Whither Taiwan and Mainland China

National Identity, the State, and Intellectuals

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Introduction

China is fast becoming a key player in world affairs. "It is the world's largest country, fastest-growing major economy, largest manufacturer, second-largest consumer, largest saver, and (almost certainly) second-largest military spender," although a *very* distant second (Zakaria 2008:92). As such, in the global efforts to deal with regional conflicts, China is playing, and expected to play, an increasingly important role, as in North Korea or Darfur. In Sino-US relations, China is in some sense a "strategic partner" of the US as well as its "competitor." It has been the largest creditor in the US bond market, and the biggest buyer of US government bonds in recent years, while it also needs the American market to sell its goods. China and the US are mutually dependent on one another. Meanwhile, China is also the US's chief competitor in Asia, Africa, and Latin America for political influence.

With all its weight to throw around in world affairs, however, China still faces a standoff in cross-Strait relations. Will China and Taiwan finally be integrated politically, and if so, how? Or will they strive to be "separate but equal?" Right now they are largely separate but not really equal. What can both sides do to maintain peace and foster prosperity across the Taiwan Strait? This book argues for a compromise solution to the Taiwan problem, based on an analysis of the nationalist developments in both China and Taiwan, with both the state and intellectuals playing major roles in these developments. It calls for a hybrid of federation and confederation across the Taiwan Strait. Whether China can make a big step in its political program, as it has done in its space program, and become a true world leader in terms of both hard and soft power, remains to be seen. The Taiwan issue is an indicator. And whether Taiwan can become a key player in China's transformation determines to a great extent what the future holds for cross-Strait relations. My arguments in this book will highlight the possibilities.

Specifically, I examine in this book the different and often conflicting discourses on nationalism and the processes of nation building across the Taiwan Strait. I focus on the role of the state and intellectuals and their dilemmas in the nationalist movements, with the help of a typology of their relationship to nationalism. I argue that although both national and international forces are still pulling in different

directions, the tone of debate on both sides of the Strait has been shifting over the years from the collectivistic and authoritarian to the individualistic and liberal. As a result, an interest in a future Chinese national identity has emerged, which can be embodied in a new political arrangement as in a hybrid of federation and confederation. A peaceful independence of Taiwan might be ideal for some, but it looks unlikely based on some sober analysis.

Political realists and idealists may differ in opinion as to what might be a viable option, however. But as I further argue, the role of intellectuals, either organic, professional, or critical, is crucial in evaluating all the possibilities and coordinating or conflicting with the state in shaping mainland China's and Taiwan's national identities. They can shape the possibilities in such a way that some kind of integration and peace, rather than disintegration and war, since peaceful independence is unlikely, can be promoted across the Taiwan Strait. I also demonstrate that intellectuals are facing a number of dilemmas in playing these roles. It is in their efforts to resolve these dilemmas that intellectuals find how effectively they might be influencing the course of history.

In the Introduction, I will first discuss the importance of nationalism, since it will be the very key word of this book and will determine to a great extent where Taiwan and China go. Then I will introduce the contents of each chapter and the methodology of my research.

The Political, Economic, and Social Importance of Nationalism

Nationalism has been one of the most important driving forces in political and social change worldwide in the past few centuries. Nations have gradually become conscious of their own historical destinies. From the French Revolution to the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia, they have wanted political self-determination and control over the state. The history of the past few centuries can indeed be viewed largely as a history of nation-building (see Hobsbawm 1992). Oftentimes, this process of break-up is violent and bloody, just as when the state wants to integrate different cultural groups into one nation-state. "War made the state, and the state made war" (Charles Tilly, quoted by Huntington 2004:16). From the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, many European countries "crystallized their national identities in the crucible of war", as Huntington (2004:28–29) would say. This is true in Asia as well, since the Portuguese set foot on this continent in the sixteenth century, followed by the Spanish, the Dutch, the British, the French, and the Americans.

If we fast-forward to contemporary times, we find that since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has had its own share of national problems. The integration of Tibet into China in the 1950s was marked by continuing violence throughout the decade, and problems still abound. China is now facing challenges

from independence movements not only in Tibet but also in Taiwan, Xinjiang, and even Inner Mongolia, though of various degrees. Nationalism is thus a serious threat to the state. But it is also a force that holds the Chinese state together. The 2008 Olympic Games, the development of the space program, and the economic progress of the past thirty years have all been cast in the light of national pride. The Chinese state has been largely successful in using nationalism to withstand criticism of its human rights record in Tibet or elsewhere. It was Chinese nationalism that mobilized overseas Chinese in countering the protests against China during the 2008 Olympic torch relay throughout the world.

In Taiwan, a sizable number of people still want *de jure* independence. Taiwanese nationalism is still such a potent force that it colorizes the legal and political process in Taiwan. Former President Chen Shui-bian has been mired in corruption scandals since 2006 when still in power. But he has been able to defend himself and win support from a fairly large number of people by portraying the corruption investigation regarding his family and his cabinet as persecution against Taiwanese people by the Chinese, represented by the Kuomintang (KMT) government, which came back to power in 2008. At the time of the writing, the legal system and the Ma regime are facing a challenge in adhering to fairness and justice while not provoking Taiwanese nationalism. Just as in mainland China, nationalism plays a key role in Taiwan's political and social development.

The KMT's return to power in 2008 seems to indicate the warming up of cross-Strait relations. Economically that may be the case, but politically, things are not clear. The Taiwanese government position is "no unification, no independence, and no use of force." Then, how do you define the position of Taiwan, or the Republic of China (ROC) with regard to the United Nations (UN)? For example, for many years the ROC had wanted membership or observer status in the World Health Organization (WHO), a United Nations agency. But the Chinese government insisted that Taiwan is part of China, and that the PRC government represents China. So, according to the UN charter, Taiwan cannot become a member, since it is not a sovereign state (Wu Yi 2003). The Taiwanese government insisted that the ROC is a sovereign country and should be recognized as such. If most countries could not agree on this, they could at least give Taiwan observer status. But the mainland government seemed to be afraid that granting Taiwan observer status, let alone membership, would appear to be supporting Taiwan independence. However, if China fails to accommodate the ROC in some ways in international organizations, it will effectively drive Taiwan further toward independence. China is facing a dilemma. Now that the KMT is in power, the two sides have found a compromise on this issue. An observer status is now given to Taiwan in the name of "Chinese Taipei," not a perfect solution, but one that is largely acceptable to both sides from a nationalistic point of view. Moreover, this would only be a beginning. Other membership problems are in line, including Taiwan's status in the yearly summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and its relationship with the various United Nations agencies, etc.

Even in the US, which is a more mature democracy, nationalism can flare up and cloud people's judgment. (I mention the US here especially because it is a key player in cross-Strait relations.) In 2003, the US government believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and was one of the sources of terrorism. That was what the war was all about, that is, to eliminate Iraq's WMDs and check terrorism, according to the then White House spokesperson, Ari Fleischer (Kristof 2003). But there was no solid evidence to substantiate either of these claims. Yet, the majority of Americans still supported the war. Whether they could find WMDs did not seem to matter (see also Stolberg and Nagourney 2003). They as a nation were hit on September 11, 2001, by terrorists from Islamic nations. People were scared, and might therefore have thought that retaliation against these "other" people in the "other" part of the world was justified.

One might argue that it is patriotism that guided American support for the war against Iraq, and that guides Chinese support of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime. But patriotism, which usually means a love for and devotion to one's country for what it is, just or unjust, right or wrong, is based on a nationalistic ideology, an "us" versus "them" ideology. Because we are a nation (nationalism), we need to love it, just as one loves one's own family. We need to protect ourselves against others (patriotism). If nationalism provides the bonding and binding for a national group to start a political movement to build a nation, then patriotism provides the push for that movement. One has to participate in the movement, like it or not. "We love our country, our land, our culture, and our people; therefore, we need to support our government against foreigners." Thus we have seen time and again patriotic people in many parts of the world led by the nose by their leaders into war.

American patriotism, or nationalism, is also reflected in the voting of the US congressmen and women over the aptly titled "USA Patriot Act" of 2001, just as Chinese patriotism was reflected in the fervor over the 2008 Olympics and their space program. The USA Patriot Act gives broad power to the president and the attorney general, and relaxes many rules that used to protect people from unfair investigation and prosecution. The president can, at his sole discretion, order any non-US citizen to be tried by a military tribunal rather than in an ordinary criminal court. Yet, it passed in the senate with only one dissenting vote out of 100 senators, and in the house of representatives with only 66 dissenting votes out of over 400 representatives (see Dworkin 2002).

Both patriotism and nationalism view one's own country in relation to or against other countries. So the American war on Iraq was a patriotic war on the part of the government and of most Americans to protect themselves against foreigners. All US citizens had to support it if they were patriotic. The ideology was so powerful that few wanted to be seen as doubting the war. It is true that many other Americans saw this war as unwise and unjust, and for them, to speak out against the government

for engaging in something wrong and unjust was truly patriotic. But this kind of interpretation of patriotism most often does not constitute the mainstream, in the US, in post-June 4 China, or elsewhere.[1] For the Chinese, the few people who were not excited about or who were even critical of the 2008 Olympics were seen as equally unpatriotic.

The government is not always doing the wise and just thing. But a patriot will support the government anyway. The kind of state the government envisions may not be necessary, but the patriot will support its building anyway. This support is unconditional for a patriot, and he or she is willing to die for it. "Men don't allow themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions," or "people do not voluntarily die for things that are rational" (Smith 1998:162, citing Chateaubriand and Walker Connor). Anderson (1991:141) reminds us that "nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love." Many progressive and cosmopolitan intellectuals also "insist on the near-pathological character of nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism" (Anderson 1991:141), or its "murderous virulence" (Gellner (1997:58).[2]

That self-sacrificing and sometimes near-pathological passion is derived from patriotism, which in turn is derived from nationalism. Nationalism is the root, and patriotism is the fruit. Nationalism provides the foundation, and patriotism provides the devotion. Patriotism does not exist without nationalism, and it is therefore part of nationalism.[3]

It is true that patriotism often serves to mobilize the masses for good purposes in times of emergency, such as unexpected natural disasters, as in the aftermath of the earthquakes in Sichuan in 2008. But at other times patriotic and nationalistic actions lead to the death of ordinary people, soldiers or civilians. Few, if any, generals or politicians die in a patriotic and nationalist war. Patriotism, or nationalism, is a potent force that can affect the lives of millions, and can be used for both just and unjust causes, depending on whose definition of the word prevails. This holds true for all countries.

I want to emphasize that I am not saying that nationalism is all bad. In fact, as Anthony Smith (1995:153–60) points out, and as I have also mentioned above, historically embedded, nations and nationalisms are politically necessary and socially functional. Politically, they can "make room for submerged and unrecognized culture-communities in a world of national states" (p. 154). Socially, "the myths, memories, symbols and ceremonies of nationalism provide the sole basis for . . . social cohesion and political action" (p. 155). My point is that nationalism is a double-edged sword. It makes it possible for individual groups to assert their interests but it also sets boundaries between groups and nations which impede communication and impair relationships, resulting in damages on both sides. It is thus crucial that we understand how nationalism works, and how it can be used to enhance rather than damage interstate relations and people's livelihoods.

The more we understand how nationalism works and what roles the state and intellectuals play in nationalist movements, the better we can see where the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan, or for that matter, between the US and Islamic countries, will go.[4] We will see more clearly what kind of nation-state the two sides are shaping or can shape for themselves.

