TRACES
A MULTILINGUAL SERIES OF CULTURAL THEORY AND TRANSLATION

Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference

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Introduction:
Addressing the Multitude of Foreigners, Echoing Foucault

Naoki Sakai and Jon Solomon

Since its inception, *Traces* has explicitly sought to provide readers with the elements for a strategic intervention into the neo-colonial distribution of theory and data.[1] Naturally, such a vast project requires multiple interventions, yet what is unique to *Traces*, we think, is the temporal gambit implicit in a multilingual revue. By proposing to provide, simply at the representational level, the same content at the same time to readers in several different language markets, the performative synchronicity created by *Traces* directly intervenes in the field of "linear progress" and "developmental stages" invariably favored by the powerful historical narratives of colonial modernity.

Given the four language-markets in which *Traces* is currently published, it may appear reasonable to surmise that East Asia and North America form the poles around which this synchronicity is spun into action. From the outset, however, *Traces* has taken upon itself the task of opening these poles to a third — variously European, South and Southeast Asian, African, East European, and Latin American — moment. Or to put it more succinctly, *Traces* has never been interested in legitimating its mission in terms of geopolitical regionalism. Accordingly, it is utterly misleading if some of our readers would take this fact alone as evidence of an unwitting reinscription of the very neo-colonial distribution of theory and temporal lag in which *Traces* initially set out to intervene! For this reason, it is essential to invite readers to recall previous moments of intellectual

synchronicity in the East Asian historical experience of "theory" precisely because these moments have been palimpsestically written out (on account of the political milieu in which they were conceived). Far from being a call to rekindle the flames of a bygone era when the alternative between "Pan-Asianism vs. Socialism" marked the political choice of several generations before and after World War Two, we would intend, in a very limited fashion, to call attention to the gargantuan difficulty of articulating transnational intellectual work across the temporal schisms essential to the regime of the West-and-the-Rest. Punctual moments of synchronicity such as that seen in Tanabe Hajime's innovative, critical, yet imperialist, reading of *avant garde* European thinkers such as Martin Heidegger (in the early 1930s at a time when many so-called "Western intellectuals" might not yet have even heard the German philosopher's name) have to be understood in the context of a regime of translation and cross-reading, broadly understood, that was selective at best and quite often simply unilateral. Even today, when Tanabe's *tour de force* in "social ontology" remains untranslated,[2] and, more seriously, a professional knowledge of Japanese language is still virtually unheard of among non-ethnic philosophers, the legacy of this moment of synchronicity can only be effectively seen from the perspective of Japanese language — where it is all-too-easily recuperated by a *transnational* regime of culturalism. Among other instances of historical synchronicity buried under the historical weight of the regime of unilateral translation, Cai Yi's writings on image-thought and esthetic theory in the 1950s[3] and Takeuchi Yoshimi's writings on Lu Xun[4] are equally emblematic. To these instances we might add a whole history of translations of Buddhist texts and terms through the matrix of Humanism and the fantasy of a non-Western "other."

If French-inflected Europeanist theory draws our attention in this volume, we insist that it is part of a critical project to turn inside-out the very terms of knowledge with regard to both its positionality and the bodies that move through it. In short, we recognize the incontrovertible value of exposing theory to its "outside" — in this case, specifically the historical difference repressed by the victory of neo-Liberalism at the end of World War Two as well as the promise of international social transformation repressed by the unilateral regime of translation.

It is well known that the poststructuralist "philosophies of difference" made their mark essentially by proposing historically nuanced readings of German philosophy in light of the political cataclysms of the twentieth century. It is widely

acknowledged that the U.S. reception of these "philosophies of difference" played a pivotal role, not just in the global dissemination of these theories outside France, but even in the acceptance grudgingly accorded to these thinkers and their theories within France. At the same time, however, the very same Europeanist disciplines in the United States responsible for the English-language dissemination of these theories unwittingly repeated the founding gesture of the philosophy being deconstructed by occasionally claiming it as their own cultural heritage and, even more gravely, by consistently managing it as their own (intellectual) property. East Asians have been readers of so-called "Western" theory for centuries, yet their readings continue to be seen as "external," both politically and epistemically. How can we continue to accept this kind of positionality?

Seen in the context of postwar East Asia, where the U.S. not only enjoyed the only real sovereignty in the region but also presided over a virtual epistemic hegemony determining the contours of legitimate knowledge in and about the region, this historical situation has meant that "theory" in the context of East Asia today is both doubly repressed and doubly intrusive. No wonder why the identification of theory with "the West" *tout court* could be seen, depending upon a logic of predetermined *positions*, as either an anti-Eurocentric gesture of resistance to, or a Eurocentric argument for, the supposed uniqueness of "the West" and "its" theory. Naturally, such gestures are themselves mutually complicit with an economy of hegemonic amnesis and reified collective memory that sustains the referential ubiquity of the West.

Needless to say, the practico-theoretical problematic of German thought, in both its revolutionary and reactionary aspects, was extremely important to both the Pan-Asianism and the Socialism of a previous era; of course, these currents and contexts were utterly delegitimized and, yes, even criminalized, during a series of political and military battles leading to the postwar consolidation of neo-Liberalism and U.S. imperial sovereignty in East Asia. The undercurrents that run among, (a) the absence of critique about postwar Germany, which sat in a minority position relative to the U.S., over the way the U.S.-led occupation instituted a subtle, reciprocal repression of historical difference — not just by emphasizing Economy as the sole source of political legitimacy but also by reifying the very concept of "the West" (by assuming Germany's inalienable cultural position within it as a bastion of defense against Eurasian Communism) — thus eliminating a question that had previously been so obsessive for modern German

thought, (b) the postwar Franco-European deconstruction of modern philosophy and its political derivations, (c) the U.S. reception and dissemination into East Asia of these historically-informed "deconstructions" through the circuits of global English against which national imaginaries (including those of both postwar Europe and East Asia) were figured, and (d) the prewar East Asian projects of resistance and theory that aimed — in very complex and often highly compromised ways — precisely at propagating and fracturing, at the same time, the dominance of "the West" and "Western Theory," are even today extremely turbulent and still highly opaque. Here is where it is essential not to stop at re-presenting these past differences, but also to continue on and discover the extent to which contemporary theory itself — inasmuch as it is tethered, through established disciplinary divisions, historical narratives of heritage and a plethora of institutional practices, to specific geopolitical regions like France or the United States — remains inscribed in the relations of domination codified in the global positioning system of macro-spatiality.

The legacy of macro-spatiality (i.e., nations, regions, continents, worlds, etc.) bequeathed to us by the colonial modernity is, it bears repeating, not a faithful rendition of some supposedly transcendental principle (such as the national sovereignty or the uniqueness of the West), but rather a historically specific form of the appropriation of the Common. It combines a structural expropriation of the means of production with a systemic expropriation of place, doubly inscribing the logic of private property into a regime of communal macro-spatiality (typically associated with the nation-State, but also extending, in our perspective, to the biopolitical forms of control such as nationalized language). Inasmuch as *Traces* is committed to a project joining the disparate temporalities of simultaneous translation and theoretical ex-position, it presents an unusual opportunity to intervene in the geopolitical regime of macro-spatial private property codified in the global flows of knowledge. In other words, *Traces* offers a rare, performative chance to reconfigure the relation between knowledge and the Common in a materialist way that does not presuppose the latter as either essence or teleology.

Hence, we would like to preface this volume by way of describing the politics of knowledge and the social relations of production in relation to a global regime of translation that opens onto the problem of the Common. Although this essay is not an introduction in the conventional sense that details the significance of each individual contribution, it does provide an introduction to a unified vision

of the Common — as opposed to a unitary "common vision" — that brings these essays together within the context of our *Traces*.

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Let us take the point of departure from a dialogue between Michel Foucault and Zen monks in Japan that highlights the problematic relation between anthropological and epistemological regions at the heart of Foucault's Occidentalism.[5] Launching a critical evaluation of the Occidentalism of an important thinker who has remained an inspiration throughout much of this volume, we are not concerned aboutdelimiting his work within the fatigued framework of debates over "Western theory" and "non-Western cultures." Quite the opposite, the critique of Occidentalism itself is a theoretical enterprise whose effects must always be seen in relation to the praxis of social relations and the politics of knowledge. This essay will mount a critical intervention into the link between regionality and thought (specifically, the construction of respective "Western" and "Eastern" regions with their corresponding "ways of thought") that constitutes Foucault's dialogic construction of "the West" and "Western thought," and the conjunctural formation of the two as "crisis."

On the occasion of his second trip to Japan in 1978, Michel Foucault paid a visit to Seionji where an ensuing, brief dialogue between Foucault and several Japanese monks[6] was recorded and published in two different versions, Japanese and French. The main points of the dialogue have been excellently summarized in a penetrating — and ultimately disappointing — analysis by François Jullien, a philosopher and sinologue. Foucault's posture in the dialogue appears incredibly naïve, and there is certainly a strong part of his positions — the conventionalized oppositions between East and West that orient his discourse — that would easily fall under a postcolonial critique today. The dialogue itself is painfully aware of this limit, as Foucault identifies Western thought with crisis, and crisis specifically with the historicity of imperialism and its project of universalism.

