

The Dynamics of Beijing–Hong Kong Relations A Model for Taiwan?

Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo

HKU
PRESS
香港大學出版社

Hong Kong University Press
The University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
www.hkupress.org

© Hong Kong University Press 2008

ISBN 978-962-209-908-1 (*Hardback*)

ISBN 978-962-209-909-8 (*Paperback*)

All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed and bound by Condor Production Ltd., Hong Kong, China.



Hong Kong University Press is honoured that Xu Bing, whose art explores the complex themes of language across cultures, has written the Press's name in his Square Word Calligraphy. This signals our commitment to cross-cultural thinking and the distinctive nature of our English-language books published in China.

“At first glance, Square Word Calligraphy appears to be nothing more unusual than Chinese characters, but in fact it is a new way of rendering English words in the format of a square so they resemble Chinese characters. Chinese viewers expect to be able to read Square Word Calligraphy but cannot. Western viewers, however are surprised to find they can read it. Delight erupts when meaning is unexpectedly revealed.”

— Britta Erickson, *The Art of Xu Bing*

Contents

Acknowledgements	vii
Abbreviations	ix
Introduction	1
1. Patron-Client Pluralism and Beijing's Relations with Hong Kong	7
2. The Mainlandization of Hong Kong	39
3. The Politics of Judicial Autonomy	81
4. The Emergence of Constitutional Conventions	109
5. The Implementation of the Basic Law	133
6. Identity Change from the National Security Debate to Celebrations of the Tenth Anniversary	151
7. The Election of the Hong Kong Deputies to the National People's Congress	185
8. A Fusion of Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Political Cultures in the 2007 Chief Executive Election	199
9. Applying the Spirit of "One Country, Two Systems" to Taiwan's Political Future	227
10. Conclusion	253
Notes	261
Bibliography	307
Index	323

List of Tables

Table 1.1	Patron-Client Relations between Beijing and Hong Kong's Political Actors	31
Table 2.1	Estimated Number of Participants on the July 1 Protests, 2003–2007	41
Table 2.2	The Evolving Self-Identity of the Hong Kong People, 1993–2007	64
Table 3.1	Events from the Court of Final Appeal's Ruling on January 29 to the NPC Interpretation of the Basic Law on June 26	84–85
Table 4.1	Distinguishing Conventions from Laws, Practices, Understandings, and Habits	110
Table 6.1	Timeline of the Development of the National Security Bill	152–153
Table 6.2	Some of the Local Groups Opposing Article 23 of the Basic Law	161–164
Table 7.1	The 54 Winners in the First Round of Voting	187
Table 7.2	Election Results of the Hong Kong Deputies to the Tenth National People's Congress	191–192
Table 8.1	The Support of Donald Tsang and Alan Leong in the Nomination Process	207–208
Table 8.2	Comparison of Tsang and Leong's Political Platforms	210
Table 8.3	Surveys Conducted by Lingnan University and the University of Hong Kong on the Performance of Candidates in the Chief Executive Election	220
Table 8.4	The Reasons Why Respondents Supported Tsang or Leong	221
Table 8.5	Public Support of Tsang and Leong	221

Introduction

The transfer of the sovereignty of Hong Kong from Britain to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on July 1, 1997 was a crucial experiment with the concept of "one country, two systems" designed and proposed by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. With Taiwan as the final target of reunification with China in mind, Deng hoped that the retrocession of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) would be as smooth as possible, laying the groundwork for his successors' attempt at wooing Taiwan back to the PRC orbit.

Nevertheless, as this book will argue, the governance of the HKSAR has proved to be superficially "successful" but substantially turbulent and conflict-ridden. The difficult years of governance in the HKSAR from July 1, 1997 to the sudden resignation of the former chief executive Tung Chee-hwa in March 2005 posed a tremendous obstacle for the PRC to demonstrate the success of "one country, two systems" to the world and to the Taiwan leaders. The popularity of Tung's successor, Donald Tsang, has made it easier for Beijing to sell the "one country, two systems" to the outside world, but not necessarily to Taiwan where the pro-independence elites and masses remain resistant to the Hong Kong model. Although civil liberties in the HKSAR have been by and large maintained since July 1997, the superficial phenomenon has hidden the fact that the "one country, two systems" has brought about tremendous tensions between the people of Hong Kong and Beijing, and between the Hongkongers and the C. H. Tung administration from July 1, 1997 to March 2005, when the chief executive stepped down for health reasons. Although the people of Hong Kong were in general satisfied with Beijing's political leadership, they were deeply dissatisfied with the fact that Beijing sided with Chief Executive C. H. Tung whose policies were out of touch with the public in the HKSAR. As this

book will discuss, the debate over Article 23 of the Basic Law — the stipulation that outlaws subversion, sedition and treason — proved to be a disaster for the Tung administration in July 2003, compounded by the mismanagement of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) that broke out in the early half of the year. Although the Tung regime temporarily shelved the enactment of Article 23 of the Basic Law, the issue will sooner or later re-emerge as a sore point between some Hong Kong people and Beijing, and between the pro-democracy Hongkongers and the HKSAR government.

The tenth anniversary of the HKSAR on July 1, 2007 was punctuated by a glittering fireworks display on the Victoria Harbor, marked by a high-level visit by PRC President Hu Jintao, and characterized by a parade that celebrated the return of Hong Kong to the motherland. At the same time, the tenth anniversary demonstrated an official propaganda orchestrated by the pro-Beijing local and mainland mass media. While the mainland-backed media such as the China Central Television (CCTV) and Phoenix overwhelmingly portrayed the return of Hong Kong to mainland China as a triumph of the “one country, two systems,” the local Chinese media displayed an increasingly politically correct line. What was alarming was the large number of mainland-born media professionals who worked for the CCTV and Phoenix. Naturally, their perception and description of the HKSAR developments were necessarily biased, excluding the views of most Hong Kong-born people who may not be fluent in Mandarin and who were not really interviewed by the CCTV and Phoenix, except for those pro-Beijing Hongkongers such as Jasper Tsang Yok-sing and Cheung Chi-kong.¹ Compounding the problem of biased television coverage of Hong Kong was the increasingly self-censored news of the local TVB and ATV whose ownership change in recent years has been accompanied by a silent revolution toward a tendency of reporting “good” rather than “bad” news on the HKSAR.

From an objective standpoint, Hong Kong remains alive rather than “dead,” as the local mass media in the HKSAR have accurately stressed. It is ludicrous for any commentator to propound the imminent “death” of Hong Kong; the HKSAR will surely survive. But the crux of the question is whether it is going to retain its politico-economic and socio-cultural uniqueness as distinct from the rest of mainland China. The question of convergence between the HKSAR and the mainland, and the related issue of divergence, have so far not been seriously studied by Hong Kong commentators, journalists, observers, and scholars.

Chief Executive Donald Tsang has been maintaining a high degree of

personal popularity, affecting the public acceptance of his policy to integrate Hong Kong with the motherland. The economy of the HKSAR has become prosperous after the mainland's economic measures in mid-2003, such as the implementation of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements (CEPA), the free individual visit scheme, and the relaxation of mainland enterprises and securities to float their shares and bonds in the Hong Kong stock market. Underlying the apparent "success" of "one country, two systems" are, as this book will argue, the twin processes of self-censorship on the part of the local mass media and the deeper penetration of the PRC politico-economic influence on the HKSAR. Hong Kong remains important in its functions for the PRC modernization; Hong Kong's clean government, assertive civil society and rule of law demonstrate the strengths of the Hong Kong model of governance to mainland China. Yet the dialectical process of mainland's politico-economic influence on the HKSAR has to be recognized simultaneously. Chapter One will delineate all the existing perspectives on Beijing's relations with the HKSAR. It will argue that patron-client politics are increasingly crucial to our understanding of the complex and dynamic Beijing-Hong Kong relationship.

Chapter Two of this book argues that the turbulent governance of the HKSAR from July 1997 to March 2005 was attributed to the policies of the Tung regime, which sought to converge with the PRC politically, and that Hong Kong's politico-economic convergence with the mainland has been deepened by Donald Tsang's policy of integration with the mainland. In the legal sphere, as Chapter Three will argue, the politicization of the legal system has become inevitable. The debate over the right of abode of the mainland Chinese in the HKSAR resulted in the decision of the HKSAR government to request that the National People's Congress should interpret provisions of the Basic Law. The entire debate was highly political to the extent that legal issues in Hong Kong have often become politicized, polarized, and perhaps distorted. On the other hand, constitutional conventions in the HKSAR, especially its relationships with Beijing, have gradually emerged since the transfer of sovereignty. Chapter Four will examine the birth of constitutional conventions in the HKSAR. The implementation of the Principal Officials Accountability System (POAS) since July 2002 has already propelled the government to become more accountable to the public. Ministerial resignations could be seen in the Tung administration, laying the groundwork for a silent process of political reform. However, such ministerial resignations in the event of scandals and blunders remain dependent on the personal factor in Hong Kong politics. Politically, the development of constitutional conventions in the HKSAR is a significant

part of “one country, two systems,” but it takes time for their further development and consolidation. Chapter Five will explore the overall implementation of the Basic Law and the difficulties of developing mainland Chinese conventions in dealing with Hong Kong.

An excellent example showing that legal issues are bound to be politicized was the debate over the national security bill in 2002 and 2003. Chapter Six shows that the entire debate was extremely political, leading to public outcry and the government’s decision to postpone the enactment of the national security bill indefinitely. The whole debate illustrated the polarization of identity of the people of Hong Kong. Those who identified themselves as Chinese tended to support the bill, whereas those who identified themselves as Hong Kong people reacted to the bill fiercely and believed that its passage would sound a death knell to their civil liberties.

Due to the failure of Beijing’s united front work in the HKSAR during the Tung era, it has changed its policy toward Hong Kong for the sake of winning the hearts and minds of the Hong Kong patriots since mid-2003. Chapter Seven uses the example of the election of the Hong Kong members to the National People’s Congress to demonstrate how Beijing’s officials attempted to control the election process. However, due to the pluralistic nature of Hong Kong’s political actors, some Hong Kong NPC candidates leaked out issues that embarrassed the PRC officials. The elections showed that although mainland China’s agents were keen to exert some degree of control over the selection of NPC members, the election results demonstrated some surprises to them. This phenomenon also illustrated the pluralistic setting of Hong Kong where PRC officials cannot have an absolute and easy control over even the pro-Beijing political elites.

Chapter Eight will show that the 2007 chief executive election represented an amalgamation of mainland Chinese and Hong Kong political cultures. The mainland cultures of emphasizing the use of *guanxi* and patrimonial practices have pervaded Hong Kong politics, especially at the top level of the political leadership involving the POAS and the appointment of the members of the top policy-making Executive Council. Yet the 2007 chief executive election opened up the mainland-style political process by allowing a party-affiliated candidate, Alan Leong of the Civic Party, to compete with Beijing-preferred Donald Tsang. The campaigns, as Chapter Eight will demonstrate, displayed a merging of the mainland and Hong Kong political cultures — a sign of convergence between the two places.

Chapter Nine adopts a comparative perspective to contend that although the problematic operation of the “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong cannot become a model for the PRC to reunify Taiwan in the long run,

the formula's spirit can be applied to the Taiwan problem. Taiwan has developed a political system and unique identity very different from Hong Kong. Still, the spirit of the "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong and Macao, characterized by mutual compromise, concessions, trust, and perseverance during the Sino-British negotiations, can be applied to tackle Taiwan's political future.

10

Conclusion

The innovative concept of “one country, two systems” was used by the late Chinese reformer Deng Xiaoping to tackle Hong Kong’s and Macao’s political future in the short run and to deal with Taiwan’s reunification matter in the long term. Although he passed away in 1997 and failed to witness the transfer of Hong Kong’s and Macao’s sovereignty and administration to Beijing respectively, his concept has evolved rapidly. The concept was implemented unskillfully by both the Tung leadership and Beijing’s clients in the HKSAR, leading to chaotic governance and public outcry, thus discrediting the “one country, two systems” model. Fortunately, under the Donald Tsang administration and with the economic support of Beijing, Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” appeared to be a “success” during its tenth anniversary of the return to the motherland — a phenomenon politically overstated by the official PRC media and the increasingly self-censored HKSAR mass media. The case of Macao, however, is very different from Hong Kong’s.¹ Despite the fact that Macao’s governance was smoother and did not necessitate the rescue from Beijing, its politico-economic convergence with the PRC has been faster than Hong Kong. Politically, Hong Kong remains more pluralistic than Macao, which is more tolerant of dissent than the PRC polity. Economically, both Hong Kong and Macao have become increasingly dependent on the PRC, thus diluting their economic uniqueness. Although Hong Kong’s rule of law and civil liberties are generally retained, and social groups’ assertiveness remains impressive, the legal system has been highly politicized and its decisions have been judged by political actors in a hyper-politicized manner. Due to the clash of Western and Chinese civilizations, the pro-democracy elites who strongly identify themselves as Hong Kong people are constantly under the watchful eyes of the central government’s agents. Yet the explosion of civil society as

manifested on July 1, 2003 has remained a bulwark against any political encroachment on civil liberties. Arguably, the implementation of the “one country, two systems” has not been as smooth and “successful” as the official propaganda portrays. The political experience of the HKSAR has failed to attract Taiwan back to the PRC orbit.

If the “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR during its first decade was viewed as “successful,” the phenomenon could be attributable to the existence of civil liberties in general and the tenacity of the rule of law in particular. Yet the persistence of civil liberties and the rule of law is by no means the political gifts endowed upon the people of Hong Kong by either the PRC state or the HKSAR regime. They are arguably the products of the fierce struggle of those Hong Kong people who maintain a strong degree of Hong Kong identity and who oppose any state intervention in the erosion of civil liberties. The loyal political clients of Beijing often accuse the pro-democracy elites in the HKSAR of being “anti-China” and creating a “chaotic Hong Kong.” This argument is a testimony of political correctness in conformity with patron-clientelism in both the HKSAR and the PRC. But Beijing’s political clients in Hong Kong have totally neglected the fact that, without the staunch opposition from those pro-democracy elites and masses to any sign of state encroachment upon their civil liberties, the rule of law and societal freedom in the HKSAR could not have thrived so easily.

Deng’s concept of “one country, two systems” entails a dialectical process filled with contradictions. These contradictions are manifested in the ongoing capitalist revolution in the PRC, whose economic system is more akin to the Hong Kong counterpart than ever before. Yet politically, the HKSAR polity is under tremendous pressure to converge with the mainland system, although the former remains more pluralistic than the latter. The synthesis of the “two systems” will be clear when both Hong Kong and the mainland will be prepared for a closer politico-economic integration in the year 2047. From now to 2047, the tensions between Hong Kong’s pluralistic setting and the PRC monolithic polity will continue to be shown in the HKSAR judicial politics, constitutional debate, identity transformations, media development, and electoral participation. In any case, the “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong is gradually drifting toward “one country, one system” in which the economy of both the HKSAR and the mainland is basically capitalist whereas their polities are increasingly converging. The hallmarks of the “two systems” can still be found in the societal defense of civil liberties and the rule of law.

Interestingly, during the tenth anniversary of the HKSAR, both Britain and the United States announced that the “one country, two systems” in

Hong Kong was “successful.” Western powers like Britain and the United States, which hope that the HKSAR will envisage the direct election of the chief executive through universal suffrage as soon as possible, are adopting a double standard. On the one hand, they push for democratization in the HKSAR. On the other hand, they accept the superficiality of the persistence of most civil liberties without critically assessing the trend of mainlandization of the HKSAR under the “one country, two systems.” Perhaps the lucrative economic market in the PRC has induced both Britain and the United States to pragmatically accept the superficiality of the “successful” operation of the “one country, two systems” with total ignorance of Hong Kong’s drift toward media self-censorship, political Sinification or recolonization, economic dependency on the mainland, and the politicization of judicial decisions.

Beijing’s clients in the HKSAR do not see the process of mainlandization as an erosion of the Hong Kong identity, for they have already been politically co-opted, culturally assimilated, and endowed with economic interests in both Hong Kong and the mainland. From a critical perspective, Beijing’s political clients in the HKSAR are imbued with a colonial mentality. While they staunchly opposed the British colonialists from the 1960s to the 1990s, they have turned to be the politically loyal but absolutely uncritical agents of Beijing. At the apex of the Tung regime’s misrule in the HKSAR, the pro-Beijing elites continued to provide an inaccurate assessment of Hong Kong’s political circumstances to the central government. The Liaison Office and the HKMAO made errors in their over-optimistic assessment of Hong Kong’s political situation — a phenomenon partly ascribable to the failure of the pro-Beijing elites to wake up to the evident governing crisis from 1999 to 2004. The pro-Beijing elites enjoyed political power to such an extent that they were intolerant of any public criticisms during the Tung regime. If colonial mentality is conceptually defined as a politically opportunistic mindset toeing the official line of the overlord, it does exist among the HKSAR’s patriotic elites. If political opportunism marked the pro-British elites in Hong Kong before July 1, 1997, then a blind patriotism that amalgamates politico-cultural identifications with the PRC is characterizing Beijing’s clients in the HKSAR. In the event that mainland Chinese politics undergo drastic changes in the form of significantly reducing the value and influence of patron-clientelism, the pro-Beijing elites in the HKSAR will perhaps experience a very painful process of self-evaluations, self-criticisms, and self-adjustment.

Some of the elites and masses with strong Hong Kong identity, however, view the rapid mainlandization of the HKSAR with great concerns. Unlike

the pro-Beijing elites, the pro-Hong Kong elites tend to be less patriotic toward the motherland and continue to be the critical activists in Hong Kong. They are concerned about the influx of tens of thousands of mainland-born Chinese into the HKSAR since its retrocession, the constant political restrictions, the increasingly self-censored mass media, and the politicization of judicial judgments. Interestingly, the celebrations of the HKSAR tenth anniversary emphasized the superficial triumph of the mainland national Chinese identity and de-emphasized the existence of the strong Hong Kong identity. The message from the central government was clear: the HKSAR leadership will have to accelerate patriotic education so that the local Hong Kong identity will hopefully be diluted whereas the politico-cultural identification with the PRC will be enhanced. The process of mainlandizing the mindset of most Hong Kong people who have strong local identity will by no means be easy. To them, patriotism has to proceed naturally without any sign of compulsion. The tug of war between the local Hong Kong identity and the mainland Chinese identity will persist. Indeed, they can also coexist and amalgamate, as with the case of the 2007 chief executive election where the mainland and Hong Kong political cultures were merged.

The publication of a consultative document on political reform in the HKSAR in July 2007 showed that the Donald Tsang regime has been adopting a delaying tactic to postpone the direct election of both the chief executive and the entire legislature.² Specifying various options for political reform, the document has encouraged the people of Hong Kong to ponder the ways forward. Nonetheless, without revealing any mainstream political models for the direct election of the chief executive and the entire legislature, the *Green Paper* symbolized the predicament of the Tsang regime, which is bound to be a loyal client of the central government. Beijing does not want to envisage any Taiwanization of Hong Kong's polity. Nor does it wish to witness any popular directly elected chief executive who will no longer be a politically correct and obedient client. The debate over Hong Kong's democratization is destined to be protracted, illustrating firstly the patron-client relations between the HKSAR regime and Beijing and secondly the central government's fear of having a Taiwan-style democratic polity in Hong Kong. The controversy reveals a deep-rooted rift between those pro-democracy Hongkongers imbued with a very strong Hong Kong identity and those pro-Beijing elites and masses inculcated with an equally strong politico-cultural PRC identity.

On December 12, 2007, Chief Executive Tsang submitted a report on Hong Kong's constitutional development to Beijing. The report says that there is a need for amending the methods of selecting the chief executive

and the Legislative Council in 2012, and that implementing universal suffrage for the chief executive first by no later than 2017 will have a better chance of being accepted by most Hong Kong people. In response to the report, the SCNPC reached a decision on December 29. According to the decision, the chief executive and the entire legislature would not be returned by universal suffrage in 2012; the HKSAR government would maintain the half-and-half ratio of legislators returned from geographical constituencies and those from functional constituencies in 2012; and that any future amendment on the method of selecting the chief executive must be reported to the SCNPC for a decision, which would be followed by a government bill to the Legislative Council where a two-thirds majority vote, the chief executive's consent and finally the SCNPC approval would be required. The SCNPC decision opens the door to the possibility of electing the chief executive by universal suffrage in 2017. For the HKSAR government, the earliest possible year of having the chief executive directly elected by universal suffrage would be 2017 and that of having the entire legislature directly elected by universal suffrage would be 2020. The Taiwan government reacted to the SCNPC decision swiftly and expressed its regret that there would not be the direct elections of both the chief executive and the whole legislature in 2012. The HKSAR government issued a statement and said that Taiwan had no role in Hong Kong's internal development. The content of the SCNPC decision on Hong Kong's constitutional reform had little demonstration effect on Taiwan, where the president is directly elected by citizens through universal suffrage.

However, Beijing's decision on Hong Kong's democratization has implications for the PRC's relations with Taiwan. It allows the HKSAR government to tackle the relatively "easier" issues on political reforms, followed by the technically difficult and politically controversial ones. The practice of dealing with the less contentious matters first in political negotiations can be constructively applied to Beijing-Taipei relations. Meanwhile, although there is a deep mutual distrust between the Hong Kong democrats and the HKSAR government, and between the democrats and Beijing, the SCNPC decision gives at least ten years to all sides in designing a political model for Hong Kong. Arguably, the spirit of trying to reach agreements amidst mutual distrust is a dynamic aspect of Beijing-HKSAR relations that can be applied to Beijing-Taipei negotiations in the future.

