

# *The Dignity of Nations* *Equality, Competition, and Honor* *in East Asia Nationalism*

*Edited by*

Sechin Y. S. Chien and John Fitzgerald



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— Britta Erickson, *The Art of Xu Bing*

# Contents

Contributors	vii
1. Introduction: The Dignity of Nations <i>John Fitzgerald</i>	1
2. Equality, Hierarchy and Identity in Modern Japan: Reflections on the Nationalist Ethics of Fukuzawa Yukichi <i>Naoki Sakai</i>	23
3. Indignity for the Emperor, Equality for the People: Taishō Democracy and the Transition from Nationalism to Ultra Nationalism <i>Masachi Ohsawa</i>	33
4. Turning Slaves into Citizens: Discourses of <i>Guomin</i> and The Construction of Chinese National Identity in the Late Qing Period <i>Sung-chiao Shen and Sechin Y. S. Chien</i>	49
5. Dignity of the Nation, Gender Equality, or Charity for All? Options for the First Modern Chinese Women Doctors <i>Angela Ki Che Leung</i>	71

6.	Nationalism, Democracy and Dignity in Twentieth-Century China <i>John Fitzgerald</i>	93
7.	Between Heimat and Nation: Japanese Colonial Education and the Origins of "Taiwanese Consciousness" <i>Wan-yao Chou</i>	115
8.	Is Taiwan a Nation? On the Current Debate over Taiwanese National Identity and National Recognition <i>Yi-huah Jiang</i>	141
9.	In God's Image: The Christian, the Individual, and the Nation in Colonial Korea <i>Kenneth M. Wells</i>	165
10.	Economic Nationalism and Income Distribution in Late Industrializing Countries <i>Alice H. Amsden and Takashi Hikino</i>	189
	Notes	207
	Index	245

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# 1

## Introduction: The Dignity of Nations

John Fitzgerald<sup>1</sup>

A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom

— Emmerich de Vattel, *The Law of Nations* (1758)<sup>2</sup>

National states are not equal in any substantive sense, nor are they autonomous except in principle. In relating to one another, however, nations do insist on being treated as equals irrespective of the actual situation that prevails among them. Emmerich de Vattel captured this distinction nicely in his *Law of Nations* (1758). “Nature has established a perfect equality of rights between independent nations,” he observed. As freedom and sovereignty are enjoyed equally by all nations, no nation had a right to claim pre-eminence or precedence over another. In practice, a small state may pay deference to a “powerful and extensive state” within a code of manners that preserved the dignity of both by bridging the gap between the laudable principle of equality and the actual world of presidents and princes. Even then, however, a small state could concede the unequal power of a mighty state on condition that “ceremonial deferences ... do not, in fact, destroy their equality, and only show a superiority of order, a first place among equals.”<sup>3</sup> For Vattel, national equality and national dignity were to be preserved in everyday practice through codes of conduct that were elaborated in ceremonies and standard forms of address which to this day make up the routine curriculum of Foreign Affairs and State Department training programs the world over. For the mighty it is a code of humility, for the weak, a code of honor. Taken together,

it is a common code founded on the modern notion that national subjects are equally sovereign.

In this age of national hubris, powerful states still pay deference to the formal equality of nations in their formal diplomatic repertoire. President George W. Bush has declared that the national sovereignty of states no longer presents a formidable obstacle to the extension of US military power abroad. Still, the US does not propose to humiliate states unnecessarily along the way. In relations with China, for example, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer told the press team accompanying the President to Beijing, in February 2002, that Washington would no longer take to the pulpit and preach about American moral leadership. "The reason I'm not going down that road is because it's consistent with the President's approach to also have a *humble* foreign policy," Fleischer told reporters from the aisle of Air Force One. "And it's an interesting balance that the United States observes, as the United States speaks of what makes our society strong and how our government relates to its people, in a way that is cooperative, in a way that is productive in dealing with other nations and other people, in a *humble* fashion."<sup>4</sup> There is no record of whether China's President at the time, Jiang Zemin, read the President's respectful silence as a mark of deference to an equal partner. Nevertheless, any show of humility on the part of a great state pays tribute to an underlying principle of modern nationalism which underpins the international state system. This is the principle that sovereign states are formally equal.

On the whole, it is true, nations are better known for the competition and variation among them, for their relative wealth and power, than for their equal sovereignty. The power of nations is tested daily in politics, trade, and international relations, and widely acknowledged in the framing of institutions, in the formation of identities, and in shaping categories of knowledge.<sup>5</sup> The same holds true for the study of nations. The relative wealth of nations has attracted scrutiny from the founding of economics more than two hundred years ago to recent research into markets, cultures, and national traits in the literature on national development.<sup>6</sup> Market economists are typically interested in national states as sites for the provision "of law and order, of property rights, and the sanctity of contracts."<sup>7</sup> In economic history, nations tend to feature as clusters of cultural traits or value systems which influence long-term patterns of market behavior and economic competitiveness. David Landes, for example, has argued that the fate of industrial revolutions from one nation to the next is everywhere reliant on specific cultural traits including thrift, persistence, trust, honesty, and a strong work ethic, and that economic development will continue to elude nations that fail to internalize these kinds of values.<sup>8</sup>



Another way of thinking about equality and competition among nations is to imagine them as sites of status negotiation rather than merely sites for the accumulation of wealth and power — or rather to reconsider wealth and power as status indicators. If we concede that individuals and nations value honor and prestige, and acknowledge that people and nations happen to be the kinds of things to which honor and prestige attach, then we can imagine people and nations organizing their affairs to maximize their prestige in any number of ways. From this perspective, even international markets might be considered arenas for negotiating prestige, driven in some measure by vanity and generally functioning to facilitate status negotiation. Nations might then be approached on one level as bounded communities of people who act to maximize their prestige through myriad individual choices. On another, nations can be seen as active participants in international prestige markets themselves. In the market for national prestige, nations matter not simply because they are bundles of cultural traits, nor because they act as market regulators, but because they are one of the major sites for the accumulation and display of prestige in the modern world.

Like the citizens who people them, however, nations are in principle autonomous, sovereign, and formally equal. Again like citizens, some nations are wealthy, some powerful, some both, some neither. Nations compete with one another in the space that emerges between an ideal of formal sovereign equality and the fact of actual status inequality. Nations try to assert their comparative or competitive advantage across a variety of institutional networks, including military, economic, cultural, historical, and sporting networks.<sup>9</sup> In so far as nation-states are formally sovereign and equal, however, they possess one status-indicator that cannot be traded on the market. This is their national dignity.

Dignity can be described as a fundamental endowment of a sovereign and equal subject. Whether this subject is defined as an individual person, an autonomous nation, or any category of people which can lay claim to autonomy, freedom, and formal equality, that subject can plausibly lay claim to dignity as well. And within a given category (humans, nations, races, or religious faiths) dignity is reckoned to be held in equal measure by each and every member. National dignity is earned on the attainment and recognition of statehood and maintained for as long as states remain organized as sovereign and equal. National dignity is therefore the baseline of prestige in a competitive and substantially unequal international order. Often as not, it is a haven of last resort.

References to national dignity usually surface when states have little to fall back on but their dignity — more commonly, when particular national

regimes are placed at risk. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a case in point. Since the mid-1990s, the North Korean state has been placed under a form of martial rule (so-called "army-based policy") to forestall social discontent arising from food shortages and economic hardship. The Stalinist state calls on its people to defend this style of government on the home front by upholding "the dignity and might of the DPRK under the great banner of army-based policy."<sup>10</sup> International challenges meet with a similar reaction. In January 2003, anticipating a hostile international reaction to its withdrawal from the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the DPRK government staged massive rallies in defense of "national sovereignty and dignity." Around one million people gathered in a Pyongyang city square to denounce the US and shout their defiance. The official news-agency accompanied the demonstration with a warning that "if any forces attempt to encroach upon the sovereignty and dignity of the DPRK, it will mercilessly wipe out the aggressors and mete out stern punishment to them."<sup>11</sup> Fragile regimes resort to a language of national dignity when they have little else to recommend them.

In the twenty-first century, however, the claim to national "sovereignty and dignity" is placed at risk not just by challenges from other states, or from domestic discontent, but by alternative claims on sovereign subjectivity — the competing claims of individuals, for example, or of religious faiths, or humankind as a whole. Categories of sovereign equality now compete among themselves. "In the 21st century," UN Secretary General Kofi Annan affirmed in his Nobel Speech of December 2001, "I believe the mission of the United Nations will be defined by a new, more profound, awareness of the sanctity and dignity of every human life, regardless of race or religion ... The sovereignty of states must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights."<sup>12</sup> If the UN Secretary General has his way, the twenty-first century will be remembered as one in which human dignity takes priority over the dignity of nations. Vattel's dwarf may yet stand taller than any nation.

### **Equality and Dignity: An East Asian Problem?**

Much has been written about the dignity of Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and China in recent years, not least by people in these countries themselves. North Korean President Kim Jong Il, we noted, regularly appeals to national dignity as a sentimental foundation for his personal grip on national sovereignty. National dignity is not merely a resort of endangered regimes. In Japan, Shintaro Ishihara and Akio Morita launched a tsunami of swollen national

pride and anti-US resentment in the late 1980s with their first book, *The Japan That Can Say No*. The two well-positioned authors — one a senior corporate executive and the other a member of parliament — enumerated the indignities the country had suffered since the ratification of the Japan-US Security Treaty, they listed Japan's achievements in the meantime, and they pressed their compatriots to resist US bullying and recover Japan's sovereign equality. "A Japan that can say no to US orders," they proclaimed, "is a Japan that has recovered its full sovereignty, just like any other nation."<sup>13</sup> For all its bravado, the claim sought no more than the recognition of Japan's formal equality with the US as an autonomous and sovereign state. Dignity is a basic attribute of the fully sovereign state.

Their call inspired imitators abroad. Some years later, half a dozen titles appeared in China bearing variants of the title "*China Can Say No*."<sup>14</sup> In this case, the target of Chinese national resentment included Japan as well as the US. The author of the original book Shintaro Ishihara (by this time Governor of Tokyo) hit back at China. In a speech critical of "third-country people" (*sangokujin*), he obliquely attacked China and the Chinese in a language that again aroused anger on the continent.<sup>15</sup> On the Chinese side, there followed another in a sequence of events that refocused public anger and official indignation against a foreign power, this time the US following a collision between a Chinese jet fighter and a US spy plane off Hainan Island in April, 2001. The connections among these events would be remote but for one element in common — national dignity was held to be at issue.

In view of these recurrent references to national dignity in contemporary East Asia, it is tempting to conclude that there is something culturally specific about dignity in the civilizational legacy of East Asia. In fact, particular national explanations suffice. In the case of Japan "saying no," for example, we would do well to remember that this brief episode had its American counterpart in widely publicized Japan-bashing among senior analysts, administration officials, and industrial workers over the same period. National economic interest had little direct bearing on the dispute as both sides leapt to defend their national honor. As American economist Paul Krugman remarked at the time, "Japan's success hurts our pride far more than it hurts our standard of living."<sup>16</sup>

The Chinese case has little in common with the Japanese one apart from their common resentment of alleged US bullying. China's domestic crisis of legitimacy played a part as well. The media in China expressed outrage over the Hainan Island spy-plane affair much as it did over the Belgrade Embassy bombing two years earlier. Newspaper columnists called US officials "stupid" and demanded that they apologize. E-mail chat lists called for execution of

the twenty-four captured crew to avenge the death of the journalist, Xu Xinhui, who was killed in the Belgrade embassy bombing some years earlier.<sup>17</sup> In the latter case, however, crowds were not permitted to approach the US Embassy in Beijing, and government representatives were more measured in their responses. On this occasion, a series of dour government representatives in suits appeared in the press and on television, giving forceful but dignified voice to the people's distress. The People's Government was seen to represent not just the abstract interests of the people but their intimate moods and feelings. Speaking in defense of the country's national dignity, the government of China could credibly claim to represent the people.

A case needs to be made, all the same, for the claim that national dignity has greater or lesser salience in the politics and rhetoric of East Asian countries than in North America or Western Europe. Dignity is a powerful term in the rhetorical system of nationalism generally.<sup>18</sup> How do ideals such as national sovereignty, national equality, and national dignity, take root across different political vocabularies and political cultures? Are they transformed or perhaps given greater or lesser emphasis in the process of translation?<sup>19</sup> Are there in fact reasonable grounds for drawing broad cultural or civilizational generalizations about the salience of national dignity? Turning to Japan, Korea, China, and Taiwan, in particular, is there a common civilizational heritage that is implicated in the translation, development, and application of modern nationalism?

Although modern nationalism entered East Asia from outside the region along with the battleships, missionaries, and merchant marines of Europe and America, the forms that nationalism assumed were shaped to a large degree by encounters among neighboring states themselves. East Asian nationalisms were endogenous to the region in much the same way that French, Polish, Italian, or German nationalisms were native to Europe. The intra-regional dynamics of East Asian nationalism bears out this particular legacy. There have been repeated attempts over the past century to forge pan-regional alliances against Western imperialism or global capital and yet equally consistent efforts to deflect or to defeat them. Their own experience in the history of the region weighs heavily on each of the national states of East Asia.

The idea of East Asia as a region came to be embedded in the national imaginary of each constituent state, informing the ways each thought about its neighbors and the ways in which it reflected on itself.<sup>20</sup> The implications of the regional idea differed from state to state. For Chinese elites of the nineteenth century, the empire seemed to shrink inexorably from a universal world system to a particular nation, embedded in the regional space of an evolving international state system.<sup>21</sup> For Japanese elites, the same regional

idea created space for Japan to escape the hegemony of imperial China, and to expand its national role within the region and the international system. From the late nineteenth century, China ceased to appear the Central Kingdom (*zhongguo*) in Japan and came to be known instead as *Shina*.<sup>22</sup> In each case, a historical model of the East Asian region entered into the nationalist imaginary as a cultural or civilizational realm in which the particularities of the limited and sovereign nation could be grounded. Modern nationalism thus helped to confirm an older idea of a common civilizational legacy in East Asia, one that distinguished it from other regional civilizations, while at the same time underpinning the renovation of each autonomous national state.

Indigenous cultural theorists of the late nineteenth century turned to defining the region's civilizational inheritance.<sup>23</sup> The number of possible candidates for a distinctive regional identity proliferated in the second and third decades of the twentieth century, one positing a fraternity of proletarian Asian states, another a pan-Eastern spiritual alliance against Western materialism, others again for pan-Asian movements against imperialism. East Asia emerged as one contender among these regional models. The most powerful variants were schemes that yoked ideas of pan-Asian civilization to an expanding Japanese nationalist state: the New Order in East Asia and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere. But the idea of a pan-Asian or East Asian civilization need not have been harnessed to a single state to secure the idea, a place in history. Particular nationalisms are often embedded in wider civilizational discourses of one kind and another, in imagined civilizations conceived as far grander than the communities or states imbedded in them. "Western Civilization" is a case in point. Civilizational discourses of this kind were integral to the worldview that brought nationalism into the world, and integral to the processes by which nationalism was domesticated in East Asia.<sup>24</sup>

If the states of East Asia can be imagined as sharing a common civilizational legacy, they can as well be supposed to reveal a common pattern of resistance to that legacy in the modern era. In nationalist thought, the nation is conceived as moving away from its past with sufficient gravity to retain its historical identity but pushing ahead towards modernity with enough momentum to carry it to its destiny.<sup>25</sup> Along the way, the historical nation retains or rejects aspects of received tradition. At such transitional moments, those who do the talking generally explain their acts of rejection or retention in the language of modernity. Confucianism is a case in point. When radical nationalists in China and Japan chose to attack Confucianism as an "ideology of hierarchy, status, and authority," Tu Wei-ming reminds us, they borrowed an imported "Enlightenment rhetoric."<sup>26</sup> In attacking Confucianism as merely a system

of dominance and subjection, rather than a system of faith or doctrine, they revealed a dependence on nationalist categories of thought that gave high priority to the alternative principles of autonomy and equality. And to the extent that they attacked Confucianism as an ethic of hierarchy, they committed themselves to equality as a formal ethical system to a pronounced degree.

A numbers of essays in this volume support the proposition that modern ideals of sovereignty and equality entered into the repertoire of East Asian values through the agency of modern nationalism, as the antithesis of a Confucian respect for hierarchy. There was in fact very little space for the ideal of equality in the Confucian repository of the late imperial era. The Confucian legacy was repudiated by modern nationalist movements precisely on the ground that it favored hierarchy over equality as the foundational virtue of public life.<sup>27</sup> In facilitating a shift from an ethic of hierarchy to one of equality, a distinctive feature of the regional civilizational legacy was a tendency to turn that legacy on its head.

The same might be said for the high value placed on dignity that allegedly prevails in East Asian societies. The value placed on dignity in contemporary East Asia is generally traced to the maintenance of family loyalties, to the performance of social obligations under the Confucian code, or in the case of China to abiding cultural codes of "face."<sup>28</sup> In fact, the code of dignity may be inversely related to the code of face — a distinctly modern outcome of the continuing struggle for equality rather than a residual or reconstituted ideal associated with the norms of Confucian hierarchy. A twentieth-century emphasis on equality and distinctly modern codes of self-regard are among the historical outcomes of an extended interaction between nationalism and inherited ethical systems in East Asia. Nationalism was refracted by Confucian ethics (and by many of the related cultural beliefs and social practices that pass under other names in Japan and Korea) in ways not easily captured by simple reference to the "Confucian tradition" or the "Sinic heritage" of East Asia. This is because the confrontation between hierarchy as an ethical system, and equality as a revolutionary episteme, has specific historical as well as cultural or civilizational foundations.

## **Hierarchy and Equality in History**

Ideally, hierarchy and equality can be imagined as two distinct ethical systems. As far as their respective claims and arguments go, the two systems are basically incommensurable. To the hierarchically minded, equality is base, while to egalitarians hierarchy is unequal. Neither claim makes sense to proponents

of the other. Historically however, they often came together. The formal hierarchies of monarchy and empire, for example, often co-exist with greenwood ethics of brotherly camaraderie, while in the modern era, the ideal of formal equality does little to redress inequalities across the categories of race, gender, and class around which modern nations are constructed.<sup>29</sup>

At the level of orthodox belief, hierarchy can nevertheless be characterized as an ethic of monarchies and empires, and equality as an underlying principle of national states and of the formal architecture of the international state system. At this level, the historical encounter between the two orthodox ethical systems can be traced in the struggle between empires and nations which culminated in the victory of the nation-state. The most familiar paradigm for capturing the historical transition from empires to nations in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Asia is the fabled encounter between tradition and modernity.<sup>30</sup> The notional shift from the traditional to the modern mirrors the way in which nationalists situated themselves within this transition. The shift from the principle of hierarchy to one of equality traces a similar journey, from empire to nation, and similarly reproduces the language in which nationalists experienced this transition.

Admittedly, the two sets of terms are equally fuzzy. In the nationalist imagination, the nation is situated as an historical community between hierarchy and equality no less than between tradition and modernity.<sup>31</sup> One of the tasks of nationalist thought is to contrast the opposing terms in each dyad — in our case hierarchy and equality — with sufficient clarity to situate the nation as an historical community comfortably between the two. In historical terms, nationalism introduces a new ethic of equality that challenges the legitimacy of existing status hierarchies: it overturns ascriptive hierarchies, inherited at birth, and replaces them with new ones based on wealth, profession, achievement, and fame. At the same time, nationalist thought reconstitutes hierarchies around nation, race, gender, and other categorical entities within states and across regions. Rather than simply replace hierarchy, nationalism reassigns hierarchy to categorical relationships consistent with the practices of national states.

As historical subjects, hierarchy and equality are just as elusive as tradition and modernity. In studies of East Asia, in particular, the notional transition from hierarchy to equality presents one of the most challenging problems for Western historians. Benjamin Schwartz once observed that the role of hierarchy, status, and authority is “intractably problematic” for Western students of Chinese culture. Being “children of the Enlightenment” they are readily inclined to approach and to judge hierarchical systems through the “unmasking” vocabulary of domination, subjugation, and repression.<sup>32</sup>

Patterns of behavior and belief that endorse hierarchy receive even less sympathy when they appear to survive (anachronistically as it were) the transition from a hierarchical empire to a modern national state. Further, the historiography of social hierarchy in Asia has on occasion regarded the states of Asia as displaced sites of the old regimes of Europe. The projection of Old World Europe onto Asia compromises the categories employed to define the underlying problem.

Nevertheless, there is nothing uniquely "Western" about any of these assumptions. As Tu Wei-ming has famously remarked, the subjects and the chroniclers of China's modern history are "children of the Enlightenment with a vengeance."<sup>33</sup> To read almost any foundational source for the history of modern China, Japan, or Korea, is to come away with an overriding impression that there was little that hierarchy could possibly offer to East Asia apart from domination, oppression, and submission, in the eyes of local nationalists. In these sources, the West is represented at its own estimation as a realm of autonomy, equality, and freedom.

