

STAGING NATION

English Language Theatre in Malaysia
and Singapore

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Hong Kong University Press is honoured that Xu Bing, whose art explores the complex themes of language across cultures, has written the Press's name in his Square Word Calligraphy. This signals our commitment to cross-cultural thinking and the distinctive nature of our English-language books published in China.

"At first glance, Square Word Calligraphy appears to be nothing more unusual than Chinese characters, but in fact it is a new way of rendering English words in the format of a square so they resemble Chinese characters. Chinese viewers expect to be able to read Square Word Calligraphy but cannot. Western viewers, however are surprised to find they can read it. Delight erupts when meaning is unexpectedly revealed."

— Britta Erickson, *The Art of Xu Bing*

Contents

Foreword	vii
Preface	ix
Abbreviations	xi
Introduction: States of Play	1
Chapter 1: Scripting the Nation	9
Chapter 2: Conditions of Production	31
Chapter 3: Return of the 'Native': <i>The Cord</i>	51
Chapter 4: Disrupting the Culture of Silence: <i>1984 Here And Now</i>	81
Chapter 5: Complicity and Subversion: <i>Emily of Emerald Hill</i>	109
Chapter 6: Competing Subjectivities: <i>The Coffin Is Too Big for the Hole</i>	137
Chapter 7: Conclusion: Playful Strategies	165
Notes	191
Selected Bibliography	213
Index	225

1

Scripting the Nation

National Culture... is a contingent product of history, of struggle. It is also not an invariant condition: it is not something a state either has or does not have... national cultural integration is a fluid process rooted in power, not a fixed condition of social health.

— Richard G. Fox, *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures*⁴

HISTORICAL BACKDROP

Although the Malaysian and Singaporean governments have deployed very different language and cultural policies towards achieving National Culture, the racially based principles underlying the construction and mobilisation of these policies expose the colonialist ideology that remains entrenched within the upper echelons of power. In order to gain a better understanding of Malaysian and Singaporean forms of nation building, it is necessary to first undertake a brief historical survey of post-independence political developments in the countries concerned, as a way of providing a wider comparative framework as well as drawing attention to the extent to which the histories of the two countries are intertwined.

Unlike some of the other British colonies, Malaya achieved independence in 1957 in a relatively peaceful manner. The reason was largely that the United Malays National Organisation-led Alliance government was able to guarantee the protection of British investments in the country. The leaders of the Alliance were the English educated élite from the three main racial groups (Malay, Chinese and Indian). The coalition was formed on the agreement that the Malays would control the structures and symbols of government in return for non-Malays gaining citizenship rights, including the freedom to pursue economic, cultural and religious interests. In effect, the Alliance bargain set the precedent for the Malay/non-Malay dichotomy that would pervade every facet of Malaysian society by confirming the political hegemony of the

Malays while protecting the economic interests of the predominantly Chinese bourgeoisie. According to the 2000 government census, the Malays form approximately 66.1% of the population of the Federation of Malaysia. The Chinese constitute about 25.3%, the Indians 7.4% and 'Others' form 1.4% of the total population.² The small margin between the Malay and non-Malay populations has been a source of continuous political tension in the country.

By comparison, Singapore's path to independence was more complicated. The island attained full internal self-government in 1959 under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and the People's Action Party. Ideological rifts between PAP moderates who wanted to develop the economy by encouraging private local and foreign investments and the left-wing extremists who aimed at a socialist and, ultimately, communist state, were intensifying. This affected the party's relations with the trade unions, and by 1961, it was obvious that industrial unrest and communist infiltration was a threat not only to the political stability of Singapore but to the entire region. So great was the threat that Malaysia was forced to suggest a merger as a security measure, to curb the spread of communism. The British Crown Colonies of North Borneo were also invited into the Federation, to prevent Singapore's Chinese majority from challenging Malay dominance in the peninsula. In 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was formed with Malaysia, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. Problems started immediately with protest and military threats from Indonesia and the Philippines, but the main source of concern was the irreconcilable political differences between the leaders of Singapore and Malaya. The Singapore government was intent on building a democratic multiracial society and refused to concede to the privileging of Malay culture, which remained a significant aspect of the organisation of the Federation. The call for a 'Malaysian Malaysia' by the PAP (and its peninsula counterpart, the Democratic Action Party, or DAP) gained much support from the non-Malays in the peninsula, who were becoming disillusioned with the co-option of their ethnic representatives in the Alliance. The threat of losing the non-Malay vote overrode all other considerations for the Alliance government, and in 1965, Singapore was expelled from the Federation.

Left to its own limited natural resources, Singapore was faced with the daunting prospect of creating a nation of predominantly Chinese citizens in an otherwise Malay-dominated region. The 2000 census indicates that the population of just over four million consists of 76.8% Chinese, 13.9% Malays, 7.9% Indians and 1.4% 'Others'.³ The Chinese

majority has meant that racial tension is often evoked both within and without the country, although it is by no means comparable to the Malaysian situation. Industrialisation and modernisation of Singaporean commercial and communication systems were deemed imperative to the success of the republic. Large-scale structural developments were rigorously implemented, and the worldwide economic boom of the late 1960s and 1970s consolidated Singapore's eminence as an international broker in East-West trade. The PAP government had to compromise much of its socialist ideals in the drive for maximum efficiency and growth; a mixed economy was adopted which combined private enterprise with state participation, and incentives were offered to private (local and foreign) capital. By 1975, Singapore was the world's third largest port and a leading economic presence in the region. Nonetheless, a price had to be paid for material progress, and it was in the form of increasing political restrictions. There was suppression of views contrary to the government's position, rigid control of the media and other ideological state apparatuses, and legislative power over the labour market. The PAP had committed Singapore to the path of competitive, dynamic growth by imposing constraints within and without. Capitalism and self-sufficiency were encouraged, and national pride was fostered by stressing the material achievements and superiority of its people. This attitude has sometimes been perceived as arrogant by neighbouring countries, including Malaysia. There was intense rivalry between the two states in the immediate years after the separation, and to this day, relations between the two countries are often strained.

Singapore continued to grow from strength to strength in the 1980s and 1990s, as the government moved into the realm of state capitalism. The PAP remains the dominant ruling party and maintains control by means of an efficient party machinery, and through the institutions of the government (including community organisations), the judiciary, and media. In recent years, there appears to be a growing resentment, particularly by the post-war generation, of the stifling political culture. Lee Kuan Yew relinquished his position towards the end of 1990 but continues to influence government in his role as Senior Minister. His successor, Goh Chok Tong, has not made any radical departure from Lee's form of government, despite earlier promises of a more relaxed style.

Violent race riots erupted in the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur, on 13 May 1969, marking the turning point in the country's politics. The event was precipitated by the enormous gains made by the non-Malay opposition parties in an election campaign dominated by communal

issues. A state of National Emergency was declared, the Constitution suspended and the Parliament disbanded. Parliament resumed in 1971 with a new national ideology that placed Malay culture as the foundation of national unity, and a New Economic Plan (NEP). The Constitution Amendment Act of 1971 forbade the discussion of 'sensitive' issues such as Malay privileges, the status of Malay as the national language, citizenship rights and the sovereignty of the rulers. The amended Constitution also facilitated the implementation of the NEP. In spite of the NEP's stated aim of the eradication of poverty for all Malaysians, irrespective of their race, it was primarily designed for the economic advancement of the Malays. The goal was for Malays to own 30% of equity capital, non-Malays 40% and foreigners 30%, by 1990. Although the reforms instituted through the NEP and its successor, the National Development Policy (NDP), have reduced poverty and led to the growth of the Malay middle and business classes, concern is growing over the influence of political patronage in the business sector, the increasingly inequitable distribution of wealth, and the apparent increase in corruption and other abuses of power.⁴ The NEP and the privileging of Malay interests have, in effect, legitimised racial discrimination and perpetuated economic inequality.⁵

In a move towards absorbing and neutralising some of the opposition parties, the Alliance formed the *Barisan Nasional* (National Front) comprising the UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Association (MIC) in 1973. The remaining opposition parties in the 1980s and early 1990s were too weak and divided by political ideology to represent any real threat. The trial and subsequent imprisonment of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 acted as a catalyst for a new wave of mass politicisation and led to the formation of the multiracial *Barisan Alternatif* coalition consisting of the DAP, *Parti Islam Se-Malaysia* (Islamic Party of Malaysia, or PAS), *Parti Keadilan Nasional* (National Justice Party) and *Parti Rakyat Malaysia* (People's Party of Malaysia) for the 1999 election. In 2001, the DAP pulled out of the *Barisan Alternatif* due to irreconcilable differences citing the PAS policy on the establishment of an Islamic state. There is growing concern by moderate Muslims and non-Muslims alike about the possibility of an Islamic state as a result of the increased interest in Islamic revivalism. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad stepped down in 2002 after twenty-one years in office. Although the Anwar case had led to a significant erosion of popular Malay support for UMNO, Mahathir managed to recuperate some of that support as a moderate Muslim leader in the post-September 11 struggle against regressive Islamism.

before retiring. UMNO's dominance was further consolidated by his successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's overwhelming victory in the 2003 federal elections. The results have been interpreted as a personal endorsement for Adullah Badawi who has cultivated an image as a corruption fighter and a moderate and progressive Muslim leader.

NARRATING NATION

Nationalism, according to Hans Kohn, 'is a political creed that underlies the cohesion of modern societies and their claim to authority. Nationalism centres the supreme loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people upon the nation-state, either existing or desired'.⁶ Seen in this light, nationalism is an ideological construct that attempts to legitimise a particular power structure by lending permanence and authority to what is an otherwise fluid and often contradictory process of governance.

Nationalism as myth works to efface the traces of its own historical production by representing the nation as a transcendental signifier. The act of reinscribing the political body operates through a process of selection and, more importantly, the exclusion of particular values, beliefs and practices that conflict with the interests of the ruling élite. Historical, cultural and racial continuities are often fabricated to support political dominance, while new symbols such as the flag and the national anthem are created to facilitate collective identification. To quote Ernest Gellner: 'Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it *invents* nations where they do not exist'.⁷

Nationalism is often described as being Janus-faced, and this is particularly true in the postcolonial context. On the one hand, nationalism is creative and progressive in the striving for solidarity and self-determination, but on the other hand, it can be reactionary and totalitarian in its attempt to impose cultural homogeneity. There is the danger that in enforcing socio-political unity through cultural discourses, the dominant class or culture is privileged at the expense of the less powerful. The designation of power is further complicated by the presence of neocolonial forces that maintain a firm grip on the economy through collaboration with the bourgeois ruling élite. According to Richard Fox, nationalist ideology is defined as the production of conceptions of peoplehood:

A national culture starts out as a nationalist ideology, that is, a consciousness or perception of what the nation is or should be, which then gains public meaning and is put into action. Usually there are several coexisting and even contradictory perceptions, which constitute competitive nationalist ideologies. A national culture emerges from the confrontation over what the nation should and will be among nationalist ideologies. Struggles among nationalist ideologies — contests over ideas as well as conflicts between people — may propel one nationalist ideology into dominance and leave others by the wayside.⁸

Although the construction of a national cultural policy lends political and institutional weight to a particular nationalist ideology, this does not necessarily mean the erasure of competing ideologies. Neither does it mean that national culture, as lived praxis, will conform to the dominant nationalist ideology. Rather, 'National Culture' is best understood as a formalised political discourse that attempts to impose specific ideological constraints on the process of representation and identification; it is officially designated and should not be confused with the desires of the people.

MALAYSIA

Malay Nationalism

The Malaysian approach to nation building corresponds to Joshua Fishman's definition of 'nationalism', which involves the imposition of a supranational identity based on the politically dominant 'host' culture.⁹ The main aim is to enforce cultural and linguistic homogeneity in what is an essentially pluralist community. National identity is constructed through a system of closure and exclusion by promulgating the political values and cultural symbols held by only one segment of the polity. The privileging of the Malay culture as the *teras* (foundation) of Malaysian national identity is signified by the national slogan: *Satu Negara, Satu Bangsa, Satu Bahasa* (One Nation, One Race, One Language). The Malay language, or the post-independence term, *Bahasa Malaysia* (Malaysian Language), commands the status of a national language, and Islam is the national religion. All symbols and procedures of government including the monarch (as head of state and protector of Islam) are derived from Malay sources. The national anthem is an old Malay song,

and the insignia of the national airline is a Malay kite. Although the *Rukunegara* (national ideology) contains an explicit statement promoting a multicultural society, Malay political and cultural supremacy is nonetheless constitutionally protected in contrast to non-Malay interests.