Beijing favors a controllable model of having the Hong Kong chief executive directly elected by universal suffrage. As the deputy secretary-general of the SCNPC, Qiao Xiaoyang, explained the SCNPC decision on December 29, a "broadly representative nominating committee" shall

nominate the candidates for the chief executive election in the future. As long as the composition of the nominating committee is controlled by Beijing's representative Liaison Office in the HKSAR, the nominated candidates would be politically acceptable to the central government—a mainland Chinese style of democratization in a pluralistic Hong Kong setting. This mainland Chinese political culture will clash with the vision of the pan-democratic camp, which rejects a filtering mechanism that would exclude any moderate democrat from running in the chief executive direct election. The democrats will face a dilemma of either accepting a bird-cage type of democracy, which will run contrary to their Western values, or rejecting it but discrediting themselves in the eyes of the pragmatically-minded public and the increasingly politically correct Chinese media. If the democrats remain disunited and excessively individualistic, they would be easily politically marginalized and constantly portrayed by the mainstream media as destructive rather than constructive oppositionists. If democracy embraces the spirit of making concessions and consensus, it will be imperative for the democrats to negotiate with the HKSAR government from now to 2017. On the other hand, Chief Executive Donald Tsang will likely complete his last term of office with political glory. He has skillfully utilized the colonial policy of elite co-optation and patron-clientelism to establish a much stronger power base than his predecessor Tung Chee-hwa; tried to portray an image of fighting for the interest of Hong Kong *vis-à-vis* Beijing; and secured patron Beijing's consent for the likelihood of having a chief executive directly elected by universal suffrage in HKSAR in 2017. Overall, the SCNPC decision on Hong Kong's political reform on December 29, 2007 was a testimony to the operation of patron-client pluralism in the new politics of post-colonial Hong Kong.

This book argues that although the implementation of the “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR has been seemingly “successful,” it hides the rapid underlying and irresistible process of mainlandization. Despite this prominent development, the spirit of the “one country, two systems” formula can still be applied to deal with Taiwan's political future. The “one country, two systems” is predicated on the devotion of power to a locality and the coexistence of two different systems. This spirit does contain a tinge of *de facto* federalism, albeit in reality Beijing's political culture tends to exert control over the HKSAR through its direct intervention and its loyal clients. Some elements of the nine points raised by the late Marshal Ye, as discussed in Chapter 9, can be modified and applied to resolve Taiwan's political future. Somehow the people of Taiwan appear to be ignorant of the concept of “one country, two systems.” While critics of the concept accurately point

to the real difficulties of Hong Kong's autonomy *vis-à-vis* Beijing, they have overstated the aspect of governance and neglected the ways in which Britain and the PRC reached the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong's political future.

If we look back to the ways in which Britain and Portugal reached the agreements with China on the future of both Hong Kong and Macao respectively, the concept of "one country, two systems" can be interpreted broadly so that steps can be taken to solve the problem of Taiwan's political future. As the last chapter suggests, the PRC and Taiwan can build up a trustful relationship perhaps with the help of third parties. Hopefully, trust-building can be an interim solution that will narrow the differences of the PRC and Taiwan. The visits of opposition party leaders in Taiwan, including the Kuomintang, to the PRC were the first step toward official rapprochement in the long run. However, the obstacle to Taiwan's political future is not really the turbulent implementation of "one country, two systems" in the HKSAR. Rather, the island's democratic politics has unleashed strong pro-independence forces critical of any move toward eventual reunification with the PRC. If so, the PRC will have to devise a solution far more flexible than the "one country, two systems" formula as applied to Hong Kong and Macao.

When the PRC National People's Congress enacted the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005, it did not really mention using the concept of "one country, two systems" to deal with Taiwan's political future. Perhaps this was a sign that the PRC leadership is open-minded toward other alternatives in dealing with Taiwan's reunification with the mainland. Another optimistic sign was that President Hu's remarks on the HKSAR during its tenth anniversary also did not mention the utilization of the "one country, two systems" to tackle Taiwan's political future. Beijing is perhaps studying various options that can lure the island regime back to the orbit of a united China or Greater China.

Taiwan's democratic operation, however, is by no means a model for both Hong Kong and Macao. Although some democrats in Hong Kong and Macao hope that the chief executive would be directly elected by universal suffrage, just like the political model of Taiwan, the island's chaotic governance and elite corruption are not attractive to many ordinary citizens of Hong Kong and Macao. In order to prove that the Taiwan model of governance is attractive to Hong Kong and Macao, the Taiwan elites and masses will have to consolidate democratic governance, reduce elite corruption, and reach harmonious consensus in a deeply politically divided society. From the perspective of governance, neither the Hong Kong model nor the Taiwan one is politically attractive to each other. It is unfortunate

that advocates of either the Hong Kong model or the Taiwan example have been focusing on its governance.

In a nutshell, the “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR has evolved in a way that is by no means conducive to its rigid application to tackle Taiwan’s baffling political future. The mainlandization of the HKSAR is inevitable, partly because of the rapid rise of a global China and partly because of the political correctness of Beijing’s clientelist rulers and supporters in Hong Kong. However, if we step back to learn a lesson from how Sino-British diplomats reached an agreement on Hong Kong’s future in the early half of the 1980s, we can put aside the problem of having “one system” currently eroding the uniqueness of the “two systems” in the HKSAR. Nor do we need to look for those “successes” from the cases of Hong Kong and Macao to justify a solution to deal with Taiwan’s political future. It is the spirit of mutual trust, compromise, concessions, consensus, and understandings that are critical to the resolution of the differences between the PRC and Taiwan. Ultimately, in the event that the political leaders of the PRC and Taiwan have the political will to settle their differences, their historical reunification is not really an insurmountable problem. Perhaps generational change in both the PRC and Taiwan leadership will propel the two sides to explore creative, innovative, and feasible solutions to solve the problem of Taiwan’s political future. No Chinese in Greater China and overseas countries in the world would like to witness any military skirmishes and conflicts between the PRC and Taiwan, who have been traditionally brothers in the same Chinese family. If democracy in Taiwan demands an unprecedented degree of creativity, tolerance, and consensus, any forward-looking Taiwan leaders should not procrastinate in the quest for a solution to the island’s political future. Similarly, if the principles of the PRC governance are now embracing political tolerance and social harmony, its leaders should explore a more flexible solution to deal with the future of Taiwan. This book has argued for the need for both the PRC and Taiwan to meet the bottom lines of the other side, as with the Sino-British negotiation over Hong Kong. In the event that both sides adopt a liberalizing political acumen, a solution under the spirit of mutual understandings, tolerance, compromise, concessions, and coexistence should not be too far away from the current impasse. In conclusion, although the “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR proves to be turbulent and marked by political mainlandization and convergence with the PRC, its spirit can be applied boldly and creatively to resolve the political stalemate between Beijing and Taipei.

Notes

Introduction

1. Personal observations of the CCTV and Phoenix coverage of the tenth anniversary of the HKSAR, July 1, 2007 in Hong Kong.

1 Patron-Client Pluralism and Beijing's Relations with Hong Kong

1. Jae Ho Chung and Lo Shiu-hing, "Beijing's Relations with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: An Inferential Framework For the Post-1997 Arrangement," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 167–186; Sonny Lo Shiu-hing, "Five Perspectives on Beijing's Policy Towards Hong Kong," in Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ed., *Political Development in the HKSAR* (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2001), pp. 41–60; and Ting Wai, "HKSAR's Relations with its Chinese Sovereign," in James C. Hsiung, ed., *Hong Kong the Super Paradox: Life after Return to China* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 265–288.
2. Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, *Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Critical Introduction to Third World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 52; Robert D. Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1976), pp. 157–160; and James Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 66 (1972), pp. 90–113.
3. Randall and Theobald, *Political Change and Underdevelopment*, p. 52. Also see Robin Theobald, "Patrimonialism," *World Politics*, vol. XXXIV, no. 4 (July 1982), pp. 548–559; and Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia," *World Politics*, vol. XXXI, no. 4 (July 1979), pp. 571–587.
4. James Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXIII, no. 4 (December 1969), pp. 1142–1158.
5. See, for example, Andrew Scobell, "Hong Kong's Influence on China: The Tail That Wags the Dog?," *Asian Survey*, vol. XXVIII, no. 6 (June 1988), pp. 599–612; and also Michael DeGolyer, "Hong Kong tail wags dog," *The Hong Kong Standard*, May 17, 2007.
6. Liu Wei, "Hong Kong's Impact on Shenzhen Real Property Law," *Hong Kong Law Journal*, vol. 27 (1997), pp. 356–373; and Lo Shiu-hing, "Hong Kong's Political Influence on South China," *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 46, no. 4 (July/August 1999), pp. 33–41.

7. *Yazhou Zhoukan*, July 6, 2007 (it is called *Zhonghua Tansuo* or *China Exploration* in Toronto), pp. 6–19.
8. For the political development of the PRC, see Bruce Gilley, “Elite-led Democratization in China: Prospects, Perils and Policy Implications,” *International Journal*, vol. 61, no. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 341–358; and also Winberg Chai, “China’s 2005 White Paper: ‘Building of Political Democracy’ in China,” *Asian Affairs*, vol. 33, no. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 3–36.
9. Some mainlanders secretly attended the candlelight vigil and admitted the failure of the PRC regime to deal with the demands of student demonstrators in May–June 1989 peacefully. See *Ming Pao*, June 5, 2007.
10. One member of the mainland Chinese Communist Party said that she did not participate in the Hong Kong protests, which to her would upset political stability. See *Sing Tao Daily*, June 28, 2007, p. B5.
11. Shirley Lau, “Migrants shaping Hong Kong’s new face,” CNN, June 30, 2007.
12. *Ibid.*
13. See Deng Xiaoping, “One Country, Two Systems,” in *Deng Xiaoping On the Question of Hong Kong* (Beijing: New Horizon Press, 1993), pp. 6–11, in which he stressed that the capitalist Hong Kong would coexist with socialist China (p. 7). In June 2007, President Hu Jintao reportedly rejected “democratic socialism” as the PRC political objective.
14. Lo Shiu-hing, Yu Wing-yat, and Wan Kwok-Fai, “The 1999 District Councils Elections,” in Ming K. Chan and Alvin So, eds., *Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 139–165.
15. One of the key organizers of the rescue of the student democrats from mainland China after the June 1989 Tiananmen tragedy, Chan Tat-ching, who denied that he was and is a triad member, openly said he expected the inevitable transformations of the PRC in a recent interview. For the details regarding his rescue operations which secured the support of Western governments, some mainland security officials, and mainland citizens sympathetic of the student leaders, see *China Times*, June 4, 2007 and <http://peacehall.com/news/gb/pubvp/2007/06/200706020001.shtml>, June 20, 2007.
16. When Democratic Party leader Albert Ho and Civic Party member Margaret Ng visited Toronto in late May 2007, they both expressed the view that the PRC would change democratically in the long run.
17. For all the details, see <http://www.hxem.com>. They included the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, the China Construction Bank Corporation, China Telecom, and the Petro China Company, to name a few.
18. This situation reversed the phenomenon of Hong Kong as a “socioeconomic center” of the PRC. See Alvin So and Reginald Kwok, “Socioeconomic Center, Political Periphery: Hong Kong’s Uncertain Transition Toward the Twenty-first Century,” in Reginald Kwok and Alvin So, eds., *The Hong Kong–Guangdong Link: Partnership in Flux* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995), pp. 251–257.

19. For dependent development, see Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
20. Raymond Wong accurately pointed to the self-censorship trend of the Chinese print and electronic media in the HKSAR when he visited Toronto in June 2007. A careful observation of the TVB news and ATV news, especially the former, demonstrated a high degree of political correctness in their coverage of Hong Kong's politics.
21. Remarks made by Mrs. Regina Ip in a course on Hong Kong's tenth anniversary at the University of Hong Kong's School of Professional And Continuing Education, April 28, 2007.
22. For the survey result, see "Hong Kong, SAR: The first 10 years under China's rule," a report of the Hong Kong Transition Project and the national Democratic Institute for International Affairs, June 2007, p. 72.
23. For an insightful discussion of the relationships between taxation and democracy in Hong Kong, see Richard Cullen and Tor Krever, *Taxation and Democracy in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Civic Exchange, November 2005), pp. 1–35.
24. For this argument, see Lo Shiu-hing, *Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay* (New York: Nova Science, 2001), p. 245.
25. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 70–72.
26. Michel C. Oksenberg, Michael D. Swaine, and Daniel C. Lynch, "China Faces the Twenty-First Century," in Orville Schell and David Shambaugh, eds., *The China Reader: The Reform Era* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), p. 515; and Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "China: Alternative Futures," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 32 (1999), p. 17.
27. *Ming Pao*, June 15, 2007.
28. Personal communication with Wang, May 2006.
29. *Ibid.*
30. See You Tube for the detailed coverage of Jiang's public outburst in front of the Hong Kong reporters.
31. For *nomenklatura* in Hong Kong, see John P. Burns, "The Role of the New China News Agency and China's Policy Toward Hong Kong," in John P. Burns, Victor C. Falkenheim, and David M. Lampton, eds., *Hong Kong and China in Transition* (Toronto: Canada and Hong Kong Research Project, University of Toronto–York University, 1994), pp. 17–60; John Burns, "The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong," *Asian Survey*, vol. 30, no. 8 (August 1990). For the recent studies on China's united front work in Hong Kong, see Jamie Allen, *Seeing Red: China's Uncompromising Takeover of Hong Kong* (Singapore: Butterworth-Heinemann Asia, 1997), pp. 68–111; Holly Porteous, "Beijing's United Front Strategy in Hong Kong," *Commentary*, no. 72 (Winter 1998); Benson Wong, "Can Cooptation Win Over the Hong Kong People?," *Issues & Studies*, vol. 33, no. 5 (May 1997); and Sonny Lo, Eilo Yu,

- Bruce Kwong, and Benson Wong, “The 2004 Legislative Council Elections in Hong Kong: The Triumph of China’s United Front Work after the July 2003 and 2004 Protests,” *Chinese Law & Government*, vol. 38, no. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 3–29.
32. See the official PRC government’s website and also the website of the Liaison Office, in <http://www.locpg.gov.hk> (accessed June 19, 2007).
 33. *Open Magazine*, no. 200 (August 2003), pp. 38–39.
 34. Bruce Kwong, “Patron–Client Politics in Hong Kong: a study of the 2002 and 2005 Chief Executive Elections,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 16, no. 52 (July 2007); and Lo Shiu-hing, “The Political Cultures of Mainland China and Hong Kong: Democratization, Patrimonialism and Pluralism in the 2007 Chief Executive Elections,” *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, forthcoming (July 2007).
 35. *Open Magazine*, no. 200 (August 2003), pp. 40–41.
 36. Man Cheuk-fei, “The Model of the Chinese Communist Control on Hong Kong’s Leftwing Newspapers: A Study of Party Newspapers in an Enclave, 1947–1982,” unpublished M.Phil thesis, Department of Government and Public Administration, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, December 1998.
 37. *Open Magazine*, no. 200 (August 2003), pp. 38–40.
 38. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
 39. Carrie Chan, “Ex-convict picked as next secretary for home affairs,” *The Standard*, June 15, 2007. It must be noted that the home affairs secretary is more or less playing the same functions as the director of the PRC United Front Department.
 40. *Ming Pao*, June 17, 2007.
 41. *Open Magazine*, no. 200 (August 2003), pp. 40–41.
 42. Xu Jiatao, *Xu Jiatao’s Hong Kong Memoir* (in Chinese), volumes 1 and 2 (Taipei: United Daily News, 1993); and Lo Shiu-hing, “The Chinese Communist Party Elite’s Conflict over Hong Kong, 1983–1990,” *China Information*, vol. 8, no. 4 (Spring 1994).
 43. Lo, *Governing Hong Kong*, pp. 142–144.
 44. TVB interview with C. H. Tung, June 8, 2007.
 45. *The Trend Magazine*, no. 215 (July 2003), pp. 6–8.
 46. *Ming Pao*, June 17, 2007.
 47. *The Trend Magazine*, June 2007.
 48. *Ming Pao*, June 17, 2007.
 49. *Ming Pao*, June 15, 2007.
 50. Remarks made by a mainland researcher who interviewed the author twice in September and October 2003.
 51. “What is 9+2? Pan-PRD: A Diversified Single Market — an enlarged hinterland of Hong Kong,” in *Bauhinia Gala: A Celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region* (Toronto: Best Deal Graphic & Printing, 2007), p. 35.

52. For “policy wind” in the PRC, see David Zweig, *Agrarian Radicalism in China, 1968–1981* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989).
53. *Ming Pao*, May 27, 2007, p. A35.
54. Personal discussion with Chief Executive Edmund Ho, December 2004.
55. “Special Meeting of the House Committee on 27 February 2004: Background Brief Prepared by Legislative Council Secretariat. Main Issues Relating to Cooperation between Guangdong and Hong Kong discussed with the Chief Secretary for Administration,” LC Paper No. CB(2)1442/03–04.
56. *Sing Tao Daily*, June 2, 2007, p. B17. Also see *Today Daily News* (Toronto), June 2, 2007, p. A11.
57. See *Sing Tao Daily*, June 2, 2007, p. B7.
58. Lo Shiu-hing, *The Politics of Cross-Border Crime in Greater China*, forthcoming (M. E. Sharpe).
59. *Ming Pao*, May 28, 2007, p. A15.
60. Lo Shiu-hing, *Political Development in Macau* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995).
61. *Ming Pao*, May 28, 2007, p. A15.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Hong Kong Standard*, July 2, 2007, p. A3.
64. *Zhonghua Tansuo (China Exploration)*, the overseas Chinese (Toronto) version of *Yazhou Zhoukan*, no. 88 (July 13, 2007), p. 11.
65. Zhang Ran, “QDII expanded to include securities, fund companies,” *China Daily*, June 21, 2007.
66. A notable exception was Bruce Kwong, “Patron–Client Politics and Elections in Hong Kong,” unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Politics and Public Administration, the University of Hong Kong, 2004.
67. Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” pp. 1142–1158.
68. A. Weingrod, “Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 10 (July 1968), pp. 377–400.
69. J. D. Powell, “Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 64 (June 1970), pp. 411–425.
70. Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” p. 1144.
71. On the Article 23 debate, see Anthony B. L. Cheung, “The Hong Kong System under One Country Being Tested: Article 23, Governance Crisis and the Search for a New Hong Kong Identity,” in Joseph Cheng, ed., *The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event* (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2005), pp. 33–70; and Sonny Lo, “Hong Kong, 1 July 2003 — Half a Million Protestors: The Security Law, Identity Politics, Democracy and China,” *Behind the Headlines*, vol. 60, no. 4 (April 2004), pp. 1–14.
72. Carrie Chan, “Beijing to announce new Tsang team,” *The Standard*, June 23, 2007.
73. Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” pp. 1150–1158.

2 The Mainlandization of Hong Kong

1. *Ming Pao*, March 11, 2005.
2. *Yizhoukan (Next Magazine)*, no. 782 (March 3, 2005), pp. 46–53.
3. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 4, 2005.
4. *Dongzhoukan (Eastweek)*, May 26, 2004, pp. 19–28. Also see *Cheng Ming*, no. 215 (July 2003), pp. 6–8; *Guangjiaojing (Wide Angle)*, no. 371 (August 15–September 16, 2003), pp. 6–10; and *Qianshao (Frontline)*, no. 162 (August 2004), pp. 6–8. For the debate over Article 23 of the Basic Law, see Fu Hualing, Carole J. Petersen, and Simon N. M. Young, eds., *National Security and Fundamental Freedoms: Hong Kong's Article 23 Under Scrutiny* (Hong Kong: Hong University Press, 2005).
5. See *Sing Pao*, July 24, 2003. Also see Liam Fitzpatrick, “The Long March,” *Time*, July 14, 2003, pp. 18–23. The central government criticized its officials in Hong Kong for failure in understanding the problems of the territory and the degree of public discontent. Political commentator and Hong Kong member to the National People’s Congress, Allen Lee Peng-fei, publicly unveiled that Gao Siren, the director of the Liaison Office in the HKSAR, was criticized by Beijing. Lee made the remarks on his program at the Commercial Radio, July 25, 2003 at 9:25 am.
6. *Sing Pao*, July 18, 2003.
7. See *Dongzhoukan*, June 9, 2004, pp. 14–29.
8. For the intimidation incidents, see *Yizhoukan*, June 3, 2004, which dealt with Allen Lee’s story. A former mainland Chinese official of the PRC’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office called Lee’s home and he appeared to be intimidated. Raymond Wong was reportedly in debt, whereas the threats issued to Cheng and Lee appeared to be purely political. Both Wong and Cheng were staunchly anti-Communist, but Lee tended to be an independent commentator critical of the Tung regime.
9. Wang Wenfang, *China’s Resumption of Sovereignty over Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: David C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, 1997).
10. *Mingbao Zhoukan (Ming Pao Sunday Supplement)*, no. 616 (March 6, 2005), pp. 28–33. One unsubstantiated report said Tung had offered to resign five times (2002, 2003, 2004, January 2005, and March 2005). See *Cheng Ming*, no. 235 (March 2005), pp. 16–17.
11. Alfred G. Meyer, “Theories of Convergence,” in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 336–337.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 323. Also see Alan J. Foster, *Political Convergence: The Theory* (London: Politics Association, 1978); and Johan K. Vree, *Political Integration: The Formation of Theory and Its Problems* (The Hague: Mouton, 1972).
13. See Andrew Jack, *Inside Putin’s Russia: Can There Be Reform without Democracy?*

- (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Lilia Shevtsova, *Putin's Russia* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
14. For an optimistic view, see Su Shaozhi, "Problems of Democratic Reform in China," in Edward Friedman, ed., *The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1994), pp. 225–230; and Zibigniew Brzezinski, "Will China Democratize? Disruption without Disintegration," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 9, no. 1 (January 1998): pp. 3–4. For a pessimistic perspective, see, for example, Pei Minxin, "Is China Democratizing?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 1 (January/February 1998), p. 81; and Tatsumi Okabe, "China's Prospects for Change," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Democracy in East Asia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 175–176.
 15. On Hong Kong's convergence or divergence with China, see an earlier study by James Cotton, "Hong Kong: Convergence or Divergence?" *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 6, no. 4 (Winter 1987). Also see Gerald Segal, *The Fate of Hong Kong* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1993), pp. 207–210.
 16. On China's authoritarian system, see Michel Oksenberg, "China's Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," in Jonathan Unger, ed., *The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang*, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 193–208. On Hong Kong's semi-competitive system, see William Overholt, "Hong Kong: Between Third World and First," *Hong Kong Democratic Foundation Newsletter*, no. 17 (January 2001).
 17. For a discussion of Hong Kong's dependence on China, see Ian Holliday, Ma Ngok, and Ray Yep, "After 1997: The Dialectics of Hong Kong Dependence," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 34, no. 2 (2004), pp. 254–270.
 18. Indeed, the HKSAR can also influence the political culture of the PRC, especially in South China. See Andrew Scobell, "After Deng, What? Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic Transition in China," *Problems of Post-Communism* 44, no. 5 (September/October 1997), pp. 27–28; and Michel Oksenberg, "Will China Democratize? Confronting a Classic Dilemma," *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 31–32.
 19. The Party-state in the PRC remains "quite heavy-handed in controlling activities by religious groups, educated professionals, labor, youth, and women." See Carol Lee Hamrin, "Social Dynamics and New Generation Politics," in David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan, eds., *China's Leadership in the 21st Century* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 205–211.
 20. Anthony B.L. Cheung, "Civil Service Reform in Post-1997 Hong Kong: Political Challenges, Managerial Responses?" *International Journal of Public Administration* 24, no. 9 (2001), pp. 929–950; and Wilson Wong, "From a British-Style Administrative State to a Chinese-Style Political State: Civil Service Reform in Hong Kong After the Transfer of Sovereignty" (Paper written for the Brookings Institution, June 2003), <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/wong2003.pdf> (accessed June 2, 2005).