For much the same reason, the place of equality and dignity in European and American forms of nationalism needs to be clarified before we can appreciate their place in East Asian nationalisms. Questions of honor or dignity are not to be discounted in the national histories of the United States or France, for example, simply because conspicuous codes of honor came to play a diminished role in public life from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. We need to ask why, if they were so conspicuous up to the eighteenth century, codes of honor more or less disappeared from the stories these countries told about themselves in the modern era. In East Asia, the history of equality and the fate of honor were bound up with the struggle of political communities to reconfigure themselves as democratic national states. So they were in France and North America. The idealization of equality and the prominence given to codes of honor in East Asia may be no more a distinctive feature of post-revolutionary China or post-war Japan than they were of France after the revolution, or the United States after independence.<sup>34</sup>

This point is worth pursuing a little further. Honor is elided from Anglo-American self-representation through application of rational choice analysis focusing on the pursuit of hard-edged "interest" rather than on softer surfaces of status or prestige.<sup>35</sup> Concern for honor is often projected onto other communities and cultures, as if codes of honor were distinctive footprints of Asian or Latin American societies which had left no trace on the home ground of universal values. So for example, honor is a staple topic in studies of Latin American nation-building, Japanese culture, Mediterranean societies, and military history the world over.<sup>36</sup> By contrast, honor occupies little space on



the shelf of modern Anglo-American history. This can hardly be because honor has played no role in the national histories of the states of Western Europe or North America. The omission can be traced to the occlusion of honor in the study of metropolitan modernities. Romantic Latins defend their honor, proud Arabs covet pride, East Asian societies are obsessed with face, but mad dogs and Englishmen rationally pursue their "interests."<sup>37</sup>

The history of "interest," William Reddy argues, was closely bound up with the fate of honor in post-revolutionary Europe and the United States.<sup>38</sup> The codes of honor that operated under the old regimes were not abolished along with the hierarchical society of orders that proclaimed them. Instead, they underwent a revolution characterized by Robert Nye as a "democratization of honor." In post-revolutionary France, for example, the hierarchical code of honor was recast in a new code of *politesse* that emphasized equality, neighborliness, and the equal dignity of the citizen.<sup>39</sup> In a community of equally honorable citizens, a code of honor that contrasted the honorable and the mean would have defeated its own purpose. Equality does not allow for conspicuous celebrations of honor of the kind that hierarchical codes seem to require. There is little point in citizens proclaiming by their dress or manners that they are more equal than others — although there may be something to be said for the citizen whose dress and manner displays a greater *commitment* to equality than others.<sup>40</sup>

At the same time, egalitarian dignity was no longer proclaimed to be a motive for action as widely as hierarchical honor had been in the literatures and liturgies of the old regime. William Reddy traces this transition obliquely through the changing preoccupations of successive generations of critical thinkers in the post-Enlightenment era. For Montesquieu and Rousseau, honor was a central issue in historical inquiry and political philosophy. By the time of Tocqueville and Marx, honor had given way to the idea of interest. Rational calculation of material gain came to substitute for honor as the archetypal inspiration for manly action.<sup>41</sup> Although dignity was less commonly proclaimed to be a motive for action, concern for the dignity of the equal citizen became as commonplace as concern for equality in the modern era.<sup>42</sup> With the rise of the revolutionary ideal of equality, all of the sentimental reservoirs of pride and self-regard that had earlier found expression in hierarchical codes of honor were transferred to new codes celebrating equal dignity.

This democratization of older codes of honor earned little credit for the eagerness with which people in Europe and North America pursued their "interests." An earlier contrast between matters of interest, and affairs of honor, translated into the assumption that honor or dignity were not among the kinds of interest that rational people strove for. Under the old regime, interest had

signified venal pursuit of selfish gain by people whose station in life placed them outside the prevailing code of honor. As honor once overruled interests, rational pursuit of interest overrode honor in the representation of the modern citizen. This did not of course, stop actual citizens from insisting they should be treated with respect. Every man could now stand on his dignity and did so as often as he pleased. The banishment of honor from the rational world of interest did, however, place honor and dignity outside the domain of history and beyond the purview of serious political philosophy.

Where honor and dignity do converge with political philosophy is around the question of recognition. Since the advent and spread of nationalism, codes of honor have been yielding to codes that offer mutual recognition of formal equality. In so far as this involves a struggle for recognition, the desire for recognition offers a useful point of entry into what it is that makes nations (including Western ones) conceited and national citizens angry.<sup>43</sup> Isaiah Berlin traced the roots of modern political conflict to a universal struggle for recognition that was driven by "a wounded or outraged sense of human dignity." The desire for recognition was universal, he argued, in that it applied with equal force to political communities in North America and Europe as it did to anti-colonial movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.<sup>44</sup> Further, following Kant, Berlin observed that the key to our anti-hierarchical "unmasking" vocabulary is the axiom that people are authors of their own destinies. From this elementary principle of autonomy emerge two imperatives. One is to adopt the almost irresistible political vocabulary of the modern age — "the whole terminology of exploitation, degradation, humiliation, dehumanization" — and the other, a political imperative to shrug off "oppressors" in heroic acts of self-affirmation and self-determination.<sup>45</sup> In each case, public expressions of personal, civic, or national grievance draw upon a common vocabulary of humiliation and oppression, resistance and liberation, equality and dignity, a vocabulary as universal as the struggle for recognition in which political behavior has been grounded in the modern age.

The concept of a modern but nevertheless universal struggle for recognition is well applied to East Asian nationalism. The desire for recognition can be illustrated historically in the widespread introduction of the new "unmasking" vocabulary of the Enlightenment into East Asian political rhetoric itself. One striking illustration of this vocabulary is the emergence of the "slave" as a rhetorical device in East Asia from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, an event noted in a number of our chapters. Slavery has become a universal trope of modern nationalism since the days of "Rule Britannia" in the mid-eighteenth century.<sup>46</sup> The master-slave relationship is also the central focus of the *locus classicus* of Continental commentary on the

struggle for recognition, Hegel's discussion of the struggle for recognition between the master and the slave.<sup>47</sup> As it happens, the image of an abject slave, bullied and humiliated by its master, has come to enjoy wide currency in China, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan where it serves as an inverse image of proper relations based on the principle of equality.

The trope of slavery helped to popularize the modern vocabulary of nationalism in East Asia, a vocabulary that came to embrace terms such as oppression and resistance, humiliation and dignity, submission and liberation, envy and love. This vocabulary carried with it a number of associated ideals and different possibilities for the organization of political community which were based on the principles of national equality and popular sovereignty. The trope of the slave also lent a particular slant to the idea of liberation. In nationalist literature and propaganda, the slave was represented not merely as unfree but as subservient, as debased and humiliated in relation to its master. The image of the slave thus invited a particular reading of liberation: the freed slave was not just "free" but elevated from its debased status. On liberation, the slave stood up and attained universal recognition as the status equal of its master — it escaped humiliation and attained dignity. To this day, the popular histories of Korea, China, Taiwan, and Japan recount episodes in the universal struggle for recognition culminating in the attainment of national dignity.

## About This Book

The dignity of nations is a topical subject at a time when competing claims to human dignity and to national sovereignty are increasingly in tension. Our focus on China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is also timely as the politics of recognition are being played out in Taiwan's struggle for recognition in the international state system, in China's concerted resistance to Taiwan's international recognition, and in the belligerent death-rattle of a sovereign state facing possible demise in North Korea. That said, the scope of this study is not merely relevant or timely. We are dealing with some of the core values associated with modernity — with equality, dignity, autonomy — refracted through the historical encounter between competing ethical systems of old-world empires and modern nation-states in East Asia.

We trace generic features of East Asian nationalism through the particular historical experiences of the four states. That said, we do not confine our sights to the struggle for equality, dignity, and autonomy on the part of states themselves. We work on a further assumption that the struggle of each national state is bound up with the domestic reconstitution of its particular nation.

For this reason, we dwell as closely on citizens, women, and other categories of membership in the new national order as we do upon the larger category of the nation. To be sure, domestic struggles for status equality are not in every case analogous with the national struggle nor are they always consistent with the particular claims of nationalist elites. The nationalist category of "women," for example, rarely matches the expectations of actual women. By directing attention to questions of equality and dignity, we can sharpen our focus on the interplay between domestic struggles for status equality and wider claims by national states for recognition of their equality, dignity, and autonomy within the international state system.

In his opening chapter, Naoki Sakai argues that Confucian ethics presumed patterns of social relations and conceptions of individual identity that were incommensurable with modern nationalism, at least in the forms in which nationalism was embraced in Japan. In the Japanese case, modern nationalism was explicitly juxtaposed to a Confucian hierarchical worldview premised on unequal social relations. This reading of Confucianism as an ethical system founded in hierarchical relations differs from recent variants that focus on faith and doctrine rather than on the hierarchical ordering of social life.<sup>48</sup> It also ignores Confucianism's capacity for radical reconfiguration as an ethical system that could support ideals of universal equality.<sup>49</sup> Nationalists typically keep things simple. In Meiji nationalism, Confucianism was rebuked as an ethical system because it upheld unequal patterns of social relations; and hierarchical social relations were associated indelibly with Confucianism. For early theorists of nationalism in Japan, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, it came down to a choice between one or the other: "equality" under nationalism, or hierarchy under Confucian ethics.

When nationalists in Japan repudiated Confucianism, they elevated many of the virtues that characterized the citizen and the nation into the twentieth century, including equality, autonomy, and dignity. The emergence of the equal and autonomous subject in turn implied new kinds of social relations. Naoki Sakai describes the difference in terms of relational identities on the one hand and specific (or categorical) identities on the other. Relational identities of the Confucian hierarchical order link the individual to the social whole through kinship or fictive kinship mediation. Nationalism demands specific identities — specific in the sense of being liberated from relational identities or social rank, specific in the sense of being autonomous and self-defining, and specific in relating to the social whole through "bonds with one's countrymen." A new comprehension of individual identity was necessary "for the installation of the nation-state."

Not all hierarchical frameworks were to be dismantled. In China, the

emperor was toppled to make way for a republic of equal citizens but in Japan the emperor system was retained. How was a nationalist preference for equality reconciled with the new hierarchies of modern "imperial" Japan? Ohsawa Masachi points to a shift in the dramaturgy of imperial ritual from around the time of the first Meiji Constitution to accommodate a potential contradiction between the august position of the emperor and the mundane status of the citizen. Rather than present himself to the people, on pilgrimages for example, the emperor was now represented to them in words, images, and new kinds of rituals. The emperor remained secluded in his palace in Tokyo and gave consent for royal portraits to circulate in his place. This shift in the ritual display of authority marked a simultaneous shift from a model of social relations based on direct encounters to ones revolving around abstract or categorical relations. It evoked the abstract community of a nation of equal citizens who were "represented" by the national state.

Ohsawa raises the familiar question of whether the ultranationalism of the Showa period was a heightened form of Meiji nationalism or perhaps bred from a different species. The emperor was, as it happens, a figure of little substance in the intervening Taisho period. Showa nationalism resulted not from excessive adulation of the emperor over the Taisho period but rather from a crisis of representation in the earlier era reminiscent of the crisis of representation identified by Marx in the Eighteenth Brumaire. The democratic leadership ushered in by universal male suffrage in Taisho 14 (1923) typically acted on behalf of sectional interests. Civic experience of Taisho democracy then failed to match the universalization of social norms that came in train of nationalism, at the same time disappointing widespread expectations of the representation of "universal" interest that were inspired by universal suffrage. A people who could not represent themselves, as Marx might have said, had to "be represented." To remedy this crisis of representation, non-elected representatives of the whole people mounted attacks on elected representatives of "sectional interests." Threats, bombings, and assassinations were among the classic domestic signatures of ultranationalism. But there was more. Subtle shifts in the poetry, literature, and philosophy of the period display a nostalgia for something that never was — an equal citizenry that was not universal at all and yet universally Japanese.

From the late nineteenth century, the nationalist impulse moved rapidly towards granting equal membership to everyone who made up the nation throughout the states of East Asia. In the language of nationalism, the monarch's hierarchically ordered subjects could be counted equal only in so far as they suffered equal humiliation as "slaves" — a term of abuse which, Shen Sung-chiao and Sechin Chien point out in their chapter, was ubiquitous

in China's early nationalist movement. Once Confucianism came to be seen as a system of social enslavement, nationalism was extolled as a movement for converting equally humiliated slaves into equally dignified citizens. Shen and Chien argue that the ideal of the citizen (*guomin*, *kokumin*) as an equal, sovereign, and autonomous agent of history was the leitmotif of early Chinese nationalism.

They trace three paths of citizenship discourse pioneered by leading intellectuals of the late Qing era — ethnic citizenship, civilizational or cultural citizenship, and political citizenship — and suggest that the point at which the three converged was the point at which they facilitated the construction of an equal, sovereign, and autonomous nation-state. Shen and Chien mount a strong claim for the statist orientation of the language of citizenship in modern China. Although much of the discussion about recasting subjects into citizens was vaguely associated with values characteristic of Western modernity, the creation of free and autonomous individuals was not the overriding aim of China's nationalist agitators. This was a statist project aiming to create a category of equal national citizen to service the nation-state.

If individuals were not free and autonomous agents, who then represented, legislated, and executed the will of the nation? Agency appears to be constructed for the collective citizenry around categorical identities of gender, ethnicity, and class. On this point, Shen and Chien qualify Naoki Sakai's argument about categorical identities by highlighting not just their specificity but their ambiguity. Where discussion of citizenship encountered the category of woman, for example, it elevated women to the status of "women citizens" yet at the same time placed them at the margins of citizenship by classifying women as "the mother of the citizen." In this way, social divisions were constructed within the collective citizenry between public men on the one hand and domestic women on the other.

Angela Leung highlights a brief utopian moment for women over the decades leading to China's Republican Revolution when new possibilities emerged to escape slavish "humiliation" and establish autonomous identities and roles as modern "women." This egalitarian moment was linked to a wider nationalist concern that China should escape the international humiliation that female subjection everywhere implied. A nationalism that sought to shrug off humiliation by tracing its national shame to women, to poverty, or to the weakness of its men at arms, could not easily determine which dishonor should take priority among them. Angela Leung shows how women doctors worked through the ambiguity of these egalitarian and hierarchical impulses in different ways over the course of their individual lives before wider possibilities were foreclosed with the rise of radical nationalism in the Republic.

In particular, Leung highlights discrepancies between the egalitarian nationalist discourse on “the women question” and the actual lives of women who were educated in the modern academy. Liang Qichao’s writings around the turn of the twentieth century offer a useful point of comparison for assessing the personal odysseys of these female physicians. Through his prolific writings, Liang gave wide currency to the image of women as slaves of the lineage and parasites on the nation in the late nineteenth century. He also promoted a solution. Women should acknowledge their shame and seek redemption by serving the nation. His model of the “idiotic, idle” woman, Angela Leung observes, bore little relation to the actual lives of women in China. Nor did Liang’s vision of shame and redemption match the ways in which trained female physicians saw their roles in the modern nation. Female health workers who studied in Western missionary institutions were inclined to adopt broadly humanitarian values, Leung observes, in place of the narrowly nationalist ones that Liang Qichao prescribed. Women from the literate elite who practiced traditional medicine enjoyed equality because they shared the social status of elite males in their profession. Class status intersected with gender status in ways that complicated the egalitarian gestures of a prescriptive nationalism.

John Fitzgerald places equality, dignity, and autonomy at the center of Chinese nationalism. Relating the history of equality and dignity to the classic historical paradigm of China’s quest for “wealth and power,” he argues that wealth and power were seen as means for acquiring and measuring status in the international order, and that this search for status can fruitfully be approached as an historical problem in its own right — one that logically precedes the struggle for wealth and power and embraces other struggles as well, including those over gender, class, caste, and civic equality. This procedure opens up another avenue for thinking about the relationship between nationalism and democracy. How, he asks, is China’s historical struggle for national equality, autonomy, and dignity related to the struggle for equality, autonomy, and dignity at home — to the struggle for human rights in China?

In more ways than one, he argues, equality is an element of democracy and nationalism *sui generis*. The idea that all members of a political community enjoy equal membership establishes one of the foundations for democracy. Citizens are “free” because they enjoy equality of rights. Democracy also requires that governments treat all citizens equally in law and in government irrespective of their particular attributes; that is, regardless of their color, gender, age, innate “skills” or handicaps, or their relative wealth or power.<sup>50</sup> Equality is also a bridge linking democracy with nationalism. The nation emerged in Europe as a category “of free and equal individuals.”<sup>51</sup> In East

Asia, the nation was and is generally conceived as an equal whole, partly realized on the ashes of an old social order, and partly imagined as existing outside the hierarchical orders of society.

Fitzgerald is more optimistic than Shen and Chien in estimating what we might call the liberal potential of statist discourses of national equality and dignity in China. On initial reflection, nationalism and statist citizenship would seem to bear little relation to the ideals and practices of democracy. Liberal democracy is generally imagined as taking root in soil enriched by decades of economic development, sprouting under the tender care of freely exercised rational choice, and blossoming when the last clouds of nationalist *ressentiment* have passed over the horizon. Fitzgerald does not accept these assumptions. He maintains that political liberalism is every bit as irrational as nationalism in so far as it is grounded in a basic desire to achieve status recognition. If anything, the struggle for equality and rights within China and Taiwan has gathered momentum with the attainment of higher international standing. He argues for wider recognition of the discursive link between competition for national status and competition for civic equality within national states. The mechanism that links the two fields of action is not simply the rise of the middle class or the birth of civil society, but nationalism itself, which incubates an incipient discourse on equality and rights. He shows how orthodox nationalist discourses in China have managed to nurture democratic ideals from the time of Liang Qichao at the turn of the century, to Sun Yatsen in the 1910s and 1920s, to Wei Jingsheng in the 1970s and 1980s. The commitment to equality which makes a nation out of an empire, he argues, can plausibly make a democracy out of a nation as well.

In the case of Taiwan, Chinese civic nationalism was grafted onto sturdy Japanese colonial stock to yield a distinctive Taiwanese political community. In her chapter, Chou Wan-yao traces the origins of Taiwanese civic nationalism to the earlier colonial era when modern forms of government were extended beyond the internal frontiers of Chinese imperial administration to every mountain, bay, and inlet of Taiwan. It was only under Japanese colonial rule that the island's coastline became its primary frontier. And it was only in the Japanese colonial era that communities which happened to live on Taiwan first came to acquire a sense that they might have something in common by virtue of living together on a bounded island under a single administration — something they might consider "Taiwanese." The civic nationalism of today's Taiwan independence advocates, Chou suggests, builds on this colonial legacy more than on the China-centered nationalism of the Nationalist period.

Chou elaborates her argument by tracing the introduction of Japanese



colonial education into Taiwan and the creation of an island-wide educational system. The Japanese achievement in extending elementary school education on Taiwan has long been recognized.<sup>52</sup> Rather than see these educational achievements as measures of Taiwan's relative modernity, Chou probes their significance for the discursive history of a local sense of community and identity. Her findings are quite striking. With the exception of history texts, textbooks of the colonial era typically dwelled more on Taiwan-related matters than on Japan. In the bureaucratic geography of Japan's Ministry of Education, Taiwan counted as a local unit. Hence the local educational supplements developed by educational authorities conveyed a sense of the polity as a deeply rooted community in a *heimat* called Taiwan.

When the Chinese Nationalists took control of the island in 1945, they tried to eliminate all vestiges of the Japanese educational system. To do so, they brought with them a language of enslavement and liberation which had for decades sustained their propaganda on the mainland. In order to be liberated, the people of Taiwan had first to be taught that they were debased slaves of the Japanese. By Chou's account, few heeded the lesson. To the contrary, with their haughty talk of slavish debasement and their authoritarian style of administration, the Nationalists alienated several generations of people who had been educated in the colonial era. These same people taught at home what their children could no longer be taught at school: that they belonged to a place called Taiwan which had a history of achievement under moderately benevolent colonial rule.

At the end of the day, self-defined identity is incomplete in the absence of recognition by an authoritative other. Identity politics is a close partner to the politics of recognition — and pursuit of international recognition remains central to Taiwan's claim to be an autonomous and sovereign state. That said, the politics of recognition can be cruel and unforgiving. It is all very well to believe that you are a sovereign state, or for that matter the Emperor Napoleon, but unless you can secure from others the recognition due to an emperor or a state, then you are likely to be consigned to an asylum or cast out of the United Nations. As Ohsawa notes in his chapter on the Japanese emperor system, the self-proclaimed Emperor Ashiwaru ended his days in the psychiatric ward of Sugamo Hospital because nobody but himself would acknowledge him as emperor. Many people in Taiwan believe that they constitute an equal, sovereign, and autonomous nation. The problem is that few significant others recognize them as a nation.

This is the problem Yi-huah Jiang tackles in his chapter. Chen Shui-bian announced shortly before his election to the Presidency that the Democratic Progressive Party would have to accept Beijing's refusal to tolerate third-party

recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. The politics of recognition imposed a choice between dignity and survival. To survive as a political entity, Taiwan would have to settle for less than it sought — recognition of itself at its own value — and for much less than the “inherently limited and sovereign” nation it had arguably become after decades of political struggle. The politics of recognition denied the people of Taiwan their dignity. The people of Taiwan would have to “endure temporary indignities,” President Chen conceded, for the sake of their survival as people.

Yi-huah Jiang explores the logic of Chen’s complaint by showing that Western concepts of state and nation did not do full justice to the President’s dilemma. If recognition entails acceptance of a self-proclaimed identity, Jiang argues, then it is important to clarify what kind of identity is at stake. The politics of identity in Taiwan are less concerned with establishing the status of identities *vis-à-vis* the state than with establishing the salience and status of the state itself in the international state system. The English term “national identity” fails to capture this core assumption about the state embedded in its Chinese equivalent *guojia rentong*. One implication of this argument is that Taiwanese nationalism should be approached from the perspective of competing conceptions of statehood rather than simply alternative visions of national identity. Jiang expands upon this point through finely detailed analyses of five different positions adopted on state and nation in Taiwan in recent times. In each case, the central problem of recognition retains its force. Taiwan seeks recognition as a legitimate autonomous subject considered fit to participate as a state.

Like Taiwan, Korea was under Japanese colonial occupation for the first half of the twentieth century. After the Korean people were liberated from Japan in 1945, the division of the country into north and south failed to restore the national integrity for which people presumably struggled in the colonial era. Individual dignity fared little better. In the North, people were suffocated by repressive state practices, sanctified by homilies of national liberation, while in the south, the dignity of citizens counted for little to autocratic South Korean regimes. Looking back, the conclusion beckons that indigenous nationalist movements rarely made allowance for the autonomy of the individual in planning for the recovery of the nation. For this reason, Korean nationalism is widely characterized as a defensive statist reaction to the Japanese invasion and formal occupation of the Korean peninsula. On this basically reactive model, the character and strength of nationalism in Korea were both determined by a higher need to recover Korea’s national autonomy as a sovereign state; and individuals were valued for their utility in recovering national sovereignty and building the nation in the post-colonial era.