The National Consultative Council, which was formed in the immediate period after the 1969 riots, set out to establish positive and practical guidelines for interracial co-operation and social integration for the growth of a national identity. This led to the implementation of the NEP, the Constitutional Amendments to protect Malay privileges, and the prohibition on discussions of issues such as race and language. Finally, there was the inauguration of the *Rukunegara*, which was inspired by the Indonesian national ideology, the *Pancasila*. The contradiction between the stated rhetoric of democracy and multiculturalism, and the existing political structure is nowhere more explicit than in this declaration of national beliefs. The second principle declares unqualified loyalty to both king and country, despite the fact that both constructions are specifically Malay-oriented. The third principle, which is the upholding of the constitution, necessarily entails acceptance of and co-operation with the institutional bias towards the Malay as *Bumiputera* (son of the soil). This leads to a situation in which all other democratic considerations within the multiethnic context are subordinated to the protection of Malay primacy. The ethnic minorities are permitted rights as befits any other citizen, but only within the parameters permitted by the Malay-dominated state.

The political upheavals of 1969 also led to the establishment of the 1971 National Cultural Policy, which identified the principles of Malaysian culture as: 1) necessarily based on the indigenous/*Bumiputera* culture, 2) able to incorporate suitable and 'pertinent' elements from the other cultures and, 3) focused on Islam as an important element in the formation of the National Culture.¹⁰ The identification of an 'indigenous culture' and the qualification of 'pertinent' cultural traits from 'minority' communities serve to obscure a further political agenda. The marginalisation of the non-Malays is explicit; their cultural contributions will be deemed suitable only if they enhance the (Malay) *status quo*.

The dominant presupposition that the National Culture is Malay culture has never been effectively countered by the Malaysian government; on the contrary, there have been numerous examples of overt cultural discrimination such as the lion dance controversy in 1979, when the then-Home Affairs Minister declared that the lion dance (widely held as a positive Chinese contribution to Malaysian culture) could not

be considered Malaysian because 'the dance originated from China where it is now extinct and, as such ... could not develop further'.¹¹ This pronouncement had significant repercussions on cultural and civil rights, as police permits were thereon required for public performances of the dance. To prevent heightened communal hostilities, symbols of multicultural Malaysia consist mainly of the various cultural 'styles' of dance, music, food, dress and so forth, belonging to the three major racial groups. Representatives from the Chinese and Indian communities have protested against the legitimacy of the National Cultural Policy, and numerous documents have been lodged with the Ministry of Culture over the years. The latest and most comprehensive memorandum was submitted in 1999 by the Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals (popularly known by its Mandarin name, *Sugiu*), a coalition of thirteen national Chinese organisations. To date, little has been done by the authorities to address these concerns, other than to dismiss the legitimacy of non-government organisations such as *Sugiu* by likening them to communist groups of the past.

Raymond Lee asserts that while most Malaysians have come to terms with Malay political power, communal antagonism has been transposed onto the cultural and religious scene with the fight to position the three major ethnic groups within the status hierarchy.¹² Examples of the fight for symbolic dominance include the controversy over the order for all graduates to wear the traditional Malay dress in a university graduation ceremony and the privileging of the construction of Malay mosques in prime locations in contrast to that of Chinese temples.¹³ If nationalism is taken to mean nation-consciousness, that is awareness of belonging to what Benedict Anderson calls an 'imagined community',¹⁴ then nationalism in Malaysia remains a predominantly Malay imagining. Milton Esman argues that the development of a syncretic Malaysian national identity is unlikely, given the salience of communalism: 'The national identity is thus unfamiliar, shallow ... It is emotionally empty to the Chinese and other non-Malays because all the official symbols of the state ... draw exclusively from Malay culture. They contain not a single symbol drawn from the traditions of any of the non-Malay peoples which could grip them emotionally'.¹⁵

It should be noted that the cleavage between Malays and non-Malays should not obscure disputes within and between the minority racial groups about what the National Culture ought to be. Similarly, there are competing ideologies within the Malay community regarding the concept of a National Culture.¹⁶ Nationalist factions exist within the *Bumiputera*

circle of bureaucratic intellectuals that demand a stronger Malay focus; Islamic revivalist factions have been calling for increased Islamicisation of state culture.

Language and Education Policies

Although the aim of making Malay the national language was explicitly to create a sense of social cohesion and national identification, the salience of race in the national imagining has meant that Bahasa Malaysia has not been able to disarticulate itself from its cultural roots. According to Tham, the Malay language is the single most manifest indicator of Malayness.¹⁷ The promotion of the language is therefore paramount in the rationalisation of the Malays as the 'natural' and historically legitimate rulers. The Malay adage '*Bahasa Jiwa Bangsa*' (Language is the soul of the nation) suggests in part the significance of the language to both cultural and political identity, as does the slogan employed in the early days of Malay nationalism, '*Hiduplah Bahasa! Hiduplah Bangsa!*' (Long live the language! Long live the race/nation!). The elevation of Malay to Bahasa Malaysia implies that the other non-Malay languages are no longer Malaysian languages; their status is akin to other foreign languages like Japanese or Dutch.

The government's promotion of the national language is integrally linked to its education policies. The Razak Report of 1956 presented a blueprint for national education. The recommendations were acceptable to the majority of the ethnic groups whose leaders were anxious to present an image of inter-ethnic tolerance in the leadup to independence. The report recommended making Malay the national language while preserving and sustaining the growth of the languages and cultures of other communities living in the country. In the immediate post-independence period, English and Malay were recognised as official languages, and Malay was promoted to the status of national language. By 1967, and in the face of growing Malay ethnocentrism, the National Language Act interpreted 'main language' in the education reports to mean 'sole language', thereby elevating Malay to the position of both the national and the singular official language. The 1969 race riots led to the explicit instatement of Malay dominance and brought about a new education policy that privileged Bahasa Malaysia as the sole language of instruction for all education sectors.

The vernacular Mandarin and Tamil schools are therefore effectively peripherised. Their students are disadvantaged as a result of not gaining

access to Malay-medium national tertiary institutions, and their lack of formal qualification in Bahasa Malaysia disqualifies them from gaining employment in the public service. English education is only available in private schools catering to expatriates and local élites and is geared towards the education systems of Western countries. As the Constitutional Amendment Act makes it illegal to question the status of the national language, oppositional views on the issue of language and education are rarely disseminated. Most local criticism of education policy has, to date, concentrated on issues such as the injustices associated with entry into tertiary institutions, the lack of funding to vernacular schools, and the limited access to scholarship awards.¹⁸

Malay is the sole language of official administration and its subsidiary concerns. All dealings with the state are therefore conducted in Bahasa Malaysia, and competence in the language is a prime requisite for employment in the Civil Service. Although English is used in the commercial sphere and particularly within multinational corporations, its status and function hinges on its value within the international trade and political arena. The government has always maintained the necessity of keeping English as a second language for such purposes and, to this end, communication English is taught in the school curriculum. The ambiguous status of English (which is partly related to its colonial heritage) *vis-à-vis* the Malaysianisation of the education system has resulted in varying standards of competency. While English is still accorded marginal status in official policy, there is now less overt hostility towards it in contrast to the early years of nation building. Fears over the declining standard of English in the last decade has led to a review of the language policy, and there is now a renewed promotion of English in the schools to facilitate the country's vision of attaining developed nation status by 2020.

Thus the unconditional institutionalisation of Bahasa Malaysia in both the education and cultural spheres replicates the colonial strategy of maintaining hegemonic control by excluding the Other from the symbolic order. It is obvious that it is not the English language *per se* that is a problem in the debate as to whether English should play a more significant role in both the education system and the cultural scene at large. The fact that the government sponsors many of its brighter Malay students to study abroad in English-speaking countries to benefit from the education systems and the high status accorded to English speakers in the Malay community points to the political nature of the language issue. There was even a trend in the 1970s and 1980s to recruit British

teachers to teach the language in the more prestigious and almost exclusively Malay schools.¹⁹ It is also worth noting that English (or rather the local variant of it) is used unofficially by many Malaysians, in both intra- and inter-ethnic communications. Malaysian English differs from the generic form in that its speakers cover a wider range of the linguistic spectrum and are prone to switching codes and registers with liberal 'borrowings' from the other local vernaculars. It is therefore obvious that the structural resistance to the English language is at odds with the lived experience of many Malaysians for whom English is a first or second language. One could, instead, argue that the English language is problematic to the Malay state because it is the language of the colonial élite and represents a history which it is now attempting to disavow, even while remaining locked into colonial ideologies of race and culture.

The minority ethnic languages continue to be used in private domestic spheres as well as within the respective ethnic commercial organisations, because communal politics ensure the internalisation of ethnocentrism and the preservation of its cultural manifestations. The Malaysian case proves Anderson's point that it is a mistake to overstate the value of a national language *vis-à-vis* nation-ness.²⁰ While it may be said in theory that Bahasa Malaysia is available to all citizens and should facilitate a sense of community and equality, the fact remains that most aspects of the *symbolic nation* are expressed by Malay culture. This effectively hinders identification and co-operation by those excluded from its terms of reference. In other words, the function of the national language or any other signifier of official political identity may be rejected by a significant proportion of the polity, because the lived experience of the citizenry does not match the promises of the nationalist rhetoric.²¹

Bumiputeraism

Communalism and the politicisation of race have antecedents in colonial history. Judith Nagata claims that there is strong evidence that race was not significant in the construction of either individual or collective identity in the precolonial period but rather functioned as merely one aspect of a broader set of socio-economic and political considerations in group transactions.²² The presence of culturally hybridised communities such as the Straits Chinese and the *Jawi Peranakan* point to the degree of social fluidity and cultural accommodation prevailing then. This probably reflects the greater economic and political dependence of the immigrant groups on the Malay community, and

particularly on its ruling élites. The increase in the number of immigrants encouraged by the colonial government and the displacement of Malay political power led to a radical reorganisation of social and cultural relations among the Asian communities. British colonialism resulted in the division of labour along racial lines, which caused ethnic boundaries to rigidify. According to Nagata:

Forced to move along grooves carved for them by an alien power, fluidity and freedom of operation gave way to closed ranks and defensiveness, and the question of separate origins and distinct cultures became the rationales for these rivalries, rather than being merely incidental to them ... [it] was only with eventual unification into a single political state that these separate communities truly could be said to have become 'ethnic', since the idea of ethnicity presupposes parts of a larger (political) whole.²³

Communalism was encouraged as a means of controlling and perpetuating 'indirect rule'. Among the measures taken were the recognition and protection of the Malays and Aboriginal peoples as the indigenous population against the influx of migrants. This was done to gain the support of the Malay ruling class and was an effective form of labour control. *Bumiputera* rights were subsequently enshrined in the Independence Constitution of 1957. According to the document, the definition of a Malay is determined largely by culture: someone who is a Muslim, habitually speaks the Malay language and follows Malay customs. That the criteria to distinguish the other racial groups are not defined lends weight to Raymond Lee's claim that the boundaries of Malay identity are formalised 'so that its legal status vis-à-vis other ethnic groups can no longer be questioned. The boundaries of the non-Malay groups remain implied, meaning that they lack the legal means to regulate ethnic membership'.²⁴

The discourse of Malay hegemony is based on the premise that the Malays are what the present prime minister terms 'the definitive people', who formed the first effective government in the land.²⁵ Malays are accorded a privileged position because they are the 'true' subjects of the Malay kings who are charged with the protection of Islam, the Malay language and customary laws. Residents of the *Tanah Melayu* (Malay kingdom) who do not live up to the criteria are perceived as less than 'true' subjects and should be treated accordingly.²⁶ All issues pertaining to land and the symbolic expressions of status traditionally under the

auspices of the sultanate are transferred onto the state, which effectively marginalises all non-Malay claims.

The Malay state has, thus, appropriated the historical-political discourse of cultural legitimacy by firstly redefining the terms of Malayness or *Bumiputeraism*, and secondly marginalising the non-Malays. The first context regarding mythic reconstruction is demonstrated by Nagata's documentation of the collapsing of 'traditional' differences between the local Malay communities and the 'other Malays'.²⁷ This enshrinement of a primordial homogeneous Malay cultural identity is, arguably, the most obvious form of postcolonial recuperation and demonstrates the perpetuation of colonial myths of authenticity. The second factor functions as a response to the first since, despite a common citizenship, there now exist two categories of citizens. The term *kaum pendatang* (immigrant community) only came into use with the advent of Malay nationalism. It is a relatively new term in the Malay vocabulary that has been self-consciously coined as an antithesis to the equally new *Bumiputera* concept.²⁸ According to Chandra Muzaffar, the obvious outcome of the institutionalisation of the *Bumiputera-kaum pendatang* opposition was 'the development of interests and attitudes which would create an entire belief-system out of a primordial feeling'.²⁹ The Malays have come to believe that their privileged position is an inalienable right instead of a temporary measure initiated to create a more equitable society, while the non-Malays resist marginalisation by reconstructing an identity based on the fragments of a premigratory past.