Introducing Each Chapter

Chapter 1 defines national identity: identification with the nation, the state, and the nation-state. When one identifies with the nation, one's identity is mainly cultural, entailing one's cultural rights and duties. When one identifies with the state, one's identity is mainly political. We are talking about political rights and duties, such as protecting one's freedom and participating in elections. When one identifies with a nation-state where the nation and the state are largely congruent, or with a multinational state, one's identity is both cultural and political. The specific content of this identity varies since the specific content of the nation-state differs; for example, it can be a Chinese democracy, a multinational democracy in Greater China, or something else.

I will also define and classify nationalism, the state, and intellectuals, especially the role of the latter two. I will define individualistic, collectivistic, civic, and ethnic nationalisms and their combinations. Each has a different emphasis, but together they cover most of the terrain of the nationalist discourse. In addition, I define the role different states play. Liberal democratic, pluralist democratic, and authoritarian or totalitarian states tend to adopt different nationalisms. I also define organic, critical, and professional intellectuals and the specific roles they play in nationalist movements. Different categories of intellectuals follow different ethics. These are ideal types, and we need to keep in mind that in reality, most of the time, there are overlapping nationalisms, states, and intellectuals.

Chapter 2 examines the Japanization and re-Sinicization processes on the part of first the colonial state in Taiwan and then the KMT Chinese state, as well as the role of intellectuals in shaping the Taiwanese identity since 1895 and before the Lee Teng-hui era. As one can imagine, fifty years of Japanese colonization and another forty years of the KMT rule have brought tumultuous changes in Taiwan. While both the Japanese and the KMT states were practising a collectivistic ethnic nationalism, one Japanese and the other Chinese, the Taiwanese intellectuals were faced with identity conflicts that would require a solution of some kind. As a result, we have seen armed resistance for liberation, and cultural movements for autonomy in the Japanese colonial era, and democracy and Taiwanese nationalist movements in the KMT era. The resistance against the Japanese colonial government failed and in that era intellectuals were beginning to develop a national consciousness that

would embrace Chinese, Taiwanese, and Japanese elements. The resistance against the KMT resulted in the triumph of democracy, but national identity conflict has continued to trouble the state and intellectuals.

Chapter 3 explores the de-Sinicization process by the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian regimes in Taiwan. Although it seems that the state was moving toward a more exclusive Taiwanese nationalism, it was not quite sure of its steps, either because of the pressure from both the Chinese and American governments or because of some internal contradictions in viewpoint and sentiment. On the other hand, intellectuals' organic, professional, and critical roles were becoming clearer, especially their organic roles. And the intellectuals were facing various ethical dilemmas while playing those roles. They, too, were caught up in the conflict between collectivistic ethnic nationalism that recognizes only the rights of the ethnic collectivity, and an individualistic ethnic nationalism that would recognize both the individual and collective ethnic rights. Just like the Taiwanese state itself, in dealing with the dilemmas and conflicts, the intellectuals were looking for what might be most conducive to building a more satisfactory cross-Strait relationship.

Chapter 4 looks into the development of nationalism in China: from culturalism to the Three Principles of the People, socialism, and liberalism. In response to foreign aggression in China, the Chinese state and intellectuals had to invent a modern nation that would be able to cope with the new world. Culturalism would no longer work, and a Chinese nationalism was born. But in the Self-Strengthening Movement, the Republican Revolution, the May 4 Movement, and the Communist Revolution, the Chinese state and intellectuals failed to develop fully an individualistic ethnic nationalism that would emphasize both the individual rights and cultural group rights, although liberalism began to develop a tradition of its own at any rate.

Chapter 5 analyzes the nation-building on the part of the CCP state and intellectuals after 1949. As Mao declared at the first meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 21, 1949, "the Chinese people have stood up!" But have they? Who are the Chinese people? The CCP state has made various efforts to assimilate national minorities into the Chinese nation, but it has not been clear as to what kind of nation-state it wants to build. Socialism has largely failed, and capitalism has not brought an equal society, either. On the contrary, society is becoming increasingly unequal. Conflicts between the Han and other minorities, between the mainland and Taiwan, have arguably deepened. So far, the CCP has developed a collectivistic ethnic nationalism that is based mostly on exclusion rather than on inclusion. As a result, they are still dogged by ethnic as well as cross-Strait conflicts. Only in recent years do we see some relaxation in the CCP's minority policy and a more flexible Taiwan policy, although the policies in Tibet and Xinjiang seem to be more restrictive than in the 1980s and are apparently serving a negative purpose. As in Taiwan, intellectuals have mostly taken the side of the state as its organic intellectuals. Professional and critical intellectuals are also lacking in

the mainland. Their important roles remain largely potential. Nonetheless, just as Taiwan is still hesitant about where to go after the massive de-Sinicization efforts, both the state and intellectuals in the mainland are moving toward individualistic ethnic nationalism, or at least also hesitating between collectivistic and individualistic ethnic nationalisms.

Chapter 6 examines the various possibilities of a future national identity. Nation building can be based on nationalist principles, such as cultural, ethnic, historical, and political, or liberal nationalist principles. The latter would bridge the individual human rights of personal autonomy, freedom of choice, and the collective ethnic rights of belonging, loyalty, and solidarity. Apparently liberal nationalism seems most appealing to most people. But the People's Republic of China, a Taiwan Republic, "one country, two systems" as is now conceived, and the Republic of China are all ill-equipped to accommodate liberal nationalist demands. A hybrid of federation and confederation, which would ask the two sides to share their sovereignty, appears most appealing for the purpose of ethnic solidarity, political democracy, and also economic development and efficiency.

Chapter 7 surveys the obstacles to such a confederation. It first examines the difficulties encountered in crossing cultural boundaries and in overcoming one's prejudices and discriminatory attitudes on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Then it examines the difficulty of writing off political realism, which views conflict as not only inevitable but also insoluble short of violence. Both the state and its organic intellectuals tend to buy into this belief. Then I analyze a number of concepts that would counter argue for the possibility of a hybrid of federation and confederation. Sociability and idealism, for example, recognize not only the inevitable conflict but also the inevitable reconciliation to make a livable society possible and why it is possible. Cosmopolitanism brings us to concern for all humanity. Liberal nationalism bridges both individual and collective interests through a cultural interpretation of self-determination and a more flexible political arrangement other than the nation-state. The state and intellectuals are instrumental in fostering these contradictory ideologies. How they handle the contradictions will help determine whether there is war or peace across the Taiwan Strait.

The reader might note that I analyze and articulate an ideal solution in chapters 6 and 7. I am hoping that my arguments will contribute to the debate from a moral or ideal point of view. But as I also explain in chapter 7, there may be more obstacles to this than one can think of.

Chapter 8 re-emphasizes the crucial role of the state and professional, critical, and organic intellectuals in nation building and national identity formation. The understanding of their roles and of their blurring of roles will help us better understand the direction in which a nation is heading. Together, the state and intellectuals hold the wheel of national history, and therefore the key to national identity, and to war or peace.

Methods of Research

My chief methodology is historical-comparative and interpretive. I explore the historical processes of nation-building on both sides of the Strait and look for larger social forces that have affected the changes in people's national identities. I view the state and intellectuals as the two most important social forces in creating national identity and managing identity conflicts, but both are also influenced by other social factors and processes. We look at the interdependency of events and factors, and the mutual interaction and reciprocal effects that occur over a period of time. In other words, we look at the dynamics of change in national identity and the way people manage their identity conflicts.

Sociology is mainly an art of comparison, so I will inevitably compare nationalism in China with nationalism elsewhere, as I have done above. But the main comparison is between Taiwan and mainland China. The differences and similarities revealed should illuminate the understanding of national identity conflicts across the Taiwan Strait as well as within China.

As Arthur Schlesinger (2007) says, we need to remember that history is to the nation as memory is to the individual. Only when we understand the historical development of national identities in the past can we understand where they may go in the future. In addition, one cannot just talk about the development of Taiwanese nationalism without talking about the development of Chinese nationalism on the mainland, and vice versa, since they are intertwined. So a comparative analysis is also crucial. Historical-comparative approach is the main approach of the book.

I also use the interpretive method. Given the complex and changing nature of people's feelings and understanding of a multifaceted, multi-stranded, mutable and contested issue such as national identity, it would be difficult to get a broader picture of people's sentiments simply from what they publish in a partisan journal or what they say at a political meeting. In addition, social behavior and feelings are much more complex than can be revealed through a survey. It is thus important to actually talk to people and have them elaborate their ideas and explain the development of those ideas. It is important to carry out focused interviews with individuals who are faced with identity conflicts, especially intellectuals and politicians. So I have also interviewed a number of persons on both sides of the issue and incorporated their opinions into my analysis.

In my analysis throughout the book on nationalisms (e.g. collectivistic vs. individualistic ethnic nationalisms), national identity (nation, state, and nation-state), the state (e.g. authoritarian vs. democratic), and intellectuals (organic, professional, and critical), I have used Weberian ideal types. This means that none of the subcategories in each of these terms is an absolute thing in itself. In fact, they overlap. Analyzing them separately as if they were pure types will help us better see the qualities of each, but it should not mislead us to believe that they are

really pure. Indeed, I emphasize in the book that it is the complexity of each term, their overlapping qualities, and the interaction between the ideal types that are most interesting and challenging in understanding the role of the state and intellectuals in shaping their conflicting national identities across the Taiwan Strait.

In sum, nationalism has been a crucial factor in influencing national development. The state and intellectuals are instrumental in building the kind of nation that is being constructed now. A study of these social agents will then be very important for a proper understanding of this important part of human endeavor, be it humanly constructive or inhumanely destructive. This book will help people see more clearly the various possibilities and the roles of the state and intellectuals in affecting the future directions of both the PRC and the ROC. It is thus of interest not only to China scholars, undergraduate and graduate students, and state policy analysts and policy makers, but also to those who are concerned about cross-Strait relations, including regular readers as well as professionals and business people, who have a stake in where the cross-Strait relations go.

Chapter One

National Identity, Nationalism, the State, and Intellectuals

In this chapter, I will define what I mean by national identity, nationalism, the state, and intellectuals. I will develop a typology of the relationship between nationalism on the one hand and the state and intellectuals on the other.

The Meaning of National Identity

As Dittmer and Kim (1993:30) ask, when people talk about *national identity* (國家認同), what is it, exactly, that people identify with? What is the behavioral or essentialist content of that identity? As one asks about one's citizenship, "Who am I?" "What should I do?" (see Habermas 1992:16, citing H.R. van Gunsteren). And "what are my rights?" This much we can say: when people talk about national identity, they actually mean identification with a nation (民族), with a state (國家), and/or with a nation-state (民族國家), each with a symbol system known as the national essence. Let us distinguish the three and see what contents each of them has.

