and Charles Jackson returning to Java as mentioned above, Agnes and Harry returned after the war to help in the recovery of Borneo.

In the preface to my thesis, I wrote that many books and studies of the military aspects of the Second World War had been written. However, the civilian side of the story had not been well covered. While individual experiences had been published, general coverage of civilian internment in the Far East had not been done. My thesis helped to fill this void.

Today, with the widespread use of personal computers and the World Wide Web, the tracing of family histories has rapidly increased. As a result, interest in Stanley Camp is probably more widespread than ever. The internees' children, grandchildren and now even great-grandchildren are often eager to learn more about their family members who were interned. Other people are also interested in the general history of the period. While my thesis has been available in the University of Hong Kong library, access has not been easy. Its publication now as a book is still justified.

The publication of my thesis in the *Hong Kong Studies Series* of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch means that many more people will read it. Without doubt one of the benefits of this will be increased awareness and knowledge of the Camp, for no doubt some readers will share information, perhaps family records, diaries, old photographs, and so on. The new bibliography added to this publication includes materials not available when I wrote the thesis, the endnotes give additional information, and the additional appendices also provide more information which will interest many people.

Finally, I would like to close with a quotation from a man I greatly admire who was associated with Stanley Internment Camp. This is Dr. Selwyn-Clarke. This good man, who himself suffered grievously in the Japanese gendarmerie cells in Hong Kong and later in Stanley Prison next to the Camp, wrote:

> Though the death-rate in the Stanley Camp had been much lower than in the military camps (in Hong Kong), the adult internees were a pathetic sight at liberation, little but skin and bones, several of them tubercular and others suffering from deficiency diseases. Some of them died soon after reaching the United Kingdom or Australia, and at least one gallant character did not live to reach home. This was Sir Alisdair (*sic*) MacGregor, Chief Justice of Hong Kong, whose heart had been affected by beri-beri.[82]

Sir Alasdair Duncan Atholl MacGregor, usually known as Sir Atholl MacGregor, was carried onto the first hospital ship to leave Hong Kong and died on the ship before reaching Suez. He was buried at sea. I dedicate this book to his memory and to all the other Stanley internees, for whom internment in Stanley Camp was a dreadful experience.

Notes

1. Sir Robert Hotung (1862–1956), one of the most famous Eurasians in Hong Kong, became very wealthy as a businessman and property owner. He was knighted in 1915. Jean Hotung Gittins (1908–95) was the daughter of Sir Robert and Lady Clara Hotung. Sir Robert's first wife, Lady Margaret, was unable to have children and she arranged for her cousin, Clara, to become an 'equal wife'. Clara had three sons and three daughters. Jean's books give many details about the family, and another good source of information, especially photographs, is *Ho Kam Tong: A Man for All Seasons.* Ho Kam Tong was Sir Robert's brother.
2. William Minto Gittins ('Billy') was born in 1897, the son of Dorothy Ahlmann Gittins and Henry Gittins. Henry, an accountant, worked for Jardine Matheson from 1912 to 1935. Billy graduated from the University of Hong Kong and taught in the Faculty of Engineering. Jean's parents, Sir Robert and Lady Clara Hotung, did not at first approve of the marriage but love won through and Billy and Jean were married in 1929. They had two children, Elizabeth, born in 1930, and John, born in 1935. As war clouds gathered, the two children were sent to Australia in May 1941, where they both live today.

   In 1938, Billy had joined the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, serving as a sergeant in charge of the searchlights guarding Lyemun Pass, the eastern entrance to Hong Kong harbour. On 7 December 1941, hours before the Japanese invasion, the Volunteers were called up. At 3 p.m. Jean and Billy said good-bye as he headed off to the Volunteers, not realizing they would never meet again. They spoke only once more, briefly over the telephone on 10 December, Billy's birthday.

   Following the surrender on 25 December, Billy became a POW in Shamshuipo Camp. In December 1943, along with some 500 other POWs, he was sent to Japan to work there. Suffering from general weakness due to dysentery and malnutrition, in 1945 he died of pneumonia. He is buried in the Commonwealth War Cemetery in Yokohama, Japan. (See Jean Gittins, *Eastern Windows — Western Skies* and Peter Hall, *In the Web.*)
3. Bernice Archer became interested in civilian internment in the Far East during the Second World War because of a neighbour, Naomi Price (*née* Walton-Smith), who had been interned in Stanley Camp. Through a former colleague of mine at St Paul's College, Mr. Graham Thomas at the University of London, she learned of my thesis and contacted me. In 1991, she and her husband, Michael, came to Hong Kong and together we visited the Stanley Camp site. In 1992, Archer wrote a 119-page Study of Stanley Internment Camp for a B.A. (Hons) in Humanities at the University of the West of England and subsequently wrote about civilian internment in the Far East for a Ph.D. at the University of Essex. In 2001, she researched and curated the first ever exhibition totally related to civilian internment in the Far East, which was held at the British Empire and Commonwealth Museum in Bristol. Then, in 2004, she published a book entitled *The Internment of Western Civilians under the Japanese, 1941–1945: A Patchwork of Internment*, as part of the RoutledgeCurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia. In September 2005, she presented a paper, 'Children's Experiences of Internment', at the 'The Japanese Occupation: Sixty Years after the End of the Asia-Pacific War' conference, held by the National Institute of Education of Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

4. Bernice Archer and Kent Fedorowich, 'The Women of Stanley: Internment in Hong Kong, 1942–1945', *Women's History Review,* Vol. 5, No. 3, 1996: 373–99.
5. Bernice Archer, *The Internment of Western Civilians under the Japanese, 1941–1945: A Patchwork of Internment* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. vii. Unless otherwise noted, all references to Archer in this new introduction refer to this book.
6. Emerson, Thesis, p. i.
7. Archer, *The Internment of Western Civilians under the Japanese 1941–1945,* p. 11.
8. Ibid., p. 12.
9. Ibid., p. 15.
10. Ibid., p. 16.
11. Kevin Blackburn, 'Commemorating and Commodifying the Prisoner-of-War Experience in South-east Asia: The Creation of Changi Prison Museum', *Journal of the Australian War Memorial,* Issue 33, 2000: 1–13.
12. Emerson, Thesis, p. iii.
13. Tony Banham, *Not the Slightest Chance: The Defence of Hong Kong, 1941* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003). Tony Banham is a long-term resident of Hong Kong, having arrived in the 1980s. He has been studying the battle of Hong Kong for well over a decade and has written on the subject, aided in the production of television documentaries, and helped many children of veterans in their researches into their fathers' war years. In 2006, he published *The Sinking of the Lisbon Maru: Britain's Forgotten Wartime Tragedy* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press).
14. Philip Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004). Snow, a resident of Hong Kong and honorary research associate of the Department of History, the University of Hong Kong, is the son of the writers C. P. Snow and Pamela Hansford Johnson.
15. Sir Franklin Charles Gimson was born on 10 September 1890 and educated at Oxford. In 1914, he became a cadet in the Ceylon civil service, where he served until 1941, when he came to Hong Kong. He received a CMG in 1945 and KCMG in 1946, and from 1946 to 1952, he was governor of Singapore.
16. Sir Mark Aitchison Young (1886–1974) was governor of Barbados (1933–38) and governor of Tanganyika (1938–47) before coming to Hong Kong as governor in 1941. Following the surrender of Hong Kong, the Japanese moved him to Formosa (Taiwan) and then to Manchuria. He resumed duties as governor of Hong Kong on 1 May 1946 and retired in 1947. He died on 12 May 1974. See also note 27.
17. Greg Leck, *Captives of Empire: The Japanese Internment of Allied Civilians in China, 1941–1945* (Bangor, PA: Shandy Press 2006).
18. John Stericker, *A Tear for the Dragon* (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1958). Stericker came to China from Liverpool at 26 in 1935 to work for the British-American Tobacco Company. He had lived in Hong Kong as a boy when his father's regiment was stationed there in 1912. In 1941 he had come to Hong Kong from Shanghai to install some machinery in the tobacco factory there, and he was caught by the Japanese attack. In Stanley Camp he served as administrative secretary, keeping the official records, which were buried in old shell cases. He used these papers to write *A Tear for the Dragon*, an autobiography with a long section on Stanley Camp. A longer manuscript about the Camp was given to the University of Hong Kong library, and I used this when writing my thesis. See also note 1 in my thesis.
19. Interviews 1970. All the former internees I interviewed for my thesis were promised anonymity. See Thesis, pp. 307–310.