SINGAPORE

Multicultural Ideology

The course taken by the Singapore government is aimed at the creation of a synthetic Singaporean identity composed of the traditional elements of all the major communities. Fishman refers to this pragmatic approach to reconciling interethnic differences as 'nationism'.³⁰ State intervention is justified on the grounds that enforced homogenisation may lead to heightened ethnic hostility, and national unity is to be achieved on the basis of shared political symbols without the pre-eminence of any one ethnic language or culture. Nationalism differentiates between political identity and cultural identity, and the promotion of the latter is not seen to be in conflict with the former.

The ostensible approach taken to create a pragmatic notion of nationhood, based on what are assumed to be common economic and social goals such as material wealth, a high standard of living, modernisation and a peaceful environment, is signified by the national motto, *Majulah Singapura* (Singapore Progress). According to the first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, 'The government's policy was not to "assimilate", but to integrate our different communities, in other words, to build up common attributes such as one common working language, same loyalties, similar values and attitudes, so as to make the different communities a more cohesive nation'.³¹

The Singaporean multicultural model has been described as a 'stir-fry': Chinese, Malay, Indian and Other cultures forming the main ingredients, popularly referred to as the CMIO formula. The combination of the principles of multiculturalism and meritocracy ensures that no one culture is privileged, at least in theory. Cultural pluralism is guaranteed by the constitution, which offers equal citizenship to all the races and prohibits any enactments of laws that discriminate against citizens on racial and religious grounds. Although Malays are recognised as the indigenous people of the island, the nature of this status is rather ambiguous.³²

Research has shown that despite Singaporeans laying claim to a strong sense of national identification, race predominates in the Singaporean national imagining.³³ This is not surprising, as the multicultural model of Singaporean society inadvertently politicises race: to be classified and identified as a member of the society, one has to claim an ethnic/racial label. Racial origin is inscribed in compulsory identity cards carried by all Singaporeans and must be stated on almost every public administration form. Similarly, an individual's culture is defined by race; the two do not vary independently.³⁴ Failure to claim racial affiliation with one of the elements of the four-culture paradigm is not to have a culture, officially, at all. The contradiction within the multicultural policy is revealed in practice: on the one hand, the logic of the multiracial model points towards the production of a synthetic Singaporean culture including official encouragement to develop a national costume, song, dance, and so forth. On the other hand, it forces individuals to identify even more closely with their racial communities in order to manifest evidence of cultural origins. According to Clammer, this leads to the paradoxical situation in which 'if one is *too* much for a synthesis one is rootless; but if one is too much for one's own source culture then one is a chauvinist'.³⁵ The result thus far has been an

enforced and superficial amalgam of the four official cultures. The 'Instant Asia' shows manufactured for tourist consumption are symptomatic of this form of cultural reification.

The contradiction inherent in the multicultural model is partly the reason why public discussions about the emergence of a distinctive Singaporean National Culture have always been projected into the future. It is envisaged that only when the people see themselves as Singaporeans first and foremost, before claiming race membership, can a truly 'Singaporean Culture' exist.³⁶ Contrary to the usual government rhetoric, little has been proffered as to what this homogeneous and distinctive identity will be, except that it has to incorporate the four 'great traditions'. The development is usually described as a mechanical process in keeping with the ideology of pragmatism and technocracy, and can be hastened through state apparatuses like education and media systems.

Language and Education Policies

Recommendations by the 1956 All-Party Committee on Chinese Education became the foundation of an independent Singaporean education policy. Among the provisions implemented were the equal treatment and co-ordination of the four-language streams and the introduction of bilingual education, which was considered vital to the development of a multicultural society. Malay was adopted as the national language, to improve Singapore's chances of merging with Malaysia; it was a symbolic recognition of the historical and cultural ties with the Malay Archipelago. English, Malay, Mandarin and Tamil are recognised, at least theoretically, as equal official languages, although in practice English and Mandarin have become the main languages of participation and social mobility.

The teaching of a second language became compulsory for all four-language streams at the primary level in 1960 and from 1966 at the secondary level. All students are required to be instructed in English (the first, or 'working', language) and one of the other official languages (the second language, or the 'mother tongue'). The term 'mother tongue' is interpreted by the Singaporean system to mean the language socially identified with the individual's ethnic group rather than the language used in the home.³⁷ The bilingual education policy aims to: 1) ensure bilingual competence to facilitate communication between the linguistic groups and thereby encourage nation building; 2) promote English as a 'neutral' language to enable all the races to compete equally in the

international market; and 3) promote the use of the mother tongues to ensure knowledge of and identification with 'traditional' cultures as a means towards avoiding deracination and/or Westernisation.

The stress on promoting Malay as the national language faded soon after the Malaysia fall-out, and the status of the language has since been largely ceremonial. There is at present a renewed emphasis on Malay, in response to the emergence of discussions about minority group rights, as well as to placate strained relations with neighbouring countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, which are suspicious of Chinese dominance in the region. The government has also considered it necessary to establish official intracommunal link languages to facilitate better communications within the Chinese and Indian communities in particular, which are linguistically divided into dialect and subdialect groups. The choice of the link languages has, however, been the subject of some debate. Tamil was selected to represent the Indian community, despite the fact that it was spoken by only a minority of the Indian Singaporeans. At best, only half of those classified as Indians appear to use Tamil to any significant extent, and moves to promote it as the link language have been ineffective.³⁸ Mandarin has similarly been selected as the link language for the Chinese community, although the dialects are used more extensively. The 'Speak More Mandarin, Use Less Dialects' campaign was launched in 1979 and has continued with unabated force to the present, with remarkable success. The campaign has been given added weight through emphasis on the utilitarian value of Mandarin in gaining access to the expanding market in mainland China. The promotion of Mandarin has been received with apprehension, particularly by the minority groups, as official sanctioning of Chinese dominance. There has already been a shift in status within the official language paradigm: English and Mandarin dominate the linguistic field, which has direct social and political repercussions for the community at large.³⁹

The choice of official link languages has wider repercussions. The definition of Mandarin as the representative language of the Chinese majority inadvertently transforms it into a symbol of the majority. Despite this symbolic importance, access to learning Mandarin in the education system is race-specific. The emphasis placed on the association between the mother tongue and race has resulted in a situation where language is not only a way into that culture but paradoxically becomes the defining factor in the construction of race and culture itself. The association of the mother tongue with race reproduces the discourse of race and power in specific ways, as Purushotam argues:

Given that the (multiracial) project claims equality, despite being based on 'race' — which ensures that Singaporean citizens comprise a majority and minority of 'races' — the disciplining of the 'Chinese' to become one 'race' is at once the disciplining of others to understand themselves as either dominated and marginalised; or, if equality is to be ensured, the disciplining of others to understand that their minority racial status will be protected.⁴⁰

Asian Versus Western Values

English is the only non-Asian language in the official model and is therefore considered a neutral linguistic bridge between ethnic groups. English functions as the symbolic medium in the creation of a syncretic, supraethnic political identity that does not exclude or impinge on simultaneously held racial identities. In this regard, it is therefore the *de facto* national language. Despite (or perhaps because of) its colonial heritage, English has remained the favoured working language of state administration and is the *lingua franca* of the country's trade with the international community. Although vital to both nation building and economic growth, English is also associated with 'Western' values that could deracinate and alienate Singaporeans from their 'traditional' roots. In his 1978 National Day Rally speech, Lee Kuan Yew expressed the fear that:

A person who gets deculturalised — and I nearly was, so I know this danger — loses his self-confidence ... I may speak the English language better than the Chinese language because I learnt English early in life. But I will never be an Englishman in a thousand generations and I have not got the Western value system inside; mine is an Eastern value system. Nevertheless I use Western concepts, Western words because I understand them.⁴¹

The most striking aspect of this speech is the assumption that race is primordial and is intrinsically linked to one's culture and language; one can become 'deculturalised', but his or her culture cannot be changed. And yet, paradoxically, two cultural systems can coexist, provided the 'foreign' is externalised and intellectualised, while the 'native' is internalised and instinctual. Hence it is possible to be bilingual but not bicultural.⁴² The key point is that while it is good for Singaporeans to exploit English as the 'working language', it could never provide the 'cultural ballast' afforded by the mother tongue, to counter

the negative effects of modernisation. This utilitarian view of the English language is elaborated in another of Lee's speeches: 'English language gives us access to the science and technology of the West ... [But the mother tongues represent] ... the learning of a whole value system, a whole philosophy of life, that can maintain the fabric of our society intact'.⁴³ The present prime minister, Goh Chok Tong, has maintained this policy on language and culture, claiming that: 'To enhance our identity and cultural values, we must teach our mother tongues ... to impart values, so that we will remain Asian and not become Westernised and de-culturalised'.⁴⁴

The notion that language is somehow imbued with an essential supply of race-specific cultural values is problematic, to say the least. Even more troubling is the question of what exactly 'Asian' or 'traditional' values are and how they differ from the undesirable 'Western values'. As Shirley Chew points out with reference to the Chinese community: 'What is wrong with "traditional values" is that they refer us back to a China which no longer exists ... and if they signify universal human values such as devotion to the family, loyalty to friends, feeling for country, then traditional values are not peculiar to Chinese society and culture'.⁴⁵ The term 'Asian values' is often glibly used as a reductive and ahistorical category that ignores the internal diversity of the various cultural systems within the Asian region. Close examination of official rhetoric reveals a practical and selective emphasis on values such as 'honesty, industry, respect for the family, cleanliness and thrift' which support the economic and political agenda of the government.⁴⁶ As Koh Tai Ann asserts, for manners, civic consideration and hygiene to be confused and conflated into the category of the 'moral' and 'traditional' merely indicates a shallow understanding of either culture or morality.⁴⁷

Like many other developing countries, Singapore is faced with the problem of, on the one hand, being forced to compete commercially by encouraging modernisation and the technology of progress while on the other hand disavowing the cultural effects of economic transformation. The blanket term 'Westernisation' is often used as an *explanation* of the transformation towards post-industrialism, when it is perhaps more accurately a *description* of the process. As Chua Beng Huat notes, the inculcation of Asian values as a defence against so-called Western corruption is a discursive move whereupon individualism, as a cultural entailment of capitalism, 'is detached from the economic sphere and dressed up in the moral language of anti-Westernisation'.⁴⁸ Westernisation has come to embody all that is negative and threatening

to the political culture, including 'hippyism, permissiveness, student radicalism, ideologies of the welfare state and anti-establishment and anti-multinational company attitudes'.⁴⁹ Seen in this light, the push towards traditional values can be read as a form of political control, without jeopardising either production or economic growth.

Myth of Cultural Purity

I have argued that mobilisation of race within the confines of the multicultural ideology serves to rigidify and reproduce racial differences in Singapore. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the myth of racial and cultural purity was used to legitimise British political and economic domination. The colonial strategy of divide and rule was based on the assumption that primordial ties of blood, descent, and land of birth determined the 'natural' propensities of the individual. This simplistic interpretation of 'genetic determinism' invariably led to racial stereotyping and is largely responsible for the (racist) images the racial groups have of each other. The entire colonial hierarchy was built on the premise that each race was defined by a quantifiable propensity and function that was best developed by a political structure that maintained the equilibrium.⁵⁰ In this way, a hierarchy of 'progressiveness' was legitimised with the British positioning themselves at the pinnacle of development.

Seen in this light, race functions as an artificial construct that confers social identity 'which derives in the first instance from an imposed, externally derived set of cognitive categories rather than from the cultural "facts" on the ground'.⁵¹ It follows that any observable equivalence between cultural or genetic condition and racial classification is more likely to be discursive rather than an index of 'reality' as such. Nagata substantiates the view that racial boundaries are subject to hegemonic manipulation, by demonstrating how the heterogeneous racial mosaic of precolonial Malaysia and Singapore was reduced and homogenised in a series of colonial censuses to form the present three major racial categories of Malay, Chinese and Indian.⁵² Ethnic categories as socially determined boundaries are continually redefined according to socio-political contingencies. Perhaps the clearest challenge to the myth of a primordially determined ethnic identity is provided by miscegenated cultures such as the *Peranakan* Chinese and Indian-Malays, who are known to express different ethnic orientations situationally.