21. Martin Lee, “Letter to Hong Kong,” RTHK Radio 3, September 5, 1999, <http://www.martinlee.org.hk/lettersToHK9.5.99.htm> (accessed May 15, 2005).
22. Melinda Liu and Alexandra A. Seno, “Getting the Word Out,” *Newsweek*, July 12, 2004.
23. See “Research Team on the Compendium of Submissions on Article 23 of the Basic Law” (report prepared by Robert Chung and his research team at the University of Hong Kong), <http://www.hkupop.hku/Chinese/resources/bl23/bl23gp/report/app8.pdf> (accessed May 10, 2005).
24. Tung’s governing strategy was shaped by Confucian values such as harmony, benevolence, and peace, but it was out of touch with the increasingly politicized environment of Hong Kong. See Lau Siu-kai, “Government and Political Change in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” in James C. Hsiung, ed., *Hong Kong the Super Paradox: Life After Return to China* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 35–57; and Lau Siu-kai, “Tung Chee-hwa’s Governing Strategy: The Shortfall in Politics,” in Lau Siu-kai, ed., *The First Tung Chee-hwa Administration: The First Five Years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2002), pp. 1–40.
25. For the crisis of legitimacy in Hong Kong before the retrocession, see Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990). With regard to the PRC’s intervention in Hong Kong’s political reform in the 1990s, see Jermain T. M. Lam, “Democracy or Convergence: The Dilemma of Political Reform in Hong Kong,” *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 15, no. 2 (December 1993), pp. 225–253.
26. *Cheng Ming*, no. 183 (November 2000), pp. 6–8; and *Kaifang (Open Magazine)*, no. 158 (February 2000), p. 18.
27. Beijing also decided that the term of the replacement chief executive should be two years rather than five years, generating a debate in Hong Kong over whether the Basic Law’s stipulation concerning the five-year term of office of the chief executive was violated. Eventually, on April 27, 2005, the NPC had to interpret the Basic Law saying that the term of office of the replacement chief executive would be two years. For the entire debate, see *Sing Tao Daily*, April 28, 2005; Editorial, “Court Need Not Anticipate NPC,” *Ming Pao*, April 5, 2005; and “Rule of Law a Necessity, Not a Luxury,” *South China Morning Post*, April 20, 2005, A14. For a critique of the NPC interpretation of the Basic Law by the democrats such as Margaret Ng and Martin Lee, see *Xinbao* (Hong Kong Economic Journal), May 2, 2005, 4 and *Ming Pao*, April 20, 2005, p. D13. The Catholic Church’s Bishop Joseph Zen criticized the NPC interpretation as a move that “failed to respect the Basic Law.” See *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, April 9, 2005, p. 4.
28. The British colonial administration relied heavily on patronage too. See Ambrose King Yeo-chi, “Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass-roots Level,” *Asian Survey*, vol. 15, no. 5 (May 1975), p. 424;

- and S. N. G. Davies, “One Brand of Politics Rekindled,” *Hong Kong Law Journal* 7 (1977), pp. 69–70. The post-handover political absorption can be found in Anthony B. L. Cheung and Paul C. W. Wong, “Who Advised the Hong Kong Government? The Politics of Absorption before and after 1997,” *Asian Survey*, vol. 44, no. 6 (December 2004), pp. 874–894.
29. Raymond Wu was removed from the Equal Opportunities Commission and Tam Yiu-chung was stripped of his chairmanship of the Vocational Training Council, thus sparking suspicion that the Tsang alienated some pro-Beijing elites. The pro-Beijing elites such as Wu and Choy So-yuk publicly expressed their displeasure with Tsang, triggering an attempt by officials of the Liaison Office — China’s representative office in the HKSAR — to persuade them to support Tsang. See *Sing Tao Daily*, May 20, 2005, p. B3.
 30. *Sing Tao Daily*, June 28, 2007, p. B4.
 31. *Ibid.*, March 11, 2005.
 32. Tan Ee Lyn, “Hong Kong Tung says Falun Gong evokes Jonestown suicide,” *Reuters*, May 22, 2001; and Stella Lee and Kong Lai-fun, “Tung Steps Up Attack on Sect,” *South China Morning Post*, April 26, 2001. The rise of Falun Gong in China can be seen as a confrontation between the Party-state and society. See Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, “Governance and the Political Challenge of the Falun Gong,” in Jude Howell, ed., *Governance in China* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 297–225.
 33. *Wen Wei Po*, July 2, 2007, p. A20.
 34. The former financial secretary Antony Leung was involved in a car scandal; the former secretary for health Yeoh Eng-king was severely criticized for his mishandling of the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome; and the former secretary for security Regina Ip was enmeshed in the debate over Article 23 of the Basic Law. Tung did not ask any of the three to resign until they themselves took the initiative to do so.
 35. See Editorial, “First-Rate Good Man But Not First-Class Leader, Wholeheartedly Working for Hong Kong But Lacking in Capability,” *Ming Pao*, March 11, 2005.
 36. Alvin Y. So and Ming K. Chan, “Conclusion: Crisis and Transformation in the Hong Kong SAR — Toward Soft Authoritarian Developmentalism?” in Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So, eds., *Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 363–384; and Anthony B. L. Cheung, “The Changing Political System: Executive-led Government or ‘Disabled’ Governance?” in Lau, *The First Tung Chee-hwa Administration*, pp. 41–68.
 37. Michael E. DeGolyer, “How the Stunning Outbreak of Disease Led to a Stunning Outbreak of Dissent,” in Christine Loh and Civic Exchange, eds., *At the Epicentre: Hong Kong and the SARS Outbreak* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), pp. 117–138.
 38. *Yizhoukan*, no. 749 (July 15, 2004), pp. 42–48.

39. See Editorial, “The Organizer of the 1967 Riots Should Not Receive the Medal,” *Ming Pao*, July 2, 2001.
40. See *Taiyang Bao* (*The Sun*), July 6, 2003.
41. Carrie Chan and Diane Lee, “Ma critics use June 4 row to attack DAB,” *The Standard*, May 17, 2007.
42. *Ibid.*
43. For Chan’s disagreement with Tung, see *Yizhoukan*, no. 567 (January 18, 2001), p. 52; and *Dongzhoukan*, no. 407 (August 10, 2000), p. 26.
44. For the Principal Officials Accountability System, see Christine Loh and Richard Cullen, “Political Reform in Hong Kong: The Principal Officials Accountability System: The First Year (2002–2003),” *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 42 (February 2005), pp. 153–176.
45. *Taiyang Bao*, July 7, 2003.
46. *Ibid.*, July 8, 2003.
47. *Ibid.*, July 10, 2003.
48. For a discussion that Chinese nationalism is compatible with authoritarianism, see Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s,” in Suisheng Zhao, ed., *China and Democracy: Reconsidering the Prospects of a Democratic China* (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 253–270.
49. *Dongxiang* (*The Trend Magazine*), no. 235 (March 2005), pp. 16–17. For China’s united front work, see Holly Porteous, “China’s United Front Strategy in Hong Kong,” *Commentary*, no. 72 (Winter 1998), pp. 1–10. The aim of united front is to isolate the minority and to win the majority. See Van Slyke Lyman, *Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 3–6. For a good review of China’s united front work in Hong Kong before the handover, see Jamie Allan, *Seeing Red: China’s Uncompromising Takeover of Hong Kong* (Singapore: Butterworth-Heinemann Asia, 1997), pp. 68–111; and Wai-kwok Wong, “Can Co-optation Win Over the Hong Kong People? China’s United Front Work in Hong Kong Since 1984,” *Issues & Studies* 33, no. 5 (May 1997), pp. 102–137.
50. Editorial, “Cyber Priorities,” *South China Morning Post*, August 5, 2000; and *Yizhoukan*, no. 473 (April 2, 1999), pp. 30–38.
51. *Dongxiang* (*The Trend Magazine*), no. 235 (March 2005): 17. Interestingly, when Donald Tsang was tipped as the replacement chief executive in April and May 2005, the Hong Kong reports said he was close to Liao Hui. However, when Hong Kong reporters asked Gao for his view on Tsang, the former refused to say anything in public — a move apparently contrary to most PRC officials dealing with Hong Kong affairs. Therefore, the report on the opinion differences between Liao and Gao appeared to be accurate.
52. John Flowerdew, *The Final Years of British Hong Kong: The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 178–186.
53. *Dongxiang*, no. 183 (November 2000), pp. 6–8.

54. The DAB and the rural advisory body Heung Yee Kuk publicly endorsed the nomination of Tsang as the candidate for the chief executive election scheduled to be held on July 10, 2005. See TVB news, June 1, 2005.
55. For details, see “Framework of accountability for principal officials,” press release, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200204/17/0417251.htm> (accessed August 1, 2002). Interesting, in March 2004, the PRC’s legal expert, the late Xiao Weiyun, visited Hong Kong and he argued that the POAS actually violated the Basic Law.
56. Leung’s letter of resignation to Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, March 10, 2003, in LC Paper No. CB(2)1526/02–03(01), Annex; Chris Yeung, “I Forgave an Honest Mistake, Says Tung,” *South China Morning Post*, March 22, 2003; Editorial, “Chief Executive Must Let Antony Leung Go,” *South China Morning Post*, March 19, 2003, p. 12; Editorial, “A Time of Reckoning,” *The Standard*, May 7, 2003, p. A2; “Credibility Crisis,” *The Standard*, March 26, 2003, p. A15; Margaret Ng, “The Case against Antony Leung,” *South China Morning Post*, March 28, 2003, p. 16; and Yeung Sum, “Abuse of Power?” *South China Morning Post*, April 15, 2003, p. 14.
57. Carole J. Petersen, “National Security Offences and Civil Liberties in Hong Kong: A Critique of the Government’s ‘Consultation’ on Article 23 of the Basic Law,” *Hong Kong Law Journal* 32, Part 3 (2002), pp. 457–470.
58. A survey found that 90 percent of the 1,154 protestors opposed the legislation on Article 23 of the Basic Law, and that 60 percent of them came from the middle class. See *Taiyang Bao*, July 7, 2003.
59. For Bishop Zen’s political defiance, see Beatrice Leung and Chan Shun-hing, *Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950–2000* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), pp. 117–124. In October 2000, Zen publicly unveiled that the Liaison Office’s officials tried to warn him of his contacts with the mainland Catholics. See *Apple Daily*, October 5, 2000, p. 21.
60. Some students of the pro-Beijing schools, such as the Fukien Secondary Schools, participated in the mass protests. Their teachers reportedly used the justification of the absence from school to “penalize” them. See *Taiyang Bao*, July 9, 2003.
61. *Apple Daily*, July 2, 2003.
62. Allen Lee Peng-fei’s remarks at the University of Hong Kong SPACE course on April 28, 2007.
63. *Yizhoukan*, no. 708 (October 2, 2003), pp. 46–52. Since July 1, 2003, Liao’s public profile has become so low that his subordinate Chen Zuo’er is the spokesman of the HKMAO in public.
64. I am indebted to Sister Beatrice Leung for this point. Also see Beatrice Leung and Marcus Wang, “Hong Kong and Vatican Relations in the Chinese Context,” paper presented at the conference “Hong Kong Ten Years After,” on June 29–30, 2007 at the City University of Hong Kong and jointly sponsored by the CNRS-CERI/Po, Paris.

65. *Ibid.*
66. He remarked on the July 1, 2007 protest in which he was one of the participants: “We really wait for a long time to see the direct elections of the Chief Executive and the entire Legislative Council. We hope to envisage their realization as soon as possible.” TVB news, July 1, 2007.
67. *Hong Kong iMail*, August 28, 2005. For an overview of the debate on Hong Kong’s constitutional reforms, see Johannes Chan, “Some Thoughts on Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong,” *Hong Kong Law Journal* 34, Part 1 (2004), pp. 1–12; and Albert Chen, “The Constitutional Controversy of Spring 2004,” *Hong Kong Law Journal*, Part 2 (2004), pp. 215–225.
68. *Apple Daily*, July 2 and July 3, 2004.
69. Ambrose Leung, Cheung Chi-fai, and Carrie Chan, “United Front Cadre Seeks to Heal Rift,” *South China Morning Post*, May 27, 2004, p. 1.
70. For the full results of the elections, see <http://www.elections.gov.hk/elections/legco2004/eindex.html>. Also see Christine Loh, “Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections: Overcoming the System,” *China Brief* 4, no. 18 (September 16, 2004), published by the Jamestown Foundation, <http://www.jamestown.org> (accessed June 2, 2005).
71. *Cheng Ming*, no. 330 (April 2005), p. 87.
72. For China’s market transition, see Barry Naughton, “China’s Transition in Economic Perspective,” in Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., *The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 30–44.
73. Patten’s assumptions can be seen in Chris Patten, *East Meets West: The Last Governor of Hong Kong on Power, Freedom and the Future* (London: McClelland & Stewart, 1998), pp. 292–300.
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 104–105.
75. Beijing set up the Provisional Legislative Council to veto the political reform introduced by Patten. Members of the Provisional Legislative Council were all appointed by the PRC and none of the democrats could ride the “through train” to cross over the legislature beyond July 1, 1997. However, the democrats were able to return to the legislature in the 1988 Legislative Council elections. See Leo Goodstadt, “China and the Selection of Hong Kong’s Post-Colonial Political Elite,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 163 (September 2000), pp. 721–741. Also see Leo Goodstadt, *Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between Public Interest and Private Profit in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004).
76. Lau Siu-kai, “The Making of the Electoral System,” in Kuan Hsin-chi, Lau Siu-kai, Louie Kin-sheun, and Timothy Ka-ying Wong, eds., *Power Transfer and Electoral Politics: The First Legislative Election in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1999), pp. 3–35.
77. Alvin Y. So, *Hong Kong’s Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 231–232; and Lo Shiu-hing

- and Yu Wing-yat, “The Politics of Electoral Reform in Hong Kong,” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 39, no. 2 (July 2001), pp. 99–108.
78. Choi Chi-keung, “The Decisive Effect of the Proportional Representation System: From Inter-party Competition to Intra-party Competition,” in Kuan Hsin-chi, Lau Siu-kai, and Timothy Ka-ying Wong, eds., *Out of the Shadow of 1997? The 2000 Legislative Council Election in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2002), pp. 99–124.
 79. *Dongzhoukan*, no. 372 (December 9, 1999), p. 45.
 80. Also see Craig N. Canning, “Hong Kong: ‘One Country, Two Systems’ in Troubled Waters,” *Current History* 103, no. 674 (September 2004), pp. 295–296.
 81. *Ta Kung Pao*, July 20, 2003.
 82. President Hu Jintao said Beijing opposed any intervention from foreign forces into Hong Kong’s domestic affairs. See *Taiyang Bao*, July 20, 2003.
 83. See *The First Report of the Constitutional Task Force: Issues of Legislative Process in the Basic Law Relating to Constitutional Development* (March 2004), www.info.gov.hk/cab (accessed June 1, 2005). The first report in March also focused on the technical issue of amending the Basic Law and local ordinances.
 84. *The Second Report of the Constitutional Task Force: Issues of Legislative Process in the Basic Law Relating to Constitutional Development* (April 2004), pp. 18–19, www.info.gov.hk/cab. The report came up with a number of rules governing political reform, including the need to maintain the central government’s authority and the executive-led system. Also see *South China Morning Post*, April 16, 2004.
 85. See “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2008. Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress at its Ninth Session on 26 April 2004,” S. S. No. 5 to Gazette Extraordinary No. 8/2004, <http://www.info.gov.hk/cab/cab-review/eng/basic/pdf/es5200408081.pdf> (accessed December 29, 2004). Also see “The Fourth Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force: Views and Proposals of Members of the Committee on the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2008 (December 2004),” <http://www.info.gov.hk/cab/cab-review/eng/report4/pdf/fourthreport.pdf>, 2 n. 1 (accessed December 29, 2004).
 86. “The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress . . . ,” E9.
 87. *Ming Pao*, June 3, 2005, revealing national security agents, Public Security Bureau officers, and many other researchers from Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong were sent to Hong Kong to collect intelligence on the territory, because the intelligence provided by the Liaison Office had proved to be inaccurate.

88. *South China Morning Post*, February 2004, p. 1.
89. For a full debate over patriotism, see Ming Pao, ed., *Aiguo lunzheng* (“The debate over patriotism”) (Hong Kong: Ming Pao, April 2004).
90. *South China Morning Post*, May 28, 2004, 1. Also see Editorial, “Freedom of Speech Must Be Defended,” *South China Morning Post*, May 28, 2004, p. 12.
91. The retired mainland official, Cheng Shousan, denied that he had intimidated Lee, but later reports said he was one of the Chinese officials who were asked to conduct stronger united front work on the people of Hong Kong. See *South China Morning Post*, June 1, 2004, p. 1.
92. *South China Morning Post*, August 17 and 24, 2004.
93. *Apple Daily*, September 14, 2004.
94. *Ibid.*, February 27, 1999, p. 1.
95. The HKSAR Government Daily Information Bulletin, “The Chief Executive Report to the State Council” (June 10, 1999).
96. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 21, 2004.
97. *Hong Kong Economic Times*, March 30, 2005, p. 33.
98. Chan withdrew his legal challenge after the SCNPC’s interpretation of the Basic Law.
99. Leung said, “If Aw Sian was prosecuted, it would be a serious obstacle for restructuring. If the group should collapse, its newspapers would be compelled to cease operation.” See *South China Morning Post*, February 5, 1999, p. 1. For critiques of Leung’s position, see Editorial, “Secretary Leung Should Take a Rest,” *Apple Daily*, February 5, 1999, p. A8; Editorial, “This Good Person Has Done a Wrong Thing,” *Ming Pao*, February 5, 1999, p. A2; and Editorial, “Question of Justice,” *South China Morning Post*, February 5, 1999, p. 18. For a critical review of the rule of law in Hong Kong, see Margaret Ng, “Post-handover Rule of Law: A New Interpretation,” in Chris Yeung, ed., *Hong Kong China: The Red Dawn* (Sydney: Prentice Hall, 1998), pp. 99–120.
100. Byron S. J. Weng has argued that the Basic Law “provides a weak basis for judicial independence.” See Weng, “Judicial Independence under the Basic Law,” in Steve Tsang, ed., *Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), p. 69.
101. See *Apple Daily*, June 31, 2003; and *Hong Kong Economic Times*, July 2, 2003.
102. The term is borrowed from Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 49.
103. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 23.
104. For social movements in Hong Kong, see Lui Tai-lok and Stephen Wing-kai Chiu, “Introduction: Changing Political Opportunities and the Shaping of Collective Action: Social Movements in Hong Kong,” in Stephen Wing-kai Chiu and Lui Tai-lok, eds., *The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press 2000), pp. 1–20.

