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*Culture and Society*

# TOWARD CRITICAL PATRIOTISM

## Student Resistance to Political Education in Hong Kong and China

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"At first glance, Square Word Calligraphy appears to be nothing more unusual than Chinese characters, but in fact it is a new way of rendering English words in the format of a square so they resemble Chinese characters. Chinese viewers expect to be able to read Square Word Calligraphy but cannot. Western viewers, however are surprised to find they can read it. Delight erupts when meaning is unexpectedly revealed."

— Britta Erickson, *The Art of Xu Bing*

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# Introduction

"If we accept that it is we who have to decide our future . . . we will have to strive for more active participation in politics, we will have to campaign for the allegiance of our youth, . . . we need to reform our education system." Thus wrote the author of "Has Hong Kong a Future?" in the student publication *Undergrad* in the midst of the 1967 anti-colonial riots in Hong Kong (quoted in Leung 2000, 212). This article, along with others like it appearing in student publications, represented burgeoning discussion and debate among students about their role in broader social and political affairs in Hong Kong. This increase in political consciousness and activism was in reaction to perceptions of an illegitimate colonial government which was out of touch with the local Chinese community and of the need for social and political reforms. Among the results of such discussions and rising student awareness in the 1960s were the University Reform Movement and the birth of the broader Hong Kong student movement (Leung 2000).

Twenty years later to the north in mainland China a similar situation was being played out. University students in late 1980s China were beginning to perceive that economic reforms were stalling and political reform was being postponed, that the potential of intellectuals to act as the nation's conscience and offer needed advice on China's future was going untapped, that nascent intellectual freedoms were under threat, and that the Chinese Communist Party was losing legitimacy in the face of its inability to deal effectively with corruption and economic woes such as inflation (Calhoun 1994; Hartford 1992; Lin 1994; Saich 1991; Unger

1991). Reactions to such perceptions took the form of an increasing disregard for the authorities, the rise of "salons" or discussion groups, and ultimately, the demonstrations and protest movement centered in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Among the demands during this student movement were the end of corruption; a speeding up of economic reform; freedoms of speech, publication, and assembly; the freedom to criticize and advise the government and participate in political decision-making; freedom from stifling political control; an independent judiciary; and a free press. The immediate result of the movement was, ironically, its own demise and a stifling of some of the few freedoms enjoyed prior to 1989.

These two examples of student resistance in the Hong Kong and Chinese contexts share characteristics with student political activism elsewhere (Altbach 1989). Such activism and resistance focuses attention not only on broader socio-political-ideological concerns but on issues that impinge on students themselves. There is a perception of the social, political, and economic manifestations of authoritarianism and oppression. This perception often leads to reactions of feelings of powerlessness in the face of authority, despite students' elite status in most societies. Further reactions include overt opposition to authority, struggles for the direct benefit of students as well as for idealistic causes, political activism, and protest movements. Among the varying results of these reactions are, for students themselves, a "cognitive liberation" (Leung 2000), and for society, a focusing of public consciousness on social, economic, and political problems; broader social unrest; concessions by governments; further government repression; or regime downfall.

Resistance can thus be seen as a process of perception, reaction, and result. Resistance, however, is not limited to overt group acts of opposition to state authority. The focus in this book is on the factors which lead to resistance at the individual level, in the minds, thoughts, attitudes, and dispositions of some Hong Kong and Chinese students. It traces the students' perceptions of the indoctrinating character of political education and their reactions to these perceptions in the form of critical thinking dispositions through to the result, for students themselves, of the formation of a set of critical and constructive national attitudes. As student resistance occurs in the face of state attempts to influence their attitudes toward the nation, the discussion here first turns to the origins of, and justifications for, such attempts.

Patriotism and nationalism (literally *aiguozhuyi* and *minzuzhuyi*, respectively, in Chinese) are relatively recent historical phenomena as sentiments toward the nation held by individuals in China. Despite a common cultural civilization and a state staffed by an intricate bureaucracy, it was not the nation, but rather the family, the clan lineage, and the village which formed the roots of social order in China prior to the twentieth century (Chu 1983; Dreyer 1993; Fei 1992; Johnson 1962). Confucian virtues called for loyalty to the emperor, but in practice, the loyalty of Chinese to their families and localities surpassed loyalty to the imperial ruler (Peake 1932). Although an "imagined community" (Anderson 1991) may have existed in a cultural sense, actual political links between the leadership and the people were weak, a sentiment made clear in the saying, "Heaven is high, and the emperor is far away." Communication between the bureaucracy and the people, primarily in order to exact taxes and military or labor service, was top-down, and still reached only as far as the county level, beyond which bureaucrats relied on the power of village and clan leaders to maintain order (Chu 1983; Dreyer 1993; Fei 1992). These weak links between the government and the people "made it difficult for China to undertake major tasks that would require a national effort, such as large-scale economic development or concerted endeavors toward sociopolitical reform . . ." (Chu 1983, 10).