Multiculturalism as State Apparatus

The Singaporean concept of multiculturalism is premised on the reinvention and propagation of an imagined system of ethno-specific and transcendental 'traditional' values. One can even go so far as to argue that Singapore's multicultural ideology functions more as a discourse on monoculturalism that is heavily influenced by the communalist strategies used by the British. More importantly, the multicultural model denies alternative forms for representing the symbolic nation. Race as the dominating principle of social organisation in Singapore obscures the validity of other more overtly politicised and counter-hegemonic forms of social identification. It is therefore not surprising that the official Singaporean national identity is rarely inscribed in the present. Rather than subscribing to an organic view of culture where each stage is complete in itself, the envisioned National Culture must always be projected into the future as an idealised objective, in order to coerce and organise the social polity and maintain the *status quo*.

Discourses of cultural and racial purity, xenophobia and multiculturalism intersect at yet another level of ideological struggle in relation to the peculiarly Singaporean concept of social pollution. The term encompasses physical/environmental hygiene (for example, not littering and not smoking in enclosed public areas), personal hygiene (including not spitting, and flushing toilets) as well as social ethics (including radical sexual behavior). Singapore represents one of the clearest examples of a society in which boundary maintenance of the body politic is expressed symbolically through the emphasis on control over the body proper.⁵³ One of the most immediate forms of social pollution identified by the authorities has been the threat of Western values, which are communicated through metaphors of disease and contagion. The political body can only be defended by constructing an extensive immune system: among the precautions taken are the use of the mother tongue and the recuperation of the respective 'traditional' cultures. The myth of Western corruption could perhaps be read as a subconscious acknowledgment of the importance of Western culture as a medium of inter-ethnic communication. More significantly, as Benjamin points out, Western culture is a rapid solvent of ethnic differences and poses a corresponding threat to the maintenance of the multiracial ideology.⁵⁴ The terms 'Asian' and 'Western' as ideological referents are therefore mobilised as oppositions: the former representing all that is politically and culturally desirable, and the latter as evil and anathema to the welfare of the nation.

Singapore's cultural policy shows how new Asian nations are caught up in a cultural struggle between the ideological discourses of East and West. While such imaginings have their origins in the Enlightenment project, especially in Orientalism, it is the ways in which the discourses of East and West have been appropriated and reproduced within a postcolonial context by independent nation-states that is of interest to this study. The authorities are uncomfortable with the idea of a hybridised Singaporean National Culture located at the nexus between East and West; such a dynamic and fluid position is, arguably, too threatening to the seat of power. The response has been a conservative swing to close the range of cultural identification by insisting that Singapore is an inherently 'Asian' society.

This chapter has elaborated on the ways in which colonialist race-based imaginings have been selectively appropriated and naturalised through language and other cultural policies by the ruling élites in Malaysia and Singapore to construct hegemonic versions of National Culture. The consequences of the Malaysian state being organised along racial lines is that issues of representation in all aspects of public life are inherently communalistic. Malaysian National Culture is built on the foundations of Malay culture; elements of other cultures may be incorporated if deemed suitable and are not considered anathema to Islam. More than thirty years after the instatement of the National Cultural Policy, there is still no clear signal from the authorities as to what specific incorporations from non-Malay cultures have been sanctioned. The assimilative nation-building strategy employed by the government to create a cohesive polity based on the concept of a singular nation, language and culture has instead caused greater divisions and political tensions between the *Bumiputeras* and non-*Bumiputeras*. In contrast, the Singaporean government is built on a multiracial platform; its mobilisation of multiculturalism and meritocracy as key nation-building strategies was aimed at creating an equitable national culture that respected cultural difference. The focus on language as a vehicle for racialised culture via the mother tongue policy has, however, resulted in the disciplining and reification of race as a social and political category. This has the effect of reproducing the racialised majority-minority balance and hence the political *status quo* in Singapore.

The Malaysian and Singaporean case studies demonstrate the degree to which postcolonial governments have attempted, in different ways,

to deal with the legacy of colonial race policies. While the aim of maintaining racial harmony is upmost on the agenda of the respective governments, the degree to which the ruling élites are themselves complicit in the reproduction of racial discourse in the name of maintaining the *status quo* is less often critiqued. There is a failure to recognise, as PuruShotam points out, that the production of race 'is the production of the legitimisation for the existence of, even the explanation for, the presence of social inequalities as "natural" inequalities'.⁵⁵ Yet, it is important not to reduce the political élites' construction of race-based nationhood to a Machiavellian plot whereby they are perceived as all-powerful and the polity as passive subjects.⁵⁶ Such a view would not only designate absolute power to the élites but obscure the fact that the élites are themselves also caught up and imprisoned by their reification of racial imaginings and therefore subject to its social repercussions. More importantly, this view denies agency to individuals and communities within the nation to resist and challenge dominant ideologies.

If the discourse of National Culture represents the state-endorsed script for imagining the nation and is therefore distinct from other competing notions of the nation held by the polity, the gap between these two 'realities' is embodied by what Homi Bhabha calls the 'nation-space'. This is a fluid, processual space where dominant ideologies are challenged by alternative ways of imagining nationhood. Within such a space of ideological contestation, 'history may be half-made because it is in the process of being made; and the image of cultural authority may be ambivalent because it is caught, uncertainly, in the act of composing its powerful image'.⁵⁷ The nation-space is precisely the space in which theatre and other forms of cultural production circulate. The theatre as a site of the collective imagining of its participants (writer, actors, directors, audience, production crew) offers ways of critiquing hegemonic narratives of nationalism, and articulating and assessing alternative ways of scripting the nation.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

- 1 Tejaswini Niranjana, P. Sudhri and Vivek Dhareshwar, 'Introduction,' *Interrogating Modernity: Culture and Colonialism in India* (Calcutta: Seagull, 1993), 7.
- 2 This study is limited to the analysis of English language theatre in Malaysia and Singapore. While there are other significant theatrical traditions in Malay, Tamil, Hindi and the various Chinese dialects operating in the countries under discussion, there is little interaction between these ethnically stratified traditions except through the medium of English language theatre.
- 3 Homi K. Bhabha, 'Dissemination: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,' *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 299.
- 4 Bhabha (1990), 300.
- 5 I use the term 'politics' in the wider sense as it pertains to the complex relationships and practices of negotiating power within society rather than just limiting it to issues of governance.
- 6 Shirley Lim, 'Regionalism, English Narrative, and Global Cities.' Paper presented at the Twelfth Triennial Conference of the Association of Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies (ACLALS), Canberra, July 2001.
- 7 The term 'opposition' is used to refer to a deliberate or overt counter-act; 'resistance' denotes a more subtle and disguised form of counter-response.
- 8 Thus far, William Peterson's *Theatre and the Politics of Culture in Contemporary Singapore* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2001) is the only book-length study available.
- 9 There are already a number of studies including Nur Nina Zuhra, 'The Social Context of English-language Drama in Malaysia,' *Asian Voices in English*, eds. Mimi Chan and Roy Harris (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1991), 177–85; Solehah Ishak, 'The Emergence of Modern Malaysian Theatre,' *Tenggara* 19 (1986): 17–41; Lloyd Fernando, *Cultures in Conflict: Essays on Literature and the English Language in South East Asia* (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1986); Robert Yeo, 'Towards an English Language Theatre in Singapore,' *Southeast Asian Review of English* 4 & 5 (1982): 59–73; David Birch, 'Singapore English Drama: A Historical Overview'

- 1958–1985,¹ *Nine Lives: Ten Years of Singapore Theatre 1987–1997* (Singapore: The Necessary Stage Ltd., 1997), 22–51; Clarissa Oon, *Theatre Life! A History of Singapore English Language Theatre Through The Straits Times (1958–2000)* (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings, 2001).
- 10 For further details, see Audrey Wong, ‘Companies and Audiences: Developments in Recent Singaporean Theatre,’ *Interlogue: Studies in Singapore Literature*, Vol. 3: Drama, ed. Kirpal Singh (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2000), 19–35.
- 11 This is not to suggest that theatre was not politicised prior to this period; on the contrary, plays such as Robert Yeo’s *Are You There Singapore?* (1974) demonstrate a high degree of political engagement. However, such plays were anomalous, and it was not until the mid-1980s with the popularisation of works such as Kuo Pao Kun’s *The Coffin Is Too Big for the Hole* that a political turn became discernible in the theatre.
- 12 Jonathan Dollimore, ‘Introduction: Shakespeare, Cultural Materialism and the New Historicism,’ *Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism*, eds. Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 13.
- 13 See Jacqueline Lo, ‘Where Are the Bodies? Post-Colonial Theory and Theatrical Resistance in Malaysia,’ *SPAN* 36.1 (1993): 311–19.
- 14 Fredric Jameson, ‘World Literature in an Age of Multinational Capitalism,’ *The Current in Criticism*, eds. Clayton Koelb and Virgil Lokke (Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1987), 140.
- 15 Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), 322.

CHAPTER 1

- 1 Richard G. Fox, ed. ‘Introduction,’ *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures* (Washington DC: American Anthropological Association, 1990), 10.
- 2 From <http://www.smpke.jpm.my/ris-main.html> (accessed 25 March 2002).
- 3 From <http://www.singstat.gov.sg/c2000/census.html> (accessed 25 March 2002).
- 4 For further analysis, see Edmund Terence Gomez and K. S. Jomo, *Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits* (2nd ed Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- 5 Employment in the Civil Service is on the ratio of 4 to 1, in favour of the *Bumiputera*. Entrance into state tertiary institutions is determined by race rather than by meritocracy, as is the allocation of scholarship awards. In 1980, the tertiary student population amounted to 66% *Bumiputera*, while the Chinese and Indians were 27% and 7% respectively. Viswanathan Selvaratnam,

- Ethnicity, Inequality and Higher Education in Peninsular Malaysia: The Sociological Implications*, Working Paper series 78 (Singapore: Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, 1987), 22.
- 6 Hans Kohn, 'Nationalism,' *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David L. Sills, Vol. 11 (New York: Macmillan Co. & The Free Press, 1968), 63.
 - 7 Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), 168.
 - 8 Fox (1990), 4.
 - 9 J. A. Fishman, ed. *Language Problems of Developing Nations* (New York: Wiley, 1968), 39-52.
 - 10 See Ismail Zain, *Cultural Planning and General Development in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Kementerian Kebudayaan, Belia dan Sukan Malaysia, 1977), 9.
 - 11 The minister suggested that the dance would only be accepted as part of Malaysian culture if the lion's head was replaced by a tiger's, and the dance was accompanied by music from the gong, flute, tabla or gamelan. 'No to Lion Dance With Tiger Head,' *Straits Times*, 24 May 1979, 9.
 - 12 Raymond Lee, 'Symbols of Separatism: Ethnicity and Status Politics in Contemporary Malaysia,' *Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Malaysia*, Occasional Paper no. 12, ed. Raymond Lee (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1986), 21-35.
 - 13 For details, see Raymond Lee (1986), 36-40.
 - 14 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
 - 15 Milton J. Esman, 'Malaysia: Communal Coexistence and Mutual Deterrence,' *Racial Tensions and National Identity*, ed. Ernest Q. Campbell (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), 228-29.
 - 16 See A. B. Shamsul, 'Nations of Intent in Malaysia,' *Asian Forms of the Nation*, ed. Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv (Richmond, Surrey: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies & Curzon Press, 1996), 323-52.
 - 17 Tham Seong Chee, 'Literary Response and the Social Process: An Analysis of Cultural and Political Beliefs Among Malay Writers,' *Essays on Literature and Society in Southeast Asia: Political and Sociological Perspectives*, ed. Tham Seong Chee (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981a), 261.
 - 18 See Richard Basham, 'National Racial Policies and University Education in Malaysia,' *Culture, Ethnicity, and Identity: Current Issues in Research*, ed. William C. McReady (New York: Academic Press, 1983); and Selvaratnam (1987).
 - 19 Ee Tiang Hong, 'Literature and Liberation: The Price of Freedom,' *Literature and Liberation: Five Essays from Southeast Asia*, ed. Edwin Thumboo (Philippines: Solidaridad, 1988), 35-6.
 - 20 Anderson (1983), 122.