Unfortunately, there is today, as far as we know, no extant version of this dialogue in its integral form. Neither of the published versions amounts to a simple transcription. We know that Foucault did not speak Japanese, and we assume that his interlocutors, monks, did not speak French. Presumably, the dialogue itself was conducted in *both* French and Japanese, alternately, with the

aid of on-site, consecutive translation. In addition, it is highly probable that further refinements in the on-site translation were made in the process of transcription for the published version. In any case, both versions share what they erase: the practice of translation itself.

François Jullien, recently commenting (significantly, also in the form of a dialogue) at length on Foucault's Zen dialogue, finds in it "*everything*...not only the confrontation, as fleeting as it may be, with a thought from outside, but also at the same time the areas of understanding and misunderstanding... ."[7] Outside, failure, *and* everything: while Jullien's astute reading of the dialogue grasps its global significance beyond Foucault, accounting for what would be called, outside France, the postcolonial aspects of Foucault's Occidentalism,[8] Jullien's "everything" implicitly includes, like Foucault, the crucial element of translation, yet misses its significance for the praxis of social relations. Our task here is not to refute Jullien's reading, but rather to follow his lead, adopt the same posture, and tease out of the Foucauldian dialogue *more* of this elusive "everything" — in this case, the social praxis of translation, a point of departure that would ultimately necessitate a radical reformulation of both Foucault's Occidentalism and Jullien's corresponding "outside."

The dialogue counts a total of three instances in which translation is mentioned. These three instances cover what may be considered to be the multiplicity of translational practices and representations: the metaphorical, the spatio-communicational, and the practico-addressive. When Foucault speaks, at the close of the dialogue, of the way in which philosophy has always been "translated" into disastrous political programs, he appeals to a notion of "translation" as a generalized mode of transposition in relations across the social field. "Philosophy" is translated into "politics": translation names the process that would relate two discretely separate spheres or realms of experience. "Translation" in this sense becomes the metaphor of metaphor, the very principle of its own operation. Our question would be to know to what extent a certain determination of philosophy itself has been based on a particular metaphysics of translation-as-meta-metaphor? Is not metaphor itself a "metaphor" for translation? Before we even begin to answer these questions, let us at least observe that they will inevitably extend across different fields of both knowledge and social formation. In effect, we will be asked to attend to the intersections between, on the one hand, the role of national language and disciplinary specialization in the

institutional formation of the modern, national-imperial university, and, on the other hand, the division of the world into geopolitical units based on a supplementary relation between sovereignty and civilizational difference.

Leaving aside these more or less acquired Derridean considerations,[9] let us return now to the beginning of the dialogue, where we once again find, in the second question posed by the monks to Foucault, the issue of translation: "I am told," says one monk, "that almost all of your works are translated into Japanese. Do you think that your thoughts are understood enough?"[10] Foucault dodges the very terms of the question by repeating his well-known critique of authorial intention. In Foucault's response, we can also detect a nascent moment in which one reader of the French "original" and another of the Japanese "copy" both implicitly occupy the same position in relation to the socially produced meaning of the text. All readers, including the author, operate within the same scope of (de)legitimation, and the meaning of the text can only be the product of endless re-readings of readings among these variable positions. What both Foucault and his Japanese interlocutor seem to miss, however, is the potentiality that the Japanese translations may well in fact pose questions of "understanding" back to the "original" French text in such a way that it requires us to ask of French readers exactly the same question. Indeed, we must call into question the assumption of immanence in the monk's query that implicitly links French readers to the French text. The fact that one can suture French language to French community does not in itself guarantee the success of communication. This radical exteriority of social relationships to the production of meaning is precisely thaepoint to which we want to draw attention, in our ensuing discussion of translation, with the distinction between *address* and *communication*. Whereas "address" indicates a *social relation* (that between addresser and addressee) that is primarily practical and performative in nature, hence undetermined and still-to-come, "communication" names the imaginary representation of that relation in terms of pronominal identities, informational content, and receptive destinations: who we are supposed to be and what we were supposed to mean. Theories of communication regularly obscure the fact of address in communication, whereupon they are derived from the assumption that supposedly "we" should be able to "communicate" among ourselves if "we" are a linguistic community. To confuse address with communication is thus a classic hallmark of what we call "the regime of homolingual address."[11]

The institution of homolingual address is a form of homosociality[12] based on a model of community abstracted from the notion of communion or fusion, what Jean-Luc Nancy calls "immanentism,"[13] among its members. What is precisely excluded from such homosociality is the fact of "failure" in communication, a "failure" that does not occur simply because of presumed gaps between linguistic communities, but also because, to try to communicate is to expose oneself to exteriority, to a certain exteriority that cannot be reduced to the externality of a referent to a signification.[14]

Jullien's strategy in reading Foucault, which incidentally forms the introduction to his strategy for reading China through the notion of "outside thought," pivots upon a conception of "outside" that is essentially hermeneutic — and arguably quite different, in its idealist spatiality, from the meaning Foucault first ascribed to that phrase.[15] "Chinese" texts in their foreignness allow the insertion of a heterogeneous element into the constitution of "our" everyday, thus allowing "us" a critical distance upon "our" temporality and identity. Certainly, we would not want to underestimate the critical potential inherent in such moves. Nevertheless, at the same moment that hermeneutics reveals the historicity of our position, it can also be used to institute a certain economy that regulates the distribution of the foreign — typically through spatialized representations of separate linguistic spheres. Naturally, in order to delineate an "outside" and locate the foreign within the hermeneutic economy of the anticipated meaning against the horizon of prejudice and tradition,[16] it is imperative to disqualify forms or instances that obscure or simply do not adhere to the boundary between inside and outside. In order for the merger of horizons to take place, each horizon must be first sanitized of the foreign contamination and homogenized, so that the foreign may come only from without. In terms of linguistic activity, translation is precisely one such form to be disqualified, both in its formal and practical aspects, including notably the exceptional position of the translator, the plurality of language forms among the addressee(s), and the figure or regulative idea that substitutes for the impossibility of making the unity of language an object of experience. Forms of address that take such exteriority into account in the very formation of an impossible interiority are what we call "heterolingual forms of address." The social relationships denoted by such forms do not "add up to" anything — they form what can be called a non-aggregate community. "In this respect, you are always confronted, so to speak, with foreigners in your enunciation

when your attitude is that of the heterolingual address. Precisely because you wish to communicate with her, him, or them, so the first, and perhaps most fundamental, determination of your addressee, is that of the one who might not comprehend your language, that is, of the foreigner."[17] Clearly, the distinction between homolingual and heterolingual address thus goes far beyond the question of communication as raised by Foucault in terms of authorial intention. Indeed, our work on translation is designed to illustrate that translation names primarily a *social* relationship whose form permeates linguistic activity as a whole, rather than simply comprising a secondary or exceptional situation.

In Jullien's case, it would be quite easy to show that the constitution of the "outside" is based instead upon the confusion and mobility enabled by the ambiguities inherent in the word "Chinese," which becomes a site of immanence that nevertheless transcendentally sutures an immense plethora of different enunciative positions, historical periods, and social identities. Ultimately, this transcendental suturing enables a notion that particular readers immanently "embody" the ideas of a certain corpus of texts on account of their putative linguistico-ethnic identity. In other words, the presupposition that Westerners understand Western texts in a primary, authentic manner — in short, better than non-Westerners. It may be worthwhile to point out, once again, that the most powerful historical form to-date of this hermeneutic notion has certainly been found in the construction of an idealized, Western readership that is posited as someone who identifies with the position continuous with "Western thought"; Western readership is supposedly capable of comprehending "from within the horizon of the Western *prejudice*," the entirety of Western thought from Heraclitus to Erigena, from Leibniz to James, down to Whitehead and Sartre. It is precisely the figure of Western readership that implicitly underlies the Japanese Zen monk's query about Foucault's work in translation. In a move that demonstrates the way in which this figure is always complicit, that is, co-figured, with another figure, Thierry Marchaisse, Jullien's interlocutor, poses exactly the same problem of immanently embodied transcendental understanding, with the terms simply reversed: "If there is one thing that Foucault effectively cannot do," asserts Marchaisse, "it is to understand Zen *as* it is understood by the monks around him." This statement formally is not any different from saying, "If there is one thing the Japanese readers of Foucault cannot do, it is to understand Foucault *as* the French (or the Westerners) do." Significantly, Marchaisse and the Japanese

Zen monk do not ask whether the Zen monks, or the Westerners, themselves understand "things" in the same way amongst each other — much less how "Zen" or the "Foucauldian text" and the sets of heterogeneous practices within each attempt to manage such distinctions. Jullien, in order to explain this difference, or more precisely, in order to capitalize upon this difference as an unassimilable supplement exterior to the expressions of *our* thought, exclaims, "That's the place where it all becomes Chinese."[18]