Before the twentieth century, formal education thus had a negligible role in shaping relations between the state and the populace. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), the government issued regulations for the establishment of community and charity schools (Ch'u 1962; Rawski 1979), but provided no funds to the localities. The curriculum of all schools during this period focused on the Confucian Classics, using versions of varying difficulty, leading Spiller (1909, 202) to write that "not to communicate knowledge or learning, but to mould character, to instil right principles of action and conduct, is evidently the object of the Chinese common school." Aside from the establishment of schools, some attempts were made to reach the masses with moral education, by way of regular public lectures expounding the "Sacred Edicts." However, this practice extended only as far as the district seat, not reaching the bulk of the rural population (Ch'u 1962). The Sacred Edicts themselves focused on family and local relations, as well as encouraging moral behavior. There was no mention of the individual's relationship to the emperor or the state.

In response to the expanding threat of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century, the Qing government embarked on a series of state-strengthening and modernization reforms. The moves to strengthen government involvement in rural areas and to establish a modern school system were two aspects of these reforms (Duara 1988). Among the aims of the first modern school system, modeled after that of Japan, and outlined in 1903 but never fully implemented, was the development of schoolchildren's morality, public spirit, loyalty to the emperor, and patriotism (Cleverley 1985; Peake 1932). The middle school curriculum was to include the Confucian Classics, history, geography, and civics and economics.

The Revolution of 1911 brought an end to the Chinese dynastic system and launched a new era of modern government. Primary among state aims in the new environment was the creation of a body of citizens loyal to the nation, infused with modern values, and mobilized around the goal of ridding China of the threat of imperialist encroachment (Peake 1932). Nationally produced citizenship education textbooks during this period reflected the concerted efforts of the new government to cultivate loyalty to the nation over loyalty to the family and locality. In a discussion of the Five Cardinal Relationships which had governed social relations in traditional times, *Essentials of Ethics for Middle Schools* (1914) told students that the Confucian virtue of loyalty to the emperor should be substituted for loyalty to the nation, and while acknowledging the importance of one's duties to the family, the book pointed out that the family was the foundation of the nation. Students were explicitly encouraged to be patriotic and loyal to the nation in *Essentials of Ethics*.

In contrast to traditional educational techniques of concentrating students' attention on family morals and Confucian social relations through the use of historical examples, these early textbooks presented stories about the recent revolution and contemporary events. While some traces of traditionalism remained, they were often used as a contrast to modern progressive values. Some books were interspersed with quotations from Confucius and Mencius, while others quoted prominent figures in Western culture, including Washington, Lincoln, Franklin, Roosevelt, Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Kant. Various values and concepts portrayed as modern appeared in the books, including liberty, equality, people's rights and freedoms, the virtues of a small family, the importance of science and of the rule of law, and the value of education for nation-building.

The concepts of patriotism and nationalism were presented in several ways in the earliest civics textbooks (Peake 1932). Students were encouraged to learn about the nation, its people, and the national government. China's unique ethics and characteristics, as well as its contributions to world culture in the form of the compass, printing, gunpowder, silk, and tea, were presented in order to instill national pride. On the other hand, China's weakness in the face of Western competition was blamed on the strength of family loyalties and people's lack of a sense of duty to the nation. A militaristic tone was apparent in several textbooks which discussed the importance of the military and soldiers in war and national defense. Anti-foreign sentiment and anti-imperialist themes, including calls to boycott foreign goods, appeared more prominently after the killing of Chinese students and civilians by foreign troops in Shanghai in 1925. Finally, there was some mention of national economic problems and policies, as well as the need for economic and industrial development.

The founding and rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Kuomintang (KMT)-ruled China of the 1920s saw the beginning of an ideological struggle which was in part played out in the educational arena. The struggle was reflected in a diminished emphasis on patriotism and nationalism in favor of more explicit KMT doctrines. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles of nationalism, people's livelihood, and people's rights began to be more aggressively promulgated throughout China by 1928, with the consolidation of power by the KMT after the drive against the northern warlords. Textbooks appearing after 1927 bore the title "The Three Principles of the People (*San Min Chu I*)," replacing "Civics," which had in turn replaced "Ethics" in 1923. While nationalistic content remained, over the next few years the proportion of textbook content devoted to the "Three Principles" and the KMT increased, and included topics related to the KMT's political program and its history, and characterizations of the KMT as the "salvation of the people" (Peake 1932, 180). Although the *New Age San Min Chu I Reader*, published in 1927, included material about both the KMT and communism, books published after this date clearly emphasized the superiority of the KMT's Principles. *Studies in San Min Chu I Education*, a teachers' guide published in 1928, declared the "enemies" of Nationalist ideology to be militarism, communism, and imperialism.

In the next two decades, education in China became increasingly politicized, reflecting the Kuomintang government's attempts to maintain and strengthen its power (Cleverley 1985). Prospective teachers were required to take courses in the "Three Principles" and anti-communism, and teachers of civics were required to obtain approval from local KMT headquarters. During the war with the Japanese from 1938 to 1945, schools in Japanese occupied areas (about 80 percent of China's educational institutions) taught Japanese language and political ideas. During the Civil War which followed, the Ministry of Education dropped the requirement for institutions of higher education to teach politics and ethics, and allowed primary and secondary schools greater freedom to determine their curricula, moves indicative of last-ditch KMT attempts to maintain popular support.

