

# **CULTURAL STUDIES AND CULTURAL INDUSTRIES IN NORTHEAST ASIA**

## **What a Difference a Region Makes**

*Edited by*

**Chris Berry, Nicola Liscutin, and  
Jonathan D. Mackintosh**



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Hong Kong University Press is honoured that Xu Bing, whose art explores the complex themes of language across cultures, has written the Press's name in his Square Word Calligraphy. This signals our commitment to cross-cultural thinking and the distinctive nature of our English-language books published in China.

“At first glance, Square Word Calligraphy appears to be nothing more unusual than Chinese characters, but in fact it is a new way of rendering English words in the format of a square so they resemble Chinese characters. Chinese viewers expect to be able to read Square Word Calligraphy but cannot. Western viewers, however are surprised to find they can read it. Delight erupts when meaning is unexpectedly revealed.”

— Britta Erickson, *The Art of Xu Bing*

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# Introduction

Jonathan D. Mackintosh, Chris Berry, and Nicola Liscutin

*Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries in Northeast Asia: What a Difference a Region Makes* is a collection of essays about the discipline of Cultural Studies and its use to analyze the cultural industries in Northeast Asia. It opens with a section considering the discipline itself — perhaps even treating it as a kind of cultural industry in its own right. It considers the challenges and possibilities that arise from its use in the context of Northeast Asia and when studying it from outside the region, and then follows with essays that use Cultural Studies approaches to analyze cultural industries and their products in Northeast Asia. The overarching unifying and original element of the book is the use of Cultural Studies to consider cultural industries in Northeast Asia.

The volume emerges from an international symposium of the same title, organized by the Japanese Department of Birkbeck, University of London, and the Pacific-Asia Cultural Studies Forum of Goldsmiths, University of London, in 2006. We conceived of the event as highly specialized and planned it initially as a roundtable discussion. However, when registration hit 120 we had to change to a bigger venue. Furthermore, the symposium itself generated unexpected creative energy through the intersection of Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries research. With the exception of some recent scholarship (see, for example, McGuigan and his call for a critical and reflexive cultural policy analysis, 2004),<sup>1</sup> these two approaches are rarely practiced in tandem. This volume not only seeks to record this productive energy. Culture and the cultural industries of Northeast Asia are gaining a global profile and both influencing and helping to constitute a new sense of the region as “New

Asia.” Asian Cultural Studies is rapidly developing as a regionally distinct branch of the larger field. In these circumstances, we are also eager to amplify and extend this energy so that culture and its production are recognized as integral to an understanding and appreciation of the region, and vice versa.

The turn of the millennium has been accompanied by a massive shift in the cultural makeup of Northeast Asia. At the close of the first decade of the twenty-first century, popular culture, media and communications, as well as the creative, intellectual, and consumer product industries of the region are moving beyond national boundaries with ever-increasing strength. They enjoy unprecedented regional and global success and, according to some, are laying the foundations for future Asian co-operation.<sup>2</sup> Yet, just a decade before, the Northeast Asian region and its culture, in general, were characterized more by division and uncertainty exacerbated by unresolved histories, and in turn, often strident, defensive, and parochial nationalisms: Korea still maintained a ban on Japanese popular culture and media; Taiwanese democratization in the 1990s was expressed as political and cultural independence from the mainland; and Japan and China gazed inward, the former at the apparent failure of its samurai-cum-salaryman culture and the latter at the reunification of greater China with the return of Hong Kong.

Has the region changed so dramatically? What is the place of culture — in particular, popular and media culture, the industries that produce it, the policies that promote it, and the disciplines that study it — in the definition, construction, imagination, and interrogation of Northeast Asia? This collection of essays presents research that considers, within the context of regional change and continuity, a wide variety of cultural discourses, politics, products, practices, representations, and identities. Employing diverse methodological approaches and informed by an array of intellectual and vocational backgrounds, this collection seeks to analyze and challenge, in particular, an equation that is increasingly deployed by governmental, non-governmental, and economic elites. According to that equation, the region is discursively and normatively understood as an equitably balanced triangulation of power among three key actors: the nation, the market, and the individual. At the very least, exchange and dialogue is enhanced, so it is assumed. At its most ideal, culture is assumed to assuage historical grievance and to effect national reconciliation, regional peace, and global harmony.

*Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries in Northeast Asia* brings together scholars and experts from a diverse range of disciplines and fields: communications, advertising, and media; film and visual culture; anthropology and ethnomusicology; cultural policy, regulations, and industry; cultural studies and gender studies. This combination of academic and professional

expertise introduces an important innovation to the multidisciplinary that characterizes this volume's methodology. It brings into direct conversation two approaches that are usually seen as incompatible: Cultural Studies with its emphasis on intellectual criticism, text, meaning, power, and individual emancipation; and Cultural or Creative Industries, focused on economics, the market, policy, and personal freedom.

Ultimately, the goals of this volume are twofold. First, taken together, the individual essays composing it interrogate the very nature of the region by engaging with Northeast Asia at the points where the individual, nation, market, and region intersect. Second, they seek to understand how culture is constituted in complex, powerful, and — not always obvious — political ways that may do as much to undermine as stimulate lasting regional stability, prosperity, understanding, and peace. It is these tensions that come into focus by bringing Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries together in the work presented here.

With this in mind, this Introduction first describes the context within which culture and especially the cultural or creative industries have risen apparently to a place of primacy in the construction and mobilization of Northeast Asia as a regional identity and affiliation. In order to provide the reader with a wider context within which to situate each of the essays in this collection, it also discusses how we might understand globalization and the relationship of the market, cultural industries, and nation. Last, there follows a short guide to the chapters and how they relate to the overall themes of the anthology.

## Context

In a speech entitled “Creative Industry: A Key to Solidify Bases for Regional Cooperation in Asia,” Japanese Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs Itsunori Onodera declared to a gathering in Hong Kong of the Asia Cultural Cooperation Forum in November 2004, “In this age of globalization, culture is increasingly being shared, transcending national boundaries.” Referring specifically to the “wealth of cultural exchange between Japan and other Asian countries” he went on to emphasize:

culture as a matter of course nurtures a soundness and wealth of spirit, but given that it also encourages creative industry and supports economic vitality, it is an area that is the key for the future prosperity of Asia and also in terms of making a contribution to the world.<sup>3</sup>

Onodera's speech is significant. Although its emphasis on culture and the creative industries was neither unique in content or tone at the time, it articulated a certain mood characterizing the region and its relations in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In proclamation after proclamation across the region, culture was recognized, lauded, and made official. "Creativity matters" asserts the Hong Kong Trade Development Council's official 2002 statement calling for the promotion of creative industries.<sup>4</sup> In its *Challenge 2008* six-year plan to overhaul its cultural industries, the Taiwanese government aims at doubling employment and tripling production value through "building Taiwan's cultural creativity in the Chinese world."<sup>5</sup> China's 2006 launch of its international Confucius Institute and governmental Cultural Industries website herald an official embrace of culture,<sup>6</sup> while in Korea, the Culture Industry and Cultural Policy Bureaus seek to enhance the "national competitiveness of [the] culture industries" and the "globalization of Korean culture."<sup>7</sup> Finally, in Japan, 2002 is marked by the legislation of culture as a legal entity in the 2002 Fundamental Law for the Promotion of the Arts and Culture.

The apparent centrality of culture and the creative industries in Northeast Asia is, at first glance, easily explained by the profit-driven logic of the market. For example, it was estimated that, in 2006, the cultural industries of Japan and South Korea together accounted for thirteen percent of the international culture market; China and the other countries of Asia made up a further six percent.<sup>8</sup> To be certain, in contrast to a country like the United Kingdom, whose creative and cultural industries accounted for 7.3 percent of the national economy in 2007,<sup>9</sup> this sector still formed a small part in emerging economies like China (two percent in 2004,<sup>10</sup> though in major centres like Beijing, the total value-added output might be as high as ten percent).<sup>11</sup> And although the production value of cultural and creative industries was higher in small economies such as Hong Kong at four percent in 2007 (and near three percent in Taiwan in 2000),<sup>12</sup> its massive potential cannot be ignored. Figures put out by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) suggested that the entertainment industry alone in Japan was worth up to ten percent of the GNP in 2004. Marubeni Research Institute, moreover, estimated that Japanese cultural exports have grown by 300 percent since 1992. In the same period, exports as a whole increased by only twenty percent in Japan.<sup>13</sup>

Crucially, as much as culture is a matter of sound business sense, the economic role of culture in the construction of Northeast Asia translates into ideational and normative goals. "The process of promoting mutual exchange, discovering what values are common to Asia," writes Onodera, "would contribute to an increased understanding among the people of Asia of the

cultures of the different countries of Asia, and further promote the appeal of Asian culture and the culture of each country. In so doing, Asian values, which embrace peace and harmony, would, if transmitted more dynamically to the world, be able to make a significant contribution in the future of human civilization in the 21st century.”<sup>14</sup>

The reference to Asian values may sound suspiciously like the traditionalistic, anti-Western ideologies of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysia’s Mahathir bin Mohamad, and Japan’s Ishihara Shintarō in the late 1980s and 1990s. But there is an important difference. Whereas the leaders of the so-called Asian Renaissance made nationalistic appeals to an assumed shared Neo-Confucian tradition,<sup>15</sup> the current focus on culture is the product of a neoliberal ideology espousing a global free-market — what Fu-Kuo Liu dubs “Asian Pragmatism”<sup>16</sup> — and the linking of post-industrial globalized consumerism to individual freedom, hence, individual and social well-being. Moreover, it is contemporary, open, transnational, and, in the lingo of twenty-first century Japanese foreign policy, “cool.” Onodera, for instance, cites a variety of examples of the new Asian culture ranging from the recent Japanese love affair with all things Korean — the so-called “Korean Wave” — to the news that three global Chinese stars — Zhang Ziyi, Gong Li, and Michelle Yeoh — would portray Japanese geishas in a Hollywood production (Rob Marshall’s *Memoirs of a Geisha*, 2005). To Onodera’s list one could add Korean mobile phones and video games, Japanese *otaku* “geek” style from stylish Shibuya, hard- and software made in Taiwan, new waves of Chinese cinema and tourists, and Hong Kong Cantopop. In a novel development, national brands and images such as these are often reconfigured as regional ones, for instance, Taiwanese-Japanese star-actor Takeshi Kaneshiro and pan-Asian advertising campaigns of the kind discussed here in Shinji Oyama’s essay. Thanks to burgeoning new information technologies, trends emerge regionally, such as queer Asian cinema and trans-Asian manga cults. At the beginning of the 2000s, then, culture and the creative industries, it seems, have the capacity to effect historical reconciliation and shrink spatio-temporal distance to create a cosmopole of consumers who identify themselves as Asian.

Or do they? Do flows of popular culture and media only promote transnational regional culture? As is well known, the casting of the three Chinese stars in *Memoirs of a Geisha* provoked outrage. Not only did Chinese men object vigorously to seeing Chinese actresses portraying “prostitutes” who sold themselves to Japanese men and condemn Zhang Ziyi, in particular, as a traitor. Japanese men were equally indignant that Hollywood could not find Japanese stars to incarnate something as allegedly quintessentially Japanese

as geishas.<sup>17</sup> This is not an isolated misfire. For example, how do nationalist backlashes like the Japanese *Kenkanryū* (“Anti-Korean Wave”) analyzed here in Nicola Liscutin’s essay, and anti-Japanese demonstrations in the People’s Republic of China and South Korea throughout the early 2000s fit into Onodera’s vision? Do these transborder cultural flows result from reduced trade barriers and reflect a lessening of nation-state power or are they not, on the contrary, driven by national policy and interest? To what extent does twenty-first century Northeast Asian cultural regionalization displace twentieth-century asymmetrical power relations and social marginalization? What effect might an emergent regional consciousness have on individuals’ ability to negotiate culture and their representation? As the final section — a kind of case study bringing together studies highlighting the contentious Korean-Japanese relationship — demonstrates, the answers are neither simple nor definitive.

Finally, how are such questions to be approached and considered? Critical Cultural Studies certainly aspires to address these issues. But what is the relation of Cultural Studies to Cultural Industries in Northeast Asia? First, is there a role for a Cultural Studies of Asia conducted outside Asia, in English-language academia for example, and what are the potential benefits and pitfalls it brings, both to Asia and to the academic world outside Asia? Michael Dutton attends to these questions in his critical piece here. His essay adds to a growing body of critical literature by a variety of scholars. This includes Chris Burgess’s 2004 article on the “crisis” in Asian Studies in which he asks if Cultural Studies can provide a way out.<sup>18</sup> In 2005, Mingbao Yue and Jon Goss edited a special issue of *Comparative American Studies* on the role that Cultural Studies from Asia can play in “De-Americanizing the Global.”<sup>19</sup>

The important questions that Yue and Goss’s special issue of *Comparative American Studies* open up about the discipline of Cultural Studies in general extend far beyond the parameters of this book.<sup>20</sup> But a fundamental condition for their project is also central to *Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries in Northeast Asia*. This is the rapid growth of Cultural Studies within the region itself. The first Cultural Studies conferences held outside the English-speaking world took place in Taiwan. These were the first and second Trajectories conferences, held in Taipei in 1992 and 1995.<sup>21</sup> They were hosted at the Center for Asia-Pacific/Cultural Studies, established in 1992 at National Tsing Hua University, where Chen Kuan-hsing is Professor of Cultural Studies, and where a B.A. program in Cultural Studies is taught. Since then, a number of other courses, centers, and organizations have appeared in various parts of the region. For example, Lingnan University in Hong Kong launched its B.A. program in 1999.<sup>22</sup> In addition, Yonsei University in Seoul has a graduate

program in Gender and Cultural Studies; there is the KUNCI Cultural Studies Center in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, and other centers exist in Taiwan at National Chiao-tung University and National Taiwan University.

As well as these various nationally based initiatives, Cultural Studies has emerged as a regional phenomenon through journals such as *Traces* and *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, whose success has also led to the formation of an *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* society that holds biennial conferences. Although the editorial office of the former is based at Cornell University in the United States, the journal is published through Hong Kong University Press. Furthermore, its commitment to simultaneous English, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese editions demonstrates its strong commitment to the Northeast Asian region. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* is an avowedly regional phenomenon, based at National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan, but with an editorial collective drawn largely from across the region.

The editorial statement of *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, published in its 2000 inaugural issue and now also on its website, makes a clear distinction between the progressive political project of the journal and the forces of global capitalism driving the rhetoric and reality of the “rise of Asia.”<sup>23</sup> Nonetheless, the decision to publish in English speaks to the complex entanglement of regionalism with global capitalism, even within the avowedly resistant domains of Asian Cultural Studies. Have the contemporaneous rise of Cultural Studies and the cultural industries in East Asia been parallel and separate, or is Cultural Studies in some way part of the cultural industries. These issues and more are discussed by Mark Harrison in his essay for this volume. But in this introduction, we hope that underlining this complexity helps to explain why bringing Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries into dialogue and debate is a useful move.

All the essays in this volume address the questions raised in this introduction, though in very different ways and with highly varying results. Nevertheless, when considered as a whole, some distinctive shared concerns about the Northeast Asian region appear across *Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries in Northeast Asia*. These concern globalization and the relationship of cultural industries to national power. They also consider Cultural Studies as a tool to deconstruct and demonstrate Northeast Asia as a region, and in particular, they alert us to how the region might shape the way individuals negotiate gender, class, community, and history, or in other words, their identities.



## Globalization

James H. Mittelman has posited that “Regionalism today is emerging as a potent force in the globalization process.” He explains that,

If *globalization* is understood to mean the compression of time and space aspects of social relations then *regionalism* may be regarded as but one component of globalization. In this sense, regionalism is a chapter of globalization. But regionalism may also be a response or a challenge to globalization (emphasis in original).<sup>24</sup>

In this definition, the region is not simply reified as an intermediate socioeconomic or political position between the structure of the nation-state and globalizing forces of capital and/or ideology. Nor does its emergence in history as a more widely encompassing but not universal affiliation mark a middle point on a timeline that represents globalization as a teleology. Rather, the push/pull dynamic characterizing the region that Mittelman describes suggests that globalization is a complex, conflicting, and indeterminate process. This understanding is paramount in its importance, if subtle in its implications.

First, the region helps us to approach the key concepts of the “global” and the “local” not in dichotomous opposition but as an ongoing cultural negotiation. Crucially, then, the “global” from the Northeast Asian perspective does not derive geographically from “over there,” since the “global” is always/already “local.” This approach may bring to mind the concept of “glocalization” according to which products are tailored to meet local tastes and demands,<sup>25</sup> but this is not quite accurate. Notwithstanding its construction as a market strategy, “glocalization” starts from a normative premise derived from imperialism whereby globalization is homogenization driven from the (Euro-American) center to the (Third World) local. Many of the essays in this volume demonstrate that this is not the case, and that the global, far from being hegemonic, is a contested site where resistance and subversion generate cultural diversity and complexity. Laikwan Pang, for example, discusses copyright infringement and laws as a result of pirating practices in China which affect and are contested throughout the region. She alerts us to questions of how traditional social concepts like class are complicated and even undermined by new affiliations and communities borne of technological innovation in communications. In her study of Korean pop music fans in China, Rowan Pease’s essay highlights a site of conflict in the music industry: its domination by a politically conservative elite of male producers and executives, on the one hand, and their female — sometimes

highly subversive — fans, on the other. It is beyond the scope of *Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries in Northeast Asia* to provide definitive answers to these complex and contradictory questions, but the essays presented here serve to open a debate on how the region influences identity as individuals negotiate culture and cultural production.

Second, the lens of the region intervenes in postcolonial approaches to globalization. The twentieth-century colonial legacy of Northeast Asia is hugely complex, obliging us to interrogate basic concepts even as they may be deployed for their explanatory utility. Consider, for example, “hybridity.” Developed to counter essentialist understandings of culture and nation and Orientalist conceptions of “us” and “them,” its uncritical application can easily slide into the “presumption of the existence of once pure cultures that may have existed before the age of international capital compressed the globe.”<sup>26</sup> The “global” is rendered as modern — one homogenous modernity — and inauthentic; the “local” is traditional — one originary tradition, hence essential and pristine. Yet, through the regional perspective of Northeast Asia, the historical experiences of each of the countries treated in this volume belie such an easy schematic, as both Yoshitaka Mōri in his study of Japanese/Korean pop music and Yoshi Tezuka in his case studies of film production argue. All are shaped by multiple, conflicting modernities brought into being through interlocking, mutually effecting histories of internal and external colonialisms, decolonization, and in the case of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, American Cold War and post-Cold War neo-colonialism. Put another way, Northeast Asian identity is inaccurately understood as a bifurcated history of tradition and transformation whose globalization originates from an imperialistic West to be followed by a colonized hybridized rest. Rather, the national and regional cultural identities of Northeast Asia are themselves articulations of globalization whose politics and ideologies, subversions and interrogations, subjectivities and representational practices, hierarchies and subjugations, and violations and marginalizations can be nothing other than hybrid. The contemporary Northeast Asian postcolonial experience is shaped by regionally informed proliferations of national cultural identity and national configurations of institutional modernity.<sup>27</sup> Just as the “global” is always/already Northeast Asian, so too is Northeast Asia always/already modern. Shinji Oyama’s challenging study of regional brands and branding requires us to consider this conception of globalization as modernity, and both Michael Dutton and Kōichi Iwabuchi’s interrogations of Asian Cultural Studies and Cultural Studies of Asia point to the ways in which this history provides both fruitful territory for the field at the same time as it complicates its development.

## **The Market, Cultural Industries, and the Nation**

To what extent is the nation displaced through trade, the market, and culture? This is a perennial question for the study of regionalization and globalization and is one of the central fault lines dividing theorists and experts. Answers fall across a wide spectrum whose end poles are aptly identified by Held and McGrew as “globalist” — “contemporary globalization is a real and significant historical development” — and “sceptic” — globalization “is primarily an ideological or social construction which has marginal explanatory value.”<sup>28</sup> The general contours of this debate are productive when analyzing regionalism in Northeast Asia, but because of the specific configuration of global and regional politics, the market, and, crucially, of culture, it is worth reviewing this debate in more detail. In the process, it will become clear once again that the assumption of an either/or opposition between the nation and globalization is not the only way to think about these questions. Under conditions of globalizing market forces both the nation and the region can be reified as brands at the same time as they operate — often at cross-purposes — as political and ideological forces.