105. Writing before July 1, 1997, Ip Po-keung had already argued that the civil society in Hong Kong would at best be “tamed,” but not “crushed.” See Ip Po-keung, “Development of Civil Society in Hong Kong: Constraints, Problems and Risks,” in Li Pang-kwong, ed., *Political Order and Power Transition in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1997), p. 183. For the civil society’s quest for autonomy in the HKSAR, see Agnes S. Ku, “Negotiating the Space of Civil Autonomy in Hong Kong: Power, Discourses and Dramaturgical Representation,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 179 (September 2004), pp. 647–664.
106. In general, the public believes that the English language “is the key to preparing the young people for a successful career.” See Chao Fen Sun, “Hong Kong’s Language Policy in the Postcolonial Age: Social Justice and Globalization,” in Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So, eds., *Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 295.
107. It must be noted that the British colonial officials originally viewed the Catholic Church with either “contempt” or political suspicion. See Beatrice Leung and Chan Shun-hing, *Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950–2000* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), p. 27.
108. Thomas Tse-kwan Choi, “Civic and Political Education,” in Mark Bray and Ramsey Koo, eds., *Education and Society in Hong Kong and Macao: Comparative Perspectives on Continuity and Change* (Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, University of Hong Kong, 2004), p. 189.
109. Yet recent surveys have found that patriotism of the Hong Kong people has slightly increased; 73 percent of a survey of 1,054 citizens identified themselves as “feeling proud of being a Chinese.” See *Ming Pao*, June 2, 2005.
110. Civic Exchange, “Listening to the Wisdom of the Masses: Hong Kong People’s Attitude toward Constitutional Reform” (January 2004), <http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp>, 16 (accessed June 1, 2005).
111. See Elaine Chan, “Defining Fellow Compatriots as ‘Others’: National Identity in Hong Kong,” *Government and Opposition* 35, no. 4 (2000), pp. 499–519.
112. Gordon Matthews, “Heunggongyahn: On the Past, Present and Future of Hong Kong Identity,” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 29, no. 3 (1997), p. 13.
113. David Akers-Jones, *Feeling the Stones: Reminiscences by David Akers-Jones* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), p. 268.
114. Chu Yun-han and Chang Yu-tzung, “Culture Shift and Regime Legitimacy: Comparing Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong,” in Hua Shiping, ed., *Chinese Political Culture, 1989–2000* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 331–332.
115. This phenomenon is contrary to Hong Kong as a “socioeconomic center” before the handover. See Alvin Y. So and Reginald Yin-wang Kwok, “Socioeconomic Center, Political Periphery: Hong Kong’s Uncertain Transition toward the Twenty-first Century,” in Reginald Yin-wang Kwok and Alvin

- Y. So, eds., *The Hong Kong–Guangdong Link: Partnership in Flux* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995), pp. 251–257.
116. Inter-marriage between the people of Hong Kong and mainlanders, especially between Hong Kong men and mainland women, has become commonplace since retrocession. More Hong Kong women have visited the mainland and searched for male partners too.
117. Sung Yun-wing, *The Emergence of Greater China: The Economic Integration of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong* (London: Palgrave, 2004); Sung Yun-wing, *Hong Kong and South China: The Economic Synergy* (Hong Kong: City University Press, 1998); and Sung Yun-wing and Song Enrong, *The China–Hong Kong Connection: The Key to China’s Open-Door Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
118. The criticism leveled at Anson Chan came mainly from the pro-Beijing elites, but whether Chan really was an obstacle to closer economic integration between Hong Kong and China was debatable. For a good review of the multifaceted Hong Kong–China integration, see Anthony Gar-on Yeh, Yok-shiu F. Lee, Tunney Lee, and Nien Dak Sze, eds., *Building a Competitive Pearl River Delta Region: Cooperation, Coordination, and Planning* (Centre of Urban and Environmental Management, University of Hong Kong, 2002).
119. His remarks made at the conference “Hong Kong Ten Years After” at the City University of Hong Kong, June 29, 2007. I am indebted to Professor Ting Wai for this insightful point.
120. Some mainland visitors were amazed at the mass protests in the HKSAR on July 1, 2003 and July 1, 2004. Some participated in the annual candlelight vigil held at the Victoria Park to commemorate the Tiananmen incident in the PRC.
121. Information provided by a mainland student to the author, April 16, 2005.
122. *Ming Pao*, July 5, 2007, p. A15.
123. For the British colonial legacy, see Ming Chan, “The Imperfect Legacy: Defects in the British Legal System in Colonial Hong Kong,” *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law* 18, no. 1 (Spring 1997); and Ming Chan, “The Legacy of the British Administration of Hong Kong: A View from Hong Kong,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 151 (September 1997).
124. In the British colonial era, the business people adapted to the transfer of sovereignty by looking for mainland Chinese partners, enhancing their links with the mainland and retaining a politically conservative outlook. See C. K. Lau, *Hong Kong’s Colonial Legacy: A Hong Kong Chinese View of the British Heritage* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1997), pp. 83–100.
125. Hong Kong Cable Television program on the tenth anniversary of the HKSAR, “Hong Kong Connection,” broadcast in Canada’s Fairchild Television on June 22, 2007 at 10:45 pm.
126. Remarks made by Martin Lee in “Hong Kong Connection,” Cable TV program, broadcast in Toronto on June 24, 2007.

127. See *Sing Tao Daily*, December 22, 2005. Lau Chin-shek has moderated his political views and stance since he had to visit his ailing mother in mainland China in the late 1990s. His vote share in the direct elections held for the Legislative Council also declined gradually, pointing to his gradual political eclipse.
128. For the most recent survey on self-censorship in Hong Kong, see Hong Kong Journalist Association, “Survey on Press Freedom in Hong Kong, January 2007,” in <http://www.hkja.org.hk> (accessed January 12, 2007).
129. Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
130. *Ibid.*
131. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
133. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
134. See *Ming Pao*, November 23, 2005.
135. “The Fifth Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force: Package of Proposals for the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2008,” October 2005, in [els/ca/papers/ca1021cb2-rpt-e.pdf](http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/ca/papers/ca1021cb2-rpt-e.pdf) <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/ca/papers/ca1021cb2-rpt-e.pdf> (accessed 25 November 2005).
136. Bruce Gilley, “Elite-led democratization in China: Prospects perils and policy implications,” *International Journal*, Spring 2006, pp. 341–358.

3 The Politics of Judicial Autonomy

1. One observer said that politicization could be seen from “the beginning [of the government’s attempt to ask for the NPC’s interpretation] to the end.” See Anthony Cheung Bing-leung, “Interpretation from a political beginning to a political end,” *Ming Pao*, June 30, 1999, p. A25.
2. Byron S. J. Weng, “Judicial Independence under the Basic Law,” in Steve Tsang, *Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), p. 50.
3. See *Apple Daily*, February 27, 1999, p. A1. Also see Xiao Weiyun and others, “Why the Court of Final Appeal Was Wrong: Comments of the Mainland Scholars on the Judgment of the Court of Final Appeal,” in Johannes M. M. Chan, H. L. Fu, and Yash Ghai, eds., *Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict Over Interpretation* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp. 53–60.
4. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, February 27, 1999, p. 1. Also see the CFA’s judgment on January 29, 1999. Final Appeal Numbers 14, 15, and 16.
5. Remarks made by Cheung Tat-ming, a lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. See *Oriental Daily*, February 27, 1999, p. A20. Also

- see Yash Ghai, “Court must explain its power but stand firm against a review,” *Hong Kong Standard*, February 26, 1999, p. 11. Margaret Ng believed that the CFA should not yield to the demand of those people who were dissatisfied with its decision. See her article “When people write the history of this moment in the future,” *Ming Pao*, March 10, 1999, p. E10.
6. Chung Ching-tin, “The central government adopts a retrained attitude toward the CFA’s judgment,” *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, March 10, 1999, p. 14.
 7. *Hong Kong Standard*, June 27, 1999, p. 13. Also see Qiao Xiaoyang, “Explanatory Note on ‘The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC (Draft)’ at the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on 22 June 1999,” in Chan, Fu, and Ghai, eds., *Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict Over Interpretation*, pp. 483–484. When the CFA judges discussed Article 22 in the landmark case in January 1999, Judge Charles Ching and Judge Henry Litton remarked that Article 22 belonged to “the affairs under the mainland’s jurisdiction.” See *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, January 13, 1999, p. 8.
 8. *Hong Kong Standard*, June 27, 1999, p. 13. Also see Qiao’s “Explanatory Note . . . ,” pp. 484–485.
 9. *Sunday Morning Post*, June 27, 1999, p. 1.
 10. *Ibid.*
 11. The five judges of the CFA are Andrew Li Kwok-nang, Justice Henry Litton, Justice Anthony Mason, Justice Kemal Bokhary, and Justice Charles Ching. See *South China Morning Post*, February 26, 1999, p. 1.
 12. Wong On-yin, “It is wise for Li Kwok-nang to resign,” *Apple Daily*, June 28, 1999, p. D1. Another letter from a citizen, however, said that Li should resign in a bid to protest against the reversal of the verdict of the CFA by the NPC. See Lee Shek-keung, “Li Kwok-nang should resign to protest,” Letter to the editor, *Apple Daily*, May 22, 1999, p. F1.
 13. *Hong Kong Standard*, February 8, 1999, p. 2.
 14. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, May 13, 1999, p. 7.
 15. *Apple Daily*, February 12, 1999, p. A15.
 16. *Ming Pao*, February 12, 1999, p. A9.
 17. *Ming Pao*, 26 May 1999, p. A9. However, one CFA judge, Anthony Mason, said on 30 January during a seminar at the University of Hong Kong that the court had made a “purposive interpretation” of the Basic Law. The CFA’s judgment said: “It is generally accepted that in the interpretation of a constitution such as the Basic Law a purposive approach is to be applied. The adoption of a purposive approach is necessary because a constitution states general principles and expresses purposes without condescending to particularity and definition of terms. Gaps and ambiguities are bound to arise and, in resolving them, the courts are bound to give effect to the principles and purposes declared in, and to be ascertained from, the constitution and relevant extrinsic materials.” See

- the CFA's judgment in Appeal Numbers 14, 15, and 16 of 1998. *Ng Ka Ling, Ng Tan Tan v. The Director of Immigration; Tsui Kuen Nang v. The Director of Immigration; The Director of Immigration v. Cheung Lai Wah*.
18. *Ibid.*
 19. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, May 26, 1999, p. 8. Shiu also opposed the idea of amending the Basic Law, saying that "if we were to amend the Basic Law because you, she or I misinterpret the Basic Law, where would the dignity of the Basic Law be? The law enjoys a supreme position under the rule of law. You and I are under it — even Li Kwok-nang and Tung Chee-hwa are under the Basic Law." See *South China Morning Post*, May 16, 1999, p. 2.
 20. *Hong Kong Standard*, May 16, 1999, p. 2.
 21. *Hong Kong Standard*, January 8, 1999, p. 5. Also see *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, January 8, 1999, p. 7.
 22. *Hong Kong Standard*, January 8, 1999, p. 5. Judge Ching was critical of the government's immigration law introduced after the handover. He said that the law was "totally absurd" as it could split family members who were born before and after a parent had met the seven-year permanent residency requirement. See *South China Morning Post*, January 13, 1999, p. 4.
 23. The Honourable Mr Justice Godfrey, Justice of Appeal, "Legal issue is what is at stake," Letter to the editor, *South China Morning Post*, May 12, 1999, p. 16.
 24. Reproduced in English in *Apple Daily*, May 20, 1999, p. A2. Godfrey's letter was dated May 19, 1999. Also see *Ming Pao*, May 20, 1999, p. A8. A spokesperson for the Judiciary said it had no comment on Godfrey's letter, which was just "an individual opinion." *Hong Kong Standard*, May 20, 1999, p. 3. Godfrey's letter aroused the concern of three mainland Chinese legal academics researching comparative law at the City University of Hong Kong. The three academics interpreted his letter as "implying that it is procedurally inappropriate for the government to request the NPC to interpret the Basic Law." For this interpretation of Godfrey's letter, see Lin Leifan, Ku Minkang, and Zhu Guobin, "Judges cannot resist the NPC's interpretation," *Ming Pao*, May 25, 1999, p. B13.
 25. *South China Morning Post*, May 4, 1999, p. 3. Also see *Apple Daily*, May 4, 1999, p. A4.
 26. *South China Morning Post*, May 17, 1999, p. 3.
 27. *Ibid.*
 28. This was one of the sections in the CFA's judgment in the Final Appeal Numbers 14, 15, and 16 of 1998. The judgment was made on January 29, 1999.
 29. *Ibid.*
 30. See *Oriental Daily*, February 7, 1999, p. A19. *Ming Pao*, February 7, 1999, p. A4. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, February 8, 1999, p. 1.
 31. *South China Morning Post*, February 8, 1999, p. 1.
 32. *Hong Kong Standard*, February 8, 1999, p. 2.

33. *South China Morning Post*, February 26, 1999, p. 1.
34. *Ibid.* Also see *Ming Pao*, April 30, 1999, p. A6.
35. Cited in Felix Lo, “NPC a good option to help settle abode issue,” *China Daily*, May 17, 1999, p. 1. *China Daily* used the word “reinterpretation,” which was not a term accepted by the HKSAR government. I therefore use the word interpretation instead of reinterpretation. The HKSAR government said that the term reinterpretation “is only apt to describe the situation where the same body interprets the relevant legal provisions for a second time. The present case does not fit that description. The NPC Standing Committee, as a higher authority, will be interpreting the provisions for the first time.” See Pamela Tan, Director of Administration and Development, Department of Justice, “Interpreting provisions,” Letter to the editor, *South China Morning Post*, June 26, 1999, p. 14.
36. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, June 21, 1999, p. 4 and *South China Morning Post*, June 21, 1999, p. 4.
37. *Hong Kong Standard*, February 8, 1999, p. 2.
38. *Hong Kong Standard*, February 8, 1999, p. 2.
39. *Ming Pao*, May 5, 1999, p. A6.
40. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, April 29, 1999, p. 2.
41. *Hong Kong Standard*, February 8, 1999, p. 2.
42. *Hong Kong Standard*, June 27, 1999, p. 2. See the remarks made by Maria Tam and Anthony Neoh, the Hong Kong members of the Basic Law Committee.
43. See the remarks of Maria Tam in *Oriental Daily*, June 27, 1999, p. 1.
44. The most effective way, according to Maria Tam and Raymond Wu, was the government’s request of the NPC to interpret the Basic Law. See *Hong Kong Commercial Daily*, May 9, 1999, p. A12. For Tam’s similar remarks, see *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, May 10, 1999, p. 7.
45. *South China Morning Post*, May 3, 1999, p. 1.
46. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, February 8, 1999, p. 5.
47. *Apple Daily*, February 13, 1999, p. F2.
48. *Apple Daily*, February 27, 1999, p. A1.
49. *Ming Pao*, May 19, 1999, p. A6.
50. *South China Morning Post*, May 16, 1999, p. 2.
51. *Oriental Daily*, March 1, 1999, p. A19.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*
54. Editorial, “It is time constitutional row ended,” *Ming Pao*, March 1, 1999, p. E8.
55. See Chen’s article, “The survival of the rule of law rests on one idea,” *Ming Pao*, February 9, 1999, p. A8. Another Committee member, Anthony Neoh, attempted to play down the incident by saying that the mainland legal experts might “misunderstand” the CFA’s judgment, which according to him did not intend to challenge the NPC authority. *Ibid.*

56. See his “Participating in revising the Basic Law, developing the spirit of self-governance,” *Ming Pao*, March 15, 1999, p. E9.
57. *Ming Pao*, May 22, 1999, p. A9.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Oriental Daily*, February 26, 1999, p. A19.
60. *Apple Daily*, May 22, 1999, p. A19.
61. *Oriental Daily*, May 30, 1999, p. A19. Also see *The Sun*, May 30, 1999, p. A11.
62. *Ming Pao*, May 21, 1999, p. A6.
63. See *Ming Pao*, May 30, 1999, p. A8.
64. *Ibid.*
65. See *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, May 22, 1999, p. 4. Tam said that the time might not be ripe for the establishment of constitutional convention, for the right of abode issue was only one court case.
66. See Ng, “Horrible Constitutional Convention,” *Ming Pao*, June 2, 1999, p. A32.
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Ibid.*
69. Liu is with the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong. See his “Writing before the interpretation by the NPC Standing Committee,” *Ming Pao*, May 22, 1999, p. B12.
70. Remarks made by Democratic Party member and legislator Cheung Man-kwong. *Hong Kong Standard*, May 18, 1999, p. 4.
71. See Michael Allen, Brian Thompson, and Bernadette Walsh, *Cases & Materials On Constitutional & Administrative Law* (London: Blackstone, 1994), p. 247.
72. *Hong Kong Standard*, June 13, 1999, p. 2.
73. Six of them were from Hong Kong and the other half from the PRC.
74. *Apple Daily*, June 19, 1999, p. A15. *South China Morning Post*, June 19, 1999, p. 2.
75. *Hong Kong Standard*, June 19, 1999, p. 1.
76. *Ibid.* Also see *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, June 19, 1999, p. 4.
77. See Yash Ghai, “Framework to judge law,” *South China Morning Post*, October 6, 1997, p. 21.
78. *Ming Pao*, May 18, 1999, p. A6. Nine Hong Kong NPC members did not sign their names. They included Jiang Enzhu (the head of the NCNA who did not want to express his view), Rita Fan (the President of the Legislative Council), Allen Lee (who opposed the NPC interpretation), Wong Po-yan, Ng Hong-mun, Maria Tam, Raymond Wu (who were the Hong Kong members of the Basic Law Committee and who did not want to express their views), Tso Wang-wai and Wong Man-kong (who both advocated the idea of asking the CFA to “rectify” its decision). Also see *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, May 17, 1999, p. 5.
79. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, May 18, 1999, p. 7.
80. He was one of the outspoken Hong Kong NPC members on the right of abode issue. Ma, a member of the pro-China Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong, advocated that the central government should help

- the HKSAR government to deal with the influx of population. See his “The central government should assist [us] in solving the CFA incident,” *Ming Pao*, March 16, 1999, p. E6. Ma also argued in February that “[i]f the CFA refuses to clarify or gives a clarification which is unacceptable, that means the mistakes have not been corrected and action should be taken to get the problem fixed.” See *South China Morning Post*, February 26, 1999, p. 4. Ma at one point insisted that he would initiate a motion to the NPC to “clarify” issues related to the CFA’s ruling. See *Oriental Daily*, February 26, 1999, p. A19.
81. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, March 15, 1999, p. 5. Also see *Apple Daily*, March 15, 1999, p. A6.
 82. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, March 15, 1999, p. 5.
 83. *South China Morning Post*, June 14, 1999, p. 4.
 84. *Ibid.*
 85. *Hong Kong Standard*, May 21, 1999, p. 2.
 86. *Ibid.*
 87. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, May 4, 1999, p. 10. Also see *Hong Kong Standard*, April 30, 1999, p. 1.
 88. *Apple Daily*, February 13, 1999, p. A6.
 89. *Apple Daily*, May 4, 1999, p. A4.
 90. *South China Morning Post*, June 21, 1999, p. 4.
 91. *Hong Kong Standard*, June 22, 1999, p. 2.
 92. *South China Morning Post*, May 3, 1999, p. 1; June 10, 1999, p. 19 and June 23, 1999, p. 1. Also see *Oriental Daily*, May 3, 1999, p. A19. Allen Lee, “We have to fight for the rule of law,” *Ming Pao*, May 29, 1999, p. B14. Also see *Apple Daily*, May 17, 1999, p. A12.
 93. See his “Only hope that the NPC will make an impartial decision,” *Ming Pao*, May 8, 1999, p. B12.
 94. *Hong Kong Standard*, May 3, 1999, p. 3. Also see *Oriental Daily*, May 3, 1999, p. A19.
 95. *South China Morning Post*, February 8, 1999, p. 4.
 96. Chris Yeung and No Kwai-yan, “The ties that bind our NPC deputies,” *South China Morning Post*, March 16, 1999, p. 19.
 97. See Lau Yui-shiu, “The central government does not need to worry about the uncontrollable Hong Kong NPC members,” *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, March 17, 1999, p. 9.
 98. *Ibid.*
 99. Terry Cheng, “NPC deputies face dilemma on dual roles,” *Hong Kong Standard*, March 17, 1999, p. 11.
 100. *South China Morning Post*, January 9, 1999, p. 5.
 101. *South China Morning Post*, February 2, 1999, p. 1.
 102. Daily Information Bulletin of the HKSAR Government, “Government Statement on CFA’s Judgment,” January 29, 1999.
 103. See Editorial, “Happily accepting the judgment, calmly facing the

- consequences,” *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, February 6, 1999, p. 1. Also see Editorial, “Ending confusion,” *South China Morning Post*, February 2, 1999, p. 16, which said “One of the most encouraging aspects of the CFA’s decision on right of abode for mainland-born children is the way it has been so unhesitatingly accepted by the Government.”
104. *South China Morning Post*, February 5, 1999, p. 19.
 105. Margaret Ng, “Justice speaks with a clear voice,” *South China Morning Post*, February 5, 1999, p. 19.
 106. Daily Information Bulletin, “Chief Executive’s media session on the CFA ruling,” February 10, 1999.
 107. The word “inform” was from *Apple Daily*, February 27, 1999, p. A14. The word “forewarn” was from “Statement by the Secretary for Justice at Legislative Council House Committee Meeting, March 5, 1999.”
 108. Remarks made by Martin Lee Chu-ming, Margaret Ng, and Emily Lau. See *Apple Daily*, February 27, 1999, p. A14. However, Leung argued that “[t]o regard the application itself as applying political pressure on the court is entirely wrong. The CFA itself regarded the application as proper in the exceptional circumstances.” See “Statement by the Secretary for Justice at the Legislative Council House Committee Meeting, May 5, 1999.”
 109. Daily Information Bulletin, “Government applies by motion to CFA for clarification.” February 24, 1999.
 110. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, May 3, 1999, p. 6.
 111. *Apple Daily*, May 4, 1999, p. A4.
 112. *South China Morning Post*, May 6, 1999, p. 6.
 113. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, May 6, 1999, p. 7.
 114. *Ming Pao*, May 3, 1999, p. A2.
 115. *Ibid.*
 116. Daily Information Bulletin, “Interpretation: A legal and constitutional option,” May 18, 1999.
 117. *Ibid.*
 118. Ip’s remarks in the legislature on May 19, 1999, broadcast live at the Cable TV.
 119. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, May 20, 1999, p. 7.
 120. *South China Morning Post*, May 20, 1999, p. 3.
 121. *Oriental Daily*, June 3, 1999, p. A19.
 122. Daily Information Bulletin, “Chief Executive’s report to State Council,” June 10, 1999.
 123. *Ibid.*
 124. Remarks made by Cheung Tat-ming, see *Ming Pao*, May 13, 1999, p. A11. He also questioned whether the HKSAR government had the right to request the State Council to ask the NPC to interpret the Basic Law.
 125. Daily Information Bulletin, “Chief Secretary for Administration’s Transcript,” May 19, 1999.