At the same time, schools in the Communist-controlled territories were operating with the objective of mobilizing the people to pursue revolutionary goals (Seybolt 1971). Political education courses in the Yan'an border region covered Border Region policies and organizations, economics and politics; the anti-Japanese war; and Communist ideology. History and geography courses emphasized modern history, politics, and economics. Mao Zedong's goal for education from this time forward was "to change man's consciousness so as to change the world in which he lives" (Seybolt 1971, 641).

The Common Program, adopted as a draft constitution in 1949, set forth new national goals for education that reflected Mao's educational philosophy that education was extremely important in serving the needs of revolutionary change:

> Article 41. The culture and education of the People's Republic of China are new democratic, that is, national, scientific, and popular. The main tasks for raising the cultural level of the people are: training of personnel for national construction work; liquidating of feudal, comprador, Fascist ideology; and developing of the ideology of serving the people. (quoted in Price 1970, 29)

In this context of ideological struggle and civil war in mainland China, there was considerable sentiment at high levels of the British colonial government, and more broadly throughout Hong Kong society, for restrictions on politics and political education in schools, in reaction to

the strong, and potentially destabilizing, political and patriotic sentiments among some of the colony's youth. In a memorandum in the aftermath of the 1925–26 anti-imperialist general strike and boycott in Hong Kong, Robert Kotewall, a senior member of the Executive Council, described views on the dangers of political activity in schools that Sweeting (1993) notes were widely shared by colonial and local Chinese elites:

> One of the most serious and significant features of the recent disturbances is the part played by schoolboys and students . . . It is necessary to learn from these events how to prevent the corruption of schoolboys in future, and particularly their attempts to interfere in politics . . . Now, let us try to trace the cause or causes of the present state of affairs. From the first year of the Chinese republic schoolboys and students in China have been arrogating to themselves the right to assist in the government of the country, and they have been encouraged by persons who had their own ends to serve. In so far as our own schools are concerned, there can be no doubt that to a very large extent the ground had been prepared for them for this trouble, as during the last two years or so very undesirable literature has been introduced into the schools, particularly the vernacular boy-schools, and some of the Chinese teachers had not been altogether innocent in this respect. (quoted in Sweeting 1993, 193)

In 1948, during the Chinese civil war, the governor, Sir Alexander Grantham again warned against politics in schools:

> There are those, and to my mind they are the most evil, who wish to use schools as a means of propaganda and poison the minds of their young pupils with their particular political dogma or creed of the most undesirable kind.
>
> This we know is what happened in the schools of Fascist States and is now happening in Communist-dominated countries. This deforming and twisting of the youthful mind is most wicked and the Hong Kong Government will tolerate no political propaganda in schools. (quoted in Sweeting 1993, 199)

Within forty years of both Grantham's statement and the promulgation of a Chinese constitution which called for education to promote an ideology of serving the people, the states in both the People's Republic of

China (PRC) and Hong Kong were faced with what scholars have called a crisis of legitimacy (Chen 1995; Cheng 1992; Ding 1994; Scott 1989). In the Mainland, successive political campaigns from the 1950s to the 1970s, and subsequently, the first steps toward a market economy, signaled a crisis of the Chinese Communist Party's Marxist-Leninist based legitimacy (Chen 1995; Domes 1990). After 1984, the crisis of the Hong Kong colonial government's already debatable legitimacy was exacerbated as it became essentially a lame-duck regime concerned with maintaining its authority and the colony's prosperity in the period leading up to the transfer of sovereignty to China in 1997.

The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been said to be based on its exclusive appropriation of a Marxist-Leninist ideology which justifies its authority to rule in the interest of pursuing the ultimate goals of a classless and egalitarian communist society in China (Chen 1995). By the end of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1970s, however, this Marxist-Leninist justificatory ideology was in crisis, leading the CCP to admit to the "crisis of three faiths" — faith in the party, socialism, and the country (Domes 1990). There were at least two reasons for this crisis, which by extension signaled a challenge to the CCP's authority and its justification to rule. First, from the early 1980s increasing political apathy and even opposition to Marxist-Leninist ideology appeared among large sectors of the population. As Domes (1990) recounts, party members themselves were increasingly no longer motivated by Marxism-Leninism; urban intellectuals were ceasing to believe in the doctrine and even expressing dissent; peasants, self-employed workers, and owners of individual enterprises were skeptical of ideology and cared more about policies which were materially beneficial to them; and youth held particularly negative and cynical attitudes toward Marxism-Leninism. Among the causes of this trend were disgust at bureaucratic corruption, resentment toward the party as a result of adverse experiences under communist rule, worsening economic conditions, increasing individualism, and increasing attraction to western influences, including capitalism.