Nothing could have been further from the truth according to Ken Wells. The liberation of Korea from Japan in 1945 bore no logical or sequential relation to any indigenous nationalist strategies of the colonial era. In his chapter, Wells traces indigenous Korean nationalism through a different pedigree founded some decades before the Japanese annexation. Although not ignoring the significance of the Japanese invasion, Wells argues that reactive anti-Japanese nationalism operated in tension with an alternative and more affirmative nationalism that was founded on respect for the individual. The roots of this earlier nationalism were nourished in Korean Protestant reflections on the dignity of human life. On this model, the nation was valued as a collection of individuals each possessing an inalienable human dignity. The Japanese invasion severely tested such ideals of individual and nation, compelling Protestant nationalists to confront the problem of individual autonomy in the face of national submission to colonial rule. The response of educated women to the nationalist challenge of the colonial era, in contrast to that of men, indicates a higher commitment among Protestant women activists to preserving the dignity of the individual.

Drawing closer to the present, Alice Amsden and Takashi Hikino reflect on the connection between equality and nationalism in the distinctive model of economic development that has come to be associated with the East Asian economic experience. For Amsden and Hikino the success of the East Asian model in combining export-led growth with relative equity at home invites critical reflection on one of the key assumption of market economists: the assumption that states must eschew "economic nationalism" if they seek to grow and develop. Generally speaking, national states feature in the consideration of market economists as a help or a hindrance to the optimal functioning of markets. As nationalism is presumed to impede optimal functioning, so the model economist should resist any temptation to adopt a "nationalist" approach to economics. To Amsden and Hikino, however, economic nationalism and equality go hand in hand in accounting for the success of the so-called East Asian model.

Amsden and Hikino assume that all states are economic nationalists in so far as they act in the interests of their dominant constituents. For some states, typically the countries of Latin America, this might mean adopting an autarchic policy framework favoring the growth of national industry. For others, notably North Atlantic countries, it can mean intervening in national markets other than their own with a view to coercing them to open their markets. Developing and lately developed countries that invest heavily in their own technological capabilities, such as South Korea and Taiwan (and for that matter, Japan), are nationalist in a different sense. Their style of economic

nationalism is associated with "make or buy" decisions on technology acquisition. On this measure, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are more successfully nationalist than other states such as Brazil and Argentina which merely acquire technology. Amsden and Hikino also provide a possible explanation for the positive correlation between growth and equity in the East Asian model: equality of income distribution facilitates the adoption of economic policies that unequally favor the targeted growth of key industrial enterprises. A commitment to equality helps in the adoption of such policies by establishing a social consensus favoring unequal investment decisions. This is not itself an inherited cultural trait. The authors prefer to locate economic nationalism not in national traits such as social cohesiveness, bureaucratic power, or national autarchy, but in variations of the dominant constituencies that effectively define the national interest.

Lessons such as these, historical and contemporary, are not easily derived from studies of nationalism which ignore the place of equality and the salience of dignity in domestic politics and international relations. The genesis and growth of nationalism are generally traced to impersonal processes that have shaken the world over the last two centuries, processes that include industrialization, mass education, print capitalism, and modern-state formation.<sup>53</sup> The essays in this volume reveal a complementary heritage of nationalism at work, a heritage Liah Greenfeld has captured for Europe in her observation that the birth of modern nationalism was related above all "to preoccupation with status," and a heritage that we would argue was also at work among the states of East Asia.<sup>54</sup>

As a rhetorical system, nationalism functions to draw boundaries around national communities and to construct categorical identities within nations. These categorical procedures ignore and on occasion, subverts the actual hierarchies embedded in networks of concrete social relations.<sup>55</sup> As a system of political thought, all the same, nationalism operates around categorical identities that enable people to make claims for equality of treatment. Repressive as these nationalist procedures of categorization may be, they facilitate a politics of equal recognition among men and women, peasants and city dwellers, citizens and officials. Mechanical models of nationalism which focus on generic processes of state and nation building can all too readily paper-over the daily efforts that people make in the course of establishing their equality at home and upholding the dignity of their nations abroad. In contrast, our essays focus to an unusual degree on everyday claims to dignity and equality among the people, the communities, and the nations that make up East Asia.

## Notes

### Chapter 1

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  33. *Ibid.*
  34. For France and the USA, see Robert Nye, *Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) and Joanne B. Freeman, *Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
  35. Peter Hays Gries observes that a rhetorical contrast between "feeling" and "interests" in Western analyses of China has persistently limited appreciation of the role that pride and power both play in international relations. Gries, *China's New Nationalism*, pp. 23–4.
  36. Among relatively recent studies see David D. Gilmore, ed., *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean* (Washington DC: American Anthropological Association, 1987); Sueann Caulfield, *In Defense of Honor: Sexual Morality, Modernity and Nation in Early Twentieth Century Brazil* (Durham, NC: Duke

- University Press, 2000); Sarah C. Chambers, *From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender and Politics in Araquipa, Peru, 1780–1854* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1999); Barry O'Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999). For an earlier case, see the classic study by Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946). A notable recent exception to the lack of comparable studies on the USA (apart from studies of the Old South) is Freeman, *Affairs of Honor* (2001).
37. See also Frances Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992). Countering the Anglo-American assumption that people struggle to satisfy their actual needs and interests at the expense of their “desire for recognition,” Fukuyama cites Nietzsche against his critics: “Man does *not* strive after happiness; only the Englishman does that” Fukuyama (1992), p. 181.
  38. William M. Reddy, *The Invisible Code: Honor and Sentiment in Postrevolutionary France 1814–1848* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997).
  39. Nye, *Masculinity*, p. 129.
  40. See J. S. McClelland, *A History of Western Political Thought* (London: Routledge 1996), p. 744; Freeman, *Affairs of Honor*, pp. 42–5.
  41. Reddy, *The Invisible Code*, pp. 9–11. At the same time honor was transformed from a public hierarchical code to one applying to the now-private domains of business, family, and gender relations. See Nye, *Masculinity*.
  42. The view that communities or states should aspire to achieve equality of outcomes has been discredited in recent times but the twin assumptions that all human beings are created equal and that all states are equally sovereign has hardly been dented. “No government is legitimate,” Ronald Dworkin argues, “that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those citizens over whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance.” Equality arguably reigns supreme as the “sovereign virtue” of political communities in the modern era. See Dworkin, *Sovereign Virtue*, pp. 1, 4–7, Chapter 4 *passim*. The question of dignity arises with equal force when human beings and states ask to be *recognized* as equals. Mutual recognition of equality implies mutual recognition of the dignity of the equal subject.
  43. Fukuyama explains the struggle for recognition thus: “[I]t is like an innate human sense of justice. People believe that they have a certain worth, and when other people treat them as though they are worth less than that, they experience the emotion of *anger*. Conversely, when people fail to live up to their own sense of worth, they feel *shame*, and when they are evaluated correctly in proportion to their worth, they feel *pride*.” Fukuyama (1992), p. xv.
  44. Isaiah Berlin, “Rabindranath Tagore and the consciousness of nationality” (1961), in Isaiah Berlin, *The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and their History*, edited by Henry Hardy (London: Pimlico, 1997), pp. 249–66, esp. p. 252.



45. Isaiah Berlin, "Kant as an unfamiliar source of nationalism" (1972), in Berlin, *The Sense of Reality*, pp. 232–48, esp. p. 238.
46. "Rule Britannia, Britannia rule the waves. Britons never never never shall be slaves." Words by James Thomson, music by Dr Arne, 1740. See Ebenezer Cobham Brewer, *Dictionary of Phrase and Fable* (Philadelphia, PA: Henry Altumen and Company, 1898).
47. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, A. V. Miller, trans. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 104–19 (IV: 166–96). This style of reading Hegel draws heavily on lectures by Alexander Korjeve in the 1930s and 1940s. See Fukuyama, *The End of History*.
48. See, for example, Tu Wei-ming, *Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought* (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1978).
49. See Kang Youwei, *Datong Shu* (One world philosophy) (Shanghai: n.p., 1935); Kang Youwei, *Ta T'ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei*. Laurence G. Thompson trans. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958); and Tan Sitong, *An Exposition of Benevolence: The Jen-Hsüeh of Tan Ssu-t'ung*, Chan Sin-wai, trans. (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984).
50. Dworkin offers a particular reading of liberty derived from his claim for "equality of resources." Dworkin, *Sovereign Virtue*, p. 121 and Chapter 3 passim.
51. Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 30.
52. E. Patricia Tsurami, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).
53. See, for example, Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1997); Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; and Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*.
54. Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, p. 488. See also Craig Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory* (Cambridge, MA, and Oxford: Blackwells, 1995), and *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*.
55. Calhoun, *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, pp. 9–37; 304–36. Liisa Malkki, "Citizens of humanity: Internationalism and the imagined community of nations," *Diaspora* 3.1 (1994): 41–68.

## Chapter 2

1. Wendy Brown, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 115.
2. Fukuzawa Yukizi, *Tokuiku Ikan* (On moral education) (originally published as a serial articles in *Jiji Shinpō* in 1882), in *Fukuzawa Yukiichi Zenshū* (The complete works of Fukuzawa Yukizi) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1959), Vol. 5, pp. 349–64.

3. Fukuzawa Yukizi, *Tokuiku Ikan*, pp. 357–8.
4. Fukuzawa Yukizi, *Tokuiku Ikan*, p. 362.
5. Idem.
6. Idem.
7. Fukuzawa Yukizi, *Gakumon no Susume* (Recommendation of learning), in *Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshū*, Vol. 3, pp. 42–7.
8. For instance, the preface to *Gakumon no Susume*, and Chapter 6 of *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku* (An outline of the theory of civilization), *Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshū*, Vol. 4, pp. 183–212.
9. For an excellent historical analysis of the similar point, see Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” *Annual Review of Sociology* (1993), p. 229.
10. Fukuzawa Yukichi, *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku* (originally published in 1875), p. 27.
11. Fukuzawa Yukichi, *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku*, p. 37. English translation by David A. Dilworth and G. Cameron Hurst, *Fukuzawa Yukichi's 'An Outline of a Theory of Civilization'* (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1973), p. 23. The translation has been modified in order to show the connections between Fukuzawa Yukichi's and John Stuart Mill's arguments.
12. Concerning such central notions of 19th-century liberal representative government as “national feeling,” “national character,” and “the society of sympathy,” cf. John Stuart Mill, “Considerations of representative government,” in H. B. Acton, ed., *John Stuart Mill* (London: Everyman's Library, 1972), pp. 187–428 (first published 1861). Compare Fukuzawa's explanation of nationality with Mill's: “A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others — which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, and community of religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past” (ibid., p. 391).
13. Oguma Eiji, *Tan'itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen* (The origins of the myth of the Single Ethnos) (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995). Oguma shows that there have been many views about the ethnic constitution of Japanese society since the Meiji period, but he fails to recognize the problematic nature of the ethnic unity itself. It is rather astonishing that no definition of ethnicity is given in his entire book. He clearly wants to criticize the myth of the Single Ethnos prevalent in postwar Japan. But, not being aware of theoretical complexities

in the concept of ethnicity itself, he may eventually reproduce the very myth he wants to admonish.

14. Fukuzawa Yukichi, *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku*, p. 237 (English translation, p. 177). Let me note that, although Fukuzawa rejected this characterization of the Emperor, the idea of *isshi dôjin* (literally translated, it is “one look, equal love” and connotes that every subject is absolutely equal before the Emperor or the Emperor’s love does not discriminate) was adopted to determine the relation of the Emperor to its subjects from the outset of the modern Emperor system. The expression of *isshi dôjin* repeatedly has appeared in governmental ordinances and publications since Meiji 1. For more detailed discussion on the use of the expression of *isshi dôjin* and social discrimination in modern Japan, see Hirota Masaki, “Kindai nihon shakai no sabetu kôzô” (The structure of discrimination in modern Japanese society), in *Sabetu no shosô, Nihon kindai shisô taikai* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), Vol. 22, pp. 436–516. For a discussion of the Japanese Emperor System as a displaced Christianity, see Kuno Osamu and Tsurumi Shunsuke, *Gendai nihon no shisô* (Contemporary Japanese thought) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1956), pp. 126–9 in particular.
15. Craig Calhoun uses the term “categorical identity” instead of “specific identity.” See Calhoun, “Nationalism and ethnicity.”

### Chapter 3

1. See Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), Introduction, *passim*.
2. Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996); cf. Hara Takeshi, *Kashikasareta Teikoku* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo).
3. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 6.
4. See Marleigh Grayer Ryan, trans., *Japan’s First Modern Novel: Ukigumo of Futabatei Shimei* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).
5. Hashikawa Bunzô, *Shôwa Nashonarizumu no Shosô* (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 1994), p. 7.
6. Fujitani, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
7. Noguchi Takehiko, *San’ ninshou no Hakkenn made* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobou, 1994).
8. The Rice Riots were not merely a domestic incident. They were closely related to the international state of affairs, in particular the Great War in Europe. One result of the war was a rapid increase in the price of rice in Japan. Italian Fascism, led by Mussolini, was initiated at almost the same time (1919).
9. Hashikawa, *op. cit.*, pp. 55–7.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 18–9.
11. Hashikawa, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

12. Kuno Osamu and Tsurumi Shunsuke, *Gendai-Nihon no Shisou* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1956).
13. Ibid.
14. Okura Eiichi, *Ni-niroku Jiken he no Banka* (Tokyo: Yomiuri-Shinbunsha, 1971).
15. Edwin McClellan, trans., *Kokoro: A Novel* (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1957).
16. See Jay Rubin, trans., *Sanshiro: A Novel* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977).
17. Alan Turney, trans., *The Three Cornered World* (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1957, reprinted, 1985).
18. Takeda Nobuaki, 'Koshitsu' to 'Manazashi' (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1995).
19. Takeda, op. cit.
20. Although he has now sunk into obscurity, at that time he was quite well-known. Newspapers sometimes published his comments regarding incidents. He also appears in a contemporary encyclopedia (Takeda, op. cit.).
21. Hasumi Shigehiko, "Taisho-teki Gensetsu to Hihyou," *Hihyou-kukan*, No.2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 6–21.
22. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Alan Sheridan, trans. (New York: Pantheon, 1977). Foucault also considered solitary confinement (in a private room or cell) to be a metaphor for disciplinary power. In solitary confinement, such as in a prison, individuals are made into modern subjects under an abstract universal power. In light of Foucault's theory, it is interesting how the private room became a theme in much discourse of the Taishô period, both at the level of thought and practice. See discussion of this development above.
23. Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works* (Moscow: People's Publishing House, 1968 [1852]).

## Chapter 4

1. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (London: Methuen, 1977), p. 107.
2. John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982).
3. Zhang Shizhao, "Zhang Binglin 'Kemin pian' fulun" (An appendix to Zhang Binglin's "Guest People"), *Shu bao* (Jiangshu Journal), 3 June 1903.
4. Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, *Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-racist Struggle* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 28–9.
5. Patrik Hall, "Nationalism and Historicity," *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1997), p. 17.

6. Lloyd Kramer, "Historical narratives and the meaning of nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (1997), pp. 525–45.
7. Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London: Duckworth, 1971); *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
8. Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, *Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-racist Struggle*, p. 29.
9. It is tempting to digress into an extended discussion of the many-faceted meaning of the Chinese term *guomin*. Suffice it, however, to point out that the term can be used both as a collective noun referring to the people as a group, and as a common noun referring to its members severally. The word *guo* is also confusing, as it can mean indiscriminately a feudal kingdom, an empire, or a modern state. Hopefully our discussion will clarify, rather than be mired in, the peculiarities of the Chinese terms our protagonists used.
10. Liang Qichao, "Lun jinshi guomin jingzheng zhi dashi ji Zhongguo zhi qiantu" (The general tendency of *guomin* struggles in the modern age and the future of China), *Yinbingshi wenji* (Collective essays from the Ice-drinker's Studio) (Taipei: Zhonghua Shuju, 1978), IV, pp. 56–61.
11. For instance, *Zuo zhuan* (Narratives of Zuo), the 13th year of the Duke of Zhao.
12. Lydia H. Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity — China, 1900–1937* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).
13. Liang Qichao, "Lun jinshi guomin jingzheng zhi dashi ji Zhongguo zhi qiantu," p. 56.
14. Zhang Foquan, "Liang Qichao guojia guannian zhi xingchen" (Formation of Liang Qichao's concept of state), *Zhengzhi xuebao* (Journal of Politics), No. 1 (Taipei: Zhongguo Zhengzhi Xuehui, 1971), p. 24.
15. "Shuo guomin" (On citizen), *Guomin bao* (Citizen's Tribune), No. 2 (1901), p. 8.
16. Zou Rong, *Geming jun* (The Revolutionary Army) (1903), in Zhang Yufa, ed., *Wanqing keming wenxue* (The revolutionary literature in the late Qing) (Taipei: Jingshi Shuju, 1981), p. 135.
17. Xiong Yuezhi, *Zhongguo jindai minzhu sixian shi* (A history of modern Chinese democratic thoughts) (Shanghai: Renmin Chubanshe, 1986), pp. 312–8.
18. One wonders if Liang paid any attention to the way in which some of these Western thinkers define the people (*guomin*). Hobbes, the arch-individualist, Locke, a classic liberal, and Rousseau, a champion of individual liberation, all defined 'the people' as a collective entity or even personality whose coming into being depends on the political agency of the state. See Sechin Y.-S. Chien, "Renmin yu minzhu" (The people and democracy), unpublished conference paper (Taipei: 1996); Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), pp. 69–79. Hobbes's remark that "the people is not in being before the constitution of government, as not being any person,

- but a multitude of single persons" (*De Cive*, 7.7) could have come from under Liang's pen *verbatim*. Liang was of course more familiar with Rousseau, whose idea of the people/state as the embodiment of the general will was most certainly not lost on him.
19. Chang Hao, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890–1907* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
  20. Liang Qichao, "Xinmin yi" (Discourse on the new citizen), *Yinbingshi wenji*, VII, p. 106.
  21. Liang Qichao, *Xinmin shuo* (On the new citizen) (Taipei: Zhonghua Shuju, 1978), p. 153.
  22. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
  23. Qin Lishan, "Wenzi shanggu xueshu shangjin" (Language is good to be ancient while scholarship is good to be modern), *Qingyi bao* (Journal of Disinterested Criticism), No. 80 (1901), pp. 5109–10.
  24. Mary B. Rankin, *Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and Chekiang 1902–1911* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Chen Wanxiong, *Wusi xinwenhuan de yuanliu* (Origins of the May Fourth new culture) (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian, 1992).
  25. Liang Qichao, "Zhengzhixue dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo" (An introduction to the political theory of Bluntschli), *Yinbingshi wenji*, XIII, p. 72.
  26. Benjamin I. Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964); Chang Hao, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890–1907*, pp. 197–8.
  27. Liang Qichao, "Zhengzhi yu renmin" (Politics and the people), *Yinbingshi wenji*, XX, p. 7.
  28. "Shehui jiaoyu" (On social education), *Youxue yibian* (Renditions by overseas Chinese students), No. 11 (1903), p. 7.
  29. Richard Handler, *Nationalism and the Political Culture in Quebec* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 40.
  30. Zhang Bingling, "Zhonghua minguo jie" (An explanation of Republican China), *Min bao* (People's Journal), No. 15 (1907).
  31. Wang Ming-ke, *Huaxia hanyuan* (Peripheries of China: Historical memory and ethnic identity) (Taipei: Yunchen Chubanshe, 1997).
  32. Shen Sung-chiao, "Wo yi woxue jian xuanyuan" (The myth of *Huangdi* and the construction of Chinese nationhood in late Qing), *Taiwan shehui yanjiu jikan* (Taiwan: A radical quarterly in social studies), No. 28 (1997); Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).
  33. Liang Qichao, "Zhongguoshi xulun" (An introduction to Chinese history), *Yinbingshi wenji*, VI, p. 7.
  34. Anonymous, "Minzu zhuyi zhi jiaoyu" (On nationalist education), *Youxue yibian*, No. 10 (1903), pp. 1–9.
  35. "Guojiaxue shang zhi zhina minzu guan" (Some observations on Chinese nation

- through the perspective of state theory), *Youxue yibian*, No. 11 (1903), pp. 11–2.
36. Lin Xie, “Guomin yijian shu” (Opinions from a citizen), *Zhongguo baihua bao* (Chinese Vernacular Journal), in Zhang Nan and Wang Renzhi, eds., *Xinhai geming qian shinianjian shilun xuanji* (Selected essays from the ten years preceding the 1911 Revolution), Vol. I (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian, 1962), part 2, p. 900.
  37. Wang Jingwei, “Minzu de guomin” (Ethnic nation), *Min bao*, No. 1 (1905), pp. 1–41.
  38. James Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 51.
  39. Liu Shipai, “Lun liuxueshen zhi fei panni” (Overseas students are not traitors), *Shu bao*, 22 June 1903.
  40. Zhang Bingling, *Qiushu* (Book of raillery) (Shanghai: Gudian Wenxue Chubanshe, 1958), p. 39.
  41. Zou Rong, *Geming jun*, p. 108.
  42. Tao Chengzhang, *Zhongguo minzu quanli xiaozhang shi* (A history of the rise and fall of the Chinese nation), in Tang Zhijun, ed., *Tao Chengzhang ji* (Selected works of Tao Chengzhang) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986), p. 304.
  43. Ana Maria Alonso, “The effects of truth: Representations of the past and the imagining of community,” *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1988), p. 40.
  44. Shen Sung-chiao, “Wo yi woxue jian xuanyuan.”
  45. Sun Yat-sen, *Sanmin zhuyi* (Three principles of the people), in *Sunhungshan xuanji* (Selected works of Sun Yat-sen) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1956), p. 592.
  46. Lo Zhitian, *Minzuzhuyi yu jindai zhongguo sixiang* (Nationalism and modern Chinese thought) (Taipei: Dongda Tushu Gongshi, 1998), pp. 58–60.
  47. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
  48. Kang Youwei, “Haiwai YaMeiOuFeiAo wuzhou erbaibu zhonghua xianzhenghui qiaomin gongshang qingyuanshu” (A petition to the Chinese government from the overseas Chinese citizens), in Tang Zhijun, ed., *Kang Youwei zhenglun ji* (Collected political essays of Kang Youwei) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), pp. 608–25.
  49. Kang Youwei, “Nanhai xiansheng biangeming shu” (Kang Youwei on Chinese Revolution), *Xinmin congbao* (New Citizen Journal), No. 16 (1902), pp. 59–69.
  50. Anthony D. Smith, “The nation: Invented, imagined, reconstructed,” in Marjorie Ringrose and Adam J. Lerner, eds., *Reimagining the Nation* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993), pp. 15–6.
  51. Zhang Bingling, “Kedi lun” (On the guest emperor), in Tang Zhijun, ed., *Zhang Binglin zhenglun xuanji* (Selected political essays by Zhang Binglin) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1977), pp. 85–6.