20. Dorothy Jenner and Trish Sheppard, *Darlings, I've Had a Ball!* (Sydney: Ure Smith, 1975).
21. Ibid., p. 197.
22. Ibid., p. 210.
23. Interview, 28 May 1970.
24. Jenner, *Darlings, I've Had a Ball!,* p. 211.
25. Gimson, Diary, 12 August 1943. Gimson's diary is at Rhodes House, Oxford; a microfilm copy is in the University of Hong Kong library. Hereafter, rather than using endnotes for Gimson's diary, the date will be given in the text where appropriate.
26. Interview, 22 May 1970.
27. In the University of Hong Kong library there are two reports written by Gimson. One, 42-page long, appears to be a draft for the final, slightly longer report. The two reports are bound separately. The first has no indication of where it came from. The second, which I will refer to as Report, however, has copies of two letters with it. One letter, dated 14 August 1972, is from Roderick MacLean, Defence Branch, written on Colonial Secretariat, Lower Albert Road, stationery. It is addressed to A. I. Diamond, Hong Kong government archivist (who died in 2004 in Australia) and states that the Report was 'sent to me personally' because he (MacLean) had served under Gimson when he was governor of Singapore. Also, there is a copy of a letter dated the same day, 14 August 1972, from MacLean to Gimson in Pickering, Yorkshire, U.K., no doubt his retirement home. MacLean thanked him for his memoirs and told him he had given the document to Diamond.
28. Gimson, Report, p. 6.
29. Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p. 76.
30. Gimson, Report, p. 13.
31. Alan Birch, 'Confinement and Constitution Conflict in Occupied Hong Kong, 1941–1945', *Hong Kong Law Journal,* Vol. 3, No. 3, 1973, p. 293. Birch wrote, 'F. C. Gimson arrived to take up his appointment as Colonial Secretary in Hong Kong on December 7, 1941', and he gives as his source, 'G. S. Hamilton, Government Departments in Hong Kong 1841–1966' (Government Printer, Hong Kong, 1967, p. 18). As Gimson himself wrote 'December 6th', I take this as the correct date.
32. Gimson, Report, p. 13.
33. Birch, 'Confinement and Constitution Conflict in Occupied Hong Kong, 1941–1945', p. 300.
34. Ben Wylie, general manager of the *South China Morning Post* (SCMP) was from Dumfriesshire and joined the SCMP in 1909. Described as a 'bluff, hearty, outspoken Scotsman . . . never one to pander to the Government', Wylie retired in 1948 to South Africa. Robin Hutcheon, *SCMP: The First Eighty Years* (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 1983), p. 31.
35. Hutcheon, *SCMP: The First Eighty Years*, p. 94.
36. Ibid., p. 102.
37. Ibid., p. 116.
38. Birch, 'Confinement and Constitution Conflict in Occupied Hong Kong, 1941–1945', p. 303.
39. Gimson, Report, p. 31.
40. Gimson, Report, p. 32.
41. Jean Gittins, *Stanley: Behind Barbed Wire* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1982), pp. 131–2.

42. Gimson, Report, p. 32.
43. Jenner, *Darlings, I've Had a Ball!,* pp. 210–1.
44. Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong,* pp. 198–9.
45. The British Army Aid Group (BAAG) was organized by Colonel Lindsay Ride, an Australian, professor of physiology and dean of the Medical Faculty of the University of Hong Kong before the war. During the battle of Hong Kong he was commander of the Hong Kong Field Ambulance and was imprisoned in Shamshuipo POW Camp. He escaped in early January 1943 to Chungking (Chongqing) and subsequently formed the BAAG. His son, Edwin Ride, published a history of the BAAG in 1981, *BAAG: Hong Kong Resistance, 1942–1945* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1981). His daughter, Elizabeth Ride, in recent years has dedicated herself to organizing and compiling her father's papers and those of the BAAG in the University of Hong Kong library.
46. Gimson, Report, pp. 12–13.
47. Ibid., p. 20.
48. Ibid., p. 21.
49. George Wright-Nooth, *Prisoner of the Turnip Heads: Horror, Hunger and Humour in Hong Kong, 1941–1945* (London: Leo Cooper, 1994), p. 84. Wright-Nooth (1917–2002) was born in Kenya and came to Hong Kong in January 1940 as a probationary assistant superintendent in the Hong Kong Police Service. He was interned in Stanley Camp in late January 1942. He retired in 1971. Wright-Nooth wrote this very interesting and readable book with Mark Adkin.
50. Gimson, Report, p. 22.
51. Ibid., p. 23.
52. Hutcheon, *SCMP: The First Eighty Years*, p. 91.
53. Selwyn-Clarke, *Report on the Medical and Health Conditions in Hong Kong*, p. 99.
54. Steve Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), p. 51.
55. Oliver Lindsay, *At the Going Down of the Sun: Hong Kong and South-East Asia, 1941–1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1981), p. 43.
56. Stericker, *A Tear for the Dragon*, p. 161.
57. Caroline Moorehead, *Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross* (London: Harper Collins, 1998). Unless otherwise noted in the text, all the information about the ICRC in this section comes from Moorehead's book, mostly from Chapter 15, 'Piercing the Darkness', pp. 471–499.
58. *The Stericker Papers III*, p. 13.
59. Archer, *The Internment of Western Civilians under the Japanese 1941–1945,* pp. 74, 111, 161.
60. Charles G. Roland, *Long Night's Journal into Day: Prisoners of War in Hong Kong and Japan, 1941–1945* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2001), p. 200.
61. Wright-Nooth, *Prisoner of the Turnip Heads,* p. 133.
62. Selwyn-Clarke, p. 71.
63. Roland, *Long Night's Journal into Day,* p. 197. Ibid., p. 200, quoting the Diary of Lt. Harry L. White, Winnipeg Grenadiers, at the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa, Canada.
65. Leck, *Captives of Empire,* pp. 435–7, 528.
66. Ibid., p. 528.
67. Emerson, Thesis, p. 264.
68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.
70. Tony Banham, *The Sinking of the Lisbon Maru*, p. 21.
71. Bernice Archer, *The Internment of Western Civilians under the Japanese 1941–1945,* p. 5.
72. Jan A. Krancher, ed. *The Defining Years of the Dutch East Indies, 1942–1949: Survivors' Accounts of Japanese Invasion and Enslavement of Europeans and the Revolution That Created Free Indonesia* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co., 1996), pp. 265–6.
73. Ernest Hillen, *The Way of a Boy* (Toronto: Viking, 1993), p. 105.
74. Ibid., p. 106.
75. Ibid., p. 170.
76. Ibid., p. 148.
77. Ron Nieuwenhuys, *Mirror of the Indies: A History of Dutch Colonial Literature* (Amsterdam: Em. Querido's Uitgeverij, B.V., 1972), p. 230.
78. Ibid., p. 233.
79. Ibid., p. 231.
80. Agnes Newton Keith, *Three Came Home* (New York: Little Brown and Co., Ltd, 1947). It was subsequently published in Great Britain by Michael Joseph Ltd. in 1948 and in Malaysia by Eastview Productions (1982); see Eastview edition, pp. 96, 208.
81. Ibid., p. 296.
82. Selwyn-Clarke, p. 103.

1
Politics

Governing the Camp

From the beginning of internment until January 1944, the Camp was under the control of the Japanese Foreign Affairs Department, a civilian administration, with offices in Hong Kong. On 1 January 1944, the Camp came under the control of the Japanese military, and its designation was changed from Civilian Internment Camp, Hong Kong, to Military Internment Camp, Hong Kong. (A list of Japanese who had contact with the Stanley internees is in Appendix IV.)

During the occupation of Hong Kong, many difficulties occurred between the Japanese civilian and military departments. Hong Kong was controlled by the military, and the two Japanese governors, Lieutenant-Generals Isogai Rensuke (1942–45) and Tanaka Hisakasu (1945) were military men. The civilian administrators came, of course, under the control of the governor, i.e. the military. Hence the civilians, whenever they needed or wanted something, had to get military approval. For the internment camp, this meant that the Foreign Affairs Department officials had to get military approval for everything concerning the internees. The military did what they liked and took what they liked. The civilians were given whatever was left, if the military felt like giving it at all, for example, food supplies for the Camp.

The first head of the Foreign Affairs Department was Mr. Oda Takeo. Described as 'handsome and civilized',[1] he was credited by the internees with trying to improve the food situation, though with little success from the internees' viewpoint. In April 1943, he was transferred to Nanking as a consul.[2] Mr. Oda's replacement was Mr. Hattori Tsuneo. He had been interned himself in Australia, where he was Consul in Melbourne before the war, and had been repatriated to Japan. As he was used to foreigners because of his diplomatic experience, and because, the internees assumed, his internment in Australia had been far better than their internment in Stanley, hopes were high that conditions would improve. Mr. Hattori did appear to be seriously interested in improving things, and the internees presented him with a lengthy description of their needs. This was the 'Hattori Memorandum' (see Appendix V). Unfortunately, Mr. Hattori, for all his good intentions, was able to do very little to improve conditions, finding the military a formidable obstruction.