- 21 The salience of race in Malaysian society was confirmed by a study in 2000 at the University of Malaya, which revealed that only 10% of students surveyed identified themselves by their nationality as Malaysians rather than by their race or ethnicity. Peter Cordingley, 'Mahathir's Dilemma,' *Asiaweek*, 26 January 2001, 22.
- 22 Judith Nagata, *Malaysian Mosaic: Perspectives From a Poly-Ethnic Society* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979), 6–10.
- 23 Nagata (1979), 10.
- 24 Raymond Lee (1986), 33.
- 25 Mahathir bin Mohamad, *The Malay Dilemma* (Reprint. Singapore: Times Books International, 1970), 127.
- 26 Ronald Provencher, 'Interethnic Conflict in the Malay Peninsula,' *Ethnic Conflict, International Perspectives*, ed. Jerry Boucher, Dan Landis and Karen Ann Clark (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1987), 104.
- 27 See Nagata (1979), 44. According to Ronald Provencher, the gradual change toward a more inclusionist definition of 'Malay' signified the 'forgetting' of once important conflicts with the Javanese, Acehnese and the Bugis as well as the 'overlooking' of non-compatible customs and religious beliefs with communities like the Bataks. Provencher (1987), 109.
- 28 Nagata (1979), 194.
- 29 Chandra Muzaffar, 'Has the Communal Situation Worsened Over the Last Decade? Some Preliminary Thoughts,' *Ethnicity, Class and Development in Malaysia*, ed. S. Husin Ali (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Social Malaysia, 1984), 374.
- 30 Fishman (1968), 31.
- 31 James Fu Chiao Sian, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister, *Straits Times*, 25 November 1986, quoted in Koh Tai Ann, 'Culture and the Arts,' *The Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, ed. Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 711.
- 32 The only concrete policy that signified this status was the granting of free tuition to all Malay students in tertiary education. This tuition has been means-tested since 1989. Chua Beng Huat, *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore* (London: Routledge, 1995), 122.
- 33 See Chew Sock Foon, *Ethnicity and Nationality in Singapore*, Monograph Series no. 78 (Athens, OH: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Ohio University, 1987).
- 34 This becomes problematic for offspring of mixed marriages. While racial identity in everyday life may often be expressed situationally, people of mixed ethnic backgrounds follow the race of their father in the official view, or, in some cases, are categorised as 'Other'.
- 35 John Clammer, *Singapore, Ideology, Society, Culture* (Singapore: Chopmen, 1985), 100.

- 36 For example, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong declared in 1999 that 'Singapore is not yet a nation. It is only a state, a sovereign entity ... But whether [Singapore] will last the next 100 years will depend on whether the different races can gel as one people, feel as one people and pulsate with the same Singapore heartbeat'. *Straits Times*, 6 May 1999, 1.
- 37 In practice, the bilingual policy often places overwhelming stress on the pupils to be trilingual, because the language spoken at home may be one of the vernacular dialects rather than the officially recognised mother tongues. In cases when the pupil chooses to study a second language that is not associated with his or her race, special dispensation must be sought with the authorities. Eddie C. Y. Kuo and Bjorn H. Jernudd, *Language Management in a Multilingual State: The Case of Planning in Singapore*, Working Paper no. 95 (Singapore: Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, 1988), 14.
- 38 Kuo and Jernudd (1988), 7.
- 39 For detailed analysis on the role of language in Singaporean race politics, see Nirmala Srivastava Purushotam, *Negotiating Language, Constructing Race: Disciplining Difference in Singapore* (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1998).
- 40 Purushotam (1998), 74. Purushotam provides a detailed analysis of the impact of race policy on the Indian community in Singapore. For a study of the implication for the Malay community, see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *The Singapore Dilemma: The Political and Educational Marginality of the Malay Community* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998).
- 41 *The Mirror* 14.36 (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 4 September 1978), quoted in Clammer (1985), 22.
- 42 These observations are developed from Clammer (1985), 22.
- 43 *The Mirror* 8.47 (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 20 November 1972), quoted in Edwin Thumboo, 'Self-Images: Contexts for Transformations,' *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, ed. Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), 763.
- 44 Goh Chok Tong, 'To Serve, To Keep Singapore Thriving and Growing,' speech for the swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Goh, 28 November 1990, cited by Purushotam (1998), 210.
- 45 Shirley Chew, 'The Language of Survival,' *Singapore: Society in Transition*, ed. Riaz Hassan (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), 153.
- 46 Moral Education Committee, *Report on Moral Education 1979* (Singapore: Ministry of Education, 1979), 1–2, quoted in Koh (1989), 712.
- 47 Koh (1980), 298.
- 48 Chua (1995), 120.
- 49 Clammer (1985), 23.
- 50 Geoffrey Benjamin, 'The Cultural Logic of Singapore's "Multiracialism",'

- Singapore: Society in Transition*, ed. Riaz Hassan (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), 118.
- 51 Benjamin (1976), 117.
 - 52 Nagata (1979), 253.
 - 53 Benjamin (1976), 123.
 - 54 Benjamin (1976), 123.
 - 55 PuruShotam (1998), 209.
 - 56 PuruShotam (1998), 226.
 - 57 Bhabha (1990), 3.

CHAPTER 2

- 1 Alain Ricard, 'Museum, Mausoleum or Market: The Concept of National Literature,' *Research in African Literature* 18.3 (1987): 298.
- 2 Tham (1981a), 260–61.
- 3 Tham Seong Chee, 'The Politics of Literary Development in Malaysia,' *Essays on Literature and Society in Southeast Asia: Political and Sociological Perspectives*, ed. Tham Seong Chee (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981b), 218.
- 4 Tham (1981a), 265.
- 5 Han Suyin, 'Foreword,' *An Anthology of Modern Malaysian Chinese Stories*, ed. Ly Singko (Singapore: Heinemann, 1967), 5.
- 6 Literatures by the indigenous communities such as the Dayaks, Ibans and Kadazans are categorised as 'Regional Literatures'; little official support or recognition is given to these writings because of their perceived lack of development.
- 7 Mohammad Taib Osman, 'Towards the Development of Malaysia's National Literature,' trans. Jamaliah Ridhuan and Mohammad Taib Osman, *Tenggara* 6 (1973): 119.
- 8 Osman (1973), 119.
- 9 Quoted in Tham (1981b), 235.
- 10 Ismail Hussein, 'Literary Organisations in Malaysia,' Conference of ASEAN Writers 1977 (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1978), 157, quoted in Ee (1988), 16.
- 11 *Mabua* literature uses conversational Chinese (*Bai bua*) with local settings and themes rather than following traditional Chinese literary codes. 'The Struggle of Mahua Literature,' *New Straits Times*, 2 December 1998, 6.
- 12 Zawiah Yahya, *Malay Characters in Malaysian Novels in English* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1988), 10.
- 13 Tham (1981a), 276.
- 14 There are English language writers who have attempted to write across racial

boundaries, one of the earliest being Lloyd Fernando, in his novel, *Scorpion Orchid* (1972), which focuses on the friendship between four friends who represent the Chinese, Malay, Indian and Eurasian communities, at the onset of independence. K. S. Maniam has also explored cross-racial relations in his short stories, most notably in 'The Aborting' and 'Haunting the Tiger'. Examples of theatre-writing include Huzir Sulaiman's *Election Day* (1999), which portrays the relationships between three housemates of Indian, Chinese and Malay descent.

- 15 K. S. Maniam, 'Self, Society and the Malaysian Writer Using English,' *New Sunday Times*, 12 January 1986, 8.
- 16 Maniam (1986), 8.
- 17 Harry Aveling, 'Towards an Anthology of Poetry from Singapore and Malaysia,' *South Pacific Images*, ed. Chris Tiffin (Brisbane: Academy Press, 1978), 91.
- 18 Ee (1988), 19–20.
- 19 Rehman Rashid, *A Malaysian Journey* (Petaling Jaya: Rehman Rashid, 1993), 200–1.
- 20 Cited in Michael Vatikiotis, 'Two-Edged Pen: Malaysians Who Write in English Are Facing a Dilemma,' *Far East Economic Review*, 25 November 1993, 38.
- 21 Koh Tai Ann, 'The Singapore Experience: Cultural Development in the Global Village,' *Southeast Asian Affairs 1980* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies & Heinemann Asia, 1980), 303–4.
- 22 Singapore Government, *Report on the Performing Arts* (Singapore, 1988), 59.
- 23 See Ministry of Information and the Arts, Renaissance City Report 1977 at <http://www.gov.sg/mita/renaissance/ES.htm> (accessed 26 March 2002).
- 24 'Singapore Arts Inc. in the Making,' *Business Times*, 12 March 1999, 5.
- 25 'Singapore Making Arts its Business,' *Business Times*, 27 July 1999, 14.
- 26 Jaime Ee and Schutz Lee, 'State of the Arts,' *Business Times*, 18–19 September 1993, 1.
- 27 Ismail S. Talib, 'Singapore,' *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 35.3 (2000): 98.
- 28 Edwin Thumboo, 'Singapore Writing in English: A Need for Commitment,' *Commentary* 2.4 (May 1978): 21.
- 29 Koh (1980), 304.
- 30 Jan B. Gordon, 'The "Second Tongue" Myth: English Poetry in Polylingual Singapore,' *ARIEL* 15.4 (1984): 45.
- 31 Shirley Lim, 'The English-Language Writer in Singapore,' *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*, ed. Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989b), 530.
- 32 Robert Yeo, 'The Arts in Singapore: The Last Ten Years and Beyond,' *Singapore — A Decade of Independence*, ed. Dr. Charles Ng and T. P. B. Menon (Singapore: Alumni International Singapore, 1975), 55.

- 33 Gordon (1984), 44.
- 34 Kirpal Singh, 'An Approach to Singapore Writing in English,' *ARIEL* 15.2 (1984): 11–12.
- 35 For a more detailed discussion see, Robert Yeo, 'Theatre and Censorship in Singapore,' *Theatre in Southeast Asia*, ed. Jacqueline Lo, special focus issue of *Australasian Drama Studies* 25 (1994): 49–60.
- 36 Peterson (2001), 29–30.
- 37 Cited in Talib (2000), 97.
- 38 Katherine Knorr, 'Forging an Artistic Identity From Singapore's Melting Pot,' *International Herald Tribune* (1998) from <http://www.iht.com/IHT/KK98/kk112598.html> (accessed 23 October 2001).
- 39 T. Sasitharan, 'The Arts: Of Swords, Harnesses and Blinkers,' *State-Society Relations in Singapore*, ed. Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore and Oxford University Press, 2000), 136.
- 40 For detailed discussion of the performance art controversy, see 'Looking at Culture,' a special issue of *Commentary* (1994). Online version available at <http://www.happening.com.sg/commentary/index.html> (accessed 31 January 2001).
- 41 Peterson (2001), 159.
- 42 This is not the first time theatre practitioners have been accused of having Marxist/left-leaning connections; Kuo Pao Kun was detained for four and a half years in 1976; members of the theatre group, the Third Stage, were similarly detained under the ISA in 1987.
- 43 Forum theatre emphasises the mutual conscious-raising of both performer and audience. The audience takes an active and critical role as 'spect-actors' to change the course of the narrative dramatised. See Augusto Boal, *Games for Actors and Non-Actors*, trans. Adrian Jackson (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).
- 44 Russell Heng, 'Arts, Security and Singapore's Liberal Fringe,' *Straits Times*, 28 March 1994, 10.
- 45 Norman Simms, 'The Future of English as a Poetic Medium in Singapore and Malaysia,' *Quarterly World Report/Council on National Literatures* 2.4 (1979): 12.
- 46 Woon Ping Chin Holaday, 'Singing in a Second Tongue: Recent Malaysian Poetry in English,' *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 18.1 (1983): 29.
- 47 Some Malay writers such as Salleh Ben Joned and Muhammed Haji Salleh work in both Malay and English.
- 48 T. Sasitharan, 'Do Not Proscribe Political Art,' *Straits Times*, Life supplement, 8 February 1994, 4.
- 49 Antonio Gramsci, *Selection From the Prison Notebooks* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 9.
- 50 'Whither Today's Intellectuals?' *New Straits Times*, 29 September 1997, 11.

- 51 Chan goes on to note that speaking up and criticising the ruling powers is not merely a Western tradition: 'There are many Chinese scholar-officials who have lost their heads criticising the emperor'. Chan Heng Chee, 'The Role of Intellectuals in Singapore Politics,' *The Future of Singapore—the Global City*, ed. Wee Teong Boo (Singapore: University Education Press, 1977), 46.
- 52 Catherine Lim wrote two articles in the press in 1994, which commented on the Goh government's increasingly 'stern' style. Lim was told by the prime minister to enter the political arena if she wanted to comment regularly on politics. 'PM: Debate Welcomed but Govt Will Rebut Malicious Arguments,' *Straits Times*, 24 January 1995, 1.
- 53 This occurred during Operation Lalang in 1987. See Rashid (1993).
- 54 Koh Tai Ann, 'The Role of the Intellectuals in Civil Society: Going Against the Grain?' *State-Society Relations in Singapore*, ed. Gillian Kok and Ooi Giok Ling (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and Oxford University Press, 2000), 166.
- 55 Chan (1977), 44.
- 56 Stuart Hall, 'The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists,' *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 54.
- 57 Michel Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 95–96.