To Identify with the Nation

First, what is a nation? Generally speaking, a nation is an imagined (meaning creative) sovereign political community, which is based on a relevant common history, shared cultural roots, pre-existing social networks, and a designated homeland (see Anderson 1991:6–7; Smith 1998:130). Anderson discusses a nation's immemorial past, a national language, as well as census, maps, and museums. Culture is also very important for Gellner (1983:7), who thinks that people are in the same nation "if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating." In addition, these people have to recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. Underlying these characteristics may be what people would call primordial and

perennial ethnic bonds that are filled with feelings and emotions (see also Calhoun 1997; Habermas 1992:3; Smith 1998:71, 83, 127–29; 245–70).[1]

These are the kinds of feelings and emotions both Wang Tuo, a former legislator who is a supporter of Taiwan independence, and Wang Jin-pin, an activist for unification, expressed in their Interviews with Guo Ji-zhou (1995:45, 68).[2] Wang Tuo said that he just did not feel as much about the Great Wall in China or the Grand Canyon in the United States as he did about the Badouzi Hill in his hometown. Wang Jin-ping said that he loved Taiwan so much that he wanted to devote his time and energy for its freedom and equality as a way to contribute to the welfare of the entire Chinese people. These people have a lot of feelings and emotions for their homeland, although they may have different opinions as to its future. The ethnic conflicts in Taiwan in the 1990s further illustrate the intense feelings of people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds (see Chang Mau-kuei and Wu Xin-yi 2001).

If the nation is a historical, cultural, ethnic, social, political and territorial community, but mainly cultural and ethnic, national identity would then mean the identification of people with such a community, like the two Wangs' above. According to the logic of this nation-state, the national identity of the Tibetan, the Uyghur, and the Mongol independence advocates is of the same kind. So if Taiwanese think that they are a different nation from the Chinese, as independence advocates such as Liao Wen-yi, Wang Yu-teh, Xu Shi-kai, and Shi Ming would believe (see Li Kuang-Chun 2001; Lin Jin 1993:87–91, 248–77), this is the kind of national identity they talk about, just as that of the Tibetans and Uyghurs. They would not identify with the Han in China, since they believe they are largely different from them in history and culture.

To Identify with the State

People may also identify with a state. But what is a state? From a Weberian point of view, the state is an organization that makes the rules and regulations within a given territory and that has the sole right to use violence in the enforcement of its order (Lewellen 1995:133; Smith 1998:70; Weber 1946). From a Marxian point of view, the state is a tool for one group of people to suppress other groups. From a traditional political science point of view, there is a state as long as the entity has a territory, people, government, and sovereignty (see Liu I-chou and Tian Fang-hua 2003). Thus the Greek city-states, the Roman empire, the Chinese empire as well as the over 190 modern nations/countries in the world are all examples of states.

The state is thus a political entity that coordinates and regulates human action, especially group action, within a given territory, using violence when it deems necessary. Asian Americans can identify with the democratic political system in

the United States, and share the same system with the Native, Caucasian, African, Latino, and other Americans. They recognize each other's rights and duties in the country. Their national identity would be that of the United States, referring mainly to the political system, which happens to be mostly liberal democratic. But a political system one identifies with can also be totalitarian or authoritarian. Although it is called national identification, it is in fact a state identification. The Han, the Tibetans and other minorities mentioned above can also identify with the state in mainland China or Taiwan. Their state identification is sometimes called national identification, too.

As Gellner (1983:6) points out, although nationalism holds that the nation and the state are destined for each other, they do not always happen at the same time. "The state has certainly emerged without the help of the nation. Some nations have certainly emerged without the blessings of their own state." Indeed, the states of Qin, Qi, Chu, Yan, Han, Zhao, and Wei of the Warring States period (475–221 B.C.) in China were mostly Han by nationality, but they were different states. Qin and Chu, for example, were founded by minorities in China, that is, Xi Rong and Man respectively. Singapore and China are now two different states, too, although most of the inhabitants in these two places are Han Chinese. The Aborigines in Taiwan are nations, but they do not have the blessings of a state, for better or for worse.

Thus national identity can mean state identity. But is this a totalitarian, authoritarian, or a liberal democratic state that one identifies with? Is a democratic national (state) identity possible in China, as Friedman (1995) asks? This is also the question Lucian Pye (1996) focused on. Since nations and states are not always congruent, national identity could mean either the identification with the state or with the nation, or both. In the latter case, one's identification may be with a nation-state.

To Identify with the Nation-State

A third kind of national identity is the identification with a nation-state. This could be a nation-state composed of only one's own nation, or of multiple nationalities. Less than ten percent of all the nations in the United Nations are single nation-states, and most are multiethnic, which is why Smith (1995:86) calls them national states rather than nation-states.[3] I will, however, call them nation-states, with the understanding that they are mostly multiethnic. Thus, broadly speaking, a nation-state is "*a state which the great majority of the citizens identify with to the extent of seeing it as their own*" (Tønnesson and Antlöv 1996:2, italics original). It could be said that this is a political and cultural community where the national and the political are largely congruent. One's national identity would be with both the nation and the state, where the state can be composed either of mostly one's own nation (單民族國家), or of multiple ethnicities (多民族國家).

Taiwan, mainland China, and the United States all claim to be multi-national nations or states, albeit arguably still in the making (see Chang Mau-kuei 2002; Chen Qi 2001; Shih Cheng-feng 2003:89, 180–85; Townsend 1996:18; Wang Xiao-bo 2002:300–07; Xu Xun 1998). Some Taiwanese independence advocates, following Lee Teng-hui, think that they constitute a "life community" (生命共同體) of some kind with different ethnic groups and are "new Taiwanese" (新台灣人), or a new Taiwanese nation (台灣民族) of multiple ethnicities (see Mengin 1999:120–4; Shi Ming 1998:715; Shih Cheng-feng 2003:66, 84, 126–67). Likewise, the government on the mainland also claims that they are a nation of multiple ethnicities, and their identification is with such a multi-nation-state called *Zhonghua minzu*, or Chinese nation (中華民族) composed of 56 nationalities.[4] And their nation would also include the Taiwanese nation, if there is one. The conflict between Taiwan and mainland China can then be viewed as a conflict between two multi-national-nations or nation-states.

People in China may say that they only identify with a Han nation. But they may also claim that there is a Chinese nation, the multiethnic nation-state, and that is what they identify with. So if Tibetans say that they are Chinese, this may be the nation they are referring to.[5] But she or he can also identify with the Tibetan nation at the same time. In that case, the person may have multiple national identities.

However one defines the nation-state, single-nation or multination, it is still a tool of control. To reiterate our explanation of the state above, "The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence" (Giddens, cited in Smith 1998:72). Whether this is a single-nation state or multination state, the function of that state is the same.

In a nutshell, *national identity* can refer to an identification with a *nation* that is mainly a single cultural and historical community, with a *state* that is mainly a political community, or with a *nation-state* that is a combination of a single nation or multiple nations and the state. Identity crisis could arise when these identities conflict with one another, as the Chinese in Taiwan experienced during the Japanese occupation as well as after the 2–28 Uprising and the KMT state's ruthless crackdown on civilians (see Dai Guo-hui and Ye Yun-yun 2002:309–12). Peng Ming-min's father was ashamed of being a Chinese after witnessing the KMT atrocities during the crackdown. Such conflicts continue today. But this is the kind of national identity which I will be talking about in the book.

Each ethnic group can theoretically constitute a different nation and identify with that nation while at the same time identifying with the state. But these are different national identities, and each individual can have multiple national identities.[6] As Duara (1996:31–32, 38) notes, national identity is founded upon fluid

relationships and interchangeable with other political identities. Individuals may simultaneously identify with several communities that are all imagined, and it is "a product of negotiation with historical identities within the framework of a modern nation-state system" (p. 41). Or as Hobsbawm (1992:11) reiterates, national identity not only combines with other identities, but it "can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods." Indeed, this book is about the extent to which people in Taiwan and mainland China have managed and will continue to manage to change or modify their national identities, and how and why they do so.

Nationalism

The importance of nationalism was discussed in the Introduction, but the term was not defined. Nationalism, as ism's go, is an ideology, but it is also a movement of nation-building, a kind of nation as discussed above. As Gellner (1983:1) observes, it is "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." In other words, as an ideology, nation and state should be one and the same, and this nation is mainly a single, not a multiethnic nation. Thus this ideology often evolves into a political movement for the nation to seek and exercise state power, that is, political sovereignty or autonomy that corresponds to one's national identity (Breuilly 1993:2; Goldmann, Hannerz and Westin 2000:4). Nationalism, then, can be viewed as an ideology that believes in the congruency of the nation and the state and that often fosters a social movement of nation-building or sate formation. It is thus a discourse, a project, and a value judgment, as Calhoun (1997:6) would say.[7] Tibetan and Taiwanese independence movements are good examples of nationalism.

Nationalism as a social movement can be categorized in various ways according to its nature and aspects, that is, what kind of nation-state one is building. We thus have many nationalisms. For example, Anderson (1991) examines *creole nationalism* in the US and South and Central America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, *official nationalism* as embodied in imperialism in both Europe and Asia especially before World War I, and *popular/linguistic nationalism* following World War II. Anthony Smith calls these nationalisms *plural, civic,* and *ethnic* (cited in Tønnesson and Antlöv 1996:11). For official nationalism, Breuilly (1983:8) uses a similar term, *governmental nationalism*, which I will further discuss below. Hobsbawm (1992) discusses *proto-nationalism, ethnic nationalism,* and *linguistic nationalism.*

One certainly encounters many other kinds of nationalism in the literature. For the purpose of clarity, I will, following Greenfeld (2000), focus on a typology of nationalism with *civic* and *ethnic* nationalisms on the one hand, and *individualistic* and *collectivistic* nationalisms on the other (see Table 1). Although Greenfeld defines

them as three kinds, I will view them as four. And they largely correspond to the nationalisms others have discussed. In addition, different kinds of state correspond to another four different kinds of nationalism. (I will discuss the state in detail in the next section.) Let us first have a look at the eight types of nationalism. I am introducing these seemingly complex typologies in order to facilitate the description and analysis of the state's and intellectuals' involvement in nationalist movements in the chapters that follow.

Table 1: A Typology of Nationalism and the State

	1. *individualistic nationalism*	2. *collectivistic nationalism*
3. *Civic nationalism*	5. *individualistic civic nationalism* as seen in liberalism or a liberal democratic state	6. *collectivistic civic nationalism* as seen in a democratic socialist or popular-, even liberal-democratic state, in ambivalent, problematic national consciousness
4. *ethnic nationalism*	7. *individualistic ethnic nationalism, or liberal nationalism* as seen in a liberal-, pluralistic-democratic state	8. *collectivistic ethnic nationalism* as seen in an authoritarian, totalitarian state, occasionally in a liberal democratic state, in socialism, communism, colonialism, and imperialism

Sources: Greenfeld (1992:10–1; 2000:31–4); Tamir (1993). The expansion of concepts and the numbering are mine.

For Greenfeld (2000:31–34), when the nation is defined as an association of individuals (as a composite entity), there is *individualistic nationalism* (see type 1 in Table 1). This type of nationalism emphasizes human rights, liberty, and equality, the goals of which are realized in liberal democratic institutions. The democracy movement in Taiwan, with the journal *Free China* in the 1950s and the *Dang Wai* movement in the 1970s as the most important indicators, was an example of individualistic nationalism. The *Dang Wai* movement refers to the campaign of political candidates to participate in elections as members "outside the KMT Party" (i.e., *dang wai*). The 1989 June 4 Democracy Movement in mainland China was also an example of individualistic nationalism.

When the nation is defined as a collective of individuals (in unitary terms), we have *collectivistic nationalism* (see type 2 in Table 1). This nationalism emphasizes the interests of the nation, which will take priority over the interests of the individual.