Hence, it is only the foreign outside "our" tradition that is incomprehensible. In fact, Jullien, before turning to Foucault, begins his dialogue with Marchaisse by theorizing his own personal experience of presenting Chinese philosophy to those for whom it is so unfamiliar, they can only understand it through misrecognition and ignorance. It is an experience of incomprehension so acute, that, he says, "it is extremely difficult for me *to begin* to make myself heard."[19] Of course, "to begin to make oneself heard" is precisely the situation of address that inheres in or precedes[20] — more precisely, we should say "ex-poses" — every instance of communication. Yet, Jullien's entire focus falls exclusively upon the communicational aspect of the situation, upon the effect of misrecognition that address produces upon his auditors (including, differentially, even himself). It is precisely at this point that the instantiation of "we" in address becomes a presupposed site of interior identity in communication. "Now, this is exactly one of the principal difficulties to which my work exposes me: when I try to present it, I do not *at the outset* "meet" anyone, I have no designated partner."[21] In fact, Jullien's difficulty is itself an incredibly fecund clue: identity does not precede communication, but is rather abstracted from it after the instance of enunciation. The fact that there is no "designated partner" is in fact the essential situation of address, in each and every instance, since address does not require the presupposition of relation (codified through designation) to be effective. Yet according to the communicational model of encounter to which Jullien turns, this constitutive indecision is obscured through representations based on the mutual recognition of designated positions. From such a perspective, the situation of "no 'designated partner'" becomes an obstacle. What is being obstructed? Certainly not the form of address itself. Obstruction, were there any, would occur only when the work of address becomes reified into a thing. Hence, the relation of address becomes identified with the interiority of a "given position" designated as Chinese. The spatialization of relationships and their codification through "given

designation" is a key feature of communicational representation. Needless to say, this or that designation in particular is not the only one possible; in the case of "Chinese," it is neither the only one that has been used in the past to describe some of the texts in question, and quite probably not the only one that will be invented by future social formations to come. However, when the "given designation" of positions is assumed, or represented, to be prior to the act of address in communication, the positions themselves become effectively identified with a thing that is supposed to be "outside" of the social relations that produce them, rather than the social relations themselves — what Foucault calls, at the end of Zen dialogue (in a moment referring to the new role assigned to intellectuals), "what is going on at the present."[22] If to speak of knowledge at the exclusion of this relation were the only choice left to us, we would surely join Jullien in experiencing the enormous frustration brought upon us by the ineluctable division between "Chinese" and its outside. Yet, Jullien's negative assessment of the actual situation he encounters in the situation of address should not prevent us from recognizing the immense opportunity that awaits us in the midst of his experience. Seen from the perspective of communication-ex-posed-in-address rather than communication-abstracted-from-address, the undesignated partner who might listen to me presents both of us (and others) with the moment at which social relations can occur — precisely because they remain open.

Sadly, the incredible opportunity that lies behind Jullien's frustrated hopes for a designated partner are buried beneath a mountain of specific difference between languages, nations, civilizations, traditions and races. Predictably, both Jullien and Marchaisse repeatedly appeal to a certain "we" that is not only a relation in address, but also a hermeneutic site of sedimented historical experience and the putative totality of a particular language. "We" thus have a long historical experience of encountering "them," from whence "our" experience is immediately communicable among "us"; "their" experience, by contrast, requires translation. Neither Jullien nor Marchaisse problematize their own dialogue in terms of...dialogue — the potential failure of communication that inheres in every linguistic exchange. Hence, as Jullien remarks just shortly before the ineluctable moment when "it all turns into (incomprehensible) Chinese," dialogue becomes an "impossibility." This impossibility, however, is conveniently contained by "Chinese," thereby excluding it from "French." In this series of equivalencies and surprisingly monologic dialogues, Jullien and Marchiasse thus confuse the

pronominal invocation "we" with a group of those who are inherently capable of communicating the same information with each other. Such communication is conceived of solely in terms of accurate repetition.

Now of course, Jullien's partner in dialogue, Marchaisse, does not speak or read Chinese, hence Jullien speaks to him also as a translator, a role to which he appeals for shortly after this comment by highlighting the problems of "a dialogue that does not communicate" and leads to Zen "*satori* — which is ordinarily translated," Jullien reminds his auditor, "by '*illumination* ['Enlightenment'].'" It is impossible for us, in the context of a discussion about and inspired by Foucault — the thinker whose work was in large part devoted to redefining the meaning of the Enlightenment — not to dwell upon the possibilities inherent in this (mis)translation. Jullien, for his part, bypasses the opportunity and proceeds directly to the way in which practice, repetition, becomes a technique leading up to the realization of virtuosity. An integral part of Jullien's argument is that *Chinese* thought has always been concerned with a discontinuous process of "laborious maturation" and "instantaneous realization." Centuries before Zen appeared in China, the *Mencius* text had already charted out the essential ground later assumed by Zen. This historical narrative, which is not of Jullien's invention and to which the Japanese monk in dialogue with Foucault also refers ("It seems that most Chinese specialists believe that Zen Buddhism came from China rather than India"), is a typical object *and* product of culturalist hermeneutics: We all know the story according to which "Zen" is presented as an original *sinification* of Indian *dhyana*, and in this way supposedly provides a model for an original and originary *Chinese* mimeticism — an impossibly contradictory formula — that will serve the cultural analytic of promoting particularity through mimetic reference to the universalism of the West. In this way, cultural interiority is posited as being anterior to the introduction of the foreign. In this limited space, we would simply like to draw attention to what this narrative structure excludes: that the conditions of possibility for identifying the subject of sinification may themselves be posterior to an essential hybridity.

Other points on which to argue with Jullien's position would similarly require far more elaboration than we can mount here, but they are certainly worth mentioning. Alternate interpretations of the texts and schools to which Jullien refers are possible. We note that Jullien's reading of the *Mencius* is strikingly similar to the core concern of Cheng-Zhu neo-Confucianism,[23] which itself bears

the inscription of an historically-formulated response to Zen. Needless to say, the practice of Zen itself may also include significant resources for undoing the opposition between "laborious maturation" and the pure form of "instantaneous realization." After all, Huineng's appearance (637–713) as Sixth Patriarch of the Zen lineage, his rejection of the gradualist "Northern School," was aimed precisely at this distinction.

Inevitably, notions of labor as repetition bear within themselves implicit theories of language. The contrast drawn between Jullien and our own position explodes here into a full-fledged parting of the ways when we consider how the very same elements deployed by Jullien (repetition, labor, virtuosity, pure form, neo-Confucianism, Zen, cultural difference, exteriority, materiality, and the constitution of national language) can be all present, yet in a radically different configuration. Inversely, once we admit the extent to which disciplines of knowledge based on the unities of national language and national community intrinsically accord importance to translation — only to conceal it through naturalizing representations that effectively spatialize anterior systematicity, we may begin to see how the role of the translator has significant implications for a typical Foucauldian concern: the role of the intellectual in general. In Jullien's case, it is quite clear that his comments about the esoteric impenetrability of "Chinese" parallels the way in which he draws scrutiny upon the inadequacy of the conventional translation of *satori* as "*illumination*" in French — a word that carries connotations of "Enlightenment" much as the standard English translation of *satori* as "Enlightenment." Here, we must remind ourselves that the positing of the untranslatable and the incommensurable is possible only retrospectively, after the enunciation of translation opens up a space of communication and commensurability. The practice of translation itself remains radically heterogeneous to the representation of translation. Such heterogeneity itself sprouts from the fact that the unity of language cannot be an object of experience in the Kantian sense. Yet Jullien's dialogue with Marchaisse consistently returns to the notion of a systematic unity that underlies and separates the respective Chinese and Western language-worlds. Hence, the role of the sinologue-translator, as seen in Jullien's dialogue with Marchaisse, becomes that of an active agent in the regulation and distribution of the heterogeneous/foreign. In other words, what we are given to see is the way in which the transferential desire to see oneself from another's position is actually created *after the process* of translation. The

"positions" themselves are not prior to the translational exchange, but are rather constructed out of it, in posterior fashion, by substituting the spatiality of representation for the temporality of praxis. Hence, the desire to recuperate the authentic meaning of *satori*, now corrupted by an inadequate translation entangled by "*illumination*," is inseparable from the desire for self-referentiality as a means of regulating the hybridity and heterogeneity that precedes delineations of self and other.

An alternate, genealogical approach to the undeniable inadequacy of translation might instead turn the surplus of "*illumination*," with its modern connotations of "Enlightenment," back onto *satori*, and vice versa — not as a hermeneutic means of discovering who we have become through a process of laborious maturation, the creation of an accumulated historicity called "our tradition," but rather as the initial and perhaps instantaneous ex-posing of who we really have been becoming for quite some time under the migratory regimes unleashed and policed by Capital. At this point in history, the political project of Enlightenment and the spiritual project of *anatman* or selflessness talk to each other, or remain silent, not in an abstract body of knowledge but in the concrete action of knowledgeable bodies.

