

# ELUSIVE PIRATES, PERVASIVE SMUGGLERS

Violence and Clandestine Trade  
in the Greater China Seas

Edited by Robert J. Antony



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# 1

## **Introduction: The Shadowy World of the Greater China Seas**

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*Robert J. Antony*

Many problems of the past still haunt us today — piracy and smuggling among them. Although maritime marauding reached a peak in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries — the so-called “golden age of piracy” — it has never completely vanished from around the globe. Today, piracy appears in many of the same areas where it thrived two or three hundred years ago. Although a worldwide presence, the largest number of pirates and the highest total of incidents of piracy today, as in the past, take place in Asian waters. Alongside piracy, smuggling always has posed a problem, and comprised a way of life in this area of the world. In fact, piracy and smuggling usually went hand-in-hand and have continually occurred for many of the same reasons. As recurring cyclical phenomena, the piracy and smuggling of today are inescapably bound to the piracy and smuggling of the past. Viewed from this vantage point, we should regard them as malleable concepts with multiple layers of meanings relative to time, place, and culture. Both piracy and smuggling involve complex, still-evolving historical processes. Although often dismissed as historically unimportant, in reality, pirates and smugglers have played key roles in the development of modern society.

We like to read about pirates and smugglers because their stories are captivating. Just to mention the word pirates evokes colorful and fanciful images of rogues like Blackbeard and Long John Silver. We can appreciate them as treacherous and bloodthirsty villains, yet at the same time, we might look upon them as romantic, swashbuckling heroes. Our appetite for stories about piracy and the sea seems unquenchable; there are hundreds of books, cartoons, songs, television dramas, and movies produced on these subjects each year. However, we should look at pirates and smugglers not only because of their intrigue but also because of their importance. Piracy and smuggling always have been closely linked to issues of maritime security and national sovereignty. Today, as in past ages, they have cost honest, legitimate commerce and business millions of dollars every year, not to mention the toll in human lives and destroyed property. Conversely, piracy and smuggling also have

stimulated and fostered an extensive shadow or informal economy and a vibrant subculture.

Pirates and smugglers were elusive, but pervasive, creatures with different but interrelated activities. Though both may also have had political and social overtones, economic factors fundamentally motivated them. Most people engaged in piracy and smuggling to earn money, but they may also have used these activities to gain social status or as forms of protest, for example, against colonialism. Unlike smugglers, pirates traded in stolen goods obtained through violence. Still, like smugglers, pirates disposed their loot in the same black markets and trading networks. Pirates and smugglers contrasted the most, it seems, in the methods used to procure the goods that they traded; in disposing of them, however, they were functionally the same. Also, because smuggling was illegal, sometimes smugglers had to use violence to protect their interests or to defend themselves against repressive authorities, thereby becoming little different from pirates.

Furthermore, some people who became pirates and smugglers did not consider themselves outlaws or their activities illicit. As Anthony Reid reminds us in his chapter, what we label as piracy is a Western construct, and may have had little to do with native Asian perceptions. From the perspective of most governments and victims, pirates and smugglers appeared as merely criminals, but in the eyes of their supporters and their own self-image, they believed their enterprises justified and proper. It was not uncommon for pirates to become folk heroes; Asian societies also have their equivalents of Francis Drake and Henry Morgan. Likewise, many smugglers considered themselves as authorized because local practices and official connivances safeguarded such activities and thereby gave them a sense of validity. In some cases, such informal trade appeared safer and better protected than the legitimate trade. Since the illicit trade supported the licit trade, and the two were interconnected, smuggling proved difficult to eradicate and, in fact, some officials even tolerated it.<sup>1</sup>

Because of the nature of their work, pirates and smugglers left few records, which would, indeed, have been risky to keep. They did not want to draw attention to themselves from officials. Sometimes, pirate gangs went to extraordinary lengths to remain anonymous, even murdering entire crews of ships that they attacked in order to eliminate any witnesses. Hence, the famous pirate adage: “Dead men tell no lies.” What we know about pirates and smugglers, therefore, comes chiefly from their enemies and victims. As the documents are biased, obscure, and fragmentary, we need to use a broad range of sources in many different languages. The studies in this volume do exactly that.

This book examines the extent, diffusion, and characteristics of piracy and smuggling in the greater China Seas region over the past six centuries. At the fringe of the Pacific Ocean, the China Seas encompass over four million square kilometers from Indonesia and Borneo in the south to China, Korea, and Japan in the north. The

Philippine Islands and Taiwan border the east, with the Malay Peninsula, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam on the west (see Map 1.1). Following the five oceans, this region constitutes the next greatest body of water. Even before the appearance of European explorers and adventurers in the sixteenth century, it was and has since remained one of the busiest shipping zones in the world. Today, in terms of world annual merchant fleet tonnage, over fifty percent passes through the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits. This vast expanse of water, with its countless islands and harbors, has provided not only seamen and merchants but also pirates and smugglers with jobs and livelihoods for centuries. In fact, as the authors in this book demonstrate, piracy and smuggling played integral, even essential, roles in shaping East and Southeast Asian history.

## The Greater China Seas Region

Most histories of Asia stop at the water's edge, treating the littoral and the seas beyond as peripheral and, therefore, less important. According to conventional wisdom, major events and ideas emanated from the land and not from the sea.<sup>2</sup> In this book, however, we depart radically from the standard terra-centered histories to place the seas at the center rather than at the margins of our inquiries. Ocean and sea basins encompass, as Jerry Bentley explains, important "units of analysis to the extent that human societies engage in interaction across bodies of water."<sup>3</sup> The seas acted as buffers between land-based polities, contested "zones of transition" that were "crucial both for the conduct of commerce and for the exercise of power."<sup>4</sup> Making the seas the focus of our analysis allows us to more easily transcend geopolitical boundaries to examine the interconnectedness of the entire region encompassing East and Southeast Asia. Focusing on the water, rather than on the land, better enables us to stitch together the diverse histories of Japan, China, and Southeast Asia. The greater China Seas region is best viewed as the sum of its multiple parts and pasts.

What we call the greater China Seas region does not appear as an autonomous body of water easily delineated by a simple set of boundaries, but rather, a vast water world of "porous borders" and "flows and seepages."<sup>5</sup> Matt Matsuda's description about the Pacific applies equally well to the China Seas: "an Oceanic space of movement, transit, and migration in a *longue durée* of local peoples and broad interactions."<sup>6</sup> Indeed, it consisted of not one sea but a "complex of seas" radiating from the core South China Sea into the East China Sea and Japan's Seto Inland Sea to the north, and into the smaller Sulu, Java, Celebes, and Banda Seas to the south. Open waters and narrow passages — the Malacca, Sunda, and Tsushima Straits — connected the China Seas and its shores to their various component parts and to the world at large.

Paradoxically, the greater China Seas combined both diversity and cohesion. On the one hand, there was the multiplicity of peoples, cultures, languages, and histories of Japan, China, and Southeast Asia; on the other hand, the seas were a unifying conduit for the transmission of goods, peoples, germs, ideas, and religions. Like Braudel's Mediterranean, the China Seas tied an area of heterogeneous civilizations together through commercial and cultural exchange.<sup>7</sup> As Eric Tagliacozzo points out in his chapter, this water world "both connects and fragments at least a dozen countries in Asia, as well as the shipping of other nations whose vessels transect its open waters." This paradox of diversity and cohesion represented a defining characteristic of the region.

The China Seas region blended peoples and cultures from not only Asia but from around the world in a maritime melting pot. It provided an area of transit and a source of income for untold numbers of people. Despite their different languages and ethnic origins, the indigenous groups of "sea peoples" — the *ama* of Japan, the Dan (Tanka) of southern China, and the "sea gypsies" (Orang Laut), Iranun, Balangingi, and Bugis of insular Southeast Asia — shared a common maritime culture and life experiences that distinguished them from their countrymen living on shore.<sup>8</sup> Throughout history, people continuously moved in and out of the region — migrants, sojourners, emigrants, missionaries, traders, sailors, and slaves — first from India, China, and Southeast Asia, and later from Japan, Europe, and Africa. They intermingled, intermarried, and struggled with one another and with native sea peoples. A persistent, systematic, and constant interaction among the diverse groups of people living and working in the region prevailed after the sixteenth century.<sup>9</sup>

Ships and shipping constituted the lifeblood of the region. By the early sixteenth century, as Igawa Kenji informs us, numerous sea lanes crisscrossed the entire China Seas region linking Japan, Korea, and China to the Philippines, Vietnam, Siam (Thailand), Borneo, Sumatra, and Java. Even earlier, for many centuries, Indian and Chinese traders and sojourners had visited the area, followed by Japanese and European merchants and adventurers in the sixteenth century. By the late eighteenth century, the maritime economy of the greater China Seas had become sophisticated and highly integrated while also "brimming with vitality."<sup>10</sup> An intricate patchwork of interconnected markets linked the smaller ports, harbors, and fishing villages to the larger entrepôts of Canton, Chaozhou, Amoy, Nagasaki, Bangkok, Saigon, Malacca, Batavia, and Manila. After its founding in 1819, Singapore was added to this vast maritime network (see Map 1.2). Trade routes connected these larger marts with one another and with the global markets in Europe and the Americas. These earlier commercial patterns continued and expanded during the period of "high imperialism" (1870–1940).<sup>11</sup>

Despite the intrusion of the West, the entire region continued to be dominated by Asians and intra-regional trading networks well into the nineteenth century. Indian, Chinese, and Southeast Asians were all involved in both long-distance and

local trading networks long before Western merchants entered the area. In fact, when the Europeans first arrived in the South China Sea, they found Gujerati and Chinese vessels virtually monopolizing commerce there. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, despite Ming and Qing bans on overseas trade, a tremendous growth of “private” (illegal) trade with Japan and Southeast Asia took place.<sup>12</sup> Likewise, before the Tokugawa government began to restrict maritime trade in the 1630s, Japan also markedly expanded commerce throughout the greater China Seas region.<sup>13</sup>

China had long been the economic powerhouse in the region. When Europeans established their settlements around the rim of the China Seas, they did so in places along well-established Chinese trunk routes to Southeast Asia. According to Leonard Blussé, Western trading ports, including Batavia, Manila, and Singapore, “were only feasible because of Chinese participation.”<sup>14</sup> After the Qing government opened up maritime trade in 1684, the Chinese junk trade proliferated and reached its zenith between 1740 and 1840, during the so-called “China Century.” Also, native trade within Southeast Asia greatly increased to accommodate the growing commerce with China as well as other global markets.<sup>15</sup> Throughout this period, the number and tonnage of Chinese junks surpassed those of Western vessels in the region.<sup>16</sup> Although after the 1870s, the number of steamships had risen tremendously, still, even in the early twentieth century, large numbers of Chinese and native sailing ships plied the greater China Seas. As Tagliacozzo explains in his chapter, the region “bustled with a wide variety of ships.”