### ***The Macro-economic Background of Northeast Asian Regionalism***

Some, like Onodera as cited above, directly link the regional emergence and potential of Northeast Asia — and Asia more generally — to economic globalization. To be certain, the past decade has seen an expansion and deepening of links at the intergovernmental level. For example, Yeo Lay Hwee, executive director of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, argues that the basis for a Northeast Asian rapprochement to decades of historical animosity and cultural suspicion is made possible through a strategically informed escalation of bilateral contacts, as a first step towards the development of a more far-reaching multilateralism.<sup>29</sup> Robert Scollay, director of the New Zealand APEC Study Centre, concurs. Examining the case of formal preferential trade agreements (PTAs) prior to 1998, he likens East Asia to an “empty box” in the regional and global maps of PTAs: . . . Japan and Korea maintained a policy of avoiding involvement in PTAs, preferring to rely on the GATT’s non-discrimination principle, while China was preoccupied with its transition to a market economy.” A major sea-change was effected in 1998 by the decision of Japan and Korea to discuss a bilateral free trade area (FTA), which, according to Scollay, represents a “policy watershed.” (Significantly, it was in 1998 that Korea formally lifted its ban on Japanese popular and media culture.) Henceforward, PTAs became the

central trade-policy pillar in a wider strategy of bilateralism within the region and externally not just for Japan and Korea but also China and Taiwan: “The way was thus cleared,” Scollay concludes, “for PTAs to become a central part of the trade architecture of East Asia, and possibly of the entire Asia-Pacific region.”<sup>30</sup>

Despite the driving force behind region-building that economic factors appear to constitute, geopolitical policymakers and academics are guarded in their optimism. Yeo, for example, acknowledges that the future of East Asian regionalism is “fuzzy.” Lacking a blueprint to deepen co-operation and advance communitarian integration, intergovernmental trade developments are largely reactive responses to global market forces, which nevertheless may ostensibly confirm a national commitment to openness and co-operation.<sup>31</sup> Dent is more challenging in his assessment. He describes Northeast Asian regionalism as “stunted.”<sup>32</sup> Richard Baldwin, in his comparison of East Asian regionalism with Europe, is even more pessimistic: “Real regionalism has not yet started in East Asia.”<sup>33</sup>

Caution about the prospects of Northeast Asian regionalism is well founded. Compared to the European and North American regional groupings, Northeast Asia is the least advanced, its organization characterized more by an array of intergovernmental, semi-formal, and informal consensus-building arrangements, and more reactive in nature, an effect of geopolitical circumstance, as opposed to formalized long-term visions and plans.<sup>34</sup> EU-style institutional supranationalism, NAFTA-like “big-bang” originating treaties,<sup>35</sup> and ASEAN communitarian aspirations<sup>36</sup> are responses, in part, to the vicissitudes of economic globalization. However, they also differ significantly, undercutting their ability to stand as models and measures for Northeast Asian regionalism and pointing to the importance of regionally specific histories and characteristics in each case.<sup>37</sup> This is where culture and the culture industries of Northeast Asia may play a distinctive and particularly crucial role, topping up, as it were, the necessary but not sufficient momentum of economic regionalization.

### ***The Role of Culture and Cultural Policy in Northeast Asian Regionalism: Globalist Aspirations***

Returning to Onodera’s appeal to “develop creative industry,” we find an attempt to construct a particularly Asian response to the question of how the individual, nation, and region relate. Commenting on twenty-first century conflict borne of terror and environmental degradation, he writes,

It is only too easy for policymakers and citizens alike to turn their attention almost exclusively to security and economic considerations. True human happiness however, is to be found in spiritual wealth . . . the creative industries, will be the key for humankind, and above all Asia.<sup>38</sup>

Onodera's prescription for an Asia united through culture may read like an impractical flight of fancy, but a closer inspection reveals that his ideas, while cloaked by a rhetoric of aspiration, give evidence of a grounded familiarity with Cultural and Cultural Policy Studies. Consider the following when Onodera posits:

the more material wealth people achieve, the more spiritual contentment they seek . . . [and] . . . people, including the elderly, who are no longer involved in the process of manufacturing goods in their jobs, will be able to focus their energies on a second phase of life in cultural and artistic creative activities.<sup>39</sup>

What he really is trying to describe, in the lingo of Cultural Studies and policy analysts, is the shift to a "post-industrial" or "post-Fordist" social and political economy in which membership in a "cultural public sphere" confers a particular kind of post-modern democratic "social and cultural citizenship" whose *modus operandi* is the market and culture; that is, "the individualization of cultural consumption" translates to "the commercialization of culture," hence the "commercialization of experience" so that the "individual is free to make himself or herself."<sup>40</sup>

Such a statement may be overly complex for official and popular consumption, but the same basic ideas are found in all their various national translations into government policy statement by bureaucrats. Consider two examples from Taiwan and Japan. A document published in May 2002 by the Taiwanese government, *Challenge 2008: The Six-Year National Development Plan*, gives emphasis to "Developing the Cultural Creative Industry" for a "new phase of industrialization" including "artistic and esthetic creation which has been ignored in the past" and which will "enhance the quality of life and the environment." More specifically, this will be achieved by a doubling of employment in and a tripling of production value of these industries, positioning Taiwan as the regional headquarters for domestic businesses and multinational corporations, and a center of creativity in the Chinese world.<sup>41</sup>

In Japan's Fundamental Law for the Promotion of Arts and Culture passed by the Diet in December 2001, the creation and enjoyment of culture and the arts are legislated as a civic right (Articles 2.2 and 2.3).<sup>42</sup> Framed within

the context of the “Realization of an Emotionally Enriched Society through Culture,” the law is a central pillar in the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology’s (MEXT) overall vision for culture in twenty-first century Japan:

Culture serves a range of purposes and roles in today’s society and is significant in a variety of ways. Among other things, culture (1) is nourishment that allows people to live a human life, (2) forms the basis of a society in which we live together, (3) creates high quality economic activity, (4) contributes to the development of human truths, and (5) is the foundation for world peace.<sup>43</sup>

A comprehensive textual analysis of cultural policy documents throughout Asia is beyond the scope of this Introduction. Nevertheless, all of these excerpts demonstrate the central role that culture has been elevated to in the official shaping of twenty-first century conceptions of society, the economy, and by implication, politics. But, that is not all, since the uses of culture and the promotion of cultural industries and the creative economy are not solely explained by the logic of market functionalism. “Globalists” also aim at the ideational level, and it is through the region that culture becomes particularly potent.

According to Kevin Robins, who writes on globalization in relation to culture and identity,

It is surely clear that the global shift — associated with the creation of world markets, with international communication and media flows, and with international travel — has profound implications for the way we make sense of our lives and of the changing world we live in.<sup>44</sup>

Robins’s observation underscores a basic premise of economic-cum-cultural regionalization in Northeast Asia as spelled out in the various excerpts above. Culture — particularly popular, media, and consumer culture — transcends borders with such frequency and intensity as to constitute an irrevocable and irresistible force that regionalizes identity. It is this power that “globalists” celebrate. It is also this power that governments seek to promote through the articulation and legislation of cultural policy.

### ***The Role of Cultural Policy and Cultural Industries in Northeast Asian Nationalism: The “Skeptics” Retort***

Writing on the contemporary Japanese manga and anime industry, Roland Kelts writes, “Younger Japanese had grown up amid the wealth of the postwar Japan Inc. machine just as its cogs were starting to falter. But instead of stymieing them, the resulting slump actually cultivated their creativity.”<sup>45</sup> Kelts’s application of Horacian logic (which posits that adversity reveals genius and prosperity hides it) importantly highlights how the success of 1990s Japanese popular culture worldwide — Douglas McGray brands this “Japan’s Gross National Cool” — is directly correlated with the failure of the dominant model of the Japanese politico-economic state.<sup>46</sup>

Here, culture is seen to empower individuals by releasing them from ideological and discursive strategies of the modern nation-state and market-driven representational practices. That is not all, for in also “discrediting Japan’s rigid social hierarchy”<sup>47</sup> while relegating traditional culture like the tea ceremony and *bushidō* samurai ethics to a backseat position,<sup>48</sup> creativity radically acts as a leveling mechanism. It restores a kind of equalitarian and even democratic balance at a time when power seems to lie primarily in the hands of the state and the market — an understanding that places culture also in tension with rather than simply as a support for the state and the market. Cultural unpredictability and chaos are, in fact, key defining features of creativity, hence the marketability of creative industries. So, in a rather counterintuitive manner, it is this productive friction between the individual subject emerging through culture and the nation, that, on closer inspection, animates cultural policy thinking and that governments and business seek to harness. It is something that “Cool Japan,” a potential cultural superpower, has reinvented and mastered. According to McGray, “Japan’s growing cultural presence has created a mighty engine of national cool.” In so doing, it has come to wield “soft power.” McGray continues, “National cool is an idea, a reminder that commercial trends and products, and a country’s knack for spawning them, can serve political and economic ends.”<sup>49</sup>

It is from this economically realist perspective that a “globalist” reading of cultural policy statements and cultural industrial objectives given above can be challenged. In its opening statement, *Challenge 2008* states that it is formulated by the government of the Republic of China for the express purpose of “fostering the creativity and talent Taiwan needs.” Japan’s MEXT summary statement on culture directly links the Fundamental Law’s objective to promote national culture and arts with the enhancement of “the presence of Japan and its people within the global community.”<sup>50</sup> In other words,

postures on internationalization, cultural exchange, and globalization may not only be about the promotion of a harmonious world order. They are also about projecting one's own national prestige, presence, and influence through a jockeying for position in a regional and global market structured by relative strength of economic — now linked to culture — and/or political power. Take, for example, Japan's proposal in September 2006 to create an East Asian Economic Partnership with ASEAN, China, India, New Zealand, and Australia. While impressive in scale and inclusive of such key cultural areas as intellectual property rights, this apparently regionalizing strategy has been interpreted by some as a cynical maneuver on the part of Japan to secure its own power. Outflanked by China and South Korea which have agreed FTAs with ASEAN, and stalled in its own attempts to secure a similar arrangement with ASEAN, Japan fears that it will be left behind in what may be a fundamental shift from bilateralism to multilateral regional trade agreements.<sup>51</sup>

In addition to the realpolitik that the culture-focused rhetoric concerning regionalization and globalization appears to mask, two factors need to be mentioned that are further examined in some of the essays here. First, while it is undeniable that, “with mobility, comes encounter”<sup>52</sup> in the emerging regional and global order, this experience may be highly circumscribed for certain segments of the population. Regional identity and affiliation comes only to those “who can afford a cosmopolitan identity,” like certain sectors of the urban middle class and the business and media elite.<sup>53</sup> Yeo may be correct when he argues that a lack of popular support and public indifference in East Asia are not insuperable obstacles to regionalism, but he does acknowledge that “constituencies promoting these trends are narrowly based and therefore vulnerable to pressures from those with wider nationalist identifications and loyalties, including the desire to protect fragile national sovereignties.”<sup>54</sup> Regionalism may marginalize individuals by alienating their loyalties, even as its supporters argue for its properties to soothe historical pain and ease national animosities, a point which Nicola Liscutin stresses in her study of the Japanese manga *Kenkanryū* (“Anti-Korean Wave”) and which Mark Morris complicates in his textual reading of the representation of Japan in Korean film.

This raises a second point. Regionalism is far from minimalizing or eradicating marginalizations and oppressions that emerged as a result of capitalism and development as structured in the bipolar world. As part of globalization in the twenty-first century, it replicates, reproduces, and regenerates them, if in slightly different form. So, although it was predicted that the region would take the form of a Japanese “core” surrounded by a developing “periphery,” what has in fact evolved is a “complex division of



labor involving symmetric as well as asymmetric power relationships between and within economies, industries and firms.”<sup>55</sup> The case of the Korean animation industry’s struggles to respond to the challenge of globalization by transitioning from outsourcing to original creations of its own is analyzed by Ae-Ri Yoon through the experiences of those who work in the industry. She powerfully demonstrates how the twentieth-century hierarchy that saw Korea in the shadows of Japan is in danger of being reproduced by the new regionalism.

## Guide to Chapters

### *Reflections on Cultural Studies in/on Northeast Asia*

Constructing a theoretical context for all the chapters that follow, this section presents essays by three leading theorists of Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries in Northeast Asia. As Cultural Studies has been established in one part of Asia after another, it has inspired ambitious programs of critical and political intervention. Wang Xiaoming, professor of Cultural Studies at Shanghai University, has written a “Manifesto for Cultural Studies.” In it, he not only provides a devastating critique of Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s, asking, “Why did we fail to foresee that an arbitrary and corrupt power could create a completely different kind of market economy and use it to perpetuate even greater deceit and more ramified sorts of exploitation?”<sup>56</sup> He also assigns a special role for Cultural Studies in countering the consequences of the current crisis, writing that, “it seems urgent that contemporary cultural studies be expanded. For . . . each great change in society . . . has been not only an economic, political, or ecological phenomenon, but also a cultural one.”<sup>57</sup> In Taipei, Chen Kuan-Hsing has consistently interrogated the work of the various organizations he is involved with, prodding and pushing them to remain engaged and resist complacency. For example, his epic two-part essay on the lasting consequences of the Cold War in producing political blockage in the Northeast Asian region also calls for Cultural Studies to play a special role in attempting the deconstruction of that situation.<sup>58</sup>

The essays included here have been produced specifically for this volume, to interrogate how Northeast Asia may be approached from within and without and to put into critical conversation Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries as theory, method, epistemology, approach, and practice. Like Chen Kuan-Hsing, Kōichi Iwabuchi is one of the pioneers of Cultural Studies in

the Northeast Asian region. Here, offering personal reflections after a number of years of work and not shying away from the difficulties of the current situation, he intervenes in debates over Media and Cultural Studies. He asks how they may be made “useful,” that is critical *and* practical, tools of intervention at a time when popular culture has become a convenient resource for expanding national interest. He argues that the propensity to narrowly apply the concept of culture overlooks the political implications of market fundamentalism and brand nationalism that drives and animates much popular cultural traffic in Northeast Asia under the guise of advancing social democratization.

The next two chapters shift our perspective, the essay by Michael Dutton drawing the reader out of the region to question what it means to practice Asian Cultural Studies in an English-language context. In a particularly novel look at Adorno and other theorists, he suggests what role Western-derived theories like those of the Frankfurt School may play in the effort to force open a space for critical thought in a territory dominated by the legacies of Orientalism and Area Studies. His open-ended conclusion leaves the reader to ponder the state and very nature of Cultural Studies itself and to query whether Western-based Cultural Studies of Asia can avoid the risk of resuscitating colonial/Orientalist positions of subject and object, and knowledge and power.

In some ways, Mark Harrison’s critical survey of identity politics in Taiwan from the period of Japanese colonial rule to the democratization era seems to directly respond to both Dutton and Iwabuchi’s work, extending the pointed questions they raise about the discipline to interrogate its role in Taiwan, a project he has traced in his monograph on the topic of intellectual disciplines and their role in the formation of Taiwan’s identity.<sup>59</sup> Developed out of both a strong admiration of the pioneering work in Cultural Studies carried on in Taiwan and a very close reading of key cultural identity theorists, particularly those of the past decade, Harrison’s research presents a situation in which Cultural Studies is neither indigenous nor long-standing, its ideas and questions instead often being appropriated all too easily for a national industry of cultural identity. Here, he seems to be saying, Cultural Studies runs the risk of becoming a cultural industry.

### ***Cultural Industries in Northeast Asia***

The distinctive feature of this set of chapters is that the authors combine personal and/or professional experience in specific cultural industries with Cultural Studies academic insight. Focusing on visual and film culture, the

essays present the reader with intimate views from the inside, views that enhance the critical edge that each work brings to bear on questions of cultural production, marketing, and the impact of multinational employment practices, global markets, and the globalization of the creative industries.

SooJeong Ahn worked for one of the most influential film festivals in the region, the Pusan International Film Festival, before beginning to research it. Developing a detailed examination of the selection of specific films for particular sections of the festival, in particular the opening film, she hones directly in on the tensions between national objectives to promote Korean cinema and individual Korean filmmakers' strategies to enter the global film market, and the festival's deployment of regional ambitions as a site to negotiate those tensions. Her research records how those important few years when Korean cinema burst forth onto the world stage at the turn of the millennium were experienced by individuals, negotiated by institutions, and influenced the Korean construction of the region. Her conclusions are often surprising, since the relationship of the festival to the industry, its practitioners, its products, and the market is anything but straightforward.

Yoshi Tezuka, in contrast, takes a longer historical perspective. He combines his knowledge as a filmmaker in Japan and detailed interviews with film crew members to develop a comparative examination of two Japan-US film co-productions, *Shogun* (1980) and *Lost in Translation* (2003). From the subjective perspectives of those who participated in these productions, he charts how cosmopolitanization and national identity have evolved in different forms in different historical epochs. In the earlier era, cosmopolitanism on the part of the Japanese line producer was deployed in the service of national interests and to resist foreign domination. In the contemporary era of globalization, the Japanese line producer's sense of identity as a cosmopolitan independent filmmaker overrides concerns about the national interest.

Finally, the ethnographic approach is most clearly developed in Ae-Ri Yoon's study of the animation industry in South Korea. Based on participant observation and interviews conducted in Korea and Japan, Yoon's research charts how the appreciation of animation has changed in Korea from the unique perspective of the animators themselves. She details the conflicts and dilemmas they face, and contextualizes their experience against larger questions of how culture contributes to national economic power within the region and the world. For the animators drawing cells in Seoul, is the call for original creation a welcome opportunity to shake off the humiliation of outsourcing, or is it just a new stage of entrenchment in a global order where survival makes it the only way forward and demands new self-sacrifice?

### *Discourse, Crossing Borders*

The next set of essays focuses on the consumption of cultural products. The three chapters start from highly varying methodological positions. First, Laikwan Pang brings the radical engagement of a Cultural Studies perspective to bear on the regionally popular cultural phenomena of animation culture. Not taking the rhetoric of intellectual property rights at face value, she asks us to question how the illegal reproduction of Japanese animation culture in China creates new forms of circulation and consumption practices of copying and sharing. In an essay that strikes right at the heart of questions concerning alternative forms of politics — “an anti-politics” that challenges the current global knowledge economy — she argues that such acts are subversive to the dominant system of the information society based on the privatization of intellectual property.

In contrast, Shinji Oyama analyses his topic of the East Asian brandscape both from high theory and from the ground up — or to be more precise, the ground floors of the department store where the cosmetics sections are located. This double approach enables him to move away from the dominant focus on brands as national cultural epistemologies to an ontology of brands that gives order to Appadurai’s otherwise disjunctive “-scapes” (media, economy, law, technology, and so on), and that shape the complex power relations of globalized consumerism and consumer knowledge. To be specific, where many of us think of brands in national terms, Oyama deconstructs their image with information about ownership, marketing, and other features of the transnational corporate era to demonstrate that brands are no longer confined to the nation, but rather they deploy the national as part of the transnational operations.

Finally, Rowan Pease’s study of Korean pop music in China shows where Pang’s and Oyama’s seemingly divergent approaches to consumption converge. Through her grounded analysis of Chinese fan writing and art about Korean pop music, she describes how the popular cultural market, nation, region, and discourses of gender and sexuality, ethnicity, and nationalism are negotiated by the consuming subject. Just as Pang and Oyama argue that national power is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, Pease demonstrates how regional and global enterprise may be subverted in unexpected ways by the unpredictable and maybe uncontrollable activities of local fans on the ground. Crucially, then, Pease describes a complex, often ambiguous relationship that exemplifies how popular culture does not correspond with easy binary structures of producer and consumer, enterprise and individual, and region and nation.

### ***Nationalism and Transnationalism: The Case of Korea and Japan***

At first glance, the last group of essays is the most directly informed by Cultural Studies approaches. However, what is presented here is not simply a set of close textual readings of cultural products. Rather, by expanding the more established concern of how the individual shapes and is shaped by the discursive power of the nation-state to include the transnational, the authors demonstrate how Cultural Studies has a vitally useful and crucially critical role to play in understanding nationalism and the Northeast Asian region. In order to reveal more closely these intersections and negotiations, they take as their focus the particularly difficult relationship between Korea and Japan. The essays presented here have been selected because the varying and diverse perspectives they work from generate a highly salient and deeply thoughtful dialogue that not only produces new and topically relevant insights on this particular corner of the region. By concluding *Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries in Northeast Asia*, they also speak to concerns cutting across Northeast Asia overall.