Significantly, Foucault's otherwise platitudinous call for a "confrontation" between Eastern and Western thought, the means of overcoming the crisis presented by the end of imperialism, is focused on the figure of the philosopher. "This crisis has produced no supreme philosopher who excels in signifying that crisis...There is no philosopher who marks out this period." If the crisis cannot be signified, the reason is certainly because the "crisis" concerns the very possibility of signification, as such, what Jean-Luc Nancy identifies as the problem of "the sense of the world" in an historical age when "meaning," "world," and "being" can no longer be distinguished.[24] Foucault's interest here falls squarely on the *future*: "if philosophy of the future exists, it must be born outside of Europe or equally born in consequence of meetings and impacts between Europe and non-Europe." Foucault, like all of us, does not *know* what the future holds, yet he *senses* its topographic contours. But where would "outside Europe" be in an age when "Europe" is synonymous, as Foucault asserts, with the universal? Clues to this enigma can be pieced together by placing Foucault's interest in the ninth-century monk Rinzai (Linji in Chinese), whom he finds to be a "great Zen philosopher," alongside his experience of Zen. Significantly, Foucault remarks

that Rinzai was "neither a translator nor a founder." Hence, we arrive at the third instance of translation mentioned in the Zen dialogue, the one we have called temporal-addressive. In virtually the same breath, Foucault also cites the example of Rinzai to demonstrate that Zen itself is not wholly Japanese, and, by implication, not wholly Chinese, either. In other words, Rinzai, in Foucault's lexicon, stands as a figure for a philosopher who refuses both the tasks of school-building and of translation inasmuch as they both relate to the project of national construction. Are we not faced here, in a nutshell, with the entirety of anthropological difference since it entered the national-imperial university system with Hegel and Humboldt in the nineteenthcentury? Schools of philosophy in the modern period have invariably been typed as national schools; such constructions are intrinsically built upon a specific regime of translation — it is how "national language" comes to be recognized as such — that provides a metaphysical principle for positing an organic alliance between a particular school or style of thought and a specific geographically defined community.[25] Significantly, after Foucault advances his admiration for Rinzai as a radical philosopher, he immediately retreats, as a show of deference to his interlocutor, back to the default position of national institutions of translation: "I read the French translation by Professor Demiéville, who is an excellent French specialist on Buddhism." *French* translations and *French* specialists, to which we must also add *French* philosophers, the universalism of which (and critiques thereof) relies upon a division of labor thoroughly supervised by the regime of homolingual translation. It is in response to this remark that one of the Japanese monks facing Foucault advances the thesis, held by "Chinese specialists," that Zen is thoroughly *Chinese*. With this exchange, the suturing of enunciative positions and communicational totalities is complete, thereby erasing the moment of address. This moment is emblematic of the entire modern regime of translation spanning the difference between colonial and imperial modernities. What is lost is the fact that the generality of address itself, the very capability of address as such, precedes the assignation of enunciative positions. Perhaps this is the reason why Rinzai is especially well-known, within the Zen school, for his practice of striking the befuddled student: striking is to aiming as communication is to address. For, "addressing does not guarantee the message's arrival at the destination. Thus, 'we" as a pronominal invocation in *address* designates a relation, which is performative in nature, independent of whether or not "we" actually communicate the same information."[26]

In the figure of Demiéville, the *French* specialist of *Oriental* thought, we have the typical sort of body favored by the modern disciplines of the Human Sciences: this is the *body of knowledge*, a system of regularized dispersion, precisely the sort of power-knowledge configuration at which Foucault aimed. The study of these figures and their historicity is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari call "noology" — the way in which the "image" or figure of the body of knowledge, as an instance of the State-form in thought, is marked by an historical transition from the philosopher to the sociologist.[27] We are interested here in the way these figures are in fact co-figured with other figures, with the way the idealized Western reader is co-figured with the area studies specialist, and distributed spatially. It is well known that knowledge in the Human Sciences has been deeply intertwined with national sovereignty and language in the modern period. Just as social divisions created by uneven global development have been encoded in very specific and profound ways into the structure of knowledge, both in terms of disciplinary divisions as well as in terms of the legitimate objects, methods, and theses that compose each discipline, so the meanings of these divisions have been further refracted by the crystallization of nationalized language that has governed the production, dissemination, and reception of knowledge — indeed, the very criteria of truth — in the age of the single world. In short, the Human Sciences as they have developed bear within them — structurally, ideologically, linguistically, and philosophically — the presuppositions of "world history" configured through both sovereignty and colonialism.[28]

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By now it is clear why we had to take our point of departure from an analytic of Foucault's Occidentalism. Not only Foucault himself but also Zen monks and an area specialist commentator, François Jullien, all operate in the regime of co-figuration that inevitably erases the moments of social relation and construes the dialogue exclusively in communication between fixed subject positions ordered by the homolingual address and localized by spatial representation. Supposedly most sensitive to the perils of reified self-hood, the participants of this dialogue nonetheless are content to fashion themselves as national and civilizational subjects. In accordance with their retrospectively constituted identities, they

produce a neat configuration of power-knowledge, according to which the West and the Rest, France and Japan, and white and non-white appear to continue to map the world and the disciplinary classification of knowledge.[29]

The metaphysics of translation evinced in Foucault's "Zen dialogue" by the figure of the area studies specialist marries geo-political regions of the globe to disciplinary divisions in the construction of knowledge. Our name for this joint matrix, the recursive admixtures of world and thought, is the *amphibological region*, a name inspired by François Laruelle's non-philosophy.[30] Typical modernist formulations such as German Romanticism, Chinese Confucianism, and American Pragmatism, would all be examples of the amphibological region, as would the personalities populating it, such as *French* specialists of *Oriental* works (or, quite simply, *French* specialists of *French* works in a world system organized around geopolitical divisions of work). In Foucault's Zen dialogue, the amphibological region is at all times present, no moment being clearer than at the closing section of the interview in which Foucault describes Europe both as a definite geographical region and as a universal category of thought through which categories themselves appear. As such, the amphibological region corresponds exactly to what Foucault, in *The Order of Things* (*Les mots et les choses*), calls the "empirico-transcendental doublet"[31] that characterizes the emergence of Man as both subject and object of (self-)knowledge in the modern period. The amphibological region is, thus, precisely, the quintessential bio-political habitat corresponding to Foucault's modern Man.[32]

The philosopher who is neither a school-builder nor a translator is thus the "philosopher" — if that term is still appropriate — who is no longer concerned with regulating the heterogeneity of world and text through the regime of homolingual translation. In the Zen dialogue, Foucault finds a hint of this precisely in the "experience" of Zen, which is for him in this instance, largely concerned with a new set of relationships concerning the body, or again, the body as an exposed site of relationship. Jullien, a reader whose compelling attentiveness is matched only by a propensity to squander the transformative opportunities that lie therein, seizes upon the ineluctable meaning of this experience, particularly as Foucault's account of it stimulates only a response of silence from Zen monk Omori. Yet the depth of Jullien's observations fall short of calling our attention to the potential significance of Foucault's inscription of the body as an alternative to "philosophy" understood as schools of national translation.[33]

Let us echo Foucault's concern for a philosophy of the future, which we might as well call "the dislocation of the West," by outlining a project that aims to develop a comprehensive theory of translation that would simultaneously address both: (a) a notion of democratic translational practice that replaces the sovereignty of "bodies of knowledge" (typically codified as different regions/nations of the world and their corresponding area studies) with the sociality of "knowledgeable bodies"; and (b) a corresponding reorganization of the Human Sciences based upon a democratic notion of humanity as a transcendental multitude of foreigners-without-the-foreign.[34] Here, it is important to note, we are advocating neither the rise or decline of the West nor the universalization or provincialization of it; neither does our project amount to the disowning of heritage from the past. At the demise of the regime of national translation and under the heterolingual address, it would be very obvious that the West cannot be referred to even in the trope of an organic unity that grows or languishes. Ours is to dislodge the West from the racist logic of homosociality and relocate identity in a non-relational form (Me and the Foreigner are identical in-the-last-instance) that would enable the immense diversity of minor politics and syncretic knowledge. Yet, our task of the dislocation of the West is not easy at all.

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We might as well have titled this volume of *Traces* "Sovereign Police, Global Complicity: a Biopolitics of Translation and Colonial Difference." It will come as no surprise to many that we associate the theme of complicity first and foremost with the role played by the nation-States in their world system as it has been developing over the past four centuries[35]. While the rise of contemporary technologies of "securidentity" certainly trace their roots to techniques of government advanced by the metropolitan imperial nations — what Michel Foucault calls "governmentality" — there is great need to reread that history, like the history of Liberalism itself, through the experience of the populations in the colonies. In this respect, we cannot afford to continue to indulge ourselves in Occidentalism. Just as the canonization of English literature as a colonial measure in British India was "imported" back into England in order to mask an ideology of class,[36] the roots of governmentality will, we can expect, one day be found to lie in the exceptional practices of colonial administration (vis-à-vis the normative

position accorded to "civil society" within the framework of imperialism). The United States of America have undoubtedly embarked on a course that can only further aggravate this history. The unilateral violence of U.S. imperial nationalism is certainly a grave threat to people around the globe (including, of course, people in the United States), yet we would deny ourselves the chance of finding a real identity for the multitude of foreigners if we let the explosions of U.S. unilateralism blind us from noticing how the nation-States together codify a profound form of unilateral power (now exemplified by the apparatus of "securidentity") across the social field. The unilateralism inherent in governmentality as such, only apparently less urgent than that currently exercised by the U.S.A., cannot simply be described through the model of coercion, unless we redefine "coercion" to include the competition instituted by the world-systemic form itself. Indeed, the entire problem of "governmentality" begins, for Foucault, in the Liberal critique of state intervention.[37] Behind the humanist faces of national independence, self-determination, resistance to cultural homogenization, rights and law, we must see how the nation-State itself is intrinsically designed as a transcendental form of quasi-permanent unilateralism in which all nation-States are complicit. From this perspective, the challenge ahead of us is to bring the issue of coercion back into a broader analytic that tries to explain why such institutions and states of domination are such an attractive place for foreigners in the first place?