52. Tang Caichang, *Tang Caichang ji* (Selected works of Tang Caichang) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1980), pp. 134–5.
53. Kang Youwei, *Kang Youwei zhenglun ji*, p. 282.
54. Liang Qichao, “Lun zhina zongjiao gaige” (On Chinese reformation), *Yinbingshi wenji*, III, p. 55.
55. Liang Qichao, “Baojiao fei suoyi zhunkong lun” (To protect the teachings is not the right way for respecting Confucius), *Yinbingshi wenji*, IX, pp. 51–2.
56. Shen Sung-chiao, “Zhen dahan zhi tiesheng” (The genealogy of “national heroes” and the imagination of Chinese nationality in the late Qing), *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jiadarshi yanjiusuo jikan* (Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica), No. 33 (June 2000).
57. Liang Qichao, “Lun side” (On private virtue), *Xinmin shuo*, p. 134.
58. Liang Qichao, *Qingdai xueshu gailun* (Intellectual trends in the Qing period) (Taipei: Zhonghua Shuju, 1980), p. 162; Ding Wenjiang, *Liangrengong xiansheng nianpu changbian chugao* (First draft of a chronological biography of Liang Qichao) (Taipei: Shijie Shuju, 1972), I, pp. 43–4.
59. Ding Wenjiang, *Liangrengong xiansheng nianpu changbian chugao*, I, p. 157.
60. Shen Sung-chiao, “Wo yi woxue jian xuan yuan,” p. 37.
61. Liang Qichao, *Qingdai xueshu gailun*, p. 63.
62. Huang Chin-hsing, “Liang Qichao de zhongji guan huan” (The ultimate concern of Liang Qichao), *Shixue pinlun* (Historiographic Review), No. 2 (1980), pp. 85–99.
63. Liang Qichao, “Baojiao fei suoyi zhunkong lun,” p. 51.
64. Liang Qichao, “Guojia sixiang bianqian tongyi lun” (On the changing concepts of state), *Yinbingshi wenji*, VI, p. 51.
65. Liang Qichao, “Lun bianfa bi zi ping manhan zhi jie shi,” *Yinbingshi wenji*, I, pp. 77–83.
66. Liang Qichao, “Shanghai yi” (On Chamber of Commerce), *Yinbingshi wenji*, IV, p. 2.
67. Liang Qichao, “Zhongguo jiruo suoyuan lun” (On the origins of China’s weakness), *Yinbingshi wenji*, V, p. 36.
68. Liang Qichao, “Zhengzhixue dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo,” pp. 75–6.
69. Liang Qichao, “Lun bianfa bi zi ping manhan zhi jie shi,” p. 83.
70. Liang’s translations of the German word *nation* and the English word *people* as *zumin* or *minzu*, and the German *volk* and the English *nation* as *guomin*, are confusing, especially since in today’s Chinese exactly the opposite translation would have been adopted. Consequently, his usage of *minzu zhuyi* and *guomin zhuyi* also demands careful reading. It seems to us necessary to translate the former term as *ethno-nationalism* and the latter as *state-nationalism*. One wonders if Liang would accept the alleged distinction between the nation and the state after all.
71. Liang Qichao, “Zhengzhixue dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo,” pp. 71–2.
72. *Ibid.*, pp. 74–5.



73. Liang Qichao, "Da moubao disihao dui benbao zhi bolun" (A reply to the criticism from Ming bao), *Yinbingshi wenji*, XVIII, pp. 77–8.
74. Liang Qichao, "Zada moubao" (A miscellaneous reply to Ming bao), *Xinmin congbao*, No. 86 (1906), p. 52.
75. Liang Qichao, "Zhongguo guohui zhidu siyi" (Some personal comments on the institution of Chinese parliament), *Yinbingshi Wenji*, XXIV, p. 36.
76. Ding Wenjiang, *Liangrengong xiansheng nianpu changbian chugao*, I, p. 339.
77. It is tempting to suggest that the concept *renmin* ("People" as in "People's Republic") derives from the same historical context as *guomin*; the relationship between the two terms is properly the subject of another paper.

## Chapter 5

1. Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London: Sage, 1997), p. 79.
2. Tani E. Barlow, "Politics and protocols of funu: (Un)Making national woman," in Christina K. Gilmartin, Gail Hershatter, Lisa Rofel and Tyrene White, *Engendering China: Women, Culture, and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 339–59.
3. Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, p. 60.
4. Late Qing reformers like Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Tan Sitong were some of the first to promote medicine as a necessary tool for racial strengthening. Ralph C. Croizier, *Traditional Medicine in Modern China: Science, Nationalism, and the Tensions of Cultural Change* (hereafter *Traditional Medicine in Modern China*) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), Chapter 3.
5. Ling Zhiyun, "Zhu ci" (Congratulatory lines) (祝詞), in *Nanjing yixue bao* (Nanjing Medical Journal) (南京醫學報), No. 1 (1 May 1911), p. 1b.
6. One major way in which women participated in ethnic and national processes was "as biological reproducers." See "Introduction" by Yuval-Davis and Anthias, in N. Yuval-Davis and F. Anthias, eds., *Woman-Nation-State* (MacMillan Press, 1989), p. 7. The term "Mother of Citizens" (*guomin mu* 國民母) was often used in late Qing nationalist discourses; see note 8 below.
7. "Nuzi zhongxi yixueyuan jianzhang" (Regulations of the Women College of Chinese and Western Medicine) (女子中西醫學院簡章), in *Jingzhong ribao* (Alarm Bell Daily), 24 January 1905, reprinted in Li Youning and Zhang Yufa, eds., *Jindai Zhongguo nüquan yundong shiliao* (Primary sources on women's rights movements in modern China) (近代中國女權運動史料) (hereafter *Nüquan yundong shiliao*) (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1975), pp. 1087–8.
8. On the construction of the notion of "citizen" (*guomin* 國民) in this period, see Chapter 4 in this volume; also Hao Chang, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China 1890–1907* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 149–219.

9. One central theme of Liang Qichao's advocacy of women's education was that "[A]ll of the 200 million women [in our country] are consumers of profit, none is productive," quoted by Liu Jucai, *Zhongguo jindai funü yundong shi* (The history of feminist movements in modern China) (中國近代婦女運動史) (hereafter *Fünü yundong shi*) (Beijing: Zhongguo funü chubanshe, 1989), p. 92.
10. "Meiguo nügong xingsheng (American women workers are numerous) (美國女工興盛), in *Wanguo gongbao* (International Gazette), October 1904, p. 30, quoted in Li and Zhang, *Nüquan yundong shiliao*, p. 294.
11. Craig Calboun, "Nationalism and ethnicity," *Annual Review of Sociology* 19 (1993), p. 228.
12. "Nuzi zhi xin zhiye" (New professions for women) (女子之新職業), in *Nüzi shijie*, 6, 1907. Quoted in Li and Zhang, *Nüquan yundong shiliao*, p. 295.
13. Tang Erhe, "Weisheng jiangxi hui yanshuo" (Talk in the seminar on hygiene) (衛生講習會演說), in *Jingzhong ribao*, 24 May 1904, quoted in Li and Zhang, *Nüquan yundong shiliao*, p. 929.
14. Here I have borrowed the term "perennialist" from A. D. Smith, who regards perennialist assumptions about the nation as persistent and immemorial as the polar opposite to the paradigm of classical modernism. See A. D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 22–3.
15. See K. C. Angela Leung, "Women practicing medicine in pre-modern China," in H. Zurndorfer, ed., *New Directions in the Study of Chinese Women, 1000–1800* (Leiden: Brill, 1999).
16. See *The China Medical Journal* (hereafter *CMJ*), 23/5 (1909), p. 326.
17. See Harold Balm, *China and Modern Medicine: A Study in Medical Missionary Development* (London: United Council for Missionary Education, 1921), p. 55.
18. By Neal's estimate 268 Chinese had received full training and were practicing. How many were women is unclear. See K. C. Wong and L. T. Wu, *History of Chinese Medicine* (Taipei: Southern materials Center, second edition, 1985), pp. 526–7; also Wang Weifan (汪維藩), *Zhongguo jidujiao yiyao shiye* (Missionary medical enterprises in China) (中國基督教醫藥事業) (hereafter *Jidujiao yiyao shiye*) (Xiejin [Progress], 協進, 1954) pp. 46–7.
19. See Ye Weili, "Nü liuxuesheng: The story of American-educated Chinese women, 1880s–1920s" (hereafter *Nü liuxuesheng*), *Modern China*, 20:3 (1994), p. 316.
20. See Sara Tucker, "Opportunities for women: The development of professional women's medicine at Canton, China, 1879–1901" (hereafter "Opportunities for women"), *Women's Studies International Forum*, 13:4 (1990), p. 364.
21. According to another source, it was in Suzhou in 1891 that the first women's medical college was established. See Wang Weifan, *Jidujiao yiyao shiye*, p. 46.

22. See Wong and Wu, *History of Chinese Medicine*, pp. 541–2, 551–2. “Canton Women’s Medical School,” in *The China Medical Missionary Journal* (hereafter *CMMJ*), 5:3 (1901), pp. 243–4; “Hackett Medical College for Women, Canton,” *CMMJ*, 23:5 (1909), p. 300, pp. 324–9; C. Selden, “The life of John G. Kerr,” in *CMJ*, 49:4 (1935), p. 372; *CMJ*, 23:5 (1909), p. 300; Wong and Wu, *History of Chinese Medicine*, pp. 551–2; C. Selden, “The life of John G. Kerr,” in *CMJ*, 49:4 (1935), p. 372; Wang Weifan, *Jidujiao yiyao shiye*, pp. 49–50.
23. *CMMJ*, 8:4(1894), p. 211.
24. Chinese medical historians claim that the first school in TCM was established as early as 1885 in Ruian of Zhejiang, called *Liji yixue tang* (利濟醫學堂), by Chen Qiu (陳虬). See Jin Rihong (金日紅), “Liji yixue tang shimo ji jiaoxue gaikuang” (The history of the Liji Medical School and its teaching) (利濟醫學堂始末及教學概況), in *Zhongguo yishi zazhi* (Journal of Chinese Medical History), 12:2 (1982), pp. 90–138.
25. Xie Yuanfu, *Xunnu yixue* (Medicine for daughters) (n.p.: Yunlan shuwu, 1892), Preface.
26. Preface by Zhang Baixi to Zeng, *Nü xue pian*, p. 2b; Zeng’s own preface to the same work, pp. 4a–b.
27. See note 5, pp. 1087–8, and also *Zhongguo jindai funü yundong lishi ziliao* (1840–1918) (Materials on the history of feminist movements in modern China) (中國近代婦女運動歷史資料) (hereafter *funü yundong lishi ziliao*) (Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 1991), p. 341; Li Pingshu, *Li Pingshu qishi zixu* (Autobiography at 70 by Li Pingshu) (李平書七十自誌) (Shanghai: Guji chubanshe, 1989), pp. 53–4.
28. Li Pingshu, *Li Pingshu qishi zixu*, p. 54; *Funü yundong lishi ziliao*, pp. 521–31.
29. For the detailed story of Ida Kahn, see Hu Ying, “Naming the first new woman,” *Nan Nü*, 3/2 (2001), pp. 196–231. See also Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 225–6; L. Lee, A. Stefanowska and C. Ho, eds., *Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women (The Qing Period, 1644–1911)* (hereafter *Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women*) (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 101–4.
30. Liang Qichao (梁啟超), “Ji Jiangxi Kang nüshi” (On Madam Kang of Jiangxi) (記江西康女士), *Yinbingshi quanji* 32 (Taipei: Wenguan chubanshe, fac. ed., 1896), pp. 1b–2a.
31. See the biographies of these women doctors in Lee and Stefanowska, *Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women*; see also Ye Weili, “Nu Liuxuesheng,” pp. 318–9.
32. Wong and Wu, *History of Chinese Medicine*, pp. 521–3.
33. *CMMJ*, 10/4(1896), p. 182.
34. Qi Shihao (戚世皓), for instance, in his paper “Xinhai geming yu zhishi funü” (The 1911 Revolution and intellectual women) (辛亥革命與知識婦女), in Li Yuning and Zhang Yufa, eds., *Zongguo funü shi lunwen ji* (Essays on Chinese

- women's history) (中國婦女史論文集) (hereafter *Funūu shi lunwen ji*) (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1988, pp. 551–75), includes Ida Kahn, Mary Stone, Jin Yunmei as women actively contributing to the nationalist revolution.
35. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 208; and also Sylvia Walby, "Woman and nation," in G. Balakrishnan, ed., *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso, 1996), p. 247.
  36. *CMMJ*, 15/3, p. 217.
  37. Jane Hunter, *The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China* (hereafter *American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China*) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 232–3; and also Lee, Stefanowska and Ho, *Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women*, p. 102.
  38. See *Who's Who in China, 1918–1950* (Hong Kong: Chinese Material Center, 1982), Vol. 3, pp. 200–1.
  39. See Li and Zhang, *Funūu shi lunwen ji*, p. 564; see also *Shengzhou ribao*, 8 December, p. 11, quoted in *Funū yundong lishi ziliao*, pp. 520–1.
  40. One such example is her paper in the 19:6 (1905) issue of *CMMJ* on "self-supporting medical missionary work." Describing the behavior of her Chinese patients: "... they did not stop with calling in the quacks but had the idols brought in as well" (p. 224); she suggested in this paper charging greater sums from certain patients, "I firmly believe that when we charge a better sum they are much more apt to allow us to follow the case through, for what is worth beginning is worth keeping up" (p. 225).
  41. Zeng Yi, *Yixue Pian* (On medicine) (醫學篇), Changsha edition (1906), preface: 4b–5a.
  42. Hunter, *American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China*, p. 232.
  43. Tucker, "Opportunities for women," p. 359.
  44. Patricia Hill, *The World Their Household: The American Woman's Foreign Mission Movement and Cultural Transformation, 1870–1920* (hereafter *The World Their Household*) (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1985), p. 43.
  45. Hunter, *American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China*, p. 29.
  46. Hunter, *American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China*, p. 233.
  47. Lee, Stefanowska and Ho, *Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women*, pp. 288–9.
  48. Leung, "Women practicing medicine in Pre-modern China."
  49. Arthur Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644–1912* (Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 780–2.
  50. Liang Qichao, *Yinbingshi quanji*, p. 2a.
  51. "Lun nugong" (On women workers) (論女工), in *Dongfang zazhi* (Journal of the Orient), 1:8 (n.d.); Zhang Zhujun, "Nūzi xing xue baoxian hui xu" (Preface on the Assurance Association for the Promotion of Women's Education) (女子興學保險會序) in *Zhongguo xin nūjie zazhi* (Journal of New Women in China), 4 (1904). Cited in Li and Zhang, *Nūquan yundong shiliao*, p. 708 and p. 922.

52. See Li and Zhang, *Nāquan yundong shilliao*, pp. 1046, 1114–6, 1154, 1168, 1289, 1292–3, 1297, 1299, 1301–1310.
53. Charlotte Beahan, “Feminism and nationalism in the Chinese women’s press, 1902–1911,” *Modern China*, 1:4 (1975), p. 413.
54. 倡設女學堂啟, quoted by Liu Jucai, *Funū yundong shi*, pp. 91.
55. Patricia Hill, *The World Their Household*, p. 35.
56. By 1919, both northern and southern American Methodist boards had more than twice as many women as men in the China field, and the Congregational American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions could boast of nearly as many single women as married and single men together. See Hunter, *American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China*, p. 13.
57. Weili Ye, “Nū liuxuesheng,” pp. 322–3.
58. “Reports of medical missionary ladies in China,” CR, 17 (1886), p. 23.
59. Weili Ye, “Nū liuxuesheng,” p. 321. As late as 1923, a Chinese woman medical student studying in America wrote, “[I]n China there is not so much cynicism on the side of the men toward the women, which seems to be quite common in the United States.” Gien Tsiu Liu, “Chinese women in medicine,” *The Chinese Students’ Monthly*, 18/3 (1923), p. 40.
60. In 1877, the Presbyterian missionary Charles Mills of Dengzhou summed up the special case for missionary women doctors abroad: “Now personally I confess to some old fashioned prejudices against everything which unsexes women. If I were at home I would never employ a lady physician. And the very designation is repulsive to me. But giving the ladies medical training to work on mission ground strikes me as different.” See Sara Tucker, “Opportunities for women: The development of professional women’s medicine at Canton, China, 1879–1901,” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 13:4 (1990), p. 361.
61. Mary Rankin, “The emergence of women at the end of the Ch’ing: The case of Ch’iu Chin,” in M. Wolf and R. Witke, eds., *Women in Chinese Society* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 39–66.
62. Emily Honig, “Christianity, feminism, and communism: The life and times of Deng Yuzhi (Cora Deng)” (hereafter “Deng Yuzhi”), in C. Johnson-Odim and M. Strobel, eds., *Expanding the Boundaries of Women’s History: Essays on Women in the Third World* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 128.
63. Hunter, *American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China*, p. 248.
64. Emily Honig, “Deng Yuzhi,” p. 129.
65. Hu Guojun (胡國俊), “Zeng Yi nüyi wannian yixue yishi” (A few anecdotes about the practice of the woman doctor Zeng Yi in her late years) (曾懿女醫晚年醫學軼事), told by Hu Qiaowu, *Sichuan Zhongyi* (四川中醫) (1985), pp. 6–7.
66. Tu Kuixian (屠揆先), “Qingdai nü zhongyi Zeng Yi ji qi ‘Yixue pian’ jianjie” (A brief presentation of the Qing woman doctor Zeng Yi and her work “On

- medicine”) (清代女中醫曾懿及其「醫學篇」簡介), *Zhongyi zazhi* (中醫雜誌) No. 4 (1981), pp. 69–70; He Shixi (何時希), ed., *Zhongguo lidai yijia chuanlu* (Biographies of medical doctors throughout the ages) (中國歷代醫家傳錄) (Beijing: Renmin weisheng chubanshe, Vol. II, 1991).
67. Zeng Yi (曾懿), *Nuxue pian* (On women's education) (女學篇) (hereafter *Nuxue pian*), Changsha edition (1907), preface 4b, 5b.
  68. Liang Qichao, preface, “Advocating the establishment of schools for women,” quoted by Liu Jucai, *Funu yundong shi*, pp. 91–2.
  69. Zeng Yi, *Nuxue pian*, preface 1:7b–8a.
  70. Zeng Yi, *Nuxue pian*, preface 5a–b.
  71. Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, p. 79.
  72. Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, p. 13; and also Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and ethnicity,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 19 (1993), p. 231.
  73. Quoting from Yu Heqin's (虞和欽) article, “Science and Han medicine” (理學與漢醫); see also Zou Zhenhuan (鄧振環), “Xiyi yizhu yu jindai Zhongyi jie di fanxing” (Translations of Western medical texts and the reflections in TCM circles in modern China) (西醫譯著與近代中醫界的反省), *Huandong shifan daxue xuebao*, (華東師範大學學報) 1 (1986), p. 78.
  74. Croizier, *Traditional Medicine in Modern China*; Xu Xiaogun, “National ‘essence’ vs ‘science’: Chinese native physicians; fight for legitimacy, 1912–1937,” *Modern Asian Studies*, 31:4 (date), pp. 847–77; and Lei Hsiang-lin, *When Chinese Medicine Encountered the State: 1910–1949* (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1998).
  75. Medical magazines of the 1930s increasingly included writings by women doctors in TCM. In *Guoyi dizhu yuekan* (Resistant pillar of national medicine, a monthly magazine) (國醫砥柱月刊), an influential militant magazine, a special section called “Zhongguo nuyi” (Chinese women doctors) (中國女醫) was set up in the late 1930s, because “the revival of Chinese medicine is related to the strength and weaknesses of the race, it is earnestly longed for by every citizen (國民), and a responsibility of every Chinese doctor. Women doctors are part of TCM, none can deny their responsibility in this,” *Guoyi dizhu yuekan*, 15/16 (1939), p. 15. In the same year, the magazine promoted the organization of a Society of Chinese Women Doctors (中國女醫學社), to “improve Chinese medicine and promote women's position,” *Guoyi dizhu yuekan*, 19/20 (1939), p. 15.
  76. *MMJ*, 19:6 (1905), p. 223.
  77. For an account of the controversy, see Croizier, *Traditional Medicine in Modern China*, pp. 70–130; also Lei Hsiang-lin, “When Chinese medicine encountered the state.”
  78. Charlotte Beahan, “Feminism and nationalism in the Chinese women's press, 1902–1911,” pp. 412–3.
  79. Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, p. 71.
  80. Lydia Liu, “The female body and nationalist discourse: Manchuria in Xiao