In 1944, when the Camp came under military control, Mr. Hattori became Colonel Hattori. In July of the same year, his position as head of the Camp was given to one of the better known Japanese of the occupation, Colonel Tokunaga Isao. This man was well known as he was one of the cruelest Japanese in Hong Kong. He easily lost his temper and on occasions had prisoners beaten and/or executed. After the war, he was tried in Hong Kong at a war crimes trial held in Stanley Prison and sentenced to be hanged. Being corpulent, his nickname was 'The Pig'. Before becoming head of Stanley Camp, he had been in charge of the military prisoners-of-war in Kowloon. He rarely visited Stanley, but he liked to play bridge, and some of the internees used to play with him.[3]

Resident in camp, at the Japanese headquarters buildings, was the Camp Commandant. The first one was a Chinese, Mr. Cheng Kwok-leung, who had worked for Thomas Cook & Sons, Ltd. in Hong Kong before the war and whose wife was Japanese. Mr. Cheng was an unpopular Commandant, partly because he had a reputation for taking 'squeeze' from things coming into the Camp and from individuals.[4] Also, as he was a Hong Kong Chinese and not Japanese himself, most internees considered him a traitor. However, he did not remain in charge of the Camp for long, in fact less than two months. In mid-March 1942, he became ill and was replaced by two Japanese. Thereafter, until liberation in August 1945, the Commandants were always Japanese.

Mr. Cheng's successors were Mr. T. Yamashita and Mr. Nakazawa Chikanori nicknamed 'Yam and Nak' by the internees.[5] Mr. Yamashita had been long resident in Hong Kong and before the war had been a barber in the Hong Kong Hotel, his name at that time being Suna.[6] Before the war he spoke English but refused to do so in the Camp.[7] One Christmas night he surreptitiously gave Mrs. Selwyn-Clarke a box of chocolates, a bottle of brandy and two balloons. She awoke a banker friend and the two of them got drunk on the brandy.[8] Mr. Nakazawa before the war had been a tailor's assistant for five

34 Officials of the American Community in Stanley Camp with Mr. Nakazawa and Mr. Yamashita. From left to right, John R. Sindlinger, Mrs. Leonard Hospes, Dr. Henry S. Frank, Christopher J. Livingston, William T. Stanton, Rev. M. T. Rankin, Mose E. Kelley, Alvah W. Bourne, Jr., Robert G. Kendall, C. Nakazawa, Rev. John R. Steiner, T. Yamashita.

years in Hong Kong.[9] Both he and Mr. Yamashita loved dogs and used to walk around the Camp with beautiful dogs they had obtained in Hong Kong.[10]

Following Mr. Yamashita and Mr. Nakazawa were three other Commandants. From September 1943 to July 1944, a Mr. Meijima, an official of the Foreign Affairs Department served.[11] He was very conscientious, making notes of all matters and even answering letters from the internees, a rare practice, but like all the Japanese, he accomplished little from the internees' viewpoint.[12] When he left the Camp in 1944, he caused troubles later by burning all his papers, so there were no records, and the new Commandant, a Lieutenant Hara, was at an immediate disadvantage.

Lieutenant Hara came from Japan and thus had no local background for dealing with the internees. In the autumn of 1944, a water shortage occurred and the Camp experienced an outbreak of dowsing, or water-divining. Lieutenant Hara joined the eager seekers of water and decided one particular spot was likely. He gave an order to dig and awarded extra rations to those who did. For a long time, a matter of weeks, the digging went on and the spot was dubbed 'Hara's Hole', but never did it produce any water.[13] During his time, the Black Market was very active and there was a large supply of money in the Camp. Lieutenant Hara refused to allow eggs or such 'luxuries' to be sold in the Canteen because he could not explain to his superiors where the money came from to buy such things.[14] On one occasion, he slapped two District Representatives, later apologized and gave them overcoats worth ¥1,000 each.[15] When he left the Camp in May 1945, he climbed aboard the ration truck expecting the internees to cheer him off, but none did. To add to his chagrin, the truck would not start and had to be pushed.[16] Lieutenant Hara's replacement, a Lieutenant Kadowaki, faced the difficult task three months later of telling the internees that Japan had lost the war.[17]

There were various other Japanese in the Camp, interpreters and assistants, to help the Commandant. Perhaps the most extraordinary one was the Reverend Watanabe Kiyoshi, a Lutheran minister. He served in Stanley as interpreter for Lieutenant Hara, having arrived in Hong Kong in February 1942. Before coming to Stanley Camp, he worked at the prisoner-of-war camps in Kowloon and in the military hospitals. Rev. Watanabe was greatly admired by both the prisoners-of-war and the internees for demonstrating his Christian beliefs and training. He never did a thing which could have been called treasonous to his country, but he smuggled badly-needed drugs into the Camps and brought messages from loved ones and words of comfort to many of the prisoners and internees,[18] acts which could have caused punishment or even his execution. When the atomic bomb obliterated Hiroshima, his entire family perished, and yet he never showed any hatred or ill-feeling towards a non-Japanese because of this. After the war, he returned to a quiet life in Japan, until years later he was tracked down by a former Hong Kong prisoner-of-war. As a result, he visited Britain, appeared on television and a book was written about him. The book, *Small Man of Nanataki*, contains testimonials of his many acts of kindness in Hong Kong during the occupation.

In addition to the Japanese interpreters and assistants, there were, until the military takeover in 1944, a number of young Chinese to assist the Japanese, chosen for their

35 The Reverend Watanabe Kiyoshi.

ability to speak English. Previously, they had been employed as clerks and junior executives in business offices in Hong Kong. With the military takeover, they were replaced by low-ranking Japanese and Formosan guards, who were brought over from the military prisoner-of-war camps. The Formosan guards were 'a perpetual nuisance — completely undisciplined and uneducated — of most uncertain temper and would beat up hapless internees unmercifully for the most trivial offences'.[19]

In the hotel-brothels, a few days before the move to Stanley, the Japanese had circulated a set of regulations for governing the Camp (see Appendix VI), but after the move to Stanley, these regulations were apparently forgotten, if ever they were really intended for use. Although Japanese officials and Chinese assistants were present in the Camp and technically in charge, the daily running of the Camp was largely left to the internees themselves. With the war raging elsewhere, the Japanese could not spare large numbers of men to run the Camp. It was much easier to put the internees in one rather remote spot and let them fend for themselves, providing them with minimal amounts of food and supplies. From the internees' viewpoint, it was to their advantage to handle most matters themselves, for in this way they avoided to some extent contact and interference from their captors. Occasionally there were inspections by the Japanese or the superintendents, but on the whole they did not interfere much.

To allocate the supplies provided and handle administrative problems, the internees formed committees. The work of these committees is described throughout the various sections of this book. First I look at the initial committee in some detail because this committee laid the foundations upon which all the subsequent committees worked. The various committees all struggled, more or less, with the same difficulties, so their work was very repetitive. These difficulties, such as food and repatriation, are examined in detail separately. Certain important events did occur during the term of each Council and during the final period when the Councils no longer met. These events are examined later also.

Certain traits, however, do appear in common with all the Councils, namely the ceaseless struggle with the Japanese for improved conditions and the fact that whenever an election was held, most of the successful candidates had not been Council members

previously. This latter fact was a reflection of the impatience and dissatisfaction of the internees with their elected representatives. The internees were, on the whole, very demanding and could not understand why their representatives seemed to accomplish so little for them. As previously mentioned, the basic policy of the Japanese was, apparently, to leave the internees to themselves. According to the Japanese, the internees had neither rights nor power. The internees' complaints fell upon their elected representatives. As these men were, in truth, powerless to improve conditions, the internees got rid of them by electing mostly new representatives on each occasion. '. . . to a perpetually starved, ill-housed and comfortless populace, all administrators appeared to be wrong whatever they did.'[20]

The three main committees reflected the main nationalities: American, British and Dutch. At the beginning of February 1942, there were approximately 2,400 British internees, 300 Americans and 60 Dutch, in all about 1,300 men, 1,000 women and 400 children.[21] Initially these groups tended to work independently. In spite of the difference in their numbers, 'each community felt itself the equal of the other and wished to maintain its independence'.[22] Eventually realizing that in many matters cooperation was both necessary and beneficial, international committees were formed. These included the International Hospital Advisory Committee, Stores and Workshop Committee, Health Committee and a Co-ordination Committee. This last dealt with any matter of international interest outside the work of the other committees. After the first American repatriation, in June 1942, fewer than 20 Americans were left, and as the Dutch community was so small, the Camp was run for all intents and purposes by the British. Therefore, the work of the various British committees predominates in the following sections.