A second reason for the CCP's crisis of legitimacy was what Chen (1995) calls a "fundamental-instrumental discrepancy," or a disparity between the CCP's pursuit of policies leading to a market economy and the basic tenets of its justificatory Marxist-Leninist ideology. The 1980s

and 1990s saw the increasing marketization of the Chinese economy and the expansion of private enterprise. At the same time, the redefinition of economic policies as leading to "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and the declaration that the nation was in the primary stage of socialism, signaled that the party was interpreting Marxism flexibly. The goal of economic development, a focus on increasing production, and the increasing use of capitalist practices began to take precedence over the ideological objectives of a classless and egalitarian society. These trends toward capitalism had the effect of undermining the CCP's claim to legitimacy based on its adherence to a justificatory anti-capitalist ideology.

This problem was compounded by the party's need to maintain the support, and address the interests of, two audiences with different priorities (Ding 1994). For access to resources controlled by the party-state bureaucracy and the military, the leadership needed to justify its legitimacy based on its original Marxist credentials. At the same time, in order to not only preserve social order and prevent disruption, but to gain the active support and cooperation of the population for the program of economic development, the party needed to justify its legitimacy on the premise that the policies it was pursuing were in the best interest of the nation as a whole.

The leadership therefore shifted toward patriotism as an ideology to justify its rule and guidance of society, while continuing to profess ultimate objectives in line with Marxist principles (Ding 1994). Patriotism was seen as not only acceptable to and capable of uniting the entire population, but as amenable to an interpretation which justified the party's legitimacy to rule. A *People's Daily* commentary noted that:

> Among patriotism, collectivism, socialism, and communism, patriotism has peculiar features and functions. Linked with age-old historical traditions and backed strongly by public opinion and social psychology, patriotism can easily be comprehended by, and gain acceptance from, the broad masses who differ in family origin, life experience, vocation, ethnic category, age, educational attainment, and level of political awareness. Patriotism is the banner of greatest appeal. (quoted in Ding 1994, 144)

In addition to its universal appeal, patriotism also provided an opportunity for the party to justify its own position in society, by equating

the nation with the party-state, stressing the party's patriotic achievements, declaring party members to be the most exemplary patriots, and claiming that the CCP was the best representative of the nation's interests. The party began a series of patriotic campaigns with the 1982 announcement of the "Three Loves" — love the party, love socialism, and love the motherland. A comprehensive action program for patriotic campaigns was promulgated in 1983, and schools were called upon to implement programs of "patriotic education," codified in 1994 with the publication of the "Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education."

The Hong Kong colonial regime has also been characterized as having experienced a crisis of legitimacy, especially after the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, by which it was agreed that Hong Kong would return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 (Cheng 1992; Scott 1989). Although the agreement made it clear that the Hong Kong government had little need for a long-term solution to the problem of legitimacy, the regime still had an interest in maintaining social order and its authority in the transition period. This task was complicated by the government's already debatable legitimacy due to its status as a colonial government whose control over Hong Kong's territory was established through a series of unequal treaties, the fact that the Hong Kong government was not party to the Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong's future, and by China's interference on issues that straddled the handover date, such as the construction of the new airport (Lam and Lee 1993; Lau and Kuan 1988; Scott 1989).

Unlike the Chinese Communist Party's claim to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism as a justification for its authority to rule, the Hong Kong colonial authorities had no systematic theoretical justification for their legitimacy as a governing power (Lau and Kuan 1988). Scott (1989) notes that following the social disturbances of 1956, 1966, and 1967, the government improved social policies, incorporated local elites into the administration, and stressed its pursuit of policies based on consultation and consent as justifications for its authority to rule. More importantly, as Lau (1982) notes, the government pursued a deliberate policy of the "depoliticization" of society, both to avoid offending the Chinese government and to preserve Hong Kong's stability and prosperity, conditions favorable to the colonial government's continued rule until 1997 and the economic development of Hong Kong society.

The Hong Kong governor, Alexander Grantham, expressed sentiment in favor of depoliticization in 1950, "We cannot permit Hong Kong to be the battleground for contending parties or ideologies. We are just simple traders who want to get on well our daily round and common task" (quoted in Lau 1982, 36). In support of this policy and "ideology," the government for the most part minimized its involvement in society, pursued essentially laissez-faire economic policies, limited its functions to preserving social order, and provided only vital goods and services, while at the same time preventing the emergence of political groups and limiting political rights and responsibilities.

Lau (1982) posits that this policy succeeded and that the government's legitimacy could be maintained because of the unique nature of Hong Kong Chinese society. On one hand, there was a Chinese Confucian cultural tradition of the avoidance of authority and political passivity. At the same time, there was the particularity of Hong Kong society, made up of self-reliant familial groups, of which many members arrived as refugees and depended upon the group for material support and economic gain in the face of a lack of government support. Because of this self-reliance, families did not need or desire interference from the government, nor were they interested in active social or political participation. Indeed, because of the experience of a good section of the population in the heavily politicized society of the Mainland, there was also a desire to avoid politics in favor of stability and a focus on material interests. This focus on economics found an equivalent in the fact that advancement in Hong Kong's international commercial society was based primarily on economic rather than political standing. These factors all contributed to a situation which allowed the government to remain non-interventionist in society and gain popular acceptance for an "ideology" of depoliticization. Unlike mainland China, where there was a shift over time in the ideological justification for the regime's legitimacy, the Hong Kong government for the most part maintained its policy of depoliticization during the transition period to Chinese rule from 1984 to 1997, despite a steadily increasing trend in the population toward more active political participation (Lam and Lee 1993).