126. *South China Morning Post*, May 20, 1999, p. 3.
127. Daily Information Bulletin, “Secretary for Justice calls for understanding to implement ‘One Country, Two Systems,’” May 22, 1999.
128. Daily Information Bulletin, “Transcript of media session on the NPC Standing Committee’s interpretation of the Basic Law,” June 26, 1999.
129. *Oriental Daily*, May 5, 1999, p. A19.
130. *Oriental Daily*, June 30, 1999, p. A19.
131. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, June 30, 1999, p. 6.
132. *South China Morning Post*, June 30, 1999, p. 1.
133. *The Sun*, June 28, 1999, p. A6.
134. *Ming Pao*, May 26, 1999, p. A9.
135. *Ming Pao*, May 5, 1999, p. A6.
136. *The Sun*, May 10, 1999, p. A4.
137. *Oriental Daily*, June 28, 1999, p. A19.
138. See his “Rule of law is intact,” *Hong Kong Standard*, June 26, 1999, p. 11.
139. *Hong Kong Standard*, May 4, 1999, p. 3.
140. *Apple Daily*, February 27, 1999, p. A14.
141. *Hong Kong Standard*, June 22, 1999, p. 2.
142. *Hong Kong Standard*, February 2, 1999, p. 1.
143. *Apple Daily*, February 9, 1999, p. A1. *Oriental Daily*, February 9, 1999, p. A19.
144. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, March 8, 1999, p. 6.
145. *Hong Kong Standard*, May 6, 1999, p. 1. *Apple Daily*, May 6, 1999, p. A2.
146. *Oriental Daily*, May 4, 1999, p. A19. Also see *Wen Hui Pao*, May 4, 1999, p. A12.
147. *Ming Pao*, May 1, 1999, p. A3.
148. *South China Morning Post*, June 24, 1999, p. 1.
149. *Hong Kong Standard*, June 23, 1999, p. 1.
150. *South China Morning Post*, June 28, 1999, p. 1. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, June 28, 1999, p. 5. *Apple Daily*, June 28, 1999, p. A8.
151. *Ming Pao*, June 24, 1999, p. A10.
152. *South China Morning Post*, May 6, 1999, p. 6.
153. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, June 23, 1999, p. 5.
154. *Ming Pao*, June 23, 1999, p. A1 and p. B13.
155. Letter to the editor (name and address of the author supplied), “Farcical to ask judges to change their tune,” *South China Morning Post*, February 27, 1999, p. 14.
156. *Hong Kong Standard*, February 26, 1999, p. 4.
157. *South China Morning Post*, March 16, 1999, p. 6. But Chang Hsin, a legal researcher at the Chinese University, said it was unrealistic to propose a referendum because its result might embarrass the central government.
158. *South China Morning Post*, 26 February 26, 1999, p. 1.
159. Wong Man-tai, “Clarifying the judgement undermines the rule of law,” *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, March 1, 1999, p. 6. Also see Editorial, “Undermining

- the rule of law, having serious consequences,” *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, February 27, 1999, p. 1.
160. Yash Ghai, “The theatre of the law,” *South China Morning Post*, March 1, 1999, p. 23.
 161. Editorial, “Best Way Out,” *South China Morning Post*, February 27, 1999, p. 14.
 162. Cited in Quinton Chan and Samantha Wong, “Judges ‘left in awkward position,’” *South China Morning Post*, June 27, 1999, p. 3. Also see the article by Cheung Man-kyong, a member of the Democratic Party led by Martin Lee, “The Tung clique’s inauspicious bell over the rule of law,” *Ming Pao*, May 21, 1999, p. B13.
 163. *Hong Kong Standard*, May 20, 1999, p. 3.
 164. *Apple Daily*, May 18, 1999, p. A2.
 165. *Apple Daily*, May 11, 1999, p. A20.
 166. *Ming Pao*, June 14, 1999, p. A10 and June 16, 1999, p. A9.
 167. Editorial, “Judgment may open floodgates,” *Hong Kong Standard*, June 12, 1999, p. 14. The editorial criticized the Court of Appeal’s judgment on June 11 that 17 appellants could not be deported by the government which had not set up a scheme to verify their claim to the right of abode in Hong Kong.
 168. Editorial, “Judges must not play at politics,” *Hong Kong Standard*, May 20, 1999, p. 10.
 169. Editorial, “The situation is decided and do not believe in dangerous remarks,” *Oriental Daily*, May 20, 1999, p. A19.
 170. See “Speak out for the law,” *South China Morning Post*, May 30, 1999, p. 10.
 171. Chris Yeung, “Judicial powers bound,” *South China Morning Post*, June 28, 1999, p. 19.
 172. Chris Tsang Chi-ping, “Principle will be undermined,” Letter to the editor, *South China Morning Post*, June 21, 1999, p. 16.
 173. Colin Campbell, “Court should have sought NPC interpretation,” Letter to the editor, *South China Morning Post*, May 21, 1999, p. 16.
 174. Richard Lord, “Government’s bold decision,” *South China Morning Post*, May 21, 1999, p. 16.
 175. Ng Chi-sum, “Invite the Basic Law drafters to apologize,” *Apple Daily*, May 7, 1999, p. F3.
 176. See Poon Kwok-sum, “Drafters become criminals for thousand years,” Letter to the editor, *Apple Daily*, February 5, 1999, p. F3.
 177. *The Sun*, May 14, 1999, p. A18.
 178. *South China Morning Post*, May 8, 1999, p. 4.
 179. *Apple Daily*, May 9, 1999, p. A6.
 180. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, June 29, 1999, p. 7.
 181. For a detailed discussion about constitutional conventions, see Colin R. Munro, *Studies in Constitutional Law* (London: Butterworths, 1987), Chapter 3, pp. 35–60. For an argument that other constitutional conventions, such as the need

for “ministers” to resign in the event of making blunders and having personal scandals, should be seriously studied and implemented by the HKSAR government, see Lo Shiu-hing, Yu Wing-yat, Kwong Kam-kwan, Wan Kwok-fai, and Cheung Yat-fung, *The Tung Chee-Hwa Government’s Governing Crisis and its Solutions* (in Chinese) (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Publisher, 2002), Chapter 2.

4 The Emergence of Constitutional Conventions

1. The earlier version of this chapter was an article published in the *Hong Kong Law Journal* (Part 1, 2005), pp. 103–128.
2. See A. V. Dicey, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (London: Macmillan, 10th Edition, 1959), pp. 23–24. Numerous experts in constitutional law analyze the question of conventions. For examples, see Colin R. Munro, *Studies in Constitutional Law* (London: Butterworths, 1987), pp. 35–39; Colin Turpin, *British Government and the Constitution: Text, Cases and Materials* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), pp. 96–115; Peter W. Hogg, *Constitutional Law of Canada* (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), pp. 9–20; Joseph Jaconelli, “The Nature of Constitutional Convention,” *Legal Studies*, vol. 19, no. 1 (March 1999), pp. 24–46; Geoffrey Marshall, *Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Andrew Heard, *Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law and Politics* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991); Geoffrey Marshall and Graeme Moodie, *Some Problems of the Constitution* (London: Hutchinson, 1959); Eugene A. Forsey, “The Courts and the Conventions of the Constitution,” *UNB Law Journal*, 33 (1984); Stanley De Smith and Rodney Brazier, *Constitutional and Administrative Law* (London: Penguin, 1994), pp. 35–48.
3. Sir Ivor Jennings, *The Law and the Constitution* (London: University of London Press 1959), pp. 39–40.
4. John P. Mackintosh, *The British Cabinet* (London: Stevens, 1977).
5. For a similar approach to identifying the variety of constitution conventions, see Andrew Heard, “Recognizing the Variety among Constitutional Conventions,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. XXII, no. 1 (1989).
6. Hilaire Barnett, *Constitutional & Administrative Law* (London: Cavendish, 1995), p. 30.
7. Hogg, *Constitutional Law of Canada* (n 1 above), p. 16.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
9. Jennings, *The Law and the Constitution* (n 2 above), p. 136.
10. Geoffrey Marshall, ed., *Ministerial Responsibility* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
11. See Robert F. Adie and Paul G. Thomas, eds., *Canadian Public Administration: Problematic Perspectives* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1982), Chapter 8,

- pp. 261–300. Also see S. L. Sutherland, “Responsible Government and Ministerial Responsibility: Every Reform Is Its Own Problem,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. XXIV, no. 1 (March 1991), pp. 91–120.
12. Yash Ghai, *Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the Basic Law* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), p. 17.
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. Stephen Davies with Elfed Roberts, *Political Dictionary for Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1990), p. 85.
 15. *Ibid.*
 16. Yash Ghai, “Framework to judge law,” *South China Morning Post*, October 6, 1997, p. 21.
 17. See Lo Shiu-hing, “The Politics of Judicial Autonomy in Hong Kong,” paper presented at a conference on Hong Kong at the University of Warwick, July 1999. For the earlier controversies over the composition and powers of the Court of Final Appeal, see Lo Shiu-hing, “The Politics of the Court of Final Appeal Debate in Hong Kong,” *China Quarterly*, no. 161 (March 2000).
 18. For details of the protests, see John P. Burns, *Government Capacity and the Hong Kong Civil Service* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 173–176; and Sonny Lo, “Hong Kong, 1 July 2003 — Half a million protestors: The Security Law, Identity Politics, Democracy and China,” *Behind the Headlines*, vol. 60, no. 4 (2004), pp. 1–14.
 19. See “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2008: Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress at its Ninth Session on 26 April 2004,” S. S. No. 5 to Gazette Extraordinary No. 8/2004, in <http://www.info.gov.hk/cab/cab-review/eng/basic/pdf/es5200408081.pdf> (accessed December 29, 2004). Also see “The Fourth Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force: Views and Proposals of Members of the Committee on the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2008 (December 2004),” in report4/pdf/fourthreport.pdf” <http://www.info.gov.hk/cab/cab-review/eng/report4/pdf/fourthreport.pdf>, p. 2, note 1 (accessed December 29, 2004).
 20. “The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC: Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress at its Eighth Session on 6 April 2004,” L. S. No. 2 to Gazette Ext. No. 5/2004, in <http://www.info.gov.hk/cab/cab-review/eng/basic/pdf/es22004080554.pdf> (accessed December 29, 2004).

21. For details of the British government's concessions made to the PRC over the issue of direct election of the Legislative Council, see Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Lo Shiu-hing, *The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong* (London: Macmillan, 1997).
22. For Patten's confrontation with China over his political reform blueprint, see John Flowerdew, *The Final Years of British Hong Kong: The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal* (London: Macmillan, 1998); Jonathan Dimbleby, *The Last Governor: Chris Patten & The Handover of Hong Kong* (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1997); and Lo Shiu-hing, *Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay* (New York: Nova Science, 2001), pp. 161–168.
23. For details, see "Framework of accountability for principal officials," press release, <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200204/17/0417251.htm> (accessed August 1, 2002).
24. Their post titles were Chief Secretary for Administration; Financial Secretary; Secretary for Justice; Secretary for the Civil Service; Secretary for Commerce, Industry and Manpower; Secretary for Constitutional Affairs; Secretary for Economic Development; Secretary for Education; Secretary for the Environment, Health and Welfare; Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury; Secretary for Home Affairs; Secretary for Housing, Planning and Lands; Secretary for Security; and Secretary for Transport and Works. See *Ibid.* These principal officials are hired on contract terms, unlike those civil servants who are on permanent terms of service. The term of their contract would not exceed the term of the chief executive, who nominated them for appointment.
25. The primary objectives of the accountability system, according to the government, are: "to strengthen the accountability of principal officials; ensure better response to the needs of the community; enhance coordination in policy formulation; strengthen the cooperation between the Executive and the Legislature; ensure effective implementation of policies and provide quality services to the public." See *Ibid.*
26. See, for example, Cheung Chor-yung, "The Quest for Good Governance: Hong Kong's Principal Officials Accountability System," *China: An International Journal*, vol. 1, no. 2 (September 2003), pp. 249–272.
27. Andrew Wong, "Political Accountability and Constitutional Conventions (in Chinese)," unpublished paper, October 2001. Lo Shiu-hing, Yu Wing-yat, Kwong Kam-kwan, Wan Kwok-fai, and Cheung Yat-fung, *The Tung Chee-hwa Government: Governing Crisis and Solutions* (in Chinese) (Hong Kong: Ming Pao, 2002), Chapter 2.
28. *Ibid.*
29. See Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong* (see note 21 above).
30. For a review of the role of the LegCo President, see Max Wong Wai-lun,

- “The meaning of ‘charge’: private member’s bills in the Legislative Council,” *Hong Kong Law Journal*, vol. 28 (1988), pp. 230–247.
31. For Patten’s political discourse, see John Flowerdew, *The Final Years of British Hong Kong: The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal* (London: Macmillan, 1998).
 32. See *The Central Committee’s Work Report* (in Chinese) (Hong Kong: The Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong, December 2002). For a discussion of the “partial” neutrality of Hong Kong civil servants, see Lo Shiu-hing, *Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay* (New York: Nova Science, 2001), pp. 106–112.
 33. For a more in-depth discussion of the dimensions of “political neutrality” of civil servants in the HKSAR, see Lo, *Governing Hong Kong*, pp. 106–112. For the myth of “political neutrality” of civil servants in Hong Kong under British rule, see Ian Scott, “Civil Service Neutrality in Hong Kong,” in Haile K. Asmerom and Elisa P. Reis, eds., *Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality* (London: Macmillan, 1996).
 34. Margaret Ng, “Loyalty is no substitute for accountability,” *South China Morning Post*, May 8, 2001, p. 18.
 35. Chief Executive Office, “Code For Principal Officials Under the Accountability System,” G. N. 3845, attached in Panel on Constitutional Affairs, “Background Brief prepared by Legislative Council Secretariat: Prevention of conflict of interest of principal officials and related issues,” LC Paper No. CB(2)1497/02–03(01), Chapter 2, especially 2.7 to 2.11.
 36. See the commentaries of the two pro-Beijing and pro-government newspapers months prior to the formal establishment of the POAS on July 1, 2002.
 37. Cannix Yau, “LegCo shamed by Leung vote,” *The Standard*, May 8, 2003, p. A3.
 38. See *Eastweek*, May 26, 2004, pp. 19–20.
 39. *Ibid.*
 40. Response of Leung to LegCo members’ questions, see “The Financial Secretary’s response to some of the matters raised by Legislative Council members at the meeting of the Panel on Constitutional Affairs on 17 March 2003 and at the House Committee meeting on 21 March 2003,” LC Paper No. CB(2)1692/02–03(03).
 41. Leung’s letter of resignation to Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, March 10, 2003, in LC Paper No. CB(2)1526/02–03(01), Annex.
 42. Chris Yeung, “I forgave an honest mistake, says Tung,” *South China Morning Post*, March 22, 2003.
 43. *Ibid.*
 44. See, for example, Editorial, “Chief Executive must let Antony Leung go,” *South China Morning Post*, March 19, 2003, p. 12. Also see Editorial, “A time of reckoning,” *The Standard*, May 7, 2003, p. A2; “Leung the Albatross,” *Sing Tao Daily*, March 25, 2003, p. F7; “Credibility Crisis,” *The Standard*, March 26,

- 2003, p. A15; Margaret Ng, “The case against Antony Leung,” *South China Morning Post*, March 28, 2003, p. 16; and Yeung Sum, “Abuse of Power?,” *South China Morning Post*, April 15, 2003, p. 14.
45. Personal discussion with Stephen Lam Sui-lun, the Secretary for Constitutional Affairs, on May 6, 2003.
 46. On July 25, 2002, the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited proposed that prices of listed companies’ shares quoted at below HK\$0.5 should be consolidated, failing which, delisting would follow. On July 26, 577 of the 761 stocks recorded a loss. On July 27, the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited announced its decision to withdraw its delisting proposal. This penny-stock incident prompted a panel of inquiry to investigate the role of Frederick Ma, the financial secretary, the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, the Securities and Futures Commission, and other related civil servants. For details of the report, see *Report of the Panel of Inquiry on the Penny Stocks Incident by Robert G. Kotewall and Gordon C. K. Kwong, September 2002* (Hong Kong: Printing Department, the HKSAR Government, 2002).
 47. In March 2003, the PRC President Hu Jintao promised support for Tung and said he believed the chief executive would be able to properly handle Leung’s alleged conflict-of-interest scandal. See *The Standard*, March 20, 2003, p. B4.
 48. Frank Ching, “Spin master,” *South China Morning Post*, August 1, 2003, p. 12.
 49. Ip once claimed that taxi drivers and MacDonald workers were uninterested in the debate over Article 23 of the Basic Law. She also asserted that direct elections brought about Adolf Hitler’s rise to power in Nazi Germany. Her public remarks offended many ordinary citizens. See Editorial, “Why Regina Ip should not take all the blame,” *South China Morning Post*, July 25, 2003, p. 12.
 50. Michael Ng, “Yeoh urged to resign,” *The Standard*, July 6, 2004, p. B1.
 51. *Ibid.*
 52. For a discussion of the SARS crisis, see Christine Loh, ed., *At the Epicentre: Hong Kong and the SARS Outbreak* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004).
 53. Dr. Yeoh Eng-kiong, “I fully accepted responsibility,” *South China Morning Post*, March 19, 2004, p. 14.
 54. See Editorial, “Passing the buck won’t fix health system,” *South China Morning Post*, March 17, 2004, p. 14; and Patsy Moy and Carrie Chan, “Health minister washes his hands of SARS battle,” *South China Morning Post*, March 7, 2004.
 55. See Dr. Wilson Fung Yee-leung, Vice-President of the Hong Kong Medical Association, “Dr. Yeoh should step down,” *South China Morning Post*, March 29, 2004, p. 2. Also see the remarks made by Lo Wing-lok, a former legislator, in Cannix Yau, “There’s hope if they quit,” *The Standard*, October 10, 2003, p. B2.
 56. *Ming Pao*, July 6, 2004.

57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*, July 8, 2004.
59. The Tung administration's legitimacy crisis could be seen even before the mass protests on July 1, 2003. See Lo, *Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay* (n 22 above).
60. Scarlett Chiang, "Law quits ICAC," *The Standard*, June 21, 2007.
61. *Ibid.*
62. For the Robert Chung incident in 1999, see Carole J. Petersen and Jan Currie, "Higher Education Restructuring and Academic Freedom in Hong Kong," *The Journal of Comparative Asian Development*, vol. 6, no. 1 (Spring 2007), pp. 143–163.
63. See *Sudden Weekly*, no. 493, January 7, 2005. Also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudden_Weekly (accessed March 14, 2005).
64. *Ibid.* Also see "Tung Chee-hwa's top aide resigns, reasons unclear," *Taipei Times*, January 8, 2005, p. 5.
65. Gianni Griveller, "The (not so glorious) end to Tung Chee-hwa's political career," *The Star*, March 14, 2005, in actionId=132&fArticleId=2446499" <http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=132&fArticleId=2446499> (accessed March 14, 2005).
66. TVB news, July 9, 2007. Also see "Union backs RTHK chief despite 'out of character' action," *The Standard*, July 9, 2007.
67. Una So and Diane Lee, "RTHK chief quits amid media frenzy," *The Standard*, July 10, 2007.
68. Chu's scandal came at a time when the HKSAR government tried to replace the RTHK, which was severely criticized for his financial mismanagement, with a new public service broadcaster as suggested by the Committee on Review of Public Service Broadcasting.
69. For Tung's formal resignation letter see *Sing Tao Daily*, March 13, 2005. In fact, it was reported that after the protests of half a million Hong Kong people on the streets against the HKSAR government on July 1, 2003, Tung twice offered to resign. But Beijing declined his resignation offers. See *Next Magazine*, no. 708, October 2, 2003, pp. 46–52.
70. *Ming Pao*, March 13, 2005.
71. *Ibid.*
72. See, for example, Audrey Eu's remarks, TVB News, March 14, 2005. Also see the remarks made by Ronny Tong, *Ming Pao*, March 12, 2005.
73. See Elsie Leung's statement reported in *Sing Tao Daily*, March 13, 2005.

5 The Implementation of the Basic Law

1. For a general discussion of the constitutional "positioning" and "repositioning" on Chapter 1 of the Basic Law, see Benny Y. T. Tai, "Chapter 1 of Hong

- Kong's New Constitution: Constitutional Positioning and Repositioning," in Ming Chan and Alvin So, eds., *Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong Kong* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 189–219.
2. *The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China* (hereafter *The Basic Law*) (Hong Kong: The Consultative Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, April 1990), p. 6.
 3. For a useful study of Hong Kong's democracy movement, see Alvin So, *Hong Kong's Embattled Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); and Lo Shiu-hing, *The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong* (London: Macmillan, 1997).
 4. *Ibid.*
 5. *Ming Pao*, May 27, 2007.
 6. *Deng Xiaoping On the Question of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 1993), pp. 7–8.
 7. Three major perspectives on China's democratic future are advanced by Pei Minxin, Gordan Chang, and Bruce Gilley. Pei Minxin argues that China's developmental autocracy has its limits in the difficult process of democratization. Gordan Chang has predicted the coming collapse of the mainland Chinese regime. Bruce Gilley argues that democratization in mainland China will be a matter of time. See Pei Minxin, *China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Gordan Chang, *The Coming Collapse of China* (New York: Random House, 2001); and Bruce Gilley, *China's Democratic Future: How it will happen and where it will lead* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
 8. Rao Geping, "'One Country' Must Dominate the Two Systems," in <http://www.hkjourn.org>, April 2006, pp. 1–6; Wang Zhenmin, "Why Does Hong Kong Still Matter?," in <http://www.hkjourn.org>, April 2006, pp. 1–6; Rao Geping, "Hong Kong can develop its capitalist system only under the framework of the 'One Country, Two Systems' policy," paper presented at the international conference "The Evolution of 'One Country, Two Systems' in Hong Kong and Macao: Implications for Canada," held on March 24, 2006 at the University of Waterloo; and Wang Zhenmin, "China's Legal/Constitutional Approach Toward Hong Kong and Macao," paper presented at the international conference, "The Evolution of 'One Country, Two Systems' in Hong Kong and Macao: Implications for Canada," held on March 24, 2006 at the University of Waterloo.
 9. "Close cooperation established between police and PLA Hong Kong Garrison Commander," *People's Daily*, May 12, 2007.
 10. For a study of how the police handled the anti-WTO protests, see Lo Shiu-hing, "The Politics of Policing the Anti-WTO Protests in Hong Kong," *Asian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 14, no. 2 (December 2006), pp. 140–162.
 11. It was rumored that the Executive Council member who toyed with such idea

- was the leader of the pro-Beijing Federation of Trade Unions Cheng Yiu-tong. For the half a million protestors on July 1, 2003, see John P. Burns, *Government Capacity and the Hong Kong Civil Service* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 173–176; and Sonny Lo, “Hong Kong, 1 July 2003 — Half a Million Protestors: The Security Law, Identity Politics, Democracy, and China,” *Behind the Headlines*, vol. 60, no. 4 (April 2004), pp. 1–14.
12. *Sing Tao Daily*, May 22, 2007, p. B3.
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. *Ibid.*
 15. *Ming Pao*, May 23, 2007, p. A12.
 16. *The Basic Law*, p. 12.
 17. For details of how the Liaison Office shaped the local elections, see Lo Shiu-hing, Yu Wing-tat, and Wan Kwok-fai, “The 1999 District Councils Elections,” in Ming Chan and Alvin So, eds., *Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2002); and Sonny Lo, Yu Wing-yat, Kwong Kam-kwan, and Wong Wai -kwok, “The 2004 Legislative Council Elections in Hong Kong: The Triumph of China’s United Front Work After the July 2003 and 2004 Protests,” in *Chinese Law & Government*, vol. 38, no. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 19–24.
 18. *The Basic Law*, p. 13.
 19. For a detailed analysis of the development of civil liberties and the rule of law in the HKSAR, see Johannes Chan, “Civil Liberties, Rule of Law and Human Rights: The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Its First Four Years,” in Lau Siu-kai, ed., *The First Tung Chee-hwa Administration: The First Five Years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2002), pp. 89–122.
 20. See the critical remarks made by Raymond Wong in all his short videos mounted onto www.youtube.com.
 21. See Human Rights Monitor, “Surveillance, Basic Law Article 30, and the Right to Privacy in Hong Kong: A Briefing Paper,” Legislative Council LC Paper No. CB(2)259i/05–06(01), October 2005, pp. 10–22.
 22. H. L. Fu and Richard Cullen, “Political Policing in Hong Kong,” *Hong Kong Law Journal*, vol. 33, Part 1 (2003), pp. 199–230.
 23. Thomas E. Kellogg, “A Flawed Effort? Legislating on Surveillance on Hong Kong,” in <http://www.hkjournal.com> (accessed May 24, 2007).
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
 25. *Apple Daily*, May 5, 2006.
 26. *Sing Tao Daily*, May 21, 2007, p. B4.
 27. *Deng Xiaoping on the Question of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 1993), p. 19.
 28. Albert Ho’s interview by OMNI news (Toronto, Canada) on May 28, 2007 at 9:00 pm.