At first a Temporary Committee of internees co-ordinated the running of the Camp. Later four Councils supervised matters. These groups and their dates are as follows:

January–February 1942	–	Temporary Committee
March–August 1942	–	British Communal Council
August–February 1943	–	1st British Community Council
February–August 1943	–	2nd British Community Council
August–February 1944	–	3rd British Community Council

On 1 January 1944, Japanese control of the Camp changed from civilian to military. Because the military were opposed to the idea of an elected council, the 3rd British Community Council was disbanded, and from February to August 1945, there was no formal council but the District Chairmen met informally with Mr. Gimson once a week. For a detailed description of the relationship between the Councils and Mr. Gimson before 1944, see Appendix VIII.

Elections were held from time to time for the various councils, and the Camp was divided into districts, mainly geographical — St Stephen's District, the Warders' Quarters District, the Indian Quarters District and, at first, the Preparatory School District. The first three districts had two representatives each, the Preparatory School District one,

and in addition the Police Force, at this time housed in Block 10 of St Stephen's District, one representative. In addition, there were six representatives of the Camp at large. Throughout internment, only one woman was ever elected to a Council.[23] An American woman who was repatriated in June 1942, wrote to her friends in October 1942,

> In the minds of the men, women just did not count in camp. Their attitude was 'we are going to make our camp just as slick as we can, our women and children are not going to lack anything we can get.' But as for expecting women to contribute to the work or thought for the camp, nil! They just forgot us! In the community elections I was the only woman nominated for the council, and was speedily defeated, 'we don't want any women in our meetings!'[24]

Most of the Council members were businessmen, clergy and professional men such as solicitors and doctors. Very few government servants were elected. This occurred because many, if not most, internees were angry at the government, largely as a result of the quick surrender of the colony to the Japanese, showing the lack of preparation and overconfidence of the government.

> The first impulse that ran through (Camp) would, on a larger social stage, have been called revolutionary. On every side, by almost every mouth, the former leading men of the colony were bitterly denounced. They were held to blame for what had happened in Hong Kong. Along the camp roadways where people gathered to gossip, one heard the same angry talk of the government servants' complacency, stupidity and shortsightedness.[25]

Most people had assumed that it would take at least six months for the Japanese to conquer the colony, if they were able to at all. In addition to anger over the quick capitulation, shortly before the outbreak of war, confidence in the government had been lessened by two commissions of inquiry into malpractices within the government. Furthermore, a number of senior government officials had disobeyed an order for women and children to leave the colony before the war, and the addition of these people increased the problems of the Camp. At one meeting of the Temporary Committee, a senior businessman expressed the apprehension of some internees that several government servants had been appointed to positions of responsibility, and he asked for assurance that a general election would be held soon.[26]

The governor of Hong Kong, Sir Mark Young,[27] was first interned in Kowloon in the Peninsula Hotel and later moved to Formosa and then Manchuria. He never went to Stanley Camp. The colonial secretary, Franklin C. Gimson,[28] was initially held in Hong Kong along with Dr. Selwyn-Clarke,[29] Mr. Gimson was able to get to Stanley occasionally during the first few weeks and did attend the first meeting of the Temporary Committee on 24 January 1942. During February both he and Dr. Selwyn-Clarke attended a few meetings, but it was not until 13 March 1942 that Mr. Gimson moved permanently into the Camp.[30] On the previous occasions when he had been unable to get to the Camp to attend meetings, he was represented by Mr. J. A. Fraser, a senior government official, who was executed in October 1943 after the discovery of a radio in the Camp.

The relationship between the Temporary Committee, later the Councils, and the government was rather awkward. The Committee and Council members wanted independence and non-interference from government officials. This reflected the general anti-government feeling as well as the fact that the members had been elected and therefore felt that they represented the will of the majority. Mr. Gimson, however, did not feel that he could allow the Committee or the later Councils to operate independently as long as he was in Hong Kong, for he was the King's representative and the highest ranking government officer in Hong Kong after the governor had been removed from the colony. The problem of the relationship between the Council and the government was raised at a meeting in March 1942, and Mr. Gimson with the aid of his legal advisers drew up an agreement (see Appendix VIII) which was approved by the Council in April 1942. Briefly, Mr. Gimson agreed, firstly, to seek the Council's advice on matters of external affairs, i.e. his dealings with the Japanese, and, secondly, that the Council would be in charge of internal affairs, although he reserved the right to ask the Council to reconsider any matters he thought vital to the community or to the British Imperial interests.[31]

As mentioned earlier, the Temporary Committee first met on 24 January 1942. As most of the internees had entered the Camp on 21 January, the Committee was rather hastily elected, by necessity. At St Stephen's, the electing was by a show of hands; at the Warders' Quarters, blackboard and chalk were used. As it was a 'temporary' committee, it was understood that when the Camp had settled down, a proper election would be held.[32] At the first meeting, officers were elected. The chairman was Mr. Benjamin Wylie, director and general manager of the *South China Morning Post*.

The Committee met almost daily and was primarily concerned with the problems of housing and food. Other topics which frequently appeared on its agenda — and on the agendas of the succeeding Councils — were repatriation, sanitation, firewood, discipline and, surprisingly, dogs. The Committee met at least twenty-two times and dogs were discussed at least eleven times! The problem was that many internees had brought their dogs into the Camp, and with food a problem for the internees, food for the dogs struck many people as wasteful and unnecessary. Not until November 1943, did all the dogs finally die or leave the Camp.[33]

Another subject discussed frequently by the Temporary Committee and the Council during the first weeks was that of committees needed to help run the Camp. 'When several are gathered together, if they be Englishmen, one of the first things that enters their head is to form a committee.'[34] One of the first was a Canteen Committee, and this was followed by Committees for Education, Electricity, Welfare, and an Election Committee for the more permanent council. After the election, the Council soon formed many additional committees. These included Supplies, Relief and Welfare, Billeting and Census, Medical, Sanitation and Water, Construction and Maintenance, Electric Light and Power, Recreation and Entertainment, Gardening, and Education and Religion.[35]

One woman, an Irish national, was somewhat critical of all these committees. She said, 'Instead of getting on with it and getting down to it, they (the British) were forming committees and sub-committees. They were all flying off to meetings.'[36] However, to

deal with the many problems of running the Camp with nearly three thousand internees and with the friction between government servants and most other internees, it would seem that the committees were necessary. In time the committees became organized and did quite an efficient job in running the Camp.

At the meeting of the Temporary Committee on 27 January, Mr. Gimson stated that a list of prisoners-of-war in the Kowloon military camps was available. This list, apparently provided by the Japanese, proved to be both incomplete and inaccurate. Some internees, wives and fiancées, waited months to learn whether or not their loved ones were alive. One unfortunate girl was informed that her fiancée had died during the fighting; at Christmas 1942, she received a card from him saying he was alive and well in Shamshuipo Camp, Kowloon.[37]

After a week in the Camp, at the end of January, conditions were still very bad. There was no electricity, water was short and the food was very meagre. Furthermore, it was not until 7 February that all the bodies from the fighting were buried.[38] Things were slowly getting organized, but there was still a lot of confusion. On 31 January, four instructions from the Japanese were issued. The internees were forbidden to overlook the prison, pick flowers, leave the Camp or use the football ground below St Stephen's. At first glance these rules might appear rather silly if not naïve. However, one can only assume that the Japanese had good reasons for them. Firstly, there were two possible factors behind the rule not to overlook the prison. As the Warders' Quarters were on a hill just above the prison, it was very easy for the internees to see into the prison, and it was being used by the Japanese for prisoners from other parts of Hong Kong. Also, as previously mentioned, the Japanese belief that to look down upon a person was insulting might have played a part here. The second rule, no picking flowers, is a mystery; picking flowers was perhaps the farthest thing from the minds of the internees, faced as they were with enormous problems of food and overcrowding. The third rule of not leaving the Camp is not as silly as it might seem. At this time, the end of January 1942, it was still possible for the internees to easily escape had they decided to try. (Why they did not try is discussed later.) It was several weeks before the Camp was completely enclosed with barbed wire or other barriers. Even later, when the Camp was more fully wired, the wire did not always completely enclose the bottoms of the many ravines in the Camp, and it was fairly easy for a person to crawl under. This did cause trouble, not because internees were escaping, but because Chinese from Stanley village were sneaking in to look for food in the Camp. Also, it was discovered that dogs from the village were getting in the same way. When the internees complained to the Japanese — surely an ironic thing for internees to complain of the ease of escape — the Japanese simply refused to believe such gaps existed under the wire. To admit this would have meant that they had been lax in their supervision. As a result, they refused to investigate the complaints. Finally, the rule about not using the football ground below St Stephen's was made because this area was reserved for the use of the Japanese gendarmerie, who were resident in Stanley village at the police station. The gendarmerie had no official contact with the Camp, which was a good thing for the internees as they were undoubtedly the cruelest group

of Japanese in Hong Kong. However, apparently the gendarmes did not use the field as eventually it became a garden for the use of the internees.[39]

During February, a major problem arose with the Commandant, Mr. Cheng. He insisted that internees with bank accounts in Hong Kong withdraw $50 for supplementary rations of meat, fish and vegetables.