Nicola Liscutin considers the nationalist backlash against recent attempts to foster the Korean-Japanese relationship by analyzing *Kenkanryū* (“Anti-Korean Wave”), a polemic in manga form against Korean culture, Koreans, and resident Koreans in Japan. Treating its visual representations and rhetorical strategies as a form of “performative history,” she explores the issue of historical agency, identity politics, and nationalism as they are shaped and transformed in regional flows of popular culture. She demonstrates that both the “Korean Wave” and the manga that react against it are embedded in the cultural flows enabled by the lowered trade barriers of globalization. The result is a classic example of Appadurai’s disjunctures that is ripe for Cultural Studies analysis, and — informed by the critical pedagogy of Henry Giroux — political intervention.

Mark Morris takes us to the other side of the Korean Straits in his examination of how Japan, Japanese figures, and Koreans with Japanese connections are represented in Korean film. At first glance, one might expect Korea’s postcolonial cinematic politics of representation to construct Japan singularly as the focus of historical resentment, and superficially, this is the case. Yet, in spite of, or precisely because of, the history of Japanese colonial rule in Korea, the picture that emerges in film is unexpectedly complicated by political confusion, violence, upheaval, and change in the years immediately following World War II to the present. Decolonization and a history of entanglement and dependence clash against each other to produce an agonistic cinematic landscape, whose features are shaped as much by resistance as by complicity.

Finally, in perhaps the most upbeat appraisal presented here of the power of the individual through the regional flows of popular culture, Yoshitaka Mōri considers transnational exchanges of music between Korea and Japan. He adopts and adapts the concept of hybridity to emphasize how such diverse forms of music as *enka* (a “traditional” style of music characterized by melancholy sentiments), alternative rock, and dance music “in-between” Japan and Korea are constructed from their very inception as a blend of influences. In so doing, he demonstrates how this blend is the result of often underground collaborative activities that belie any nationally circumscribed definitions. Are these musicians Korean or Japanese? Does it really matter? As much a modern survey as a critical reading of popular music, Mōri’s location of a form of *transnational* cultural production returns us to some of the concerns with Cultural Studies and its role in addressing cultural industries that also animates the first section.

\* \* \* \* \*

In a section entitled “Creative Societies, Dynamic Economies” at the OECD Forum 2005, the director of the Marubeni Research Institute, Sugiura Tsutomu declared, “I believe capitalism should be followed by *culturalism*.”

I use the word *culturalism* as the word *capital* is used in *capitalism*. In postmodern economy, capital power is not enough for us to successfully compete in the globalized world. It should be flavored or seasoned with cultural or creative power. In the *culturalism* world, human activities are motivated not by money but rather by cultural attractiveness. All countries, all regions, and all people have their own culture. Every country has an equal chance to become a leading actor in the *culturalism* world. There are no super powers when it comes to culture and happiness.<sup>60</sup>

Sugiura’s vision is as ostentatious as it is idealistic. Yet, whether one adopts a “globalist” or “skeptic” approach to the region, his speech highlights how central culture and the cultural industries are to Northeast Asia and perhaps a globalized world overall. It is not just that culture reflects and promotes economic integration, thereby leading on to increasing political co-operation and an enhanced sense of individual affiliation to the region. Rather, the region itself is being constructed discursively, ideologically, and normatively as a cultural entity, one in which welfare is replaced by well-being and quantity of production is superseded by quality of life. Sugiura’s, Onodera’s, and a host of other visions may simply be paying lip service to what is in the end

a social-democratic façade masking very old-fashioned politics, national relationships, social marginalizations, and market fundamentalism.

*Cultural Studies and Cultural Industries in Northeast Asia*, through the multiplicity of its topics and the diversity of its approaches and assessments, ultimately seeks to question the centrality of culture and the cultural industries in the construction of Northeast Asia. All contributors avoid a simplistic definition of the nation, developing instead a complex understanding that gives primacy of place to the individual as consumer *and* producer, not only of the meaning of cultural products and practices but also to mediate the nation and the region, their respective identities, patriotisms, and chauvinisms. Crucially, all adopt a reflexive approach with the result that this volume not only presents studies of a diverse range of cultural products and practices in their subjective, discursive, normative, and ideological construction of Northeast Asia. It also obliges the reader to ask how we might interrogate our approaches to the study of culture and cultural industries themselves.

# Notes

## Introduction

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26. Jonathan Friedman, "Global Crises, the Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual Porkbarrelling: Cosmopolitans versus Locals, Ethnics, and Nationals in an Era of De-hegemonisation," in *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism*, eds. Prina Werbner and Tariq Modood (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1997), 73.
27. John Tomlinson, "Globalization and Cultural Identity," in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, 2nd edition, eds. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 271–2.
28. David Held and Anthony McGrew, "The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction," in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, 2nd edition, eds. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 2.
29. Yeo Lay Hwee, "Realism and Reactive Regionalism: Where is East Asian Regionalism heading?" *UNISCI Discussion Papers* (May 2005): 5.
30. Robert Scollay, "Regional Trade Liberalization in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: The Role of China" (Paper presented at 2004 Latin America/Caribbean and Asia/Pacific Economics and Business Association Annual Conference, Beijing, People's Republic of China, December 3–4, 2004). [http://www.iadb.org/laeba/downloads/WP\\_35\\_2004.pdf](http://www.iadb.org/laeba/downloads/WP_35_2004.pdf) (accessed October 30, 2007), 6; Berger (2004), 283. It should be noted that bilateralism more generally was, in fact, not novel. However, although flows of trade and capital had been structured bilaterally between the market-oriented economies of Northeast Asia since the 1950s, that bilateralism differed significantly from today's. Emerging out of Japan's piecemeal, nation-by-nation approach to reparations settlements following World War II, postwar- and Cold War-era bilateralism enforced asymmetrical power relations: Japan was positioned as the regional hub and economic leader while its developing neighbors, attached like spokes to the center, were recipients of Japanese foreign direct investment (Glenn Hook, "Japan and the Construction of Asia-Pacific," in *Regionalism and World Order*, eds. Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne [Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1996], 174–84). Of course, this arrangement was central to America's Pacific security order to contain Soviet and Chinese communism. Centred on Japan as the capitalist engine, the coastal defense ring of nation-states stretching from Anchorage to Australia linked defense strategy to economic production. By contrast, bilateralism in the twenty-first century, while still in keeping with America's globalizing conception of a liberalized market-friendly, "low-risk Asia-Pacific," establishes exchange according to legally defined relationships of trade equality in a security

- environment that is regionally polycentric rather than globally bipolar (Ngai-Ling Sum, “The NICs and Competing Strategies of East Asian Regionalism,” in *Regionalism and World Order*, eds. Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne [Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1996], 215). The United States is still omnipresent in the region, but a relative scaling back of its presence creates room for regional leaders like Japan, China, and, now possibly, ASEAN to modify Northeast Asian and Asian regional organization.
31. Yeo (2005), 1, 9.
  32. Christopher M. Dent, “Introduction: Northeast Asia — A Region in Search of Regionalism?” in *Northeast Asian Regionalism: Learning from the European Experience*, eds. Christopher M. Dent and David W. F. Huang (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 4. See also, for example, Gilbert Rozman, *Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadows of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
  33. Richard Baldwin, “Prospects and Problems for East Asian Regionalism: A Comparison with Europe” (Paper presented to Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, January 31, 2003). <http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/03013101.html> (accessed October 30, 2007). A comparison of East Asian regionalism with Europe can be found in Christopher M. Dent and David W. F. Huang’s collected volume, *Northeast Asian Regionalism: Learning from the European Experience* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).
  34. Yeo (2005), 9.
  35. Sum (1996), 209.
  36. The ASEAN nations affirmed in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) their commitment to establish by 2020 an Asian Economic Community. Its objectives, broadly defined as “economic integration,” are to “create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities.” ASEAN Homepage, “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II),” ASEAN. <http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm> (accessed October 30, 2007).
  37. Yeo (2005), 5.
  38. Onodera (2004).
  39. Onodera (2004).
  40. McGuigan (2004), 35, 122, 130.
  41. Government Information Office, Republic of Taiwan (2002).
  42. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), Japan, “*Bunka geijutsu shinkō kihonhō*” [Fundamental Law for the Promotion of Culture and Arts]. MEXT, [http://www.mext.go.jp/a\\_menu/bunka/geijutsu/01.pdf](http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/bunka/geijutsu/01.pdf) (accessed October 30, 2007).
  43. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), Japan Homepage, “Culture: Toward the Realization of an Emotionally

- Enriched Society Through Culture,” MEXT. [http://www.mext.go.jp/english/org/f\\_culture.htm](http://www.mext.go.jp/english/org/f_culture.htm) (accessed October 30, 2007). See also Agency for Cultural Affairs, Japan, “Building a Society that Values Culture,” Agency for Cultural Affairs. [http://www.bunka.go.jp/english/pdf/chapter\\_01.pdf](http://www.bunka.go.jp/english/pdf/chapter_01.pdf) (accessed October 30, 2007).
44. Kevin Robins, “What in the World’s Going on?” in *Production of Culture/Cultures of Production*, ed. Paul du Gay (London: Sage Productions, 1997), 38.
  45. Roland Kelts, *Japanamerica: How Japanese Pop Culture Has Invaded the U.S.* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 180.
  46. Douglas McGray, “Japan’s Gross National Cool,” *Foreign Policy* (May/June 2002): 44–54.
  47. McGray (2002), 9.
  48. Kelts (2006), 5.
  49. McGray (2002), 12.
  50. MEXT “Culture.”
  51. “Japan Looks to Play Leading Role in Regional Trade,” *Daily Yomiuri*, September 15, 2006.
  52. Robins (1997), 18.
  53. Friedman (1997), 81.
  54. Yeo (2005), 8.
  55. Hook (1996), 200.
  56. Wang Xiaoming, “A Manifesto for Cultural Studies,” trans. Robyn Visser, in *One China, Many Paths*, ed. Chaohua Wang (London: Verso, 2003), 279.
  57. Wang Xiaoming (2003), 287.
  58. Chen Kuan-Hsing, “Why Is ‘Great Reconciliation’ Impossible? De-Cold War, Decolonization, or Modernity and Its Tears,” Parts I and II, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 3, no. 1 & 2 (2002): 77–99, 235–51.
  59. Mark Harrison, *Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).
  60. Tsutomu Sugiura, “From Capitalism to Culturalism” (Speech presented at OECD Forum 2005, Fuelling the Future: Security, Stability, Development — Creative Societies, Dynamic Economies, May 2–3, 2005). <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/61/34825496.pdf> (accessed October 30, 2007).

## **Chapter 1 Reconsidering East Asian Connectivity and the Usefulness of Media and Cultural Studies**

1. Larry Grossberg, “Does Cultural Studies Have Futures? Should It? (Or What’s the Matter with New York),” *Cultural Studies* 20, no.1 (2006): 17.
2. See Joseph Tobin (ed.), *Pikachu’s Global Adventure: The Rise and Fall of Pokemon* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

3. Ulf Hannerz, *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places* (London: Routledge, 1996).
4. Stuart Hall, “The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity,” in *Culture, Globalization, and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*, ed. Anthony King (London: Macmillan, 1991), 28.
5. Gregory Beals and Kevin Platt, “The Birth of Asiawood,” *Newsweek* (May 21, 2001).
6. Grossberg (2006).
7. Toby Miller, *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitanism, Consumerism, and Television in a Neoliberal Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007), 11.
8. See, for example, Kōichi Iwabuchi, *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); Kōichi Iwabuchi, ed., *Feeling Asian Modernities: Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004); Kōichi Iwabuchi, “When Korean Wave Meets Resident Koreans in Japan,” in *East Asian Pop Culture: Approaching the Korean Wave*, eds. Chua Beng-Huat and K. Iwabuchi (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008); Youna Kim, “Experiencing Globalization: Global TV, Reflexivity and the Lives of Young Korean Women,” *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 8, no. 4 (2005): 445–63; and Yoshitaka Mōri, ed., *Nisshiki Hanryū: “Fuyu no sonata” to nikkanshaishū bunka no genzai* (Korean Wave Japanese Style: The TV-Drama “Winter Sonata” and the Present State of Japanese-Korean Popular Culture) (Tokyo: Serika Shobō, 2004).
9. Sonia Livingstone, ed., *Audiences and Publics: When Cultural Engagement Matters for the Public Sphere* (Bristol: Intellect, 2005).
10. For more detailed discussion, see Iwabuchi, 2002.
11. Joshua Meyrowitz, *No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behaviour* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
12. Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
13. Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, “The Global and the Local in International Communications,” in *Mass Media and Society*, eds. James Curran and Michael Gurevitch (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), 118–38.
14. George Yúdice, *The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).
15. Toby Miller and Marie Claire Leger, “Runaway Production, Runaway Consumption, Runaway Citizenship: The New International Division of Cultural Labor,” *Emergences* 11, no. 1 (2001): 89–115.
16. Ien Ang, “Who Needs Cultural Research?” in *Cultural Studies and Practical Politics: Theory, Coalition Building, and Social Activism*, ed. Pepi Leystina (New York: Blackwell, 2004), 477–83.
17. Ang (2005), 482.

18. Simon During, *Cultural Studies: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 77.
19. Edward Said, *Representations of the Intellectual* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994).
20. Raymond Williams, “The Idea of a Common Culture,” in *Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism*, ed. Robin Gable (London: Verso, 1989), p. 36.

## Chapter 2 Asian Cultural Studies: Recapturing the Encounter with the Heterogeneous in Cultural Studies

1. Raymond Schwab, *The Oriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680–1880*, trans. Gene Patterson-Black and Victor Reinking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 24.
2. I have little space to explain the detail of this relationship here, but for those interested, see Michael Dutton, “Lead Us Not Into Translation: Notes Toward a Theoretical Foundation for Asian Studies,” *Nepantla: Views for South* 3, no. 3 (2002): 495–537; or Michael Dutton, “The Trick of Words: Asian Studies, Translation, and the Problems of Knowledge,” in *Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological Others*, ed. George Steinmetz (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 89–125.
3. On the lack of any direct critical theory legacy upon British cultural studies, see Kate Soper, “Despairing of Happiness: The Redeeming Dialectic of Critical Theory,” *New Formations* no. 38 (1999): 141–53.
4. On the question of vocabulary and the favorite son status of Benjamin, see Esther Leslie, “Space and West End Girls: Walter Benjamin versus Cultural Studies,” *New Formations* no. 38 (1999): 110–24. Indeed, as Leslie points, Benjamin all too often plays good cop to Adorno’s bad cop in that ongoing soapie called cultural studies.
5. Siegfried Kracauer, *The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays*, trans. & ed. Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 260.
6. It was believed, for example, that Hitler had used the radio in his rise to power when in fact, as Lazarsfeld himself shows, his acquisition of stations happened quite late. See Simon L. Garfield, “Radio Research, McCarthyism and Paul F. Lazarsfeld” (Ph.D. thesis, MIT Political Science), 1987, 26. Cited online at [http://www.simson.net/clips/academic/pfl\\_thesis\\_ocr.pdf](http://www.simson.net/clips/academic/pfl_thesis_ocr.pdf) (accessed January 11, 2007). In *Radio and the Printed Page* (New York: Duall, Sloane and Pierce, 1940), 5, Lazarsfeld introduced the concept of “serious radio listening,” and asked the question “To what extent has radio increased, or can radio increase, the scope of serious responses beyond the scope so far achieved by print?”
7. Hynek Jerabek, “Paul Lazarsfeld — The Founder of Modern Empirical Sociology: A Research Biography,” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 13, no. 3 (2001): 229.

8. Rolf Wiggershaus, *Theodor W. Adorno* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 242.
9. Jerabek, 239.
10. Cited in Stefan Müller-Doohm, *Adorno: A Biography*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 247.
11. Georges Bataille, “The Psychological Structure of Fascism,” *New German Critique* no. 16 (1979): 69.
12. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 1978), frontispiece quote drawn from Karl Marx’s essay, “18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress publishers, 1950), volume I, 303.
13. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (London: Continuum, 1976); Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942).
14. By 1943, six members of the institute were in the employ of the US government’s security wing. Neumann was deputy chief of the European Section of OSS, and Marcuse was a senior analyst, while Kirchheimer and Gurland were both employed there. Lowenthal was a consultant at the Office of War Information, while Pollock was a consultant with the Justice Department. Only Adorno and Horkheimer (who were both on the West Coast anyway) were not employed in this fashion.
15. William E. Scheuerman, *Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 123.
16. I am thinking here of Robert Hall’s 1948 report on Area Studies, which is arguably the beginning of Asian Area Studies: *Area Studies: With Special Reference to Their Implications for Research in the Social Sciences* (New York: Committee on World Area Research Program, Social Science Research Council).
17. Tani E. Barlow, “Colonialism’s Career in Postwar China Studies,” in *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia*, ed. Tani E. Barlow (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 373.

### Chapter 3 How to Speak about Oneself: Theory and Identity in Taiwan

1. Kiansing Ko, “On the Definition of the Formosan,” *Independent Formosa* 4, no. 4 (August 1965): 10.
2. Helen Lee, *Gandong 228 (Touching 228)*, DVD (Taiwan National Alliance, 2004).
3. Stephan Feuchtwang, “The Chinese Race-nation,” *Anthropology Today* 9, no. 1. (Feb. 1993): 14.
4. This comment is taken from Lo Ming-Cheng’s Foucauldian interpretation of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan. See Ming-cheng Lo, *Doctors within Borders:*

*Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 43.

5. On February 28, 1947, what began as a local riot spiraled into an island-wide uprising against Chinese Nationalist rule of Taiwan. Protests, both violent and institutional, demanded redress for corruption, economic mismanagement, and social engineering, in which the KMT attempted to “re-Sinicize” the Taiwanese after fifty years as a colony of Japan. In March and April of 1947, the uprising was systematically crushed by troops brought from mainland China, killing 20,000 or more people.
6. After forgoing support for the Nationalists against the Communists in January 1950, the Truman administration reversed its position and made the decision to support Taiwan two days after North Korea invaded South Korea on June 27, 1950.
7. For a conservative reading of Taiwan’s post-WWII development, see Ezra F. Vogel, *The Four Little Dragons* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
8. See, for example, Joshua Liao, *Formosa Speaks* (Hong Kong: Graphic Press, 1950), and Thomas Liao, *Inside Formosa: Formosans vs. Chinese since 1945* (Tokyo: Publisher unknown, 1956).
9. Liao Kianliong, “Why Formosa Wants Independence,” *Formosa Quarterly* 1, no. 1, (July 1962): 6.
10. *Benshengren* or “native Taiwanese” refers to the Taiwanese who can trace their migration to the island from regions of Fujian on mainland China over several generations from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries; *waishengren* or “mainlanders” refers to the post-1949 Nationalist refugees and their descendants.
11. Cited in Christine Louise Lin, *The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Advocacy of Local Autonomy*, Sino-Platonic papers, no. 92 (Philadelphia: Dept. of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Pennsylvania, 1999), 95.
12. Jing Wang, “Taiwan Hsiang t’u literature: Perspectives in the evolution of a literary movement,” in *Chinese Fiction from Taiwan: Critical Perspectives*, ed. Jeannette L. Faurot (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 49.
13. For a detailed discussion on Taiwanese nativist literature, see Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, *Modernism and the Nativist: Resistance Contemporary Chinese Fiction from Taiwan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993). For an example of the critical tenor of the debate in Taiwan over nativist literature in the 1970s, see Yan Yuanshu, “Dangqian Zhongguo wenxue wenti” (The problems of contemporary Chinese literature), in *Xiangtu wenxue taolun ji* (Discussing Nativist Literature), ed. Wei Tiancong (Taipei: Wei Tiancong, 1978): 763–6.
14. An example of this phrase occurs at the conclusion of the national day speech given by Chiang Kai-shek on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China. See “Zongtong zui mian quan guo tongbao jizhi