The global analytic of complicity we propose does not mean that we close our eyes to the actual and highly fluid differences of power between the obviously unequal nation-States and the various populations circuiting through them.[38] This is the Foucauldian perspective of biopolitics, which distinguishes states of domination and the techniques of government that institutionalize and sustain those states from the ebb-and-flow of power-and-play in everyday life that Foucault calls strategic relations. The imperative to national subjective formation, the imperative to form a majoritarian project, to appropriate the minority positions in a state of domination sustained by the communicational techniques of a unitary "voice of the people" and an authoritative "body of knowledge"...*this* sort of unilateralism has proven to be far more durable than the national social projects of any single nation.

In order to understand why democratic nations repeatedly move, in a relatively short space of time, in and out of quasi-fascistic political formations, we need to start accounting for the recursive circuits cycling *between* three very different

series, or subsets, of the problem. The divisions are well-known; let us simply summarize them here: first, of course, there is the structural or national series (gender difference, labor difference, and linguistico-ethnic difference); then the systemic series (sovereignty, the West-and-the-Rest, and empire); and finally the political economy series (labor, value, and time). The fascinating debates now raging within the fields of sociology and international relations over the role played by the United States in the current conjuncture generally advance their arguments — a kind of moral posturing — by opening up the contingency of elements in one series only to reify elements in another series. They cannot adequately deal — i.e., in relational fashion — with the fluidity of and between the basic categories such as gender, class, ethnicity, race, geographic region, and civilization. This kind of disciplinary short-circuiting is not only a good sign that entirely new categories of analysis aiming at multiple levels are needed, it also serves as an important clue to understanding how fascist formations, be they colonial or imperial, repeatedly arise. Between the three major subsets of the political problem that creates the conditions for fascism lies a hidden, recursive circuit.

In spite of the attention given to the innumerable forms of hybridity and differences that pre-exist in the contemporary circuits of migration, exchange, and cooperative networking, we continue to see a majoritarian consolidation of "culture" as a kind of fossilized artifact. Needless to say, nationalization is not just a process of "reduction" (as it was termed by the nineteenth-century Spanish colonial administration in the Philippines) conducted upon disparate elements of territory, market, and ethnicity; it also retroactively creates knowledge, bodies, and life. The archive, the language, the culture and the history — in short, the modern fetishization of "communicable experience" — are as much sites of primitive accumulation for the construction of majoritarian subjects of domination as are the modes of production and labor for Capital. Would the usage of terms such as "accumulation" and "exchange" thus suggest their meaning be extended to a metaphorical, or perhaps even literary, sense? Evidently not. The benefits of such accumulation (what Jason Read calls "the real subsumption of subjectivity by Capital"[39]) exclusively accrue to actual, authoritative bodies of knowledge. These bodies are the ones that "speak" the unitary language. Such authoritative bodies could be either people or institutions; in either case, they are the forms of relation regularized according to the apparently natural boundaries of "the

individual" and its corollary, the collective. So much has already been written about the process of extreme abstraction required to sustain the premise of the "individual," one might think it unnecessary to repeat it here: the real site of metaphorical excess, when it comes to the authoritative body, is actually to be found in abstractions such as the individual speaking subject and the nationalization of her language.

Nothing sustains and typifies the transcendental representations managed by these authorities, these majoritarian bodies of knowledge, more than the tandem notions of the West-as-a-normative-value and of Modernity-as-an-unfinished-project. Taken together, these two axes form a grid of global proportions along which the microgradient of majority/minority relations is continually plotted. Undoubtedly, herein lies the key to a minoritarian analytic and a new interdisciplinary syncretism on a global scale. But can we really assume the consistency and indexical veracity of the map onto which such positions are plotted?

We all know the story of anti-Eurocentrism, according to which the minoritarian critique of Western hegemony in the context of the (post)colonial nation sustains the critical shock to the "Western" majority formation. By transposing it into a local register, the critique of Eurocentrism becomes a good rhetoric for the elite, whose subjectivity is partly formed in their systemic competition with "the West" through the structural (class) accumulation of value by the labor of their social inferiors. Similarly, the majoritarian dispensation of respect for minoritarian difference short-circuits the possibility of recoding relations on a completely different terrain. The dialectical form of this relation is well known: apparently free, the position coded Master suffers from its actual bondage to the labor of the Slave; the position coded Slave, however, dreams of nothing if not the chance of assuming, finally for itself, the magisterial height of the Master — without realizing that the Master position is always already deprived from the very outset of the possibility of being simply for itself. Certainly the first step out of this aporia is to admit that the very split between the two distinct forms of modernity — the imperial modernity and the colonial modernity — is itself the very definition of something like Modernity in general in the constitution of the hierarchical, non-democratic world of Capital. Even in their very opposition, both the colonial modernity and the imperial modernity are bound to a common index, the normative value of the West, the supposed naturalness of which

obfuscates a state of domination. This sleight of hand is accomplished, as always, by the form of an exception. Indeed, as deconstruction has never tired of showing, the dialectical subject *of* history excepts itself *from* history (without taking exception *to* history), thereby eliding the continual presence, or "trace," of third-term "exteriorities" (supplements, exclusions, and displacements).

It is precisely because we look at what we are calling, in an inevitable moment of pure jargon, "traces" or "exteriorities" that we avoid falling into the either/or formalisms of signifying chains and political economy. Instead, we want to draw links between exteriority in the sense described above and the notion of externality utilized by economists. "Externality" names any situation in which the action of two parties (be they friends or enemies) to an exchange (verbal, economic, military, etc.) affects, either positively or negatively, a third party not directly participating in the exchange of the other two. Clearly, this notion of externality could also be applied to the position of the translator as it has been described in the modern, homosocial regime of translation. In the intercourse between nation-States, we will want to know who are the "third parties" affected by their complicity? Will these "third parties" be easily recognizable in the same way as the "speaking subjects" and "legal persons" taken to be constitutive of the nation? Evidently, the answer is negative. Just as the border between two physically adjacent countries does not in itself form a positive space, but is the negative condition for the creation of the national interiorities on both sides of the line; we would expect that these "third parties" would also be found in the silent, stuttering and/or interrupted interstices between the talking subjects and authoritative bodies typically supported by the nation-States.

The attempt to "regularize" the status of these interstitial spaces, even when propelled by good intentions, inevitably has profound implications across the social field — including, of course, the speaking subjects provisionally sustained by the nation-State. It is a truism to say that we are living a time when the previous forms of exteriority and externality are in crisis or have collapsed completely, while new forms proliferate. The development of the systemic integration now culminating in "globalization" is one of the most visible effects of this massive reorganization of exteriority. With the implosion of "unexplored" space, the extension of the comity of nations across the face of the globe, the supplement of exteriority known as "civilizational difference" (the economy of spatialized lawlessness that defined the West by separating its competitive rule of law from

a non-West available for lawless, infinite violence) has reached a point of crisis. Elements associated with "Western modernity" can now be found in places that have conventionally been excluded from "the West" — often in forms that are more authentic than what is found in the West itself. At the moment when the global expansion of the two universal forms of Capitalism — the commodity and the nation-State — is finally complete, such civilizational distinctions appear, historically for the first time, as what they essentially are: void of any specific content, and thus, absolutely ideological. No longer is there any ground whatsoever to substantiate the distinction between the West and the Rest. Or, to put it differently, it is no longer possible to continue to disavow that the West is floating and dispersing (with the tides of domination); but it is equally important to note that the West is *not* declining. Hence, our project of the dislocation of the West. No wonder we have seen, in the supposed age of the decline of sovereignty, a call by right-wing thinkers to reinstitute the axis of civilizational difference at the heart of global security management. Since the sovereign nation-State system was initially developed, with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), at the inaugural period of the imperial-colonial era when the world was divided into two realms, one governed by international laws (the West) and one exposed to the discretion of colonial powers (the Rest),[40] it is no wonder that a breakdown in the apparatus of sovereignty would produce shock waves in the lines of civilizational difference, and vice-versa. Civilizational difference has from the very outset performed the role of a necessary supplement required by sovereignty's impossible quotient of interior consistency.

It is crucial to understand that the apparatus of sovereignty does not initially concern the national space, which is primarily structured by the markers of social distinctions such as class, but concerns first and foremost the international space of a world system. Hence, the relative erosion of sovereignty seen in the transnational flows of global cities does not indicate that the system of sovereignty has diminished; it has simply mutated. It is for this reason that the sovereignty of the nation-State seeks its legitimacy in the discrete imposition of exclusionary rules upon migrants entering its territory and in xenophobia.

We are witness to an age when the toxic waste of sovereignty's implosion is leaching into the very ground on which sovereignty was supposedly constructed — the idea of the nation as a form of organic life. Even as the transnational flows of Capital erode the juridico-institutional form of the nation-State, it continues to

be progressively consolidated at a biopolitical level.[41] The nation-State has become a complex form of "life support system." While it positively manages the "life" of the population concerned, it also simultaneously exercises fundamental constraints upon the bodies passing through it, inciting some theorists to ask whether the modern nation-State (and sovereignty) ought not to be understood in relation to the political experience of the "camp"?[42] Needless to say, these "life support systems" serve to manage labor — the one commodity that Capital, until now, has been unable to produce — yet in so doing, they also engender the formation of specific kinds of subjectivity.