> With childlike effrontery, the Foreign Affairs Department of Greater Nippon presented to the camp a bill for $86,000, $9,000 of which represented 'hotel charges' for the filthy accommodation in which internees were herded before the opening of Stanley Camp; the remainder was the cost of fish and vegetables, the Japanese blandly explaining that rice and salt only is a prisoner's official ration, as recognized by them, and anything else must be paid for by the victim.[40]

Mr. Fraser, representing Mr. Gimson, refused this request and instead demanded full access to the bank accounts for the internees. In this, he was supported by the leaders of both the American and Dutch communities. The result was that Mr. Cheng threatened to cut off all rations if payment was not forthcoming. Needless to say, the internees had no choice but to comply, so two bankers from the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank drew up an agreement for the money to be withdrawn.

The Temporary Committee had expected to hold its last meeting on 19 February 1942, but this trouble with Mr. Cheng necessitated three extraordinary meetings. The following month, after the election, a cheque for HK$88,153.06 was given to Mr. Cheng, along with a letter of protest. This sum represented $9,765 boarding fees for the hotels where the internees were put in January, plus $78,388.06 for the period since moving to Stanley. A receipt was given, but later, after Mr. Cheng's departure, the cheque was returned uncashed.[41]

This demand for money was certainly unfair, because the internees were not in the Camp by choice. This being the case, it was the responsibility of the Japanese to provide food and not expect payment. At the same time as this demand was being made in Hong Kong, in the United States at one of America's most famous and palatial resorts, The Homestead, at Hot Springs, Virginia, the Japanese from the Washington, D.C. area were interned in extreme luxury at an estimated cost to the American government of US$2,000 per day.[42]

As previously mentioned, there was little interference from the Japanese in the internal running of the Camp by the internees. At first the Japanese required a copy of the Temporary Committee's minutes, but eventually this stopped.[43] On one occasion the Japanese protested that the internees' office was being referred to as the C.S.O., which could be Colonial Secretariat Office. The internees explained that the initials really stood for Camp Secretariat Office, a rather weak excuse but acceptable to the Japanese, and the protest was withdrawn.

By mid-February 1942, the Temporary Committee felt that its purpose in starting to organise the Camp had largely been fulfilled, and so on 18 February, elections were held for the British Communal Council. The Temporary Committee had accomplished

a great deal in these first weeks, a particularly difficult and trying period for everyone. With the foundations laid for tackling the problems of keeping nearly three thousand very unhappy and very impatient people fed and sheltered, Stanley Camp was becoming a going concern.

Repatriation

Probably the two most-talked-about subjects in the Camp were food and repatriation. The latter was a 'burning question for over two whole years'[44] and talk of it never completely stopped. This is hardly surprising. Stuck on Stanley peninsula in overcrowded conditions, with little food, poor housing and few clothes, almost all internees looked to their home countries to get them out of Hong Kong. As early as 24 January 1942, at the first meeting of the Temporary Committee, the subject was discussed, and the following appeared in the minutes:

> Referring to the question of repatriation, the Colonial Secretary stated that Mr Yano had, in Tokyo, pressed for this on behalf of women and children and those whose health might seriously be impaired by internment camp conditions. Speaking with reference to the possibility of securing repatriation for men over military age, Mr Fraser expressed the opinion that such could be affected by arrangement between the two sovereign states concerned, made through diplomatic channels.[45]

The subject was, of course, discussed at many subsequent meetings, but it was not until 30 March 1942, that the first definite word from the Japanese came. On that day a group of Americans and Canadians were called to Japanese headquarters. Mr. Oda, head of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Hong Kong, announced that repatriation would take place for diplomats and journalists. Those included were to be sent to Shanghai by 20 April, and from there sent by ship to America.[46] This never occurred; repatriation took place directly from Hong Kong.

Weeks passed, and also 20 April, with no further action. During April, community meetings were held by the Americans and forms were filled out stating whether one wanted to go to Free China, if permitted, or to America.[47] Such a choice was never offered. At the same time there was confusion over who could go — some Americans had British, Australian, Chinese and Russian wives. Eventually the Japanese agreed to allow families to go together, but the Chinese wives had to stay behind.[48]

In May, things began to move. The camp bulletin of 6 May, referred to the pending American repatriation and stated that the *Asama Maru* and/or the *Conte Verde* and the *Nitta Maru* were expected in Hong Kong about 15 June. In fact, the *Asama Maru* was the only ship to come to Hong Kong for the first repatriation. During this waiting period, the Japanese treatment of the Americans markedly improved. More and better food was given, they were allowed to contact Chinese friends outside the Camp, and each American was given US$10 worth of food.[49] Things did not, however, improve for the British internees. 'The English were starving. Into the American quarters poured bags full of food.'[50] On

30 May, the American journalists were called for an interview with Mr. Ogura, head of Domei News Agency Bureau, Hong Kong. Six Japanese journalists were present and questions were asked about the war and internment. The results of this meeting were discovered when the internees boarded the *Asama Maru* and found a copy of the *Japan Times Weekly & Trans-Pacific* dated 11 June 1942. The article about the interview was propaganda claiming the American journalists had stated that the Japanese army was 'not only the strongest in the world but also the most strictly disciplined' and that 'the internment camp here (at Stanley) is probably the most comfortable in the world'.[51] As previously mentioned, in the United States, about 250 Japanese from the Washington D.C. area were interned at the outbreak of war in Virginia at The Homestead, one of America's most luxurious resort hotels, where 700 waiters, maids, bellboys, porters, chauffeurs, gardeners, chefs, etc. waited on them.[52]

Although hopes had increased during May, 1 June passed with no sign of a ship. The Japanese announced 7 June would be the day,[53] but that too passed with nothing happening. *The Hongkong News* on 2 June announced that 'practically the whole American community in Hong Kong will be repatriated about two weeks hence'. Two weeks later, on 23 June, the newspaper stated that 'owing to a minor hitch', repatriation had again been postponed, for the third time, and it is not known when it will take place'. The internees had copies of *The Hongkong News*, so they saw these notices. One can only imagine their feelings of impatience and frustration.

While the Americans in Stanley were chafing at the bit, the Japanese being exchanged from America and South America were preparing to embark. *The Hongkong News* on 21 June, quoted a report dated 19 June that the Swedish ship, the *Gripsholm,* had left New York with 1,098 Japanese and Thais bound for Lourenco Marques, Mozambique, where the exchange was to take place. The ship later stopped at Rio de Janeiro and picked up more Japanese.

Suddenly, late in June, an order was given: 'Pack up. You will be inspected before you leave Camp.' 'Smallpox vaccinations and cholera inoculations were given as well as very thorough medical examinations, of such a nature that I have not as yet recovered from the effects,' wrote one internee later.[54] The repatriates' luggage was inspected first by the Formosan guards and then by the Japanese. All diaries had to be left behind and no addresses were permitted to be taken out. Books and Bibles were taken away. Some people buried things in the Camp, in hope of returning one day.[55] The Japanese did allow each internee not being repatriated to write a letter of 150 words to go with the Americans. These letters reached their destinations, mainly in Britain, late in 1942.[56]

As written messages, aside from the 150-word letters, were not permitted to be taken, people memorized things. One American professor from the University of Hong Kong was asked by Mr. Gimson to take out messages. In addition, the professor interviewed many non-Americans to learn as much as possible about the Camp. Shortly before his departure, he was able to also learn about conditions in the Shamshuipo, Hong Kong military camp when two British doctors from St Theresa's Hospital, Kowloon, were sent into Stanley. These doctors had been in contact with the military prisoners-of-war.[57]

Finally, on the morning of Monday, 29 June, a large ship, the *Asama Maru*, was sighted. 'Tears were in everyone's eyes and there were no words to be said.'[58] 'My heart began throbbing and pounding. The internment Camp was teeming with agitation.'[59] 'Throughout the Camp the cry was taken up. "The *Asama*'*s* here. She's here." Men flooded up to the cemetery. Some shouted with joy, but most of us were numb with disbelief.'[60] The ship had a black hull with huge Japanese flags and large white crosses painted on either side. There were smaller white crosses on the bow and stern and large, illuminated crosses on the superstructure.[61] *The Hongkong News* of 30 June, described the ship as bearing four white crosses on each side of the hull and two on the funnel. Within a few hours of the sighting, guards were posted to separate the Americans from the other internees.