- chenglie fu guo jiu min” (The president resolutely urges compatriots of the whole nation to continue towards recovering the nation and saving the people), *Lianhe bao (United Daily News)*, January 1, 1961.
15. “Zongtong zhongshen fangong fuguo juexin” (The president resolutely reiterates the determination to fight communism and recover the mainland), *Zili Wanbao (Independent Evening Post)*, January 1, 1979.
  16. “Zongtong zhongshen fangong fuguo juexin,” *Zili Wanbao* (1979).
  17. “‘Taidu’ zai Riben gaojifenzi Qiu Yonghan zuo fanzheng gui guo” (The leading “Taiwanese Independence” activist in Japan Qiu Yonghan repudiates his cause and returns to the nation), *Lianhe Bao (United Daily News)*, April 3, 1972.
  18. Examples of this kind of appeal following the end of martial law include pieces by the Hakka writer Li Chiao and the well-known anthropologist Chang Mao-kuei. Both called for the renaming of the Republic of China as the Republic of Taiwan, in order to establish a unifying identity consciousness under the name “Taiwan,” which would overcome the social division created by martial law and establish an ontologically coherent foundation for national development. See Chang Mao-kuei, “Taidu shi wei toushen guoji de ‘zhengming’ yundong” (Taiwanese independence means joining in the international movement for the ‘rectification of names’), *Zili Wanbao (Independent Evening Post)* April 1, 1992, and Li Chiao, “Taiwan guo gong he shenme?” (What does a Taiwanese nation bring together?), *Zili Wanbao (Independent Evening Post)*, December 12, 1991.
  19. Chen Yongxing, “Zou chu lishi yinying jianli hu ai shehui” (Stepping out of history’s shadow to build a society of mutual love), *Zili Wanbao (Independent Evening Post)*, February 28, 1988.
  20. Chen (1988).
  21. “356 Yi wenren gong kai xin yu Bian ‘zi ai yin tui’” (356 artists’ open letter appeals to A-Bian to “show self-respect and resign”), *Lianhe Bao (United Daily News)*, August 25, 2006.
  22. Ackbar Abbas, *Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997): 25–6.
  23. “Huanying Guomindang xinsheng dai zai di hua” (Welcoming the rebirth of the sense of place of the KMT), *Ziyou Shibao (Liberty Times)*, May 4, 2004.
  24. Democratic Progressive Party, “Zuqun duoyuan guojia yi ti jueyiwen” (Resolution on ethnic pluralism and national unity). [http://www.dpp.org.tw/history/pub/LIT\\_6.asp?ctyp=LITERATURE&catid=1742](http://www.dpp.org.tw/history/pub/LIT_6.asp?ctyp=LITERATURE&catid=1742), (accessed September 10, 2006).
  25. See one version of this argument about the category of gender in Elspeth Probyn, *Sexing the Self: Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 1–7.
  26. Ping-hui Liao, “The Case of Emergent Cultural Criticism in Taiwan’s Newspaper Literary Supplements: Global/Local Dialectics in Contemporary

- Taiwanese Public Culture,” in *Global/Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary*, eds. Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 338.
27. Liao (1996), 339.
  28. Liao (1996), 340.
  29. Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies,” in *Cultural Studies*, eds. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), 278.
  30. “Duihua, jiaotong, fansi, Sayide tanlun sayide” (Dialogue, communication, remembrance: Said on Said), *Ziyou Shibao (Liberty Times)*, February 16, 2005.
  31. Tsai Ing-wen, “Rentong yu zhengzi: zhong lilunxing zhi fansheng” (Identity and politics: A theoretical reflection), *Zhengzhi kexue luncong (Political Science Review)* 8 (June 1997): 51.
  32. Tsai (1997), 53.
  33. Homi K. Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 297.
  34. Liao (1996), 342.
  35. Yin Zhangyi, “Taiwan yishi shifen” (Analyzing Taiwan consciousness), *Zhongguo Luntan (China Tribune)* 25, no. 1 (October 10, 1987): 95–114.
  36. “Xinpian ‘Renshi Taiwan’ jiaokeshu yinqi de zhengyi” (The controversy over the new “Understanding Taiwan” textbooks), *Lianhe Bao (United Daily News)*, June 13, 1997.
  37. Myra Lu, “President Adds Weight to Chip Foundry Debate,” *Taipei Journal* 19, no. 11 (March 22, 2002): 15.
  38. Wang Meishu, “Xie gei qian lü xuezhe pengyoumen” (A note to Light Green scholarly friends), *Ziyou Shibao (Liberty Times)*, June 15, 2006.
  39. “Minzhu guan jie pai Bian chi jiu wei quan huohai” (President Chen condemns the damage of authoritarianism at the inauguration of the National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall), *Ziyou Shibao (Liberty Times)*, May 20, 2007.
  40. Chen Yi-shen, “Zhongzheng miao de zhuangxing shunxu” (Taking steps to remake the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial), *Ziyou Shibao (Liberty Times)*, March 16, 2007.
  41. Liao (1996), 344.
  42. Lin Yi-hsiung, *Xiwang you yi tian* (I hope there comes a day) (Taipei: Yuwangshe, 1995), 33.
  43. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble* (London: Routledge, 1999), 24.
  44. Kuan-hsing Chen, “The Decolonization Question,” in *Trajectories: Inter-Asian Cultural Studies*, ed. Chen Kuan-hsing (London: Routledge, 1998), 4.
  45. Chang (1993), 149.
  46. Li Xiaofeng, *Taiwan, wode xuanze!* (Taiwan, my choice!) (Taipei: Yushanshe chuban, 1995): 1.

47. Chen (1998), 16.
48. Chiu Kui-fen, “‘Houzhimin’ de Taiwan yanyi” (The post-colonial logic of Taiwan), in *Wenhua yanjiu zai Taiwan (Cultural Studies in Taiwan)*, ed. Chen Kuan-hsing (Taipei: Juliu Tushu, 2000), 292.
49. Chen (1998), 20.
50. Ping-hui Liao, *Ling lei xiandai qing (Alternative Modernities)* (Taipei: Yunchen Wenhua, 2001): 159–61.
51. Thomas B. Gold, “Taiwan Society at the Fin de Siècle,” *China Quarterly*, 148, Special Issue: Contemporary Taiwan (December 1996): 1104.

#### **Chapter 4 Placing South Korean Cinema into the Pusan International Film Festival: Programming Strategy in the Global/Local Context**

1. Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, “National/International/Transnational: The Concept of Trans-Asian Cinema and Cultural Politics of Film Criticism,” in *The First Jeonju International Film Festival Symposium*, ed. Kim Soyoun (Chŏnju: JIFF, 2000), 61.
2. *Regional* specifically indicates the East Asian region: Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China, and Hong Kong. I often interchange the term *national* with *local* in order to contrast the *regional* with the *global*.
3. *Korean cinema* designates films made in South Korea, not North Korea.
4. Jeeyoung Shin, “Globalization and New Korean Cinema,” in *New Korean Cinema*, eds. Chi-Yun Shin and Julian Stringer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 54–5; Darcy Paquet, “The Korean Film Industry: 1992 to the Present,” in *New Korean Cinema*, eds. Chi-Yun Shin and Julian Stringer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 49.
5. The term (*Hanliu* in Chinese and *Hanryū* in Japanese) indicates the sudden influx of Korean popular culture in and continuing since the late 1990s, ranging from television dramas to popular music and films throughout East Asia, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, Japan, as well as mainland China.
6. The Screen Quota system is a kind of trade barrier to protect local films. The strictly enforced system, introduced in 1966, requires Korean cinemas to screen local films for between 106 and 146 days each year. It is widely presumed that the Screen Quota system has helped local films to secure screen space and to survive in the highly competitive global film industry. However, this system has been challenged by Hollywood and put under pressure by the dramatic growth of the local film industry since the late 1990s. As a result, controversy has emerged, some advocating a reduction of the quota or the abrogation of the entire system. Korean filmmakers have vigorously fought to protect the system through continuous protest against its abolition. Recently, however, as a result of the Free Trade Agreement

- between Korea and the United States on April 2, 2007, the Screen Quota has been reduced from 146 to 73 days.
7. Japanese cultural products, including films, songs, and TV programs, were prohibited following the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948.
  8. Kim Kidök, *Coast Guard (Haeansön)*, LJ Film, 2002; Pae Ch'angho, *Last Witness (Hüksusön)*, Taewon Entertainment, 2001; and Yi Ch'angdong, *Peppermint Candy (Pakha satang)*, East Film Company, 1999. Korean is transcribed according to the McCune-Reischauer system. The transcription of names often differs in *The Korean Film Database Book* published by the Korean Film Council in 2006 and upon which this research draws. These alternative transcriptions are given on first occurrence in brackets.
  9. Liz Czach, "Film Festivals, Programming, and the Building of a National Cinema," *The Moving Image* 4, no. 1 (2004): 76–88. Czach succinctly explores the relationship between the programming process in the Toronto Film Festival and Canadian film industry.
  10. Since the first running of the festival, however, these categories have changed with the addition of two new sections: "Open Cinema" added in 1997 and "Critic's Choice" introduced in 2002.
  11. Film Director and Director of Busan Film Commission Park Kwang-su, interview by author, January 6, 2006, Seoul.
  12. Pusan City's decision to support PIFF was made quite suddenly in 1996 and only a few months before the festival was launched on September 13, 1996. On February 2, 1996, the local newspaper *Kukche Shinmun* reported "Pusan city has suddenly abandoned its long neglect of PIFF and decided to support it, so it can open the event this year to promote the 2002 Asian Games" (Jin-woo Lee, "PIFF Opens in September," *Kukche Shinmun*, February 2, 1996).
  13. Figures taken from annual program booklets (1996 to 2005) of the Pusan International Film Festival.
  14. Yong-kwan Lee, "Opening Film," in *The 4th Pusan International Film Festival, Programme Booklet*, 1999, 21.
  15. Dong-jin Lee, "To Get the Innocent Dream Back, 'About-turn,'" *Chosön Ilbo* (October 15, 1999).
  16. The Director's Fortnight is an independent section running alongside the Festival de Cannes and organized by the French Directors Society.
  17. In addition to its box-office takings, over 300,000 viewed it in Seoul alone (available at [www.kofic.or.kr/statistics](http://www.kofic.or.kr/statistics) [accessed June 18, 2007]). A club called "People Who love *Peppermint Candy*" was created by fans who organized a New Year Special Screening which has subsequently taken place every New Year's Day. Although this was initiated as a part of a PR event, it continues until the present, and considerable numbers participate (East Film Company, "*Peppermint Candy* Homepage." <http://www.peppermintcandy.co.kr/> (accessed December 13, 2007).
  18. Yong-Kwan Lee, interview by author, January 4, 2006, Seoul.

19. David Martin-Jones, *Deleuze, Cinema and National Identity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 205–19.
20. Moon-yung Hur, “Opening Film,” *The 7th Pusan International Film Festival Catalogue*, 2002.
21. Hye-jin Jung, “*The Lasts Witness* Fails to Deliver,” *Korea Times* (November 17, 2001).
22. Frank Segers, “Hae an-seon” (*The Coast Guard*), *Moving Pictures* (November 2002).
23. Kim Sugyŏng, “Haeansŏn” (*The Coast Guard*), *Dong-A Ilbo* (November 21, 2002). [http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?code=Q\\_\\_&n=200211210301](http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?code=Q__&n=200211210301) (accessed December 13, 2007).
24. Tony Rayns, “Sexual Terrorism: The Strange Case of Kim Ki-duk,” *Film Comment* November–December (2004): 51. Rayns coins the expression “sexual terrorism” to characterize the striking scene of fishhooks piercing a woman’s vagina and the protagonist’s throat in Kim’s *The Isle* (1999).
25. In Venice, *The Isle* (1999) and *Unknown Address* (2001) were nominated in competition. *3-Iron* (2004) received the Best Director Award while *Bad Guy* (2002) was shown in competition. *Samaritan Girl* (2003) received the Best Director Award in Berlin.
26. Rayns (2004), 50.
27. Chris Berry, “‘What’s Big about the Big Film?’: ‘De-Westernizing’ the Blockbuster in Korea and China,” in *Movie Blockbusters*, ed. Julian Stringer (London: Routledge, 2003), 217–29.
28. Yunmo Yang, “Olhae pŏrgŏraeming” (This Year’s Programming), *Pusan Ilbo* (November 17, 2001).
29. Ŭnju Park, “Hŭksusŏn” (The Last Witness), *Han’guk Ilbo* (November 13, 2001).
30. Darcy Paquet, “The Korean Film Industry: 1992 to the Present,” in *New Korean Cinema*, eds. Shin Chi-Yun and Julian Stringer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 44–6.
31. *Shiri* was released in February 1999 and the new edited director’s cut was screened in the “Open Cinema” section in the same year at the 4th PIFF.
32. Paquet (2005), 43–9.
33. David Martin-Jones (2006) also points out the importance of UniKorea in his analysis of *Peppermint Candy*.
34. “Mainstream” refers to films intentionally designed to be box-office hits, such as *The Ginkgo Bed* (1996), *The Letter* (1997), *A Promise* (1998), and *Shiri* (1999). Korean cinema entered a boom period with the unprecedented box-office success of many of its films in and since the late 1990s. The key factors explaining this rapid growth are new sources of film finance, increased standards of film production, and governmental film policy prompted by Korean globalization. For an overview of this analysis, see Paquet (2005).

35. UniKorea Culture & Art Investment Co. Ltd. was launched in January 1999 with an initial operating budget of 3 billion won (US\$2.5 million). The owner of the company is Yeom Tae-soon, who runs an enterprise called *Aizim*, a fashion brand for young consumers. Its key members are Lee Chang-dong, Moon Sung-keun, and Myung Kae-nam. UniKorea and Aizim were key sponsors of PIFF in 1999.
36. Martin-Jones (2006), 208.
37. The Korean Film Council was established on May 28, 1999, when KMPPC was restructured by the new government of President Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003). KMPPC was founded on April 3, 1973, under the military regime of President Park Chung-hee. Park’s government (1961–79) enforced a strict political and ideological agenda that stifled the film industry. For example, KMPPC enacted the Motion Picture Law and frequently revised it to keep the film industry under tight control. For more information, see Korean Film Council’s official website: [www.koreanfilm.or.kr](http://www.koreanfilm.or.kr). and Paquet 2005, 32–50.
38. Following the revision of the Film Promotion Law in 1999, the reform of film policy by KOFIC has changed the structure of the industry. For example, KOFIC has supported “art-house” cinema as well as commercial cinema and tried to restructure the distribution system in order to promote “cultural diversity.”
39. Jonathan Watts, “Japan-Korea Team at Pusan,” *Hollywood Reporter* (September 17–19, 1999).
40. Czach (2004), 82.
41. Stephen Cremin, “Pucheon Set to Fill Regional Niche,” *Hankyureh* 21 (August 2, 2006). [http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\\_edition/e\\_entertainment/146041.html](http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_entertainment/146041.html) (accessed December 13, 2007).
42. Derek Elley, “Pusan Pumps Korean Pic Profile,” *Variety* (November 1–7, 1999). However, in response to those criticisms, PIFF in 2004 established an extra section called “Industry Screening” for the guests who attend the PPP to view more Korean films.
43. Su-yun Kim, “British Film Critics Pleased with Improved Facilities at PIFF,” *Korea Times* (October 22, 1999).
44. Cremin (2006).
45. Dina Iordanova, *Cinema of the Other Europe: The Industry and Artistry of East Central European Film* (London: Wallflower Press, 2003), 30.
46. Hong Kong International Film Festival Coordinator, Foreword to *The 10th Hong Kong International Film Festival Programme* (Hong Kong: The Urban Council, 1986), 8.
47. Hong Kong Critics Society ed., *A Century of Chinese Cinema: Look Back in Glory: The 25th Hong Kong International Film Festival* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Film Archive and Leisure and Cultural Services Department, 2001).

48. Soyoung Kim, “Cine-mania or Cinephilia: Film Festivals and the Identity Question,” *UTS Review (Cultural Studies Review)* 4, no. 2. (1998): 183.
49. Thomas Elsaesser, *European Cinema: Face to Face with Hollywood* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2005), 85.
50. Derek Elley, “Savvy Moves Boost Pusan Fest Fortunes,” *Variety* (October 8, 2006).

## **Chapter 5 Global America? American–Japanese Film Co-productions from *Shogun* (1980) to *Lost in Translation* (2003)**

1. Ulrich Beck, “Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies,” *Theory, Culture and Society* 19, nos. 1–2 (2002): 22.
2. Pheng Cheah, “Cosmopolitanism,” *Theory, Culture and Society* 23, nos. 1–2 (2006): 495.
3. Toby Miller, Nitin Govil, John McMurria, and Richard Maxwell, *Global Hollywood* (London: BFI publishing, 2001), 216.
4. Ben Goldsmith and Tom O’Regan, *The Film Studio: Film Production in Global Economy* (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2005), xii.
5. For example, the cinematographer of *Shogun*, Andrew Laszlo, stated that “it was not a little culture shock but it was a huge surprise . . . the camera and lighting equipment in Japan was at least twenty years behind what we have in the States,” from “The Making of *Shogun*,” Disk 5 bonus feature, James Clavell’s *Shogun*, directed by Jerry London, DVD box set (Paramount Pictures, 2004).
6. Ulrich Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision* (London: Polity Press, 2006), 19.
7. Ulrich Beck, quoted in Terhi Rantanen, “Cosmopolitanization — now! An Interview with Ulrich Beck,” *Global Media and Communication* 1, no. 3 (2005): 250.
8. Nicholas Rose, *Power of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 137.
9. Gillian Ursell, “Television Production: Issues of Exploitation, Commodification and Subjectivity in UK Television Labour Markets,” *Media, Culture & Society* 22, no. 6 (2000): 810.
10. Leslie Sklair, *The Transnational Capitalist Class* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
11. Leslie Sklair, “The Transnational Capitalist Class and the Discourse of Globalization,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 14, no. 1 (2000): 4.
12. Val Burris, “Review: *The Transnational Capitalist Class*,” *Contemporary Sociology* 31, no. 4 (2002): 416
13. Pheng Cheah, “Cosmopolitical — Today” in *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*, eds. Bruce Robbins and Pheng Cheah (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 26.

14. I was the managing director of Chimera Films and Communications from 1996 to 2005. The company provided services for Japanese film companies who came to shoot in Europe.
15. Pertti Alasuutari, *Researching Culture: Qualitative Method and Cultural Studies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 63.
16. Pertti Alasuutari, p. 25.
17. Pertti Alasuutari, p. 65.
18. Pertti Alasuutari, p. 69.
19. Most film historians agree that the 1950s was the golden age of Japanese cinema. See, for example, Tanaka Jun'ichirō, *Nihon eiga hattatsu-shi* Vol. 4: *shijō saikō no eiga jidai* (The history of the development of Japanese cinema, Vol. 4: The zenith of the age of cinema) (Tokyo: Chukō-Bunko 1976). Films such as *Rashōmon* (Akira Kurosawa, 1950), *Ugetsu* (Kenji Mizoguchi, 1952), and *Jigokumon — The Gate of Hell* (Teinosuke Kinugasa, 1953) won international recognition through film festival success. Domestically, cinema attendance peaked in 1958 and then went into terminal decline. By the end of the 1970s, none of the Japanese major studios were producing films regularly — apart from Nikkatsu, which decided to specialize in soft-core pornography. See for example, Yomota Inuhiko, “Stranger than Tokyo: Space and Race in Postnational Japanese Cinema,” in *Multiple Modernities: Cinemas and Popular Media in Transcultural East Asia*, ed. Jenny Kwok Wah Lau (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 77.
20. Chino Keiko, “Shogun to Karucha shokku,” (*Shogun* and Culture Shock), *Kinema Junpō* no. 797 (1980): 90.
21. Jerry Fisher, “Shogun ga beikoku ni uetsuketa ‘nihonjin wa chujitsu’ ‘nihonjin wa kageki’ no imēji” (*Shogun* implanted the image that “Japanese are loyal” and “Japanese are extremists” in American minds), *Asahi Journal* 22, no. 46 (November 14, 1980): 22.
22. For example, Mad Amano, “Shogun boom no nazo o toku: hainichi ka hainichi ka” (To resolve the mystery of the *Shogun* boom: Bashing Japan?), *Ushio* no. 260, (January 1981): 106–7.
23. James Clavell, *King Rat* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1962); *Tai-Pan* (London: Sphere Books, 1967).
23. James Clavell interviewed by Don Swain in 1986. <http://wiredforbook.org/jamesclavell/> (accessed November 5, 2007).
24. Numerous American and European films were shot in Japan in the 1950s, such as *Tokyo File 212* (Stuart McGowan, 1951); *Geisha Girl* (George Breakston, 1952); *Three Stripes in the Sun* (Richard Murphy, 1955); *The Tea House of The August Moon* (Daniel Mann 1956); *Sayonara* (Joshua Logan, 1957); *The Barbarian and the Geisha* (John Huston, 1958); *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (Alain Resnais, 1959). Most of these foreign productions in Japan were initiated by foreign film companies to utilize their Japanese earnings, which they were not allowed to take out of the country because of the foreign exchange



- regulations of the time. Thus these so-called co-productions did not require major Japanese financing, and they were not made with Japanese audiences in mind. As a consequence, most of these films were commercially unsuccessful in Japan, and the portrayal of Japanese culture and people in these films were often criticized as insensitive to the Japanese audience. See, for example, Michihiro Kakii, *Hariuddo no Nihonjin: eiga ni arawareta Nichibei bunka masatsu* (Japanese in Hollywood: Representation of Japanese–American cultural conflicts in films) (Tokyo: Bungeishunjū, 1992); Takashi Monma, *Ōbeieiga ni miru nihon* (The representation of Japan in American and European films) (Tokyo: Shakaihyōronsha, 1995); Sachiko Masuda, *Amerika eiga ni arawareta 'nihon' imēji no hensen* (Changes in the image of 'Japan' represented in American cinema) (Osaka: Osaka University Press, 2004).
25. Fujii Hiroaki, interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, August 5, 2005, in Tokyo.
  26. “*Shogun* DVD booklet,” James Clavell’s *Shogun* DVD box set (Paramount Pictures 2004).
  27. Fujii interview.
  28. “*The Making of Shogun*,” Disk 5 Bonus Feature, James Clavell’s *Shogun* DVD box set (Paramount Pictures 2004).
  29. Nagata advocated the internationalization of Japanese cinema following the success of *Rashomon* (Kurosawa, 1950). He was involved with various international film co-productions, and he set up mechanisms to promote the export of Japanese films to Western and Asian countries (see Tanaka Jun’ichirō, Nagata Masaichi [Tokyo: Jiji tsūshinsha, 1962], 123–67).
  30. Fujii produced Japanese films shot on location in Italy, such as *The Garden of Eden* (Yasuzō Masumura, 1980). He also produced a film directed by the fashion designer Kenzo Takada, *Dream, After Dream* (Kenzō Takada, 1981), in France, and facilitated the Japanese locations for Joseph Losey’s *Trout* (1982).
  31. The interpreter, Jun Mori, used to work in my production office in London, and we discussed a lot about Fujii.
  32. See, for example, John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War 2* (New York: Norton, 1999), trans. Miura Yoichi et al. as *Haiboku o dakishimete* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001), 401–29.
  33. The Van Ness Organization, *The Making of James Clavell’s Shogun* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1980): 214
  34. Tōhō Studio, where *Shogun* was shot, was the site of the fiercest labor struggles in postwar history, but its labor union was weakened considerably in the 1970s. Sato, Tadao, *Nihon Eigashi 2: History of Japanese Cinema 2* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 189–205.
  35. The Van Ness Organization, *The Making of James Clavell’s Shogun* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1980), 23.
  36. Chikara Higashi and G. Peter Lauter, *The Internationalization of the Japanese Economy* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), 6.