The latter's rights can be legitimately sacrificed for the good of the former. A certain elite determines what these national interests are. According to Greenfeld (2000:32), this situation usually finds itself in socialism, communism, and socialist or popular democracy, as in Chinese socialism. We find collectivistic nationalism in imperialism as well. That is what Anderson (1991) calls *official nationalism*. The American nationalism that advocates pre-emptive strikes is an official nationalism. This collectivistic nationalism can occasionally be seen in a liberal democracy; this type of nationalism was apparent in many governmental and media justifications for the US war on Iraq in 2003. This strand of American nationalism can also be viewed as collectivistic ethnic nationalism, which will be discussed below.

The third and fourth types of nationalism, Greenfeld (2000:31–34) thinks, derive from the criteria of national membership, that is, either *civic* or *ethnic* (see also MacCormick 1999:169–71). *Civic nationalism* (see type 3 in Table 1) corresponds to individualistic nationalism in that it also emphasizes the rights and duties of the individual, but it states that one can become part of the nation if he or she identifies with the nation and is committed to its principles (see also He Baogang and Guo Yingjie 2000:45, 168; Jiang Yi-huah 1998:156–57, 161–76, 189–202; Smith 1998:125–27). Chinese-Americans, who identify with the American values and ideals and become citizens of the United States, are more likely to adhere to this kind of nationalism. When Lucian Pye (1996) laments that Chinese nationalism lacks substantive content, he means mainly civic nationalism. This national identity is not based on ethnicity, as below, but on political principles.

There is no doubt that *civic nationalism* can also be oppressive, making uniform demands on citizens without regard to cultural and ethnic difference (Smith 1995:101–2). As Yack (2000) points out, "collective righteousness can inspire just as much violence and intolerance as mindless ethnocentrism." This problem may be better dealt with by individualistic ethnic nationalism, or liberal nationalism, to be discussed below.

The fourth type, *ethnic nationalism* (see type 4 in Table 1), however, stresses ascriptive characteristics, natural qualities inherent in one's very being. These are important for membership in the nation. If one does not belong to the ethnicity, one cannot stay in the country. The Holocaust and ethnic cleansings in the twentieth century are examples of such nationalism, which emphasizes inclusion and exclusion based on cultural and ethnic identities (see also Hobsbawm 1992 for proto-nationalism, and Smith 1998:125–7).

Most of the time, however, we do not see pure types of nationalism. Rather, we see combinations of them. Different combinations of the above nationalisms will then yield another four types of nationalism. Since *civic* nationalism corresponds to *individualistic* nationalism, we can have a fifth kind of nationalism, *individualistic civic* nationalism (type 5 in Table 1), as found in liberal democracies. The three terms (types 1, 3 and 5) overlap in meaning and can be used interchangeably, as

will be done in this book. When mainland China and Taiwan emphasize building democratic institutions to guarantee human rights, they are practising individualistic civic nationalism. Our Chinese-Americans can also be viewed as adhering to individualistic civic nationalism in the US

Greenfeld (2000:33) thinks that the sixth kind, *collectivistic civic nationalism* (type 6 in Table 1), presents some ambivalent and problematic national consciousness, since the two values are irreconcilable. But that is where nationalism is most interesting. The question is whether nationalists can design institutions that guarantee interests of the individual on the one hand, and the interests of the collectivity on the other. It might be fair to say that it is a problem which both mainland China and Taiwan, coming politically from a Confucian tradition, are struggling with. It is Confucian China faced with a modern fate, to paraphrase Levenson (1965). As we have seen in modern Chinese history, the result of this struggle between tradition and modernity is not so much the likelihood of one eliminating the other, but rather of each finding ways to accommodate the other, hence the possibility of *collectivistic civic nationalism.*

Greenfeld (2000:36) thinks that the seventh kind, *individualistic ethnic nationalism* (type 7 in Table 1), is not quite possible, either. She states that ethnic diversity is antithetical to liberal democracy, and if we commit ourselves to the political ideal of the former, we shall weaken the latter. In other words, *individualistic ethnic nationalism* might be an oxymoron, similar to *collectivistic civic nationalism*. (So these two nationalisms have different meanings—collective versus individualistic—but they are not diametrically opposed to each other, since ethnic is also collectivistic, albeit referring to a smaller collectivity.) That may indeed be one of the dilemmas of modernity, but we may be able to find some success in multiculturalism, or what might be called a pluralistic liberal democracy. Mainland China has 56 nationalities, and Taiwan four larger ethnic groups (Hoklo, Hakka, Mandarin speaking groups, and Aborigines, the latter of which is now further divided into 13 ethnic groups; see also Wang Fu-chang 2002).[8] When their governments talk about building a nation of multiple ethnicities with equal rights for all, they are talking about an individualistic ethnic nationalism. Theoretically, it is possible for them to build such a liberal democratic nation. That is also what the US, Canada, and many other nations are trying to do, although not without difficulty.

This *individualistic ethnic nationalism* can also be viewed as *liberal nationalism,* as explicated by Tamir (1993). This nationalism will be discussed in detail later, but suffice it to say that liberal nationalism, by definition, emphasizes advancing both the cultural rights of the ethnic group and the human rights of the individual. As Greenfeld implies, to build such a nationalism is a difficult task. The difficulties can also be seen in the disputes on affirmative action policies in the United States. But this might be the most appealing option compared with other nationalisms.

Ethnic nationalism often combines with collectivistic nationalism, and together they form the eighth kind, *collectivistic ethnic nationalism* (type 8 in Table 1). This nationalism "consistently subjugate[s] the individual to the collectivity and consistently reject[s] the notion of individual freedom as both unrealistic and immoral" (Greenfeld 2000:33). For example, when the Han nationalists in China subjugate the minorities by allowing them less autonomy than they need for their cultural survival, or when Hoklo nationalists in Taiwan exclude others by speaking Minnan Hua (southern Fujianese dialect) only, which the latter may not understand, implying that they should, they are practising collectivistic ethnic nationalism. Wang Fu-chang (1996:183–5) describes how Hoklo was used at meetings in the 1980s as a very important symbol of Taiwanese nationalism, of inclusion and exclusion.[9] Hoklo has been the "politically correct" language for many occasions (Chang Mau-kuei 1994:133; Li Xiao-feng 1994:157–61),[10] and it is now considered as the "national" language, or *Tai yu* (that is, the language of Taiwan). Indeed, when I was in Taiwan in 2002–2003 or before that in the US, and wanted to attend a meeting organized by the independence movement, before deciding whether to attend the meeting, I needed first to establish whether they were going to speak Mandarin, which I understand, or Hoklo, which I do not. Language is a very effective tool of inclusion and exclusion. If the majority group is in power and practices ethnic nationalism with state power, it becomes collectivistic ethnic nationalism.

As mentioned earlier when discussing collectivistic nationalism, in the justification of its war against Iraq in 2003, the United States administration appealed to a collectivistic ethnic nationalism. When President Bush used the terms "crusade" and "axis of evil" in his war against terrorism, he was referring to groups of people with different religions and ethnicities. He was practicing nationalism, as Anthony W. Marx, a professor of political science at Columbia University, and Linda Colley, a historian at the London School of Economics, would say (see Stille 2003).[11] It is a collectivistic ethnic nationalism, since it is a collectivistic and ethnic "us" against a collectivistic and ethnic "them." The "English only" policy in some states in the US is another example of American ethnic nationalism.

Thus, theoretically we have eight types of nationalism. As one can see, types 1, 2, 3, and 4 are pure types of nationalism, and the rest are mixtures and combinations, which are more likely to occur in real life. It is these latter four, especially Type 7 and 8, that I will focus on in this book. Individualistic civic nationalism and collectivistic ethnic nationalism/liberal nationalism are almost directly opposed to each other, and they are on either end of the nationalist continuum. Also in conflict are collectivistic versus individualistic nationalisms, and civic versus ethnic nationalisms. Collectivistic civic and especially individualistic ethnic or liberal nationalisms are efforts to reconcile these values. The conflict between individualistic ethnic and collectivistic ethnic nationalisms will determine future cross-Strait relations, as I will further explain in the book.

It is important for us to remember that these are ideal types, and most nationalisms are not either this or that. There are many in-between and overlapping cases, which we will see more clearly when specific situations are analyzed. Ideal types can be approximated but are unlikely to be fully realized (Greenfeld 1992:11). As Breuilly (1993:9) points out, classifications "are not right or wrong; rather, they are either helpful or unhelpful." More importantly, the main purpose of our using this typology is to see how these classifications help define the kind of state being produced, and what insights they provide for intellectuals and the state in their imagining of national identities, as will be clear in the following chapters. Let us now examine the role of state in nationalism. I will again use typologies.

The State

When the state is introduced in the discussion of nationalism, it is mostly in terms of the differences and relationship between culture, nation and the state. Anderson (1991:86–110, 159–60) discusses official nationalism in the way of, for example, Anglicization, Russification, Hispanization, and Japanization. This is a nationalism where nationalists use the power of the state to pursue their own Machiavellian visions. This is often a state action. Similarly, Breuilly (1993:8–9) discusses governmental nationalism, or state-led nationalism, in the sense of a state's external policies extending its territory into areas the state claims to be its own, and in the sense of internal policies against specific groups or individuals for their alleged anti- or non-national character.

Gellner (1983:1, 134; 1997:5–13) discusses one nation one state, or one nation many states, and the universality of culture and organization but temporality of states and nationalisms. One could certainly add the possibility of one state many nations, since "not all nationalisms have in practice opted for independent statehood" (Smith 1998:73). Regarding the state, the ultimate question is what kind of nation or state one would build and how (e.g., through social movements led by intellectuals, through war, etc.). That will depend on the kind of nationalism envisaged and who the nationalists are (see Greenfeld 2000; Smith 1998:70–96).

I will touch on all these problems, but I will focus on the role of the state in nationalist movements, whether official/governmental nationalism, popular nationalism, or other kinds of nationalisms, as discussed in Anderson, Breuilly and others. But what role the state can play depends on the nature of the state. While all states might be making rules and regulations, they do so differently. In addition to the different kinds of nationalism, Table 1 also shows that we can identify at least four kinds of state with differing values, and therefore four kinds of roles the state can play in advancing nationalism.

First, there is the *liberal democratic state*, which is more likely to advance *civic nationalism* emphasizing the rights and duties of the individual. Again, there is probably no pure liberal democracy, so we can only talk about predominance of its characteristics. We might view the US as a liberal democracy. It can move toward a more ideal form of pluralistic democratic state, but at times it may move toward an authoritarian or imperialist state as in the case of the US war on Iraq in 2003. In that case, as in many cases of the US's anti-terrorist measures, including the harsh measures toward immigrants or potential immigrants, the state has actually practiced collectivistic ethnic nationalism, although not everything harsh is necessarily linked with ethnic nationalism.[12] Some of these policies have been reversed after Barack Obama became president of the US in 2009, and the nature of the state is also changing to some extent, moving toward a more liberal pluralistic democracy, as will be discussed below.

Second, there is the *liberal pluralistic democratic state*, which fosters an *individualistic ethnic nationalism*, aiming to build a nation that values individual rights and duties while taking ethnicity into consideration. The US might be viewed as moving in this direction, as mentioned above. Canada's and Australia's multicultural public policies are another example, with an emphasis on equal opportunities, the rule of law, and respect for human rights (Goldmann, Hannerz, and Westin 2000:9–10). But again there might be contradictions between individual rights and ethnic rights, as in the dispute on affirmative action in the US already mentioned. It might be fair to say that this is also the form of state that both mainland China and Taiwan are striving for.