- Hong's field of life and death," in A. Zito and T. Barlow, eds., *Body, Subject and Power in China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 157–80.
81. There is much confusion about her medical education. Feng Ziyou recorded that she was educated in the Hackett Medical College for women and graduated in 1900. As the college was established later, this is clearly incorrect. Other sources said that she had 13 years of medical training in the Bojing Hospital in Canton. As none of the medical institutions in China provided such a long period of medical training, this information is also doubtful. See Feng Ziyou (馮自由), "Nü yishi Zhang Zhujun" (The lady doctor Zhang Zhujun) (女醫士張竹君) in *Geming yishi* (Miscellaneous events about the Revolution) (革命逸史) (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, third edition, 1947), p. 41; Ma Junwu (馬君武), "Nüshi Zhang Zhujun zhuan" (Biography of Madam Zhang Zhujun) (女士張竹君傳), in Mo Shixiang, ed., *Ma Junwu ji 1900–1919* (Works by Ma Junwu) (馬君武集) (Wuhan: Huazhong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1991), p. 1; *Shuntian shibao*, 16 November 1905, quoted in Li and Zhang, p. 1379.
  82. Feng Ziyou, "Nü yishi Zhang Zhujun," p. 41; Ma Junwu, "Nüshi Zhang Zhujun zhuan," p. 1; Li Pingshu, *Li Pingshu qishi zixu*, p. 52.
  83. Ma Junwu, "Nüshi Zhang Zhujun zhuan," p. 1.
  84. Feng Ziyou, "Nü yishi Zhang Zhujun," p. 41.
  85. Ma Junwu, "Nüshi Zhang Zhujun zhuan," pp. 2–3.
  86. Feng Ziyou, "Nü yishi Zhang Zhujun," p. 41.
  87. Lu Danlin (陸丹林), "Guangdong nü zhishi Zhang Zhujun yishi" (The Guangdong woman revolutionary, Doctor Zhang Zhujun) (廣東女志士張竹君醫師), *Guangdong wenshi ziliao* (廣東文史資料) (1982), p. 166.
  88. Feng Ziyou, "Nü yishi Zhang Zhujun," p. 41.
  89. Apparently, most of Zhang's educational and medical enterprises in Canton before 1904 were generously financed by Xu; Feng Ziyou, "Nü yishi Zhang Zhujun," pp. 41–2; Lu Danlin (陸丹林), "Guangdong nü zhishi Zhang Zhujun yishi," p. 167.
  90. Her male friends included such Cantonese celebrities as Hu Hanmin (胡漢民), Cheng Ziyi (程子儀), Zhu Tongru (朱通儒), all of whom were involved in the 1911 Revolution in various ways.
  91. Feng Ziyou, "Nü yishi Zhang Zhujun," p. 43.
  92. Her public talk in Shanghai in 1904 was typical, "I could not help crying for our women whose dependent nature is persistent ... if we want to save the nation, we have to start with education; if we want to start with education, we have to start with women ..." quoted in Li and Zhang, *Nüquan yundong shiliao*, pp. 1383–4.
  93. Lu Danlin (陸丹林), "Guangdong nü zhishi Zhang Zhujun yishi," p. 166. She covered in particular Huang Xing, disguised as a volunteer, and his concubine Xu Peixuan, as a nurse. *Funü yundong lishi ziliao*, pp. 529–30.
  94. She was reported to have recruited 69 men and 54 women members. The

- women included 14 doctors and 40 nurses, many of whom were students or graduates of the Medical College that she and Li organized. On 24 October, she took with her to Wuhan 21 of these women and 20 men. On 20 December of the same year, she wrote an article openly condemning the imperial forces and supporting the revolutionary army. See *Shenzhou ribao*, 11 November and 20 December, quoted in *Funū yundong lishi ziliao*, pp. 526–7. The news of the departure of the Red Cross volunteers was published daily in October in 1911 in the newspaper *Minli bao* (People's Independence Daily) (民立報) (see 18–30 October).
95. Feng Ziyou, "Nü yishi Zhang Zhujun," p. 44.
  96. Gu Xingyuan (顧杏元), "Jidu jiaohui yiyuan yu diguo zhuyi qinlue" (Christian hospitals and imperialist invasion) (基督教會醫院與帝國主義侵略), *Renmin baojian*, (人民保健) 1 (1960), pp. 51–6.
  97. Chu Nan (楚南), "Boxue duocai di nu jiaoyujia" (An erudite woman educator) (博學多才的女教育家) in *Gujin zhuming funu renwu* (古今著名婦女人物) (Vol. 1, Hebei remin chubanshe, 1986), p. 384.
  98. Geoff Eley, "Nations, publics, and political cultures: Placing Habermas in the 19th Century," in Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 308–9.
  99. Raia Prokhnovnik, "Public and private citizenship: From gender invisibility to feminist inclusiveness," *Feminist Review*, 60 (1998), p. 91.
  100. Liu Jucai, *Funū yundong shi*, p. 319. In Chinese, "光怪陸離·非中非西·非男非女·非僮非尼之異象," quoted in an article in *Minlibao* (民立報) 1912.
  101. Liu Jucai, *Funū yundong shi*, pp. 360–78. The struggle for women's rights of political participation and equal legal rights, led by the Association for Women's Political Participation (女子參政同盟會) under Tang Qunying (唐群英), encountered strong resistance from the Republican government in its first year. The Association was dissolved in November 1913.
  102. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 209.
  103. Walby, "Woman and Nation," p. 243.
  104. By sapping the power of the military aristocracy, and consolidating the Imperial Civil Examination, the Song state was responsible for the long-lasting dominance of literati culture. See Liu Zijian (T. C. Liu) (劉子健), "Lue lun Song dai wuguan qun zai tongzhi jieji zhong di diwei" (略論宋代武官群在統治階級中的地位) (On the position of military officials in the Song ruling class), in *Liang Song shi yanjiu huibian* (Collected essays in Song history) (兩宋史研究叢編) (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshiye gongsi, 1987), pp. 173–84, p. 183.
  105. Gael Graham, "Exercising control: Sports and physical education in American Protestant mission schools in China, 1880–1930," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 20:11 (1994), p. 31; p. 41.
  106. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 208.



## Chapter 6

1. See, for example, Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004); Paul Cohen, *China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past* (London: Routledge, 2003); and John Fitzgerald, "China and the quest for dignity," *The National Interest* 55 (Spring 1999), pp. 47–59. For a more state-centred approach, see John Fitzgerald, "The nationless state: The search for a nation in modern Chinese nationalism," in Jonathan Unger, ed., *Chinese Nationalism* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996). Hays Gries has characterized the last essay as offering a top-down state-centred perspective on Chinese nationalism. While it certainly focuses on the state the point of the argument is that state communism in China is a variant of nationalism — not that Chinese nationalism is irretrievably statist.
2. See Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), Introduction, *passim*.
3. Bates Gill, "China's weakness is what makes it so dangerous," *Los Angeles Times*, 6 April 2001.
4. Zhu Hanguo, *Zhongguo jindai guochi quanlu* (Complete record of national humiliations in modern China) (Beijing: Shuhai chubanshe, 1993).
5. Fitzgerald, "China and the quest for dignity."
6. For the intellectual pedigree of this idea, see Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), Introduction. Frances Fukuyama writes eloquently on the politics of recognition in *The End of History and the Last Man* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), p. xv.
7. See, for example, Kofi Annan's Nobel Speech of December 2001. "In the 21st century, I believe the mission of the United Nations will be defined by a new, more profound, awareness of the sanctity and dignity of every human life, regardless of race or religion ... The sovereignty of states must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights."
8. Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
9. See, for example, Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*; also Ralph Gaebler, "Is liberal nationalism an oxymoron?" *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 283–5.
10. Isaiah Berlin, "Kant as an unfamiliar source of nationalism" (1972), in Isaiah Berlin, *The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and their History*, edited by Henry Hardy (London: Pimlico, 1997), pp. 232–48, esp. p. 238.
11. Emphases added. For web versions see [www.un.org/aboutun/charter](http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter) (2002); also Steven Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), pp. 45–51.
12. For a classic account of China's quest for "wealth and power," see Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1964).

13. Emphasis added. Cited in Kwang-ching Liu, "Nineteenth-century China: The disintegration of the Old Order and the impact of the West," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis, China's Heritage and the Communist Political System*, Vol. 1, Book 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 149.
14. Song Qiang et al., *Zhongguo haishi neng shuo bu* (China is still capable of saying no) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chuban gongsi, 1996), p. 8.
15. Qin Xiaoying, "Daixu" (Foreword), in Song Qiang et al., *Zhongguo haishi neng shuo bu*, p. 3. This theme is developed further in my "China and the quest for dignity," *The National Interest*, 55 (Spring 1999), pp. 47–59.
16. Greenfeld (1993), pp. 3–10. I have argued elsewhere that if the nation is merely the referent of the representing nation-state (the "people" of "we the people"), then the nationalism of the nation-state is bound up with the representative relationship between "we" (the representing state) and "the people" (the represented sample). Democracy is then a relationship of representation. See "The nationless state."
17. See, for example, Tu Wei-ming, "The enlightenment mentality and the Chinese intellectual dilemma," in Kenneth Lieberthal, Joyce Kallgren, Roderick Mac Farquhar and Frederick Wakeman, eds., *Perspectives on Modern China: Four Anniversaries* (Armonk, NY: M E Sharpe, 1991), pp. 103–18.
18. Chow Tse-tung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967).
19. Martin W. Huang, *Literati and Self-Re/Presentation: Autobiographical Sensibility in the Eighteenth-Century Chinese Novel* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1995); Haiyan Lee, "Love or lust? The sentimental self in Honglou meng," *Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews*, No. 19 (December 1997), pp. 85–111.
20. See Tan Sitong, *An Exposition of Benevolence: The Jen Hsueh of Tan Ssu-t'ung*, Chan Sin-wai, trans. (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984); Kang Youwei, *Ta T'ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of Kang Yu-wei*, Laurence G. Thompson, trans. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958). For the anarchists, see Peter Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). On utopian visions of egalitarian order in the period, see my *Awakening China: Politics, Culture and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1996).
21. Shan hua pi jia you, "Pingdeng shuo" (The theory of equality), *Xiangbao* (Hunan Journal), No. 58 (n.d.), p. 229; No. 59 (n.d.), p. 233; No. 60 (n.d.), p. 237, c. 1898.
22. *Ibid.*, No. 58, p. 229.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, No. 59, p. 233.
25. On Kang Youwei's early essays on this theme, see Hao Chang, *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning, 1890–1911* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 29–30, 46–8.

26. Tan Sitong, *Exposition of Benevolence*, pp. 215–6; also Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward: 2000–1887* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1967 [1888]).
27. See Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*, and Arif Dirlik, *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991).
28. Liang Qichao, *Xin zhongguo weilai ji* (An account of the future of New China) [1902]. In Liang Qichao, *Yinbingshi zhuanji* (*Monographs from the Ice-Drinker's Studio*) (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1936), pp. 1–57.
29. Liang Qichao, *Xin zhongguo weilai ji*, pp. 7–8.
30. Pamela Kyle Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 127.
31. Liang Qichao, “Zhongguo jiruo suyuanlun” (Tracing the source of China's weakness). In Liang Qichao, *Yinbingshi wenji* (Collected essays from the Ice-Drinkers' Studio) (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1928 [1900]), Volume 2. Liang delivered the essay in a series of lectures in the meeting hall of the Empire Reform Association. His publication of a pamphlet on this theme is noted in the Sydney *Tungwah Times* (*Donghua shibao*), 13 March 1901.
32. *Tungwah News* (*Donghua shibao*), 16 January 1901.
33. Liang “Zhongguo jiruo suyuanlun,” pp. 16–7.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 17–22.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
37. Liang Qichao, *Xin zhongguo weilai ji*, pp. 56–7.
38. Zhang Jianhua, “Ershi shiji zhongguo dui bupingdeng tiaoyue gainian de qishi” (Origins of the concept of the unequal treaties in twentieth-century China). Unpublished paper presented to the Joint Conference of the History Department of Peking University and the Historical Society for Twentieth-Century China, Peking University, 15–17 June 2001, pp. 5–6; “Gongfa xuehui xu,” (Preface to Society for the Study of Public Law), *Xiangbao*, No. 43 (n.d.). See also Li Yumin and Li Bin, “Wuxu shiqi weixinpai dui pingdeng tiaoyue de renshi” (Recognition of the unequal treaties among the reform faction in 1898), *Hunan shifan daxue shehuikexue xuebao* (Journal of the School of Social Sciences of Hunan Normal University), No. 2 (1999).
39. Hu Hanmin, “Paiwai yu guojifa” (Anti-foreignism and international law), published serially in *Minbao*, Nos. 4, 6–10, and 13 (1906).
40. Jingwei, “Bo geming keyi zhao guafen shuo” (Refuting the claim that revolution will lead to partition), *Minbao*, No. 6 (1906).
41. Zhang Jianhua “Ershi shiji zhongguo,” pp. 7–8.
42. See, for example, *Sun Zhongshan quanji* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981–6), 11 Vols., Vol. 9, p. 283; Zhao Jianmin, “Geming lixiang yu zhengzhi xianshi de bianzheng” (Dialectic between revolutionary ideals and political realities). Unpublished paper presented to the 80th Anniversary Conference on the May Fourth Movement, Institute of Modern History, Academic Sinica, Taipei, April 1999, p. 3.

43. Admittedly the term “nationalism” also conveys a variety of different senses in European historiography. I mean only to suggest that in its most comprehensive sense this term has no equivalent in Chinese outside specific ideological systems, such as the Three Principles. The word for nationalism (*minzuzhuyi*) evokes merely the particularity of a national people seeking or exercising self-determination.
44. See published accounts in the *Times* of London, which inserted a sub-heading for “slavery” in its annual index entries under “China” in the Republican era.
45. Mao Zedong, “Zhongguo renmin zhanqilai” (The Chinese people have stood up), in *Mao Zedong xuanji* (Selected works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1977), 5 Vols. Vol. 5, pp. 3–7.
46. On “recognition,” see G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, A. V. Miller, trans. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 104–19 (IV: 166–96); Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Fukuyama, *The End of History*.
47. On continuities from the ideal of liberation to that of liberty, see John Fitzgerald, *Between Individual Dignity and Nationalist Indignation: The Irrational Roots of Liberalism and Nationalism in Contemporary China* (New York: Columbia University East Asian Institute Reports, 1998).
48. Wei Jingsheng, *Interview with China News Digest*, January 1998. CND serialized the interview over five separate issues in January and February 1998. The interview was conducted in Chinese, compiled by Fang Wu, translated by Fabian Fang and proofread by Bing Wen for serial publication in CND-Global on 15, 20, 25 and 31 January, and 7 February 1998. See CND: GL98-007, GL98-010, GL98-013 and GL98-017 and GL98-021. Reader responses were published on 22 February in CND: GL98-028. For ease of reading, I have in places corrected the English of the respondents.
49. Wei Jingsheng, “The Fifth Modernization,” in James D. Seymour, ed., *The Fifth Modernization: China’s Human Rights Movement 1978–1979* (Stanfordville, NY: Human Rights Publication Group, 1980), pp. 47–70.
50. Wei Jingsheng, “A CND Interview with Wei Jingsheng: Part I.” Interviewed by Fang Wu and translated by Fabian Fang, *China News Digest* (Global News, No. GL98-007), 15 January 1998.
51. Wei Jingsheng, “The Fifth Modernization,” p. 56.
52. Wei Jingsheng, interviews with CND 1998 (see preceding notes).
53. In the same spirit, Wei noted in a letter from prison: “A foreign trade cadre who was in prison here for accepting a bribe told me that foreigners he did business with called me a hero of the Chinese people. ‘Foreigners used to think that Chinese people were weaklings and lacked the courage to stand up for principles,’ he once said to me, ‘but this time you’ve shown them that we Chinese have real guts.’” Wei Jingsheng, *The Courage to Stand Alone: Letters from Prison and Other Writings*, Kristina M. Torgeson, ed. and trans. (New York: Viking, 1997), p. 7.

54. Wei Jingsheng, interviews with CND 1998 (see preceding notes).

## Chapter 7

- Jonathan Mirsky, "Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui told the truth last week," *Hong Kong Voice of Democracy*, 10 November 1997, www.democracy.org.hk/pastweek/97\_nov/mirsky971110.htm.
- My sample is limited to Taiwanese of Han origin, chiefly descendents of Fujianese and Hakka immigrants. The aboriginal peoples of Taiwan fall outside the focus of this study on the implications of Taiwanese identity for the autonomy of the state.
- According to 1996 surveys, people identifying themselves as Taiwanese, Taiwanese and Chinese, or primarily Chinese, made up 33.1, 45.1 and 16.6% of Taiwan's population respectively. The corresponding ratios in 1991 were 16.5, 47 and 32.5%. Figures cited in Hsiao A-chin, "Crafting a nation: Contemporary Taiwanese cultural nationalism" (PhD dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1998), p. 186, note 63.
- H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thoughts 1890–1930* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 18.
- See Weng Jiayin, *Taiwan hanren wuzhuang kang Ri shi yanjiu, 1895–1902* (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1986), pp. 88–90.
- The emergence of Han people in Taiwan from the status of an immigrant society to an "indigenized" or a "Sinicized" one is dated by some scholars to the 1860s.
- See Liao Jiazhan, *Laozheng xinsheng* (Taipei: Yuanliu chuban yuexian kongsi, 1995), p. 39.
- "*Mingzhi jun zuo zhu*," see Weng Jiayin, "Fucheng jiaohui bao suojian Riben ling Tai qianhou lishi xiang," in *Taiwan fengwu* 41 (September 1991), pp. 93–4.
- The final uprising of the aborigines, in October 1930, was known as the Wushe Incident.
- See George H. Kerr, "A licensed revolution," *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement 1895–1945* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1974), Chapter 5, pp. 69–94.
- See Yanaihara Tadao, *Teikokushugi ka no Taiwan* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1929).
- Discrimination at secondary level worked via a disproportional quota system. For instance, Taihoku Normal School (Taihoku shihan gakkō) customarily accepted 30 Japanese for every 10 Taiwanese to make up a class of 40.
- See Wang Taisheng, "Ribei zhimin tongzhi xia Taiwan de falü gaige," in Wang Taisheng, *Taiwan falü de jianli* (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue faxue congshu bianji weiyuan hui, 1997), pp. 170–2.

14. Lian Wenqing, *Taiwan zhengzhi yundong shi*, in Weng Jiayin and Zhang Yanxian, eds. (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 1988); Lin Bowei, *Taiwan wenhua xiehui cangsang* (Taipei: Taiyuan chubanshe, 1993); Lu Xiuyi, *Rifu shidai Taiwan gongchandang shi, 1928–1932* (Taipei: Qianwei chubanshe, 1990).
15. For a study of the *kōminka* movement, see Wan-yao Chou, “The *kōminka* movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and interpretations,” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 40–68.
16. Wu Wenxing et al., eds., *Taiwan zongdu Tian Jianzhilang riji* (Taipei: Preparatory Office, the Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 2000).
17. For an evaluation of the success with each program, see Wan-yao Chou, “The *kōminka* movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and interpretations.”
18. A Taiwanese veteran says: “I was Japanese for twenty-five years ... [f]rom when I was born until the war ended.” Usui Kazumitsu, *Shōkon* (Osaka: Kōbō U, 1987), p. 22.
19. Cf. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 140.
20. Zhou Wanyao (Chou Wan-yao), “Aimei de Taiwanren: Riben zhimin tongzhi yu jindai minzu guojia zhi rentong,” in *Hwei Taiwan?* (Taipei: Xungshi meishu yuekanshe, 1996), p. 8.
21. In 1898 there were 1,707 *shobō* in Taiwan, enrolling 29,941 students (65 female). This is probably under 5% of school-aged children. Taiwan kyōikukai, ed., *Taiwan kyōiku enkakushi* (Taipei, 1939), p. 984.
22. In 1904, the number of Taiwanese children enrolled in elementary schools was 23,178, while *shobō* had 21,661 students.
23. Taiwan sheng xingzheng zhangguan kongshu, ed., *Taiwan sheng wushiyi nian lai tongji tiyao* (Taipei: The editor, 1946), p. 1241.
24. E. Patricia Tsurumi uses “common schools” and “primary schools” to translate *kōgakkō* and *shōgakkō* respectively. See her *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 18, 33.
25. Only towards the very end of Japanese rule did *kōgakkō* start using the same textbooks as those used in schools in Japan proper.
26. The Imperial University of Taihoku (Taipei) was established in 1928, chiefly to cater for Japanese. It was more difficult for Taiwanese to enter than prestigious universities in Japan proper.
27. Similar situations can be found in the Spanish Americas. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London and New York: Verso, 1991), p. 51, note 19.
28. The title of this subject was changed to “National History” (*kokushi*) in 1933.
29. Before 1922 the subject of science was taught in the fifth and sixth grades.
30. The subject of Japanese language took up 12, 14, 14, 14, 10 and 10 hours per week, respectively, from the first grade to the sixth grade, out of 24, 26, 28,

- 29 (31), 32 (33) and 32 (33) total hours. Figures in parentheses are class times for female students. See Taiwan kyôikukai, ed., op. cit., pp. 379–80.
31. “*Kokumin*” during the war era implied “subjects of imperial Japan.” On “*shôkokumin*” (young *kokumin* in textbooks), see Xu Peixian, “Suzao zhimindi shaoguomin: Riju shiqi Taiwan kongxue Xiao jiaokeshu zhi fenxi,” MA thesis, National University of Taiwan, 1994.
  32. For details see Chou Wan-yao (Zhou Wanyao), “Shixue jiaoyu yu xiangtu jiaocai: Disanqi kongxue Xiao ‘guoyu’ jiaokeshu de fenxi,” *Taiwan shi yanjiu* 4:2, pp. 7–53.
  33. For Fukuzawa Yukichi’s idea of *jitsugaku*, see Fukuzawa Yukichi, “Gakkumon no susume,” in *Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshû* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1979), pp. 21–144. For the significance of Fukuzawa’s idea of *jitsugaku*, see Maruyama Masao, “Fukuzawa ni okeiru ‘jitsugaku’ no denkai: Fukuzawa Yukichi no tetsugaku kenkyû josetsu,” in *Maruyama Masao shû* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995), Vol. 3, pp. 107–31.
  34. For a list of 68 lessons under the category “practical learning,” see Zhou Wanyao (Chou Wan-yao), “Shixue jiaoyu yu xiangtu jiaocai: Disanqi kongxue Xiao ‘guoyu’ jiaokeshu de fenxi,” pp. 24–5.
  35. Taiwan Sôtokufu, ed., *Kôgakkô yô kokugo tokuhon (dai’ichi shû)* (Taipei: The editor, 1924/1931), Volume 7, Lesson 21, pp. 73–7.
  36. See Chen Roshui (Chen Jo-shui), “Ribei jindai wenhua yu jiaoyu zhong de shehui lunli wenti,” in *Taiwan jiaoyushi yanjiuhui tongxun*, No. 3 (March 1999), pp. 13–6.
  37. E. Patricia Tsurumi compares Japanese language and ethics textbooks used in Taiwan and Japan (op. cit., pp. 133–45). She concludes that textbooks compiled for Taiwanese children were not watered-down versions of those used for Japanese children, and that the former were in effect less nationalistic than the latter.
  38. They are Cao Jin and Wu Feng in the Qing period. Cao Jin was a Qing official praised for good public service. Wu Feng was an interpreter working among aboriginal people, but the story of Wu sacrificing his own life in order to rid them of their custom of head-hunting has been widely judged a fiction.
  39. For an analysis of ethics textbooks used in colonial Taiwan, see Zhou Wanyao (Chou Wan-yao), “Shiluo de daode shijie: Ribei zhimin tongzhi shiqi Taiwan gongxue Xiao xiushen jiaoyu zhi yanjiu,” *Taiwan shi yanjiu* 8:2 (December 2001), pp. 1–63.
  40. Isoda Kazuo, “Kôminka kyôiku to shokuminchi kokushi kyôkasho,” in *Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, 4 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993), p. 124.
  41. In History readers compiled in 1938, a final chapter entitled “The Resolution of the Imperial Subjects” (*kokumin no kakugo*) was added. The presentation of Japanese history chiefly in terms of the unbroken imperial line was a crucial way to support *tennô*-centered nationalism in modern Japan. In reality, only in a limited period of time did emperors wield real power in Japanese history.