## The Shadowy World of the Greater China Seas

In the shadows of legitimate society lurked the elusive pirates and pervasive smugglers. A confusing assortment of clandestine activities and the nomenclature used to describe them proliferated in the greater China Seas region. What Westerners called “pirates” were in China commonly referred to as “sea bandits” (*haidao*, *haizei*, *haifei*, or *haikou*); in Japan the most common term was *kaizoku*, which likewise means “sea bandits.” Depending on the context, the terms also implied “sea rebels” or “sea traitors.”<sup>17</sup> The Chinese and Koreans pejoratively called Japanese maritime raiders and smugglers “dwarf bandits” (Chinese *wokou*, Korean *waegu*); but as Peter Shapinsky explains, Japanese sea people would never have regarded themselves in such a way, though the word *wakō* remains in common use today. In fact, the *wokou* or *wakō* of the sixteenth century were predominantly Chinese, not Japanese. Apparently, before the nineteenth century, Southeast Asia did not even have a local term for “pirate” or “piracy.” The people there considered maritime raiding as a form of warfare essential for statecraft. Our modern concepts of piracy only became globalized in the colonial era.<sup>18</sup>

For many people, the seas symbolized lawless space, beyond the pale of civilization. They were, to paraphrase Eliza Gould, a zone where people freely engaged in practices that would have been unacceptable on shore.<sup>19</sup> For land-based elites in China and Japan, pirates represented an exotic and dangerous “other.”<sup>20</sup> In labeling pirates as *haifei*, the suffix *fei* in Chinese, an absolute negative, denied individuals their humanity and, consequently, their right to exist. In imperial China, piracy constituted a serious crime linked to treason, and was punishable by beheading, a most dehumanizing form of execution. The Chinese state, like Western colonial powers, viewed its war against piracy, and, to some extent, also against smuggling, as a conflict between civilization and barbarism. In the colonial mindset of nineteenth-century Southeast Asia, the terms “Malay” and “Illanun” (Iranun) practically equated with “pirate.” Reid quotes an American poet who likened Acehean pirates to “demons from hell.” From the Western perspective, it defined those who operated outside the colonial trading system or who opposed its rule as pirates. The suppression of piracy functioned not only as a crusading and civilizing mission, but it also motivated and justified colonial expansion.<sup>21</sup>

Yet, some areas and some people regarded pirates and smugglers as neither criminals nor shadowy figures. Sometimes local communities and states knew their presence and activities well and even encouraged and approved them. In 1562, Zheng Ruozeng described Japanese pirates in this fashion: “When they return to their [home] islands from plundering ... they say they have come back from trading ... Even the neighbors do not know, or [if they do know] they think it honorable.”<sup>22</sup> In Satsuma, during the Tokugawa period, contrabanding became a highly regarded, even legitimate profession after the domain’s leaders sanctioned smuggling in order to boost the local economy.<sup>23</sup> Traditionally, much of archipelago Southeast Asia looked upon so-called “piracy” as a respectable occupation supported by local chiefs and regional sultans.<sup>24</sup> The Iranun and Balangingi of the southern Philippines accepted state-sanctioned maritime raiding as a way of life crucial to the region’s social, economic, and political structures.<sup>25</sup> In these cases, indigenous peoples would hardly have labeled such activities as illicit, and in fact, often they treated the outlaws as local heroes. In coastal South China, according to Paola Calanca, villagers, who worked with pirates and smugglers as fences, suppliers, and arms dealers, interacted cordially with the outlaws. In Fujian, people considered the pirate-smuggler Zheng Zhilong an upright, benevolent man because he aided the poor and provided many people with jobs.<sup>26</sup> The Chinese of southern Taiwan even eulogized his son, Zheng Chenggong, as a god after his death in 1661.

The reality, of course, is subtle and complicated, and there appear no firm distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate in the actions of what we and others label pirates and smugglers. It is better to think in terms of a continuum, with activities that are completely legal on one end, those that are completely illegal on the other end, and most activities somewhere in between.

Coming from all walks of life, pirates and smugglers included not only rascals and social deviants, but also ordinary sailors and fishermen, as well as merchants, samurai, and *datu* chieftains. Because the seas were, by their very nature, transnational spaces, piracy and smuggling were multi-ethnic and multi-national enterprises. Ota Atsushi describes a gang of local Southeast Asian pirates in the 1830s, led by two Chinese from Riau who professed Islam and wore Malay clothing. In the 1850s, one of the most notorious pirates on the South China coast was an American named Eli Boggs, who was finally apprehended in 1857 by an equally colorful compatriot, Bully Hayes, a well-known opium smuggler. In modern times, Chinese very actively participated in the smuggling trade, as did Malays, Bugis, Europeans, Americans, Muslims, Armenians, Parsees, and nearly every other ethnic group.<sup>27</sup>

Piracy and smuggling were part of the process of commercialization. As licit trade increased, so too did illicit trade, and the two were intimately connected. Although pirates and smugglers engaged in a different sort of business from legitimate merchants, they also contributed importantly to the economic development of the greater China Seas region. During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, because of the repeated banning of maritime trade by successive Chinese governments, it became impossible to distinguish between trader, smuggler, and pirate. In the Ming period, as James Chin explains, piracy and smuggling necessarily evolved into the most common and profitable form of commerce. In Southeast Asia, according to Richard Leirissa, piracy operated as a form of trade based on theft rather than exchange.<sup>28</sup> Ota's chapter clearly employs this approach which depicts early nineteenth-century piracy in the Malacca Strait as a type of commercial competition and network-building among Asian, Dutch, and British traders seeking to obtain goods for the China market. According to Tagliacozzo, smuggling remains just as pervasive and important today as when it thrived a century ago in the South China Sea.

Pirates and smugglers also needed support from people on land as well as in friendly ports where they could outfit their ships, recruit new crews, and sell their goods. Chin and Antony argue that although smuggling and piracy detracted from legitimate trade and profits, nonetheless, they also had important positive economic consequences, and in fact, helped to boost local and regional economies. Both authors suggest that the "shadow economy" became significant since it allowed large numbers of otherwise excluded, poor, and marginalized people to participate in the wider commercial economy. Piracy and smuggling provided jobs, either directly or indirectly, to tens of thousands of people living around the rim of the greater China Seas.

In addition, as several chapters explain, piracy and smuggling also played important parts in the development of new ports created specifically to handle the growing illegal trade.<sup>29</sup> In some cases, such as the island of Shuangyu in the sixteenth century and Giang Binh in the early nineteenth century, when the state could not

control such illicit trading hubs, the government sent in the military to destroy them. Sometimes, official trading areas declined and became bases for covert activities, as in the case of Riau after the Dutch War of 1784.<sup>30</sup> Other areas more successfully made the transition from illegitimate to legitimate, such as the islands of Itsukushima and Tsushima in Japan, and the ports of Yuegang and Amoy (Xiamen) in China. In the latter two cases, for example, Yuegang emerged as a prosperous smugglers port in the fifteenth century and an offset to the official port at Quanzhou. After the government recognized Yuegang as an administrative seat in 1567, smugglers and pirates moved elsewhere, in particular, to Amoy. During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Chinese and foreign smugglers and pirates used Amoy as their meeting place, and, for much of the seventeenth century, it also served as the major base of operations for the Zheng family's piratical empire. In 1684, with the downfall of the Zhengs, the Qing court designated Amoy as a legitimate port and the clandestine trade moved elsewhere.<sup>31</sup> A majority of the illicit ports, however, were not as successful as Yuegang and Amoy; most were small and remained anonymous and unsanctioned.

As several chapters in this volume explain, the aid that pirates and smugglers received from coastal residents, including fishermen, sailors, merchants, soldiers, and officials, factored significantly in their success. Whenever they lost that patronage, piracy and smuggling declined. As Calanca explains, piracy in southern China diminished greatly in the eighteenth century in large measure because wealthy and powerful coastal families in Fujian decided to back the new Qing government and oppose piracy. A century earlier, in Japan, the new Tokugawa shogunate substantially curbed the power of piratical "sea lords" around the Seto Inland Sea by forcefully relocating them inland away from their bases of support.<sup>32</sup> Hellyer also shows that nineteenth-century Japan had few pirates because financial assistance, first from the Korean government and later from the Japanese government, obviated the need for turning to piracy. Over the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while never completely disappearing, piracy had greatly decreased. It happened not only because of the appearance of steam warships after the 1830s, and the relentless destruction of pirate strongholds, but also because national and colonial authorities resettled maritime raiders away from the coast where they expected them to engage in farming and other peaceful trades.

## **Studies in This Volume**

This volume arranges the following ten chapters, which cover six hundred years from the fifteenth century to the present, more or less chronologically. After Anthony Reid's chapter, which discusses the perceptions of piracy in China and Southeast Asia over several centuries, the next four chapters look at piracy and smuggling in the



fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In Chapter Seven, Paola Calanca closely analyses the crucial transitional period between 1600 and 1780, providing a bridge between the first and second halves of the book. The remaining four chapters deal with the nineteenth century and afterwards. The three chapters by Shapinsky, Petrucci, and Hellyer focus mainly on Japan and the seas around it; the three chapters by Chin, Calanca, and Antony concentrate chiefly on China and Chinese maritime outlaws; and the chapters by Reid, Igawa, Ota, and Tagliacozzo principally concern the water world of Southeast Asia.