29. Lo Shiu-hing, “Colonial Policy-makers, Capitalist Class and China: Determinants of Electoral Reform in Hong Kong’s and Macau’s Legislatures,” *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 62, no. 2 (Summer, 1989), pp. 204–218.
30. *Apple Daily*, December 12, 2005, p. A6.
31. In July 2007, the DAB vowed to support the direct election of the chief executive in 2017, but it was reported that its party heavyweight Tam Yiu-chung visited Beijing to consult the central government on the party’s new position. After his visit to Beijing, the DAB stressed that candidates for the chief executive elections would have to undergo “democratic procedures,” a term that appears to be favored by Beijing authorities. See *Sing Tao Daily*, July 7, 2007, p. B5 and *Today Daily News* (Toronto), July 7, 2007, p. B12.
32. *The Basic Law*, p. 38.
33. *The Basic Law*, p. 40.
34. *Today Daily News*, May 28, 2007.
35. Yash Ghai, “Framework to Judge Law,” *South China Morning Post*, October 6, 1997, p. 21.
36. For the complexities of the NPC Standing Committee’s legislative and constitutional interpretations, see Albert Chen, *An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China* (Hong Kong: Butterworths, 2004), pp. 118–128.
37. Wang Zhenmin, “The Roman Law Tradition and Its Future Development in China,” *Frontier Law China*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2006), p. 74.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
40. *Deng Xiaoping On the Question of Hong Kong*, pp. 17–18.
41. For a classic work on the clash of Hong Kong’s legal system with China’s, see Michael Davies, *Constitutional Confrontation in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1989).
42. Remarks made by Martin Lee, and cited by Margaret Ng during her visit to Toronto and in her public forum on May 25, 2007.

6 Identity Change from the National Security Debate to Celebrations of the Tenth Year Anniversary

1. For details of the debate over Article 23 of the Basic Law, see Cheung, “The Hong Kong System under One Country Being Tested: Article 23, Governance Crisis and the Search for a New Hong Kong Identity,” in Cheng, ed., *The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event*, pp. 33–69.
2. *Apple Daily*, July 17, 2003.
3. *Apple Daily*, July 6, 2003, p. A6.
4. *Apple Daily*, July 5, 2003, p. A2.
5. *Apple Daily*, July 5, 2003, p. 1.

6. Personal observations of LegCo's committee meetings on the National Security Bill from April to June 2003.
7. *Apple Daily*, July 1, 2003.
8. *Apple Daily*, July 9, 2003.
9. *Apple Daily*, July 5, 2003, p. A1.
10. Personal discussion with Tien's aide, August 2003.
11. *Apple Daily*, July 7 and July 8, 2003.
12. *Sing Pao*, July 8, 2003, p. A2.
13. *Apple Daily*, July 9, 2003, p. A2.
14. Although Ian Scott and Anthony Cheung insightfully trace the policy deadlocks in the HKSAR to the disarticulated nature of the political system and policy environment, neither of them has adopted a patron-clientelist approach to critically assess the failure of the National Security Bill. See Ian Scott, "Legitimacy, Governance in Post-1997 Hong Kong," *The Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 29, no. 1 (June 2007), pp. 29–50; Ian Scott, "The Disarticulation of Hong Kong's Post-handover Political System," *The China Journal*, no. 43 (January 2000); and Anthony Cheung, "Policy Capacity in Post-1997 Hong Kong: Constrained Institutions Facing a Crowding and Differentiated Polity," *The Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 29, no. 1 (June 2007), pp. 51–76.
15. Personal observations of LegCo's committee hearings on the public views with regard to the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill from April to June 2003.
16. Lo Shiu-hing, *Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay* (New York: Nova Science, 2001).
17. *Apple Daily*, July 8, 2003, p. A2.
18. *Apple Daily*, July 5, 2003.
19. Mao Zedong, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," October 1938, in Mao Zedong, *Selected Readings From the Works of Mao Zedong* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1971), p. 144.
20. For Xiao's detailed remarks, see Ming Pao, ed., *The Controversial Discussions on Patriotism* (Hong Kong: Ming Pao, April 2004) pp. 20–34.
21. *The Controversial Discussion on Patriotism*, pp. 59–118.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 107–112.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 174–178.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 165–173.
25. Lo Shiu-hing and Yu Wing-yat, "The 2000 Legislative Council Elections in Hong Kong," *Representation*, vol. 38, no. 4 (2002), pp. 327–339.
26. Kwok had a sex scandal involving his assistant and this case was interestingly investigated by a democrat who became a journalist.
27. For details of the elections, see Sonny Lo, Yu Wing Yat, Kwong Kam Kwan, and Wong Wai Kwok, "The 2004 Legislative Council Elections in Hong Kong: The Triumph of China's United Front Work After the July 2003 and 2004

- Protests,” in Sonny Lo, Eilo Yu, Bruce Kwong, and Benson Wong, eds., “The 2004 Legislative Council Election in the HKSAR,” *Chinese Law and Government*, vol. 38, no. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 3–29.
28. The Hong Kong Journalists Association found in 2007 that 60 percent of the journalists believed that at least some of their colleagues were exercising self-censorship. Francis Moriarty also wrote: “If journalists are playing safe, that suggests self-censorship.” See Francis Moriarty, “Press Freedom in Hong Kong: The Trend is Down,” in moriarty.pdf” www.hkjournal.org/PDF/2002_summer/moriarty.pdf, no. 2 (April 2007), p. 2.
 29. Personal observations as I have access to TVB and ATV news every day in Ontario, Canada.
 30. Personal discussion with a reporter in the HKSAR, July 2, 2007.
 31. Personal observations in the HKSAR, July 1, 2007.
 32. Cable TV news, July 1, 2007.
 33. “Hong Kong Current Affairs,” ATV, June 30, 2007 at 11:00 pm.
 34. TVB Sunday File, June 30, 2007.
 35. TVB (Pearl) on July 1, 2007 and ATV Newslines program, July 1, 2007.
 36. CCTV coverage of the tenth anniversary of the HKSAR, July 1 and July 2, 2007.
 37. CCTV (Channel 9), July 2, 2007.
 38. *Ibid.*
 39. *Ibid.*, July 1, 2007 at 8:00 pm.
 40. *Ibid.*, “Rediscovering China: Foreign Students in Hong Kong,” July 1 and July 2, 2007.
 41. CCTV (Channel 9), July 1, 2007.
 42. The Phoenix’s coverage of the HKSAR tenth anniversary on July 1, 2007.
 43. The Phoenix interview with Donald Tsang, July 1, 2007 at 1:00 pm. It was then broadcasted again on July 2, 2007.
 44. Tam is a very knowledgeable commentator on mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. For his blog, see http://blog.phoenixtv.com/index.php/uid_674350_action_viewspace_itemid_33059. Tim Hamlett is a professor at the Department of Journalism at the Hong Kong Baptist University.
 45. A reporter in the Phoenix revealed to the author that there was a “political gatekeeper” overseeing the remarks of the commentators and reporters, who needed a rehearsal and detailed discussion prior to the formal live broadcast. Personal discussion with the reporter, July 2005. A careful analysis of the views of the commentators is that most of their views tended to be politically safe and correct, notably the remarks of Peter Qiu on both Hong Kong affairs and mainland China’s relations with foreign nation-states. Qiu’s commentaries on China’s foreign relations can be regularly seen in *Today Daily News* (Toronto). On July 1, 2007, Qiu commented on the remarks made by President Hu on the HKSAR, and he praised the President’s emphasis on social harmony and tolerance. With the benefit of hindsight this was a politically correct comment,

although some Hong Kong print media (such as the *Apple Daily*) on the following day highlighted, in fact inaccurately, President Hu's "emphasis" on Beijing's veto over Hong Kong's political reforms. For President Hu's speech, see *Wen Wei Po*, July 2, 2007.

46. The Phoenix interview with Chris Patten, July 1, 2007.
47. *Apple Daily*, June 30, 2007, p. A1.
48. *Ibid.*, p. A2.
49. *Ibid.*, July 1, 2007, p. A1.
50. *Oriental Daily*, July 1, 2007, p. A1.
51. *Ibid.*, p. A30.
52. "Persisting Four Principles. Is it 'one country' or 'two systems'?" *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, July 2, 2007, p. 1. Also see "No dispute over the 'one country' principle, but 'two systems' need to take care of Hong Kong's circumstances," *Ming Pao*, July 2, 2007, p. A4.
53. For the strong Taiwan identity, see Daniel C. Lynch, "Taiwan's Self-Conscious Nation-Building Project," *Asian Survey*, vol. 44, no. (2004), pp. 513–533.

7 The Election of Hong Kong Deputies to the National People's Congress

1. For the first election held for the Hong Kong members of the NPC, see Suzanne Pepper, "Hong Kong Joins the National People's Congress: a first test for one country with two political systems," *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 8, no. 21 (July 1999), pp. 319–343.
2. *Xinhua News Agency*, November 18, 2002.
3. A candidate needed to obtain ten nominations. Ma Lik, a local NPC deputy from the DAB, claimed that some of the 953 NPC election panel members asked to nominate him. Thus, he said, "it amounts to a vote of confidence in our work." See *South China Morning Post*, November 2, 2002, p. 3.
4. For details, see Lo Shiu-hing, "'Legitimizing' the Selection of the Second HKSAR Chief Executive: From the Election Committee to the Chief Executive Election Bill," *China Perspectives*, no. 38 (November–December 2001), pp. 44–59.
5. Cheung obtained the nominations of 14 members of the Election Committee, more than the required ten nominations for a candidate to run in the election held for the Hong Kong NPC members. See *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, November 11, 2002, p. 5.
6. *South China Morning Post*, September 27, 2002, p. 2.
7. *South China Morning Post*, July 17, 2002, p. 6. However, the DP had four members who were eligible to register as voters in the NPC election but did not do so, including Szeto Wah and Andrew Cheng Kar-foo. See *South China Morning Post*, July 17, 2002, p. 6.

8. Chris Yeung, "Observer," *South China Morning Post*, November 20, 2002, p. 16.
9. *Ibid.*
10. See Kuan Hsin-chi, Lau Siu-kai, and Timothy Ka-ying Wong, eds., *Out of the Shadow of 1997? The 2000 Legislative Council Election in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2000); Kuan Hsin-chi, Lau Siu-kai, Louie Kin-sheun, and Timothy Ka-ying Wong, eds., *Power Transfer And Electoral Politics: The First Legislative Election in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1999); Ma Ngok, "The First HKSAR Election: Changed System, Changed Results, Changing Electioneering Techniques," in Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ed., *Political Development in the HKSAR* (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2001), pp. 139–164; and Shiu-hing Lo, Wing-yat Yu, and Kwok-fai Wan, "The 1999 District Councils Elections," in Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So, eds., *Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong Kong* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 139–165. For earlier studies on Hong Kong's elections, see Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds., *Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993); and Rowena Kwok, Joan Leung, and Ian Scott, eds., *Votes Without Power: The Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections 1991* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University press, 1992). For Pepper's work, see her "Hong Kong Joins the National People's Congress: a first test for one country with two political systems (see endnote 1)."
11. Usually, candidates who are CCP members or who are supported by the CCP have a greater chance to be elected than non-CCP members. For the recent local elections in China, see for example Li Lianjiang, "Elections and Popular Resistance in Rural China," *China Information*, vol. 15, no. 2 (2001), pp. 1–19; Kelvin J. O'Brien, "Villages, Elections, and Citizenship in Contemporary China," *Modern China*, vol. 27, no. 4 (October 2001), pp. 407–35; Li Lianjiang and Kevin O'Brien, "The Struggle over Village Elections," in Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 129–144.
12. *South China Morning Post*, November 30, 2002, p. 3.
13. *South China Morning Post*, November 30, 2002, p. 3.
14. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, November 30, 2002, p. 6.
15. *South China Morning Post*, November 30, 2002, p. 3.
16. *Apple Daily*, November 30, 2002, p. A15. The new chairman of the DP is Yeung Sum.
17. *South China Morning Post*, November 30, 2002, p. 3.
18. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, November 26, 2002, p. 7. The Chair Group had 15 members, including Chong Sai-ping, Li Ka-shing, Cha Chi-min, Chung Sze-yuen, Xu Ximin, Leung Chun-ying, Tung Chee-hwa, and Fok Ying-tung. They were elected in Hong Kong on November 1, 2002. Only 759 members attended the meeting on November 1, 2002. About one-fifth of the

- 953 members were absent. While 744 members of the Election Committee voted for their support of a list of the members of the Chair Group, Democratic Party member Chan Wai-yip voted against the members. Fourteen members abstained, including barrister Alan Leong and horse trainer Kan Ping-chee. The members of the Chair Group then elected Tung Chee-hwa as the Group's chairman. See *Apple Daily*, November 2, 2002, p. A6.
19. *Wen Wei Po*, November 26, 2002, p. A4.
 20. See *Oriental Daily*, November 2, 2002, p. A27; and *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, November 2, 2002, p. 7.
 21. *South China Morning Post*, November 30, 2002, p. 3.
 22. *Ibid.*
 23. *The Standard*, November 30, 2002.
 24. *Apple Daily*, November 30, 2002, p. A15.
 25. *Ming Pao*, November 29, 2002, p. A8. *Wen Wei Po* criticized the democrats for putting up a “political show.” See *Wen Wei Po*, November 28, 2002, p. A11.
 26. *Ming Pao*, November 29, 2002, p. A8.
 27. *Ibid.*
 28. *Ibid.*
 29. Cannix Yau, “Democrats fall at first hurdle in NPC ballot,” *The Standard*, November 30, 2002.
 30. *Oriental Daily*, November 30, 2002, p. A31.
 31. *Ibid.*
 32. *Ibid.*
 33. *Oriental Daily*, November 30, 2002, p. A31.
 34. *Ibid.*
 35. *Oriental Daily*, December 1, 2002, p. A31.
 36. *Wen Wei Po*, November 30, 2002, p. A4.
 37. Leung became “the queen of nominations” when she got a total of 270 nominations from the 953-strong election panel, but it would have “no bearing on her election chances.” See Chris Yeung, “Observer,” *South China Morning Post*, November 20, 2002, p. 16.
 38. *The Standard*, December 4, 2002.
 39. *South China Morning Post*, December 5, 2002, p. 3.
 40. *Ming Pao*, December 5, 2002, p. A2.
 41. *The Standard*, December 6, 2002.
 42. *South China Morning Post*, December 6, 2002, p. 2.
 43. Xu accused the democrats of creating troubles. He wrote: “Most of the 900 members of the Election Committee are experienced elites nominated by different sectors. Their interest cannot be bought. Apart from the need to take care of the overall situation of loving China and loving Hong Kong, it was difficult to manipulate the process. This time, in the nominating list, there were several people who publicly opposed the Chinese constitution and the Hong Kong Basic Law. Most members of the Election Committee did not

have to be reminded about these people. Most members had the automatic ability to resist the virus and poison . . . In fact, Hong Kong people's ability to distinguish the good from the bad has increased since the transfer of sovereignty. It was also impossible to distribute or allocate votes amongst the members of the Election Committee. In fact, in the first round of the election, voters were free to choose between one and thirty-six candidates, thus allowing several people who were against China to penetrate. But the second round needed a voter's choice of all 36 candidates. Otherwise the vote would be invalid . . . This election is successful, open, fair, just, reasonable and legal." See his "It is self-contradictory to talk about 'manipulating the election,'" *Wen Wei Po*, December 6, 2002, p. A18.

44. *South China Morning Post*, December 6, 2002, p. 2.
45. *South China Morning Post*, December 5, 2002, p. 3.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *South China Morning Post*, December 6, 2002, p. 2.
48. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, December 6, 2002, p. 7.
49. *South China Morning Post*, December 6, 2002, p. 2.
50. *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, December 6, 2002, p. 7.
51. *South China Morning Post*, December 6, 2002, p. 2.
52. Editorial, "Was NPC election rigged?," *Ming Pao*, December 5, 2002, p. E4.
53. Chris Yeung, "James Tien puts NPC election in perspective," *South China Morning Post*, December 8, 2002, p. 8.
54. Editorial, "Open, fair election, a credit to new era in Hong Kong," *China Daily*, December 4, 2002, p. 6.
55. *Ibid.*
56. Personal interview with Allen Lee, December 20, 2002. These lists were confirmed by Johnny Lau, who is a commentator on Chinese politics and who is very close to the pro-Beijing camp. Personal discussion with Lau, December 22, 2002.
57. Personal interview with Allen Lee, December 20, 2002.
58. *Ming Pao*, December 5, 2002, p. A2.
59. Chan Tung, "Is there any recommended list from the Liaison Office?," *Ming Pao*, December 5, 2002, p. A32.
60. *Ibid.*
61. *Ibid.*

8 A Fusion of Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Political Cultures in the 2007 Chief Executive Election

1. For Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement and its political hurdles, see Kuan Hsin-chi, "The Pro-Democracy Movement in Hong Kong," in C. L. Chiou and Leong H. Liew, eds., *Uncertain Future: Taiwan–Hong Kong–China Relations*

- After Hong Kong's Return to Chinese Sovereignty* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 1–22.
2. Ting Wai accurately captures the essence of Beijing's political relations with the HKSAR: "Some basic tenets of Chinese Communist rule are steadfast: the CCP controls the state, while the state controls society, although such control has slackened somewhat since the open-door and reform initiative began 20 years ago. The Chinese consider that national independence, territorial integrity, and reunification are national goals of utmost importance. Having integrated into the Chinese political order, Hong Kong is supposed to uphold the same principles governing the whole country." Ting Wai, "Hong Kong's Relations with Its Chinese Sovereign," in James C. Hsiung, ed., *Hong Kong the Super Paradox: Life after Return to China* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 267.
 3. Vicky Randall, "Why have the political trajectories of India and China been different?," in David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh, and Paul Lewis, eds., *Democratization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), pp. 208–214.
 4. See Anson Chan and Her Core Group, *The Road to Universal Suffrage* (Hong Kong: The Anson Chan Core Group, March 5, 2007), pp. 1–22. Also see *Toward Full Universal Suffrage: A Reform Model for Public Consultation on the Political System in 2012* (Hong Kong: The Democratic Party of Hong Kong, March 2007), pp. 1–22.
 5. Robin Theobald, "Patrimonialism," *World Politics*, vol. XXXIV, no. 4 (July 1982), p. 548.
 6. Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia," *World Politics*, vol. XXXI, no. 4 (July 1979), p. 572.
 7. *Ibid.*
 8. See Bruce Kwong, "Patron-Client Politics and the Chief Executive Elections in Hong Kong," *Journal of Contemporary China*, forthcoming 2007. For another discussion of Hong Kong's patron-client politics, see Lo Shiu-hing, *Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay* (New York: Nova Science, 2001), pp. 199–203 and pp. 273–280.
 9. Lucian Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 197–232.
 10. Ch'ien Mu, *Traditional Government in Imperial China: A Critical Analysis*, translated by Chu-tu Hsueh and George O. Totten (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1982), pp. 67–142.
 11. Jing Huang, *Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
 12. For the PRC case, see Benjamin C. Ostrov, "Clientage in the PRC's National Defense Research and Development Sector," in Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui, and Peter N. S. Lee, eds., *Informal Politics in East Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 215–233. A recent study has found that the CCP recruitment is showing a gradual decline in orthodox communist ideology and a more technocratic ruling party. See Gang Guo, "Party

- Recruitment of College Students in China,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 14, no. 43 (May 2005), pp. 371–393.
13. For the changes China’s loyal opposition, see Merle Goldman, *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 356–360. On the Chinese state’s control of the loyal opposition, see Anita Chan, “The changing ruling elite and political opposition in China,” in Garry Rodan, ed., *Political Opposition in Industrializing Asia* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 161–187.
 14. Sonny Lo, “Hong Kong, 1 July 2003 — Half a million protestors: The Security Law, Identity Politics, Democracy, and China,” *Behind the Headlines*, vol. 60, no. 4 (April 2004), pp. 1–14.
 15. Cannix Yau, “Back to square one for Tsang,” *The Standard*, December 22, 2005.
 16. The only democrat who abstained in the voting was Lau Chin-shek. Bishop Joseph Zen felt happy with the outcome of the vote. See Jonathan Cheng, “Zen happy about LegCo’s rejection of proposals,” *The Standard*, December 23, 2005.
 17. “Hong Kong Constitutional Reform: What Do the People Want?,” Survey Report of the Hong Kong Transition Project, commissioned by the Civic Exchange (December 2005), p. 38.
 18. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
 19. Personal communication with Professor Michael DeGolyer, December 2006.
 20. For details, see <http://www.eac.gov.hk> (accessed May 14, 2007).
 21. I calculated the figure based on the statistics from http://www.eac.gov.hk/en/ecse/ecse_2006_electionresult.htm (accessed May 14, 2007).
 22. See http://www.eac.gov.hk/en/ecse/ecse_2006_turnout.htm (accessed May 14, 2007).
 23. *Ming Pao*, January 31, 2007, p. A14.
 24. *Ming Pao*, February 7, 2007, p. A15.
 25. *Ibid.*
 26. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 6, 2007, p. B6.
 27. *Ibid.*
 28. *Ibid.*
 29. “Anson Chan will not contest election for Chief Executive,” September 23, 2006, in <http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=7297> (accessed May 14, 2007).
 30. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 10, 2007, p. B12.
 31. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 5, 2007, p. B1.
 32. It is interesting to note that Anson Chan and Alan Leong are also Catholics.
 33. *The Epoch Times*, February 16, 2007, p. A4.
 34. *Ming Pao*, February 15, 2007, p. A14.
 35. *The World Journal*, February 4, 2007, p. A22.
 36. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 1, 2007, p. B3.

37. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 1, 2007, p. B1.
38. *Ming Pao*, March 1, 2007, p. A17.
39. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 6, 2007, p. B6.
40. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 18, 2007, p. A19.
41. *Ming Pao*, February 14, 2007, p. A14 and also *Ming Pao*, February 14, 2007, p. D13.
42. *Ming Pao*, February 16, 2007, p. A14.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 3, 2007, p. B1.
45. *Today Daily News*, March 16, 2007, p. B8. Also see RTHK's program on the chief executive election forum on the night of March 15, 2007.
46. *World Journal*, March 16, 2007, p. A21.
47. *Ming Pao*, February 2, 2007, p. A21.
48. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 16, 2007, p. B3.
49. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 16, 2007, p. B3.
50. "Sparks fly in face-off," *The Standard*, March 2, 2007.
51. If political correctness in the HKSAR comes from the media representatives, who are intellectuals, the situation is no different from mainland China where intellectuals are the target of co-optation. See Joseph Fewsmith, "Where Do Correct Ideas Come From? The Party School, Key Think Tanks, and the Intellectuals," in David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan, eds., *China's Leadership in the 21st Century* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 152–164.
52. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 3, 2007, p. B1.
53. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 7, 2007, p. B1.
54. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 7, 2007, p. B1.
55. The top ten legislators in February 2007 were consecutively Rita Fan, Audrey Eu, Selina Chow, James Tien, Lee Cheuk-yan, Jasper Tsang Yok-sing, Emily Lau, Martin Lee, Leung Kwok-hung, and Albert Cheng King-hon.
56. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 13, 2007, p. B4.
57. For Victor Li's stance during the nomination period, see *Ming Pao*, February 5, 2007, p. A14.
58. *Today Daily News*, February 17, 2007, p. B1.
59. *Ming Pao*, March 15, 2007, p. A 16.
60. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 13, 2007, p. B4.
61. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 24, 2007, p. B4.
62. *Ming Pao*, March 19, 2007, p. A11.
63. *Sing Tao Daily*, January 23, 2007, p. B6.
64. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 15, 2007, p. B4.
65. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 19, 2007, p. B6.
66. "Democrats unveil suffrage proposals," *The Standard*, March 14, 2007, p. E19.
67. *Ming Pao*, February 2, 2007, p. A24.
68. Joseph Cheng, "'Eleventh 5-year' Action Plan Similar to Election Platform," *Sing Tao Daily*, January 26, 2007, p. B8.

69. “Optimistic blueprint will take courage,” *The Standard*, January 16, 2007.
70. *Ming Pao*, January 26, 2007, p. A18.
71. *Ibid.*
72. *Ming Pao*, February 1, 2007, p. A24.
73. *Ibid.*
74. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 7, 2007, p. B1 and March 12, 2007, p. B6.
75. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 7, 2007, p. B1.
76. *Today Daily News*, March 17, 2007, p. B4.
77. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 7, 2007, p. B8.
78. *Ibid.*
79. *Ming Pao*, March 7, 2007, p. A11.
80. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 12, 2007, p. B6.
81. *Ming Pao*, March 8, 2007, p. A13.
82. Editorial, “Empty talk on ideals without help on democracy, big changes in the constitution add more difficulties to the future of direct elections,” *Ming Pao*, February 13, 2007, p. A13.
83. *Ming Pao*, March 25, 2007, p. A9.
84. *Ibid.*
85. *Ibid.*
86. Personal communication with a member of the Election Committee, March 2007.
87. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 3, 2007, p. B3.
88. *Ibid.*
89. *Ibid.*, March 2, 2007, p. B3.
90. *Sing Tao Daily*, February 10, 2007, p. B3.
91. OMNI News (Toronto, Ontario), May 11, 2007.
92. See *Ming Pao*, March 16, 2007, p. A20.
93. *Ming Pao*, March 16, 2007, p. A15.
94. Editorial, “Public debate creates history, Leong’s performance better than Tsang,” *Ming Pao*, March 2, 2007, p. A14.
95. *Ibid.*
96. Editorial, “Donald Tsang apparently small but practically large, Alan Leong stylistically right but realistically left,” *Ming Pao*, February 26, 2007, p. A11.
97. *Ming Pao*, February 26, 2007, p. A14.
98. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 24, 2007, p. B4.
99. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 26, 2007, p. B4.
100. *Ming Pao*, February 23, 2007, p. A16.
101. *Ming Pao*, February 16, 2007, p. A14.
102. *Ibid.*
103. *Ming Pao*, March 25, 2007, p. A1.
104. *Sing Tao Daily*, March 26, 2007, p. A1.
105. “Government gifts make tourism sector a Liberal Party fiefdom,” *South China Morning Post*, March 31, 2007, p. 14.

106. Jimmy Cheung, “Tsang gets glowing report from Beijing,” *South China Morning Post*, April 3, 2007.
107. Tsang Yok-sing, “Still Observing the Election Result,” *Sing Tao Daily*, March 23, 2007, p. B1.
108. Editorial, “Tsang’s legacy tied to universal suffrage,” *South China Morning Post*, March 26, 2007.
109. Albert Wong, “Savoring victory on an open-top double-decker,” *South China Morning Post*, March 26, 2007.
110. *Ibid.*

9 Applying the Spirit of “One Country, Two Systems” to Taiwan’s Political Future

1. Jamie Allen, *Seeing Red: China’s Uncompromising Takeover of Hong Kong* (Singapore: Butterworth-Heinemann Asia, 1997); and Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990).
2. *Shijie Ribao*, November 14, 2004.
3. Yu-ming Shaw, ed., *The Republic of China on Taiwan Today* (Taipei: Kwang Hwa, 1989).
4. Chen Wei, “Taiwan unveils missile defences to a wary public,” *Globe and Mail*, October 23, 2004.
5. *Shijie Ribao*, November 15, 2004.
6. Peter Goodspeed, “China’s President now a player on world stage,” *National Post*, November 11, 2004.
7. Kenneth Liberthal, “Preventing a War Over Taiwan,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 2 (March/April 2005), pp. 53–63. Also see *Shijie Ribao*, November 11, 2004.
8. Byron S. J. Weng, “‘One Country, Two Systems’ From A Taiwan Perspective,” *Orbis*, vol. 46, no. 4 (Fall 2002), pp. 730–731.
9. Tony Saich, *Governance and Politics in China* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); and Jonathan Unger, ed. *The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002).
10. Yu Wing-yat, *Intra-Party Democracy and Democratization in Taiwan*, unpublished PhD Thesis, the University of Hong Kong, 2004.
11. “Taiwan Chen’s son-in-law charged,” BBC news, July 10, 2006.
12. Steven Mosher, *Hegemon* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000).
13. Bruce Kwong, *Patron-Client Politics and Elections in Hong Kong*, unpublished PhD Thesis, the University of Hong Kong, 2004.
14. Macao’s problem of governance can be seen in Sonny Lo, “Macao’s Looming Crisis of Governance: The Deeper Problems Underlying the Labor-Police Confrontations,” *Macau Closer*, June 2007, pp. 18–21. For an earlier work on

- how Edmund Ho built up his legitimacy, see Sonny Lo and Herbert Yee, “Legitimacy-Building in the Macao Special Administrative Region: Colonial Legacies and Reform Strategies,” *Asian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 13, no. 1 (June 2005), pp. 51–79.
15. Chang Jaw-ling, *Settlement of the Macao Issue: Distinctive Features of Beijing’s Negotiating Behavior (With Text of 1887 Protocol and 1987 Declaration)*, no. 4 (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1988), pp. 1–37.
 16. Joseph Cheng, ed., *Hong Kong in Transition* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986).
 17. *Ibid.*
 18. See his speech on *Wen Wei Po*, July 2, 2007.
 19. Kim Richard Nossal, “A High Degree of Ambiguity: Hong Kong as an International Actor after 1997,” *Pacific Review*, vol. 10, no. 1 (1997), pp. 84–103.
 20. *Ibid.*
 21. Cheng, ed., *Hong Kong in Transition*.
 22. ATV interview with Lu Ping, June 30, 2007.
 23. For details, see Chung Sze-yuen, *Hong Kong’s Journey to Reunification* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2001), pp. 70–71.
 24. *South China Morning Post*, September 27, 1997.
 25. Murray Scott Tanner, “The National People’s Congress,” in Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., *The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). In fact, during the March 2007 NPC meeting, mainland deputies became far more open to media questions and public criticisms — a positive sign of the PRC political development.
 26. Weng, “‘One Country, Two Systems’ From A Taiwan Perspective,” p. 715.

10 Conclusion

1. For the governing differences between Hong Kong and Macao, see Sonny Shiu-hing Lo, “One Formula, Two Experiences: political divergence of Hong Kong and Macao since retrocession,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 16, no. 52 (August 2007), pp. 359–387.
2. *Green Paper on Constitutional Development* (Hong Kong: The HKSAR Government, July 2007).

Index

- Academic freedom 128, 291, 318
- Accountability 3, 30, 31, 33, 47, 115, 116, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 131, 132, 139, 201, 270, 271, 286, 288, 289, 307, 311, 316, 317, 321
- Administrative officers 33, 34, 51
- American 41, 56, 71, 171, 229, 244, 247
- Annexation 7, 8, 10, 34, 37
- Anti-democratic 12, 15, 67, 75
- Anti-foreignism 173, 181
- Anti-Japanese protests 63
- Apple Daily* 62, 67, 85, 105, 153, 157, 165, 180, 182, 187, 192, 217
- Article 23 of the Basic Law 122, 124, 126, 131, 138, 139, 140, 141, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 168, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 173, 181, 202, 205, 211, 233, 234, 265, 266, 268, 269, 271, 290, 294, 311, 318
- Article 23 Concern Group 60, 164
- Asian financial crisis 12, 23, 28, 44, 45, 233
- ATV 1, 175, 176, 177, 182, 222, 263, 296, 306
- Authoritarianism 8, 10, 34, 174, 235, 270, 321
- Autonomy 14, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 28, 37, 54, 59, 60, 61, 67, 73, 76, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 113, 116, 123, 124, 134, 135, 136, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 157, 174, 179, 182, 198, 238, 250, 251, 259, 275, 277, 287, 314
- Chinese definition of 145
- economic autonomy 142
- in external relations 143, 144
- fiscal autonomy 28, 37
- Hong Kong autonomy 14, 16, 17, 22, 23, 54, 81, 88, 96, 100, 103, 113, 116, 123, 124, 134, 135, 144, 145, 147, 148, 158, 251, 259, 275
- judicial autonomy 14, 59, 60, 61, 67, 73, 76, 81, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 100, 103, 105, 107, 108, 146
- legislative autonomy 136
- media autonomy 179, 182
- personal autonomy 19
- political autonomy 198
- Taiwan's autonomy 79, 250
- Bar Association 103
- Basic Law 2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 17, 22, 23, 28, 34, 40, 42, 43, 46, 47, 50, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 73, 76, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 130, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 161, 163, 164, 169, 170, 171, 173, 178, 181, 202, 203, 205, 209, 211, 213, 216, 217, 225, 233, 234, 238, 239, 245, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 266, 268, 269, 271, 273, 274, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 283, 284,

- 285, 287, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294,
300, 307, 308, 311, 313, 318, 321
- Basic Law Committee 59, 90, 93, 95,
107, 108, 113, 135, 137, 144, 171,
178, 280, 281
- Basic Law Committee member 95,
107, 171, 178
- Basic Law interpretation 13, 14, 43, 52,
57, 59, 60, 62, 73, 82, 83, 84, 86,
87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 98, 99,
100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107,
113, 115, 130, 134, 144, 146, 147,
268, 274, 278, 284, 307
- Beijing 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38,
39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57,
58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66,
67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76,
77, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 89, 90, 91,
92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102,
104, 106, 108, 110, 112, 113, 114,
115, 116, 118, 120, 122, 123, 124,
126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133,
134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140,
141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147,
148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155,
156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 164,
165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 177,
178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184,
186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193,
194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200,
201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208,
209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216,
217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224,
225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232,
234, 235, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241,
242, 243, 244, 246, 247, 248, 249,
250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256,
257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263,
265, 266, 268, 269, 271, 272, 273,
276, 289, 291, 293, 294, 295, 297,
300, 301, 305, 306, 311, 312, 316,
317, 318
- Beijing-Taipei relations 37, 149,
182, 198, 225, 228, 234, 240, 242,
234, 248, 252, 257
- Beijing's fear of Taiwanization 13, 37,
256
- Bird-cage type of democracy 258
- Britain 1, 8, 21, 39, 70, 111, 174, 227,
231, 236, 237, 240, 241, 251, 254,
255, 259
- Bureaucratic politics 7, 21, 22, 34, 37
- Business 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 21, 25, 29,
32, 45, 47, 49, 53, 54, 58, 59, 65,
66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76,
87, 121, 140, 153, 155, 156, 160,
162, 168, 179, 187, 192, 195, 198,
204, 206, 208, 209, 212, 213, 214,
215, 218, 276
- business elites 11, 12, 13, 32, 49,
68, 74, 75, 76, 168, 208, 212
- business interest 58
- business party 75
- business profession 204, 206
- business sector 75, 153, 179, 214,
218
- business tycoons 12, 29, 140, 160
- Cable TV 176, 182, 276, 283, 296, 309
- Canada 91, 175
- Capitalism 34, 248, 232, 233, 235
- Capitalist 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 30, 35, 37,
54, 68, 70, 78, 132, 134, 135, 158,
161, 233, 234, 254, 262, 292, 294,
318
- Cardinal Zen 50, 51, 62, 179, 180,
268, 302
- CCTV 177, 178, 179, 182, 261, 296
- Censorship (also see self-censorship) 3,
32, 42, 70, 138, 151, 175, 176, 177,
181, 182, 218, 222, 239, 255, 263,
277, 296

- Central government 7, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 45, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 56, 57, 68, 73, 85, 88, 89, 92, 96, 101, 104, 114, 123, 124, 130, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 149, 157, 158, 159, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 181, 188, 189, 190, 193, 199, 200, 201, 205, 209, 210, 213, 215, 216, 217, 221, 223, 225, 232, 236, 251, 253, 255, 256, 258, 266, 273, 278, 281, 282, 284, 294
- Central-local relations 16, 92
- Central Policy Unit 31, 166,
- CEPA 3, 11, 23, 25, 35, 40, 52, 65, 70, 167, 215
- Chan, Anson 25, 26, 46, 47, 51, 66, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 180, 189, 200, 205, 216, 276, 301, 302, 310
- Chan, Margaret 126
- Chan, Tat-ching 262
- Chen, Albert Hong-yi 91, 178, 272, 294
- Chen, Shui-bian 13, 56, 169, 172, 228, 229, 230, 234, 239, 246
- Chen, Zuo'er 23, 176, 216, 271
- Cheng, Albert 40, 52, 56, 57, 165, 206, 303
- Cheng, Joseph 203, 213, 265, 303, 306
- Cheng, Yiu-tong 19, 122, 155, 157, 187, 191, 193, 215, 293
- Cheung, Anthony 42, 185, 186, 188, 190, 277, 295
- Cheung, Chi-kong 177
- Chiang, Ching-kuo 228
- Chief executive 1, 2, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 4, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 67, 68, 69, 73, 74, 83, 94, 99, 104, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 136, 137, 130, 140, 141, 142, 148, 153, 155, 156, 165, 166, 169, 170, 178, 179, 181, 185, 189, 192, 193, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 234, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 264, 265, 268, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 277, 283, 287, 288, 289, 290, 294, 297, 300, 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 314, 315
- chief executive election 4, 9, 17, 18, 44, 47, 69, 74, 136, 193, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 211, 212, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 256, 258, 264, 271, 294, 297, 300, 301, 303, 314, 315
- chief executive election bill 297, 315
- chief executive election campaign 74, 205, 209, 214, 224
- Chief Executive Office 33, 125, 289, 307
- replacement chief executive 49, 268, 270
- China's annexation of Hong Kong 8, 10, 34, 37
- Chinese civilization 15, 16, 34, 36, 43, 51, 174, 238, 253
- Chinese Communist Party 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 33, 34, 36, 37, 41, 43, 46, 49, 51, 68, 73, 76, 140, 141, 142, 145, 148, 168, 169, 170, 171, 181, 182, 198, 201, 230, 234, 250, 251, 262, 264, 295, 298, 301, 315, 317
- Chinese Foreign Ministry 22, 143, 216
- Chinese nationalism (also see nationalism) 73, 138, 181, 270, 321
- Chow, Selina 33, 156, 223, 303
- Chu, Pui-hing 129
- Chung, Robert 125, 177, 268, 291

- Civic Party 4, 161, 164, 213, 215, 218, 224, 262
- Civil liberties 1, 4, 42, 43, 50, 58, 62, 67, 73, 75, 76, 77, 148, 151, 159, 160, 165, 236, 239, 253, 254, 255, 271, 293, 310, 318
- Civil service 20, 30, 33, 40, 42, 45, 47, 129, 160, 179, 268, 287, 288, 289, 293, 310, 311, 319, 321
- Civil service party 20
- Clash of civilization 7, 15, 7, 34, 43, 263, 313
- Colonial mentality 255
- Commercial Radio 52, 266
- Common law 14, 42, 62, 67, 91, 99, 113, 132, 144, 145, 146
- Consensus 17, 26, 89, 93, 116, 121, 123, 141, 152, 171, 214, 218, 238, 245, 246, 252, 258, 259, 260
- Constitutional conventions 3, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 115, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 125, 127, 129, 131, 132, 133, 137, 144, 146, 147, 148, 285, 286, 288, 313, 315, 317, 321
- Convention of self-restraint 81, 90, 92, 93, 107, 108, 113, 132, 136, 141
- Convergence 2, 3, 4, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 59, 62, 63, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 233, 234, 253, 260, 266, 267, 268, 312, 313, 314, 317
- Convergence theory 41, 73
- Cooptation 32, 37, 263, 321
- Coordination 7, 24, 25, 26, 30, 36, 40, 46, 47, 52, 66, 124, 167, 276, 288, 321
- Corruption 8, 32, 34, 94, 126, 128, 259, 261, 265, 319
- Court of Final Appeal 59, 76, 81, 84, 113, 147, 277, 287, 315, 321
- CPPCC 130, 168, 196, 198
- Crime 27, 265
- Cross-border prostitution 26
- DeGolyer, Michael 177, 203, 261, 302
- Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong 10, 18, 30, 33, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 54, 56, 58, 62, 63, 74, 108, 118, 119, 122, 123, 125, 134, 142, 148, 154, 155, 156, 158, 160, 166, 172, 173, 178, 179, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 196, 204, 205, 215, 222, 223, 252, 270, 271, 281, 289, 294, 297, 320
- Democratic Party 42, 58, 68, 118, 119, 140, 171, 172, 173, 185, 187, 215, 222, 262, 281, 285, 297, 298, 299, 301, 320
- Democratic Progressive Party 13, 16, 37, 56, 140, 169, 172, 228, 230, 241
- Democratization 11, 15, 16, 17, 23, 36, 52, 54, 56, 57, 60, 68, 69, 75, 76, 78, 115, 132, 134, 140, 148, 162, 163, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 176, 199, 200, 209, 214, 217, 221, 222, 224, 225, 234, 255, 256, 257, 258, 262, 264, 267, 277, 288, 289, 292, 301, 305, 313, 315, 318, 319, 321
- Democrats 11, 12, 13, 16, 23, 31, 32, 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 67, 68, 69, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 119, 125, 138, 140, 141, 147, 155, 157, 162, 164, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 180, 186, 187, 188, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 208, 209, 211, 213, 214, 218, 221, 222, 257, 258, 259, 262, 268, 272, 299, 303
- mainstream 202, 203, 213
- pan-democrats 74, 203, 213, 214
- radical 74, 78
- social 138, 164, 202, 213, 218
- Deng, Xiaoping 1, 10, 14, 16, 20, 33, 40, 77, 135, 140, 145, 171, 176, 232, 238, 253, 262, 292, 293, 294, 302, 312, 313