Third, there is the *democratic socialist* or *popular democratic state*. This kind of state tends to practice *collectivistic civic nationalism* and emphasize the rights of the collectivity more than the rights of the individual. Most of the time this is what the mainland Chinese government does. Sometimes, the Taiwanese government also falls into the mode. For example, in April 2003, the Taiwanese government was thinking about regulating the press by having an organization monitor its political reports. In a state that is ruptured along ethnic group lines, and with the administrative power in the hands of one of the groups, this proposal understandably aroused a lot of opposition and was dropped eventually. In monitoring the press in this way, the government would be practicing a collectivistic civic nationalism or even collectivistic ethnic nationalism. As one can see, this kind of government, although aiming at civic reform, is in danger of sacrificing individual rights at the expense of collective rights, and thus tending to protect one group rather than all groups.

Fourth, there is the *authoritarian and totalitarian state*, which advocates *collectivistic ethnic nationalism*. The most obvious example is Hitler's Nazi government. But authoritarian governments may also follow similar lines, with largely collectivistic ethnic nationalism, as in the KMT government under Chiang

Kai-shek and the mainland Chinese government under Mao. In fact, even *liberal democratic* governments like those of the US and Taiwan could sometimes commit such acts when they felt, rightly or wrongly, that their national security was under threat.[13]

Organic Intellectuals, Critical Intellectuals, and Professionals

More often than not, intellectuals and professionals play a crucial role in the development of nationalism everywhere in the world, whether by creating the ideology, by initiating the movement or by furnishing its leadership. As a result, the discussion of nationalism and the state will inevitably touch on intellectuals, although scholars may use varying terms to refer to them (see Smith 1995:76–83; 1998:50, 55–57, 91–95, 106–09). But the study of the roles of intellectuals and professionals in nationalism is quite patchy. Further efforts are needed to make a more complete description of the roles of intellectuals and professionals, which is part of what this book is trying to accomplish.

Broadly defined, intellectuals are those people who have received a considerable amount of education and are doing some kind of professional work. But here are some caveats. In traditional China, individuals trained in Confucian classics were called *shi,* 士, meaning "gentry," which is also related to *shi,* 事, meaning professional "things." When such literati became officials, they were called *shi,* 仕, meaning "scholar-official" (see Zhidong Hao 2003a:38; Lin Tongqi 1980:46–47). These different meanings of the literati indicate the various aspects of intellectual work, and the literati were the intellectuals in the past.

Since the Republican era, such knowledge workers have been called "intellectuals" on account of the education and professional training which sets them apart. To become an official is no longer the only right thing to do or the only option available to educated individuals as it was in traditional China. One can become a professional, like an engineer, a doctor, a lawyer, an accountant, etc. (Zhidong Hao 2003a:380–83; Schwarcz 1986:187–88). So in modern times, we have intellectuals who are *professionals.*

In addition, there are intellectuals who have become officials or who work for officials, just like the scholar-officials of the past, whom I shall now call *organic intellectuals*. In their relations to the powers that be,[14] which is the chief distinction among the three kinds of intellectuals discussed here, organic intellectuals are closest to the powers, but professionals keep a distance from them. *Critical intellectuals* are the furthest from the powers that be; in fact, they are often critical of them. In addition to being critical of the powers, such intellectuals are also professional in their work, concerned about the most disadvantaged in society, and following an ethic of ultimate ends. Let me now further explain these differences among the three kinds of intellectuals.

Critical intellectuals and organic intellectuals serve different groups in society. The former stand up for the disadvantaged groups in society and therefore often find themselves in opposition to the powers that be. They serve as the conscience of society (see Zhidong Hao 2003a:385–91; Said 1994:113; Yu Ying-shih 1988:94–95). Their criticism is often based on what they find in their professional work, so they have the characteristics of a professional.

Organic intellectuals, on the other hand, as Gramsci (1971:12) points out, serve as the dominant group's deputies assisting in its social and political hegemony. But they may also serve as the theorists and organizers of the proletarian movements or other social movements (Mannheim 1936:158; Schumpeter 1976:154). They can be organic to any well-established interest group (see Zhidong Hao 2003a:3–4). The intellectuals or professionals discussed in Anderson (1991:79–81, 88, 140–41), Gellner (1983:47 on "febrile thinkers"), Breuilly (1993:46–51) and others are such intellectuals. Because they possess certain intellectual and professional knowledge and skills, they perform important roles in the formation of the nationalist ideology, in the organization of the nationalist movement, or in defending the *status quo*.

Critical and organic intellectuals have different ethics. Critical intellectuals follow an ethic of ultimate ends and will stand for a set of ultimate and absolute values and will not use dubious means to achieve their goals (see Coser 1965:208; Weber 1946:121). But organic intellectuals, on the other hand, will follow an ethic of responsibility, using "morally dubious means or at least dangerous ones" to achieve what they believe to be ethically good purposes (see also Zhidong Hao 2003a:50–56 for more discussion on this ethical dilemma). For example, in the democracy movement in Taiwan from the 1950s to 1970s, intellectuals who followed peaceful means to strive for democracy were critical intellectuals. They faced social pressure from colleagues, friends, and family for doing the right thing. They stood for a set of ultimate values and managed to expose civil and social injustice (Arrigo 2002). But if they risked family, careers, and even freedom and life, and being blamed for incriminating or endangering other people as well as themselves, they were so committed that they became organic intellectuals to a social movement. This was even more so when they used violence, in itself a dubious means, to advance the independence movement.

Typical professionals are those who pursue their intellectual work for the sake of intellectual work, or "art for art's sake." They do not generally involve themselves in politics (see Zhidong Hao 2003a:33–44). As Breuilly (1993:48) observes, "Many [intellectuals] remain aloof from overt political activity—whether because of self-interest, lack of interest, or a sense that this is the proper, disinterested position to take." Our discussion of professionals will focus on those who do work on nationalism. Their work will be professional in that they will try to be neutral, objective, reasonable, and will not falsify history. In their research, they make an effort to avoid inflammatory words that show clear preference for one position over

another. And they are less likely to appear on talk shows than organic intellectuals. They view this as the most appropriate stance for a professional to take, and by acting in this way they are following an ethic of ultimate ends. Table 2 is a typology of intellectuals based on their political positions regarding nationalism and their ethics.

Table 2: A Typology of Intellectuals and Their Favorite Nationalisms

organic intellectuals	*critical intellectuals*	*professionals*
engage in ethnic, collectivistic ethnic nationalism as in official Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism or their social movements; follow an ethic of responsibility	engage in individualistic ethnic nationalism aiming at a pluralistic liberal democratic state, such as a federation or confederation; follow an ethic of ultimate ends	engage in detached professional research on nationalism; follow an ethic of ultimate ends

Source: Zhidong Hao (2003a).

As can be seen from Table 2, *organic intellectuals* are most likely to work for Chinese or Taiwanese nationalism, either in government or in a social movement. They will be more likely to work in the frame of ethnic or even collectivistic ethnic nationalism and follow an ethic of responsibility. *Critical intellectuals*, on the other hand, while striving to serve as the conscience of society, might want to look at the matter from the perspectives of both Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms and strive for the best interest of the whole society, especially for that of the most disadvantaged members of it. Critical intellectuals work in the framework of individualistic ethnic nationalism. *Professional intellectuals* will focus on solving the social and political puzzles of nationalism, and they will keep their distance from both Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism. Both critical and professional intellectuals follow an ethic of ultimate ends.

Another dimension of intellectuals is their dual and split personalities (Zhidong Hao 2003a:60–68). This happens when an organic intellectual struggles to be critical. In the Chinese history, examples may include, to cite the most famous, Hai Rui from the pre-modern times and Deng Tuo in the modern times (see also Cheek 1997; Goldman 1981). Wang Shiwei is an example of a critical intellectual who was also organic to a social movement, in this case, the Chinese Communist movement (see also Dai Qing 1994). Hu Shih and Tao Baichuan may be examples of such intellectuals under the KMT regime.

When they are organic to the powers that be or to a social movement, intellectuals are not always content with that position. This is because politicians may not have the same values as they do. As decision makers, politicians generally discount opinions held by intellectuals, thinking their ideas would not work. This creates a

situation where intellectuals may find themselves disappointed when working for the powers that be or for heads of social movements, unless they too become such politicians and heads. So they may decide to leave the state government or the social movement. They may become critical intellectuals or simply professionals. Then we would see intellectuals switch positions, or otherwise demonstrate dual or even split personalities.

Indeed, the three types of intellectuals may change from one role to another in the same position or between positions, and our typology is, like the one on nationalism, only a description of ideal types. This is yet another important dimension of intellectuals, especially organic intellectuals. Many also move among the three positions or roles of organic, critical, and unattached professional, with one orientation as the major characteristic at a certain time (if they do not want to suffer from severe split-personality syndromes). In other words, a critical or unattached intellectual may want to become an official, or he or she may drift in the other direction. So the roles and orientations of intellectuals are dynamic rather than static. Their political and social efficacy is reflected in this constant process of looking for and finding what they believe to be the right role to play in a certain place and at a certain time.

In sum, these ideal types are used for us to evaluate the political roles of intellectuals in nationalist movements. In reality, one would be hard pressed to find who is a pure critical intellectual, and who is a pure organic or professional intellectual. Intellectuals switch positions from time to time and issue to issue (see Zhidong Hao 2003a:71–72; Mannheim 1936:158). They may exhibit more organicity on one issue but more critical ability on the other. Critical and professional abilities are often present in organic intellectuals as well. In fact, in switching positions, intellectuals look for the best opportunity to make use of their potentialities. And they suffer dual or split personalities. With these ideal typical measurements, the roles of intellectuals in nationalist movements of nation-building can be seen more clearly.

To sum up, in this chapter, I have analyzed the definition of national identity in terms of identification with the nation, the state, and the nation-state. I have presented a typology of nationalism (individualistic, collectivistic, civic, ethnic, and their combinations), of the state (liberal democratic, authoritarian-democratic, pluralist democratic, and authoritarian or totalitarian), and of intellectuals (organic, critical, and professional). It is hypothesized that organic intellectuals tend to follow ethnic and collectivistic ethnic nationalisms, while critical intellectuals tend to follow individualistic ethnic nationalism. Professionals are not directly involved in the nationalist movements but are engaged in their professional research on nationalism. While a liberal democratic state may foster individualistic civic nationalism, it may also advance an individualistic ethnic nationalism, just as a liberal pluralistic

democratic state does. But occasionally it may foster a collectivistic ethnic nationalism, just as would an authoritarian state. Intellectuals and the state interact with each other.

As one can see, these ideal types help us see better the roles of the state and intellectuals in nationalism. But again, we need to keep in mind that in reality there are overlapping nationalisms, intellectuals, and the states. In the following chapters, we will see how the state and intellectuals interact on the issue of nationalism, first in Taiwan, and then in mainland China. We will see how they imagine Taiwan, China, and a federation or confederation. We will use the analytical frameworks developed above.