The depoliticization of society found a corollary in the depoliticization of Hong Kong's educational curriculum (Bray and Lee, 1993; Leung, 1995). Civic education was relatively weak, especially in comparison with

political education in the Mainland. By virtue of a clause in the Education Regulations, until 1990 schools were forbidden to engage in education which was determined to be of any political nature (Education Department 1971). In light of the approaching change of sovereignty, the Curriculum Development Committee moved toward a change in this situation with the issuance of a set of *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* in 1985. Numerous studies have pointed out, however, that because implementation of the *Guidelines* was not made mandatory, a lack of resources directed toward civic education, and the lingering effects of the pre-1990 prohibition on politics in schools, civic education remained largely depoliticized in the period leading up to 1997.

Thus in both the People's Republic of China and the former British colony of Hong Kong we have states with an interest in preserving their own legitimacy and authority to rule, and the cooperation of the population in following state-defined paths to economic growth and development. In both cases, to accomplish these objectives the state adopted an ideology which had broad acceptance in society. In the Mainland, as a result of a loss of faith among sectors of the populace in the original guiding Marxist-Leninist ideology, the state adopted patriotism. In Hong Kong, while pursuing capitalist policies, the state adopted an approach, or "ideology," of depoliticization, in order to preserve a stable environment conducive to economic activity.

In both cases, there was a need to promote these ideologies throughout society, especially among the rising generation. In the PRC, the state wanted youth to have strong patriotic sentiments and to understand the importance of the interests of the nation as a whole. It attempted to achieve this objective by extending patriotic campaigns into the schools in the form of patriotic education. In Hong Kong, in the interest of social stability in the transition period, the state desired students who would show little concern for political matters, and in particular, would not hold strong, and potentially disruptive sentiments toward China. The Hong Kong government took an approach opposite to that taken by the Mainland. It promulgated a civic education curriculum which had among its objectives the preservation of social stability and the avoidance of the discussion of potentially controversial political issues such as democracy and nationality. In effect, it could be said to have been promoting a civic education which taught ambivalence toward the nation.

The following chapters focus on mainland Chinese and Hong Kong university students in the 1990s, the targets, in both instances, of state efforts to inculcate political attitudes in line with the respective state ideologies. Along a line of direct comparison, there is a concentration on the political attitudes of patriotism and nationalism, with the idea that the Mainland state desired students to be patriotic and nationalistic, while the Hong Kong colonial regime sought to create students whose patriotic and nationalistic sentiments were weak. In particular, the focus is on those *factors* which led students to hold attitudes which on the surface would appear contrary to the state's ideal intended goals: factors which led some Mainland students to hold relatively negative, neutral, or ambivalent attitudes toward the nation and factors which led some Hong Kong students to hold relatively positive attitudes toward the nation. In contrast to other studies which might interpret attitudes divergent from what the state and schools might desire as a failure on the part of schools themselves, the focus here is on students' own critical thinking dispositions, as representative of a more or less conscious form of resistance to the efforts of the state, through schooling, to influence their attitudes toward the nation. The primary goals here are therefore to build an argument for resistance as an explanation for divergent attitudes and to build a model of how resistance has played out in the Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese contexts.

The objective of Chapter Two is to introduce the concept of resistance and how it emerges from a Marxist conflict perspective on society. A review of narrative on, and empirical studies of, political socialization is followed by a critique of the narrative's neglect of the idea of the state as representative of dominant groups in society; of the idea that the values promoted through schools' political socialization efforts are weighed in favor of these dominant groups; of the question of how the dominant group-defined values are presented as representative of society as a whole and how these values come to be accepted by subordinate groups; and of the question of why political socialization messages may not come to be fully accepted by their intended targets. To address these problems, the chapter introduces the concepts of the state and hegemony, as developed by the Marxist theoretician, Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci defines the state as representative of a society's dominant class and encompassing the educational institutions of civil society. Hegemony is the process by which

the objectives defined by a society's dominant group are presented to the population as universal and in the interests of the entire population, and whereby subordinate groups grant their consent to the ruling group and its direction of society. The room that Gramsci leaves for human agency and the construction of an alternative hegemony by subordinate groups has led to the development of the concept of resistance. Resistance, particularly as developed by Henry Giroux, entails the perception of dominant class hegemony among some members of subordinate groups; their reaction to this perception of hegemony and a realization of their powerlessness; and the result of this reaction in a form of self-emancipation which challenges the relations of domination. Resistance is represented here by students' dispositions to think critically, which includes skepticism, intellectual curiosity, and an openness to multiple perspectives. This study looks at how critical thinking affects students' perceptions of the political socialization process and their attitudes toward the nation. It examines the nature of resistance to state-directed hegemonic political socialization efforts in school among mainland Chinese and Hong Kong university students, and the influence of this resistance on students' attitudes toward the nation.