37. “Let’s Get Lost: Translation Talk with Sofia Coppola and Ross Katz,” DVD booklet for *Lost in Translation*, directed by Sofia Coppola (Momentum Pictures, 2003).
38. Lynn Hirschberg, “The Coppola Smart Mob,” *New York Times* (August 31, 2003).
39. Ibid.
40. Inoue Kiyoshi, interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, August 12, 2005, in Tokyo.
41. Ross Katz, in “Let’s Get Lost.”
42. Wendy Mitchell, “Sofia Coppola Talks about ‘Lost in Translation’, Her Love Story That’s Not Nerdy,” *indieWire* (February 4, 2004). [http://www.indiewire.com/people/people\\_030923coppola.html](http://www.indiewire.com/people/people_030923coppola.html) (accessed November 7, 2007).
43. Inoue worked on *Abnormal Family* (Masayuki Suo, 1983) as an assistant director, the film by Suo Masayuki who later directed *Shall We Dance?* (Masayuki Suo, 1996). Inoue worked on numerous low-budget exploitation films in the 1980s before he went to the US. After the collapse of the Japanese studio production system in the 1970s, these sex exploitation films were one of only a few places from which young filmmakers could gain working experience.
44. Inoue interview.
45. Inoue interview.
46. Inoue interview.
47. For example, based on my own experience, the average rate of pay for a first assistant director in the early 2000s in the US was about US\$650 for ten hours a day, whereas in Japan 30,000 yen (approx. US\$250) would buy a very experienced first assistant director for a flat day, which normally means over fifteen hours.
48. Ulrich Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision*, 20 (emphasis in original).

## **Chapter 6 In between the Values of the Global and the National: The Korean Animation Industry**

1. Zigmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), 1.
2. Harvey introduces the term “time-space compression” in *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 240: “processes that . . . revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time.” This often stresses the rapidity of the exchange of finances, telecommunications, transportation, and more, which are phenomena of globalization, or, in Harvey’s view, signs of postmodernity.
3. Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, *The Medium Is the Message* (London: Penguin, 1967); David Harvey *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Marjorie Ferguson, “The Mythology about Globalization,” *European Journal of*

- Communication* 7 (1992) 69–93; Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992); John B. Thompson, *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995).
4. Bauman (1998), 1.
  5. Malcolm Waters, *Globalization* (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 5.
  6. Jonathan Friedman, *Cultural Identity & Global Process* (London; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), 15. Here, Friedman uses historical events and previous examples to explain the global process and people’s cultural identity. For this reason, he states that his approach is rather “experience far.”
  7. Friedman (1994), 15.
  8. Note that, for reasons of privacy, interviewees’ names used in this chapter are pseudonyms. OEM means “original equipment manufacturer,” or a company that produces a certain product to order under the brand name of the main company.
  9. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994). Throughout the book, Bhabha explains in-between in relation to hybridity under colonial conditions.
  10. Cho Hae-Joang, “Constructing and Deconstructing Koreanness,” in *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey and United States*, ed. Dru Gladney (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 81. For a more economic approach, see Dong-Myeon Shin, *Social Economic Policies in Korea: Ideas, Networks, and Linkages* (London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 52.
  11. This is a part of the original manifesto of former president Park Chung-Hee’s *The Country, the Revolution and I*, cited in Shin 2003, 52 (my translation).
  12. GNP per capita was about US\$67, and forty-seven percent of the population was engaged in agricultural production. In 1962, GNP per capita grew to US\$87, and there were increases in the population engaged in the manufacturing, industrial, and service sectors. National wealth grew continuously and, by 1977, GNP per capita exceeded US\$1,000. ECOS — Economic Statistic System, The Bank of Korea, GNP 1953–2000. <http://ecos.bok.or.kr> (accessed November 15, 2005).
  13. In the mid-1970s, a thirteen-year-old boy committed suicide, believing that he would come back to life like a cartoon character he admired. This was headline news and, as a result, rather negative images of cartoons, comics, and animation were planted in the minds of the Korean public.
  14. John A. Lent, “Animation in Asia: Appropriation, Reinterpretation, and Adoption or Adaptation,” *Screening the Past* no. 11 (2000). <http://www.latrobe.edu.au/screeningthepast>. (accessed February 16, 2007).
  15. Ahn Jiwon, “Animated Subjects: On the Circulation of Japanese Animation as Global Cultural Products.” Paper presented at The Globalization and Popular Culture: Production, Consumption & Identity Workshop, University

- of Manitoba (2001). [http://www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/english/media/workshop/papers/ahn/ahn\\_paper.pdf](http://www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/english/media/workshop/papers/ahn/ahn_paper.pdf) (accessed April 30, 2002).
16. Ted Tschang and Andrea Goldstein, “Production and Political Economy in the Animation Industry: Why Insourcing and Outsourcing Occur.” Paper presented at DRUID Summer Conference on Industrial Dynamics, Innovation and Development, Elsinore, Denmark (2004), 3.
  17. Nelson Shin, the CEO of ACOM, which does outsourcing work for *The Simpsons*, said: “In order to make a 22-minute-episode of *The Simpsons*, 120 staff need to work. In order to make a series, it takes three months to complete and requires 22,000 drawings. As *The Simpsons* requires delicate movements, each character has 27 different mouth shapes” (March 3, 2005, *SportsHanKook*; my translation). This shows that animation requires a labor-intensive production process.
  18. Kim Sönguk, *Han'guk aenimeisyönnim öpta* (There is no Korean animation) (Seoul: Yesol, 1998); Joe Jo, “Overseas Marketing Suggestions for Korean Animation Industry,” *Animation World Magazine* 4, no. 12 (2000): 1–3.
  19. Kim Joon-Yang, “Critique of the New Historical Landscape of South Korean Animation,” *Animation* 1, no. 1 (2006): 61–81.
  20. See Lee Sang-Dawn, *Big Brother, Little Brother: The American Influence on Korean Culture in the Lyndon B. Johnson Years* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 1–19.
  21. Keith Negus and Michael Pickering, *Creativity, Communication and Cultural Value* (London; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004), 47.
  22. Philip Moins, Director of *Anima 2005*, *Kyoto News* (February 5, 2005).
  23. Box office data source: <http://www.the-numbers.com/movies/records> (accessed December 10, 2005).
  24. Quoted in Annalee R. Ward, “The Lion King’s Mythic Narrative: Disney as Moral Educator,” *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 23, no. 4 (1996): 47. For the original source of the data, see Scott Hettrick, “‘Lion King’ to Video March 3,” *The Hollywood Reporter* (January 27–29, 1995): 1, 58.
  25. Im Ch’öngsan “Manhwa yöngsang kwallyönhakkwaüi kyoyuk kwajöng kaebal kwa unyöng yö’n’gu” (Studies on the development and management of curricula for cartoon and animation courses), *Cartoon & Animation Studies* 3 (1999): 132–93.
  26. “Apricot Lady” (29), a female animator who has a university degree in animation from abroad, depicted Korea’s animation OEM industry as follows: “We (Korean animators) seem to be a puppet of the USA and Japan by doing their OEM work. I feel unhappy about it!”
  27. “Mr Quiet” (26), who interrupted his undergraduate studies in animation for a year and currently works at a Japanese OEM animation company, says: “This bird is us, the Korean animation industry. I hope that one day we will be free and more creative, just like a bird flying high in the sky.”

28. Georgie Hyde, *South Korea: Education, Culture and Economy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 3.
29. Nick Crossley, *The Social Body: Habit, Identity and Desire* (London; Thousand Oaks, CA; New Delhi: Sage, 2001), 97.
30. Ibid.
31. Christopher Winch, *Education, Work and Social Capital: Towards a New Conception of Vocational Education* (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 5.
32. Michael J. Seth, *Education Fever* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press and Centre for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, 2002), 14, 140.
33. Korean currency used in this work is converted to US dollars, using <http://www.oanda.com>.
34. Youna Kim, *Women, Television and Everyday Life in Korea: Journeys of Hope* (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 157.
35. Youna Kim (2005), 157.
36. Bauman (1998), 11.
37. Robert O'Brien and Marc Williams, *Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 175.

## **Chapter 7 The Transgression of Sharing and Copying: Pirating Japanese Animation in China**

1. I use the term “creative industries” here largely to mean “cultural industries” — ones that produce cultural products. My intent is to highlight its relationship to the current knowledge economy.
2. Henry Jenkins, *Textual Poachers: Television Fans and Participatory Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1992).
3. Li Jianping, “Tashan zhi shi — Riben donghuapian daigei women de sikao” (How we could learn from Japanese animation), *Dianshi Yanjiu (Television Studies)*, no. 9 (2000): 69.
4. Guo Hong, “Beijing, Shanghai qingshaonian donghua diaocha” (Survey of the reception of animation among Beijing and Shanghai youths) (July 2, 2004), <http://www.chinanim.com/dh1/newsxx.asp?newsid=4709> (accessed March 13, 2006); Zhao Hua and Xu Yang, “‘Sun Wukong’ weihe doubuguo ‘mi laoshu’?” (Why can't the Monkey King overcome Mickey Mouse?) *Xinhuanet.com* (August 12, 2004). <http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/www.ln.xinhuanet.com/wangtan/katong/images.htm> (accessed March 8, 2006).
5. *Gin'iro no kami no agito (Silver-haired Agito)*, dir. Sugiyama Keiichi) was the first anime co-produced by Japanese and Chinese companies (Gonzo and Chinese Film Animation Company [Zhongying Donghua Chanye Gongsi]). It was also the first anime film to be screened in China in March 2006, but, for unknown reasons, it has not yet happened. See “Kaikyō! Nihon anime-

- shijō hatsu no Chūgoku kōkai kettei!! *Gin'iro no kami no agito*” (“What a feat! The first Chinese release in the history of Japanese anime: *Silver-haired Agito!*”), [http://www.gin-iro.jp/web/news\\_html/news\\_bn.php?REC=18](http://www.gin-iro.jp/web/news_html/news_bn.php?REC=18) (accessed February 20, 2006); and Gigi, “Maichu chanye diyibu? Ajide nian'nei shangying” (The first step to the industry: *Agito* will be screened in this year) (March 17, 2006), [http://news.myuni.com.cn/content/news/210722355620063171035435944484\\_1.shtml](http://news.myuni.com.cn/content/news/210722355620063171035435944484_1.shtml) (accessed January 30, 2007).
6. The importation of revenue-sharing foreign films began in China 1994, when the quota was ten films per year. After China joined the WTO, the quota increased twenty, and it reached forty in 2005.
  7. Editorial, “‘Anime’ Subculture Exchange May Bridge Japan–China Gap,” Jiji Press Ticker Service (October 29, 2005) (accessed through LexisNexis on March 2, 2006).
  8. Laikwan Pang, *Cultural Control and Globalization in Asia: Copyright, Piracy, and Cinema* (London: Routledge, 2006), 80–116.
  9. Anonymous, “Zhongguo Dongman Chongman Wenti de ‘Chaoyang’” (The rising sun of the problematic Chinese manga and anime) Chinanim.com (October 16, 2005). <http://www.chinanim.com/dh1/newsxx.asp?newsid=9856> (assessed March 3, 2006).
  10. Vivienne Chow, “Internet Piracy Nightmare for Anime Director,” *South China Morning Post* (January 9, 2006).
  11. A wave of lawsuits and criminal proceedings against file-sharers is currently instigated by the music industry across the world. In January 2006, the British court for the first time declared illegal file-sharing unlawful and charged two sharers with fines. At around the same time, a new Swedish political party was established, with the clear political aim to abolish copyright laws. For relevant news, see “[exis-nexis.com/universe/document?\\_m=ae1d7f2b4118b30c275a50f5cee117b&\\_docnum=8&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkVA&\\_md5=575da7cb01edf85bc48466aee00aac7](http://exis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=ae1d7f2b4118b30c275a50f5cee117b&_docnum=8&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkVA&_md5=575da7cb01edf85bc48466aee00aac7)” File-sharers in Europe face a wave of lawsuits?” *The International Herald Tribune* (April 5, 2006); Jonathan Brown, “Illegal File-sharers Fined for First Time in Britain,” *The Independent* (London) (January 28, 2006); Gladys Fouche, “Pirates Pursue a Political Point: A New Swedish Party Aims to Abolish the Copyright Laws that Criminalise File Sharers,” *The Guardian* (London) (February 9, 2006).
  12. Editorial, “‘Made in Japan’ Trademark to Fight Anime Piracy,” *Mainichi Daily News* (July 3, 2004) (accessed through LexisNexis on March 3, 2006). Such figures are, of course, enormously misleading; Chinese consumers choose piracy partly because official products are so expensive.
  13. For example, one can find many Japanese anime on the Chinese “VeryCD” website <http://www.verycd.com/> (accessed February 27, 2006). Some major Chinese websites featuring Japanese anime and manga include Comic–Anime Beat, [http://www.cabeat.com/pub/index.php?option=com\\_frontpage&Itemid=1](http://www.cabeat.com/pub/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1) (assessed February 27, 2006); and TotoroClub.net, <http://>

- www.totoroclub.net/index.htm (assessed February 27, 2006).
14. Fei Yuxiao, “Chuangzao mengxiang yu feixiang de laoren: Gong Qijun” (The world of Miyazaki Hayao), co-published by Dongfang yinxiang dianzi chubanshe and Kuilü wenhua. I bought the book at Idea Bookshop on February 7, 2006. It does not indicate the year of publication, but since *Howl’s Moving Castle* was not released until 2004, it is likely to be 2004 or 2005. This author has published similar items about Japanese manga and anime materials.
  15. For example, the Korean *Totoro* poster (p. 54) was likely copied from Korean website Cincine.co.kr, [http://www.cincine.co.kr/movie\\_poster.asp?movie\\_code=1155&back\\_url](http://www.cincine.co.kr/movie_poster.asp?movie_code=1155&back_url) (accessed February 27, 2006).
  16. For example, the many manga illustrations in *Nausicaä of The Valley of the Winds* (pp. 26–34) were likely copied directly from the original manga *Nausicaä of the Valley of the Winds*, vols. 1–6 (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1987).
  17. The quality of the different images varies greatly, and those pictures with the lowest resolution are quite clearly television screen captures (e.g., pp. 91, 172).
  18. For example, many of the photos of the Ghibli Museum (pp. 220–33) were copied from the Chinese book *The Hot Air of Ghibli (Jibuli de refeng)* (Beijing: Feitian dianzhi yinxiang chubanshe, n.d.), which is also a pirated book.
  19. Kanō Seiji, “*Kaze no tani no naushika* kara *Mononoke no hime* e—Miyazaki Hayao to Sutajio Jiburi no 13 nen” (“From *Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind* to *Princess Mononoke* — 13 Years of Miyazaki Hayao and Studio Ghibli”). <http://www.yk.rim.or.jp/~rst/rabo/miyazaki/ghibli13nen.html>, accessed February 25, 2006.
  20. Kazuto Tsukamoto, “Shanghai Surprise: Animation on the Rise,” *Asahi Shimbun* (April 23, 2005) (accessed through LexisNexis on March 2, 2006).
  21. Kenji Kawase, “Hangzhou Aspires to Crown of Animation, ‘Manga’ Capital,” *The Nikkei Weekly* (June 20, 2005) (accessed through LexisNexis on March 3, 2006).
  22. Chan Siu-sin, “Animation Industry Lacks Talent and Chinese Brands, says Official,” *South China Morning Post* (January 20, 2006).
  23. Kazuto Tsukamoto, “Shanghai Surprise: Animation on the Rise.”
  24. For a historical overview of South Korea’s animation industry, see Joon-Yang Kim, “Critique of the New Historical Landscape of South Korean Animation,” *Animation* 1, no. 1 (2006): 61–81.
  25. “Manga Course Attracts Lecturers,” *The Daily Yomiuri* (June 9, 2004) (accessed through LexisNexis on March 3, 2006).
  26. See Ae-Ri Yoon’s work in this volume.
  27. Paul Wells, *Understanding Animation* (London: Routledge, 1998), 190–6.
  28. Ollie Johnston and Frank Thomas, *The Illusion of Life: Disney Animation* (New York: Disney Editions, 1981).
  29. Thomas Lamarre, “Platonic Sex: Perversion and Shōjo Anime (Part One),” *Animation* 1, no. 1 (2006): 45–59.
  30. See, for example, Susan J. Napier, *Anime*, 172–7, 215–8.



31. Paul Wells, *Understanding Animation*, 34–67.
32. Lev Manovich, *The Language of New Media* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 298–307. The current game culture has benefited much from the logic of cartoon culture.
33. For example, the 1928 *Steamboat Willie*, the first feature animation film of Walt Disney which made him and Mickey Mouse famous, was a spoof of a Buster Keaton film called *Steamboat Bill, Jr.*
34. See Toby Miller et al., *Global Hollywood* (London: BFI, 2001).
35. Salil Mehra, “Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All the Cartoons My Kid Watches are Japanese Imports?” *Rutgers Law Review*, 55 (Fall 2002). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=347620> or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.347620
36. Kōichi Iwabuchi, *Recentring Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 38. See also Sean Leonard, “Progress against the Law: Anime and Fandom, with the Key to the Globalization of Culture,” *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 8, no. 3 (2005): 281–305.
37. Ian Rowley, Chester Dawson, Hiroko Tashiro, and Ihlwan Moon, “The Anime Biz: Still an Adolescent,” *Business Week* no. 3939 (June 27, 2005): 50–2.
38. Editorial, “‘Made in Japan’ trademark to fight anime piracy,” *Mainichi Shinbun* (July 3, 2004) (accessed through LexisNexis on March 8, 2006).
39. Japanese anime and manga are also popular in other places, as my chapter shows. But we must recognize that such popularities can by no means be compared to the national scene. See Anne Allison, “Can Popular Culture Go Global? How Japanese ‘Scouts’ and ‘Rangers’ Fare in the U.S.,” in *A Century of Popular Culture in Japan*, ed. Douglas Slaymaker (Lewiston, ME: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 127–53; Anthony Fung, “Hong Kong as the Asian and Chinese Distributor of Pokemon,” *International Journal of Comic Art* 7, no. 1 (2005): 432–48. Susan J. Napier, *Anime: From Akira to Princess Mononoke* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 8.
40. See Amy Fung Kwan Li’s “Slash, Fandoms, and Pleasures.” M.Phil. thesis, Department of Cultural and Religious Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. Amy has been both my source of inspiration and information for this paper. My sincere gratitude.
42. Lawrence Lessig, *Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity* (New York: Penguin, 2004), 25–8.
42. Iwabuchi, *Recentring Globalization* (2002), 23–35.
43. Iwabuchi (2002), 36.
44. Judith Butler, *Theories in Subjection: The Psychic Life of Power* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 28–30.