In order to understand this change, we will have to chart out the new itineraries and new forms of "exteriority" being posited today, against which "life" is supposed to be a natural given. As the connection between *form-of-life* and *form-of-law* begins to completely coincide, "biopower" assumes position as the major political arena. In a series of public lectures in the late seventies on the birth of biopolitics, Foucault distinguishes the biopolitical problematic that emerges in the eighteenth century from the problems of government in the preceding period and understands it as a modification of "pastoral power." The term "sovereign police," first coined by Giorgio Agamben, an astute philosopher of biopolitics, is of course a combination joining the two forms of state reason that preceded the biopolitical project. As a form of juridical discourse on legitimacy, sovereignty was originally theorized as a form of external limitation upon the power of the monarch. As the obverse complement to this external power, the State deployed a police authority that was naturally external to the people who were its object. In both instances, the composition of State power was conceived or enabled through the application of limitations that were extrinsic by design. With the advent of modern theories of political economy in the context of Liberalism, however, a new series of objects and techniques were enabled, the aim of which was to render the principle of governance completely intrinsic and self-contained. This intrinsic principle was that of a maximal–minimal quotient of efficiency (or intensity) extending, eventually, far beyond the classical concerns of labor and Capital to include all aspects of the social and private body. It displaced the previous forms of sovereign law and police state without, however, eliminating them.

Even as Liberalism's seemingly inexorable expansion has freed more and more spaces from the subservience to sovereign power, the productive power of life itself has become more and more the focus of governmental activity such

that the forms of sovereignty and police can now be found in a micro-politics of "life." Foucault implicitly warns against optimism (induced, for instance, by the transformation of sovereignty) when he speaks of an "indispensable hypoderm" complementing the face of power. Foucault is certainly not calling for a metaphysics of the deep, of underlying essence here. The entire style he developed, first archaeological and then genealogical, was motivated, as he continually emphasized, not by an interest in "the way things were, " but rather out of concern for "our immediate and concrete actuality."[43] In other words, Foucault was interested in how the praxis of knowing creates not objects of knowledge, but new subjectivities (which might not be simply subjects of knowledge).

Although "the life" is supposed to be given as an inalienable right at an absolute remove from the purchase of sovereign power, it paradoxically has become invested with sovereign forms. Today, nationalized forms of life (notably "culture" and "language") are still proposed as the "hypoderm" of which Foucault spoke, a substratum or accumulation that supposedly underlies or girds the massive variations in the actual forms of life disclosed by the globalization of Capital. What if the "hypoderm" were not the internal well-spring of national culture, but rather the effect of Capital's increasing penetration? In marked contrast to the great triptych of contemporary social analysis, gender-race-and-class, culture and language are completely occult in their hypodermic status. Nothing exemplifies this situation better than the global index of whiteness today. Formerly one of the world's most highly mobile, diasporic populations, the white population around the globe today has entered a period of amazing fixity on the one hand, and of fluidity on the other; a period of fixity in which "white" bodies are regarded as the most stationary and the least capable of transforming themselves; it is however, also a period of fluidity in which whiteness constantly shifts and transforms depending on the conditions of the social formation. But, precisely because of this apparent fluidity, the obsessive insistence upon whiteness and the efforts to naturalize it have never been more prevalent than today, and whiteness is more frequently than before fantasized by the white themselves as immobile fixity — much like that formerly ascribed, by white colonists, to the indigenous. Is this not what the current notion of "homeland security" aims for? Yet how can one not see such "native preserves" as a kind of biopolitical camp into which precarious labor herds itself in the meager hopes of survival?

In order to bring what may be the most compelling and ubiquitous forms of nationalization left today — those concerning "life" — into the realm of a creative minoritarian resistance that does not aim to "take power" through civil war or "balance power" through sovereign complicity, but rather aims for an entirely different form of social organization, we need to begin by charting out the ways in which forms such as "culture" and "language" typical of nationalized "life" have been formed in the crucible that joins the commodity to the national subject. Communication surely is the ideology of Capital, but this alliance rests on a biopolitics. Even as "life" stripped of any qualifications other than "existence" has become the paramount, universal form of the humanitarian rejection of violence, it paradoxically continues to function as a strategic, necessary tool in the unlimited extension of that violent power. Through the category of "life," the sovereign police try to manage, now quite violently, a series of strategic externalities that amount, finally, to the institution of a highly mobile gradient of majoritarian authority all around the globe. This majoritarian authority should undoubtedly be called the "West." Yet in the familiar series of equal signs that describe its tautological movement (e.g., white = male = Christian = european language = white, etc.), the meaning of the "West" in all historical specificity must be measured against an actual constitutive process that reveals it to be, time and again, so highly arbitrary that it is in fact actually void of any specific content. This is why there is no hope for finding any ground to substantiate the difference of the West and the Rest. The only thing it really names, in the end, is what might be called, paraphrasing Hegel, the bad infinity (of a relation ill-conceived).

Global complicity is obviously, thus, first and foremost, a form of bad cooperation, a form through which Capital appropriates the very solidarities and networks that determine its madly rational mutations. For this very reason, it is imperative to stress, from the outset, that we are not the least bit interested in an analytic of complicity that could be used, in the style of a "political correctness" inquisition, to absolve our friends and damn our enemies. Quite the opposite, what we are aiming to problematize here are the specific forms of exteriority and externality inhabiting the widest possible variety of subjective practices. Ultimately, the minoritarian analytic is not at all concerned with codifications and classifications in the order of knowledge. Although these are necessary, and cannot be compromised, their sole purpose is in the constitution of new human subjects.

Far too many of the figures proffered today to populations around the globe as the objects of collective dream and desire — or simply as the form of recognition that has become a prerequisite to such dreams — are nothing but rehashed versions of yesterday's imperial identities, many of which exist only as the spectral others of Modernity (i.e., the premodern). This is the form of subjectivity that is really but a state of domination rather than an active participation in the guidance and development of strategic relations. If contemporary sociology thinks of nothing but an analytic of risk, this is surely the indication, as Maurizio Lazzarato points out,[44] of a massive inability to conceive of invention at the level of the subject. It is only when the possibility of creating something new as a form of *becoming* has been denied (or has been itself absorbed into a predetermined set of targets or destinations) that the question of agency becomes reduced to a calculus of loss and gain. Needless to say, the very notion of a "society of risk" thus formulated would necessarily be unable to avoid complete penetration by the apparatus of governmentality.

With this issue of *Traces*, we originally proposed to prospective authors (cf. the call for papers in the appendix) the idea of bringing *translation* squarely into a politically informed discussion about the production of social relations in much the same way that labor has occupied a central place for theorists since Hegel and Marx. The modern regime of translation is a concrete form of "systemic complicity." In other words, it is a globally applicable technique of domination aimed at managing social relationships by forcing them to pass through circuits on the systemic level (such as national sovereignty). In our research on the transnational discursive structure of both Japanese studies and the institution of the Japanese Emperor system,[45] or again in the relation between imperial nationalism and the maintenance of ethnic minorities,[46] we were persuaded that the geography of national sovereignty and civilizational difference indicates an important kind of subjective technology or governmental technique that has, until recently, been thoroughly naturalized by an anthropological discourse of culture. It is only today that we can begin to see how a multiplicity of disciplinary arrangements forming an economy of translation (in place since the colonial era but far outliving colonialism's demise) actually produces differentially coded subjects, typically national ones, whose constitution is interdependent and, at specific intervals, actually complicit in a single, yet extremely hierarchical, state of domination. Our aim was thus to trace a series of genealogies within which

"translation" is no longer seen as simply an operation of transfer, relay, and equivalency, but rather assumes a vital historical role akin to that played by labor in the constitution of the social.

Like labor, language is a potentially totalizing category that concerns not just a specific activity but a form of social praxis that produces, or at least binds, the production of the world and the self. Like labor, language could easily be seen as something that is not the exclusive purchase of the individual, but an essential part of humanity in general (without which any notion of "humanity in general" would necessarily presuppose a sort of global "final solution" leading up to "the last man"). Finally, like labor, language appears to call into question the meaning of repetition and singularity.

Our research into the position of the translator within the modern regime of cofigured, nationalized language, shows a precise parallel to the logic of sovereignty itself. Just as Giorgio Agamben has shown how the logic of sovereignty is based on the form of exception (embodied by the figure of the sovereign), the position of the translator has been represented in a similarly exceptional fashion. Our work has turned this relationship inside out, demonstrating that the regularity of the "national language" as a formation in which the (hybrid) position of the translator has been deemed irrelevant is in fact produced only after the subjective encounter of social difference in translation (or in any social situation in which communication might fail). By proposing to look at the formation of national language through the exceptional position of the translator, we have been able to show that it is indeed a systemic, or transnational, technique of domination. This discovery parallels the growing awareness, largely advanced by Yann Moulier Boutang, of the crucial role in Capitalist expansion played by the various forms of slave labor, rather than the regularized forms of wage labor.[47] Hence, at the back of the call for papers for this issue was a proposal to displace the state of domination managed by the dual normalizing technologies of wage labor and nationalized speaking subjects with the inventive subjectivities seen in the exodus from wage labor and national language.