While piracy might have been economically motivated, it also carried intensely political overtones. Modern states view any acts of violence in their territories or possessions not by their own agents as illegal and potentially subversive. In his chapter, Anthony Reid examines “piracy” — a particular type of violence at sea — over the past several centuries. Because the word piracy is specifically English, and comes out of a particular European experience, it does not so easily translate into Asian languages. This chapter seeks to connect our present concern with piracy by studying understandings of the term by the Chinese and Malay, the two Asian experiences that have intersected most with European concepts of piracy. In so doing, Reid utilizes the concept of “organized hypocrisy” in the international system to demonstrate the way both outlaws and states have manipulated piracy over the past several centuries. In hindsight, he concludes, we must recognize the period of “pirate” suppression in the first half of the twentieth century as an exception rather than the norm for our contemporary international order.

Peter Shapinsky discusses further the meanings of piracy in the context of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Japan. Departing from most Japanese scholars’ depiction of pirates as feudal vassals, he describes them as entrepreneurs of violence, as free agents who sold their services in the emerging monetized economy — the embodiment of mercenarism rather than vassalage. Commerce and violence did not contradict each other. His chapter explores the potential for using Janice Thomson’s concept of “nonstate violence” as a way to understand the challenges that seafarers labeled pirates posed for land-based polities in contemporary and historical contexts. To do so, Shapinsky considers the trans-border cultures of seafaring in a case study of one of the most traveled sea lanes in premodern Japanese as well as East Asian history — the region known today as the Seto Inland Sea.

The first half of the sixteenth century marked a unique period in the history of maritime Asia, when large numbers of Chinese smugglers and pirates congregated on the South China coast, where they bartered with merchants from different countries. While most historians have viewed the foreign presence along the China coast as an unwelcome intrusion and a manifestation of imperialism, James Chin argues that the foreigners, in truth, positively influenced the Chinese economy by bringing it new life. In fact, this period saw a new maritime economy and regional trade system emerging in southern China with joint ventures and emporia established

through close collaborations between Chinese merchant-pirates and multinational smuggler-traders from Japan, Ryukyu, Portugal, and the port polities of Southeast Asia. Chin explains that although the piracy and violence that was closely associated with smuggling had a negative impact on the local social order, nevertheless the booming illegal trade on the South China coast had, in fact, greatly facilitated the development of a new commodity economy in local society which filled a need that the regular economy failed to offer.

Maria Petrucci's chapter, which analyzes the interactions between merchants, Christian missionaries and Japanese converts, *daimyos*, and pirates in the late sixteenth century, expands on themes developed by Shapinsky and Chin. She discusses the roles that Japanese and Chinese pirates played in the clandestine manufacturing and smuggling of gunpowder between Japan, China, and Southeast Asia, as well as their partnerships with regional Japanese hegemons and Portuguese traders and missionaries. She also shows how piratical "sea lords" helped develop castle towns around the Seto Inland Sea. Petrucci critically examines the dynamics of powerful bands of pirates, such as the Shirai clan, that depended for survival on support and recognition from land-based *daimyos* and on the geopolitical forces that shaped southern Japan in the late sixteenth century.

In his chapter, Igawa Kenji shifts the focus away from Japan and China to discuss the important role that the Philippine Islands played in the international relations of sixteenth-century Asia. Significantly, Igawa demonstrates how Chinese and Japanese pirates critically impacted the development of early sea routes throughout the greater China Seas region. The *wakō*, who were multiethnic bands of Japanese, Chinese, and Southeast Asians, pirated the area from the Korean Peninsula to Southeast Asia, mainly in the sixteenth century. From bases in the Japanese archipelago, they conducted raiding and trading expeditions throughout the entire region. Their wide-ranging activities and far-flung commercial networks required relay points, first off the Chinese coast (such as on Shuangyu Island), and then later in the Philippines, at a time when the Spanish were also occupying the islands. In analyzing this complicated history, Igawa focuses on the famous Chinese pirate, Limahon (Lin Feng), and his vast piratical and commercial networks. He provides a rare example of a pirate who appeared not only in Asian but also in European sources, and who furthermore operated in both China and in the Philippine archipelago.

In the next chapter, Paola Calanca examines an important transitional period (1600–1780) in South China's history and in the history of piracy, in particular. Before the watershed year 1684, both the Ming and Qing governments followed rigid closed-door policies that banned maritime trade and labeled private sea merchants outlaws. During the turbulent Ming-Qing dynastic wars from the 1600s to the early 1680s, powerful coastal families, in particular the Zhengs of southern Fujian, took advantage of the anarchy to form a huge maritime empire that dominated the

greater China Seas region from bases at Amoy and later on Taiwan. After 1684, once the Qing had conquered Taiwan and had consolidated its power over China, the government reversed earlier policies and began to open China up to overseas trade. With legitimacy came stability and prosperity, and most merchants quickly became strong bulwarks of support for the state and staunch opponents of piracy. Although piracy declined, it never disappeared between the 1680s and 1780s. As Calanca shows, this reduction in piracy resulted from several factors, one of the most important being the government's co-optation of powerful coastal families, with close ties to overseas trade, into the Qing naval apparatus.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, piracy once again had become a huge problem in the South China Sea. Tens of thousands of poor, marginalized fishermen and sailors became involved both directly and indirectly in piracy. Robert Antony's chapter examines the roles that pirates and their networks of accomplices played in promoting the shadow or informal economy. Not only did the growth of legitimate commerce facilitate the development of new ports and markets, but so too did the pirates' illicit trade. Black markets sprang up everywhere along the southern coast to trade with pirates and smugglers and to service their ships and crews. Pirates and their collaborators became economic pioneers who fostered the opening up of new commercial facilities and opportunities in areas not easily reached by the established trading system. By selling their booty at bargain prices, pirates brought many goods within the reach of a wider public while, at the same time, they expanded distribution networks. Because so many people came to depend on piracy for their livelihoods, it developed into a self-sustaining enterprise and a significant and integral feature of South China's maritime world in the early modern period.

Not all poor seafarers became pirates. Robert Hellyer gives us a case study of Japan's Tsushima domain from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. Although during the late medieval period, the island of Tsushima served as a major center for piracy in the waters around Japan and Korea, in the sixteenth century, the island's leaders entered into agreements with the Korean court and with the Japanese central authority that gave them special privileges in Japanese-Korean trade. For nearly a century, the profits from trade mitigated against a return to the piracy of the island's ancestors. When trade declined dramatically in the eighteenth century, Tsushima faced economic hardship, a situation exacerbated by its dearth of agricultural production. Hellyer's chapter considers why at this point, poverty did not lead Tsushima leaders to revive piracy, especially given that the Japanese central authority and the Korean court lacked the naval power to police the waters around it. The author persuasively argues how financial and other awards from the Korean and the Japanese governments stifled piracy. By examining the reasons piracy did not emerge in Japan, Hellyer also offers a comparative perspective from which to study the development of piracy in other parts of Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Ota Atsushi's chapter re-examines piracy and trade around the Malacca Strait in the early nineteenth century, a period of colonial expansion and so-called increased piratical activities. Piracy was a violent enterprise deeply tied to the region's culture, economy, and society. Ota characterizes the trade in the area of that period as one of competition and network-formation between Asian (mostly Chinese and Bugis), Dutch, and British traders who sought to obtain export commodities for the China market. He sees the intricate role piracy played in local and regional commercial development, especially in the burgeoning China trade. In this chapter, Ota views piracy from the perspective of the victims, characterizing it as economically motivated and as a fundamentally local strategy that both reacted to changing conditions in the region and spurred the formation of colonial states.

In the final chapter, Eric Tagliacozzo takes a long view of smuggling in the South China Sea over the past two centuries. Smuggling has operated as big business in the region for many centuries, and a variety of actors and interested parties have all participated in these activities. This chapter links historical data and ethnographic fieldwork together in reflecting on these processes over what the French historian Fernand Braudel has called the *longue durée*. In his discussion of smuggling and other clandestine activities, Tagliacozzo considers the interplay among European, Chinese, and other Asian actors over the past several centuries.

While much has already been written about pirates and smugglers, still, little rigorous scholarly research exists on these subjects. Amateur historians, who have had little or no training in methodology and research, have written most of the literature on piracy and smuggling. Even serious historical inquiries usually discuss piracy and smuggling within limited national contexts, and fail to examine the issues within a broader context. Individuals with insurance, police, and policymaking backgrounds largely write analyses of current-day piracy that deal rather narrowly with pressing legal, economic, and security issues. The connections between piracy and terrorism, for example, are currently hot topics of research.

With few exceptions, most previous studies lack in-depth historical and comparative perspectives, making this the first book to carefully examine piracy and smuggling from that angle for the whole East and Southeast Asian region, the area that we call the greater China Seas. The approaches the authors take in this book offer important vantage points because in order to more fully understand the problems of piracy and smuggling, we must appreciate the fact that they are deep-rooted, complex, and evolving phenomena. Furthermore, piracy and smuggling did not limit themselves to a single geographical space, but, rather, they traversed the entire region of the greater China Seas. We hope that the studies in this book will stimulate further discussions on piracy and smuggling as subjects worthy of serious research. The history of piracy and smuggling is important.

# Notes

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

1. See Van Dyke 2005, 124–5, 132, 141.
2. Among the important exceptions, of course, are the seminal sea-centered studies on Southeast Asia by Jacob van Leur and Georges Coedès, which are discussed in Sutherland 2003.
3. Bentley 1999, 217.
4. Wigen 2007, 15.
5. See Tagliacozzo 2005, and Reid 1996.
6. Matsuda 2006, 769.
7. Braudel 1972; also see Sutherland 2003.
8. Antony 2003, 139–40, and Shapinsky in this volume.
9. See, in particular, the chapters by Igawa, Ota, and Tagliacozzo.
10. Blussé 1999, 112.
11. See Reid 1997, Blussé 1999, Tagliacozzo 2005, and Chin, Igawa, Antony, and Ota in this volume.
12. See Chin and Calanca in this volume.
13. See Ng Wai-ming 2004, and the chapters by Shapinsky, Petrucci, and Igawa.
14. Blussé 1999, 116.
15. See, for example, Warren 1981 and 2003.
16. Reid 1997, 71.
17. Zheng Guangnan 1999, 3–7, and Matsuura 2003, 75; for a broader, cross-cultural perspective on piracy see Risso 2001.
18. See, in particular, the discussions in the chapters by Reid and Shapinsky.
19. Gould 2007, 105–6.
20. See Shapinsky's chapter.
21. Antony 2007, 44–45, and Reid's chapter.
22. *Chouhai tubian* (1562), cited in Elisonas 1991, 259.
23. Hellyer 2005, and his chapter in this book.
24. See, for example, the chapters by Reid and Ota in this volume.
25. Warren 1981 and 2002.
26. Besides Calanca, also see Antony in this book.