42. Taiwan sôtokufu, ed., *Kôgakkô yo Nihon rekishi* (Taipei: Taiwan sôtokufu, 1923), Vol. 2, p. 13.
43. Taiwan sôtokufu, ed., *Kôgakkô chirisho* (Taipei: Taiwan sôtokufu, 1931), Vol. 1, lesson 2, pp. 6–7.
44. Hoshina Kôichi is known as “kokugo kyôikusha” (educator for national language education).
45. See Hoshina Kôichi, *Saikin kokugo kyôjufu no shomondai* (Tokyo: Kyôiku shinchô kenkyûkai, 1915), p. 292.
46. Shinjô Teruo, “Hontô kyôiku to kyôdo kyôiku,” in *Taiwan kyôiku* 381 (April 1934), p. 37; Suzuki Hiroo, ed., *Genten Kaisetsu: Nihon kyôiku shi* (Tokyo: Nihon tosho bunka kyôkai, 1985), pp. 288–91.
47. Karasawa Tomitarô, *Kyôkasho no rekishi: kyôkasho to Nihonjin no keisei* (Tokyo: Sôbunsha, 1956), p. 370.
48. Hisasumi Ei’ichi and Fujimoto Genjiro, *Kôgakkô kakuka kyôjuhô* (Taihoku: Shinkôdô shoten, 1924), p. 80.
49. Hoshina Kôichi, op. cit., p. 292.
50. See Zhou Wanyao (Chou Wan-yao), “Shixue jiaoyu yu xiangtu jiaocai: Disanqi kongxue Xiao ‘guoyu’ jiaokeshu de fenxi,” p. 37.
51. Suzuki Kizo, “Taiwan ni okeru kyôdo kyôiku no kachi,” *Taiwan kyôiku* 417 (April 1937), pp. 2–10.
52. Kitahata Gen’ei, “Shotô kokushi kyôiku no honshitsu to sono shimei ni oite: Toku ni kôgakkô no kokushi kyôiku ni oite (4),” *Taiwan kyôiku* 386 (September 1934), p. 30.
53. For the Taiwanese “zeal for national language” (*guoyu re*), see Xu Xueji, “Taiwan kuangfu chuqi de yuwen wenti,” *Shilian zazhi* 19 (December 1991), pp. 91–2.
54. On the issue of “enslavement,” see Li Xiaofeng, “Ereba shijian qian de wenhua chongtu,” *Shilian zazhi* 19 (December 1991), p. 111. The term “zuguohua” was actually used by officials in charge of the takeover of Taiwan in 1945.
55. The Taiwan Diaocha weiyuanhui was set up by the KMT government in April 1944, when Japan’s defeat was anticipated. The committee was headed by Chen Yi, later governor of Taiwan.
56. Chen Mingzhong and Chen Xingtang, eds., *Taiwan kuangfu he kuangfuhou wunian shengqing* (Nanjing: Nanjing chubanshe, 1989), p. 49.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
58. *Taiwan Xinsheg bao* (1 April 1947).
59. *Ibid.*
60. Xu Xueji, “Taiwan kuangfu chuqi de yuwen wenti,” pp. 97–8.
61. There were exceptions such as literary critic Ye Shitao (1925–). See Ye Shitao, *Yige laoxiu zuojia de wuling niandai* (Taipei: Qianwei chubanshe, 1991), pp. 27–8, 33, 92.
62. In the 1950s, speaking the mother tongue attracted fines or punishments,



- e.g. being forced to hang a square board from their necks reading “I spoke dialect.”
63. For Taiwanese involvement in the Japanese war effort from 1937 to 1945, see Zhou Wanyao (Chou Wan-yao), “Ribei zai Tai junshi dongyuan yu Taiwan ren de haiwai canzhan jingyan, 1937–1945,” *Taiwan shi yanjiu* 2:1 (June 1995), pp. 85–126.
  64. *Chuji xiaoxue guoyu changshi keben* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1951), Vol. 1, p. 7; Vol. 2, p. 30.
  65. *Chuji xiaoxue guoyu changshi keben* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1951), Vol. 5, p. 15, 50; Vol. 7, pp. 21–2; Vol., 8, p. 17; *Gaoji xiaoxue guoyu keben* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1951–52), Vol. 1, pp. 3–6, pp. 25–6; Vol., 2, pp. 1–4; Vol., 3, pp. 1–5.
  66. *Chuji xiaoxue guoyu changshi keben* (Taipei: guoli bianyi guan, 1951), Vol. 5, p. 19; Vol. 7, pp. 14–5, 55, 59; Vol. 8, pp. 28–33, 50–1; *Gaoji xiaoxue keben* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1953), Vol. 4, p. 1.
  67. *Chuji xiaoxue guoyu changshi keben*, Vol., 8, pp. 29–33.
  68. *Guomin xuexiao guoyu keben: Chuji* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1964), Vol. 5, p. 23.
  69. *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, lesson 21.
  70. For example, *Guomin xuexiao guoyu keben: Chuji* (Taipei: Guoli bianyi guan, 1962–6) had lessons entitled “The Diligent President Chiang” (Vol. 4, Lesson 1), “Long Live President Chiang” (Vol. 5, Lesson 12), “The Patriotic President Chiang” (Vol. 5, Lesson 28), “The Loyal and Brave President Chiang” (Vol. 6, Lesson 28), and “The Great President Chiang” (Vol. 7, Lesson 21). In the readers for the fifth and sixth grades, one lesson was entitled “The Constantly Self-strengthening President Chiang” (*Guomin xuexiao guoyu keben: Gaoji*, Vol. 1, Lesson 11).
  71. Only during wartime did most characters in textbooks appear with Japanese-style names.
  72. “Xiao Hua” is the main protagonist in readers used in the early 1950s. Only when I came across two names Aihua and Xinghua in the later parts of the readers did I realize that “hua” stands for China (Zhonghua). Aihua literally means “loving China” and Xinghua “awakening China.”
  73. Ye Shitao, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–53.
  74. Professor Cao Yonghe (Ts’ao Yung-he) shared with me the observation that scholars avoided dealing with the transition of power from Zheng Chenggong to his son for fear of what it might imply about Chiang Kai-shek’s relations with his son.
  75. Ka Gilin (He Yilin), “Taiwan jin no seiji shakai to ni-ni-hachi jiken: Datsu shokuminchika to kokumin tōgō no kattō” (PhD dissertation, Tokyo University, 1998), p. 16.
  76. Question 16: How did you feel about the education [provided at] a common school or a primary school? The responses were as follows: 1. Very satisfied

- (15), 2. Satisfied (70), 3. No opinions (14), 4. Dissatisfied (2), 5. Very dissatisfied (0). The numbers in parentheses represent the number of respondents checking the choice.
77. Question 17: How did you feel about school life? The answers were as follows: 1. Liked very much (20), 2. Liked (59), 3. No special feelings (20), 4. Disliked (2), 5. Strongly disliked (0).
78. Question 55: Your overall evaluation of Japanese education is: (to be answered in writing). See “questionnaire on education in elementary schools under Japanese colonial rule.”
79. Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education*, p. 143.
80. We must note that aboriginal peoples in Taiwan (roughly today’s *gaoshanzu*) were hardly under the Qing administration by 1895, although most “Plains aborigines” (*pingpuzu*) were. The concept of “nation” was alien to them before the 1940s.

## Chapter 8

1. Speech dated 22 April 1999. Chen Shui-bian eventually won the Presidential Election in March 2000, and promised in his inaugural speech that he would not declare Taiwanese independence if the People’s Republic of China did not invade Taiwan.
2. Thomas B. Gold, “Taiwan: Still defying the odds,” in Larry Diamond et al., eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 178–80; Tian Hong-mao, “Taiwan’s transformation,” in Larry Diamond et al., eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, p. 155.
3. For a detailed account of the historical background mentioned above, see John F. Copper, *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?* (Boulder: Westview Press, third edition, 1999), pp. 21–52, Alan M. Wachman, *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 91–127, and Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 21–94. See also Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991) for the analysis of the February 28 event and Chu Yun-han, *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan* (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992) for the process of democratization in Taiwan.
4. Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), p. 14.
5. Smith, *National Identity*, p. 39.
6. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, second edition, 1991), pp. 6–7.
7. For discussions of the origin and formation of nations, see also E. J. Hobsbawm,

- Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 18–45; Anthony D. Smith, “The nation: Invented, imagined, reconstructed?” in Marjorie Ringrose and Adam J. Lerner, eds., *Reimagining the Nation* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993), pp. 15–6; Anthony Arblaster, “Unity, identity, difference: Some thoughts on national identity and social unity,” *New Community*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1995), pp. 197–202; and Omar Dahbour, “Introduction: National identity as a philosophical problem,” *Philosophical Forum*, Vol. 28, No. 1–2 (1996–97), pp. 11–6.
8. The distinction between the primordial and modernist approaches is, to be sure, a simplified depiction of the literatures on nationalism, but other approaches have not attracted as much attention from scholars and do not have as much bearing on our topic here. For further discussion of the different approaches to nationalism, see John Breuilly, “Approaches to nationalism,” in Gopal Balakrishnan, ed., *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso, 1996), pp. 149–59, and Anthony D. Smith, *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000), pp. 27–51.
  9. Prasenjit Duara, “De-constructing the Chinese nation,” in Jonathan Unger, ed., *Chinese Nationalism* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 32.
  10. Duara, “De-constructing the Chinese nation,” pp. 37–8.
  11. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1.
  12. Bhikhu Parekh, “The concept of national identity,” *New Community*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1995), p. 255. Elsewhere, Parekh says: “The term national refers to both the nation and the state. Hence the debate about national identity can be about the identity of the nation as well as that of the state. One can ask what constitutes the identity of a specific political community or a state, as also wherein lies its identity as a nation or a self-conscious and cohesive ethno-cultural community.” He then suggests that we use the phrase “the identity of a political community,” which equates to what I call “state identity.” See Bhikhu Parekh, “Discourses on national identity,” *Political Studies*, No. 42 (1994), p. 501. Similar ideas can also be found in Alan M. Wachman, *Taiwan*, p. 64.
  13. Shih Ming, *Taiwanren 400 nianshi* (The history of the Taiwanese since 1600) (San Jose, CA: Pengdao, 1980).
  14. Shih Zheng-feng, ed., *Taiwan minzuzhuyi* (Taiwan nationalism) (Taipei: Qianwei, 1994); Shih Zheng-feng, *Minzu rentong yu Taiwan dull* (National identity and Taiwan independence) (Taipei: Qianwei, 1995), pp. 47, 60–1.
  15. Xu Xin-liang, *Xinxing minzu* (The rising people) (Taipei: Yuanliu, 1995), p. 32.
  16. Xu Xin-liang, *Xinxing minzu*, p. 187.
  17. Alan M. Wachman, *Taiwan*, p. 63.

18. Lee Teng-hui, *Jingying da Taiwan* (Managing the Great Taiwan) (Taipei: Yuanliu, 1995), pp. 181–92; Wu Guo-liang et al., *Zuqun ronghe guayue shiji* (Ethnic fusion in the next century) (Taichung: Department of Information, Taiwan Provincial Government, 1996).
19. Wang Xiao-po, *Taiwan qiantu lunji* (Essays on the Future of Taiwan) (Taipei: Pamirs, 1989); Chinese Unification Association, *Tongyi guandien: Zhongguo tongyi lienmeng dakewen* (The view of unification: The standpoint of the Chinese Unification Association) (Taipei: Haixia pinglun, 1993).
20. Jiang Yi-Huah, *Ziyouzhuuyi, minzuzhuuyi yu guojiaerentong* (Liberalism, nationalism and national identity) (Taipei: Yangzhi, 1998), pp. 214–22.
21. Lin Zhuo-shui, *Guojia de goutu* (The framework of the state) (Taipei: Qianwei, 1991), pp. 2–42; *Wenhua, zhongzu, shijie yu guojia* (Culture, ethnic group, world and state) (Taipei: Qianwei, 1992), pp. 89–90, 101; *Zhanzai lishi de zhuanliedien shang* (Standing on the pivot of history) (Taipei: Qianwei, 1995), pp. 13–26.
22. Chu Hong-yuan, “Minguo yilai huaren guojia guannien de yanhua,” (The evolution of Chinese national identity since 1911) in Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., *Identity and National Formation: Chinese and Western Experiences in the Modern World* (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1994); Chen Yi-shen, “20 shiqi shangbanye zhongguo minzuzhuuyi de fazhan,” (The development of Chinese nationalism in the first half of the twentieth century) in Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., *Identity and National Formation*; Sheng Song-qiao, “The myth of Huangdi (Yellow Emperor) and the construction of Chinese nationhood in late Qing,” *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*, No. 28 (1997), pp. 1–77.
23. For a helpful comment on the concept of Chinese and other related concepts, see Alan M. Wachman, *Taiwan*, pp. 80–8.
24. Chu Yun-han and Lin Jia-long, “Democratization, cross-strait rivalry and the construction of Taiwanese identity,” paper presented at the conference on the Development of Contemporary Taiwan, co-sponsored by Institute for National Policy Research (Taipei) and French Research Center for Contemporary China (Hong Kong). Taipei, Taiwan, 16–17 December 1998.
25. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward consolidated democracies,” in Larry Diamond et al., eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 27.

## Chapter 9

1. Interview, George Lak-Geon Paik, Seoul, 27 August 1981.
2. Matsuo Takayoshi, “The Japanese protestants in Korea, part one,” *Modern Asian Studies* 13:3, 1979, p. 401.
3. Yi had received his earlier education at a mission school and was influenced by Yun Ch’iho and especially by An Ch’angho, and in his writings he

- introduced a religious point of view on nation and its meaning and fate, through dealing with themes of sin, repentance, self-sacrifice, spiritual love, and later Buddhist piety, but all in all he entertained a cultural view of Christianity as a servant of society and nation. There is good discussion of this in Ku Ch'anhwon, "Ch'unwŏn munhage nat'an'an kidokkyo sasang," in Shin Tonguk, ed., *Ch'oe Namsŏn'gwa Yi Kwangsu'i munhak* (Literature of Ch'oe Namsŏn and Yi Kwangsu) (Seoul: Saemunsa, 1981), pp. 118–32.
4. Yi Kwangsu, "Yasokyoŭ Chosŏne chun ūnhye," July 1917, in *Yi Kwangsu chŏnjip* (Collected works) (Seoul: Ushinsa, 1979), Vol. 10, pp. 17–9. Six months later he composed the February 1919 Tokyo Students' Declaration of Korean Independence.
  5. Naimushō keihōkyoku: "Zairyū Chōsenjin gakusei no gendō" 1. (VIII) 22/1/1916. Haguhoec oratorical meeting, Tokyo YMCA, in *Gendaishi shiryō: Chōsen* (6 Vols.) (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1966), Vol. 2.
  6. See, for example, Wang Gungwu, "The Chinese urge to civilise: Reflections on change," *Proceedings of The Australian Academy of the Humanities, 1982–1983* (Melbourne: The Dominion Press–Hedges and Bell, 1984).
  7. John Henry Newmann, *The Idea of a University* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), Discourse V, 9, pp. 110 and 112.
  8. See Aat Vervoom, "Music and the rise of literary theory in ancient China," *Journal of Oriental Studies*, 24: 1, 1996, p. 50, where he faults approaches to Chinese literary theory that presume that "literary theory can arise only where a distinction is drawn between literary values on the one hand, and moral and political values on the other."
  9. See Chang Hao, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890–1907* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
  10. Kenneth M. Wells, *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea, 1896–1937* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin; Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 1991), p. 51.
  11. Uchimura Kanzo, *How I Became a Christian: Out of My Diary* (Tokyo: Keiseisha, 1895), p. 166.
  12. Uchimura was influenced by Joseph Neejima, who was Yun Ch'ihō's teacher in Japan in the early 1880s, and through him he met Julius H. Seelye in the late 1880s when he was President of Amherst College, and was converted to evangelical Christianity by Seelye. *The Complete Works of Kanzō Uchimura* (Tokyo: Kyobunkwan, 1972), Vol. 4, p. 134.
  13. Yun Ch'ihō, "Tongnip hyŏphoeŭi hwaltong," *Tonggwang*, 26 October 1931.
  14. *Taehan K'ŭrisŭtoin heobo* 1:8, Kwangmu 2, 23 February, Editorial.
  15. Yun Ch'ihō, "Popular movements in Korea," *The Korean Repository*, December 1898, p. 469.
  16. On Yun's decision, see Kenneth M. Wells, op. cit., pp. 64–5.
  17. Augustine of Hippo, *City of God*, Book V, Chapter 11.
  18. There have been several significant exceptions, when the doctrine has been

- given particular application in support of national policies in Europe and the USA. See John F. Berens, *Providence and Patriotism in Early America: 1640–1815* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1978); Alistair Fox, *Thomas More: History and Providence* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); and Simon Schama, *The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (London: Fontana, 1991), Chapter 2.
19. Simone Weil, 1974: 58–60.
  20. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics* (New York: 1955), p. 355.
  21. See Wells, op. cit., pp. 64–8.
  22. *Government-General Police Affairs Bureau*, Kōkei kihatsu No. 422, 3 March 1915: “Futei Senjin seinen Yachō no ken,” and “Futei Senjin seinen torishirabe no ken”; Kōkei kihatsu No. 527, 13 November 1916: “Fuonsha hakken shobun no ken”; Kōkei kihatsu No. 553, 6 December 1916: “Fuonsha hakken shobun no ken”; Kōkei kihatsu No. 574, 20 December 1916: “Shiritsu gakkō ni okeru fuon kyōju”; Kōkei kihatsu No. 26, 26 January 1917: “Chihō minjō ihō: Yasokyō fuzoku gakkō chō no gendō,” and many more.
  23. *Shinhan minbo* 373: 8 July 1915.
  24. Speech in LA: “Uri kungminūi chinhwaūi syunsō” *Shinhan minbo* 387: 22 January 1916.
  25. *Shinhan minbo* 398: 22 June 1916.
  26. Naimushō keihōkyoku: “Zairyū Chōsenjin gakusei no gendō” 2. (XXVII), 22 November 1918. Haguhoē oratorical meeting, Tokyo YMCA, in *Gendaishi shiryō: Chōsen* (6 Vols.) (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1966), Vol. 2.
  27. “Chōnjaeng chonggyōlkwa uriūi hal il,” *Shinhan minbo*, 17 October 1918.
  28. “Cheilch’a pukkyōngno yebaedang yōnsōl” 26 May 1919, Shanghai; in a speech in Shanghai on 7 December 1919, titled “Mul panghwang,” An said March First had brought Koreans respect from world.
  29. Yi Kwangsu, “Minjoge kwanhan myōtkkaji saenggak,” *Samch’ōlli*, October 1935.
  30. Kim Yun’gyōng, “Illyu sahoe palchōn chōngdoūi pulllyu,” *Tonggwang*, 7 November 1926.
  31. Han Ch’igwan, “T’ūksujōk Chosōnin” *Tonggwang*, 8 December 1926.
  32. Kim Yun’gyōng, “Musil yōkhaeng sinūi yonggi” *Tonggwang*, 10 February 1927.
  33. Kim Yun’gyōng, “Puin undonggwa in’gyōk munje,” *Shin Yāsōng* December 1924, p. 5.
  34. Kim Yun’gyōng, “In’gyōkūi hangnijōk haeūi,” *Tonggwang*, 4 August 1926.
  35. Kim Yun’gyōng, “In’gyōgūi hamyang,” *Tonggwang*, 5 September 1926.
  36. Kim Yun’gyōng, “In’gyōkkwa tan’gyōl,” *Tonggwang*, 6 October 1926.
  37. *Naimushō keihōkyoku* (tokukeisatsu) (Gempi: Shōwa gonen ni okeru shakai undō no jōkyō. 2). Minzokushugi undō no jōkyō.
  38. Uchimura Kanzō, *The Japan Christian Intelligencer*, April 1926, in *The Complete Works of Kanzō Uchimura* (Tokyo: Kyobunkwan, 1972), Vol. 4, p. 27.
  39. Uchimura Kanzō, *The Japan Christian Intelligencer*, February 1928, 1926, in *The*