The similarities between the logic of slave labor upon which wage labor secretly rests and the regime of translation upon which national language is secretly built are profound. In both instances the action of a subject (translation or labor) expresses itself in an object (the work) that is thought to define the generic form of human activity itself. As such, both have potentially political implications, yet

are most often associated with the pure economy of exchange. How we propose to look at this exchange, of course, determines the space we accord to individual autonomy and agency. Yet, according to an all-too-familiar reification, the creative potential of human activity is admitted in the constructivist account of social formation only to be turned into an objectivized thing, a series of institutions or objective realities that recursively constrain the way subjects actually work, limiting the power of invention to specific disciplinary rules. Just as the Marxian critique of the commodity fetish proposed to remind us that the fruits of labor, now reified, actually bear within them the trace of a social relation (and hence the possibility of creative transformation), we advance the thesis that translation can also be understood as form of social relation requiring similar critique. In effect, translation appears to us as the social relation from which the critique of communication as the ideology of Capital is most directly linked to a politics of life, or again, the politics in which life becomes invested by Capital.

Notes

[1] Cf. *Traces* Prospectus.

[2] This remark may be misunderstood. For example, Tanabe Hajime's *Zange-dô no Tetsugaku* (*Philosophy as Metanoia*, Takeuchi Yoshinori and James W. Heisig trans. with foreward by James W. Heisig (Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 1990) has been translated into English, but it was precisely in the spirit of the civilizational difference, characteristic of the U.S. sovereignty in postwar East Asia (and the postwar Japanese resentment to it), that this work of translation was framed and exercised. It ignores not only Tanabe's previous philosophical work devoted to the cause of Japanese Imperial Nationalism to which *Zange-dô no Tetsugaku* is intimately connected but also to the fact that translation was already an essential element in his philosophical enterprise.

[3] Cf. Peter Button, *Aesthetic Formation and the Image of Modern China: The Philosophical Aesthetics of Cai Yi*, Ph.D. thesis , Cornell University, 2000.

[4] Cf. Takeuchi Yoshimi, tr. & ed. Richard Calichman, *What is Modernity? Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004))

[5] Michel Foucault, tr. Christian Polac, *"Michel Foucault et le zen: un séjour dans un temple zen,"* in Michel Foucault, *Dits et Écrits II, 1976–1988* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 618–624. English translation: Michel Foucault, tr. Richard Townsend, "Michel Foucault and Zen: a stay in a Zen temple (1978)," in Jeremy R. Carrette, ed., *Religion and Culture/by Michel Foucault* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 110–114. Footnote references to the dialogue will henceforth be marked by *ZD* ("Zen dialogue"), followed by two numbers referring to paginations in the French and English texts, respectively. The Japanese translation was not available to us at the time this text was composed. Parts

of this argument have been published in Chinese as Su Zhean (Jon Solomon), *"Weilai de Zhexue: Lun Fuke de Xifangzhuyi yu Fanyi Wenti* [Philosophy of the Future: Foucault's Occidentalism and the Problem of Translation]," in Huang Jui-chyi, ed., *Zaijian Fuke* [Revisiting Foucault] (Taipei: Sunghui, 2005).

[6] Including Omori Sogen; significantly, the others are not named.

[7] François Jullien, Thierry Marchaisse, *Penser d'un dehors (la Chine)[Thinking from outside (China)]* (Paris: Seuil, 2000), 17. Abbreviated *JM*.

[8] "What is equally curious is that Foucault plays to the hilt here — and indeed throughout his interview — upon the grand oppositions and the grand habitual baggage: world-thought, East-West, etc." *JM*, 18.

[9] Cf. the second half of Jacques Derrida, *Du droit à la philosophie* (Paris: Galilée, 1990), tr. Jan Plug et. al., *Eyes of the University* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2004).

[10] *ZD*, 619/111.

[11] Naoki Sakai, *Translation and Subjectivity: On "Japan" and Cultural Nationalism* (Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1997), 6. Hereafter abbreviated *TS*.

[12] Homosociality here refers to the mode of communal solidarity that is obtained by the boundary of distinction. The assumed homogeneity of the inside is no other than an effect of the erection or marking of distinction by which the outside is posited and excluded. Let us take the example of a xenophobic joke: this sort of joke isolates certain foreigners as an object of laughter, and against this object "we," who are distinguished from "them" by virtue of the fact that "we" can laugh at "them," are consolidated as a community. Laughter serves as the act of the marking of distinction, which gathers "us" together. This use of homosociality should not be confused with the well-known one by Eve K. Sedgwick.

[13] Jean-Luc Nancy, tr. Peter Conner, et al., *The Inoperative Community* (Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1991), 3. Cf. Su Zhean (Jon Solomon), *"Fanyi de gongtongti, gongtongti de fanyi* [Translation of Community, Community of Translation]" preface to Shang-Luke, Nongxi (Jean-Luc Nancy), tr. Su Zhean (Jon Solomon) *Jiegou Gongtongti* [La Communauté désoeuvrée] (Taipei: Laureate Books, 2003), I–XV.

[14] *TS*, 7.

[15] Cf. Michel Foucault, *"La pensée du dehors"* in *Critique* 229 (June 1966), pp. 523–546. Tr. Brian Massumi, "The Thought of the Outside" in Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, eds., *The Essential Foucault* (New York, New Press, 2003) 423–441.

[16] Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, "The philosophical requirement of hermeneutics is, thus, one that concerns preliminary faith, that is to say, a precomprehensive anticipation of that very thing which is the question to be comprehended, or the question which comprehension must finally command." *Le partage des voix*, (Paris: Galilée, 1982) p. 17; tr. Gayle Ormiston, Gayle Ormiston and Alan Schrift, eds., *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context* (Albany: SUNY, 1990), 213, translation slightly modified.

[17] *TS*, 9.

[18] *JM*, 26. The locution is undoubtedly intended as a pun. The phrase *"C'est du chinois"* has a general meaning like the English phrase, "It's all Greek to me", in which the appellation *"chinois"* is to be understood in a general, rather than specific, way referring

to incomprehensibility. Obviously, the meaning here cannot be dissociated from Chinese in all its specificity (otherwise the pun itself would not function as such), hence our literal translation.

[19] *JM*, 9. Emphasis in original.

[20] Address "precedes" communication only if we allow that its "coming first" (*pre-*) occurs only by having already given "itself" up (*cedere*). Communication is thus "ex-posed" by address: it is simultaneously revealed and displaced.

[21] *JM*, 14. Emphasis in original.

[22] *ZD*, 624/114.

[23] Refers to the school of interpretation of Confucian texts initiated by the Cheng brothers (Cheng Hao, 1032–1085, and Cheng Yi, 1033–1107) and Zhu Xi (1130–1200).

[24] Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Le Sens du monde* (Paris: Galilée, 1993), 15; tr. Jeffrey Librett, *The Sense of the World* (Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1997), 5: "Consequently, when I say that the end of the world is the end of the *mundus*, this cannot mean that we are confronted merely with the end of a certain 'conception' of the world, and that we would have to go off in search of another one or to restore another one (or the same). It means, rather, that there is no longer any assignable signification of 'world,' or that the 'world' is subtracting itself, bit by bit, from the entire regime of signification available to us..."

[25] Deconstruction largely set the stage for a growing body of work exploring this matrix, what we call "the national institution of translation," particularly in relation to German philosophy. Cf. the pivotal role — unthematized — of translation in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's *La Fiction du Politique* (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1987), tr. Chris Turner, *Heidegger, Art and Politics — the Fiction of the Political* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990); the works of Antoine Berman, *L'épreuve de l'étranger* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), tr. S. Heyvaert, *The Experience of the Foreign — Culture and Translation in Romantic Germany* (Albany: SUNY, 1992); and *La traduction et la lettre ou l'auberge du lointain* (Paris: L'ordre philosophique, 1999); and Sathya Rao, *Philosophies et non-philosophie de la traduction*, thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, University of Paris X, Nanterre, March 2003.

[26] *TS*, 4–5.

[27] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Milles Plateaux* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1980), 466; tr. Brian Massumi, *A Thousand Plateaus* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1987), 376. Brian Holmes's brilliant critique of the "flexible personality" behind Cultural Studies suggests ways in which the figure of the sociologist (previously critiqued by the Frankfurt School notion of "the authoritarian personality") is undergoing historical metamorphosis. Cf. Brian Holmes, "The Flexible Personality — for a new cultural critique" in Brian Holmes, *Hieroglyphs of the Future — art and politics in a networked era* (Paris/Zagreb: What, How and For Whom and arkzin.communications, 2003), 106–137.

[28] Jon Solomon, tr. Frédéric Neyrat and Jerôme Maucourant, "La traduction métaphysicoloniale et les Sciences Humaines: la région amphibologique comme lieu biopolitique [Metaphysicolonial translation and the Human Sciences: the amphibological region as biopolitical site]," *Rue Descartes* No. 48 (Paris: PUF, 2004).