The *Asama Maru* sailed past the Camp and anchored about six miles away in Lamma Channel, between Hong Kong Island and Lamma Island.[62] Already on board were 432 repatriates from Japan, representing twelve nations and including the American ambassador to Japan, the Brazilian ambassador and ministers for Canada, Columbia, Mexico and Peru.[63]

Final farewells were said to British and Dutch friends. Some Americans gave all they could to friends left behind — food, cigarettes, tin cans, shoes and clothes.[64] Others jammed their suitcases full of tins of jam, tomatoes and other food. Each repatriate had received ¥100 from the Japanese (sent by the American government) a few days before departure. Some used the money to buy cigarettes for those left behind or simply gave it away. Others kept it to use on the ship.[65]

In the afternoon of 29 June, the Americans lined up in alphabetical order, and at about 3.00 p.m. the signal to move was given.[66] 'There was nothing slow about us now, even though it was a hot, Hong Kong summer day.'[67] Down they marched to the jetty in Stanley Bay to board small boats which took them to an old, green and white ferry for the trip to the *Asama Maru*. As the ferry began its journey, many looked back at Stanley Camp and waved to those left behind. Almost all those left in the Camp turned out to watch the departure. 'We sat on the wall of the cemetery and with deep emotion watched them go. We had dreams of good food for them, of fruit and ice-cream for the children. In their departure there was promise that our own repatriation would follow.'[68]

Before actually boarding the ship, a triple identification was made by an American Consular official, a Camp representative and a Japanese officer. After this, the Consular staff boarded, then people who had been brought out from the city, and finally the Stanley internees.[69] *The Hongkong News*, 1 July 1942, gave the total number of repatriates as 377 including ten Canadians, one French national and one Dutch national. The second group to board, those from the city, included a number of bankers, a few other Americans who had been in the city (in April 1942, the Japanese had allowed about twenty internees who wanted to return to the city to go, with guarantees from neutrals),[70] and a number of Chinese-Americans.

Just as there was excitement at the Camp, there was also excitement in the city when the buses left with these repatriates. 'On the day they were to go all the white

people I knew were stirred to wild excitement — we could at least watch the departure of the bankers from town. There was a flurry at the doorway of the bus; people were kissing each other good-bye and weeping. There was a shout, and a fresh burst of sobs and waves, and the buses started up.'[71]

The ship sat for at least twenty-four hours before sailing on 30 June 1942. One source[72] gives the sailing as occurring about 2 a.m., but two sources[73] give it as at sunset. After Hong Kong, the first stop was at Saigon, on 30 July, where repatriates from Burma, Thailand and Vietnam boarded the ship. At Singapore, on 9 July, it was joined by the Italian ship *Conte Verde,* carrying repatriates from Shanghai. The two ships then sailed together and reached Lourenco Marques on 22 July. The next day those on the *Asama Maru* and the *Conte Verde* changed places with the Japanese and Thais on the *Gripsholm*. On 28 July, the *Gripsholm* left Lourenco Marques and reached New York City on 25 August 1942, docking at Jersey City, New Jersey.[74]

Following the American departure from Stanley Camp, four Americans, one Dutch national and eleven British nationals were allowed to leave the Camp to reside in the city, having guarantees from neutrals.[75] For the British and others left behind in the Camp, one can only guess at their feelings. Undoubtedly they were glad for the Americans who had been able to get away, but also they must have felt a certain sadness at being left behind, a sadness mixed with the hope that they would themselves be going soon. One benefit for them was more room. Re-billeting was undertaken into the emptied American quarters. A small hall in the Prison Officers' Club, which had been used by the Americans, was taken over for use as a kindergarten, for lectures, rehearsals, informal concerts, and by the Roman Catholics for their services.[76]

A few weeks later, in August 1942, Mr. Gimson reported to the British Community Council on a long talk he had had with Mr. Zindel, the Swiss Red Cross delegate in Hong Kong. Mr. Zindel had spoken encouragingly about repatriation, saying women, children and possibly old men would be repatriated. A surprising statement in the minutes of this meeting was that 'Mr. Zindel stated that the object of the Japanese was to close the internment Camp as they were of the opinion that the present concentration of British in one centre was a mistake'.[77] This is surprising because this is the only mention of such an idea. Nothing came of it, needless to say.

Throughout August and September 1942, repatriation was discussed at many meetings of the British Community Council, as well as at length by the internees themselves. 'The Camp was bitten with the idea of repatriation'.[78] Unfortunately, in time this led to a major difficulty — probably the greatest internal trouble during internment — between the internees and Mr. Gimson. As previously mentioned, there was in the Camp a strong anti-Hong Kong government feeling. Mr. Gimson was, of course, in an extremely difficult position. As a prisoner, like all the other internees, he had no real power. Yet many internees apparently felt he was not forceful enough in his dealings with the Japanese authorities. The British Community Council urged him to press for repatriation. Perhaps aware of his position of weakness, he told the Council that the initiative for repatriation must come from the Imperial Government in London and not from him.

In September 1942, a petition addressed to London was circulated in the Camp requesting that repatriation be arranged for women and children. At the 2 October 1942 meeting of the Council, Mr. Gimson spoke against the use of such a petition. In his statement the words 'the promoters and signatories of this petition must be prepared to answer a charge of disloyalty' were used.[79] This caused a sensation among the internees. Subsequently, Mr. Gimson had to make a further statement to explain himself more fully and try to pacify the internees, many of whom were incensed by his, to them, accusation of possible treason.

Mr. Gimson explained at great length that the question of repatriation must be left to the Imperial Government. He was powerless to help, and moreover, it might have been the intention of the Imperial Government 'to maintain a nucleus of British residents in Hong Kong, not only as a matter of principle, but because it was felt that the morale of the Chinese in town, and their interest in the Allied cause, would be more fully maintained by the continued nearness of the British civilians and the former Hong Kong Government, whereas a general evacuation would savour of rats leaving the ship'.[80] Also, Mr. Gimson tried to clarify what he meant by 'disloyalty'. He called upon the internees to realize that loyalty in time of war was very different to that in peace time, that loyalty in war called for everyone to place 'their lives, their fortunes and all they held dear in the world at the disposal of the Cause'. Finally, Mr. Gimson pointed out that the only possible way for the petition to reach the Imperial authorities was through the Japanese authorities, a method of transmission, i.e. by an enemy power, 'unparalleled in the history of the British Empire'.[81]

Although Mr. Gimson was undoubtedly correct, especially in his legal arguments, unfortunately the Camp as a whole was very hurt by his use of the word disloyalty. The petition was evidently dropped but damage was done to the relationship between Mr. Gimson and the internees. Some have never forgotten nor forgiven Mr. Gimson for his stand.[82]

Weeks and months passed. The talk about repatriation never ceased, but nothing concrete happened. On Empire Day 1943, 24 May, Mr. Hattori, chief of the Foreign Affairs Department, visited the Camp and said that repatriation of women, children and the sick would occur during the summer. 'A sign of relief went up from all quarters, the very food tasted better, the rooms seemed more possible, the congestion less oppressive, for there was new hope in our hearts.'[83] Mr. Hattori also said that the British government had asked for repatriation of all British in Hong Kong, but the Japanese government would only consider that of women, children and sick men. The following day registration and medical examinations began. 'All sorts of tentative arrangements were planned in preparation for a sudden order for departure: where we wished to go and with whom we wished to travel, should the choice be left to us.'[84] Many even packed suitcases, and it seemed that 'a capacious steamship service was visualized as operating up and down the Pacific at enormous speed for the benefit of Stanley internees'.[85] *The Hongkong News* added to the hope. The issue of 25 May 1943, carried the following item:

> Tokyo, May 24 (Domei). Mr. Hori Tomokazu, spokesman of the Board of Information, at a foreign press conference today revealed that negotiations with the United States and Britain for the repatriation of internees in enemy countries are 'going on rather smoothly'. He added, 'we expect an agreement to be reached in the not distant future for the second exchange of nationals with America and Britain.'

In spite of all these hopeful signs, months passed and nothing happened, at least nothing for the British.