- Complete Works of Kanzō Uchimura* (Tokyo: Kyobunkwan, 1972), Vol. 4, pp. 129–30.
40. Yang Hyōnhye, *Yun Ch'ihowa Kim Kyoshin: Kūndae Chosōne issōsō minjokchōk aident'it'wa kidokkyo* (Seoul: Hanul, 1994), p. 118–9.
  41. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
  42. Chung Jun Ki, *Social Criticism of Uchimura Kanzō and Kim Kyo-Shin* (Seoul: UBF Press, 1996), p. 161.
  43. *Sōngsō Chosōn*, April 1935. Chung Jun Ki (preceding) actually refers to this passage as the source of his particular interpretation.
  44. *Sōngsō Chosōn*, April 1934.
  45. *Sōngsō Chosōn*, August 1934.
  46. *Government-General Police Affairs Bureau*, Kōkei 344997, 5/12/1919: “Taikan minkoku aikoku fujinkai kenkyo no ken.”
  47. Trial records of the Korean Women’s Patriotic Society, Taegu District Court, 29 June 1920, *Chōsen tōchi siryō* (10 Vols.) (Tokyo: Kankoku shiryō kenkyusho, 1970–1972), Vol. 5, pp. 739 ff.
  48. *Government-General Police Affairs Bureau*, Kōkei 1536, 22/1/1920: “Taikan minkoku fujinkai ni kansuru ken.”
  49. Kenneth Wells, “The price of legitimacy: Women and the Korean Kunuhoe Movement, 1927–1931,” in Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
  50. A good example of this tendency is Yi Yunhū’s *Han’guk minjokjuūiwa yōsōng undong* (Korean nationalism and women’s movements) (Seoul: Sinsōwōn, 1995), Chapter 5.
  51. See Laurence Fontaine and Jürgen Schlumbohm, “Household strategies for survival,” *International Review of Social History*, Introduction to Supplement No. 8, 2000.
  52. Potts, J. Manning, ed., *Grace Sufficient: The Story of Helen Kim by Herself* (Nashville: The Upper Room, 1964), pp. 10–2.
  53. I have written elsewhere on this topic and will not repeat details here. See Ken Wells, “Expanding their realm: Women and public agency in colonial Korea,” in Louise Edwards and Mina Roces, *Women’s Suffrage in Asia: Gender, Nationalism and Democracy* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
  54. The limited groups of Korean men who were eligible to vote hardly sprang to take advantage of this opportunity, since there was little credit to be gained by so doing.
  55. Kim Hyung-chan, *Letters in Exile: The Life and Times of Yun Ch’i-ho* (Covington, GA: Rhoades Printing Co., 1980), p. 65.
  56. Kim Yun’gyōng, “Puin ch’amjōnggwōn munje,” *Shin Yōsōng*, Vol. 2, No. 8, October 1924, p. 15.
  57. Potts, ed., *Grace Sufficient*, p. 43.
  58. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
  59. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

60. Kim Yun'gyōng, "Puin undonggwa in'gyōk munje," *Shin Yōsōng* December 1924, p. 7.
61. Lee Tan, "Ch'ōngnyōn yōjahoe ch'angnip," *Shin in'gan*, No. 7, November 1926, p. 44.
62. For a more detailed treatment of this division, see Ken Wells, "Expanding their realm: Women and public agency in colonial Korea," in Louise Edwards and Mina Roces, *Women's Suffrage in Asia*, pp. 160–5.
63. Kim Hwallan, "Chosōn puhūngūl wihan nongch'on kyoyuk," in *Tonggwang*, February 1932.
64. *Kūnu*, 1929, Kim Chōngwōn, "Hoewōnūrosō ūi hūimang," p. 62.
65. See excerpts of Chen Duxiu's "The way of Confucius and modern life," originally published in Chinese in December 1916, in Hua R. Lan and Vanessa L. Fong, *Women in Republican China: A Sourcebook* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 5–8.
66. See the letter from Xiang Jingyu to Tao Yi of 20 December 1919, cited in Lan and Fong, *op. cit.*, pp. 125–9.
67. Wells, *New God, New Nation*, p. 50.
68. Uchimura, *How I Became a Christian: Out of My Diary*, p. 179.

## Chapter 10

1. As discussed in Alice H. Amsden, *The Rise of the Rest: Challenges to the West from Late-industrializing Economies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). "The rest" includes Taiwan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. All these countries had accumulated some manufacturing experience before World War II. Most also industrialized rapidly thereafter.
2. Where  $P$  equals price and  $MC$  equals marginal cost. If the two are equal, competition is perfect and no distortion exists.
3. For this three-way division of technological skills, see L. E. Westphal, L. Kim, et al., "Reflections on the Republic of Korea's acquisition of technological capability," in N. Rosenberg and C. Frischta, eds., *International Technology Transfer: Concepts, Measures, and Comparisons* (New York: Praeger, 1985). For the concept of "first mover" advantage, see A. D. Chandler Jr., *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
4. Below, therefore, we discuss national enterprise in terms of these business groups, rather than specialized firms or state-owned enterprises.
5. For Korea, see Ministry of Science and Technology (Korea), *Science and Technology Annual* (Seoul: Ministry of Science and Technology, 1998). For Taiwan, see Taiwan (Republic of China National Science Council), *Indicators of Science and Technology* (Taipei: National Science Council, 1996).



6. Hereafter, OECD.
7. See also P. Patel and M. Vega, "Patterns of internationalisation of corporate technology: Location vs. home country advantages," *Research Policy* 28 (1999): 145–55, and P. Doremius and W. Keller et al., *The Myth of the Global Corporation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
8. Unless otherwise specified, empirical information is from Amsden, *The Rise of the Rest*.
9. Information on Brazil in this paragraph is from D. Monteiro Filha, *A Aplicacao de Fundos Compulsorios Pelo BNDES na Formacao da Estrutura Setorial Da Industria Brasileira: 1952–1989* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Economia Industrial, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1994).
10. Camaçari complex only.
11. Data supplied by NAFINSA from annual balances, 1935–1997, and collected by Jorge Mario Soto.
12. Of "the rest's" top fifteen SOEs in 1993, as many as three were Brazilian.
13. Foreign investors bought only 3.4% of the shares of 13 out of 24 companies privatized in 1991/1993. BNDES, *Brazilian Privatization Program* (Rio de Janeiro: BNDES, 1993).
14. C. H. Park, *The Country, The Revolution and I* (Seoul: n.p., 1963).
15. "Large enterprises" accounted for around 75% of Korean direct exports in 1985 and over 60% in 1995. G. R. Ungson, R. M. Steers, et al., *Korean Enterprise: The Quest for Globalization* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
16. "... import constraints favored the rise of small and medium-sized firms of national capital. A research study based on industrial censuses indicates that between 1935 and 1954 a process of dispersion in the Argentine industry occurred, especially in the expanding sectors such as textiles, metallurgy, machinery, and electrical appliances." See A. Goetz, "Concentracion y desconcentracion en la industria argentina desde la decada de 1930 a la de 1960," *Desarrollo Economico* 15.60 (1976), pp. 510–21. "Industrial censuses' data also show a diminishing share for stock companies: in 1935 they accounted for 5.6 percent of all firms, but they controlled 53.8 percent of total production; in 1947 their share decreased to 3.3 percent of all firms and to 45.2 percent of total production." See M. Ines Barbero, "Argentina: Industrial growth and enterprise organization, 1880s–1980s," in A. D. J. Chandler, F. Amatori and T. Hikino, eds., *Big Business and the Wealth of Nations* (Cambridge and NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 380.
17. The period 1953–68 has been called "a euphoric opening to foreign capital." A. Schwarzer, *La industria que supimos conseguir* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1996), p. 221.
18. Between 1975 and 1982, industrial output fell more than 20%, and 20% of the largest industrial plants closed. See D. Azpiazu and B. Kossacoff, *La industria Argentina: Desarrollo y cambios estructurales* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1989). Cited in M. Ines Barbero, "Argentina: Industrial growth

- and enterprise organization, 1880s–1980s,” in Chandler, *Big Business and the Wealth of Nations*, pp. 368–93.
19. For the history of business–government relations in Argentina, see J. F. Sabato, *La Clase Dominante en la Argentina Moderna: Formación y Características* (Buenos Aires: CISEA, 1988) and P. H. Lewis, *The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). For a review of Latin American business history in Argentina and Brazil, see C. M. Lewis, “Latin American business history, c. 1870–1930: Recent trends in the Argentinian and Brazilian literature,” *América Latina en la Historia Económica. Boletín de Fuentes*, 4 (Julio–Diciembre, 1995), pp. 89–109.
  20. Among a “select” group of Argentine business groups in 1992, energy and gas, food processing, steel and automobile parts were found to be the major industries. R. Bisang, “Perfil Tecno-Productivo de los Grupos Económicos en la Industrial Argentina,” in J. M. Katz, ed., *Estabukuzacuibm Macroeconomía, Reforma Estructural y Comportamiento Industrial* (Buenos Aires, Alianza Editorial for CEPAL/IDRC, 1996), pp. 377–478.
  21. Comparing plant size of 26 select Argentine groups and “other countries,” in only three cases was Argentine plant size equal to or greater than foreign plant size. See J. M. Katz, pp. 377–478.
  22. In 1996, the “foreign share” (imports plus local production by multinational subsidiaries and affiliates) of domestic drug sales was 45% in Argentina, 57% in Brazil, 62% in Mexico, 49% in Korea (which started drug production much later than Argentina) and only 32% in India. Yet Argentina’s domestic drug sales in 1996 were over twice those of India (\$4.9 billion versus \$2.2 billion). M. Mourshed, “Technology transfer dynamics: Lessons from the Egyptian and Indian pharmaceutical industries,” *Urban Studies and Planning* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999).
  23. See F. Valdes Ugalde, *Autonomía y Legitimidad: Los Empresarios, La Política y el Estado en México* (Mexico, DF: Siglo Veintiuno, 1977), for a history of business–government relations in Mexico.
  24. Foreign participation (based on sales value) in privatization from 1988 through 1993 was roughly 10% in East Asia, 18% in Latin America, and nil in South Asia. F. Sader, *Privatizing Public Enterprises and Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 1988–93* (Washington, DC: International Finance Corporation, World Bank, 1995).
  25. A careful study of post-privatization performance in Mexico attributes a 24-percentage point increase in the ratio of operating income to sales to: higher prices (10%); laid-off workers (33%) and a residual (productivity (57%). R. La Porta, and F. Lopez-de-Silanes, *The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico* (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997). Part of the residual may include the gains a private firm within a group derives from access to capital and other assets within the group, including distribution outlets, shared skills, and so forth.

# Index

## *Note for readers*

Arrangement of entries is word-by-word. References to epigraphs and endnotes are designated by the letters "e" and "u," respectively, following the page number.

Japanese names have been entered as they appear in the text, except where the editors have made it clear that the person's first name and surname have been written in that order, in which case the surname has been used as the main entry in accordance with normal indexing practice.

- Abe Jiro (writer), 44  
Acer Company, 204  
Aceros del Pacifico (steel mill), 199  
Acindar (steel company), 199  
Akio Morita (author), 4-5  
Alembic (pharmaceutical company),  
201  
Alonso, Ana Maria, quoted, 59  
Amsden, Alice, 21, 22  
An Ch'angho (nationalist), 172, 176,  
178, 185, 186, 238n3  
fled Korea, 170, 173  
in USA, 174, 175  
Anderson, Benedict, 38, 147, 161  
quoted, 36  
view of nation, 145-6  
anarchism, 104  
Annan, Kofi (UN Secretary General),  
227n7  
quoted, 4  
Anthias, Floya, 51  
Argentina, 196, 198-9  
research and development in, 191  
Association for Women's Political  
Participation, 226n101  
Augustine, Saint, 170, 171

- Australia, 104  
 autonomy and independence, teaching of, 26  
 Asahi Heigo (assassin), 37, 41
- banks, 195, 196–7, 201  
*Baohuanghui* (Society for the Defense of the Emperor), 63  
 barbarians, 60  
 Barlow, Tan, 72  
 Beahan, Charlotte, 80, 85  
 Belgrade, bombing of Chinese embassy in, 5–6, 94, 95  
 Bellamy, Edward, 103  
 Berlin, Isaiah, quoted, 12, 97  
 Bloch, Marc, 117  
 Bluntschli, Johann Caspar, 54, 55, 66–7
- BNDES (Brazilian development bank), 195, 197, 201  
 Bojing Hospital (Canton), 225n81  
 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 171  
*Book of Rites (Liji)*, 103  
 Borneo Company, 202  
 Boustead-Buttery (British company), 202
- Brazil, 194, 195, 196–7, 198, 199  
 research and development in, 191  
 Breuille, John, 49  
 Buddhism, 103  
 Bush, President George W., 2  
 business groups, 203, 204  
 big, 195, 196, 197  
 diversified, 189, 191, 194, 198
- Cai Yuanpei (anarchist), 102  
 Canton Hospital, 75  
 Cao jin, 233n38  
 “capital concentration,” 197, 198, 199, 200  
 Chen Duxin, 187  
 Chen Shui-bian, President, 19, 150, 151, 152, 155, 157, 236n1  
 on indignities to be endured by Taiwan, 20, 141  
 Chen Yi, 130, 131  
 Chuen Yung-xiang Secim, 15, 16, 18, 93  
 Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo), 134, 144  
 Chiang Kai-shek, President, 134, 144, 235n74  
 Chile, 199  
 China, 13, 17, 53, 110, 113, 159  
 class equality, 99  
 colonial investors in, 193  
 economic reforms, 100  
 humiliation of, 90, 94–5, 100, 108  
 liberation of, 108, 109  
 linkages between nationalism and democracy in, 94–7  
 national anthem, 108  
 national dignity  
 expression of, 109–10  
 restoration of, 98, 99, 100, 112  
 national identity, construction of, 49–69  
 nationalism and, 146–7, 149  
 nationalist agenda, 90  
 nationalist project, 49, 50, 73, 88, 89, 90–1  
 return of Taiwan to, 130, 139  
 “standing up”, 99, 108, 112  
 Taiwan ruled by, 143, 150  
 United States and, 2, 5  
*China Can Say No*, 100  
*China Is Still Capable of Saying No (Qin)*, 100  
*China Medical Missionary Journal*, quoted, 78  
*China News Digest (CND)*, 109, 110, 111  
 “Chinese”, concept of, 156–7, 160, 161  
 Chinese people (*see also* Han people), servile situation of, 52

- Chinese business groups, 203, 204
- Chinese medicine, *see* Traditional Chinese Medicine
- Chinese, overseas, 66
- Chiosone, Edoardo (artist), 36
- Cho Mansik, 172, 173, 178
- Ch'ondogyo (religious movement), 182
- Chou Wan-yao, 18, 19, 143
- Christian communities, 79
- Christian students, 174
- Christianity (*see also* Protestants), 168, 178–9, 180, 181, 182
- Christian citizens, 169, 172, 173
- citizenship (*see also* *guomin*), in China, 16
- civic equality, 18
- civic nationalism, 18
- codes of conduct, 1–2
- codes of dignity, 8
- codes of honor, 10–12
- Communist movement, 113
- Complete Record of National Humiliations in Modern China, The* (1993), 95
- Confucianism, 7, 8, 14, 24, 62
- defined, 27
- ethics, 24, 26, 28, 53, 54
- hierarchy, 101, 102
- neo-Confucianism, 171
- proposed as state religion, 62, 63, 65
- Consciousness and Society* (Hughes), quoted, 117
- "crowding out." of leading enterprises, 202, 203, 204
- d'Azeglio, Massimo, 49
- Datong Shu* (One World Philosophy) (Kang), 103
- Dayi jueqi lu* (Awaken the Confused to the Right Way), 60
- debt/equity ratios, 195, 197
- democracy, 18, 47, 101, 112
- equality as element of, 17
- linkages between nationalism and, 94–7
- terminology for, 45–6
- Democracy Wall Movement, 111
- Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), 4, 13
- Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 150, 152
- formation, 144
- independence platform, 141, 145, 151, 155
- Den Kenjiro (governor general), 120, 122
- Deng, Cora, 82
- Deng Xiaoping, 100, 111
- dignity, 20, 210n42
- individual, 165, 166, 186
- national, 4–6, 98, 99, 100, 109–10
- Discipline and Punish* (Foucault), 47
- divine providence, doctrine of, 166, 170, 171–2, 177, 187
- doctors, female, *see* women doctors
- "dual identity", 156, 157–8, 160, 161–2
- Duan-fang (provincial governor), 80
- Duara, Prasenjit, quoted, 147
- Dworkin, Ronald, quoted, 210n42
- East Asia
- economic model, 21, 22
- modern nationalism in, 6–8, 12
- national dignity and, 4–6
- "economic nationalism", 21–2, 189–205
- advantages and disadvantages of, 205
- defined, 189, 205
- government policies, 191, 193, 194, 198, 200
- education, 196 (Table 10.1)
- in Korea, 174, 181, 185, 186
- role of, in creating new national society, 168–9

- in Taiwan, 19, 116, 120–5; 127–8, 134–5, 137
- electronics industry, 200, 202, 204
- Embraer (aerospace company), 195
- Emperor system, in Japan
  - “emperor’s people” and “people’s emperor”, 41–2, 48
  - “people without the emperor”, 46, 48
  - pictorial representations of, 35–6, 38–9
  - system, 15, 30, 33, 34, 35, 45, 129, 213n14
- “Enlightenment Project”, 101
- equality, 9, 11, 21, 28–9, 71, 210n42
  - as East Asian value, 8
  - as element in democracy, 17
  - as ethical system, 8–9
  - ideal of, 100–2, 113
  - national, 1, 2, 107
  - social, 108
  - status, 96, 113
  - theory of, 102–6, 112
- ethics
  - Confucian, 24, 26, 28, 53, 54
  - textbooks, 124, 138
- ethnicity
  - as element in nation, 145, 146
  - guomin*, and, 56–69
  - industrialization and, 202–4
- ethno-nationalism, 58, 59, 61, 67
- Ewha Women’s University, 185, 186
- “extended nationalism,” 66
- “face”, 8, 98, 99
- family system, in China, 53
- February 28 Incident (1947), 130, 132, 133, 150
  - banned as history, 136
  - cause of, 131
  - origin, 144
  - research on, 136
- Federal Flour Mills (business group), 203
- female emancipation, 182, 183, 184
- Feng Ziyou, 87, 88, 225n81
- “first mover” advantage, 192
- Fitzgerald, John, 17, 18
- Fleischer, Ari (White House press secretary), 2
- Foochow (Fuzhou), 75
- foreign direct investment (FDI), 192
- foreign firms, *see* multinational enterprises
- foreigners, 31
  - humiliation of China blamed on, 95, 100
- Foucault, Michel, 47
- Four-Hundred Year History of the Taiwanese, The* (Shih Ming), 150
- France, 89
- Fukuzawa Yukichi, 105, 123
  - nationalist ethics of, 23–31
  - quoted, 212n12
- Fulton, Mary, 75
- Futabatei Shinzei (author), 37
- Futur of New China, The* (Liang), 104, 106
- Gellner, Ernest, 147, 148
- Geming jun* (The Revolutionary Army) (Zou), 59
- gender identity, 81, 87, 89–90
- “General Ashihara”, 44–5
- geography, teaching of, 125
- Goenka, R. P., 201
- Goto Shimpei (administrator), 118
- Greenfield, Liah, 22, 96, 97, 100
- Guangxu, Emperor, 58
- guomin* (citizens)
  - as cultural community, 60–3
  - defined, 215n18
  - discourses on, 50, 51–69
  - ethnicity and, 56–60
  - as political community, 63–8

- Guomindang, *see* Nationalists, Chinese
- Guthrie (British company), 202
- Hacket Medical College for Women, 75, 225n81
- Hainan Island, spy-plane affair, 5–6, 94, 95
- Ham Sokhon, 186
- Han Ch'igwan (teacher), 176
- Han people, 57, 58, 104
  - Manchurian, 60–2, 65–6
  - in Taiwan, 118
  - strengthening of, 73
- Han Yongun, 184
- Handler, Richard, quoted, 55
- Hanyong Sowon (school), 173, 174
- Harrison & Crosfield (British company), 202
- Hasukawa Bunzo (commentator), 37, 40
- He Jingying (Hu King Eng), 77, 79
- Hegel, 13
- hierarchy, 9, 101, 102
  - as ethical system, 8–9
  - relations, 14
- Hikino, Takashi, 21, 22
- Hill, Patricia, 81
- history
  - absence of teaching of, 127–8
  - Japanese, taught in Taiwan, 124–5
  - Taiwanese
    - not understood on Mainland, 139
    - resurgence of interest in, 135–6
- Hobbes, 215n18
- Hobsbawm, E. J., 147
- "homeland", teaching of concept of, 126–8
- Hong Kong, 95
- Hong Xiuquan, 64
- Hoshina Koichi (educator), 126, 127
- Houston College, 173
- Howe, Gertrude, 79
- Hu Hanmin, 107
- Huang Xiang, 87, 225n93
- Huangdi (Yellow Emperor), 59, 62
- Hughes, H. Stuart, quoted, 117
- human rights, 96, 98, 227n7
- humiliation, *see* national humiliation
- Hungsadon (Korean association), 175
- identity
  - gender, 81, 87, 89–90
  - national, *see* national identity
  - relational, 14, 28, 31
  - specific, 31
  - "state," 155, 161
- Imperial University of Taihoku, 232n26
- income distribution, 22, 190, 193–4, 196 (Table 10.1), 205
- inequality in, 190, 194
- independence, *see* autonomy and independence, national independence
- Independence Club, 167, 169, 183
- India, 193, 199, 200–1
- individual autonomy, 103
- individual dignity, 165, 166, 186
- individuals
  - made in the image of God, 167, 187
  - personal character of, 176–7
  - reform of, 166, 167, 172, 173, 175
  - relationship to nation, 26, 174, 177, 186, 187
  - value of, 165
- Indonesia, 203
- industrial licensing, 190, 193, 205
- industrialization, late, 191
- industry, concentration of, 198
- intellectuals, Chinese
  - late Qing, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 65, 104
  - "interest," pursuit of, 11–12
- Ishihara Shintaro (author), 4–5