CHAPTER 3

- 1 Frank Swettenham, *The Real Malay: Pen Pictures* (London: J. Lane, 1900), 39.
- 2 Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 66.
- 3 K. Das, 'Rakan, Teman, Para Bangsawan,' MATG Programme Brochure, 20–23 January 1980, cited in Ishak (1986), 19.
- 4 Quoted in Ishak (1986), 20. Another constitutional change took some time later and the name of the organisation became the Malaysian Arts Theatre Group.
- 5 'The First Act,' *MATG Newsletter* 1.1 (1967), cited in Ishak (1986), 21.
- 6 Fernando (1986), 177.
- 7 Antony Price, 'The Situation of the Malaysian Playwright,' *Westerly* 3 (1971): 36.
- 8 Edward Dorall, 'A Tiger is Loose in Our Community,' in *New Drama One*, ed. Lloyd Fernando (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972), 17.
- 9 For further analysis of early experimentation in Malaysian English, see Teoh Boon Seong, 'Singapore-Malaysian Literature in English: Context and Relevance,' *Southeast Asian Review of English* 11 (1985): 62–80.

- 10 Dorall in Fernando (1972a), 12.
- 11 Margaret Yong, 'Colonial, Postcolonial, Neocolonial and, at last, a "Post-national" Drama,' *World Literature Written in English* 23.1 (1984): 239.
- 12 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Postcolonial Literatures* (1989, London: Routledge, 1993), 38.
- 13 For further discussion, see Jacqueline Lo, 'Arrested Development: Early Malaysian Theatre in English,' *Malaysian Literature in English: A Critical Reader*, ed. Mohammad A. Quayum and Peter C. Wicks (Petaling Jaya: Pearson Education Malaysia, 2001), 94–101.
- 14 Ishak (1986), 23.
- 15 Utih, 'The English-Language Drama Revival,' *New Sunday Times*, 13 October 1985, 13.
- 16 Yong (1984), 239.
- 17 Arun P. Mukherjee, 'The Exclusions of Postcolonial Theory and Mulk Raj Anand's "Untouchable": A Case Study,' *ARIEL* 22.3 (1991): 33.
- 18 Peter J. Rimmer and Lisa M. Allen, eds. *The Underside of Malaysian History* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), 8.
- 19 Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (1993), 161.
- 20 Rimmer and Allen (1990), 8.
- 21 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313 and 'Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,' *The Spivak Reader*, ed. Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean (New York & London: Routledge, 1996), 203–35; Benita Parry, 'Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse,' *Oxford Literary Review* 9 (1987): 27–58; Ranajit Guha, ed. *A Subaltern Studies Reader 1986–1995* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
- 22 The Indians are doubly disadvantaged in both class and race, for they are lumped with the relatively wealthy Chinese under the non-*Bumiputera* category and are therefore ineligible for economic assistance through the New Development Policy or its predecessor, the New Economic Policy. According to Santha Oorjitham, about 54% of Malaysian Indians work on plantations or as urban labourers, and their wages have not kept up with the times. Although they make up only 7.4% of the total population, Indians constitute 41% of beggars and 20% of child abusers. They also rank lowest in national elementary school examinations; one in every 12 Indian children does not attend primary school. 'Forgotten Community,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 January 2001, 25.
- 23 For information on the estate labourers, see Colin Barlow, 'Changes in the Economic Position of Workers on Rubber Estates and Smallholdings in Peninsular Malaysia, 1910–1985,' in Rimmer and Allen (1990), 25–49; and D. J. M. Tate, *The Rubber Growers' Association History of the Plantation Industry in the Malay Peninsula* (London: Oxford University Press, 1996).

- 24 Alcohol was an easy source of revenue for the colonial government as well as an effective means of attracting labour for the planters. For further information see, Prakash C. Jain, 'Exploitation and Reproduction of Migrant Indian Labour in Colonial Guyana and Malaysia,' *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 18.2 (1988): 189–206.
- 25 Henri Fauconnier, *The Soul of Malaya*, trans. Eric Sutton (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), 51.
- 26 Jain (1988), 199.
- 27 Fauconnier (1990), 45.
- 28 Fauconnier (1990), 44.
- 29 Fauconnier (1990), 45.
- 30 Stephen Slemon, 'Post-Colonial Allegory and the Transformation of History,' *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 23.1 (1988): 161–62.
- 31 Bhabha (1994), 86.
- 32 Bhabha (1994), 28.
- 33 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (New York: Methuen, 1987), 205.
- 34 K. S. Maniam, *The Cord* (Kuala Lumpur: Aspatra Quest, 1983), 16. All subsequent references to the play are given in parentheses in the text.
- 35 Ruth Reyna, *Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (Bombay: Tata McGraw-Hill, 1971), 62.
- 36 Reyna (1971), 66.
- 37 Maila K. Stivens, 'Perspectives on Gender: Problems in Writing About Women in Malaysia,' *Fragmented Vision*, ed. Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), 202.
- 38 Slemon (1988), 59.
- 39 Frantz Fanon, *Toward the African Revolution*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press 1967), 24.
- 40 W. D. Ashcroft, 'Is That the Congo? Language as Metonymy in the Postcolonial Text,' *Literature and National Cultures*, ed. Brian Edwards (Geelong, Victoria: Centre for Studies in Literary Education, Deakin University, 1988), 57.
- 41 Other examples of non-translated words include reference to the pawnshop as 'lelong' (2) and verbal abuse such as 'poking-choking' (9). Examples of non-standard syntax and metaphors include 'bad-blood dreams' (5), 'An unquiet house. Unquiet stomachs' (27), and 'Your mind is as loud as boot studs' (43).
- 42 Ashcroft (1988), 61.
- 43 Ooi Boo Eng, 'Malaysia and Singapore,' *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 19.2 (1984): 96.
- 44 Ooi (1984), 96.
- 45 W. D. Ashcroft, 'Constitutive Graphonomy: A Postcolonial Theory of Literary Writing,' *Kunapipi* 11.1 (1989): 72.

- 46 Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 291.
- 47 Bhabha (1994), 112.
- 48 Bhabha (1994), 115.

CHAPTER 4

- 1 Pierre Macherey, *A Theory of Literary Production*, trans. Geoffrey Wall (London, Henley, Boston; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 87.
- 2 Tan Sooi Beng, 'Counterpoints in the Performing Arts of Malaysia,' *Fragmented Vision*, ed. Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), 285. Under the Police Act, an assembly of four or more persons without a police permit is deemed illegal; ignorance of the illegality is not accepted as a legitimate defence.
- 3 Examples include the 1996 controversy over the 'damaging influence' of Michael Jackson's concerts on Malaysian youths and the 1997 touring concert of local rap group, 'KRU'.
- 4 'Mixed Reaction to Ban on Concerts Featuring Artists With Long Hair,' *New Straits Times*, 15 June 1992a, 5.
- 5 The rock bands, 'Search' and 'Wings', were banned from live performances and airplay on television and radio. The ban was lifted in November 1992 when band members' long hair was cut by the Information Minister. This ceremony was officially broadcast live on the *Selamat Pagi Malaysia* (Good Morning Malaysia) programme. 'Minister Cuts Long Haired Artists,' *New Straits Times*, Lifestyle section, 1 January 1993, 27.
- 6 'Govt "No" to Sexy, Sleeveless Outfits for Television Artistes,' *New Straits Times*, 6 July 1992b, 15.
- 7 Maureen Ten, 'Just When We Thought It Was Safe to Go to the Theatre Again,' in Kee Thuan Chye, *1984 Here and Now* (Selangor: K. Das Ink, 1987), 93.
- 8 Shirley Lim, 'Abstracting the Nation in Kee Thuan Chye's *1984 Here and Now* and *The Big Purge*: National Allegory or Modernist Theatre,' *Tamkang Review* 29.2 (1998): 123.
- 9 Cited in Kit Leee, 'Big Brother Lives: Introduction,' in Kee Thuan Chye, *1984 Here and Now* (Selangor: K. Das Ink, 1987a), iv.
- 10 Kit Leee, 'Faith, Fear and My Frank Opinion of *1984 Here and Now*,' *New Sunday Times*, 28 July 1985, reprinted in Kee Thuan Chye, *1984 Here and Now* (Selangor: K. Das Ink, 1987b), 121.
- 11 Kee Thuan Chye, *1984 Here and Now* (Selangor: K. Das Ink, 1987), 34. All subsequent references to the play are placed in parentheses in the main text. The play was reprinted under the same title in Singapore by

- Times International in 2003. A slightly edited version of the play is included in *Postcolonial Plays: An Anthology*, ed. Helen Gilbert (London: Routledge, 2001).
- 12 Leee (1987a), x.
 - 13 K. Das, 'No Wild Cheers Just Yet, But a Quiet Yes to 1984,' in Kee (1987), 132.
 - 14 Kua Kia Soong, '1984 Here and Now,' in Kee (1987), 116.
 - 15 Bunn Nagara, 'When Courage is Not Enough to Stir Up Public Concern,' in Kee, (1987), 138.
 - 16 Leee (1987a), xi.
 - 17 Nagara (1987), 139.
 - 18 Kee (1987), ii.
 - 19 See Eugene Van Erven, *Radical People's Theatre* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988) and *The Playful Revolution: Theatre and Liberation in Asia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).
 - 20 Gramsci (1971), 12.
 - 21 Gramsci (1971), 12.
 - 22 Legislation used by the state to control dissent include: the *Public Order (Preservation) Ordinance*, which restricts public gatherings and rallies by empowering the police to regulate processions and meetings of five or more people and to search and arrest without warrant; and the Societies Act of 1966 and its subsequent amendments, which give the authorities the right to deregister any group that challenges the government and its stipulations. Groups that attempt to 'influence' the government could either be deregistered or would have to re-register as a 'political society' and would be prohibited from having non-citizen membership or any international links without permission. Gordon P. Means, *Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991), 85.
 - 23 Chandra Muzaffar, *Freedom in Fetters* (1986, Penang: ALIRAN, 1988), 284. See also section on 'The Controlled Press,' 44–54.
 - 24 Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1972, London: Penguin, 1990), 101.
 - 25 Ooi Boo Eng, 'Malaysia and Singapore,' *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 21.2 (1986): 102.
 - 26 Kee Thuan Chye, 'All We Want is an Even Chance,' *New Sunday Times*, 14 May 1989, reprinted in Kee Thuan Chye, *Just in So Many Words* (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1992), 266–67.
 - 27 Kit Leee, 'A Long-Distance Postscript,' in Kee (1987c), 155.
 - 28 Van Erven (1992), xiii.

CHAPTER 5

- 1 For a discussion of this early period of Singaporean theatre, see Birch (1997).
- 2 The Peranakans, or the Straits Chinese, are a culturally distinct group of people whose heritage dates back to the sixteenth century. It is generally believed that the early Peranakan community arose through intermarriage between Chinese immigrants and Malay women. The culture is therefore a hybrid of Malay and Chinese, and with the onset of colonialism, British accretions. The community has a distinct patois, which is a mixture of Malay, Singaporean English and Hokkien languages.
- 3 Max Le Blond, 'Introduction,' in Stella Kon, *Emily of Emerald Hill* (London: MacMillan, 1989), 3.
- 4 Max Le Blond, 'Drama in Singapore: Towards an English Language Theatre,' *Discharging the Canon*, ed. Peter Hyland (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1986), 114.
- 5 Max Le Blond, 'The English Language Theatre in Singapore,' *A Drop of Rain, a Single Flame* (Singapore: Education Publication Bureau, 1981), 13.
- 6 Le Blond (1986), 118.
- 7 Jothie Rajah and Simon Tay, 'From Second Tongue to Mother Tongue: A Look at the Use of English in Singaporean English Drama from the 1960s to the Present,' *Perceiving Other Worlds*, ed. Edwin Thumboo (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), 407.
- 8 Krishen Jit, 'Modern Theatre in Singapore: A Preliminary Survey,' *Tengarra* 23 (1989): 222.
- 9 See Felix Chia, 'Revived Interest in Baba Theatre,' *Performing Arts* 3 (1986): 1–5; and Anne Pakir, 'Peranakans in Plays: Cultural Record or Compelling Drama?' *Perceiving Other Worlds*, ed. Edwin Thumboo (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), 386–99. It is important to stress that although *Emily* is set in a Peranakan environment and has many aspects of Peranakan theatre, it is not a Peranakan play. The play's linguistic and thematic scope is more extensive and sophisticated than the typical Peranakan play, which is characteristically a comedy of manners heavily reliant on stereotyping and melodrama.
- 10 Kenneth Kwok, 'Oh Emily, Yours is a Life Worth Reliving,' *Straits Times*, 19 May 1999, 6.
- 11 Jit (1989b), 223.
- 12 Spivak (1987), 179.
- 13 Spivak (1988), 271–313.
- 14 Jenny Sharpe, 'Figures of Colonial Resistance,' *Modern Fiction Studies* 35.1 (1989): 143.
- 15 Parry (1987), 34.
- 16 John Clammer, 'Straits Chinese Literature: A Minority Literature as a Vehicle of Identity,' *Essays on Literature and Society in Southeast Asia: Political*