Notes

Introduction

1. See Baogang He and Yingjie Guo (2000) for the Chinese government-sponsored patriotism in the post-June 4 China.
2. See Wang Fu-chang 2001:76 for more discussion on this issue between ethnic groups.
3. See also Zheng Yongnian 2001a:29-30. Gellner (1983:138) thinks of nationalism as a very distinctive species of patriotism," based on cultural homogeneity, groups striving to keep a literate culture going, and anonymous, fluid, mobile, and unmediated populations. So he equates nationalism with patriotism. I agree with him, but I am also saying that patriotism is derived from nationalism, although as to feelings and ideology it is not always clear which comes first.
4. Lieven (2002) laments that by invading Iraq, the US has lost a chance to lead the rest of the world by example in responsibility, in geopolitical restraint, and in "a decent respect to the opinion of mankind," as the US Declaration of Independence has it. "What we see now is the tragedy of a great country, with noble impulses, successful institutions, magnificent historical achievements and immense energies, which has become a menace to itself and to mankind." The new government that came to power in 2009, though, is expected by many to help the US rejoin the world after eight years of self-imposed exile and become a true leader of the world again (see Kristof 2008). We are already seeing many successes on President Obama's part now.

Chapter 1

1. Calhoun (1997) lists ten features of a nation, including population and/or territorial boundaries, indivisibility, sovereignty, legitimacy, popular participation in collective affairs, direct membership, culture, temporal depth, common descent, and special historical or even sacred relations to a certain territory. It is the preponderance of them that makes a nation.
2. Regarding Taiwanese names, I have made an effort to spell them the way they have been spelled in the English literature. But in case I have not found them, I will use pinyin, but with a hyphen in the first name if there are two Chinese characters there in order to distinguish them from mainland Chinese names, where there is usually no hyphen in the first name.

3. See Smith (1995:104-5) for a brief summary of the various characteristics of the national state, including political, historical, and sociological variations.
4. Chen Qi (2001) describes the education in nationalism, though called patriotism, in high school history classes in China from 1949 to 1999. The Chinese nation is considered as one composed of multiple ethnicities. The textbooks emphasize how different ethnicities have learned technologies from each other over the long history in China, and are culturally intertwined. For example, Qu Yuan (340?-278? B.C.), one of the greatest Chinese poets, was from a minority. The textbooks also call on teachers to avoid using Yue Fei's poem on killing minorities or other terms that hurt the feelings of minorities (p. 353-4). We will come back to the Yue Fei issue in chapter 4 when we further discuss Chinese nationalism.
5. I-chou Liu (2003) was surprised when some Uyghurs said to him that they were Chinese. So this is not entirely impossible.
6. For more discussions on the various aspects of national identity in Taiwan, see also Chang Yachung 2000:130; Jiang Yi-huah 1998:5-24; 2001; Lin Chia-lung 2001; Shih Cheng-feng 2003:151-58; Wang Horng-luen 2001.
7. Some scholars believe that nationalism, and some form of nation-states, long existed and came into being with religious intolerance in the 1500s, while others think that it came along with the American and French Revolutions, when public celebration of the Fatherland, the creation of national anthems, and the devotion to the flag all arose. I'd say that these are simply different stages of the development of nationalism. In addition, nationalism first developed as democracy (see Greenfeld 2000:11; Smith 1998:17; Stille 2003). Taiwanese nationalism developed in the 1970s as a democracy movement as well (see Chang Mau-kuei 1993:148; 1994:115; 2003; Wang Fu-chang 1996).
8. By the "Mandarin speaking groups," I refer to what are often called *wai sheng ren*（外省人）, or people from other provinces of the mainland, that is, the first, second, or third generations of people who came with the KMT to Taiwan around 1949. But the term *wai sheng ren* is inappropriate, since it views such people as the "other," as the word *wai* means, and it is misleading since there are also people who came to Taiwan from other provinces but several generations ago. The first use of the term "Mandarin speaking groups" is attributed to Wang Yu-teh, a Taiwanese independence advocate, in the 1980s. It makes more sense because people from this larger group tend to use Mandarin, which was stipulated as the "national language" (*guo yu* or 國語) by the KMT government, more often than any of the other three major groups in Taiwan, even though very few would have Mandarin as their mother tongue now.
9. See also Hsiau A-chin 2000:125-47 and Huang Xuan-fan 1993 for a fuller discussion on the importance of the language in ethnic nationalism.
10. Some researchers contend that the name "Hoklo," or *He Luo* in *pinyin*, comes from Huang He (the Yellow River) and Luo Shui (the Luo Shui River). The name indicates the areas around the two rivers, where people in southern Fujian were originally from (Wang Xiao-bo 2001:8-11).
11. As one reviewer of this book points out, faced with criticism of his crusade metaphor, Bush went out of his way to include Muslim Imams in giving benedictions at the White House to show that the issue had nothing to do with different religions. What we see is, in fact, the struggle between the rational and the irrational in Bush the person, as it may be in any other person.

12. The former US attorney general John Ashcroft, for example, ruled that, to address national security concerns, illegal immigrants who had no known links to terrorist groups could also be detained indefinitely (Swarns 2003). One reviewer thinks that the discussion on American authoritarianism is unhelpful. Authoritarianism and democracy are dichotomous variables. In the American case, democracy was made less robust and it became shallower. The quality of democracy suffered. What I am doing here, though, is putting both democracy and authoritarianism on a continuum, with dictatorship and authoritarianism at one end, and liberal democracy at the other. And there is considerable overlap between the two in the middle. The state can veer toward one side or the other, more or less, depending on the issue at the time. When democracy is made less robust, authoritarianism becomes more dominant. The two extremes rarely happen.
13. On April 19, 2003, I attended a forum organized by the Zheng Nan-rong Foundation, an organization that advocates democracy. (Zheng Nan-rong was a journalist who burned himself to death in 1989 in protest against the KMT for its suppression of freedom of press.) The topic was whether it was right for the government to regulate the press. Lin Shi-yu, a political commentator and one of the two speakers, stated that when there is a national identity conflict, there is a need to contain the citizen's rights. So it is right for the government to monitor what the press says about political issues. This is a time of war and we need the rules of war. I asked him afterwards, "Isn't this argument the same as that put forward by the KMT in its authoritarian years?" He said yes, but at a time of identity crisis, some people think that such measures are necessary. But again, the KMT did the same and suppressed the press on democracy and on the Taiwanese independence movement because it thought that the country was in danger of being taken over by communists. People like Lin were at the time against the KMT for doing that.
14. These include, e.g., the government, but I would also include institutionalized social movements, which have become increasingly important in politics. The term "organic intellectual" is originally used by Gramsci, as I quote below.

Chapter 2

1. Controversies exist as to the exact dates and circumstances of these earlier histories.
2. For a collection of excerpts of documents regarding the relationship between China and Taiwan from 1662-1972, see Chiu Hungdah 1973. For a collection of documents and speeches by both governments in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, see Wang Guo-chen 1995.
3. Huang Zhao-tang's English name is Ng Yuzin Chiautong.
4. Estimates can run up to 650,000 (Wang Xiao-bo 2002:312).
5. During the resistance movement, the Japanese casualties were mainly caused by illnesses. For example, in the first seven months of the war of occupation, 4,642 Japanese died of illnesses, while 164 died from the war, and 515 were wounded (Jian Hou-cong 2002:400).
6. For a description and analysis of six such political organizations of the era, see Edward I-te Chen 1972.
7. See Huang Xuan-fan (1993) for a comprehensive description of how language was used as a way of establishing national consciousness on the part of the government, and as a way of protest on the part of individuals in the Japanese and KMT eras, including the democratization period.

8. See Chen Xiaochong 1991 for a more thorough description of the *kominka* movement.
9. This is similar to the Japanese Americans who volunteered to join the American armed forces during World War II in order to prove their loyalty while their families were still kept in the internment camps by an American government that doubted their loyalty.
10. One can argue, as Professor Lynn White points out when commenting on the book manuscript, how much of the Taiwan spirit is *Bushido,* and how much of it is the pioneering spirit "of early migrants who came from their clan wars in South Fujian over the water to conduct the ethnic cleansing of Austronesians from the western plain of Taiwan, changing the resource-and-population base there from swidden to paddies. The emperor was very far away from these folks."
11. At the same time, the Aboriginal groups' resistance was more a reaction against the Japanese discrimination and oppression than nation-building. They would be paid as little as one fourths of what Han Chinese were paid for the work they did for the Japanese.
12. One reviewer thinks that it is inappropriate to use the word "re-Sinicization." The following is what I think. It is true that the Chinese identity of Han people in Taiwan before the Japanese colonization was not clear, since they might be simply Han or *Qingren*. And even in mainland China, the concept of Chinese as a nation was still in the making. But the Manchu were largely Sinicized by the end of the Qing dynasty, so we can still say that the KMT efforts after the Japanese colonization were aimed at re-Sinicization, although the term may not be entirely accurate.
13. For a description of the tragedies befell the people in Taiwan during this period as a result of the tumultuous historical transformation and the intensifying identity conflicts, see the film *Beiqing Chengshi* (City of Sadness, 1989), directed by Hou Hsiao-hsien. The 2-28 Incident is one of the key background events of the movie.
14. But Li Ao (1997) reports that by 1995, only 1,476 Taiwanese had claimed for compensation from the government. Shi Ming-teh, however, thinks that the death number would be higher than that since many people might not know of the deaths of their family members, since for so long people did not talk about such things and some who knew might have already died in the fifty-year period (Interview with Shih 2003). For a summary of various studies, memoirs, commemoration organizations and activities, see Jian Hou-cong 2002:690-705.
15. Although we call it "uprising," one needs to understand that riots also occurred at the same time. Just as in the 1992 Los Angeles riots, there were elements of both "riots" and "uprising."
16. In 1969, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East reported that oil was discovered in the area north of Taiwan, including the Diaoyutai Islands (the Senkakus in Japanese). In 1970, Japan declared sovereignty over the Islands. The United States concurred, but the Republic of China was hesitant about its own position. This aroused anger among Chinese students both in North America and in Taiwan, and a movement to protect the Islands was started. Thousands of students participated in rallies, demonstrations, and forums to protest against Japan (Guo Ji-zhou 1999:17-36). One reviewer of this book points out that Japan took sovereignty over the Islands in 1895 in an act having nothing to do with Shimonoseki. Japan resumed that sovereignty in 1970 when the US occupation force surrendered the Islands back to Japan.
17. The journal was banned in 1979. But it had become part of the *Dang Wai* democracy movement and its authors actively participated in political criticism and the *Xiangtu* Literature Movement.

18. For more in-depth discussions on the democracy movement, see also Chang Mau-kuei 1993; Wang Fu-chang 1996.
19. Lin was an activist of the journal *Formosa*, and was arrested in the demonstration on December 10, 1979. He was in prison while the murder happened. Lin had already been a provincial legislator since 1977, and he was the chairperson of the DPP from 1998-2000.
20. Indeed, "armed struggle," or *wuli douzheng*, was one of the principles of these independence organizations at the time (see Chen Ming-cheng, Shi Zheng-feng, et al. 2000:12).
21. For more extensive description and discussion of activities of the various overseas independence organizations between 1981 and 1985, see Lin Jin 1993:96-109.
22. Peng Ming-min was a committed peace activist, and chair of the Department of Political Science at the National Taiwan University from 1961 to 1962. He came to the attention of Chiang and was appointed as advisor of the ROC delegation to the United Nations in 1962. He was the presidential candidate of the DPP in 1996 after many years of exile in the west.
23. Chang Mau-kuei (2001) seems to disagree with Hsiau (1999) about the latter's view that this change happened after the Formosan Incident. He seems to imply that their feelings had been there but the high-handed suppression might have made them express themselves differently. My own research on Chinese intellectuals during the Thought Reform Movement in the 1950s, an equally suppressive time, indicates that intellectuals might have truly believed in what they said, as Fei Xiaotong said about the excitement of thought reform (Zhidong Hao 2003a). Chen Xiu-xi's words we quoted above about being Chinese seemed indeed heart-felt.
24. See Smith 1995:89-90 for the contents of national consciousness, including the cultivation and transmission of cultural values and symbols (e.g., the language), and historical myths, memories and traditions. For more in-depth discussions on the transformation from democracy movement to nationalist movement and the establishment of a Taiwanese consciousness based on ethnicity and other socioeconomic factors, see also Chang Mau-kuei 2003; A-chin Hsiau 2000; Jiang Yi-huah 1998; Lin Mei-rong 1996; Wang Fu-chang 1996; Q. Edward Wang 2002; Wang Xiao-bo 2001, 2002; Wu Nai-teh 1999.