- Italy, 49
- Izawa Shuji (educator), 121
- Japan (*see also* Emperor system), 5, 107, 113, 134
- China defeated by, 49, 103
- history, teaching of, 124–5
- Korea
- annexed by, 21, 165, 166, 171, 175
- as protectorate of, 170, 172
- national capital, 35, 37
- nationalism in, 14–15, 33–48
- political representation in, dysfunction of, 47–8
- “sentiment of nationality” and, 29–31
- Taiwan
- acquired by, 117, 142, 143
- colonial rule in, 18–19, 116, 120–8, 129, 137, 143
- struggles against, 117–8
- urbanization of, 43–4
- Japan That Can Say No. The* (Ishihara and Morita), 5
- Japanese language, in Taiwan, 121, 123, 125
- Japanese military, Taiwanese recruited into, 133, 143
- Jefferson Smurfit (pulp and paper company), 195
- Jiang Jinguo, *see* Chiang Chung-kuo
- Jiang Weishui, 119
- Jiang Yi-huah, 19, 20
- Jiang Zemin, President, 115
- Jin Yunmei (Yamie King), 75, 77, 79, 81
- Kabayama Sukenori (governor-general), 121
- Kahn, Ida (Kang Cheng), 77, 78, 79, 86
- marginalized in national discourse, 88, 89
- quoted, 84–5
- Kang Youwei (Kang Yu-wei) (Qing intellectual), 51, 59, 60, 66, 69, 171
- commitment to Confucianism, 61, 62, 63
- Kant, 97
- Ke di lun* (On the Guest Emperor) (Zhang Binglin), 63
- Kellas, James, 58
- Kerr, George H., 118
- Kil Sonju, Reverend, 179
- Kim Chongwon, 185
- Kim Hwallan, 180, 181, 182, 186, 187
- support for independence, 183–5
- Kim Jong Il, President, 4
- Kim Ku (nationalist), 170, 173
- Kim Kyosin, 172, 178, 179–80, 186, 187
- Kim Maria, 180
- Kim Yun’gyong (linguist), 175, 176, 178, 183, 185
- Kita Ikki, 41
- Kitahata Gen’ei (educator), 127
- Klabu (pulp and paper company), 195
- “Knowing Taiwan” (*renshi Taiwan*), textbook, 136–7
- knowledge-based assets, 190, 205
- Kodama Gentaro (governor-general), 118
- Kohn, Hans, 51
- Koboro* (Natsume Soseki), quoted, 43
- kominka* movement, 119, 120, 129, 138
- Korea (*see also* Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), 20–1, 120, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202
- annexation of, 165, 166, 171, 175
- colonial, 165–87
- colonial investors in, 193
- national independence, 173, 182
- national liberation, 184, 186
- nationalism, 20, 21, 165
- nationalists, 166, 170



- as protectorate of Japan, 170, 172  
 Protestants and, 165–9, 170  
 provisional government, 175, 185  
 research and development in, 191  
 social and economic reform, 178  
 Korea Development Bank, 197  
 Korean National Association of America, 174  
 Korean Women's Patriotic Society, 180–1, 183  
 Kramer, Lloyd, 51  
 Krugman, Paul (economist), quoted, 5  
*kuni* (nation), concept of, 129  
 Kuno Osamu (commentator), 37, 41  
 Kunuhoe (political organization), 183  
 Kuok, Robert, 203  
 Kuomintang (KMT), *see* Nationalists, Chinese  
*Kusamakura* (Soseki), 43  
 Kwang Tung (Guangdong) Medical School for Women, 75  
  
 land, Gini index relating to, 196 (Table 10.1)  
 Landes, David, 2  
 language, *see* national language  
*Law of Nations, The* (Vattel), quoted, 1c  
 Lee Teng-hui, President, 115, 116, 144, 153  
 Leung, Angela, 16, 17  
 Li Pingshu, 76, 86, 87, 88  
 Liang Qichao (Ch'i-ch'ao) (Qing intellectual and nationalist), 17, 54, 55, 58, 59, 61, 64, 87, 102  
 advocacy of, 50  
 initial use of *quomin* by, 51, 52  
 model for Korean Protestants, 168  
 on national hierarchies, 105  
 praise for woman doctor, 77, 80  
 quoted, 66  
 state-nationalism advocated by, 67, 68  
 uncertainty of, 63, 65  
 unfinished novel, 106  
 visit to Australia, 104  
 women, attitude towards, 72, 74, 81  
 writings, 52–3, 104, 106  
 liberal democracy, imagined roots of, 96  
 liberation, 13  
 licensing, *see* industrial licensing, restrictive licensing  
 Lin Zhuo-shui, 155  
 Liu, Lydia, 85  
 Liu Shiwei, 58  
 Locke, 215n18  
*Looking Backward* (Bellamy), 103  
 Lu Xun, 73  
 Lugouqiao Incident, 119  
  
 Ma Junwu, 86  
 Malaysia, 202, 203  
 Manchu, anti-, 56, 65, 68  
 movement, 59  
 rhetoric, 62, 64  
 Manchu people, Han and, 60–2, 65–6  
 Mandarin (language), in Taiwan, 130, 131  
 manufacturing, 190, 205  
 experience of pre-war, 190, 192–3  
 Malaysia, 203  
 Mao Zedong, 99, 108, 110, 112  
 March First Movement (1919), 171, 174, 180, 183, 185  
 organization of, 182  
 suppression of, 175  
 market reservations, 200, 201  
 Marx, Karl, 15, 48  
 "masculinity", in nationalist project, 90–1  
 Matsuo Takayoshi, 167, 171  
 May Fourth New Culture Movement, 54, 85, 101, 102, 107

- medical colleges, in China, 73  
 medical institutions, 225n81  
 Medical Missionary Society in China, 75  
 medical missionaries, 74–5, 78  
 Meiji period  
     discontinuity between Showa era and, 38  
     nationalism of, 33, 34–7  
 Mencius, 102, 103, 106  
 Mexico, 193, 195, 196, 200  
 Mill, John Stuart, 29  
 Mills, Charles (missionary), quoted, 223n60  
*Min bao* (People's Journal), 58, 107  
 missionary women doctors, 223n60  
 missionaries (*see also* medical missionaries), 170  
     women, 81, 82  
 model communities, 173, 175  
 modernity, 99  
     in Japan, 35  
     tradition and, 9  
 Mohamad, Prime Minister Mahatir, 203  
 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (India), 201  
 monopoly pricing, 190  
 "Movement for Education about the Homeland", 126  
 multinational enterprises, 191, 192, 198, 200  
 multiple political identities, 162  
  
 NAFINSA (Mexican development bank), 195  
 Nakamura Kusatao (poet), quoted, 38  
 nation  
     as construct, 146  
     defined, 145, 147, 160  
     meanings of, 148  
     relationship with individual, 26  
 nation-states, 1, 9  
  
 national anthem, as symbol of sovereignty, 108  
 national dignity (*see also* national prestige), 3–4, 169, 186  
     expression of, 109–10, 114  
     resort of endangered regimes, 4  
     restoration of  
         China's, 98, 99, 100, 112  
         Korean, 166, 171  
 national enterprises (*see also* diversified business groups, state-owned enterprises), 189, 191, 192  
 national equality  
     concept of, 107  
     in Taiwan's relations with China, 115, 116  
 national humiliation (*guechi*), 90, 108, 166  
     blamed on foreigners, 95, 100  
     industry, in China, 94–5  
 national identity, 20, 49–69, 148, 155  
     construction of Chinese, 49–69  
     definition of, 147, 160, 157  
     role of history in, 127  
     Taiwan and, 116, 141–2, 145, 160, 161, 162–3  
     measurement of, 156, 158, 159  
 national independence, 173, 182  
 national language  
     formation of, 36  
     Japanese as, 121, 123, 125  
     Mandarin as, 130  
     policy on, 131  
 National Language Movement, 131  
 national prestige, competition for, 3, 18  
 national recognition, of Taiwan, 13, 19, 20, 115, 141  
 national sovereignty, claim to, at risk, 4  
 nationality, *see* "sentiment of nationality"

- nationalism (*see also* economic nationalism), 22, 40, 107–8, 203n18
- approaches to, 146, 237n8
- Chinese, 93, 147, 149
- civic, 18
- comparative typologies of, 68–9
- driving force behind, 97
- equality and, 17, 21
- in Japan, 14–15, 33–48
- in Korea, 20, 21, 165
- linkages between democracy and, 94–7
- modern, in East Asia, 6–8
- state, 67, 68
- Taiwanese, 147
- terminology, 148
- underlying principle of, 2
- nationalist agenda, 90
- nationalist project, in China, 49, 50
- “masculinity” and, 90–1
- women in, 73, 88, 89
- Nationalists, Chinese, 19, 204
- claim to *de facto* sovereignty, 153
- formation of KMT, 60
- government in Taiwan, 131, 137, 144–5, 150
- ideology of, 132
- “one-China policy”, 144
- retreat to Taiwan, 132, 143
- unification, KMT policy on, 152
- nationalists, Korean, 166, 170
- nationalists, Taiwanese, 150–1, 153–4
- nationality, 212n12
- nationalization, 201, 202
- nations, competitiveness between, 2–3
- Natsume Soseki (novelist), 43
- New Culture Movement, 84, 101, 107, 113
- “New Party,” 144, 153
- “New Taiwanese,” 153
- Newman, John Henry, quoted, 168
- Nietzsche, quoted, 210n37
- Nihon kuzo huan taiko* (General Outline for the Reconstruction of Japan), 41
- Nogi, General, 42, 44, 45
- Noguchi Takehiko, 39
- North America, Chinese communities in, 66
- North China Union Women’s College, 82
- North Korea, *see* Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
- “notions of generations”, 117
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), 4
- Nye, Robert, quoted, 11
- Ohsawa, Masachi, 15, 19
- oil industry, 199, 203
- Okubo Toshimichi, 41
- Okuma Shigenobu, 40
- On Equality* (Tang), 103
- On Moral Education* (Fukuzawa), cited, 24
- “one-China policy”, 144, 153
- oral history, 136
- Osaka Asahi Shinbun* (newspaper), quoted, 40
- Osan Boys’ College, 173, 174
- overseas Chinese, 66
- Pak Indok, 186
- pan-Asia, *see* East Asia
- Parekh, Bhikhu, 149
- Park Chung Hee, President, 197
- Peking, 75
- “People First Party”, 144, 153
- Perlis Plantations (business group), 203
- Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), 202
- personal dignity, 110, 111, 114, 165, 166, 186
- pharmaceutical industry, 199, 201
- political vocabulary, 12–13
- politics of recognition, 19–20, 97–100

- popular sovereignty, 108  
 private room, as metaphor, 214n22  
 privatization, 199, 200  
   foreign participation in, 200  
 production skills, 191  
 profits, rate of return, 190, 194  
 project execution skills, 191  
 Protestants  
   in Korea, 165–72, 186  
   women, 180–3, 187  
 publications, restrictions on, relaxed, 175  
 pulp and paper industry, 195
- Qin Lishan, 54  
 Qin Xiao-ying (writer), 100  
 Qing massacres, 62  
*Qingyi bao* (Journal of Disinterested Criticism), 53  
 Qiu Jin (nationalist), 72, 82, 88, 89
- "race" (*see also* ethnicity), 57–8  
 racial conflict, 203, 204  
 railroads, 37, 43
- R. E. A.-Cumberbatch (British company), 202
- recognition  
   desire for, 12  
   national, of Taiwan, 13, 19, 20, 115, 141  
   politics of, 19–20, 97–100  
   struggle for, 210n43
- Red Cross, 77, 78, 88  
 Reddy, William, 11  
 regulatory framework, corporate, 194  
 relational identity, 14, 28, 31  
 "Republic of China," 141, 145, 152, 154, 157  
 Republic of Taiwan, 141, 144, 151, 154  
 Republican revolution (1911), 59, 78, 88  
 research and development, 191–2  
   restrictive licensing, 194, 201  
 Revive China Society (*Xing zhonghui*), 98, 100  
 Rice Riots (1918), 40, 213n8  
 Rousseau, 215n18  
 rubber industry, 202
- Sakai, Naoki, 14, 16, 36, 38, 71, 105  
   debt to audience in Taipei, 23–4  
*Sanshiro* (Natsume Soseki), 43  
*Santaro no Nikki* (Abe Jiro), 44  
 Schwartz, Benjamin, 55  
   quoted, 9  
 scientific socialism, 99, 100  
 "sentiment of nationality," 29–31  
 servility, impression of, in China, 98, 99, 105  
 sexual segregation, in China, 81, 84  
 Shanghai, 73, 76, 87, 88  
   Korean provisional government in, 175, 185
- Shen Sung-chiao (Shen Songqiao), 15, 16, 18, 93  
 Shi Fumei (Zoh Fo Me), 77  
 Shi Meiyu, *see* Stone, Mary  
 Shih Ming (historian), 150  
 Shiji (Historical Records), 61  
 Shin'ganhoe ("united front"), 183  
 Showa period, ultra-nationalism of, 33, 34, 37
- Siam Cement Group, 203  
 Siam Motors, 203  
 SIDOR (steel mill), 199  
 Sime Darby (business group), 202  
 Singapore, 157, 160  
   research and development in, 192
- Sino-Japanese War, First (1895), 117, 142  
 Sino-Japanese War, Second (1937–1945), 119  
 "slaves" and "slavery," 15–16, 116  
   as motif and metaphor, applied to China, 52, 104–6, 109, 112

- as rhetorical device, 12, 108
- and vocabulary of nationalism, 12–13
- Smith, Anthony D, 51, 62, 145, 146
- So Chaep'il, 167, 169
- So Ch'un, 175
- social Darwinism, 54, 58, 168, 171, 176
- social relations, 24–7, 36
- Society for the Study of Public Law, 107
- SOCMA (business group), 198
- SOMISA (steel mill), 199
- Song dynasty, 226n104
- Songsŏ Chosŏn* (journal), 178, 180
- Sony Corporation, 204
- South Korea, *see* Korea
- Southern Cone (steel company), 199
- Southern Methodist Mission of America, 173
- sovereignty, 4, 5, 8, 227n7
  - equal, 115
  - de facto*, KMT's claim for, 115, 153
  - national, equality of, 107
  - popular, 108
  - recovery of, 165
- Soviet Union, 186
- specific identity, 31
- "state identity," 155, 161
- state-nationalism, 67, 68
- state-owned enterprises, 196, 198
- status equality, 96, 113
- status negotiation, 3
- steel industry, 196, 197, 199
- Stone, Mary (Shi Meiyu), 77, 78, 79, 88, 89
- students, Korean, 174
- subsidies, 190, 193, 194
- suffrage:
  - women's, 183
  - universal, 47
- Sun Yat-sen, 59, 107, 134
- surveys, 155–6, 156 (Figure 8.1), 158 (Figure 8.2)
- Suzhou, 75
- Syngman Rhee (Yi Sungman) (nationalist), 170, 173
- Taehan K'uninsuoin heobo* (Protestant newspaper), 169
- Taesong College, 173, 174
- Tai ping Rebellion, 62, 64
- Taisho period, 33, 34, 43–7
- Taiwan, 126–8, 199, 200, 202, 204
  - acquisition of, by Japan, 117, 142, 143
  - anti-Japanese movement in, 117–8
  - China
    - return to, 130, 139
    - unification with, 152–4, 158, 159
  - colonial investors in, 193
  - education in, 19, 116, 120–5, 127–8, 134–5, 137
  - history, 142–5
    - absence of teaching of, 127–8
    - not understood on mainland, 139
    - resurgence of interest in, 135–6
  - identification with, 159, 160
  - independence, of, 141, 152, 159, 236n1
  - Japan's colonial rule of, 18, 118–20
  - legal status, 150
  - national language, 121, 123, 125, 130
  - nationalism, 147, 149
  - as political community, 142, 161
  - "realists," 154–5
  - recognition of, 13, 19, 20, 115, 141
  - research and development in, 191
- Taiwan Association for Culture, 119
- Taiwan xinsheng bao*, quoted, 131
- Taiwanese
  - educated, marginalized, 131
  - gap between mainland Chinese and, 138, 139

- Japanization of, 119–20  
 people, 126, 143, 150, 151  
 Sinitification of, 130, 133, 136  
 war veterans, 133  
 “Taiwanese consciousness,” 116, 136, 137, 138, 155, 156 (Figure 8.1)  
 Taiwanese independents, 149, 151–2, 153  
 “Taiwanese nationalists,” 150–1, 153–4  
 Takashi Fujirani, 35, 38  
 Tan Sitong, 102, 103, 105  
 Tang Caichang, 63, 105, 107  
   on equality, 102, 103, 112  
 Tang Qunying, 226n101  
 Tao Chengzhang, 59  
 Tata group, 201  
 “Teaching of the Sage Kings,” 25, 26, 27, 28  
 Terachi Masatake, 173  
 Techint (industrial group), 199  
 technology, 193, 189, 192  
 terrorism, 37, 40–1, 47  
 textbooks, 233n37  
   Japanese, in Taiwan, 121, 123, 124–5, 127, 138  
   Taiwanese, 133–5, 136–7  
 “The Fifth Modernization,” 111, 112  
 Thailand, 203–4  
 “Three Principles of the People,” doctrine, 107–8  
 Tokyo, 35, 37, 45  
 Tokyo Taishō Exhibition, 44  
*Tongjiwang* (Light of the East) (newspaper), 175  
 Tongshuo (national society), 175, 177, 183, 186  
 tradition, and modernity, 9  
 Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM), 72, 74, 75, 78, 84  
   schools, 76  
 Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), 142  
 True Light Seminary for Girls, 79  
 Tsurumi, E. Patricia, 138  
 Tu Wei-ming, 7  
   quoted, 10  
 Uchimura Kanzō (reformer), 169, 172, 178–9, 184, 187  
*Ukigumo* (Futabatei Shimei), first vernacular novel, 37, 39  
 ultranationalism  
   gap between nationalism and, 40  
   Japan, 33, 34, 37–8, 41–2, 46  
 “Unequal Treaties,” 101, 102, 107  
 United Front Movement, 180  
 United Nations, 101  
 United Nations Charter, quoted, 98  
 United States of America (USA), 2, 5, 109, 113, 174, 175, 186  
   spy-plane incident, 94, 95  
 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), quoted, 98  
 universal suffrage, 47  
 University of Michigan, 77  
 “unmasking” vocabulary, 12, 13  
 USIMINAS (steel mill), 199  
 Vattel, Emmerich de, 4  
   quoted, 1e  
 value systems, 2, 8  
 Venezuela, 199  
 vernacular writing, 36–7, 39  
 victimhood, state mythology of, 94–5  
 vocabulary, of modern nationalism, 12–13  
 Walby, 90  
 Wang Jingwei, 58, 107  
 Watamabe Nagao (sculptor), 44  
 wealth of nations, 2  
 “wealth and power”,  
   China’s search for, 17, 98  
   historiography of, 98, 99  
 Wei Jingsheng, 109–12, 113–4  
 Weil, Simone, 170, 178

- Wells, Ken, 21  
 Western medicine, 72, 74  
 "White Terror," 132-3, 136  
 "woman", as social category, 72  
 women, 14, 16-17  
   elite, in China, 80  
   female emancipation, 182, 183, 184  
   female suffrage, 47  
   marginalization of in public sphere, 71, 89-90  
   as "mother of *guomin*", 56  
   movements, 72, 180-3, 185, 187  
   in nationalist project, 73, 88, 89  
   Protestant, 180-3, 187  
 "women citizens," 16  
 women-doctors, 72, 73-7  
   identity of, 77-82  
   nationalism and, case studies, 82-8  
 Women's College in Chinese and Western Medicine, 73, 76, 77  
 Women's Medical College of the New York Infirmary, 75  
 Wu Feug, 233n38  
 Wu Lien-tie, 77  
 Wu Zhihui (anarchist), 102  
 Wuhan, 77, 88  
  
 Xiang Jingyu, 187  
 Xiao Hong (author), 85  
 Xie Yuanfu, quoted, 76  
 Xilai'an (Jiaoba'nian) Incident (1915), 118  
*Xinmin congbao* (New Citizen Journal), 53  
*Xinmin shuo* (On the New Citizen) (Liang), 53  
 Xu Peixuan, 87, 225n93  
 Xu Xin-liang, 151  
 Xu Xinhui (journalist), 6  
  
 Yauie King, *see* Jin Yunmei  
 Yasuda Zenjiro (company president), 37  
 Ye Shitao (literary critic), 135, 136  
  
 Yen Fu, 55  
 Yi Kwangsu (nationalist), 168, 175  
 Yi Sunghun, 172, 173  
 Yi Tonghwi (nationalist), 170, 173  
 Yo Unhyong, 173  
*Yomiuri Shinbun* (newspaper), quoted, 37  
 Yongzheng, Emperor, 60  
 Yoshino Sakuro, 45  
 YPF (oil company), 199  
 Yu Qingfang, 118  
 Yun Ch'ih'o (intellectual and reformer), 170, 171, 172, 178, 179, 183, 186, 187, 238n3  
   communities established by, 173  
   Independence Club and, 167, 169  
 Yuval-Davis, Nira, 51  
   quoted, 88  
 YWCA, in Korea, 185, 186  
  
 Zeng Guofan, 64, 65  
 Zeng Yi (doctor), 76, 78, 79, 80, 85, 88, 89  
   on role of women in nation building, 82-4, 87  
 Zhang Binglin, 51, 58, 61, 62, 63, 66, 69  
   ethno-nationalism of, 56-7, 59  
 Zhang Boxi, 80  
 Zhang Jianhua (historian), 107  
 Zhang Shizhao, 50  
 Zhang Zhidong, 78  
 Zhang Zhuyun (doctor), 76, 77, 85-8, 89, 90  
   quoted, 80  
 Zheng Chengkong (Koxinga), 127, 135, 142, 235n74  
 "Zhonghua minguo" (Republic of China), 37, 61  
 Zoh Fu Me, 77  
 Zou Rong, 59  
*Zuo shuan* (Narratives of Zuo), 57  
*zulei*, 60, 63