[29] Jon Solomon, tr. Brian Holmes, Bérénice Angremy, François Matheron, Charles Wolfe, "L'empire et le régime de la traduction unilatérale," [Empire and the regime of unilateral translation]" in *Multitudes* (Paris: Exils), Numéro 13 (2003), 79–88. Also in Italian as: tr. Federica Matteoni, "Impero e il regime della traduzione unilaterale: un dibattito a Taiwan," in *DeriveApprodi* No. 23 (2003), 155–159.

[30] The classic example, in philosophical terms, of an "amphiboly" is, of course, found in the common theoretical premise that secretly joins Materialism to Idealism. Foucault recognized that this amphibological problem would find its apex in the figure of "modern Man," who oscillates between transcendental and empirical positions. While deconstructive philosophy excels at demonstrating the indecidability of the terms, it still cannot explain why the typical formula, "the real = X," always comprises some sort of recursivity between the terms, nor, for that matter, why Science has no need for the Concept. In Laruelle's "non-philosophy" (which holds for us the prospect of being the sort of philosophy-of-the-future for which Foucault calls), amphibological figures such as "the concept of Man" or "the theory of X" are structured by an economy of Decision that invariably relies upon a combination of two-and-a-half or three terms (i. e., the terms of a dyad, such as "theory" and "matter", plus a synthetic term, such as man-the-sociologist, which is the reflection of one or both of the terms of the dyad). The problem of "philosophical Decision" in Laruelle's account covers the entirety of the recursive relation between philosophy and the real in which either empirical forms surreptitiously become the basis for transcendental postulates or transcendental forms are installed as the basis for empirical judgments. Laruelle's non-philosophy is not a form of deconstruction that plays upon undecidability to destabilize metaphysical presuppositions, but is rather a rigorous critique of idealist materialism from the point of view of the non-relational Identity of the Real, which has the specific structure of determination-in-the-last-instance. Cf. François Laruelle, *Principe de Minorité* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1981), part of which has been translated into English: François Laruelle, tr. Ray Brassier, "The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter," in *Pli* Vol. 12 (2001), 33–40.

[31] Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses — une archéologie des sciences* humaines (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 329; The *Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage, 1971), 312.

[32] Edward Soja's erudite argument for a postmodern geography astutely dilates Foucault's apprehension of the amphibological nature of spatiality, yet Soja's fecund materialist understanding of spatiality still cannot avoid repeating the hermeneutic circle ("As a social product, spatiality is simultaneously the medium and outcome, presupposition and embodiment, of social action and relationship." (Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies — the reassertion of space in critical theory* (London: Verso, 1989), 129). No wonder Soja characterizes Foucault's vision of spatiality as "ambivalent." Evidently, the amphibolies discovered by Foucault appear "ambivalent" only when seen from the indecision of philosophy, including its materialist variant. Here, we cannot elaborate an alternative concept of the region that is not based on the traditional amphibological determination, both transcendental and immanent, of "being" + "at" + "there." We are

merely concerned with Foucault's inability to open up the problem of amphibological spatiality in relation to the location of the West, evinced in a 1976 interview between Foucault and specialists in the discipline of geography. Cf. "Questions à Michel Foucault sur la géographie," in *Dits et Écrits II* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001) 28–40; tr. Colin Gordon, "Questions on Geography" in C. Gordon, ed., *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 63–77. In this interview, Foucault is confronted by geographers concerned over his general deployment of spatial tropes and metaphors along with a studious avoidance of the terms of geography per se. His interlocutors offer a challenge: "Your domains of reference are alternately Christendom, the Western world, Northern Europe and France, without these spaces of reference ever really being justified or specified" (31/67). Foucault cursorily defends his approach, as Soja points out, by "reassert[ing] the spatiality of power/knowledge" (Soja, *op. cit.*, 20). Here we simply want to show that Foucault's notion of power/knowledge as spatiality must be turned, not, as the geographers imply, towards a new, more precise definition of the location of the West, nor even towards the marvelous, infinite dispersion of locality championed by Soja, but by moving in the direction of a new conception of "totality," such as Foucault seems to have intended for the concept of discourse. Needless to say, this "totality" would need to be defined in a rigorously democratic, non-hierarchical way with the sort of extreme care displayed by Laruelle's concept of determination-in-the-last-instance. Cf. François Laruelle, *Introduction au non-marxisme* (Paris: Actuel Marx, 2000), 39–56.

[33] We would like to advance a formula that would highlight the radical transition implicitly suggested by Foucault's future philosophy: *Whereas philosophy in its most general form as a pretense of knowing the real* (either in terms of a materialist identification of the real with matter or a phenomenological identification of the real with the phenomenon) *produces Bodies of Knowledge that Capitalize upon the amphibological regions of the World* (understood, in philosophical fashion of course, as given), *a non-philosophy of the future begins, without donation or essence, from the identity of the multitude as foreigner.* According to this non-philosophy, "Me and the Foreigner are identical," but this identity is only to be determined "in-the-last-instance" — before which point the two are radically (i.e., unilaterally) distinguished. Cf. François Laruelle, *Théorie des Étrangers* (Paris: Kimé, 1996), 159–169.

[34] The term "foreigner-without-the-foreign" is used to designate an identity that is a donation-without-being-given,"a radically transcendental and therefore rigorously unenvisageable form of exteriority" (Ray Brassier, *Alien Theory: The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter*, thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, 2001, 144). Naturally, it has nothing to do with the mediation of a nation-State or the fantasy of a specular unity; other alternative names might include the stranger-without-estrangement, the outsider-without-outside, and/or the alien-without-alienation. Cf. "Vers une science des étrangers? (entretien avec Michael Hardt, propos recuelli par Brian Holmes et Jon Solomon)" [Towards a science of foreigners? (interview with Michael Hardt prepared by Jon Solomon and Brian Holmes)], in *Multitudes* (Paris: Exils), No. 14, (2003), 73–80; and Jon Solomon, tr. Erik del Bufalo,

"No-soberanía para las multitudes: Recursos para una Democracia de Extranjeros, a partir de François Laruelle [Non-sovereignty for the multitudes: resources for a Democracy of Foreigners from François Laruelle's Non-Philosophy']" in *Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Avanzados* (Caracas: Cipost), No. 17 (2001).

[35] Jon Solomon, "Taiwan Incorporated: A survey of biopolitics in the sovereign police's east Asian theater of operations," in Thomas Lamarre, Kang Nae-hui, eds., *Traces: a multilingual series of cultural theory* Vol. 3, (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 2004), 229–254.

[36] Cf. Gauri Viswanathan, *Masks of Conquest*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); and Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

[37] Cf. Sakai Takeshi, *Jiyûron — 'genzaisei no keifugaku'* [On Freedom — 'the archaeology of the present'] (Tokyo: Seitosha, 2001).

[38] Sakai Naoki, "Hensha atogaki"[Editor's postface], *Soryokusen kara gurobarizeshon e: Gurobarizeshon Sutadizu* [From Total War System to Globalization – Globalization Studies] Vol. 1 Yamanouchi, Yasushi & Sakai, Naoki ed. (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2003), 319–324; Sakai initially explored the problem of complicity in his analysis of the postwar US –Japan relationship as a complicity between universalism and particularism, "Modernity and Its Critique: The Problem of Universalism and Particularism," The *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Summer 1988,Vol. 87, No. 3.

[39] Jason Read, *The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present* (Albany: SUNY, 2003).

[40] Carl Schmitt advances this argument in G.L. Ulmen, tr., *The* Nomos *of the Earth* (New York: Telos, 2003). See Part III: The *Jus Publicum Europæum*. The implications of Schmitt's argument for biopolitics have been succinctly argued by Tazaki Hideaki, *"Konjitsu no sei-seiji no naka no nîche* (Nietzsche in Contemporary Biopolitics)" in *Shisô*, No. 919 (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2000).

[41] Two related works in Chinese language come to mind: Luo Gang, ed., *Zhishifenzi luncong* [Intellectual Papers], Vol. 4 *"Diguo, dushi yu xiandaixing"* [Empire, City, and Modernity] (Jiangsu: Jiangsu Renmin, 2005); and Antonia (Yen-ning) Chao, *Daizhe caomao daochulüxing* [On the Road with a Straw Hat] (Taipei: Juliu, 2001).

[42] Cf. Giorgio Agamben, tr. Daniel Heller-Roazen, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford, 1995); and Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca: Cornell, 2001).

[43] Michel Foucault, *Naissance de la biopolitique — Cours au Collège de France, 1978–79* (Paris: Gallimard/Seul, 2004), 25.

[44] Maurizio Lazzarato, *Les Révolutions du Capitalisme* (Paris: Les empêcheurs de penser en rond, 2004), 256: "The social sciences try to grasp the new situation by defining the society of control as a society of risk. A negative and ambiguous way of saying that the evental creation of the new is no longer an exception, that the power of the creation of multiplicities is the source of the constitution of the real."

[45] Naoki Sakai, "You Asians," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Harry D. Harootunian and Tomiko Yoda, ed., vol. 99, no. 4, Fall 2000:789–818.

[46] Sakai Naoki, *"Nihonjin de aru koto"*[On being Japanese] *Shiso*, no. 882, Dec. 1997: 5–48; Naoki Sakai "Subject and Substratum", *Cultural Studies*, vol. 14, no. 3 and 4, 2000: 462–530.

[47] Cf. Yann Moulier Boutang, *De l'esclavage au salariat — Économie historique du salariat bridé* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998).