- and Sociological Perspectives*, ed. Tham Seong Chee (1981), 293.
- 17 Stella Kon, *Emily of Emerald Hill* (London: Macmillan, 1989), 5. Subsequent references to the play are placed in parentheses in the main text.
- 18 Judith Stacey, *Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 39.
- 19 Goh Chok Tong, then Minister for Trade and Industry in 1980, quoted in Linda Lim, 'A New Order With Some Old Prejudices,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 January 1984, 38.
- 20 Lee Kuan Yew cited in Vivienne Wee, 'The Ups and Downs of Women's Status in Singapore: A Chronology of Some Landmark Events, 1950–1987,' *Commentary* 7.2–3 (1987): 9.
- 21 Lim (1984), 38.
- 22 Lim (1984), 38.
- 23 See Moira Gatens, 'Corporeal Representation in/and the Body Politic,' *Cartographies*, ed. Rosalyn Diprose and Robyn Ferrell (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991): 79–87 and C. Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988).
- 24 Kumari Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World* (London: Zed Books, 1986).
- 25 Elleke Boehmer, 'Stories of Women and Mothers: Gender and Nationalism in the Early Fiction of Flora Nwapa,' *Motherlands: Black Women's Writing From Africa, the Caribbean and South Asia*, ed. Susheila Nasta (London: Women's Press, 1991), 6 (emphasis added).
- 26 Gatens (1991), 81.
- 27 Senior Minister Lee declared that the perceived imbalance caused by uneducated women bearing more children than their educated counterparts could result in less intelligent future generations and that it is the duty of the latter to ensure the perpetuation of the *status quo*. Otherwise, 'levels of competence will decline,' and '[o]ur economy will falter, the administration will suffer and the society will decline'. Cited in V. G. Kulkarni, 'Designer Genes,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 September 1983, 23.
- 28 Biddy Martin, 'Feminism, Criticism, and Foucault,' *Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance*, ed. Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988), 6.
- 29 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), 138.
- 30 Foucault (1991), 201.
- 31 Elizabeth Grosz, 'Inscriptions and Body-maps: Representations and the Corporeal,' *Feminine/Masculine and Representation*, eds. Terry Treadgold and Anne Cranny-Francis (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990), 64.
- 32 There have since been significant numbers of Singaporean plays written by women and focusing on their particular experiences, including Ovidia

- Yu's *Mistress* (1990), *Three Fat Virgins Unassembled* (1995) and *Breast Issues* (1997); Chin Woon Ping's *Details Cannot Body Want* (1992); and Eleanor Wong's trilogy: *Mergers and Accusations* (1993), *Wills and Secession* (1995) and *Jointly and Severably* (2003).
- 33 Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 136.
- 34 Jacques Lacan, 'The Line and the Light,' *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Hogarth Press & The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977), 99.
- 35 Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. and ed. H. M. Parshley (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953), 273.
- 36 Bhabha (1984), 126.
- 37 Butler (1990), 138.
- 38 Butler (1990), 140–41 (original emphasis).
- 39 Bhabha (1984), 127.
- 40 Luce Irigaray, 'Women's Exile,' trans. Couzé Venn, *Ideology and Consciousness* 1 (1977): 62–76, and Moira Gatens, 'Towards a Feminist Philosophy of the Body,' *Crossing Boundaries: Feminism and the Critique of Knowledges*, ed. Barbara Cain et al. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 59–70.
- 41 Susan J. Hekman, *Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Postmodern Feminism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990), 72–73.
- 42 Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power,' *Critical Inquiry* 8 (1982): 792.
- 43 Michel Foucault, 'Truth and Power,' *Power/Knowledge*, ed. Colin Gordon (Sussex: Harvester, 1980), 117.
- 44 Janelle Reinelt, 'Feminist Theory and the Problem of Performance,' *Modern Drama* 32.1 (1989): 52.
- 45 Norman L. Fairclough, 'Critical and Descriptive Goals in Discourse Analysis,' *Journal of Pragmatics* 9 (1985): 753.
- 46 Trinh T. Minh-ha, *Woman, Native, Other* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 106.

CHAPTER 6

- 1 Kuo Pao Kun, 'Playwright's Voice: A Forum on Playwriting,' in *Nine Lives: Ten Years of Singapore Theatre 1987–1997* (Singapore: The Necessary Stage Ltd., 1997), 67.
- 2 Clammer (1993), 36–37.
- 3 For details, see Peterson (2001) and David Birch, 'Singapore English Drama: An Exiled Theatre,' *New Literature Review* 19 (1990): 24–34.
- 4 Barry Wilkinson, 'Social Engineering in Singapore,' *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 18.2 (1988): 175.

- 5 The president's speech was made in January 1989, reprinted in the White Paper, *Shared Values* (Singapore: National Printers, 1991), quoted in Clammer (1985), 40.
- 6 Clammer (1993), 42.
- 7 E. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–2.
- 8 T. C. Bestor, *Neighbourhood Tokyo* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 4.
- 9 Cited in Lynn Pan, 'Playing Fast and Loose With Confucian Values,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 May 1988, 47.
- 10 Krishen Jit, 'Introduction,' in Kuo Pao Kun, *The Coffin Is Too Big for the Hole ... and Other Plays* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1990), 7.
- 11 For a discussion of Kuo's contribution to Singaporean theatre, see C. J. W.-L. Wee and Lee Chee Eng, 'Introduction: Breaking Through Walls and Visioning Beyond — Kuo Pao Kun Beyond the Margins,' in *Two Plays by Kuo Pao Kun: Descendants of the Eunuch Admiral and The Sprits Play*, ed. C. J. W.-L. Wee and Lee Chee Eng (Singapore: SNP Editions, 2003), 13–43.
- 12 Jit (1990), 12.
- 13 Jit (1990), 12.
- 14 Kuo (1994), 59.
- 15 Jit (1990), 16.
- 16 Kuo Pao Kun, 'Theatre in Singapore: An Interview with Kuo Pao Kun,' by Jacqueline Lo, *Australasian Drama Studies* 23 (1993): 139–40.
- 17 According to newspaper reports, Kuo was arrested on 17 March 1976: 'At the time of his arrest, he was Assistant Secretary of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce ... His conversion to communist ideology was by self indoctrination from the books he read in Australia ... he returned to Singapore in 1965 and set up a Performing Arts Studio to propagate leftist dance and drama ... He was inducted into the MPLL [Malayan People's Liberation League] in August 1974 ... ' 'The Faces of Subversion', *Straits Times*, 28 May 1976, 30, cited in Wee and Lee (2003), 32.
- 18 Kuo (1993), 141.
- 19 Kuo (1993), 142 (emphasis added).
- 20 Kuo (1993), 142.
- 21 Kuo Pao Kun, 'Time/Space with a Simple Gesture,' *The Drama Review* 38.2 (1994): 60.
- 22 Kuo (1993), 137.
- 23 Kuo (1994), 60.
- 24 Foucault (1991), 128–29.
- 25 Kuo (1994), 60.
- 26 For example, Wong Kwang Han claims that Kuo's works, which typically employ metaphors and imagery, 'have become more and more vague as the playwright grows older ... In his later works, one is hard pressed to

- pin down exactly what the target is'. 'Pitfalls in Singaporean Theatre,' *Straits Times*, Life supplement, 1 January 1999, 11.
- 27 Jit (1990), 21.
- 28 Jit (1990), 21.
- 29 George Yeo, 'Eastern Roots, Western Winds,' *Sunday Times*, Sunday Review, 6 September 1992, 8.
- 30 I use this term to mean Foucault's description of a system in which individuals are distributed around a norm — which both organises and is the result of this controlled distribution. The main function of this system of normalisation is to regulate, hierarchise and maintain the regime of power. Michael Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, trans. Robert Huxley (1976, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990).
- 31 Foucault (1990), 58–59.
- 32 Foucault (1991), 29.
- 33 Hannah Pandian, 'Meek but Masterful,' *Straits Times*, 6 December 1990, 14.
- 34 Foucault (1991), 137–38.
- 35 Ross Chambers, *Room for Maneuver* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 9.
- 36 Chambers (1991), 9.
- 37 Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), xiii.

CHAPTER 7

- 1 Sasitharan (1994), 4.
- 2 Simon Tay, 'A New Role for Singapore Poets,' *Business Times*, 25–26 February 1996, 2.
- 3 Sanjay Krishnan, 'Introduction,' *Nine Lives: Ten Years of Singapore Theatre 1987–1997* (Singapore: The Necessary Stage Ltd., 1997), 17.
- 4 Joanna Abisegam, 'DramaLab's Theatrical Experiment,' *New Straits Times*, Sunday Style supplement, 21 May 1995.
- 5 Cited in Abisegam (1995).
- 6 For a discussion of Five Arts Centre activities, see Catherine Diamond, 'Parallel Streams: Two Currents of Difference in Kuala Lumpur's Contemporary Theatre,' *The Drama Review* 46.2 (2002): 29–34.
- 7 Kit Lee, 'Review: Millennium Jump: Yet Another Millennium Approaches,' at <http://artsee.community.everyone.net/commun~v3/scripts/thread.pl> (accessed 31 August 2001).
- 8 Utih, 'Taking a Dig at Life,' *New Straits Times*, Sunday Style supplement, 15 May 1994, 16.
- 9 See Diamond (2002), 27–29.

- 10 Rehman Rashid, 'Hands on the Rudder,' *Star*, Sunday Magazine, 29 May 1995, 33.
- 11 See Chapter 1 for further discussion on *Barisan Alternatif*.
- 12 See <http://www.sabrizain.demon.co.uk/main2.htm> (accessed 29 January 2003). The diary has also been published in Sabri Zain, *Face Off: A Malaysian Reformasi Diary (1998–99)* (Singapore: BigO Books, 2000).
- 13 See <http://www.malaysiakini.com/>.
- 14 On one occasion, hackers broke into dozens of government websites with images of rotting skulls and obscene messages. One hacker who identified as 'Xenophobia' attacked twenty-one government sites with demands for greater press freedom and an end to corruption. See 'Hacking as Political Weapon in Malaysia,' <http://usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cti083.htm> (accessed 20 June 2001).
- 15 For more information, see <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/artisproactiv/> (accessed 29 January 2003).
- 16 In October 1987, one hundred and sixteen people were detained without trial under the ISA.
- 17 Lee Weng Choy, 'Artis Pro Activ,' *Art Asia Pacific* 24 (1999): 40.
- 18 Lee Weng Choy (1999), 40. APA continues to campaign for social and cultural reform. In June 2001, it hosted an art auction as a show of political solidarity and to raise funds for Hishamudin Rais, who was sentenced to two years imprisonment under the ISA. Well-known theatre practitioners, Jo Kukathas and Harith Iskandar, acted as the auctioneers.
- 19 'Malaysian Satirists Push the Limits,' *Business Times*, 20 May 1999.
- 20 Anwar Ibrahim is held at the Kamunting detention camp.
- 21 'Malaysian Satirists' (1999).
- 22 'Malaysian Satirists' (1999).
- 23 'Malaysian Satirists' (1999).
- 24 The College itself was never supportive of these efforts and viewed them with some suspicion, although no action was taken to censor the performances. I am grateful to Mohan Ambikaipaker for supplying me with information regarding ARTicle 19 and Akshen.
- 25 The group's name refers to Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinion without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers'. See <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html> (accessed 15 March 2002).
- 26 Mohan Ambikaipaker, 'Fervour of the Youth,' *The Edge*, 3 July 2000, 4.
- 27 Ambikaipaker (2000), 4.
- 28 Many of the students have gone on to pursue studies in literature and performance overseas; some have resisted the conventional university path and are currently involved in community development projects through the arts.