## Chapter 8 The East Asian Brandscape: Distribution of Japanese Brands in the Age of Globalization

1. The fieldwork on which this essay is based was partly funded by a research grant from the Japan Foundation.
2. Naomi Klein, *No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies* (New York: Picador, 2000).
3. Kōichi Iwabuchi, *Recentring Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2002), 48.
4. Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
5. There is an increasing number of works on inter-Asian cultural flow. See, for example, Larissa Hjorth, “Odours of Mobility: Mobile Phones and Japanese Cute Culture in the Asia-Pacific,” *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 26, nos. 1–2 (2005): 39–55; Kōichi Iwabuchi, ed. *Feeling Asian Modernities: Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004); and Akio Igarashi ed., *Henyō suru Ajia to Nihon: Ajia Shakai nishintō suru Nihon no poppyurā karuchā* (Transformation of Asia and Japan: Japanese popular culture in East Asia) (Yokohama: Seori Shobō, 1998).
6. Douglas McGray, “Japan’s Gross National Cool,” *Foreign Policy* no. 130 (2002): 44–54.
7. “Daitōa Atsuzoko Kyōeiken” (The Greater East Asian Japanese Super Platform-Shoe Sphere), *Nikkei Business* (January 15, 2001): 21.
8. Leo Ching, “Globalizing the Regional, Regionalizing the Global: Mass Culture and Asianism in the Age of Late Capital,” in *Globalization*, ed. Arjun Appadurai (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 257.
9. Ching (2001), 281.
10. Herbert Schiller, “Not yet the Post-Imperial Era,” in *Media and Cultural Studies: Keywords*, eds. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas Kellner (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 318–33.
11. Kevin Robins, “What in the World Is Going On?” in *Production of Culture/Cultures of Production*, ed. Paul Du Gay and Open University (London; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage in association with the Open University, 1997), 11–66.
12. Stuart Hall, “The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity,” in *Culture, Globalization, and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*, ed. Anthony D. King (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997), 41–69.
13. Roland Robertson, “Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity,” in *Global Modernities*, eds. Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 28.
14. James L. Watson, *Golden Arches East: McDonald’s in East Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).

15. Takeshi Matsui, “Seiryō Inryō: Genchika to hyōjunka no hazamade” (Soft drink: Standardization and localization), in *Branding in China: Kyodai shijō Chūgoku o seisuru burando senryaku* (Branding in China: Brand strategy for the huge China market), ed. Yuko Yamashita (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpō Sha, 2006), 75–108.
16. Celia Lury, *Brands: The Logos of the Global Economy* (London: Routledge, 2004), 6.
17. “The Beauty Top 100,” *WWD Beauty Report International* (September 2007) 27. Here, the cosmetics market is made up of fragrance, makeup, skin care, sun care, hair care, deodorant, cellulite and shaving products. This paper does not discuss Procter & Gamble, Unilever, and Avon — ranked second (US\$17.5 billion), third (US\$12.8 \$ billion), and fifth (US\$6.0 billion) respectively — because of their relative weakness in luxury fragrance, makeup, and skin-care brands.
18. Data collected by the author between July 2006 and January 2007.
19. The largest Japanese toiletry company, Kao, acquired the struggling Kanebo cosmetic brand in 2006 as part of its bid to become serious contender in the lucrative cosmetics industry.
20. Mike Featherstone, *Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmoderism and Identity* (London; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), 8–9.
21. Iwabuchi (2002), 27–8.
22. Interviews with current and former brand marketers who handled most of the brands discussed in this essay were conducted in November and December 2006.
23. Liz Moor, “Branded Spaces: the Mediation of Commercial Forms” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Goldsmiths College, University of London, 2004), 11–5.
24. [www.brandchannel.com/education\\_glossary.asp](http://www.brandchannel.com/education_glossary.asp).
25. Lury (2004), 6.
26. Manuel De Landa, *A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity* (London; New York: Continuum, 2006). This innovative book presents a social ontology that asserts the autonomy of social entities from the conceptions we have of them.
27. Adam Arvidsson, *Brands: Meaning and Value in Media Culture* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006).
28. John Murphy, “What Is Branding?” in *Brands: The New Wealth Creator*, eds. Susannah Hart and John Murphy (London: Macmillan, 1998) 3.
29. This definition is taken from the *Oxford American Dictionary* on Apple Mac OX 10.4.10. This is an anti-Kantian definition in disagreement with the structuralist insistence on the total linguisticity of experience. See Howard Caygill, *Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience* (London: Routledge, 1998) for the analysis of Benjamin’s anti-Kantian idea of experience. See also Gregory J. Seigworth, “Cultural Studies and Gilles Deleuze,” in *New Cultural Studies*, eds. Gary Hall and Clare Birchall (Edinburgh: Edinburgh

- University Press, 2007), 107–27, for a Deleuzean attempt to resuscitate Raymond Williams’s culturalist project on experience. Martin Jay in *Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) provides a comprehensive account of “experience” in Western philosophical thought.
30. <http://www.lovemarks.com/index.php?pageID=20015&lovemarkid=910>.
  31. <http://www.lovemarks.com/index.php?pageID=20015&start=10&order=commentdate&direction=DESC&lovemarkid=910&display=&move=1>.
  32. Shaun Smith, “Brand Experience,” in *Brands and Branding*, ed. The Economist et al. (London: The Economist, 2003), 97–111; see also B. Joseph Pine II and James H. Gilmore, *The Experience Economy: Work Is Theatre & Every Business a Stage* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1999); and Martin Lindstrom, *Brandsense: How to Build Powerful Brands through Touch, Taste, Smell, Sight & Sound* (London: Kogan Page Limited, 2005).
  33. Arvidsson (2006). In this sense, the value of brands depends on “immaterial labour,” defined by Lazzarato “as the labour that produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity.” Maurizio Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labour,” in *Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics*, eds. Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 133–47.
  34. Based on onsite observation of the M.A.C Cosmetics counter at London department stores Harvey Nichols and Selfridges in November 2007.
  35. Based on interview. See also Emily Ross and Angus Holland, *100 Great Businesses and the Minds Behind Them* (Naperville, IL: Sourcebook, Inc., 2006) for the history of M.A.C. Cosmetics.
  36. Smith (2003), 97–8.
  37. See Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, Post-Contemporary Interventions* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002) for an influential discussion of the Spinozean–Deleuzean notion of affect that has set the tone for the recent surge of interest in affect.
  38. Here I use the term *virtual* not in the simple sense of being immaterial but in the Bergsonian/Deleuzean sense, in which the virtual is always compared with the actual as two ontologically distinct dimensions of reality. See Andrew Murphie, “Putting the Virtual Back into VR,” in *A Shock to Thought: Expressions after Deleuze & Guattari*, ed. Brian Massumi (London: Routledge, 2002), 188–214; and Pierre Levy, *Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age* (Peseus Books, 1998).
  39. Rosemary J. Coombe, *The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation and the Law* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 318–9.
  40. Janet Fogg, “Brands as Intellectual Property,” in *Brands: The New Wealth Creators*, eds. Susannah Hart and John Murphy (London: Macmillan, 1998), 72–81.

41. This information can be found in the IR sections of their corporate website. Shiseido annual report, <http://www.shiseido.co.jp/ir/library/annual/index.htm> (accessed November 1, 2007); L'Oréal annual report, <http://www.loreal-finance.com/v9/us/contenu/rapport.asp> (accessed November 1, 2007); Estée Lauder annual report, [http://www.elcompanies.com/investor\\_relations/financial\\_reports/annual\\_reports.asp](http://www.elcompanies.com/investor_relations/financial_reports/annual_reports.asp) (accessed November 1, 2007).
42. Raymond Perrier, "Brand Licensing," in *Brands: The New Wealth Creators*, eds. Susannah Hart and John Murphy (London: Macmillan, 1998), 104–13.
43. David Aaker, *Brand Portfolio Strategy: Creative Relevance, Differentiation, Energy, Leverage and Clarity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).
44. Aaker (2004).
45. Appadurai (1996), 37.
46. Lawrence Grossberg, "Cultural Studies, Modern Logics, and Theories of Globalisation," in *Back to Reality? Social Experience and Cultural Studies*, ed. Angela McRobbie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 25.
47. In 1995, imported Japanese women's fashion magazine *non-no* was the best-selling magazine ahead of any local or localized Western magazines in a large bookshop in Taiwan, according to Kenichi Ishii in *Higashi Ajia no Nihon taishū bunka* (Japanese popular culture in East Asia) (Tokyo: Sōsō-sha, 2001), 147. The publisher Shufunotomoshia alone has twelve licensing deals in Asia, which it signed between 1995 and 2006. One of its magazines, *Ray*, a women's fashion magazine, has been licensed to Taiwan, Thailand, and mainland China. In China, its circulation is among the largest and significantly larger than the Japanese edition. Local licensees for *Ray* or other magazines translate and publish between 60 and 95 percent of the original Japanese content, including editorial and advertorial. (Interview with the company's international rights manager, November 2006.)
48. Geoffrey G. Jones, David Kiron, Vincent Dessain, and Anders Sjöman, "L'Oréal and the Globalization of American Beauty," *Harvard Business School Case* 805–086 (2005).
49. Appadurai (1996), 42.
50. Beng Huat Chua, "Conceptualizing an East Asian Popular Culture," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 5, no. 2 (2004): 200–21.
51. Scott Lash and Celia Lury, *Global Culture Industry: Mediation of Things* (Oxford: Polity Press, 2007). See also Nicholas Thoburn, "Patterns of Production: Cultural Studies after Hegemony," *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, no. 3 (2007): 79–94.
52. Smith (2003).
53. Imre Szerman, "Cultural Studies and the Transnational," in *New Cultural Studies — Adventure in Theory*, eds. Gary Hall and Clare Birchall (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 213.

## Chapter 9 Korean Pop Music in China: Nationalism, Authenticity, and Gender

1. This essay does not consider the consumption of North Korean culture in China. Hereafter, when I refer to Korea, this should be understood as South Korea (Republic of Korea).
2. McCune-Reischauer romanization is used for Korean terms, except personal names, where I retain preferred spellings where known, giving on the first appearance McCune-Reischauer equivalents in square brackets. Pinyin romanization is used for Chinese terms, except for Hong Kong names, where I retain preferred spelling.
3. The word pronounced *Han* means cold or Korea, depending how it is written. As far as I know, it has no connotations of “cool” (as in fashionable), which is generally transliterated as *ku* in Chinese. Cho Hae-Joang traces the word *Hanliu* to 1999 and suggests that there is a cynical edge to this play on words (Hae-Joang Cho, “Reading the ‘Korean Wave’ as a Sign of Global Shift,” *Korea Journal* 45, no. 4 [2005]: 172), perhaps because the word *han* (cold) has connotations of fear, suggesting that Chinese may fear excessive cultural influence from Korea. However, I have not detected a pejorative edge to the use of the term.
4. Generally focussed on consumption of TV drama and film, English language studies of *Hanliu* include: Sora Park, “China’s Consumption of Korean Television Dramas: An Empirical Test of the ‘Cultural Discount’ Concept,” *Korea Journal* 44, no. 4 (2004): 265–90; a special issue of *Korea Journal* 45, no. 4 (2005) including essays by Kelly Fu Su Yin and Kai Khiun Liew (“*Hallyu* in Singapore: Korean Cosmopolitanism or the Consumption of Chineseness?” 206–32), Doobo Shim (“Globalization and Cinema Regionalization in East Asia,” 233–60) and Hyun Mee Kim (“Korean TV Dramas in Taiwan: With an Emphasis on the Localization Process,” 183–205). Studies focussing on music include Rowan Pease, “Internet, Fandom and K-wave in China,” in *Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave*, ed. Keith Howard (Folkestone: Global Oriental 2006), 176–89; and Sang-Yeon Sung, “The *Hanliu* Phenomenon in Taiwan: TV Dramas and Teenage Pop,” in *Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave*, ed. Keith Howard (Folkestone: Global Oriental 2006), 168–75.
5. Musically, in China H.O.T. were most readily compared with the Backstreet Boys, for instance, although they incorporated rock elements that were not part of the American band’s style. In China, the ability of musicians to present competence in a range of styles is valued as proof of their musicianship and broad appeal; in the West, it might be read as “inauthentic,” or threaten their niche in a more segmented market. There is a great diversity of Korean pop music genres besides R&B and hip-hop. These are explored in *Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave* (Folkestone: Global Oriental 2006), ed. Keith Howard.

6. Kōichi Iwabuchi, “Becoming ‘Culturally Proximate’: The A/scent of Japanese Idol Dramas in Taiwan,” in *Asian Media Productions*, ed. Brian Moeran (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), 54–74.
7. An onomatopoeic term that evokes the rhythmic accompaniment to the songs, which are also known as “trot” (*t’ŭrot’ŭ*, after foxtrot). These ballads are sometimes compared to Japanese *enka*, and the origins of both genres are fiercely debated in Korea. On this, see Gloria Lee Pak, “On the Mimetic Faculty: A Critical Study of the 1984 *Ppongchak* Debate and Post-colonial Mimesis,” in *Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave*, ed. Keith Howard (Folkestone: Global Oriental 2006), 62–71.
8. The origin of this term is a pun on sun-sickness, used in the Taiwanese phrase *haRizu*, for fans of Japanese culture. See H  l  ne Le Bail, “Japanese Culture in Asia: Infatuation, Identification and the Construction of Identity: The Example of Taiwan,” *China Perspectives*, 43 (2002): 52–62. The *haHanzu* are just one of many lifestyle “tribes” in China, on which see Jing Wang, “Bourgeois Bohemians in China? Neo-tribes and the Urban Imaginary,” *The China Quarterly* no. 183 (2005): 543–7.
9. Pease (2006), 177, 180.
10. The main companies of concern to this article are SM Entertainment, JYP Entertainment, and YG Entertainment (Yedang Media).
11. John Fiske, “The Cultural Economy of Fandom,” in *The Adoring Audience: Fan Culture and Popular Media*, ed. Lisa Lewis (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 30.
12. Cho (2005).
13. Kōichi Iwabuchi, “Time and the Neighbour: Japanese Media Consumption of Asia,” in *Rogue Flows: Trans-Asian Cultural Traffic*, eds. Kōichi Iwabuchi, Stephen Muecke, and Mandy Thomas (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 151–74.
14. According to Chinese newspaper reports, his concert at the Olympic Stadium in Beijing in 1999 earned him US\$100,000 performing to 17,000 fans (*Hanju gongli shenhou, daihuo Hanliu jingji* [South Korean Drama’s Profound Success, Fires the Korea Wave Economy]), World Media Lab. <http://media.icxo.com/htmlnews/2005/08/24/653373.htm> (accessed December 5, 2006).
15. Record sales in Korea have fallen drastically: in the late 1990s the best-selling records could top 2 million domestically. In 2006, very few could exceed 200,000. In 2001, the top ten best-selling albums made a combined total of over 10 million sales; in 2006 it was just 2 million. Undoubtedly the high number of illegal download sites contributed to the downturn, but the closure of such sites has done little to reverse the trend (annual sales figures available on the Music Industry Association of Korea website, <http://miak.or.kr>).
16. H.O.T., for example, sold over 400,000 albums in China in 2000 (Kim Youn-jun, “Korean Pop Culture Craze Hallyu Sweeps Through Asia,”

- Koreana* 16, no. 1 (2002): 46), while their album sales in Korea in the same year were just double that at 900,000 (Music Industry Association of Korea, “2002 *nyŏn kayo ūmban palmae ryang chipkye*” [2002 Korean song album sales chart], Music Industry Association of Korea. <http://miak.or.kr/navigator.php?contents=html&usemode=list&DB=117> (accessed May 14, 2007).
17. International Federation of Phonographic Industries, “IFPI Music Piracy Report 2002,” International Federation of Phonographic Industries, <http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/antipiracy/piracy2002.html> (accessed 14 February 2003); Thomas Crampton, “Pop Stars Learn to Live with Pirates,” *International Herald Tribune* (February 21, 2003). <http://www.iht.com/cgi-bin/generec.cgi?template+articleprint.tmplh&AR> (accessed April 29, 2003).
  18. Anthony Fung, “Marketing Popular Culture in China: Andy Lau as a Pan-Chinese Icon,” in *Chinese Media: Global Contexts*, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (New York; London, Routledge, 2003), 257–69. Anthony Fung, “Western Style, Chinese Pop: Jay Chou’s Rap and Hip-Hop in China,” *Asian Music* 39, no. 1 (2008): 69–80.
  19. The sale and manufacture of records has for some time been of less importance to the global music industry than the creation of rights. See Simon Frith, “Copyright and the Music Business,” *Popular Music* 7, no. 1 (1988): 57.
  20. Executive Producer Hao Fang at Starry Sky TV, interview by author, August 11, 2003, Beijing.
  21. Laikwan Pang, *Cultural Control and Globalization in Asia: Copyright, Piracy and Cinema* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 109, 103. See also her essay in this volume.
  22. During July–August 2003, I interviewed record company and media workers including Ji Lingli (public relations, Baidie Record Company, Beijing), Gu Hong (Star River Audio-visual, Shanghai), Wu Qi (chief editor, Joy Entertainment Channel online, Shanghai), Hao Fang (executive producer, Starry Sky TV, Beijing), Robin Pak (programme presenter, Radio Television Hong Kong), Kelly Cha (presenter, Beijing Music Station), Ben Xu (production manager, MTV China, Shanghai), Zhang Ming (presenter, Shanghai East Radio). Hereafter, in order to protect their professional relationships, I will not attribute comments to specific individuals.
  23. The number of votes cast was 35,314. For the full poll results, see *Sina Yingyin yule*, “*Diaocha: Ni renwei zai Zhongguo zui you renqi de Hanguo geshou she shei?*” (Survey: Whom do consider to be the most popular Korean singer in China?), *Sina Yingyin yule*. <http://ent.sina.com.cn/y/2006-02-10/2009982389.html> (accessed March 13, 2006).
  24. Deborah Sontag, “A Strong Forecast for Korean Pop’s Rain,” *New York Times* (January 27, 2006). <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/27/news/rain.php> (accessed December 13, 2007).
  25. KRJeami, “Interview with Lee Soo Man” *BoAjjang.com* (September 1, 2005).



- <http://forums.boajjang.com/index.php?act=ST&f=1&t=34315> (accessed June 6, 2008).
26. News of H.O.T. revival concerts were a common feature in *Hanliu* magazines and websites, but these never materialized. For example “*H.O.T. chongzu kenengxing zengjia*” (The possibility of re-forming H.O.T. is increasing), *Yule wuxian* (Entertainment Unlimited), no. 152 (July 2003).
  27. SM Entertainment 2001, Video segment entitled “SM Entertainment, China Auditions.” [http://www.smtown.com/smtown/audition/china2001/china\\_audition\\_ch3.html](http://www.smtown.com/smtown/audition/china2001/china_audition_ch3.html) (accessed May 7, 2005).
  28. Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), *Ashia shyobijū: samgukji, Yi Suman ūi CT ron kwa Hallyu ūi mirae* (Asia Showbiz: The History of Three Kingdoms, Lee Soo Man’s CT theory and the future of Korea wave) SBS special, March 12, 2006.
  29. SBS (2006).
  30. “TVXQ” *Wikipedia*. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TVXQ> (accessed September 15, 2006).
  31. World Media Lab, *Hanju gongli shenhou, daihuo Hanliu jingji* (South Korean drama’s profound success, fires the Korea Wave economy), World Media Lab. <http://media.icxo.com/htmlnews/2005/08/24/653373.htm> (accessed December 5, 2006).
  32. Cho (2005), 169.
  33. World Media Lab, *Hanju gongli shenhou, daihuo hanliu jingji*.
  34. Figures derived from Robert Ash, “Quarterly Chronicle,” *The China Quarterly* 190 (2006): 533.
  35. Korea Culture and Contents Agency, “About KOCCA: Mission,” *KoreanContent.org* (2003). <http://www.koreacontent.org/weben/etc/kocca3.jsp> (accessed December 5, 2006).
  36. Korean National Tourism Office, “Survey Report on Actual Conditions of Hallyu (Korean Fever) Tourism, 2004.” <http://www.knto.or.kr/eng/hallyu/hallyusurvey.html#top> (accessed April 2, 2005).
  37. Korean National Tourism Office 2004; Joseph. D. Straubhaar, “Beyond Media Imperialism: Asymmetrical Inter-dependence and Cultural Proximity,” *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 8 (1991): 39–59.
  38. Keith Howard, “Coming of Age: Korean Pop in the 1990s,” in *Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave*, ed. Keith Howard (Folkestone: Global Oriental 2006), 82.
  39. Paik Won Dam, cited in Cho (2005), 163.
  40. Cho (2005).
  41. “S Korean Soap Opera Sparks Boom in China,” *China Daily* (September 30, 2003). [http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-09/30/content\\_3567436.htm](http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-09/30/content_3567436.htm) (accessed March 14, 2006).
  42. Executive Producer at Starry Sky TV Hao Fang, interview by author, August 11, 2003, Beijing.