Chapters Three and Four provide historical background and a current context for the examination of student attitudes. They show how the colonial government in Hong Kong and the CCP in mainland China promulgated their ideologies through schooling, corresponding to the process of hegemony as described in Chapter Two. Through document and textbook analysis, Chapter Three demonstrates the depoliticization of civic education in Hong Kong in the colonial state's interest of producing a younger generation with neutral sentiment toward China. Restrictions on political education in schools from the highest policy level were accompanied by a depoliticized civic education curriculum. This took the form of discretionary guidelines which, although they included topics addressing the question of national identity, had little government support in terms of resources, and were, for the most part, not actively implemented by schools or teachers. This situation is contrasted with post-1997 Education Commission-proposed reforms which put civic education at the forefront of the education agenda and called on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government to provide active support for its implementation.

Chapter Four demonstrates shifts in the content of the Mainland state's hegemony from its establishment in 1949 through the 1990s. Sensitivity over the relative stress to be placed on Marxism-Leninism versus patriotism and nationalism as ideologies justifying the regime's rule is reflected in the content of textbooks published during the period, culminating in the 1994 release of the "Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education." In contrast to civic education in Hong Kong, patriotic education in the People's Republic of China has broad support from the central policy down to the school level. Unlike Hong Kong's non-mandatory civic education guidelines, political education policy documents direct the implementation of patriotic education in Mainland schools. Policy documents stress the important position of political education and call for the improvement and strengthening of curriculum, course materials, and teaching methods. The documents provide administrators and teachers with guidance on the definition and characteristics of patriotism and patriotic education; problems leading to the need for enhanced patriotic education; national goals to which patriotic education is expected to contribute; knowledge about and attitudes toward the nation expected of students; and the implementation of patriotic education.

The subsequent three chapters present data and analyses from interviews with 20 Hong Kong and mainland Chinese university students and a questionnaire survey administered to 535 students in fourteen universities throughout Hong Kong and mainland China. Chapter Five provides a descriptive account of the nature of Hong Kong and mainland Chinese students' attitudes toward the nation, finding that as the respective states would have wished, Hong Kong students as a group were mostly ambivalent toward China, while Mainland students tended to be considerably more patriotic and nationalistic. It provides detail on the meaning for students of each of seven theoretically-grounded dimensions of national attitudes: an emotional attachment to the nation, a sense of duty to the nation, the precedence of national over individual and regional interests, a favorable impression of the Chinese people, a perception of China's superiority over other nations, a desire for China to be a more powerful nation, and a belief in the importance of patriotism over internationalism. It further finds that despite the difference in strength on these dimensions between Mainland and Hong Kong students, students

in both societies held the strongest attitudes with relation to a desire for national power, a sense of duty to the nation, and an emotional attachment to the nation.

Chapter Six describes students' perceptions of the political socialization process, again based on data from interviews and the questionnaire survey. It finds that the largest percentage of Mainland students perceived that their secondary school education, in contrast to the university, the media, family, and friends, had been an important influence on their national attitudes, reflecting the importance given to patriotic education by school administrators and teachers themselves. By contrast, and in line with the context of a depoliticized civic education, only one-third of Hong Kong students perceived their secondary education as an influence on their attitudes toward China, although this percentage was slightly higher than that of students who perceived the university, family, or friends as an influence. The media was ranked first as a perceived influence on their attitudes toward the nation by Hong Kong students. The chapter also provides detail on individual aspects of schooling and other socialization experiences, including students' perceptions of the influence of the curriculum, extracurricular activities, and teachers' encouragement of students to form their own opinions about national affairs.

Chapter Seven introduces the critical thinking dispositions as they are developed in the literature on critical thinking and as they emerged from student interviews. Skepticism is shown to encompass perceptions of schooling about the nation as indoctrination, as inaccurate or biased, and as not corresponding with what students learn outside the school or later in university. Intellectual curiosity encompasses a desire to learn more about one's nation and to meet and share experiences with people from other parts of the country. An openness to multiple perspectives refers to students' willingness to take into consideration different perspectives in forming their attitudes about the nation. To provide detail on the meaning of these dispositions and the context of the experiences from which they emerged, the chapter presents profiles of six students, each of whom exemplifies either a particular aspect of, or, by contrast, the absence of, critical thinking. It then presents detail from the rest of the interviews and survey data to bring out more fully the meaning of each of the dispositions. In the context of a depoliticized civic education in Hong

Kong and of the perception of a number of Hong Kong students' that their secondary education had not been an important influence on their national attitudes, it was curiosity that emerged as the most striking disposition in the interviews. On average, however, Hong Kong students were equally curious about their nation and skeptical of the socialization process. It was skepticism about the political socialization process that appeared as most striking in the Mainland context of a relatively comprehensive patriotic education, but survey data showed that Mainland students were on average more curious than skeptical. The chapter also presents two related factors: students' perceptions of themselves as having a tendency to think critically about national affairs, and as making up their own minds in forming their national attitudes.