27. Van Dyke 2005, 120–37, and Tagliacozzo in this volume.
28. Leirissa 1994, 112.
29. In particular, see Shapinsky, Chin, Petrucci, and Antony in this volume.
30. See Ota’s chapter.
31. See Ng Chin-keong 1983.
32. See Shapinsky’s chapter.

## Chapter 2: Violence at Sea

1. See Map 1.1 (p. 4) for the places discussed in this chapter.
2. Brunsson (1989) developed this concept, and Krasner (2001) applied it to the East Asian “system”.
3. The so-called “Chinese world order” of tribute has an extensive literature, most recently discussed in Reid and Zheng 2009.
4. Cited in Warren 2003, 24.
5. See Henty 1905, Dalton 1972, and the 1935 Hollywood classic, *The China Seas*, which features “Malay Pirates” as a rich stereotype.
6. As made clear below, the *wokou* or *wakō* in reality comprised people who would today be considered Chinese, Japanese, Southeast Asians, as well as even Europeans and Africans.
7. I thank Fang Xiaoping for looking through relevant Chinese sources for me and for making a certain sense of the usage of these terms.
8. After 1684, the Qing government gradually abandoned this policy and licensed Chinese shippers, though retaining great caution about foreign ships. See Calanca’s chapter in this book; also see Ng Chin-Keong 1983.
9. *Chouhai tubian* (1562), cited in Wang Tai Peng 1994, 39n.
10. Iioka Naoko, forthcoming.
11. Ma Huan as translated by Mills 1970, 10–11.
12. Kobata and Matsuda 1969, 179–80, and Chin, forthcoming.
13. Cited in So 1975, 26.
14. See, for example, the discussion by Calanca in this book.
15. Dian Murray 1987, and Antony 2003.
16. Van Vliet 1910, 93, describing trade missions from Siam in the seventeenth century. Houtman 1970, 14–32, narrated in more colorful and multilingual detail the way Asian trading ships were received in Aceh when they brought letters from their king.
17. Crawford 1856, 353.
18. Wilkinson 1959, 2:980.
19. Cited (without attribution) in Andaya and Andaya 1982, 130.
20. Trocki 1979, 56.
21. Starkey 2007, 3:381–84.
22. Reid 1969, 11.
23. See also the chapters by Ota and Tagliacozzo in this volume.
24. See Bassett 1980, 19–32.
25. Cited in D.G.E. Hall 1968, 528.
26. “The Battle of Qualah Battoo,” broadsheet published in Portland, Maine, on the return of the *Potomac* from her punitive mission in 1832, reproduced in Putnam 1924, 93.
27. Andaya and Andaya 1982, 131.

28. Trocki 1979, 205–6.
29. Warren 1981, 285–87.
30. Majul 1973, 283–316.
31. Reid 1969, 87–88.
32. Twang 1998.
33. The issue of smuggling is taken up in Tagliacozzo’s chapter in this volume.
34. Warren 2003, and Xu 2008.

### Chapter 3: From Sea Bandits to Sea Lords

1. The author is grateful for helpful comments from David Bertaina and Erik Freas at the University of Illinois, Springfield.
2. I am here borrowing an argument by the Japanese scholar Tanaka Takeo (1997, 1–2) about the multiethnic bands of pirates in premodern East Asia known as *wakō*.
3. Historians generally translate two words signifying “pirate” in the context of premodern Japan. The term *wakō* is the Japanese pronunciation of a word that only appears in Chinese and Korean historical sources (Chinese *wokou*, Korean *waegu*), meaning Japanese pirates, whereas *kaizoku* is one Japanese historical sources use. Although some overlap exists in the populations represented by the terms *waegu*, *wokou*, and *kaizoku*, I will be focusing on the case of seafarers labeled as *kaizoku* because of the significant corpus of documents written by them.
4. This combination of external recognition and internal control draws on a model of sovereignty laid out in Thomson 1994, chap. 1. Shoguns were warrior hegemony who ruled in Japan in the name of the emperor between the fourteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries; *daimyo* were local warlords, who possessed a domain and also often exercised extensive power. In the period under discussion in this chapter, Japan was almost constantly in a state of civil war, and the power and authority of many *daimyo* rivaled those of emperors and shoguns.
5. On these changes, see Toyoda and Sugiyama 1977, 129–44, and Farris 2006.
6. Udagawa (1981) exemplifies this Marxist historiographical trend, but Japanese scholarship continues to use the term that can be translated as naval vassal (*suigun*).
7. Murai 1993, 39. For *wakō*, see note 2 above and Igawa Kenji’s chapter in this volume.
8. Thomson 1994, 3–4.
9. Thomson 1994, especially chap. 3.
10. Conlan 2003, 149–50.
11. White 1995, 172.
12. In order to explore alternatives to understanding discourse as a unitary force, here I engage with Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1981) ideas of the “dialogical.”
13. For different ways in which seas are socially and culturally constructed over time, see Steinberg 2001.
14. Amino 1984, 30–31.
15. For estates as a “system,” see Keirstead 1992; for the maritime dimension, see Hotate 1981.
16. See Kawai 1977, and EKS 1983, doc. 2179.
17. Murai 1988, 109–10, Batten 2003, 37, and Farris 1985, 53–55.
18. Ki 1957, 36.

19. Ennin 1955, 2, 6, 94, 125, and EKS 1983, doc. 1527.
20. Batten 2003, 118–19; Amino (1984) has argued that the term *ama* can encompass the identities of fisher folk, pirates, salt makers, and others, but no evidence exists of any seafarer self-identifying as a “sea-person.”
21. Sōgi 1990, 411.
22. The *Kojiki* (712 CE) lists “sea people” as one of the groups owing tribute to the Yamato court. The eroticized, othered aspect of women of the sea can be found throughout classical Japanese literature (Goodwin 2007).
23. Quoted in Shinjō 1995, 500.
24. Matsubara 1999, 14–16, and *Ruijusandaikyaku* 1973, 614.
25. Satō Shin’ichi 1955, vol. 1, Kobayashi 1978, and Katsumata 1981.
26. EKS 1983, doc. 747.
27. Manzai, *Eikyō* 6 (1434) 1/19, and *Eikyō* 6 (1434) 1/30.
28. EKS 1983, doc. 1417.
29. For the Hosokawa, see EKS 1983, doc. 1663; and for the Kōno, see EKS 1983, doc. 2448.
30. See EKS 1983, docs. 1151, 1379, and Hashizume 2000, 207.
31. See *Jūroku-jūshichi seiki Iezusukai Nihon hōkokushū* 1994, 7:140–41, and EKS 1983, docs. 2102, 2433.
32. *Hagi-han batsuetsuroku* 1967, 4:174 doc. 10, and EKS 1983, doc. 1713.
33. Kishida 2001, 198.
34. EKS 1983, doc. 2302.
35. EKS 1983, doc. 1596.
36. Yamauchi 2005, 155–59.
37. Denning 1980, 157–58.
38. See EKS 1983, doc. 1340, Amino 1984, and John Hall 1966.
39. See EKS 1983, docs. 1733, 1901, Udagawa 1984, 440–41, and Kariyama 1989, 50–57.
40. EKS 1983, doc. 1900.
41. Ki 1957, 38.
42. See the selections from the *Chosŏn wangjo sillok* [Veritable Records of the Chosŏn Court], cited in Murai 1993, 36–39.
43. Song 1987, no. 162. For further discussions on the relations between Tsushima and Korea see Hellyer’s chapter in this volume.
44. Amino (1984) is the germinal work on non-agricultural cultures in medieval Japan.
45. Amino 1984; *Hagi-han batsuetsuroku*, 4:175, doc. 13, Kawai 1981, 6–7, and Hayashiya 1981.
46. Yamauchi 2005, 22–23, and Batten 2003, 22–42.
47. Imagawa 1994, 406.
48. Tonomura 1992, 98–101, and Usami 1999, 20–21.
49. Sakurai 1994, 116–19, and Katsumata 1996, 279–84.
50. *Mineaiki* 1989, 64–65. According to Amino (1986, 96–111), the phrase *irui igyō* shifted its meaning in the late medieval period from a positively perceived “holiness” to a negatively perceived inhumanity, possibly because outlaws and other violent bands appropriated the symbolic markers of holiness, especially clothing, to demonstrate their power.
51. See, for example, EKS 1983, docs. 1051, 1903, 1904, *Kumano Nachi Taisha monjo*, vol. 3, doc. 1048, Manzai 1928, *Eikyō* 6 (1434) 1/19, *Eikyō* 6 (1434) 1/30, and Okuno 1969, hoi doc. 21.



52. Yamauchi 1997, 169, and Bairin 1996, 471.
53. Cited in Sakurai 1994, 123.
54. For this understanding of sea tenure, see Kalland 1995, 2–3, 146; also see Cordell 1989, 12.
55. Steinberg 2001, 26–30.
56. See Shapinsky 2007.
57. Song 1987, no. 162.
58. Quoted in Kishida 2001, 198.
59. Shapinsky 2007, 233.
60. Shapinsky 2007, 232.
61. Thomson 1994, 13.
62. EKS 1983, doc. 1733, Bairin 1996, 471, EKS 1983, doc. 1519, and EKS 1983, doc. 747.
63. *Jūroku-jūshichi seiki Iezusukai Nihon hōkokushū*, 7/141.
64. Thomson 1994, 27.
65. EKS 1983, doc. 1730.
66. Hashimoto 1998, 13, EKS 1983, doc. 1770, and *Daiganji monjo*, doc. 65.
67. Suzuki 2000, 86–89. Petrucci and Antony, in their chapters in this volume, also discuss piracy in the context of the developments of new ports.
68. *Daiganji monjo* 1978, doc. 68.
69. EKS 1983, docs. 1834, 2070.
70. EKS 1983, docs. 2075, 2103, 2176, and Udagawa 1981, 58.
71. EKS 1983, docs. 2116, 2119.
72. Conlan 2003, chaps. 4–5.
73. Kishida 2001, 171, 198.
74. EKS 1983, doc. 1838, Fujiki 1995, 16–32, 134, and *Hagi-han batsuetsuroku* 1967, 3:176–77, docs. 22, 23.
75. Fujiki 1995.
76. Song 1987, no. 85.
77. Song 1987, no. 154.
78. Yamauchi 2005, chap. 6, and Kawai 1981, 11–13.