Chapter 3

1. One reviewer comments that the notion of independence should be clarified throughout. I agree. In fact, the notion of unification should be clarified as well. Taiwan enjoys *de facto* independence: it has its own military, elects its leaders, and makes its own policies. But it does not have *de jure* independence: it cannot sit on major international organizations meant for states and no major nation will extend official recognition to it. That is true. But the reviewer says that the dominant view on Taiwan is to make the *de facto* independence secure. The reviewer thinks that the CCP often behaves as if there is a movement toward such independence on Taiwan, and that I should not write as if CCP propaganda were a factual description of reality. However, as I have described earlier, the independence movement has had a real existence, although the independence seekers themselves also know that it is very unlikely for them to succeed in their goal. It is thus more of a strategy for Taiwan to extract further concessions from mainland China in their dealings with it than a realistic movement. Even former president Chen Shui-bian is making use of Taiwan independence in his defense against the corruption charges he is facing, saying that the

money he has transferred overseas is for the purpose of the movement. Very few would believe so, but the independence movement does serve a purpose, or rather, a number of purposes. Besides, reality is socially constructed. For those who believe in independence, the movement is real, and has its consequences. When we discuss the independence movement in Taiwan, these are some of the caveats we should keep in mind. The same is true concerning the unification movement. As we will discuss later in the chapter, there is almost no unification movement in Taiwan, although it has been viewed, especially by the independence camp (for whom it is indeed real) as if there is one. The most one can say about this is that the pan-Blue camp is sympathetic to some kind of integration with China without losing the fairly independent status of the ROC. That is different from what people would normally think about unification. Thus, in our discussion of unification in the book, this is something we also need to bear in mind.

2. For more discussion on the development of parties and democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, see I-chou Liu 1999, and Teh-fu Huang and Ching-hsin Yu 1999.
3. The demonstration was postponed until September because of SARS. See also Chiu Hei-Yuan 2002:210-1 on not only name but also content changes of music groups from, say, Chinese Orchestra to Taiwanese Orchestra, and Chinese music to Taiwanese music.
4. For the document, see the DPP website at www.dpp.org.tw, in the part on DPP history and its internal regulations, last accessed May 10, 2009. The statement says that Taiwan is a sovereign state, but is willing to join international organizations in other names than the ROC. It implies the possibility of the name "Chinese Taipei," which avoids the issue of sovereignty.
5. See Mainland Affairs Council's website at www.mac.gov.tw, last accessed April 15, 2003, information no longer available online.
6. See 人民网 website at www.unn.com.cn/BIG5/channel2567, last accessed May 10, 2009.
7. See 華夏經緯网 website at http://big5.huaxia.com/huzhao.html; *Lianhe Zaobao*, last accessed January 15, 2002, information no longer available online.
8. See the ROC Ministry of Education website at www.edu.tw/mandr/importance/920213-1.htm, last accessed February 13, 2003, information no longer available online.
9. The United States wants to appear to believe that the National Unification Council is only "suspended," but practically everyone else believes that "abolishment" would be a more accurate description even though the formal document says that the NUC only "ceases to function."
10. For the agreement between Chen and Soong and its further explanation, see an article at the PFP website at http://www.pfp.org.tw/news/news_detail.php?id=878&p=1160, last accessed on May 10, 2009.
11. A large part of the remainder of this chapter is based on a paper I published in *Pacific Affairs*, entitled "Between War and Peace: Ethical Dilemmas of Intellectuals and Nationalist Movements in Taiwan" (2005), 78(2)237-56.
12. In-person interview with Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, at Academia Sinica, Taipei, June 23, 2003.
13. While one may argue whether those who are involved in political parties are intellectuals, many of them obviously think they are. These are the organic intellectuals of the Taiwanese nationalist movement.
14. The color comes from the flag of the DPP. The color of the pan-Blue camp, which encompasses the opposition parties, comes from the flag of the KMT.

15. See the Taiwan Society website, which contains the group's policy statements, publications and reports on their activities, at www.twsociety.org.tw, last accessed May 10, 2009; in-person interview with Zheng Zheng-yu, executive director of the South Society, Kauhsiung, Taiwan, March 28, 2003.
16. See the electronic journal of *South News* which claims to represent the Taiwanese position, and advocates Taiwanese independence. It can be found online at www.southnews.com.tw, last accessed May 10, 2009.
17. In-person interview with Ger Yeong-kuang, June 24, 2003.
18. In-person interview with Wang Jin-ping, October 4, 2002. The Wang in question here is not the same person as the leader of the legislature.
19. In-person interview with Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, at Academia Sinica, Taipei, June 23, 2003. Hsiao may be chiefly an organic intellectual in regard to Taiwanese nationalism, but he was making a factual observation, as a professional would do, although not without his own value judgment.
20. See *United Daily News*, April 18, 2003; see also the KMT's official website, available online at www.kmt.org.tw, last accessed May 10, 2009; and the official website of the PFP, where one can find their policy statements, publications and news of activities, available online at www.pfp.org.tw, last accessed May 10, 2009.
21. In-person interviews with Chen Fu-yu and Wang Jin-ping, October 4, 2002; see also Guo Ji-zhou 1999:359.
22. Compared with the TS, TAUP, and other intellectual organizations in Taiwanese nationalism, the CTA and the CUL are fairly small and relatively powerless in the current Taiwanese political environment. In an interview with him regarding the organization's political relevance, I asked Wang Jin-ping, the then president of the CUL, whether his organization could exert political influence if it was not in fact a political party, and organic to KMT and PFP. He thought it was a good question, but he also seemed to feel that there was not much they could do under the circumstances.
23. One reviewer observes that actually before the end of WW II, Taiwan was never ruled by a Sinicized regime with stable power on the continent of Asia. I assume the reviewer's logic is like this: the Qing dynasty was ruled by the Manchu, and the Manchu were not Chinese; therefore, Taiwan was not ruled by the Chinese. The Chinese, however, tend to think that the Manchu were Sincized and had became Chinese already; therefore, Taiwan was ruled by the Chinese government, though represented by the Qing court, for over 200 years before the Japanese colonization. Both views have some grain of truth in them, and people with differing political stances may be in favor of one over the other. This calls into question my use of the word "re-Sinicization," since if there was no Sinicization in the Qing dynasty, the KMT would not be able to re-Sinicize Taiwan. This is a debatable issue. I'd say that the use of the word is not perfect, just like our use of the words "independence" and "unification." In reading the book and understanding the issues, we also need to keep these caveats in mind.
24. For a similar point to the one I am making here, see also Lin Man-houng 2002:195-202.
25. See footnote 23 above on Sinicization.
26. For Hsiao's views on Taiwanese nationalism, see Hsiao 1999. But while Hsiao seems an advocate of Taiwanese nationalism, he also embraces identification with China. In one of his articles in 1989, he says, "Of course we will identify with China. Taiwan's roots belong to China (臺灣本來就屬於中國). This is our own national culture. Without the

Chinese culture as the source, there would be no branch of Taiwanese culture (沒有中華文化的源頭，就沒有臺灣文化的延續)" (Hsiao 1989:98). He identifies with a cultural and historical China but not with a political China. Whether Hsiao has changed position since then is another issue. That is a dilemma to be dealt with by organic intellectuals to Taiwanese nationalism.

27. In-person interview with Wang Fu-chang, Taipei, June 18, 2003. Politically Wang is sympathetic towards the idea of independence, but he is striving to be a professional in his research. As I mentioned earlier, the high school history textbooks now use "ri zhi;" otherwise, the books would not be approved by the Ministry of Education under the Chen Shu-bian regime.
28. We see many cases of confusing political and professional roles in intellectuals in both Taiwan and mainland China. Chuang Kuo-Jung, an assistant professor from National Chengchi University in Taiwan, is a good example. He was assistant secretary to Tu Cheng-sheng, the Minister of Education of the ROC under Chen Shui-bian in the latter days of his regime in 2008. He almost lost his teaching job for his politically inflammatory and ethically problematic words. For a similar point to that of Weber's, see what Kilpatrick (1935) says: "If it is a controversial issue, it is neither moral nor democratic for the teachers to teach one side. It is the teacher's business to help make pupils and students ever more capable of deciding controversial social issues for themselves. This is the way to build democratic citizenship." I also had a discussion with Professor Shaw Chonghai of National Chengchi University in Taiwan, on March 19, 2004. He talked about the importance of the distinction between the two roles, using his own example of once being a professor but also serving a political campaign. Eventually, he decided to give up his political role in order to concentrate on his professional work.
29. Some may question whether professionals can produce neutral scholarship. Neutrality is indeed a struggle for a professional intellectual, for one is always influenced by one's own politics as well as by many other social and economic factors. But as Weber and Hobsbawm observe, there are things one can do in order to be as "neutral" as possible. We cannot expect professionals to be entirely "professional" and "neutral," just as we should not expect organic or critical intellectuals to be entirely "organic" or "critical." These are the complex dynamics of the ideal types of intellectuals we discuss in this book.
30. Like other disadvantaged men in Taiwan, many veteran soldiers who lost their families because of the civil war have married younger women from China since the 1980s. For a discussion on the complexity of the issues of brides from China, see Zhao Yan-ning 2004. For more information on the issue, see the website China news, online at www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2003-09-20/26/348801.html, last accessed November 7, 2004. Information no longer available online.
31. For more on the news, see the news website at http://news.cqnews.net/system/2003/11/26/000332233.shtml, last accessed November 7, 2004. Information no longer available online. As an organic intellectual, Chang drafted one of the DPP's declarations, but in this context, he is playing the role of a critical intellectual.
32. See the news website at http://news.cqnews.net/system/2003/11/26/000332233.shtml, last accessed November 7, 2004. Information no longer available online.
33. See also my in-person interview with Chiu, Taipei, June 23, 2003.
34. It was posted on the website of the newspaper *Taiwan Daily*, available online at http://taiwandaily.com.tw/, December 3, 2003. Information no longer available online now; In-person interview with Chiu Hei-Yuan, December 20, 2003.

35. Ethnic Equality Action Alliance, another more recent organization of critical intellectuals, is already accused of being partisan towards the pan-Blue. Its call for ethnic equality is viewed as a way of suppressing Taiwanese identity. See articles in *Taiwan Daily*, January 24, 2004 on this issue.