43. Fang (2003).
44. Program Presenter Robin Pak of Radio Television Hong Kong, interview by author, July 2003, Hong Kong.
45. Jin Chenguang, student, interview by author, August 3, 2003, Changchun.
46. Public Relations Officer Ji Lingli of Baidie Record Company, interview by author, August 2003, Beijing.
47. Gu Hong of Star River Audio-visual, interview by author, July 2003, Shanghai.
48. Robin Pak (2003).
49. Henry Jenkins, *Textual Poachers: Television Fans and Participatory Culture* (London: Routledge, 1991), 175.
50. Barbara Ehrenreich, Elizabeth Hess, and Gloria Jacobs, “Beatlemania: Girls Just Want to Have Fun,” in *The Adoring Audience*, ed. Lisa A. Lewis (London: Routledge, 1992) 84–106; and Jennifer Robertson, *Takarazuka: Sexual Politics and Popular Culture in Modern Japan* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1998), 140–3.
51. Qiao Fei, “Korean Culture According to Foreigners 2,” *KoreanContent.org*, 2004. [http://www.koreacontent.org/weben/inmarket/Ns\\_knews\\_view.jsp?news\\_seq=11298](http://www.koreacontent.org/weben/inmarket/Ns_knews_view.jsp?news_seq=11298) (accessed December 5, 2006).
52. Robin Pak (2003).
53. As Ehrenreich, Hess, and Jacobs note, this is partly an expression of the fans’ power: “knowing, subconsciously, that the Beatles were who they were because girls like oneself had made them that” (Ehrenreich, Hess, Jacobs 1992, 103).
54. From April to September 2003, I sent out about 600 email questionnaires on Korean music consumption to participants on bulletin boards, websites, QQ messaging system users, and fans who had written to magazines. I received 107 replies, which I then followed up with further questionnaires and correspondence. Survey responses are referred to in the following format: (nickname, date, response number).
55. Such petitions are characteristic of grassroots protests on the Internet, as outlined by Shih-ding Liu, “China’s Popular Nationalism on the Internet: Report on the 2005 Anti-Japanese Network Struggles,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 7, no. 1 (2006): 144–55.
56. hyun&hyuk, “Di yi ge, ai wo de ren” (The first person who loves me), LKPM forums. <http://lkpm.w103.leoboard.com/novel/novel/02.htm> (accessed September 10, 2003).
57. Eun-Young Jung, “Articulating Korean Youth Culture through Global Popular Music Styles: Seo Taiji’s Use of Rap and Metal,” in *Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave*, ed. Keith Howard (Folkestone: Global Oriental 2006), 113–7. Similar sentiments are expressed in the songs of Taiwanese pop star Jay Chou since 2003 (Fung 2008).
58. Yoo Young Jin, “We Are the Future,” *H.O.T. II: Wolf and Sheep*, 1997, S.M. Entertainment, SSM-20 (1997).

59. Nimrod Baranovitch, *China's New Voices: Popular Music, Ethnicity, Gender and Politics, 1978–1997* (Berkeley: University of California Press 2003), 108–89.
60. Baranovitch (2003), 155.
61. Baranovitch (2003), 144.
62. Baranovitch (2003), 153.
63. Jing Wang, *Brand New China Advertising, Media, and Commercial Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 77.
64. Laikwan Pang (2006) forcefully argues the creative nature of film piracy in China, and her ideas can be applied to music piracy.
65. Pease (2006), 185–6.
66. In this regard, compare this reaction of Japanese fans to Hong Kong stars “with a sensitivity so delicate as to appeal to the maternal instinct” (Iwabuchi 2004, 160).
67. TVXQ 2006, *TVXQ! Third Album: The another story of balloon* (Seoul: SM Entertainment SMCD137).
68. Wim Lunsing, “Yaoi Ronsō: Discussing Depictions of Male Homosexuality in Japanese Girls’ Comics, Gay Comics and Gay Pornography,” *Intersections: Gender, History and Culture in the Asian Context* 12 (2006). <http://www.she.murdoch.edu.au/intersections/issue12/lunsing.html> 2006 (accessed January 5, 2007).
69. Literally *feiyi suosu*, which my dictionary translates as “unimaginably queer.”
70. Iwabuchi (2004), 169.
71. Iwabuchi (2004), 153–5.
72. Kōichi Iwabuchi, “Embracing Korean Wave: Japan and East Asian Media Flows.” Unpublished paper presented at the symposium “*Hallyuwood*: Korean Screen Culture goes Global,” School of Advanced Study, University of London (May 20, 2005).
73. Iwabuchi (2004), 162.
74. Cuncun Wu, “‘Beautiful Boys Made up as Beautiful Girls’: Anti-masculine Taste in Qing China,” in *Asian Masculinities: The Meaning and Practice of Manhood in China and Japan*, eds. Kam Louie and Morris Low (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 28.
75. Wu (2003), 29.
76. See also Baranovitch (2003), 132–44, on “neo-traditional” male pop stars in China.
77. Wu (2003), 29.
78. Louie (2003), 6.
79. Hui Xiao, “Narrating a Happy China through a Crying Game: A Case-study of post-Mao Reality Shows,” *China Media Research* 2, no. 3 (2006): 62.
80. Robertson (1998), 144.
81. Heather Willoughby, “Image is Everything: The Marketing of Femininity in South Korean Popular Music,” in *Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave*, ed. Keith Howard (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2006), 107.

82. Ehrenreich, Hess, Jacobs (1992), 102.
83. Robertson, (1998), 42–3.
84. Cited in Ehrenreich, Hess, Jacobs (1992), 102.
85. Ehrenreich, Hess, Jacobs (1992), 85.
86. Described in Pease (2006), 186–7.
87. *Rain Zhongwen wang* (Rain Chinese Net), “*Zui xiang he Rain zuo de guanxi*” (The relationship you would most like to have with Rain), *Rain Zhongwen wan*. <http://bbs.raincn.com/thread-32595-1-1.html> (accessed January 3, 2007).
88. Ehrenreich, Hess, Jacobs (1992), 103.

## Chapter 10 Surfing the Neo-Nationalist Wave: A Case Study of *Manga Kenkanryū*

1. Takeshima is the Japanese name for the Liancourt Rocks, called Dokdo in Korea. Both countries claim the tiny rocky islands as sovereign territory. The “Takeshima Day” event was meant to reinforce the Japanese historical claim to the islands.
2. Cited in James Card, “A Chronicle of Korea-Japan ‘Friendship,’” *Japan Focus* (January 4, 2006). <http://japanfocus.org/products/topdf/1778> (accessed December 17, 2007).
3. The term “Korean Wave” (*Kanryū* or *Hanryū*) was coined to describe the remarkable influx and popularity of South Korean TV drama in Japan from the late 1990s. For a detailed analysis of the “Korean Wave” phenomenon in Japan, see Yoshitaka Mōri ed., *Nisshiki hanryū: “Fuyu no sonata” to nikkansha taishū bunka no genzai* (Korean Wave Japanese style: The TV drama “Winter Sonata” and the present state of Japanese-Korean popular culture) (Tokyo: Serika Shobō, 2004).
4. Japanese-Korean co-productions of film, anime, manga, or music should, of course, also be mentioned on the “positive” side. See essay by Yoshitaka Mōri in this volume.
5. See, for instance, the study by Iwabuchi Kōichi, *Recentring Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002) and the essays by Mōri, Pease, and Oyama in this volume.
6. Sharin Yamano, *Manga Kenkanryū* (Tokyo: Shinyūsha, 2005).
7. The Japanese title is ambiguous and can also be translated as “Anti-Korean Wave,” “The Hate Korea Wave,” “Hating the Korean Wave,” “Disliking the Korean Wave.” I have opted here for the relatively “neutral” “The Anti-Korean Wave,” even though the first character of *kenkanryū* (*ken*) suggests “hate” or “dislike.”
8. Heading on the inside cover of *Manga Kenkanryū 2*. Sharin Yamano, *Manga Kenkanryū 2* (Tokyo: Shinyūsha, 2006a).
9. Headings on the front cover of *Manga Kenkanryū 2* (Yamano 2006a).

10. Sharin Yamano, *Manga Kenkanryū — Kōshiki gaidobukku* (*Manga Kenkanryū — Official Guidebook*) (Tokyo: Shinyūsha, 2006b).
11. Rumi Sakamoto and Matt Allen, “Hating the ‘Korean Wave’” Comic Books: A Sign of New Nationalism in Japan?” *Japan Focus* (October 4, 2007). <http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/2535> (accessed December 17, 2007).
12. This term is borrowed from Kenta Tanimichi’s article “The Youthful Face of Japanese Nationalism,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* 168 (November 2005): 45–7.
13. Benjamin Lee and Edward LiPuma, “Cultures of Circulation: The Imaginations of Modernity,” *Public Culture* 14, no. 1 (2002): 191–213.
14. Henry A. Giroux, *Beyond the Spectacle of Terrorism: Global Uncertainty and the Challenge of the New Media* (Boulder; London: Paradigm Publishers, 2006), 74.
15. Volume 2 of the manga was published in February 2006 to coincide with Shimane Prefecture’s celebration of “Takeshima Day.” The publication of volume 3 in August 2007 coincided with Japanese commemorations of the end of WWII and debates about prime-ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine.
16. Figures on publisher homepage. Shinyūsha, “*Kenkanryū* site,” Shinyūsha, [www.shinyusha.co.jp/~kenkanryu/](http://www.shinyusha.co.jp/~kenkanryu/) (accessed March 7, 2007).
17. During the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to North Korea in September 2002, the North Korean President Kim Jong-il admitted publicly and for the first time that North Korean agents had abducted a number of Japanese citizens. This revelation sparked major political tensions between the two countries (when it was meant to achieve the opposite, i.e., normalization of ties) and fierce reactions from some Japanese groups against North Korea and Resident Koreans affiliated with North Korea.
18. Giroux (2006), 73.
19. On the aspect of pleasure in the consumption of revisionist narratives, see Aaron Gerow, “Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan: The New Neonationalist Revisionist in Japan,” in *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States*, eds. Laura Hein and Mark Selden (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), 74–8.
20. See, for instance, the various reviews in Yamano (2006b) or the *Manga Kenkanryū* page on the Amazon Japan website at [http://www.amazon.co.jp/review/product/488380478X/ref=cm\\_cr\\_dp\\_all\\_summary?%5Fencoding=UTF8&showViewpoints=1&sortBy=bySubmissionDateDescending](http://www.amazon.co.jp/review/product/488380478X/ref=cm_cr_dp_all_summary?%5Fencoding=UTF8&showViewpoints=1&sortBy=bySubmissionDateDescending) (last accessed January 8, 2008). I also encountered similar comments when I spoke with a Japanese MA student.
21. Giroux (2006), 12.
22. Giroux (2006), 70.
23. Giroux (2006), 75.
24. On the concept of “public technologies,” see Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar

- and Elizabeth A. Povinelli, “Technologies of Public Forms: Circulation, Transfiguration, Recognition,” *Public Culture* 15, no. 3 (2003): 385–97.
25. Blurb on back cover of *Manga Kenkanryū*. Sharin Yamano, *Manga Kenkanryū* (Tokyo: Shinyūsha 2005).
  26. Yamano (2006b), 52.
  27. Yamano (2006b), 58.
  28. Yamano (2006b), 61.
  29. Yamano (2006b), 63.
  30. Scott McCloud, *Understanding Comics — The Invisible Art* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994), 44.
  31. McCloud (1994), 44–5.
  32. Nishio Kanji is one of the leading figures of the neo-conservative Society for History Textbook Reform (*Atarashii Rekishi o Tsukuru-kai*, usually abbreviated to *Tsukuru-kai*).
  33. Yamano (2005), 3.
  34. Yamano (2005), 4.
  35. Yamano (2006), 2.
  36. Blurb on back cover of Volume 1 of *Manga Kenkanryū*, Yamano (2005).
  37. Yamano (2006a), 137.
  38. Yamano (2006a), 136.
  39. Yamano (2006a), 139.
  40. Yamano (2006a), 160.
  41. *Utsukushii kuni e* (Towards a beautiful nation) is the title of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s book, published by Bungei Shunjū in 2006, which proposes the formation of a “true nationalism” and the renewal of a strong, proud, hence beautiful Japan.
  42. Yamano (2005), 240.
  43. Yamano (2005), 213.
  44. Yamano (2005), 216.
  45. Yamano (2005), 217.
  46. Yamano (2005), 221.
  47. See episode 3 (Yamano 2005), 84–5.
  48. Yamano (2005), 84–5.
  49. I am grateful to Susanne Koppensteiner for this insight.
  50. Yamano (2006b), 31.
  51. Yamano (2005), 230.
  52. *Freeter* refers to young people who are working freelance, are un- or underemployed. *Neets* refer to young people not in education, employment, or training.
  53. On this aspect of self-esteem, see also Naoki Sakai, “Two Negations: The Fear of Being Excluded and the Logic of Self-Esteem,” in *Contemporary Japanese Thought*, ed. Richard F. Calichman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 159–92.

54. Kōichi Iwabuchi calls this the “trichotomy” of ‘Japan’, ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’ that does not change “the binary logic.” “Complicit Exoticism: Japan and Its Other — Who Imagines ‘Japaneseness’?: Orientalism, Occidentalism and Self-Orientalism,” *The Australian Journal of Media & Culture* 8, no. 2 (1994), 49–82.
55. Yamano (2005), 116.
56. Yamano (2006b), 18, 27.
57. Yamano (2005), 118.
58. Yamano (2006b), 60.
59. Thus, when Yasuhiro is in the running for president of the committee he decides to leave the group and establish his own network for the re-education of *Zainichi* Koreans. The committee remains under ethnic-Japanese leadership.
60. Yamano (2006a), 194.
61. Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 36–9.
62. Morita Akiō and Shintarō Ishihara, *Nō to ieru nihon: shin nichī-bei kankei no hōsaku* (The Japan that can say no: Why Japan will be first among equals) (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1989).
63. See Sharin. Yamano, “Sharin *pureofiru*” (Sharin profile), Yamano Sharin web page. <http://propellant.fc2web.com/contents/sharin/sharin.html> (accessed March 7, 2007).
64. On these surveys, see Hironori Sasada, “Youth and Nationalism in Japan,” *SAIS Review* XXVI, no. 2 (2006): 111–6.
65. Article 9 is the famous “No War” clause of the Japanese postwar constitution and states: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” <http://www.constitution.org/cons/japan.txt> (accessed December 17, 2007).
66. Giroux (2006), 1.
67. Giroux (2006), 3.
68. From the discussion of Guy Debord’s *Comments on the Society of the Spectacle* (1988) in *Afflicted Power: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War*, ed. Retort (London: Verso, 2005), 22–3.
69. According to a study by a group of Japanese sociologists, 2channel has around 3 million “unique users” and the number of visitors/accesses exceeds 8 million per day. Matsumura, Miura, et al., “The Dynamism of 2channel,” *AI & Society* 19:1 (January 2005), 84–92. <http://www.rhul.ac.uk/Management/News-and-Events/conferences/SID2003/Tracks-Presentations/12%20-%20Matsumura%20et%20al.pdf> (accessed December 17, 2007).
70. Nevin Thompson, “Inside the Japanese Blogosphere — The Anti-Korea Wave,” Global Voices Online, report posted on July 29, 2005. <http://>

- www.globalvoicesonline.org/2005/07/29/inside-the-japanese-blogsphere-the-anti-korea-wave/ (accessed January 23, 2007).
71. This category of the Japanese *Ninki burogu rankingu* (Popular blog ranking) can be accessed at <http://blog.with2.net/rank1500-0.html>.
  72. For an insightful discussion of these mechanisms of fragmentation and reductionism, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki's study, *The Past Within Us: Media, Memory, History* (London: Verso, 2005), especially Chapter 6.
  73. See, for example, letter by 36-year old "salaryman" reader from Tokyo in Yamano (2006b), 17.
  74. Yamano (2005), 232–3.
  75. Norimitsu Onishi, "Ugly Images of Asian Rivals Become Best Sellers in Japan," *New York Times*, November 19, 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/19/international/asia/19comics.html> (last access December 17, 2007).
  76. Leo Lewis, "Neighbour fails to see funny side of comic," *The Times* (November 1, 2005). <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article585019.ece> (last access December 17, 2007).
  77. Julian Ryall, "Comic Twist to Japanese Nationalism," *Aljazeera.net* (January 30, 2006). <http://english.aljazeera.net/English/Archive/Archive?ArchiveID=21164> (last access December 17, 2007).
  78. "Kenkanryu in the New York Times," Occidentalism.org, comment posted on November 21, 2005. <http://www.occidentalism.org/?p=104> (accessed December 17, 2007).
  79. Onishi (2005). See note 75.
  80. Posting on same page of Occidentalism.org under "Wiesunja said: ..." "Kenkanryu in the New York Times," Occidentalism.org, comment posted on November 21, 2005. <http://www.occidentalism.org/?p=104> (accessed December 17, 2007).
  81. On this lack of alternative Internet sites, see also Sakamoto and Allen (2007).
  82. Giroux (2006), 68.

## Chapter 11 Melodrama, Exorcism, Mimicry: Japan and the Colonial Past in the New Korean Cinema

1. Mark Shiel, *Italian Neorealism: Rebuilding the Cinematic City* (London; New York: Wallflower, 2006), 6–7. (Citing Marcia Landy, *Italian Film* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], xiv.)
2. "The postcolonial does not privilege the colonial. It is concerned with colonial history only to the extent that that history has determined the configurations and power structures of the present, to the extent that much of the world lives in the violent disruptions of its wake." Robert C. Young, *Postcolonialism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 4. See note 16 for qualifications

about the situation of contemporary South Korea and conceptual notions concerning the postcolonial.

3. See, for instance, Darcy Paquet, “Japanese Films in Korea,” *Koreanfilm.org* (2004), <http://koreanfilm.org/japanfilm.html>; Chaibong Hahm and Kim Seog-gun, “Remembering Japan and North Korea: The Politics of Memory in South Korea,” in *Memory and History in East and Southeast Asia*, ed. Gerrit W. Gong (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2001), XX; Kim Hyun-mee, “Kankoku ni okeru Nihon taishū bunka no jūyō to ‘Fuan ishiki no keisei’” (The significance of Japanese popular culture in Korea and the formation of a consciousness of anxiety), in *Nisshiki Hanryū: “Fuyu no sonata” to nikkon taishū bunka no genzai* (Korean Wave Japanese Style: The TV-Drama “Winter Sonata” and the Present State of Japanese-Korean Popular Culture), ed. Mōri Yoshitaka (Tokyo: Serika Shobō, 2004).
4. Korean has one of the most efficient systems of writing on the planet, but it is transcribed by several different styles of romanization. In this chapter I generally transcribe Korean film titles, words, or names via the clumsy McCune–Reischauer system but leave alone titles or names in direct quotations, names of Korean authors writing in English, and well-known names such as Korean presidents and their families.
5. See, for example, Darcy Paquet, “The Korean Film Industry: 1992 to the Present,” in *New Korean Cinema*, eds. Chi-Yun Shin and Julian Stringer (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2005), 32–50.
6. Korean Film Council, “Statistics,” *Korean Cinema 2006*, 494–6. <http://www.kofic.or.kr/english> (accessed November 20, 2007).
7. As Darcy Paquet reported in 2005, “Korea’s TV, cable and video/DVD markets remain miniscule. Online piracy and high prices have stunted the DVD sector, which is dominated by rentals rather than sell-through. Surveys indicate that only 29% of the two million households that own a DVD player have ever bought a DVD. Whereas US or European releases can double their revenues on DVD sales alone, Korea more resembles the US in the 1970s, when films had to earn two and a half times their budget in theaters just in order to break even.” “Essays from the Far East Film Festival: Korea Main Essay, 2005.” <http://koreanfilm.org/feff.html#2005> (accessed November 20, 2007).