#### Chapter 4: Merchants, Smugglers, and Pirates

1. See, for example, Zhou Jinglian 1936, 40–47, Zhang Weihua 1982, 1–56, Wang Muming 2000, and Fan Zhongyi and Tong Xigang 2004.
2. For a discussion on the commercialization of the Ming economy, see Brook 1998; and on piracy and the shadow economy in the mid-Qing period, see Antony's chapter in this book.
3. Deng Zhong 1592, 10/48a–b. Hokkiens refer to people of southern Fujian.
4. Zheng Shungong 1566, 6/2b.
5. Yu Dayou 1565, 7/20a.
6. Zheng Ruozen 1562, 8b/569.
7. Zheng Shungong 1566, 6/2b.
8. Zhu Wan 1590, 4/2b–14b.
9. Zhu Wan 1590, 4/2b–14b, and Zheng Shungong 1566, 6/2b.
10. Zheng Ruozen 1562, 11a/671–75. Similarly in the late eighteenth century, the black market town of Giang Binh, discussed in Antony's chapter, served as a clandestine trading hub.

11. Zhu Wan 1590, 4/2b–14b.
12. Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 8/571–74.
13. Zheng Shungong 1566, 6/1a–5b.
14. The Chinese people traditionally addressed each other in accordance with their family ranking, though they did have their own personal names. As a result, Chinese names, especially those from the lower social stratum, recorded in the Ming documents often appeared as Xu Yi (the eldest brother of the Xu family) or Xu Er (the second brother of the Xu family), instead of the actual names. With the development of their business, gradually people forgot their given names, but simply called them by their nicknames or adopted names derived from their standing in the family.
15. Zheng Shungong 1566, 6/8b–9a, and Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 8b/569–96.
16. See, for example, Xie Jie 1595, Book 2.
17. Zheng Shungong 1566, 6/9a.
18. Historians studying the history of *wakō* inevitably touch on the topic of Wang Zhi, but few of them have paid attention to his relations with the Portuguese. John E. Wills, Jr. (1979), and Rodirich Ptak (1998) have written the best studies on Wang Zhi in English.
19. See, for example, *Ningbo fuzhi*, vol. 22, entry of “Haifang.”
20. On the contraband saltpeter trade, see Petrucci’s chapter in this volume.
21. See Zheng Zhenduo 1947.
22. Wills 1979, 212. Professor Wills was basically correct but made a minor mistake by claiming that Zhu Wan killed Xu Dong on Shuangyu Island. Actually, Xu fled overseas.
23. For detailed accounts about Xu Hai’s activities, see Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 5/320–47, Xie Jie 1595, and Gu Yanwu 1680, 90.
24. *Haicheng xianzhi* 1762, 18.
25. *Haicheng xianzhi* 1762, 14; see also Antony 2007, 111.
26. Zhang Xie 1618, 6/113–15, and *Haicheng xianzhi* 1762, 24.
27. *Zhangzhou fuzhi*, 1/31.
28. Zheng Shungong 1566, 6/11a.
29. Zhu Wan 1590, 4/7b.
30. See Chin forthcoming.
31. Zhu Wan 1590, 4/5a–9b.
32. See Xu Fuyuan and Chen Zilong 1640, 205.
33. Xu Fuyuan and Chen Zilong 1640, 267.
34. Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 4/275–84.
35. See Yin Guangren and Zhang Rulin, 1751.
36. See Teixeira 1994, 207–15.
37. See *Teppōki*, in Kunitomo, *Nanbo bunshu*, 18th cent. ed., 7–9.
38. Lin Xiyuan 1555, 5/30.
39. Lin Xiyuan 1555, 5/30.
40. See, for example, Huang Qinghua 2006, 1/136–37. In line with conventional Communist historiography, Huang fiercely condemns Lin Xiyuan’s defense of the Portuguese as quoted above.
41. On the shadow economy, see, for example, Thomas 1992, Schneider and Enste 2002, and Williams 2006.

**Chapter 5: Pirates, Gunpowder, and Christianity in Late Sixteenth-Century Japan**

1. Sakurai 1996, 23, 386.
2. Shapinsky 2007, and his chapter in this volume.
3. Also see the discussion on Wang Zhi in the previous chapter by James Chin.
4. Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 3/6–8; also see Sakurai 1996, 386, 23. For the location of Shuangyu, consult Map 4.1 (p. 45).
5. Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 3/1–6.
6. Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 3/1–6.
7. Antony (2003, 27–28) explains how piracy actually decreased for a time after 1574, when the Jiajing Emperor allowed restricted international trade. Pirates once again became legitimate merchants.
8. Tanaka Takeo 1986, 240, and Matsuura 2003, 90. Although Tanaka seems to have attributed Sukezaemon's home to Hakata, other reliable sources depict Sukezaemon as a merchant of the wealthy Naya of Sakai. The Naya, a group of wholesale merchants, owned and rented warehouses throughout Japan for the transportation and storage of goods from province to province. However, it remains possible that this Sukezaemon from Sakai may have been a different person, though born in the same year, 1544. Sukezaemon traded not only with Wang in China, but also in Thailand and in the Philippines.
9. Tanaka Takeo 1986, 135.
10. Needham 1954, 5.7:453.
11. Ōta 2002, 329.
12. Sakuma 1979, 8.
13. Arimizu 1994, 145–53.
14. Ōta 2002, 312.
15. Ōta 2002, 383.
16. Udagawa, et al. 2005, 157, and Mote and Twitchett 1988, 976.
17. Needham 1985, 117–18.
18. Kage 2006, 261.
19. Kage 2006, 243.
20. Goodrich and Fang 1976, 631–38.
21. Kage 2006, 259.
22. Boxer 1963, 361.
23. Boxer 1963, 317–18. One picul equaled 133 and 1/3 of a lb avoirdupois; three piculs were about 400 lbs. One hundred taels corresponded to one *kan* or 3.75 kg (8.27 lb) of copper coins.
24. Kishida, et al. 1995, 116.
25. Reimon, 1562.
26. See *Cartas que os Padres e Irmaos de la Companhia de Jesus, que andão nos regnos de Japão escreverão — des annos 1549–1566*.
27. Udagawa 2002, 158/ 260, and Organtino, et al. 1597, 58. One *koku* measured mainly grain and rice. It corresponded to 180 liters or 47.654 US gallons.
28. Sanagi 1972, 103.
29. *Buke Mandaiki* 1644, 32.
30. Udagawa 2002, 111.
31. Udagawa 2002, 117.

32. *Buke Mandaiki*, 33.
33. ARSI, 46b/15.
34. Matsuda 1967, 657.
35. ARSI, 46b/155.
36. ARSI, 46b/657.
37. Organtino, et al. 1597, 58, 115.
38. Yamauchi 2005, 128.
39. Tanaka 1986, 134.
40. Yamauchi 2004, 75–82.

## Chapter 6: At the Crossroads

1. See the recent studies, for example, by Shimizu 2005, Matoba 2007, and Nakajima 2007.
2. Cortesão 1944, 376–77.
3. Retana 1910, 16–17.
4. Varela 1983, 24, 58–61, 110.
5. Varela 1983, 120, 136.
6. Wicki 1948, 471–75.
7. Galvão 1987, 107.
8. Retana 1910, 16.
9. Galvão 1987, 16, 107, 155, 166–67.
10. Galvão 1987, 169.
11. Jacobs 1974, 1/202.
12. Retana 1910, 17.
13. Jacobs, 1974, 1/240.
14. There is some mention of *wakō* relating to the “Ningbo Incident” of 1523, but no further record of them in the 1530s. By and large, the *wakō* of the Mongol and Ming periods differed considerably. In the former period, Japanese constituted the majority of *wakō*, and they mostly raided Korea; in the latter period, a more multinational group made up *wakō*, and they mostly plundered China.
15. Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 8/24, 9/24. On the activities of Wang Zhi, also see the chapters by Chin and Petrucci.
16. See Igawa 2007.
17. Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 2/18.
18. MSLSZ, 298/6–7.
19. Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 8/24.
20. Also see the discussion by Chin in this book, and in Murai 1997.
21. See Igawa 2007, 201.
22. Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 5/19, 8/14.
23. Schurhammer 1996, 57.
24. Zheng Ruozeng 1562, 8/14, and Zheng Shungong 1566, 6/3; also see the discussion in Chin’s chapter.
25. Zheng Liangsheng 1995, 365.
26. AGI, Filipinas 6-1-7, ff.1v.-2r.
27. AGI, Patronato 24-17, f.6r.
28. For a discussion on this topic, see Zheng Liangsheng 1995, 422.

29. Tomaru 1942, 54.
30. Gu Yanwu 1680, 26/8.
31. Yu Dayou 1565, 1/30.
32. MSLSZ, 8/1.
33. Lin Renchuan 1987, 108–10.
34. *Chaozhou fuzhi*, 7/31.
35. Gu Yanwu 1680, 28/63.
36. Staunton 1856, 2/11.
37. Pastells 1926, xxv–xxvi, xxxviii.
38. Staunton 1856, 2/302–03.
39. Retana 1910, 21; and Staunton 1856, 2/59.
40. *Guangdong tongzhi* 1864, 70/64.
41. See Zheng Guangnan 1999, 236–238.
42. Strictly speaking, Macau began to function after 1557; before that date, the nearby island, known as Lampacau, had served the same purpose.
43. Even after Spain abandoned her dominion over the Moluccas in the Treaty of Zaragoza in 1529, the Philippines continued close relations with them. For instance, in 1582, the Spanish governor agreed to send troops to quell disturbances in the Moluccas, and several years later, repeated the maneuver.
44. Retana 1910, 24.
45. AGI, Filipinas 6-4-49, f.2r.
46. Blair and Robertson 1903–09, 34/384–85.
47. Blair and Robertson 1903–09, 6/178.
48. Blair and Robertson 1903–09, 6/182–83.
49. In the Spanish empire, *Audiencias* had judicial, legislative, and executive functions, and therefore represented the king in his role as law-maker and dispenser of justice.
50. AGI, Filipinas 18A-5-31, f.3v, f.4r.
51. AGI, Filipinas 24-14, f.1v.
52. Biblioteca Angelica, MS.1331, ff.73v.-74r.