In August 1943, the repatriation of Canadians and more Americans was announced, to take place the following month. Similar preparations as for the first repatriation in June 1942, were made. Official messages and reports were memorized for transmittal to the outside world. Mr. Zindel of the Red Cross cabled Geneva to ask for 50,000 Swiss francs worth of supplies for Hong Kong to be put on the returning ship.[86]

The Hongkong News on 15 September 1943 reported that the *Gripsholm* had sailed from New York on 3 September with 1,340 Japanese on board while the *Teia Maru* would be coming to Hong Kong for American and Canadian repatriates. On 23 September the *Teia Maru* arrived and took on board 73 Canadian nationals, 24 Americans, 13 Latin Americans and about 30 Americans and Canadians who had been interned at Canton. A few days previously the ship had picked up internees at Shanghai. From Hong Kong the ship sailed to Portuguese Goa for the actual exchange with the *Gripsholm*.

36 *The Hongkong News* of 25 September 1943 had photographs of the *Teia Maru* and the *Gripsholm*.

Before leaving, the repatriates faced the same farewells with the British as those who had gone the previous year. 'They (the repatriates) loaded us with presents: their mugs, knives and spoons. They gave us their collection of nails, the odd bits of string, and their toilet paper, that most treasured possession of all.'[87] Just before departing, one Canadian man remarked that he had weighed over 200 pounds when he entered Stanley Camp but now was just 110 pounds, adding that he had never weighed less in his life. 'My!' a woman remarked, 'your mother must have been surprised when you were born.' Some internees, fortunately, never lost their sense of humour, and such moments helped those left behind to 'force back the tears which were not far away'.[88] As before, the British sat in and near the cemetery watching their friends go out to a ship taking them home. 'With envious hearts we wished that we could go too. We sat, gazing, not speaking, rejoicing to see something different.'[89]

On the *Teia Maru* five youths from the Shanghai Camps were brought to Hong Kong, having been at school in North China when their parents were interned in Stanley Camp. They gave reports on conditions of Shanghai internment, and it was found to be much better than Stanley Camp. Food was better and more plentiful, allowances were larger, the canteens were better stocked and there was ample hot water, even for washing. Such reports did nothing to improve the morale of the internees, which was already lowered by having to watch two groups sail away to freedom.

After the departure of this second group, life for the internees continued much as usual. People were caught up in their daily routine. But a new jingle became popular in the Camp:

> We're going to go to Goa
> when we go away.[90]

Of course, hope inevitably remained. The internees assumed the *Teia Maru* would turn around and return for the British women and children, perhaps in about six weeks.[91] It never returned.

On 2 November 1943, the Camp was stunned by the official announcement of the execution of seven fellow internees and imprisonment of four others involved in getting messages in and out of the Camp and possessing a radio receiver (see the following section, 'Executions'). As if to counter the shock and subsequent depression of the Camp over these events, the same day the Japanese released a notice regarding repatriation. The notice gave specific categories of those to be repatriated: children under fifteen and their mothers, those over seventy and those seriously ill.[92]

A special Repatriation Committee was formed to examine those who registered for repatriation on medical grounds. Examinations were given and each case was discussed by the Committee. Following the Committee's decision, the Japanese themselves examined those chosen and rejected seventeen of them. Still only about 50 percent of the seven hundred had been chosen. The Committee then faced the task of choosing the remainder. First they chose war widows, adolescent girls and military nurses. Then women with various illnesses were allowed to apply. The final decisions met with the

'usual charges of discrimination, inefficiency and everything else', but most internees seemed to feel the Committee had done the best it could. Lists of those to be repatriated were posted on all notice boards. 'There they remained until eaten by the ravages of time and weather: with the wind that scattered their tattered remnants went also the final hopes of the would-be repatriates.'[93] All the effort and all the excitement which went into the plans for repatriation were in vain. Repatriation of the British never did take place until the war ended.

The probable reason for the fact that the British were never repatriated was that following the American and Canadian repatriations, the only sizable group of Japanese in Allied hands were ones who had been pearl fishermen in Australia before the war. As it seemed possible that Japan might attempt an invasion of Australia, the Allies did not wish to risk allowing such militarily important people to return to Japan.[94] In the spring of 1944, Mr. Hattori returned from a trip to Tokyo and said that a certain dominion refused to exchange the Japanese there.[95] This undoubtedly was Australia. And thus the British internees stayed put in Stanley Camp until the end of the war.

Executions

During 1943, a series of tragedies occurred. Prior to April 1943, the Japanese occasionally allowed a few internees to go into Hong Kong to St Paul's Hospital (see Map 3) for X-rays, there being no X-ray equipment in the Camp. Although the internees did not welcome the necessity of going to the hospital, they did welcome the trip into the city. It was good just to get away from the Camp, and also Chinese and neutral friends could be contacted and from them news as well as sometimes supplies and money could be obtained. In April 1943, an internee returning from St Paul's Hospital was found to have a large sum of money hidden under his bandages.[96]

At this time, a number of British staff members of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, including Sir Vandeleur Grayburn, the chief manager, and Mr. D. C. Edmondston, manager, had been kept in the city by the Japanese in order to work on liquidating non-Axis assets in the bank.[97] The money found under the internee's bandages was apparently given to him by one of the bankers and was being sent into the Camp to be used for buying canteen supplies. Soon after the discovery, Dr. Selwyn-Clarke and Sir Vandeleur Grayburn were arrested, and the other bankers were rounded up and sent into the Camp. At the same time, Mrs. Selwyn-Clarke and Lady Grayburn were interned.[98]

This was the beginning of a general crackdown by the Japanese against people both inside and outside the Camp who were suspected of anti-Japanese activities. A number of things had been going on which the Japanese knew about. For example, contact was being made between some internees and pro-Chungking Chinese in Hong Kong by means of passing messages on the daily ration truck. Probably the drivers of the truck were being paid by both sides. Also, there was a radio receiver in the Camp, which was strictly forbidden by the Japanese. In Hong Kong, a number of Chinese were arrested.

Questioning, accompanied by torture, produced results, and then followed the arrests of a number of internees, including former police officers, several who had contact with the ration truck, and three radio engineers. One day the Japanese came into the Camp and went straight to one room to search for the radio. It was not found. Later, one of the radio engineers was brought to the Camp by the Japanese and forced to dig in a bank near the Indian Quarters. The result was the radio set.

Mr. Gimson attempted repeatedly to intervene and get aid to those arrested, but he was powerless to help. The Japanese said that Dr. Selwyn-Clarke and Sir Vandeleur Grayburn, not being internees, were of no concern to Mr. Gimson and that the internees arrested were suspected of committing acts contrary to Japanese military law and therefore not allowed to have contact with anyone. At first, those arrested were kept in Hong Kong, but later they were moved to Stanley Prison. With the move, the internees sent food, vitamin pills, flasks of tea, and clothing into the prison.[99] From the hill next to the prison, they could see the men exercising in the prison yard.

Military trials were held and about three months after the original arrests, the Japanese announced that the sentences passed on Sir Vandeleur Grayburn and the internee under whose bandages the money was found were a hundred days' imprisonment. The latter subsequently returned to the Camp as a hundred days had nearly passed before sentence was given. But on 21 August 1943, Sir Vandeleur Grayburn died in Stanley Prison. His death occurred without warning, and Lady Grayburn had not been summoned even though she was just on the other side of the prison wall. His body was sent into the Camp, and medical examination revealed that he had died of malnutrition. His funeral was held on 23 August 1943.

37 Stanley cemetery 2007 and photograph of Sir Vandeleur Grayburn.

The fate of the others was still unknown and efforts were made to find out what was happening to them. In spite of the arrests already made, perhaps in desperation for news and possibly giving aid, the ration truck was again used for passing messages. Early in October 1943, one of the internees who could write Chinese was asked to translate a message into Chinese. This was done, written on a piece of cigarette paper and pasted on the back of a matchbox tray. The message read, 'Fraser and Scott[100] sentenced to death. Request immediate intervention by British Ambassador in Chungking. Most urgent.' The message was sent but nothing more was heard of it.[101]

On 29 October 1943, a group of children passing the prison saw a van drive out. As it went by, English voices shouted out, 'Goodbye, boys.' The van drove down to the jetty at St Stephen's Beach, and internees at Bungalow C, as well as others in that area of the Camp, saw seven European men walk from the van to the hillside. They knelt next to trenches and were then shot.[101a] Days passed and no official word came. Finally, on 2 November 1943, a notice was posted in the Camp:

Notice of 2nd November 1943

The Japanese have notified me that on October 19th, 1943, death sentence was passed on Messrs. F.W. Bradley, F.I. Hall, H.S. Rees, W.R. Scott, J.A. Fraser, D.W. Waterton and C.F. Hyde.

The sentence was carried out on the 29th October, 1943.

A sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment was passed on Messrs William John Anderson, James Leslie Anderson and Frank Roberts and of ten years' imprisonment on Mr. David Charles Edmondston.

The sentences were imposed for acts contrary to the operations of Japanese military law and for fostering disturbance of the peace in Japanese occupied territory.