Chapter Eight shows the relative strength of the effect on national attitudes of socialization and critical thinking factors by comparing three multiple regression models. The first of these considers only the effects of socialization factors on national attitudes, to demonstrate the relative influence of schooling, the university, family, media, and friends on patriotism and nationalism in the absence of the effects of critical thinking. The second considers only the effects of critical thinking dispositions on attitudes, again to show each disposition's relative influence on attitudes in the absence of effects from socialization. The third combines socialization and critical thinking factors in one model to demonstrate their relative influence when considered together. The comparison of the first two models shows that critical thinking factors taken alone provide, in most cases, a stronger explanation for the nature of national attitudes than socialization factors taken alone. In the third model, which combined both types of factors, critical thinking factors were again the most important relative to the socialization factors, further demonstrating their strength. Furthermore, the inclusion of critical thinking dispositions and socialization factors in the same model reduces the strength of a number of socialization influences between the first and third models, suggesting that the importance of some of these socialization influences lies in the critical thinking dispositions that they foster.

Continuing this line of reasoning, Chapter Eight then examines in detail the impact of socialization factors on critical thinking, as well as the relationships among the critical thinking dispositions. It does this by presenting multiple regression analyses which take each of the critical

thinking factors as dependent variables in models which demonstrate the influence on them of the socialization and each of the other critical thinking factors. This demonstrates that in addition to any direct impact that a socialization factor may have on national attitudes, it may also have a further complementary or contradictory indirect effect on attitudes by influencing critical thinking factors. The relationships among critical thinking factors also display contradictions, especially those among skepticism, curiosity, and a tendency to think critically. For example, while skepticism has a negative effect on national attitudes, it also increases Hong Kong students' curiosity, which has a positive effect on attitudes.

Chapter Nine integrates the theoretical perspectives from Chapter Two with the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese educational contexts, and the data from student interviews and surveys, to construct a model of student resistance to the hegemonic political socialization efforts of the state and schools. Reiterating that these efforts were not uniformly successful in producing patriotic students in mainland China or students with neutral sentiments toward the nation in Hong Kong, it draws attention to students' own critical thinking dispositions as the primary reasons for the lack of success. Examining in detail the three components of resistance — perception, reaction, and result — the chapter demonstrates how resistance is played out through the interactions of key socialization and critical thinking factors. It concludes with a reconceptualization of the concept of resistance in these contexts as students asserting their own power over the political socialization process by recognizing and evaluating the state's efforts to control this process through schooling, taking advantage of those aspects of socialization which help to enhance their own power, and bringing into play their dispositions to think critically to form their own critical and constructive national attitudes.

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# Conclusion

The objective of the study presented in this book was to offer an explanation for the patriotic and nationalistic attitudes of some Hong Kong students, among a group of students who were for the most part ambivalent toward the nation, and the neutral attitudes toward the nation of some mainland Chinese students, within a group of students who were on average considerably patriotic and nationalistic. It found that these students' attitudes were largely attributable to their dispositions to think critically, as well as to aspects of the schooling and university experiences. As context, it took into consideration the nature of the state in Hong Kong and mainland China, the direction given by the state to schools, and the nature of political and civic education in both societies. This context, together with students' attitudes and the factors which influenced them, led to an explanation of student resistance to the efforts of the state, through schooling, to influence their attitudes toward the nation.

Each chapter has contributed to this explanation. The introduction explained the actions taken by the Chinese Communist Party in the Mainland, and the Hong Kong colonial government in colonial Hong Kong, to promulgate ideologies in their societies in support of their legitimacy to rule and their direction of society. In the Mainland, these actions took the shape of campaigns promoting patriotism — campaigns which extended into schools as patriotic education. The Hong Kong colonial state took the alternate approach of working toward a depoliticization of Hong Kong society, an approach which was also

reflected in restrictions on political education and a depoliticization of the civic education curriculum

Chapter Two, the theoretical framework, interpreted these phenomena as hegemony, or the process by which the state, an organ of society's dominant group, attempts to maintain its authority and direction of society by fostering an ideology skewed in its favor but reflecting a "collective will," contributing to the acceptance of its rule by subordinate groups The concept of hegemony leaves open the possibility for what is known as resistance on the part of actors within subordinate groups Resistance takes the form of a perception of hegemony and a reaction which challenges the relations of domination in the form of a result which shifts the balance of power in favor of the subordinated According to theorists, resistance may take the form of oppositional behaviors, but also, and importantly, the form of critical thinking

With this framework, in theoretical terms the objective of the study has been to inquire into the nature of resistance to state-directed hegemonic political socialization efforts, and to examine its effects on students' attitudes toward the nation Patriotism and nationalism were chosen as a focus of inquiry as directly comparable concepts with the idea that the Mainland state desired patriotic and nationalistic students, while the Hong Kong government desired students without strong sentiments toward their nation Critical thinking dispositions, particularly skepticism in the case of the Mainland, and curiosity in the case of Hong Kong, were utilized as representative of resistance In operational terms, the focus of the study was therefore on the effects of political socialization factors and critical thinking dispositions on patriotism and nationalism, comparing the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese cases