## Chapter 7: Piracy and Coastal Security in Southeastern China, 1600–1780

1. MSLSZ, 117/476.
2. On this subject, see Giraud 1990.
3. See for example, Lin Renchuan 1987, who uses the phrase *siren haishang maoyi jituan* to describe these groups as private sea merchants.
4. See, for example, the discussion in Calanca 2008.
5. Carioti 1995, 30–39, and 1992, 72–73.
6. Comments of Shao Tingcai, cited in Antony 2007, 113–14.
7. Between 1589 and 1612, for example, twelve years of earthquakes hit the Fujian coast, mainly affecting the prefectures of Xinghua, Quanzhou and Zhangzhou — 1589 (Funing, Fuzhou, and Xinghua); 1591 (Fuzhou, Xinghua, and Zhangzhou); 1594 (Quanzhou); 1596 (Hui'an); 1600 (Tong'an, Anxi, Zhao'an, and Nan'ao); 1602 (Fujian and Guangdong); 1603 (Xinghua, Hui'an, and Zhao'an); 1604 (Xinghua, Quanzhou, and Zhangzhou, among others); 1605 (Fujian, Guangdong, and other provinces); 1607 (Quanzhou); 1609 (Xinghua and Quanzhou); 1612 (Zhao'an). During the same period, other disasters struck some areas:

- in 1591 and 1594, drought and famine affected Fuzhou; in 1596, a typhoon hit Hui'an; in 1600, the prefecture of Quanzhou suffered an earthquake and floods; and then in 1603, a typhoon smashed into its coast. In 1602, Zhao'an experienced drought and famine, as did Xinghua in 1605. Also see Antony 2003, 30.
8. Cao Lütai 1959, 4, and *Chongzhen Changbian*, 11/ 41.
  9. MDTX, 4.
  10. See for example, the case of Mao Zongxian in his struggle against Zheng Zhilong (Calanca 2008, chap. 3, part 2).
  11. MDTX, 3.
  12. MDTX, 3–4
  13. See the discussions by Chin and Antony in this volume.
  14. On the Zhengs, see Blussé 1990, 245–64, and Carioti 1995.
  15. Zhu Kejian, 2/5a.
  16. Quoted in Cao Shuji 2000–02, 36. There were similar reports of famine and cannibalism from Guangdong; see Antony 2003, 30–31. One *li* equaled to 510 meters.
  17. QLSLZ, 4/4/84, 4/7/127, and *Lianjiang xianzhi* 1927, 3/47a.
  18. Zheng Guangnan 1999, 286–87.
  19. We know that during this period of conflict, the Zheng greatly contributed, for example, to the development of ceramics production in Japan and its commercialization, especially from the 1650s. See Ho 1994, 35–70.
  20. On legislation protecting private property, see Buoye 2000, 220; and see the discussion below on Qing measures to regulate sea traffic.
  21. Antony 2003, 19–20.
  22. KXZPZZ, 2/283–84.
  23. QLSLR, 6/245/ 435 (KX 50.3.7), and 6/246/442–43 (KX 50.5.21).
  24. QLSLR, 6/252/500 (KX 51.12.17), and 6/253/505 (KX 52.2.3).
  25. QLSLR, 6/213/9 (KX 42.9.15), 6/246/442–43 (KX 50.7.21), and KXZPZZ, 3/191–94.
  26. GZDYZ, 6/684–86 (YZ 4.10.2), 6/741–43 (YZ 4.10.13).
  27. QLSLR, 6/253/502–03 (KX 52.1.23); also see KXZPZZ, 4/247–52, 313, 380–81.
  28. KXZPZZ, 3/221.
  29. DQHDSL, 629/1b.
  30. QLSLR, 6/250/483 (KX 51.8.27).
  31. DQHDSL, 629/1b–2a.
  32. ZPZZ (*junwu fangwu*), QL 8.6.7.
  33. GZDYZ, 9/185 (YZ 5.10.26).
  34. The palace memorials provide some of the elements that enable us to determine the nature of these offenders, such as in ZPZZ (*junwu fangwu*), QL 8.6.7.
  35. Chen 1630, 75/1986–87.
  36. See Calanca 2007.
  37. On maritime customs, see Huang Guosheng 2000; on sub-county officials, see Antony 2002; and on the Qing military, see Calanca 2007 and 2008.
  38. On the *baojia* system, see *Baojiashu jiyao* 1838, as well as Hua 1988, 87–121, and Dutton 1992, 55–93.
  39. Cao Lütai 1959, 4/63–66.
  40. Zhang Xie 1618, 7/135–40, and *Ming shilu leizuan, Fujian-Taiwan juan* 1993, 549.
  41. Cao Lütai 1959, 4/67–68, 71–76.

42. Cited by Ouyang Zongshu 1998, 243.
43. *Qingshi gao*, 32:240/9543-9544.
44. *Fujian shengli* 1873, 23/616–18.
45. *Yuedong shengli* 1846, 6/3a–b, and *Baojiashu jiyao* 1838, 1/4a–b, 2/31a–b.
46. Zhu Kejian, 4/2a.
47. See the discussion in Calanca 2007.

## Chapter 8: Piracy and the Shadow Economy in the South China Sea, 1780–1810

1. Yuan Yonglun 1830, 10.
2. Cited in Winn 1994, 183.
3. See, for example, Winn 1994, and Bourgois 2002.
4. For a discussion of the negative economic impact of piracy see Anderson 1995.
5. For example, between 1775 and 1810, the coastal areas of Guangdong and Fujian suffered twenty-nine years of famines; during the height of the pirate disturbances in Guangdong between 1802 and 1810, the Pearl River Delta experienced food shortages in every year except 1807. See Antony 2003, 38, and Table 3, p. 40.
6. On Chinese piracy in this period, see Dian Murray 1987, and Antony 2003.
7. See Matsuura Akira 1983, 615–27, and Huang Qichen 1986, 155–56.
8. This topic is treated at length in Antony 2003, 54–81.
9. The word *Ladrones* derives from the Portuguese for bandit or pirate.
10. Turner 1814, 18.
11. Yuan Yonglun 1830, 10, 16, NYC, 12/90b–92a, 13/1b, and GZD (11082) JQ 13.r5.25.
12. Turner 1814, 7, 18, and Zheng Weiming 1987, 104b–105a.
13. XSXZ, 8/56b.
14. Yuan Yonglun 1830, 16. Incidentally, followers of the cult of San Po, a deity said to be the third sister of Mazu (Tianhou), practiced unorthodox exorcistic rituals and spirit possession.
15. GDHF, 1/1a–8a, and Zhang Weixiang and Xue Changqing 2006, 52–60.
16. Ye 1989, 159, and Antony 2003, 61–63.
17. Ye Xianen 1989, 160, 224–25, and Zhang Weixiang and Xue Changqing 2006, 63–69.
18. GZDQL (QL 21.6.17), 14/644, MQSLWB, 508a, WCXZ, 4/91b–92a, and Zheng Weiming 1987, 393a.
19. Suzuki Chusei 1975, 480–81, and Toyooka Yasufumi 2006, 50–51.
20. GZD (2368) JQ 2.4.24, and GDHF, 26/1a–2b.
21. GZD (1372) JQ 1.11.1, (2845) JQ 2.7.6, (3459) JQ 2.12.1, (3611) JQ 3.1.13, and (4602) JQ 4.5.29.
22. Turner 1814, 7, Zheng Weiming 1987, 105a–107b, 392b–395a, and He Weijie 2007, 63–64.
23. Yin Guangren and Zhang Rulin 1751, 78–80, 165, and Porter 1996, 77, 80.
24. See the insightful discussion on the Cape of Good Hope in Ward 2007.
25. Supercargoes to the Portuguese Governor of Macau, 1800, in the Oriental and India Office Records, British Library, G/1/19, fols. 209–11. Thanks to Prof. Rogerio Puga for bringing this document to my attention.
26. ZPZZ (1058) (*nongmin yundong*), JQ 10.11.22, Turner 1814, 32, *Chinese Repository* 1834, 3/82–83, and Zheng Weiming 1987, 109a.
27. XKTb (128) JQ 12.5.9, and Zhang Weixiang and Xue Changqing 2006, 53–54.

28. ZPZZ (1133) JQ 10.6.26, (1135) JQ 11.5.6, SCSX, 79/10a, and NYC, 12/15a–b.
29. GZD (1047) JQ 1.8.19, (2010) JQ 2.2.14, and (2845) JQ 2.7.6.
30. López Nadal 2001, 125–36 (quote on 127).
31. XKTB (102) 11.10.48. In this case, however, officials arrested the pirates before they sold much of the loot.
32. Yuan Yonglun 1830, 10.
33. NYC, 11/42a–b, 12/31b–32a, GZD (13513) JQ 14.3.5, (15187) JQ 14.8.23, and DGXZ, 33/22b.
34. Dian Murray 2004, 53.
35. SCSX, 38/1a–2b.
36. XKTB (189) JQ 16.5.21.
37. ZPZZ (1133) (*nongmin yundong*), JQ 10.9.5.
38. Katsuta Hiroko 1967, 40.
39. ZPZZ (1058) (*nongmin yundong*), JQ 10.11.22, NYC, 11/36b, and Yuan Yonglun 1830, 10.
40. Turner 1814, 32, 37.
41. ZPZZ (1121) (*nongmin yundong*), JQ 15.7.12.
42. GZD (6211 attachment) JQ 6.9.23, and (6793) JQ 6.11.28.
43. GZD (5050) JQ 7.5.12.
44. *Chinese Repository* 1834, 3/72, 81.
45. Van Dyke 2005, 143.
46. Matsuura Akira 1983, 627, and Ye Xianen 1989, 186–87, 213–14.
47. Suzuki Chusei 1967, 102–103, Dian Murray 1987, 29–30, and Van Dyke 2005, 48.
48. Suzuki Chusei 1967, 103–104.
49. GZD (1643 attachment) JQ 1.12.7, (2010) JQ 2.2.14, and Dian Murray 1987, 187 n.39.
50. Van Dyke 2005, 126.
51. XKTB (84) JQ 1.9.23.
52. LFZZ (2684) JQ 8.1.3; on Triad involvement in salt smuggling in Huizhou, see Hsieh 1972, 155–60.
53. Antony 2003, 136–37.
54. Wakeman 1972, 30.