A detailed report will be forwarded to the Prisoners of War Bureau at Tokyo and the Bureau will acquaint the British Government through the proper channels.

Further details of the charges cannot be disclosed as such disclosure would be prejudicial to the Japanese interests.

No representations or any appeal will be entertained on behalf of the prisoners sentences to imprisonment either from relatives of those prisoners or from the Camp Commandant.

No religious or communal gatherings to express sympathy with those executed will be permitted and the Japanese Authorities require that this prohibition shall be strictly observed.

The persons in charge of the internal administration of the Camp will be held responsible personally, under severe penalties, for the observance of this notice.

As Camp Commandant I direct that the normal life of the Camp should be continued.

Signed. F. C. Gimson
Camp Commandant

The Camp was horrified, '. . . it was only then that people learnt to keep their mouths shut and discretion became very much the better part of valour'.[102] News also leaked in that a number of Chinese and possibly Europeans in Hong Kong had also been executed. A wave of depression engulfed the Camp. Apparently sensing this, the same day as the announcement the Japanese released the notice about repatriation.[103] Nevertheless, 'an uneasy feeling depressed all the Camp . . . any memorial service in the Camp was forbidden. We could give no expression to our loss, but from that time all sense of security was gone.'[104]

Notes

The numbering of the footnotes as in the original thesis is retained; additional footnotes added since the writing of the thesis are given as numbers with small letters, for example, 101a.

1. J. Alsop, *The Saturday Evening Post*, 9 January 1943, p. 45.
2. *The Stericker Papers*, IX, p. 11.
3. Personal interview, 28 May 1970.
4. G. Dew, *Prisoner of the Japs*, p. 247.
5. Personal interview, 18 April 1970.
6. W. Brown, *Hong Kong Aftermath*, p. 256.
7. Ibid.
8. Personal interview, 14 December 1970.
9. G. Dew, *Prisoner of the Japs*, p. 247.
10. Personal interview, 18 April 1970.
11. *The Stericker Papers*, IX, p. 1.
12. Ibid., XIII, p. 14.
13. Ibid., XI, p. 3.
14. Ibid., XI, p. 9.
15. Ibid., p. 17.
16. Ibid., XIII, p. 16.
17. Ibid., Epilogue, p. 1.
18. Personal interview, 1 November 1973.
19. *The Stericker Papers*, IX, p. 12.
20. Ibid., XIII, p. 3.
21. Ibid., IV, p. 12.
22. Ibid., IV, p. 17.
23. Ibid., V, p. 1.
24. M. Dudley, *Women Behind Barbed Wire*, p. 7.
25. J. Alsop, *The Saturday Evening Post*, p. 51.
26. *The Stericker Papers*, IV, p. 4.
27. Young, Sir Mark Aitchison
    1938–1941 — governor of Tanganyika
    September 1941 — governor, Hong Kong
    POW — December 1941–August 1945
    1 May 1946 — resumed duties, Hong Kong
    1947 — retired

28. Gimson, Sir Franklin Charles
    b. 10 September 1890
    B.A. Oxon
    1914 — cadet, Ceylon civil service
    1937 — controller of labour, Ceylon
    1941 — colonial secretary, Hong Kong
    1946–1952 — governor of Singapore
    KCMG 1946 CMG 1945
29. Selwyn-Clarke, Percy Selwyn
    b. 17 December 1893
    1938 — appointed director of medical services
    1947–1951 — governor of the Seychelles
    (The H.K. Civil Service List for 1947, p. 318)
    (*Who's Who 1970*, p. 2802)
30. *The Stericker Papers*, V, p. 11.
31. Ibid., pp. 19–20; 27.
32. Ibid., IV, p. 2 insert.
33. Ibid., X, p. 6.
34. Ibid., IV, p. 1.
35. Ibid., V, p. 7.
36. Personal interview, 18 April 1970.
37. *The Stericker Papers*, IV, p. 4.
38. Ibid., IV, pp. 7, 12.
39. Ibid., IV, pp. 6–7.
40. M. F. Key, *Hong Kong Before, During and After The Pacific War*, p. 3.
41. *The Stericker Papers*, V, p. 10.
42. *Life Magazine*, February 1942.
43. *The Stericker Papers*, IV, p. 5 insert.
44. Ibid., IV, p. 2.
45. Ibid.
46. G. Baxter, 'Personal Experiences', p. 38.
47. R. Hammond, *Bondservants of the Japanese*, p. 70.
48. G. Dew, *Prisoner of the Japs*, p. 281.
49. R. Hammond, *Bondservants of the Japanese*, p. 71.
50. W. Brown, *Hong Kong Aftermath*, p. 261.
51. G. Baxter, 'Personal Experiences', pp. 40–41.
52. *Life Magazine,* February 1942.
53. R. Hammond, *Bondservants of the Japanese*, p. 71.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. *The Stericker Papers*, VI, p. 8.
57. W. Brown, *Hong Kong Aftermath*, pp. 259, 263–4.
58. G. Dew, *Prisoner of the Japs*, p. 288.
59. R. Hammond, *Bondservants of the Japanese*, p. 72.
60. W. Brown, *Hong Kong Aftermath*, p. 268.
61. G. Baxter, 'Personal Experiences', p. 42.
62. Ibid., p. 41.

63. *The Hongkong News*, 30 June 1942.
64. R. Hammond, *Bondservants of the Japanese*, p. 71.
65. W. Brown, *Hong Kong Aftermath*, p. 274.
66. Ibid., p. 276.
67. R. Hammond, *Bondservants of the Japanese*, p. 73.
68. W. Sewell, *Strange Harmony*, pp. 80–81.
69. W. Brown, *Hong Kong Aftermath*, pp. 276–8.
70. *The Stericker Papers*, V, p. 24.
71. E. Hahn, *China to Me*, pp. 365–8.
72. W. Brown, *Hong Kong Aftermath*, p. 28.
73. G. Dew, *Prisoner of the Japs*, p. 291; R. Hammond, *Bondservants of the Japanese*, p. 73.
74. G. Baxter, 'Personal Experiences', pp. 43–48.
75. *The Stericker Papers*, VI, p. 12.
76. Ibid.
77. *The Stericker Papers*, VIII, p. 2.
78. Ibid., p. 3.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., p. 5.
81. Ibid., p. 4.
82. For a study in detail of Mr. Gimson's relationship with the internees, see Alan Birch, 'Confinement and Constitutional Conflict in Occupied Hong Kong 1941–45', *Hong Kong Law Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 3, September 1973, pp. 292–318.
83. W. Sewell, *Strange Harmony*, p. 106.
84. J. Gittins, *A Garden in Stanley*, p. 150.
85. *The Stericker Papers*, IX, p. 14.
86. Ibid., p. 19.
87. W. Sewell, *Strange Harmony*, p. 106.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., p. 108.
90. Ibid.
91. *The Stericker Papers*, X, p. 5.
92. Ibid., X, p. 5 insert.
93. Ibid., IX, p. 14.
94. Ibid., VIII, p. 5.
95. Ibid., XII, p. 11.
96. J. Stericker, *A Tear for the Dragon*, p. 181.
97. The bankers lived at the waterfront hotel-brothels and were marched each day in a group to and from the bank. They did, however, occasionally get a chance to wander around the city. One banker found in a bazaar a book which had originally been given as a confirmation gift to a girl by her mother. The girl was interned in Stanley Camp, so the man brought the book and gave it to her when he was sent into the Camp (personal interview, 13 September 1970).
98. *The Stericker Papers*, IX, pp. 13–16.
99. Ibid., p. 16.
100. Fraser, John Alexander – born 12 February 1896
    1919 – became Hong Kong cadet
    1938 – acting attorney general, Hong Kong government

member of Executive & Legislative Councils
1943 – 29 October, executed
(*Hong Kong Civil Service List 1941*, p. 180)
Scott, Walter R. – assistant commissioner of police head, Intelligence Department of Hong Kong Police
1943 – 29 October, executed
(*The Stericker Papers*, IX, pp. 15, 17)

101. J. Gittins, *A Garden in Stanley*, pp. 168–70.

101a. Stericker, in *A Tear for the Dragon*, writes that the men were shot (p. 182). Wright-Nooth, in *Prisoner of the Turnip Heads*, gives a very graphic description of the executions by beheading, attributed to a statement by Police Sergeant Frank Roberts, dated 14 November 1945. Roberts was among those arrested at the time, and he was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, according to Gimson's notice to the internees dated 2 November 1943.

102. *The Stericker Papers*, IX, p. 16.

103. Ibid., X, p. 5.

104. W. Sewell, *Strange Harmony*, pp. 122–3.

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Photographs and sketches are shown by page numbers in *italics.*