- Dependence 12, 15, 65, 70, 74, 78, 233, 267, 313
 De-Sinification 79
 Direct elections 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 67, 69, 114, 117, 134, 137, 140, 142, 148, 163, 169, 170, 181, 186, 199, 205, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 222, 224, 255, 256, 257, 258, 272, 277, 288, 290, 294, 304
 District Councils 10, 19, 31, 44, 46, 137, 142, 186, 202, 207, 214, 262, 293, 298, 316
 Distrust 34, 47, 55, 148, 171, 200, 202, 257
 Divergence 2, 39, 43, 52, 53, 54, 62, 67, 68, 76, 77, 78, 79, 111, 267, 306, 312, 315
 Eu, Audrey 60, 174, 291, 303
 Executive Council 4, 19, 30, 31, 32, 44, 46, 47, 48, 84, 100, 101, 104, 112, 119, 121, 122, 123, 130, 134, 136, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 205, 211, 292
 Face 35, 44, 52, 82, 103, 168, 174, 189, 245
 Factional politics 34, 195, 201, 301, 313
 Factionalism 195, 201, 301, 313
 Factions 202, 242
 Fan, Rita 118, 187, 191, 196, 208, 281, 303
 Federalism 231, 232, 238, 258
 Federation of Trade Unions 30, 58, 155, 160, 164, 188, 192, 193, 215, 293
 Fiscal relations 7, 28, 35
 Fujian 15, 29, 24, 44, 58, 196, 233
 Functional constituencies 52, 53, 55, 57, 114, 115, 202, 210, 214, 257
 Gao, Siren 49, 166, 167, 194, 266
 Germany 145, 154, 290
 Ghai, Yash 93, 103, 104, 111, 144, 277, 278, 281, 285, 287, 294, 321
 Groups opposing Article 23 of the Basic Law 161, 162, 163, 164, 165
 Guangdong 15, 24, 25, 26, 32, 65, 71, 143, 195, 196, 262, 265, 273, 276, 308, 319
 Guanxi 4, 8, 9, 18, 22
 H shares 11
 Hardline 36, 57
 Hard-liners 155, 274
 Harmony 16, 51, 52, 68, 69, 117, 144, 163, 209, 211, 216, 221, 260, 268, 296
 HKSAR 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 193, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238, 239, 240, 251,

- 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 266, 267, 269, 274, 275, 276, 278, 280, 282, 283, 286, 289, 290, 291, 293, 295, 296, 297, 298, 301, 303, 306, 307, 308, 315, 316
- HKSAR tenth anniversary 2, 21, 28, 45, 67, 119, 136, 151, 154, 166, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 238, 240, 253, 254, 256, 259, 261, 263, 276, 296
- Ho, Albert Chun-yan 140, 141, 185, 186, 188, 222, 262, 293
- Ho, Cyd 222
- Ho, Edmund 26, 141, 236, 265, 306
- Ho, Stanley 29, 213
- Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic and Democratic Movement in China 9, 11, 141, 185
- Hong Kong and Macao Work Committee 22, 49
- Hong Kong external relations 22, 147, 148
- Hong Kong identity 51, 63, 64, 73, 76, 151, 155, 156, 157, 160, 165, 174, 176, 177, 181, 182, 214, 236, 254, 255, 256, 265, 275, 294, 311, 317
- Hong Kong Macao Affairs Office 21, 22, 23, 24, 49, 155, 157, 158, 166, 167, 168, 176, 255, 271
- Hong Kong Transition Project 12, 64, 177, 202, 263, 302, 312
- Hong Kong's relations with China 147, 148
- Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao bridge 25, 27, 35, 51, 66, 143
- Hongkongers 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 15, 32, 43, 52, 62, 63, 67, 68, 72, 90, 133, 134, 145, 148, 151, 155, 158, 165, 171, 176, 180, 181, 199, 202, 224, 241, 256
- Hongkongization of mainland China 8, 10
- Hu, Jintao 2, 22, 39, 49, 165, 230, 247, 262, 273, 290
- Huntington, Samuel 15, 43, 174, 263, 313
- Identity change 151, 153, 155, 157, 159, 163, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 182, 183, 294
- Independent Commission Against Corruption 8, 32, 126, 128, 169, 291
- Infrastructure 27, 28, 66, 67, 214
- Integration 3, 9, 26, 37, 66, 77
 economic 25, 37, 66, 67, 69, 75, 76, 276, 319
 political 37, 77, 266, 320
- Intermarriage 9, 276
- Internationalization of Taiwan's future 249, 252
- Ip, Regina 12, 44, 59, 97, 98, 99, 122, 126, 152, 153, 154, 159, 160, 206, 263, 269, 290
- Japan 228, 229
- Japanese 63, 145, 228
- Jennings, Sir Ivor 109, 286
- Jia Qinglin 216
- Jiang, Enzhu 49, 101, 281
- Jiang, Zemin 10, 17, 22, 40, 49, 98, 101, 151, 167, 215, 216, 230, 238
- Judges 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 105, 113, 139, 278, 279, 284, 285
- Judicial activism 86
- Judicial autonomy 14, 59, 60, 61, 67, 73, 76, 81, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 107, 108, 113, 146, 277, 287
- Judicial politics 254
- Judicial review 92
- Kuan, Hsin-chi, 44, 203, 213, 272, 273, 298, 300, 314,
- Kuomintang 37, 79, 240, 241, 251, 259

- Lam, Woon-kwong 128
- Lau, Siu-kai 166, 268, 272, 273, 293,
298, 310, 311, 314, 315
- Law, Fanny 128
- Law Society 101
- League of Social Democrats 138, 164,
202, 213, 218
- Lee, Allen Peng-fei 40, 56, 57, 94, 95,
156, 187, 189, 190, 192, 195, 206,
208, 222, 266, 271, 281, 282, 300
- Lee, Martin Chu-ming 23, 42, 44,
104, 119, 157, 171, 172, 173, 174,
180, 187, 193, 268, 276, 283, 285,
294, 303
- Lee, Teng-hui 228, 229
- Legislative Council 16, 19, 33, 44, 51,
52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 68,
69, 75, 86, 91, 94, 97, 98, 104, 112,
114, 115, 121, 130, 142, 148, 170,
172, 173, 175, 186, 193, 202, 204,
205, 208, 214, 115, 216, 217, 257,
264, 265, 272, 273, 277, 281, 283,
287, 288, 289, 293, 295, 296, 298,
307, 308, 311, 313, 314, 315, 316,
321
members 130, 289, 308
Secretariat 265, 289, 307
- Legislative Yuan 198, 242, 248
- Legitimacy 239, 263, 268, 275, 288,
289, 291, 295, 301, 305, 306, 311,
315, 316, 319
- Leong, Alan Kah-kit 4, 60, 136, 174,
202, 203, 207, 215, 216, 217, 220,
223, 224, 225, 299, 302, 304
- Leong, Chi-hung 120, 128
- Leung, Antony 50, 59, 122, 123, 124,
126, 127, 131, 132, 142, 159, 269,
271, 289, 290
- Leung, Chun-ying 19, 100, 122, 134,
211, 298
- Leung, Elsie 44, 60, 61, 84, 91, 97, 99,
100, 102, 114, 119, 122, 125, 130,
154, 169, 179, 291
- Leung, Kwok-hung 32, 69, 206, 208,
214, 303
- Li, Andrew Kwok-nang 85, 86, 95, 97,
278
- Li, Gang 216
- Li, Ka-shing 29, 49, 213, 298
- Li, Richard 49, 213
- Liaison Office 10, 18, 21, 22, 24, 36,
40, 49, 57, 58, 124, 137, 148, 157,
158, 166, 167, 168, 172, 186, 188,
189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196,
197, 216, 255, 258, 264, 266, 269,
271, 273, 293, 300
- Liao, Hui 23, 32, 49, 50, 98, 153, 155,
167, 270
- Liberal Party 9, 31, 32, 33, 47, 54, 59,
74, 75, 118, 119, 123, 125, 153, 155,
156, 157, 158, 189, 190, 192, 193,
194, 204, 205, 215, 223, 304
- Lien, Chan 240
- Lo, Vincent 67
- Loh, Christine 44, 120, 269, 270, 272,
290, 312
- Loyal opposition 201, 202, 203, 224,
225, 302
- Loyalty 10, 19, 31, 32, 33, 47, 49, 51,
69, 76, 139, 181, 197, 198, 201,
289
- Lu, Ping 21, 49, 140, 167, 176, 240,
306
- Lu, Xinhua 22, 216
- Ma, Lik 46, 58, 94, 95, 187, 189, 190,
191, 205, 215, 222, 297
- Ma, Ying-jeou 252
- Macao 5, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 29, 35, 40, 49, 51, 57, 66,
71, 85, 98, 114, 124, 138, 140, 141,
143, 216, 227, 230, 232, 233, 234,
235, 236, 237, 238, 246, 247, 248,
250, 251, 252, 253, 259, 260, 265,
266, 275, 292, 294, 296, 305, 306,
311, 315, 316, 318, 320

- Mainlandization of Hong Kong 10, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 175, 239, 252, 255, 258, 260, 266
- Mao, Zedong 170, 295, 317
- Mass media 2, 3, 17, 32, 42, 43, 58, 69, 97, 104, 125, 127, 129, 132, 138, 151, 154, 157, 165, 169, 170, 171, 175, 181, 183, 188, 194, 211, 212, 217, 223, 242, 252, 253, 256
- Political correctness 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 212, 263, 303
- Material benefits 32
- Migration 72, 93
- Military 9, 40, 71, 72, 135, 228, 229, 230, 232, 240, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 260, 261, 301, 312
- Military Affairs Commission 230
- Ming Pao* 180, 181, 182, 194, 217, 219
- Ministerial resignation 3, 124, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132
- Moriarty, Francis 177, 296, 317
- National People's Congress 4, 23, 24, 27, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 134, 135, 136, 137, 144, 147, 171, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 204, 206, 209, 213, 216, 217, 222, 250, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 294, 297, 299, 300, 306, 307
- elections 186, 194, 195, 196, 198, 297, 300
- Legislative Affairs Commission 61, 98, 102, 114
- members 4, 27, 84, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 101, 107, 108, 197, 217, 281, 282, 297
- National security 73, 134, 136, 151, 153, 155, 159, 161, 163, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183, 211, 318
- agents 138, 273
- bill 4, 60, 62, 142, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160, 164, 165, 167, 181, 182, 295
- national security law 211
- National Security (Legislative Provisions) 42, 48, 50, 119, 151, 152, 295
- Nationalism 73, 138, 181, 270, 321
- Ng, Margaret 23, 60, 92, 97, 104, 120, 123, 174, 213, 262, 268, 271, 274, 278, 283, 289, 290, 294
- Nomenklatura* 18, 19, 20, 34, 36, 263
- Non-material benefits 32
- North American Free Trade Agreement 24
- Olympics 9, 63, 73
- One country, one system 17, 235, 254
- One country, three systems 238
- One country, two systems 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 16, 29, 3, 35, 36, 40, 44, 45, 52, 53, 54, 65, 68, 70, 71, 76, 77, 78, 79, 89, 92, 97, 100, 130, 132, 135, 148, 167, 178, 180, 227, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 241, 243, 245, 247, 249, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 258, 259, 260, 262, 273, 284, 292, 305, 306, 307, 310, 312, 318, 320, 321
- One Country Two Systems Economic Institute 66, 177
- Partyization 20
- Patrimonialism 200, 201, 224, 261, 264, 301, 312, 320
- Patriotism 10, 12, 15, 20, 45, 48, 58, 63, 74, 140, 151, 170, 171, 172, 173,

- 178, 179, 181, 255, 256, 274, 275, 295, 317
 blind 255
 rational 15
- Patron-client pluralism 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 258, 261
- Patron-clientelism 7, 32, 33, 34, 74, 236, 254, 255, 258
- Patron-clientelist exclusionism 151, 170
- Patronage 32, 34, 44, 46, 47, 223, 265, 268, 320
- Patten, Christopher 47, 49, 54, 115, 123, 158, 180, 272, 288, 297, 312
- Peace Accord or Pact 245, 248, 249
- Pearl River Delta 24, 26, 276, 321
- People's Liberation Army 135, 136, 178, 292
- People's Republic of China 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 63, 65, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84, 88, 92, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 104, 107, 108, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 123, 124, 129, 130, 133, 134, 135, 138, 139, 140, 141, 146, 148, 151, 152, 164, 165, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 189, 197, 198, 199, 201, 206, 213, 215, 216, 218, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259, 260, 262, 264, 265, 267, 268, 270, 271, 272, 276, 278, 281, 287, 288, 290, 301, 306, 308, 318
- Phoenix 2, 179, 180, 182, 261, 296, 297
- Police 26, 30, 41, 45, 136, 153, 156, 157, 159, 173, 180, 214, 236, 247, 292, 305, 316
- Political bias 179, 217, 218
- Political correctness 21, 43, 45, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 212, 254, 260, 263, 303
- Political culture 4, 36, 71, 170, 199, 200, 223
 Hong Kong's 4, 17, 71, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 207, 209, 211, 213, 215, 217, 219, 221, 223, 225, 256, 300
 mainland's political culture, 11, 145, 171, 200, 201, 223, 224, 225, 245, 258, 264, 267, 275, 311
- Political parties 11, 57, 118, 148, 196, 210, 213, 265, 320
- Political reform 3, 14, 16, 17, 23, 49, 54, 56, 57, 67, 68, 75, 77, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 124, 133, 134, 141, 142, 154, 158, 162, 169, 170, 171, 181, 200, 202, 214, 216, 222, 225, 256, 257, 258, 268, 270, 272, 273, 288, 297, 302, 313, 314, 316
- Portugal 236, 237, 259
- Prevention of Bribery Ordinance 34
- Principal Officials Accountability System 3, 4, 30, 33, 34, 47, 50, 51, 115, 116, 119, 122, 123, 124, 129, 132, 271, 289
- Pro-democracy 2, 10, 20, 31, 57, 62, 67, 68, 123, 125, 133, 136, 139, 145, 153, 160, 172, 173, 180, 181, 197, 199, 200, 202, 204, 206, 212, 213, 217, 218, 222, 224, 236
 activists 54, 58, 73
 elites 11, 16, 17, 23, 30, 36, 48, 68, 133, 141, 146, 148, 170, 253, 254
 movement 78, 214, 300, 314
 parties 56, 142, 213
- Pro-independence 1, 13, 16, 37, 172, 182, 198, 240, 242, 246, 247, 248, 259

- Protests 8, 15, 24, 27, 33, 40, 41, 46, 48, 52, 56, 63, 69, 73, 74, 114, 124, 126, 127, 131, 136, 139, 141, 153, 155, 156, 158, 161, 165, 166, 172, 174, 176, 179, 180, 202, 236, 247, 262, 264, 271, 276, 287, 291, 292, 293, 296, 315, 316
- Public opinion 21, 35, 36, 104, 105, 106, 117, 122, 132, 155, 157, 158, 168, 177, 203, 217, 219, 240, 241, 242, 243, 248, 252
- Public Security Bureau 58, 91, 173, 273
- Qian, Qichen 22, 98
- Qiao, Xiaoyang 23, 61, 84, 98, 102, 213, 216, 257, 278
- Qing dynasty 90, 145, 181
- Radio Television Hong Kong 129, 177, 268, 291, 303, 315
- Rao, Geping 17, 135, 292, 318, 319
- Reunification 1, 37, 40, 65, 79, 148, 151, 182, 233, 234, 235, 238, 240, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 259, 260, 301, 306, 312
- Right of abode 3, 13, 14, 50, 59, 60, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 104, 105, 107, 113, 130, 134, 281, 283, 285
- Rule by law 201
- Rule of law 3, 10, 16, 34, 36, 42, 43, 65, 70, 76, 87, 90, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 159, 160, 161, 163, 201, 239, 253, 254, 268, 274, 277, 279, 280, 282, 284, 285, 293, 310, 317, 321
- SCNPC 13, 14, 15, 27, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 73, 75, 76, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 113, 114, 115, 130, 134, 136, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 161, 250, 257, 258, 274
- Scott, James 29, 34, 261
- Sedition 2, 40, 50, 122, 138, 161, 202, 234
- Self-censorship 3, 32, 42, 70, 138, 151, 175, 176, 177, 181, 182, 218, 222, 239, 255, 263, 277, 296
- Separate voting mechanism 115
- Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 2, 23, 28, 40, 45, 46, 66, 122, 126, 127, 128, 131, 159, 160, 165, 215, 236, 269, 290, 312, 316
- Shanghai 12, 22, 51, 67, 71, 233, 273
- Shenzhen 8, 12, 14, 25, 26, 27, 28, 50, 61, 65, 66, 143, 153, 166, 261, 315
- Shiu, Sin-por 66, 86
- Sing Tao Daily* 218, 219
- Singapore 12, 231, 243, 244, 245, 246, 249, 252, 263, 270, 305, 310
- Sino-British Joint Declaration 117, 239, 241, 259
- Sino-British negotiation 5, 231, 237, 240, 241, 242, 249, 260
- Sino-Portuguese negotiation 237, 247, 251
- Sit, Victor 85, 94, 187, 192
- Socialism 10, 34, 135, 232, 233, 262
- Soft power 71, 72, 277, 317
- Soong, James 240
- South China Morning Post* 105, 224
- Sovereignty 1, 3, 8, 16, 17, 39, 54, 56, 111, 133, 134, 136, 140, 151, 199, 233, 235, 236, 237, 240, 246, 249, 252, 253, 266, 267, 276, 287, 300, 301, 313, 314, 320, 321
- Spirit of compromise 200
- of concessions 239, 240, 246, 258, 260
- of consensus 238, 245, 246, 252, 258, 259, 260

- Spy 21
- State Council 22, 22, 39, 40, 49, 57, 82, 98, 99, 101, 114, 129, 167, 216, 274, 283, 307, 308
- Stock market 11, 12, 15, 18, 28, 29, 35, 65, 143
- Strategic Development Commission 44, 68, 69
- Subversion 2, 40, 50, 122, 138, 161, 202, 234
- Surveillance 138, 139, 148, 236, 293, 313, 314
- Szeto, Wah 171, 172, 297
- Taiwan 1, 4, 5, 13, 16, 17, 36, 37, 40, 52, 54, 56, 57, 65, 72, 78, 79, 107, 108, 131, 132, 135, 140, 148, 149, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 181, 182, 183, 186, 198, 218, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 275, 276, 296, 297, 301, 305, 306, 311, 314, 315, 316, 319, 321
- Taiwan Basic Law 248, 249, 250 (also see Basic Law)
- Taiwan corruption 259
- Taiwan democracy 174, 229, 235, 260
- Taiwan's political future 260
- Taiwan's referendum 239, 240, 248, 249, 252
- Taiwan's self-determination 241, 252
- Taiwanization of Hong Kong 13, 256
of the PRC 37
- Tam, Maria 90, 92, 95, 171, 187, 191, 280, 281
- Tam, Yiu-chung 100, 169
- Tang, Henry 122, 208
- Tang, King-shing 136
- Thatcher, Margaret 236
- Tiananmen Incident 8, 11, 19, 21, 36, 148, 170, 276
- Tong, Ronny 60, 174, 218, 291
- Treason 2, 40, 50, 122, 138, 161, 202, 234
- Triad 262
- Tsang, Donald 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 13, 19, 20, 23, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 39, 43, 44, 47, 49, 53, 61, 68, 70, 77, 114, 119, 128, 130, 132, 139, 140, 141, 154, 169, 178, 179, 202, 204, 206, 207, 216, 218, 220, 223, 225, 253, 256, 258, 270, 296, 304
- Tsang, Hin-chi 95, 171, 187, 209
- Tsang, Jasper Yok-sing 2, 19, 46, 118, 154, 155, 157, 178, 179, 193, 222, 223, 303
- Tsang, Tak-sing 19, 187, 189, 191
- Trust 5, 45, 52, 140, 155, 158, 171, 215, 225, 227, 228, 231, 236, 237, 239, 242, 243, 244, 252, 259, 260
- Tung, Chee-hwa 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 83, 95, 97, 98, 99, 102, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 134, 136, 139, 140, 143, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 179, 189, 196, 199, 202, 205, 215, 216, 223, 236, 253, 255, 258, 264, 266, 268, 269, 270, 271, 279, 285, 286, 288, 289, 290, 291, 293, 298, 299, 307, 310, 315, 316
- TVB 2, 175, 176, 177, 182
- Underground Chinese Communist Party 18, 19, 20, 33, 141, 142

- United front 4, 18, 19, 30, 32, 40, 44,
 49, 52, 124, 142, 148, 157, 158, 161,
 164, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174,
 175, 181, 182, 183, 195, 196, 197,
 203, 263, 264, 270, 272, 274, 293,
 295, 316, 318
 united front cadre 272
 united front campaign 172, 173,
 175
 united front organization 19, 44,
 142
 united front strategy 44, 197, 263,
 270, 318
 united front tactics 32, 169, 170,
 181, 182
 united front work 4, 18, 49, 52,
 148, 171, 174, 181, 182, 183, 263,
 264, 270, 274, 293, 295, 316
 United States 21, 61, 71, 160, 171,
 172, 174, 229, 244, 247, 252, 254,
 255
 Universal suffrage 12, 13, 56, 57, 114,
 115, 132, 134, 137, 140, 141, 148,
 154, 162, 170, 171, 172, 174, 176,
 180, 181, 186, 199, 211, 212, 217,
 221, 223, 225, 234, 255, 257, 258,
 259, 301, 305, 310, 320
 Wang, Zhenmin 17, 60, 135, 178,
 292, 294, 320
 Washington 229, 267
 Wen Jiabao 39, 50, 153, 165, 216, 223
 Wen Wei Po 24, 122
 Western civilization 16, 18, 36, 43,
 174, 181
 Western-style democracy 12, 13, 16,
 37, 41, 51, 132, 174, 234, 252
 Women trafficking 26
 Wong, Andrew 116, 118, 288
 Wong, Raymond 32, 40, 52, 56, 57,
 162, 165, 218, 263, 266, 293
 Wu, Bangguo 22, 23, 217
 Wu, Gordon 25, 66, 75
 Wu, Raymond 90, 171, 187, 191, 269,
 280, 281
 Xenophobic sentiment 174, 181, 234
 Xiao, Weiyun 17, 89, 123, 170, 271,
 277, 321
 Xinhua 57, 84, 171, 297
 Xu, Chongde 17, 60, 88, 130, 140,
 141, 171
 Xu, Jiataun 21, 264, 321
 Yang, Ti-Liang 216
 Ye, Jianying 250, 258
 Yeoh, Eng-kiong 123, 126, 269, 290
 Zeng, Qinghong 22, 40, 124
 Zhao, Ziyang 236
 Zhou, Nan 21, 176, 179
 Zhu, Yucheng 20, 22, 23
 Zhuhai 25, 26, 27, 28, 35, 51, 66, 88,
 143