## Chapter 9: Poor but Not Pirates

1. Arano 1988, i–ix.
2. Hellyer 2005, 1–3.
3. Descriptions of the incident can be found in three documents, in DNISK, ME 191–0009: 1870/06/19, 1870/06/19, and 1870/06/19. All dates follow the Japanese calendar with year/lunar month/day (Japan did not adopt the Gregorian calendar until 1873).
4. Yanai 1967–73.
5. For further discussions of the clandestine trade in Southeast Asia during this and later times, see the following chapters by Ota and Tagliacozzo.
6. Hellyer 2005.
7. See Osa 1965.
8. Elisonas 1991, 239–55.
9. Elisonas 1991, 247–49.



10. See Shapinsky in this book.
11. Tashiro 1981, 58–71.
12. Tsuruta 2006, 56, 65, 79.
13. James Lewis 2003, 107–45.
14. Arano 1988, 191–210.
15. Toby 1991, 53–109.
16. Quoted in Tashiro 1981, 337.
17. Tashiro 1976.
18. Izuhara Chōshi Henshū Iinkai, 763–66.
19. Tashiro 2001, 174–82.
20. *Koku*, a unit of measure, approximated five bushels or 180 liters, for rice and other grains. Because it comprised the staple crop, in the sixteenth century, the Japanese had begun to calculate taxes in rice. By the early seventeenth century, they calculated the wealth of domains in *koku*.
21. Arano 1988, 234–35.
22. DNISK, KA 002–0348: 1848/03/16.
23. DNISK, KA 005–0508: 1848/08/12.
24. DNISK, KA 010–0234: 1849/02/27; KA 011–0853: 1849/04/18; and KA 010–0234: 1849/02/21.
25. DNISK, KA 010–0234: 1849/04/09; and KA 010–0234: 1849/04[intercalary]/01.
26. DNISK, KA 010–1081: 1849/04[intercalary]/05.
27. DNISK, KA 010–1081: 1849/04 [intercalary]/09.
28. DNISK, KA 029–1134: 1851/11/24 and 1851/04/26.
29. DNISK KA 017–0620: 1850/02/03, 1850/02/28, and 1850/03/15.
30. DNISK KA 025–0452: 1851/02/23; DNISK KA 026–0083: 1851/04/03.
31. DNISK KA 039–0627: 1853/06/03.
32. DNISK, AN 110–0747: 1858/07/26, and Sugiyama 1984.
33. Ōshima Tomonojō, a domain official, presented a plan to invade Korea in 1864. The complete text of his proposal can be found in Tanaka Akira 1991, 108–17.
34. DNISK, KA 052–0942: 1853/09/04.
35. For domain and *bakufu* records concerning the visits of British and Russian vessels from 1859–61, see Hino 1968.
36. Kim 1980, 123.
37. Mitani 2006, xiv–xv.

## Chapter 10: The Business of Violence

1. In this study, Riau (also Rhio, Riow, Riouw, and Rio) and Lingga (also Linga) respectively refer to the Riau Islands and the Lingga Islands, both located south of Singapore.
2. Chronicles of European anti-piracy measures include Logan 1849–51, Buckley 1902, 276–82, Cornets de Groot 1846–47, and Kniphorst 1876–81.
3. In 1824, an anonymous writer (assumed to be John Crawford) stated that “the most confirmed pirates are the Malay in the Straits of Malacca and Karimata,” and their “most noted stations are in Lingga and Riau, and also Singapore.” Anonymous 1825, 243.

4. Raffles 1817, 1/232–34, Anonymous 1825, Newbold 1839, 1:36–39, Logan 1849–51, and Cornets de Groot 1846–47.
5. For the former studies, see Tarling 1963, and Turnbull 1972; and for the latter, see Resink 1968, Lopian 1974, and a recent work by Algadri 1994.
6. See the studies by Trocki 1979, Warren 1981, Warren 2002, Leirissa 1994, Anderson 1997, and Teitler 2002; for the historiography of Southeast Asian piracy, see Campo 2003.
7. Bugis designates a few ethnic groups that originated in south Sulawesi. After the conquest by the Dutch East India Company of their places of origin in the 1660s, large numbers of them took refuge in many places in insular Southeast Asia. See Andaya 1995.
8. The Iranun (also Ilanun, Illanun, and Lanun) is an ethnic group that originated in central Mindanao. After relocating to the Sulu Islands in the late 1760s, they conducted regular piratical raids covering almost the entire Malay Archipelago. I adopt the spelling used by Warren 1981, 149.
9. The Orang Laut, or “Sea Peoples,” generally describes the heterogeneous groups dwelling on boats in the southern Malacca Strait; see Barnard 2007.
10. Dianne Lewis 1995, 85–96, Vos 1993, 121–25, Ali Haji Ibn Ahmad 1982, 211–14, 221–22, and Trocki 1979, 22–30, 33–36.
11. Trocki 1979, 37–38.
12. See, for example, Anonymous 1825, and Logan 1849, 3:586.
13. The London Treaty, drawn up by the Dutch and British governments in March 1824, stipulated a division of the spheres of both countries’ influence along the border in the middle of the Malacca Strait.
14. Logan 1849, 3:585, and Campo 2005, 31.
15. ADR 71/3 (1825): 31–32.
16. Agar-agar is a type of seaweed from which gelatin was made. Tripang (or sea cucumber) is an echinoderm that has a thick, wormlike body. Both items were sold to Chinese traders for the Chinese market for culinary purposes.
17. ADR 71/3 (1825): 31, 35–36.
18. Spanish *mat* is a silver coin widely used in early-modern Southeast Asia. One Spanish *mat* usually had the value of eight Spanish *reals*.
19. ADR 71/3 (1825): 26–27.
20. Campo 2005, 33.
21. SSR A31: 13–15, April 28 (April 21), 1826. *Prahu* is a general term referring to local sailing ships in the Malay Archipelago.
22. Logan 1850, 4:147–48.
23. Logan 1850, 4:152.
24. ADR 71/3 (1825): 30–32, 49–51; this information agrees with Begbie 1834, 272.
25. Logan 1850, 144.
26. ADR 71/3 (1825): 56–60. Gambir is an astringent extract used in dyeing and tanning. In Southeast Asia, it is also popularly used as a material for betel chewing. In Riau Chinese settlers opened gambir plantations on Pulau Bintan in the 1730s for the purpose of export.
27. Panglima is a traditional Malay title for low- and middle-ranking officials or chiefs. Petty chiefs involved in piracy in the Malacca Strait often purported this title.
28. SSR A 28: 247, September 14 (September 6), 1826. Panglima Tarah was also reported to be an elderly man, dark, short, thin, and lame from a former injury to his left leg.

29. SSR A 25: 287–91, February 2 (January 30), 1826; SSR A26: 225–55, April 28 (March 20), 1826; and SSR A 28: 247–48, September 14 (September 6), 1826.
30. SSFR 142: 62–64, September 27 (September 21), 1827.
31. Logan 1850, 148.
32. Hussin 2007, 177–84.
33. SSR A 25: 290–91, February 2 (January 30), 1826.
34. Begbie 1834, 271.
35. Logan 1850, 404–06.
36. SSR A28: 247–48, September 14 (September 6), 1826.
37. Logan 1850, 404, 406.
38. SSR A26: 259, 261–62, April 28 (April 21), 1826, and SSR A28: 361–62, December 18 (December 14), 1826.
39. SSR A28: 248–49, September 14 (September 6), 1826.
40. SSR A42: 111–12, February 18 (February 9), 1828.
41. SSR A39: 84–87, September 20 (September 7), 1827, and SSR A 39: 88, September 20 (September 7), 1827, and SSFR 142: 641–42, September 27 (September 21), 1827.
42. SSR A31: 309–10, December 7 (December 4), 1826, and SSR A39: 88–89, September 20 (September 7), 1827. *Colak* is a utensil to scoop something granular as well as a unit to measure it. Apart from Kurou, a similar kidnapping business was organized in Turang and Batu Mou, both in Perak (SSR A18: 460–63, June 23 [June 17], 1825, and SSR A25: 52–53, January 12 (January 9), 1826.
43. SSR A26: 261–62, April 28 (April 21), 1826.
44. SSR A26: 259, April 28 (April 21), 1826, and SSR A31: 15, April 28 (April 21), 1826.
45. SSR A57: 5–5A, November 3 (November 2), 1828.
46. SSR A28: 458–60, October 5 (September 1), 1826.
47. SSR A28: 460–62, October 5 (September 4), 1826.
48. SSR A28: 484–86, October 5 (September 16), 1826.
49. Hussin 2007: 80–97, 118–20.
50. SSR A25: 52–53, January 12, 1826, and SSR A39: 87–90 87–90, September 20, 1827.
51. ADR 71/3 (1825): 36–39, and Campo 2003, 202–03.
52. Logan 1850, 144.
53. Anonymous 1833, and Logan 1850, 149.
54. Logan 1850, 149.
55. Logan 1850, 157.
56. Logan 1850, 405.
57. SSR R1: 77, May 1833 (the date is not clear in the source), and Logan 1850, 159–60, 400. According to Turnbull (1972, 191), Singapore merchants were willing to put up with anything, even with piracy, rather than pay taxes, a situation that continued until 1867. For the civil opposition against the increase in custom duties in the early 1830s, see Tarling 1963, 70–73.
58. SSR R3: 157–59, April 26, 1833, and SSR R3: 167–68, May 25, 1833. On the admiralty jurisdiction among the British authorities, see Tarling 1963, 32, 99–101.
59. It is not clear how the British authorities raised the money to cover the expenses. Tarling (1963, 73) stated that the Calcutta government now inclined toward spending money for anti-piracy operations, and that the new Governor-General, Lord Auckland, strongly supported the suppression of piracy.