Without the use of subscription websites, it is not easy to locate reliable figures on DVD sales of Korean film within the East and Southeast Asian region. In general, Chinese subtitled VCDs and DVDs sell well throughout the region but are subject to all the usual hazards of piracy; English subtitling of VCDs and DVDs (with or without Chinese) is fairly common and usually bumps up the price; at the top of the price scale are Japanese subtitled DVDs. Regional flows of DVDs (direct sales or licensing) therefore flow rather uphill as regards the Japanese market, and rather outside the corporate channels for Chinese-subtitled VCDs and DVDs.



8. Korean Film Council, “Statistics,” *Korean Cinema 2006*, 494–500. The “Foreword” to this official publication does, however, note that, as regards the Japanese market, the “Korean Wave may be retreating to a more realistic level.”
9. Youna Kim, “The Rising East Asian ‘Wave’: Korean Media Go Global,” in *Media on the Move: Global Flow and Contra-flow*, ed. Dayan Kishan Thussu (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 135–52.
10. Chris Berry, “From National Cinema to Cinema of the National: Chinese-language Cinema and Hou Hsiao-hsien’s ‘Taiwan Trilogy,’” in *Theorising National Cinema*, eds. Valentina Vitali and Paul Willemen (London: BFI Publishing, 2006), 148.
11. See, for just one of many recent rebuttals, Alexis Dudden and Kozo Mizoguchi, “Abe’s Violent Denial: Japan’s Prime Minister and the ‘Comfort Women,’” *Japan Focus: An Asia-Pacific E-Journal* (2007). <http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2368> (accessed November 20, 2007).
12. Hahm Chaibong and Kim Seog-gun, “Remembering Japan and North Korea: The Politics of Memory in South Korea,” in *Memory and History in East and Southeast Asia*, ed. Gerrit W. Gong (Washington DC: CSIS Press, 2001), 101.
13. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 12.
14. John Lie, *Han Unbound: The Political Economy of South Korea* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 181.
15. Kang Nae-hui, “Mimicry and Difference: A Spectraology of the Neo-Colonial Intellectual,” in *Specters of the West and the Politics of Translation: Traces 1*, eds. Naoki Sakai and Yukiko Hanama, 123–58 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), 133.
16. Kang refers to an important article by Anne McClintock, in which she noted that “the term ‘post-colonialism’ is, in many cases, prematurely celebratory. Ireland may, at a pinch, be ‘post-colonial,’ but for the inhabitants of British-occupied Northern Ireland, not to mention the Palestinian inhabitants of the Israeli Occupied Territories and the West Bank may be nothing ‘post’ about colonialism at all”: see “The Angel of Progress: The Pitfalls of the Term ‘Postcolonialism,’” in *Colonial discourse/postcolonial theory*, eds. Francis Baker, Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iversen (Manchester; New York: University of Manchester Press, 1994), 256. In Kang’s eyes, the continued division of the Korean peninsula and the massive presence of the US military in South Korea mean that any actually existing postcoloniality may still lie on some optimistic horizon.
17. Kang (2000), 133.
18. Kang (2000), 135.
19. “The discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. The authority of that mode of colonial discourse that I have

- called mimicry is therefore stricken by an indeterminacy: mimicry emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal. Mimicry is thus the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which ‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualizes power.” Homi Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” in *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 85.
20. Kang (2000), 151.
  21. See Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945–1970* (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), 122–9; John Lie, *Multiethnic Japan* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2001), 61–63.
  22. KBS Global, “‘Rikidozan’ to Hit Japanese Theaters in March,” KBS Global website (August 22, 2005). <http://english.kbs.co.kr/> (accessed August 24, 2005).
  23. Bhabha (1994), 85.
  24. Susan Hayward, *Cinema Studies: The Key Concepts* (3rd ed.) (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 239.
  25. Darcy Paquet, “Essays from the Far East Film Festival: Korea Main Essay 2006,” *Koreanfilm.org* (2006). <http://koreanfilm.org/feff.html#2006> (accessed November 20, 2007).
  26. Kathleen McHugh and Nancy Abelmann, *South Korean Golden Age Melodrama: Gender, Genre, and National Cinema* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2005).
  27. “The share of Hollywood films in the Korean market remained higher than in Japan proper, reaching heights of 40 percent of the length [footage] of film actually screened in Korea.” Brian Yecies, “Systematization of Film Censorship in Colonial Korea: Profiteering from Hollywood’s First Golden Age,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 1, no. 10 (2005): 65. In his pioneering research, Yecies has been able to demonstrate that the censorship fees paid by Hollywood distributors provided a flow of income which substantially funded the Government General’s film censorship apparatus.
  28. Min Eungjun, Jinsook Joo, and Kwak Han Ju, *Korean Film: History, Resistance, and Democratic Imagination* (Westport, CT; London: Praeger, 2003), 33.
  29. Min, Joo, and Han (2003), 35.
  30. Thomas Elsaesser, “Tales of Sound and Fury,” in *Film Genre Reader III*, ed. Barry Keith Grant (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 370–1.
  31. For more about *Hanbando*, see my “The Political Economics of Patriotism: The Case of *Hanbando*,” in *Korea Yearbook 2007: Politics, Economics, Society*, eds. Ruediger Frank, James E. Hoare, Patrick Koellner and Susan Pares (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), pp. 171–98. See also the comments and debate in websites such as *koreanfilm.org*; *The Korea Times*, <http://times.hankooki.com/>; and the website of the Korean Film Council, <http://www.koreanfilm.or.kr/>.

32. Tae-jong Kim, “Nationalistic ‘Hanbando’ Lacks Healthy Perspective,” *Korea Times* (July 13, 2006).
33. Tae-jong Kim, “Local Movies Thrive on Nationalism,” *Korea Times* (July 19, 2006).
34. Tae-jong Kim (2006).
35. For the official International Olympic Committee profile on Son, see International Olympic Committee, “Kitei Son.” [http://www.olympic.org/uk/athletes/profiles/bio\\_uk.asp?par\\_i\\_id=88103](http://www.olympic.org/uk/athletes/profiles/bio_uk.asp?par_i_id=88103) (accessed November 29, 2007).
36. For a brief sketch of Im and his films up to 2005, see Davide Cazzaro and Giovanni Spagnoletti, *Il cinema sudcoreano contemporaneo e l’opera di Jang Sun-woo* (Contemporary South Korean Cinema and the Work of Jang Sun-woo) (Venezia: Marsilio, 2005), 224–6.
37. For *Time Magazine*’s November 5, 1979 account of the assassination, see “Assassination in Seoul,” *Time* (November 5, 1979). <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,912509,00.html> (accessed November 20, 2007).
38. Miyako Harumi’s Korean father had come to Kyoto in 1940 and proved successful in that city’s famous silk business. Harumi claimed to have been unaware of his foreign origins until her late twenties. See any of the many Japanese sites devoted to the singer, or the entry in the Japanese Wikipedia, *Uikepedeia*, “Miyako Harumi,” *Uikepedeia* (Wikipedia). <http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%83%BD%E3%81%AF%E3%82%8B%E3%81%BF> (accessed November 20, 2007).
39. Seungsook Moon, “Begetting the Nation: The Androcentric Discourse of National History and Development in South Korea,” in *Dangerous Women: Gender & Korean Nationalism*, ed. Elaine H Kim and Chungmoo Choi (New York; London: Routledge, 1997).
40. Im Sangsu has been quite open about his tactical use of language. See Paolo Bertolin, “An Interview with Im Sang-soo,” *Koreanfilm.org*, 2005. <http://koreanfilm.org/imss.html> (accessed November 20, 2007).
41. Paquet Review (2005).
42. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, “Korean Collaborators: South Korea’s Truth Committees and the Forging on a New Pan-Korean Nationalism,” *Japan Focus: An Asia-Pacific E-Journal* (2004). <http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/2170> (accessed November 20, 2007).
43. The shot also incorporates an oblique homage to a similar scene: Martin Scorsese’s camera on its overhead path through the mayhem wrought by Travis Bickle (Robert De Niro) near the end of *Taxi Driver* (1976).

## Chapter 12 Reconsidering Cultural Hybridities: Transnational Exchanges of Popular Music in between Korea and Japan

1. See Tatsurō Hanada, Colin Sparks, and Shunya Yoshimi, eds., *Karuchuraru sutadeiizu tonō taiwa* (Dialogues with cultural studies) (Tokyo: Shinyō-sha, 1999).
2. Minoru Iwasaki and Hiroaki Ozawa, eds. *Gekishin! Kokuritsu daigaku* (The National university great shake-up!) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1999). This collected volume offers a good critical review of the neoliberalist university.
3. The teaching of popular culture in higher education has recently become popular. For example, Kyoto Seika University established the Faculty of Manga in 2006, and Tokyo National University of Fine Arts and Music is planning to launch an MA program in animation.
4. Consider, for example, Azuma Hiroki, who started his career as a Derridian and who then shifted his attention to become a critic of popular — and *otaku* (individuals defined as “geeks” and who are often associated with underground or subcultural forms of animation, manga cartoons, niche music, and so on) — culture. Although he does not see himself as a Cultural Studies scholar, he is a good example of how postmodern/Cultural Studies theory survives in market-oriented academia in Japan.
5. The former minister of Foreign Affairs, Asō Tarō, officially stated that manga is an important cultural product in Japan and proposed to establish the International Manga Award “as a Nobel-like prize of manga” in 2007 (*Sankei Shinbun*, June 29, 2006).
6. The “Korean Wave” represents a boom of Korean popular culture across East and Southeast Asia in the early 2000s that was focused, in particular, on TV dramas, for example, *A Jewel in the Palace* (*Tae Changgŭm*, 2003) and *Winter Sonata* (*Kyŏl yŏn’ga*, 2002), which were the most successful. It started in mainland China in 1999 and expanded to Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, and Singapore. See Mōri Yoshitaka, ed. *Nisshiki-Hanyū: “Fuyu no sonata” to nikkān taishū bunka no genzai* (Korean Wave Japanese Style: The TV-Drama “Winter Sonata” and the Present State of Japanese-Korean Popular Culture) (Tokyo: Serika Shobō, 2004).
7. *Zainichi* is a term that represents those who have North or South Korean nationality but who reside in Japan. Historically, most *Zainichi* moved (or were forced to move) to Japan in the colonial period (1910–45) and remained there after the war. The number of *Zainichi* at the end of the war was 2,100,000 but due in part to the return of many to the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese naturalization of others, this figure now stands at about 600,000. Although there are not many available texts concerning *Zainichi* in English, the following offer good introductions: Chapter 5 especially of Yoshio Sugimoto, *An Introduction to Japanese Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge

- University Press, 2003); and John C. Maher, Yumiko Kawanishi, and Yong-Yo Yi, “Maintaining Culture and Language: Koreans in Osaka with Ikunoku, Osaka: Centre of Hope and Struggle,” in *Diversity in Japanese Culture and Language*, eds. John Christopher Maher and Gaynor Macdonald (London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1995), 160–77.
8. Stuart Hall, “New Ethnicities,” in “Race,” *Culture and Difference*, eds. Ali Rattansi and James Donald (London: Sage Publications in association with The Open University, 1992), 252–9; Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (London: Verso, 1993); Kobena Mercer, *Welcome to the Jungle: New Positions in Black Cultural Studies* (London: Routledge, 1994); Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994).
  9. See, for example, Phil Cohen, ed., *New Ethnicities, Old Racisms* (London: Zed Books, 1999), especially Cohen’s introductory chapter (“Introduction: Through a Glass Darkly: Intellectuals on Race”) and Jayne O. Ifekwunigwe’s chapter in the same volume, “Old Whine, New Vassals: Are Diaspora and Hybridity Postmodern Interventions?” See also Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood, eds. *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism* (London: Zed Books, 1997), 180–204; and Avtar Brah and Annie E. Coombes, eds. *Hybridity and Its Discontents: Politics, Science, Culture* (London: Routledge, 2000).
  10. Jonathan Friedman, “Global Crises, the Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual Porkbarrelling: Cosmopolitans versus Locals, Ethnic and Nationals in an Era of De-hegemonisation,” in *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism*, eds. Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood (London: Zed Books, 1997), 73.
  11. Friedman (1997), 72–82.
  12. Nakasone also faced domestic criticism. For example, Hokkaido Utari Kyōkai, one of the human rights organizations of the Ainu, a major ethnic minority in Japan, delivered a strong protest to the prime minister just after the apology (*Asahi Shinbun*, August 5, 2001).
  13. During the Koizumi-Abe administration, government ministers repeated the gaffe of describing Japan as “a racially homogenous nation.” For example, in 2005, the Minister of International Affairs and Communications, Asō Tarō, said in a public speech that Japan is a unique country because it is one state and one civilization, has one language, one culture and one race. There is no other country like Japan in the world (*Asahi Shinbun*, October 15, 2005). Despite severe public criticism, the government has never issued an apology.
  14. From a sociological perspective, *Zainichi* may be categorized as an ethnic group rather than a racial one, because *Zainichi* cannot be distinguished from *nihonjin* (Japanese people) according to racial/biological features such as skin color or face. Second- and third-generation *Zainichi* are often much more enculturated into Japanese culture, language, and moral values. The problem arises in relation with the Japanese language’s unique definition of

*nihonjin*, which is not a territorial category but an ethnic one. In ethnicity, the term *nihonjin* is always a heavily racialized one in Japanese public discourse since it makes particular references to (mythic) Japanese blood. See, for example, Kōsaku Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan* (London: Routledge, 1992). The category of *nihonjin* also functions as an official status of nationality as legitimized by the Japanese passport. As a result of this racial-ethnic-political slippage, racism is viewed only as a “Black” or “Jewish” problem in the United States and Europe, while *nihonjin* believe themselves to be “innocent” to race. Japan, after all, is supposed to be a “mono-racial” nation. *Minzoku* is a powerfully confusing word that blurs the distinction between nation, race, and ethnicity, as it is used as an equivalent term in translation to all the three English terms.

15. In 2003, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government sued Edagawa Chōsen gakkō, one of Japan’s oldest ethnic primary schools established in 1946. In so doing, the long-term consensus existing between the local authority and the school was broken. The case was eventually settled out of court and the school agreed to pay 170 million yen in 2007. This incident is a recent example of the regional and national governments trying to repress ethnic schools. See Kinohanasha Publishing Ltd. Homepage, “*Edagawa chōsen gakkō shien pēji*” [Edagawa Korean School Support Page], Kinohanasha Publishing Co. Ltd. <http://kinohana.la.coocan.jp/court.html> (accessed December 18, 2007).
16. See Ken’ichi Ueda, *Shanghai Bugiugu 1945: Hattori Ryōichi no Bōken* (Shanghai boogie woogie 1945: The adventures of Hattori Ryōichi) (Tokyo: Nihon Bungeisha 2003).
17. Makoto Sataka, *Hika: Koga Masao no jinsei to merodī* (A sad song: The life and melodies of Koga Masao) (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 2005), 57–68.
18. Nobuko Kyō, *Nikkan ongaku nōto: “Ekkyō” suru tabibito no uta o otte* (Notes on music in Japan and Korea: Following the songs of travellers who “cross national borders”) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998), 97–8.
19. Sataka criticized Koga’s problematic political comments. For instance, in a symposium in the journal *Shintaishū* (*The New Masses*) in 1940, Koga is recorded as having said, “they should kick out all sentimental songs. Popular and vulgar sentimentalism that only appeal to the people is inappropriate. The government should censor all the music. I can appreciate such an action. Censorship gives me a guideline as to which way we should go.” Sataka suggested that this was unbearably offensive. Sataka (2005), 64.
20. Roland Barthes, *Image-Text-Music* (New York: Fontana Press, 1993), 142–9.
21. Hall (1980).
22. Masao Koga, *Jiden: waga kokoro no uta* (My story: Songs in my mind) (Tokyo: Tenbōsha, 2001), 205. In spite of Koga’s nationalist leanings in the postwar period, rumors have circulated in Japan that he is *Zainichi*. In fact, Koga would not be exceptional were this the case. Many popular music singers

- are often rumored to be *Zainichi* since they actually are, even though most do not come out for fear of social discrimination.
23. “Japanese Bring Latest in Music: Composer Plans to Introduce New Songs on Good-Will Mission,” *The Los Angeles Times*, December 6, 1938.
  24. See Yoshitaka Mōri, “Winter Sonata and Cultural Practices of Active Fans in Japan: Considering Middle-Aged Women as Cultural Agents,” in *Approaches to East Asian Pop Culture: Examining Korean TV Dramas*, eds. Beng Huat Chua and Iwabuchi Kōichi (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008).
  25. Christine Yano’s analysis of Kim Yōnja, a Korean *enka* singer, is one of the few introductions available in English. Christine R. Yano, “Raising the Ante of Desire: Foreign Female Singers in a Japanese Pop Music World,” in *Refashioning Pop Music in Asia: Cosmopolitan Flows, Political Tempos and Aesthetic Industries*, eds. Allen Chun, Ned Rossiter, and Brian Shoosmith (London: Routledge, 2004), 159–211. It is rather a pity that even though Yano was very aware of *enka*’s hybrid nature in her early work, her research concerns are more about Japaneseness and the Japanese heart/soul of *enka*. Christine R. Yano, *Tears of Longing: Nostalgia and the Nation in Japanese Popular Song* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 30.
  26. Gilroy (2006).
  27. Transnationalism and “hybridity-as-origin” similarly helps us to understand other cultural phenomena. Consider, for example, the “Korean Wave” today, which has to be understood not as something made in Korea but as a hybrid product influenced by American film technology, Japanese drama and animation stories, and by a transnational marketing strategy in the media industry. It would be more culturally and politically fruitful to see the “Korean Wave” as a transnational project than as a Korean nationalistic one; in other words, we can see emerging forms of hybridity in Korean culture in the “Korean Wave” through the development of transnational cultural flows and exchanges.
  28. Kangnam is an area located in the southern part of Seoul City that has recently become popular with wealthy young people for its fashion boutiques, clubs, bars, and restaurants.
  29. Hiromichi Ugaya, *J-pop towa nanika* (What is J-pop?) (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 2005), 17–21.
  30. In an interview on February 20, 2005, Yi Ilwhan explained to me that he introduced J-pop to Korean listeners in his radio program between 2004 and 2005 while working at a production company, Satio. I would like to thank Professor Hyunjoon Shin for organizing the interview.
  31. *Visual kei* (literally, visual style) is a kind of hard rock or gothic-styled rock music that is famous for its visual elements, for example, its flamboyant makeup and costumes.
  32. One of the most successful examples is *Rollercoaster Come Closer* (Sony 2001, ARJCJ-2003) mixed by Konishi Yasuharu, a member of Pizzicato five.

33. Musicians and DJs include Towa Tei, Fantastic Plastic Machine, Konishi Yasuharu, Jazztronik and Free Tempo.
34. VERBAL, *Verbal: Alien Alter Egos — Kami no pazuru sore wa boku jishin* (Puzzles of the gods, it is myself) (Tokyo: Kyūsokuteki jikan, 2002), 24–5.
35. m-flo, “m-flo loves WADA Akiko ‘Hey!’” on *m-flo loves Emyli & Yoshika / WADA Akiko* (Rhythm Zone, 2005, ASIN: B0009N2XXK).
36. Ryūtarō Nakamura, “‘Chi to hone’ no burūsu” (“Blues of ‘Blood and Bones’”), *Shūkan Bunshun* (August 11/18, 2005).
37. Yasuharu Konishi, “*Furii sōru: Wada Akiko*” (“Free Soul: Wada Akiko”) (Teichiku, 2004, ASIN: B000657REQ).
38. Nina Cornyetz, “Fetishized Blackness, Hip Hop and Racial Desire in Contemporary Japan,” *Social Text* 41 (1994): 113–39.
39. See Ian Condry, *Hip Hop Japan: Rap and the Paths of Cultural Globalization* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
40. Yoshitaka Mōri, “Culture=Politics: The Emergence of New Cultural Forms of Protest in the age of Freeter,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 6, no.1 (2005): 17–29.



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