The next section aimed at showing the state's hegemonic efforts to influence students' attitudes toward the nation through political socialization in schools Chapter Three demonstrated in detail the Hong Kong government's attempts to depoliticize Hong Kong education through restrictions on political education in school and examined the 1985 promulgation of *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* which viewed civic education as a means of preserving social stability in the transition period and did not deal seriously with the question of national identity Chapter Four, in contrast, showed the comprehensiveness of Mainland

patriotic education through an analysis of centrally-issued policy documents and school textbooks.

The following section turned to a presentation of the nature of students' attitudes and perceptions and provided the building blocks for the argument of resistance. Chapter Five showed that, as the states would have desired, Hong Kong students were on average largely neutral and ambivalent with regard to patriotism and nationalism, while mainland Chinese students were considerably more patriotic and nationalistic. The strongest dimensions of national attitudes for both groups were a desire for the nation to be more powerful, a sense of duty toward the nation, and an emotional attachment to the nation. Despite the group averages, however, there were Hong Kong students who were also considerably patriotic and nationalistic, and Mainland students who were relatively neutral. The factors which led these students to hold these divergent attitudes were the focus of interest.

Chapter Six provided a description of students' political socialization experiences. Questions about the influence of schooling on national attitudes drew out the views of the students themselves, views which provided support for the ideas of the depoliticization and weakness of Hong Kong civic education, and the strength and effectiveness of Mainland Chinese patriotic education. Such individual student perceptions were supported and strengthened by group data showing that the largest percentage of Mainland students acknowledged schooling as an important effect on their national attitudes, while only a minority of Hong Kong students similarly agreed.

Chapter Seven demonstrated how critical thinking dispositions emerged from students' perceptions and evaluations of the political socialization process. In the context of depoliticized civic education in Hong Kong and students' perceptions that their secondary schools had taught little about the nation, the fact that Hong Kong students noted that upon reaching university they had the opportunity to pursue their own curiosity about China was particularly striking. Similarly noteworthy, in the context of patriotic education, was mainland Chinese students expressing skepticism about schooling by characterizing it as inaccurate, government control, indoctrination, and at odds with what they learned outside school or later in university. Together with other critical thinking dispositions, curiosity and skepticism appeared to represent a position of

resistance to the political socialization process. Returning to the conceptualization of resistance as perception, reaction, and result, these two dispositions represented the first two components. What remained to be seen at this point was whether critical thinking dispositions actually detracted from patriotism and nationalism, or on a higher level, resulted in a situation which gave power to students at the expense of the state.

The goal of the following section was to demonstrate that the latter result was indeed the case. Chapter Eight first showed that in most cases, critical thinking factors were as important, if not more important in explaining students' national attitudes than political socialization factors. It achieved this through a comparison of the separate effects of both critical thinking factors and socialization factors on national attitudes, and a subsequent comparison of the factors' relative strengths when examined together. The roles of curiosity in strengthening Hong Kong students' patriotism and nationalism, and skepticism in weakening Mainland students' national attitudes were particularly noteworthy. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the strength of some of the socialization factors lay in the critical thinking dispositions that they fostered. This fact was also brought out more fully in Chapter Eight, which showed the interrelationships between socialization and critical thinking factors and among critical thinking factors themselves. These complex interactions among factors meant that critical thinking did not have the simple effect of negating the direction of the attitudes toward the nation held by the majority. In other words, resistance to the political socialization process did not lead to a simple rejection of the state-desired ideologies. Curiosity not only led Hong Kong students to be more patriotic and nationalistic, but through interactions with other factors, had indirect contradictory negative effects as well. Similarly, skepticism not only detracted from Mainland students' national attitudes, but also had indirect positive effects through relationships with other factors.

The evidence accumulated in Chapters Three through Eight was brought back together with the concepts of hegemony and resistance in Chapter Nine to offer a reconceptualization of the latter concept. It was described as students asserting their own power over the political socialization process by recognizing and evaluating the state's efforts to control this process through schooling, taking advantage of those aspects of socialization which help to enhance their own power, and bringing into

play their dispositions to think critically to form their own critical and constructive national attitudes. Attention again focused on the components of resistance, and perception of hegemony was demonstrated by Hong Kong students' recognition of their not having been taught about the nation in school, while some Mainland students perceived political education as indoctrination, and as being inaccurate, and biased. Among the reactions to these perceptions were those of seeking more objective information about the nation, taking advantage of the intellectual atmosphere of the university, and discussing national affairs with fellow students and teachers. The result of this resistance and the complexity of relations between political socialization and critical thinking were attitudes that involved students' own critical and reflective thought and which were expressed most strongly in a desire to make contributions leading China to be a stronger nation. Resistance is therefore not only empowering for students themselves, it is also ultimately of benefit to their societies.

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