60. See Logan 1850, 405–10, Tarling 1963, 73, 76–77, 84–90, and Turnbull 1972, 246–47.
61. Logan 1850, 408–09.
62. SSR R4: 194, June 4, 1837.
63. SSR R4: 220–21, July 1837 (the date is not clear in the source).
64. Logan 1850, 625–26.
65. SSR R4: 199, June 4, 1837.
66. Gibson-Hill (1956, 80–81) also discusses the increase in the number of followers of the Temenggong by receiving refugees from neighboring islands in the 1820s.
67. Trocki 1979, 61–71.
68. SSR R4: 164–65, April 5, 1837.
69. SSR R4: 195–96, June 4, 1837.
70. SR R4: 195, June 4, 1837.
71. Bonham, June 20, 1836, quoted in Tarling 1979, 77–80.
72. Trocki 1979, 78, 81. Gutta-percha is the latex-like sap of diverse varieties of Blanco Palauim. From the time of its discovery in the 1840s, its most important use has been in the coating of transoceanic telegraph cables.
73. Logan 1849, 1850, 1851, and Tagliacozzo 2005.
74. Campo (2003, 208) points out this tendency on the Bugis in Dutch colonial records.

## Chapter 11: Smuggling in the South China Sea

1. For references to place names mentioned in this chapter, see Map 1.1 (p. 4).
2. See, for example, the *Catalogue of the Latest and Most Approved Charts, Pilots, and Navigation Books Sold or Purchased* by James Imray and Son, 1868.
3. Chiang 1978, 136, 139.
4. ARA, 1888, MR #461.
5. La Chapelle 1885, 689–90.
6. See Bogaars 1955, 104, 117.
7. Coates 1911, 58, and Kubicek 1994, 86 passim.
8. Parkinson 1937, 351; see also de Haan 1922, 1/498 for scandals involving Chinese payoffs to an incumbent Governor General.
9. Coates 1911, 81.
10. Viraphol 1977, 124; see also Hao 1986.
11. Crawford 1828, 160–61.
12. Warren 1981, 8.
13. Reid 1993, 2, and Wong 1960, 114.
14. Viraphol 1977, 127.
15. See ANRI, Maandrapport der Residentie Banka 1879 (Banka #105).
16. See “Mr. Everett’s Journal at Papar, 1879–80, December 5, 1879, Volume 73,” in PRO/CO/874/Boxes 67–77, Resident’s Diaries.
17. For Batavia, see “Jualan Chandu Gelap Dalam Betawi,” *Utusan Malayu*, February 2, 1909, p. 2; for Singapore, see *Bintang Timur*, January 4, 1895, p. 2.
18. See the deliberations, discussions, and legislation of the Bertillon system as outlined in ARA, 1892, MR #1144; 1896, MR #743; 1898, MR #379.
19. See the “Secret Societies Amendment Proclamation of 1913,” as declared by the Governor of British North Borneo on 8/9/1913, in CO/874/Box 803 “Secret Societies.”

20. Officer of the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade to Herman Merivale, Esq., June 17, 1850, in CO 144/6; Extracts From the Minutes of the Legislative Council of Labuan, January 3, 1853, in CO 144/11; Gov Labuan to CO, January 9, 1872, #2, in CO 144/36; CO Jacket (Mr. Fairfield, and Mr. Wingfield), May 21, 1896, in CO 144/70; Gov Labuan to BNB HQ, London, November 13, 1896, in CO 144/70.
21. See Enactment #6 of 1915, Malay States; also *Bintang Timor*, December 6, 1894, p. 2.
22. *Straits Settlements Blue Books*, 1873, Spirit Imports and Exports, Singapore, 329, 379–80.
23. ANRI, Politiek Verslag Residentie West Borneo 1872 (#2/10); ARA, Extract Uit het Register der Besluiten, GGNEI, January 2, 1881, #7, in 1881, MR #18.
24. ARA, First Government Secretary to Director of Finances, November 6, 1889, #2585, in 1889, MR #773; also First Government Secretary to Resident Timor, March 8, 1892, #600, in 1892, MR #217; ARA, Dutch Consul, Manila to MvBZ, April 5, 1897, #32; MvBZ to MvK, May 24, 1897, #5768, both in (MvBZ/A Dossiers/223/A.111/“Verbod Invoer Wapens en Alcohol”); ARA, Dutch Consul, London to MvBZ, January 28, 1893, #37, and GGNEI to MvK, November 27, 1892, #2268/14, both in (MvBZ/A Dossiers/223/A.111/“Still Zuidzee”).
25. The best three monographs on the history of opium in nineteenth century Southeast Asia are Trocki 1990 and 1999, and Rush 1990; also see Warren 1981, and Tagliacozzo 2000.
26. ARA, Chief Inspector of the Opium Regie to Gov Gen NEI, October 30, 1903, #3017/R in Verbaal, January 13, 1904, #34.
27. To discourage opium abuse, governments raised prices as part of the moral argument for them to take over the trade.
28. See CO/882 Eastern, 9, #114 gives some of these stipulations for the Malay Peninsula. The government formulated different laws depending on whether they involved coastal or inland areas while racially, they allowed only male Chinese over the age of 21 to smoke opium on licensed premises. This document gives a good overview of the scope and complexity of narcotics legislation.
29. See, for example, Jennings 1997, and Trocki 1999.
30. Schell stressed that these fractured outlines have been visible for some time now, though decades or even centuries may elapse before some kind of pressure or event comes along to split these divisions at the seams. Interview notes, Berkeley, California, May 1992.
31. Hansen 2000, 221–24, and Esherick 1987.
32. Polo 2001, and Hirth and Rockhill 1911.
33. Welsh 1993.
34. See discussion in Winichakul 1994. For a theoretical discussion on the nature (and evolution) of borders, see Prescott 1987.
35. “Bersaing Di Langit Terbuka BIMP-EAGA,” *Suara Pembaruan*, November 25, 1977, p. 16; and “Mindanao Bakal Unggul Di Timur ASEAN,” *Suara Pembaruan*, January 25, 1997, p. 17.
36. “Pos Pelintas Batas RI-Filipina Ditambah,” *Kompas*, December 10, 1997, p. 8; “Tenaga Willing to Supply Power to Sumatra via Bridge Link,” *Straits Times*, June 29, 1997; “Malaysia Undecided Where Bridge to Indonesia Will Begin,” *Straits Times*, June 26, 1997. For boundary agreements across the land border in Borneo, see *Laporan Delegasi Republik Indonesia* 1981.
37. “Other ASEAN States Urged to Follow Singapore-KL Joint Approach to Crime,” *Straits Times*, June 10, 1997; “Vietnam, Cambodia Police Sign Police Accord,” *Weekly Review of*

- the Cambodia Daily*, March 19, 1997, p. 8; “Lao Police Delegation Back From Interpol Meeting in Beijing,” *Vientiane Times*, September 20–23, 1997, p. 4.
38. Indonesia also has taken to mapping the culture of border peoples in this manner; see Suwarsono 1997; “Eye on Ships,” *Straits Times*, June 7, 1997; “Seminar on New Lao Mapping and Survey Network Held in Vientiane,” *Vientiane Times*, November 5–7, 1997, p. 4; “Border Market to be Opened,” *Jakarta Post*, November 10, 1997, p. 2; for the other example, mentioned above, see “AFP Waging High-Tech War vs. Abus,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, April 9, 2001, p. 2.
  39. “Struggle or Smuggle,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 22, 1997, p. 26 *passim*.
  40. These interviews were conducted with Bugis sailors on Jakarta’s Sunda Kelapa docks in August and September of 1998; I cannot give the names of crew members (or their ships) for obvious reasons. These sailors, in fact, spoke of the maritime police as the true “outlaws” in Indonesian waters — agents who can shake down passing ships with near impunity. Interviews were also conducted with Indonesian laborers (in a variety of occupations) in Singapore.
  41. “Believe it or Not,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 27, 1997, p. 23.
  42. Bailey and Truong 2001, Figure 1.
  43. See especially the very detailed expose in McCoy 1991, 193–261.
  44. “Indonesia Sudah Lama Jadi Pemasaran Narkotika,” *Angkatan Bersenjata*, November 4, 1997, p. 12; “Philippine Police Seize Huge Volume of Drugs This Year,” *Vientiane Times*, October 29–31, 1997, p. 6.
  45. “Drugs Blacklist,” *Phnom Penh Post*, March 16–29, 2001, p. 2; “PM Warns of Takeover by Drug Merchants,” *Weekly Review of the Cambodia Daily*, April 24, 1997, p. 12; “Medellin on the Mekong,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 7, 1995, pp. 29–30; “Medellin on the Mekong,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 23, 1997, pp. 24–26.
  46. “Dadah Musush Utama Masyarakat,” *Pelita Brunei*, July 2, 1997, p. 1.
  47. “Pakistanis Tried for Trafficking Heroin,” *Jakarta Post*, December 1, 1997, p. 3; “Drug Bust,” *Straits Times*, June 26, 1997; “4 Chinese Nabbed in Drug Swoop,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, November 10, 1997, p. 24; “3 Die in Drug Bust,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, November 19, 1997, p. 20; “Drug Dealers Find ‘Open’ Market in Philippines,” *Straits Times*, June 21, 1997.
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  50. “Foreign Maids Fight Modern Day Slavery,” *Philippine News*, April 4, 2001, p. 2; “Labour Migration in Southeast Asia: Analysis, Cooperation Needed,” *TRENDS* (Journal of the Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore), September 27, 1997; “AIDS Time Bomb Ticks Away Among Asia’s Migrant Labor,” *Viet Nam News*, November 2, 1997, p. 12.
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  52. See Warren 1993.
  53. For the Dutch Indies/Indonesian case, see for example Hull, Sulistyarningsih, and Jones 1997, 1–17; Ming 1983; and Stoler 1986.

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56. “Banyak Wanita di Bawah Umur Melacur,” *Angkatan Bersenjata*, July 25, 1997, p. 7; “Fishermen Involved in Prostitution,” *Jakarta Post*, November 29, 1997, p. 2; “Banyak Tempat Hiburan Jadi Tempat Prostitutsi,” *Angkatan Bersenjata*, November 12, 1997, p. 6. For a view not from the “periphery,” but rather from the center, see Allison Murray, 1991.
57. “Alleged Call Girls Detained,” *Borneo Bulletin*, November 12, 1997, p. 1; “Pimps Jailed, Call Girls Fined,” *Borneo Bulletin*, November 13, 1997, p. 3.

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