- 29 Jan Thornton, review of *Lebih Kecob*, 23 July 2001, at <http://www.kakisensi.com/articles/reviews/MDAyNQ.html> (accessed 24 July 2003).
- 30 See mission statement at <http://www.rep21.com/> (accessed 15 March 2002).
- 31 Active protest works were also being produced in Malay language theatre. One of the most provocative and radical groups was Hishamuddin Rais's agit-prop theatre company, which mainly consisted of working-class Malay university students.
- 32 Amir Muhammad, 'What's Cooking, Charlene?' *New Straits Times*, 24 March 1999, 8.
- 33 Audrey Wong (2000), 20–21.
- 34 See Singapore Repertory Theatre website at <http://www.singrep.com/Index.htm> (accessed 18 March 2002).
- 35 For analysis of the plays, see Jacqueline Lo, 'Prison-house, Closet and Camp: Lesbian Mimesis in Eleanor Wong's Plays,' *Interlogue: Studies in Singapore Literature Vol. 3—Drama*, ed. Kirpal Singh (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2000), 99–116.
- 36 See http://www.singaporetheatre.com/groups/theatre_groups.htm (accessed 19 March 2001).
- 37 For details of the performances, see <http://www.theartsmagazine.com.sg/indexcurrent.html> (accessed 19 March 2001).
- 38 Peterson (2001), 161.
- 39 See the Singapore Tourism Board's promotion of Singapore as the New Asia at <http://www.newasia-singapore.com> (accessed 19 March 2001).
- 40 See Wild Rice Company's mission statement at http://www.singaporetheatre.com/groups/theatre_groups.htm (emphasis added); see also <http://www.artsee.net/wildrice> (accessed 19 March 2001).
- 41 Lee Weng Choy, 'Imaginary Fronts: The Necessary Stage and the Problem of Representation,' *Nine Lives: Ten Years of Singapore Theatre 1987–1997* (Singapore: The Necessary Stage Ltd., 1997), 213.
- 42 Lee Weng Choy (1997), 217.
- 43 See also C. J. W.-L. Wee, 'Creating High Culture in the Globalized "Cultural Dessert" of Singapore,' *The Drama Review* 47.4 (2004): 84–97.
- 44 See TheatreWorks website at <http://www.theatreworks.org.sg/>.
- 45 Clarissa Oon, 'Asia's Lear Goes West,' *The Straits Times*, 18 March 1999b, 2.
- 46 Cited in C. J. W.-L. Wee, 'National Identity, the Arts and the Global City,' *Singapore in the New Millennium: Challenges Facing the City-State*, ed. Derek da Cunha (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 224.
- 47 Wee (2002), 225.
- 48 To denote Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Other racial categories.
- 49 Ong Keng Sen, *Lear Programme* (Perth: Festival of Perth Publication, 1999), 6.
- 50 Peterson (2001), 215.

- 51 For instance, Clarissa Oon critiqued the production as a 'largely seamless Babel of Asian languages and tradition' which lacked substance: 'The flesh-and-blood complexity of the original Shakespearean characters have thus been pared down into archetypes ... These archetypes, while effectively played off in the performance text, are vague and flabby as socio-political commentary'. Clarissa Oon, 'Who is Behind Me?' *Straits Times*, 30 January 1999a, 32.
- 52 Cited in Peterson (2001), 216.
- 53 For detailed analysis of power relations in intercultural and cross-cultural theatre, see Jacqueline Lo and Helen Gilbert, 'Towards a Topography of Cross-cultural Praxis', *The Drama Review*, 46.3 (2002): 31–53.
- 54 Wong Kwang Han (1999), 11.
- 55 Ong Keng Sen in an interview broadcast on Japanese television, cited in Peterson (2001), 217.
- 56 Ien Ang and Jon Stratton, 'Straddling East and West: Singapore's Paradoxical Search for National Identity,' *Asian and Pacific Inscriptions: Identities, Ethnicities, Nationalities*, ed. Suvendrini Perera (Melbourne: Meridian Books, La Trobe University, 1995), 190.
- 57 Peterson (2001), 217.
- 58 Alvin Tan, 'A Necessary Practice,' *Nine Lives: Ten Years of Singapore Theatre 1987–1997* (Singapore: The Necessary Stage Ltd., 1997), 269.
- 59 Alvin Tan (1997), 269–70.
- 60 Alvin Tan (1997), 266.
- 61 For details, see Audrey Wong, 'Collaboration and Social Commitment in The Necessary Stage,' *Nine Lives: Ten Years of Singapore Theatre 1987–1997* (Singapore: The Necessary Stage Ltd., 1997), 193–99.
- 62 Jacinta Stephens, 'Lion City's Stage of Change,' *AsiaWeek.Com Magazine* 26.27, 14 July 2000 at <http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0714/as.theatre.html> (accessed 13 February 2002).
- 63 The flyer promoting the production presented three suggestive images of a semi-naked lesbian couple embracing in bed. I am grateful to C. J. W.-L. Wee for drawing the flyer to my attention.
- 64 Geraldine Heng and Janadas Devan, 'Why is the Arts Scene So Obsessed With Things Sexual?' *Business Times*, 27–28 March 1993, 2.
- 65 Philip Jeyaretnam, 'Sex, Art and Singapore,' *Commentary* 11.1 (1993): 43 (emphasis added).
- 66 See Chapter 2 for details.
- 67 Sasitharan (1994), 4.
- 68 Sasitharan (2000), 135.
- 69 A media statement by members of the arts community was coordinated by Artis Pro Activ (APA) in March 2002, to draw attention to concerns about increasing censorship regulations in March 2002.
- 70 'ICT Wants City Hall to Clarify Status' at <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/2003072300111384.php> (accessed 24 July 2003).

- 71 Chan Heng Weng, 'PM Goh Remains Committed to Consultation and Consensus Politics,' *Straits Times*, 4 December 1994, 4.
- 72 Chua Beng Huat, 'The Relative Autonomies of the State and Civil Society,' *State-Society Relations in Singapore*, ed. Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling (Singapore: Oxford University Press and The Institute of Policy Studies, 2000), 73.
- 73 Chua (2000), 25.
- 74 Stephen Greenblatt, 'Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and Its Subversion,' *Glyph* 8 (1981): 41.
- 75 Hall (1988), 53.
- 76 Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 113.

Index

- Action Theatre 175–76
Actors Studio, The 168, 172
Ahmad, Shahnون 171
Akshen Theatre. *See ARTicle 19*
ambivalence 2, 48, 59–60, 78, 83, 94–99, 114, 117, 126, 134–35, 153, 188
Anderson, Benedict 16, 19
ARTicle 19 167, 172–73
Artis Pro Activ (APA) 170–71
Asia Theatre in Research Circus 176
Asian values 6, 26–28, 139, 150–51, 177
authenticity, as problem 6, 21, 54, 57–58, 61, 71, 75, 112–13, 149
Badawi, Abdullah Mohamad 13
Bahasa Malaysia 14, 17–19, 34–36, 55, 77, 87, 168, 171
Ben Joned, Salleh 35, 37–38
Bhabha, Homi 2, 30, 51, 60, 78, 114, 126, 129
body: as performative 58, 60–61; docile body 121–24, 130, 145, 154–55, 157–60; embodied enunciation 53, 76–77; body politic 13, 28, 87, 117, 119–21, 129
Bumiputera 15–21, 29, 46, 56–57, 94, 102
censorship 4, 42–47, 80–85, 100–3, 184–87; self-censorship 42–43, 45–47, 83, 154–56, 172
colonialism 5–7, 18, 36–37, 73–75, 78, 87; colonial history 1, 56, 58, 113, 115–16, 157, 165; colonial race policy 19–21, 27, 30
communalism 11–12, 16, 19–20, 28–29, 35, 93–95, 107
Confucian philosophy/values 117, 119, 120–21, 140–42, 150–53, 156–57, 160
Constitution Amendment Act 1971 12, 15, 18, 32
counter-discourse 2, 56, 58, 76, 95, 116; counter-hegemonic 28, 77, 114, 126, 138, 188
cross-gender casting 85–86, 98
cross-racial casting 85, 88, 97
cultural essentialism 67–73, 78
dialogic 58, 77–78, 134, 188
Dorall, Edward 36, 53–55
DramaLab 168–69
Ee, Tiang Hong 36–37
expatriate theatre 51–52
Five Arts Centre 56, 167–68, 172–74
forum theatre 44–45, 138, 185, 187
Gabungan Penulis Nasional (GAPENA) 32–33
global city for the arts 4, 39–40, 178, 184, 186–87
globalization 1, 41, 43, 139, 178–82
Goh, Chok Tong 11, 26, 39, 46
heteroglossia 77–79
homosexuality 44, 121, 182; male homosexuality 44, 185
hybrid 19, 27, 29, 48, 60, 62, 117, 157, 177–78; hybridity 7, 41, 69–73, 78–79, 111; linguistic hybridity 73–79

- Ibrahim, Anwar 12, 169–72, 174
 Instant Café Theatre 167–68, 171–72,
 186–87
 intellectual 4, 17, 46–47, 49. *See also*
 middle-class intellectual
 interculturalism 176–77, 179–81
 Internal Security Act (ISA) 4, 46–47,
 101–2, 120, 137, 143, 159, 170, 186
 intraculturalism 182–84
 Islam 14–15, 20, 29, 88–89, 168;
 Islamic revivalism 12, 17, 82–83,
 98
 Jit, Krishen 37, 55–56, 83–84, 111–12,
 141–42, 144, 147, 149
 Kualiworks 168–69
 Le Blond, Max 39, 109–11
 Lee, Kuan Yew 10–11, 22, 27, 38
 liberalisation of the arts 43–46, 184–87
 Lim, Catherine 47, 187
 Mahathir bin Mohamad 12, 91, 169
 Mahua literature 33
 Malay literati/intellectual 31–35, 46
 Malayan/Malaysian Arts Theatre Group
 (MATG) 51–52
 Manichean binary/code/opposition
 6–7, 58, 60–67, 69, 113–115, 117
 May 13, 1969 riots 5, 11, 15, 16–17,
 32, 55, 67, 92, 105
 metonymy 120; metonymic language
 73–77, 79
 middle-class intellectual 35, 37, 100,
 107–8
 middle-class audience 100, 104–05,
 112
 mimicry 3, 78, 188; gender mimicry
 124–29; linguistic mimicry 54, 56,
 74
 mother tongue 23–29, 38, 40–41, 73,
 142
 Muhammad, Amir 37, 172
 multicultural policy 22–23, 27–30,
 38–42, 111, 157, 180
 multiculturalism 15–16, 167, 177, 180
 National Arts Council (NAC) 39–40,
 43–45, 185
 National Cultural Policy 14; in
 Malaysia 15–21, 29, 81, 83, 89–90,
 166; in Singapore 21–30
 National Development Policy (NDP)
 12
 national literature 31–35, 40–42
 nationalism, theorising 1–2, 7, 13–15,
 119–20; hegemonic nationalism 3,
 7, 113, 165
 nationism 21
 nation-space 30
 Necessary Stage, The 44–45, 138,
 141, 179, 181–85
 New Asia 177–79, 181
 New Economic Plan (NEP) 12, 15,
 36–37
 Ng, Josef 44, 185
 Ong, Keng Sen 141, 175–76, 179–82
 opposition and resistance, theorising
 1–3, 5–7, 18, 47–49, 68–69, 76,
 93–95, 107–08, 114–15, 135, 162–64,
 187–90
 Orientalism 29, 181; Oriental
 seductress 59, 64
 Panopticon 122–23, 145, 158
 People's Action Party (PAP) 10–11,
 42, 137, 143, 159
 Peranakan/Straits Chinese 19, 27, 35,
 109, 111–13, 115–17, 127, 131
 performance art 45, 185, 187
 performative 2–3, 76, 83–85, 115,
 155, 159, 188; performative speech
 76–77
 performing gender 122–29, 133
 performing race 88

- Public Entertainment Licensing Unit (PELU) 43–45, 185
racial essentialism 87, 96
Rais, Hishamuddin 46–47
Rashid, Rafique 171
Rashid, Rehman 37–38, 47
Reformasi 169, 186, 188; artistic responses to *Reformasi* 169–75
Repertory 21/Rep 21 167, 172, 174
sectional literature 32–35
Singapore Repertory Theatre 175–76
Soul of Malaya, Henri Fauconnier 59–60, 65
Special Branch Police 47, 83–84, 104, 106
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 57, 61, 114
stereotype: colonial 51, 57–65; gender stereotype 59, 95–99, 118–19, 134; racial stereotype 95–99
strategic essentialism 61
subaltern 57, 58, 61, 114, 134; subaltern history 55–63, 65; female subaltern 63–67
subjectivity, theorising 61–63, 114–15, 132–34, 145–46, 158–61
Sulaiman, Huzir 37
Tham, Shannon 44, 185
Theatre OX 141, 177
TheatreWorks 141, 147, 166, 175–81
traditional arts 38, 63, 82, 92, 142, 144
traditional values/culture 24–28, 32, 89, 139–41, 149–51, 160–61
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) 9, 12–13, 91, 93–94
Westernisation 24, 26–28, 38, 82, 112; Western values 25–29, 88, 139, 150–51
Wild Rice 177–78
World Theatre in Research Circus. *See* Asia Theatre in Research Circus
Yeo, Robert 42
Zaman, Dina 37, 168–69