Chapter 4

1. For more information about the dispute, see Tao Shilong 2003, and 聯合早報網 http://www.zaobao.com/ special/china/hero/hero.html, accessed February 11, 2003. Information no longer available online.
2. In the 1930s, for example, the KMT government performed rituals to include Genghis Khan, who was fiercely attacked by the revolutionaries in the late Qing dynasty as the other, on the list of national heroes (Shen Sung-Chiao 2002:77–8).
3. Shen Sung-Chiao (2002) divides the period of the development of Chinese nationalism into three: the beginning stage (*qi hang qi*) from 1895 to1918; the practicing stage (*caoyan qi*) from 1919 to 1949, and the landing stage (*zhuo lu qi*) from 1949 till the present. Townsend's periodization is similar to what we have here.
4. In this regard, the Controversy of Rites might be an interesting event to mention here. Lasting from the 1600s to the early part of 1700s, it was the dispute between the Chinese government and literati on the one hand and the Western missionaries on the other over whether the Chinese Christians could worship Confucius and their ancestors. When Matteo Ricci (1552–1616) was in charge, the Christian and Chinese cultures made an effort to accommodate each other. Things remained largely calm for many years. European missionaries were not treated as Chinese but they were treated like a minority in China. Things changed after Ricci died. They changed because the new leaders of the missionaries did not want to recognize the legitimacy of the Chinese culture. As a result, the missionaries were expelled from China. But interestingly, they were expelled to Macau. Their "Chinese minority" status had not changed. For more on this issue, see Zhidong Hao 2010, forthcoming.
5. However, as one reviewer points out, fuller Sinicization did not take place until late into the nineteenth century. Before that the ruling tactics included "going local." They were Turkic in Turkic areas and Mongol in Mongol areas and Tibetan in Tibetan areas. And they did not try to Sinicize the Turk, the Mongol, or the Tibetan.
6. See newspaper article entitled "Kexuejia Jing DNA Jiance Rewei Chunzhong Hanren Yi Bu Cunzai" 科學家經 DNA 檢測認為純種漢人已不存在 (After DNA tests, scientists think that there are no longer any pure persons of the Han nationality). *Macao Daily*, February 14, 2007, C9.
7. For a description of the frontier Taiwan, see also Shepherd 1999.
8. In fact, it was Gaoshifu She which did the killing, not Mudan She, although it was the latter that was attacked by the Japanese.
9. For more discussion on the change from culturalism to nationalism, see Chang Yachung and Li Ying-ming 2000:37–62; Duara 1996; Levenson 1965:42, 98–108; Townsend 1996; and Zheng Yongnian 2001b:367, 372–8.
10. It is not only Sun who held these ideas, though. Liang Qichao favored a Chinese nationalism that would encompass other ethnic groups, and Zhang Taiyan advocated a Chinese sovereignty that would assimilate other "alien races" (see Lodén 1999:279–81; see also Suisheng Zhao 2004:168).

11. See *People's Daily* website at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64554/4428164.html, last accessed on May 11, 2009.
12. See Xinhuanet website at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004–11/27/content_2266970.htm, last accessed May 12, 2009. In its second national conference of the representatives of the Chinese Soviet Republic in 1934, the CCP revised the constitution, but this clause remained. One reviewer comments that notions like self-determination were Leninist tactics. They were used by the CCP leadership to mobilize support to win power and then discarded. They were not part of the Leninist agenda. The CCP was never committed to a confederation. In fact, one could say the same about the CCP claim to democracy. I would, however, view these as developmental issues in that the CCP had some ideas about them but was not sure what exactly they could or could not do. I tend not to view them as conspiracies. Besides, in understanding the possibility of individualistic ethnic nationalism in China, it is crucial for us to understand what the past has to say, whoever's past it is.
13. For a wonderful rendition of this history, see Andre Malraux's splendid novel, *La Condition humaine* (Man's Fate, 1933), set in Shanghai at the time of the event, which describes the CCP organized workers' uprising, its initial success and ultimate failure.
14. Zhidong Hao 2003 and Xie Yong 2003 provide more examples of liberal intellectuals in this period.

Chapter 5

1. Deng Xiaoping believed that it was wise of Mao not to adopt a confederation, but to adopt an autonomous system instead (see Liao Jiasheng 1999:215).
2. See also W.W. Smith 1996:341–60 for a description of the CCP's nationality policies.
3. For a complete description of the Chinese rule in Tibet since 1949, see W.W. Smith 1996 and Wang Lixiong 1998. The CCP state did not change the system in Tibet until class reform in other Tibetan areas had caused so much conflict that there was a widespread rebellion or uprising in Greater Tibet ten years later. For the revolt in Tibet in 1959, see also Suisheng Zhao 2004:192–4. It is not clear how many Tibetan people were killed by the PLA. The Dalai Lama claimed the figure to be about 90,000 throughout Tibet (Patterson 1960:100). Chinese official statistics put all the Tibetan casualties together, i.e., 93,000 including the dead, wounded, captured, and surrendered. How many people were imprisoned and died thereafter is not clear, either. On the PLA side, 1,551 soldiers were killed and 1,981 soldiers were wounded in the efforts to suppress the revolt. Chinese civilians also died but the number is not clear (see Wang Lixiong 1998:192). The cruelty that befell on both the Tibetans and the Han during the revolt and the Chinese suppression of the revolt was atrocious (see specific descriptions in Wang Lixiong 1998:175–91).
4. For a good description of Chen, see Robert Barnet's paper entitled "The Chinese Frontiersman and the Winter Worms -Chen Kuiyuan in the T.A.R., 1992–2000" (2001) at Columbia University's website http://www.columbia.edu/itc/ealac/barnett/pdfs/link29-chenpiece.pdf, last accessed May 12, 2009.
5. Professor Lynn White's comments on this paragraph is worth quoting in full here: "Wang Lixiong's data about educated Tibetans becoming separatists follows a frequent pattern. Skanderbeg, who freed Albania from the Turks, was 'Alexander the Bey' brought up wholly in Istanbul. Emiliano Zapata was the (Spanish-descended) revolutionary; Benito Juarez (pure Indian) was the liberal. Many kings in Korean history, who grew up under

Chinese or Japanese protection, then rebelled when the protectors demanded too much. Even that former British soldier George Washington. Many examples."

6. This reminds one of what Liang Qichao said to Lin Xian-tang when they met in 1907: 本是同根, 今成異國, or "alas, we were of the same roots, but now belong to different countries!" Liang told Lin that in thirty years, China would not be able to help Taiwan, and the latter should find a way to help themselves by using non-violent means to achieve their goals (see Lu Yi-hui 2001:82; Wang Xiao-bo 2001:299).
7. Jiang's words were one of the "eight points" about the exchange between the two sides. Others include the one-China principle, peaceful solutions unless there is foreign intervention or secession, further exchanges between the two sides, some kind of reciprocal visits, etc. Lee Teng-hui replied with six points, emphasizing the importance of democracy, equality, and peaceful solutions to their differences rather than using force (see Hughes 1997:90–1).
8. For an assessment of Beijing's Taiwan policy in the 1980s and 1990s regarding peaceful unification, internationalizing the Taiwan problem, mobilizing the united front, etc., see also Hughes 1999.
9. There has been some dispute over this issue. Although former president Lee Teng-hui does not think that there was a consensus, the current KMT government under Ma Ying-jeou asserts that there was an informal consensus: the mainland Chinese would say that China is the PRC and the Taiwanese would say that China is the ROC. Like Lee Teng-hui, the DPP government did not think there was a consensus, either, since there was no formal agreement. The mainland Chinese government has not formally acknowledged this interpretation of one China, but in March 2008, President Hu Jintao did reiterate the consensus in his talk with President Bush, although the wording appeared only in the English version of the Xinhua news report, not in the Chinese version. There have also been other occasions in the past few years when Chinese officials alluded to this consensus. It is this informal consensus that made it possible for the two sides to work on their economic agreements in November 2008. Although mainland China has been able to avoid a formal acknowledgement of the ROC, in the future political negotiations, it will need to define the status of the ROC and what is meant by one-China. For more on this issue, see Zhidong Hao (2008b:148, 164–7).
10. See the 2000 White Paper "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue" at 中國網 at www.china.com.cn/chinese/TCC/haixia/18378.htm, accessed February 12, 2003; see also Vincent Wei-cheng Wang 2006:149–50.
11. To be sure, human rights and democracy have entered the Chinese political discourse. But one may argue that they by no means have become the dominant discourse.
12. A large part of the remainder of the chapter is based on a paper I published entitled "Between War and Peace: The Role of Nationalism in China's U.S. Policy-Making with Regard to Taiwan," pp. 139–68 in Yufan Hao and Lin Su (eds.) *China's Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy* (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2005).
13. See www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2004/china-040517.htm, website of Global Security, accessed on January 28, 2005.
14. See www.gwytb.gov.cn/zywg/zywg0.asp?zywg_m_id=105, website of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council, accessed on January 28, 2005.
15. For the set of quotes below, see Wu Yi , 2003.
16. Note again that the Taiwan independence movement is a collection of organizations that are

often called *bentu shetuan* (本土社團), which can be roughly translated as "local Taiwanese organizations," which tend to be pro-Taiwan independence. The term is misleading, because other "local Taiwanese organizations," like the KMT now, are not viewed as *bentu shetuan.* The term has been associated with the ideology of Taiwan independence. We thus have a loosely organized Taiwan independence movement.

17. Did Taiwan ever belong to China before the end of W.W. II? Social construction of reality manifests itself well on this issue also. For many Chinese, the Qing court represented China, and was viewed as China. Therefore, when Taiwan was ruled by the Qing for over 200 years, it was viewed as part of China. On the other hand, some argue that Qing was not China, and therefore Taiwan never belonged to China before the end of W.W. II.
18. In a special issue of *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1, entitled *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*, edited by Peter M. Haas, in Winter, 1992, ten authors contributed articles exploring how the networks of experts, or epistemic communities, helped nation-states create, diffuse and perpetuate ideas and practices. Their studies indicate that although state decisions are often based on political considerations, rather than experts' professional judgments, the epistemic communities have nonetheless often played a significant role in state policymaking. Similarly, the September 2002 issue of *The China Quarterly* published five articles exploring how the Chinese epistemic communities influenced China's international, military, economic and public security policies. Chinese intellectuals and think tanks in and outside the government make an effort to influence its foreign policymaking. While all these works focus on the role of intellectuals in a state's policymaking, my focus is on the role of nationalism as espoused by two kinds of intellectuals or intellectual tendencies: one in support of collectivistic ethnic nationalism, and the other in support of individualistic ethnic nationalism. All of these intellectuals are part of the epistemic community, which is apparently split in its opinions. How they each strive to influence the government policy in regard to Taiwan with their own nationalisms and how effective each is, are topics which need further research than what we do here. It will also be interesting to explore the reciprocal relationship between intellectuals and the state in this regard, which we touch on in this book. For the same point, see also my 2003 book, *Intellectuals at a Crossroads: The Changing Politics of China's Knowledge Workers*, where I discussed the dynamic relationship between the state on one hand and organic, professional, and critical intellectuals on the other.
19. These expressions are taken from the websites 中國網 at www.china.com.cn/ chinese/TCC/haixia/17072.htm, and 中國臺灣網 at www.chinataiwan.org/webportal/portal.po?UID=DWV1_WOUID_URL_2001006, accessed on January 30, 2005. I am not quoting the specific authors for two reasons. Similar to what I explained in chapter 3 regarding Taiwanese intellectuals, these are sentences summarizing the typical beliefs of such intellectuals and can be found in typical official articles written by them. In addition, to attach statements to specific authors runs the risk of stereotyping them. In fact, individuals' views are dynamic rather than static. I do not want to cast them in one voice and as having only one view. Both the two kinds of nationalisms and the two kinds of intellectuals supporting them are ideal types, not straitjackets for governments or intellectuals to wear. It is the dynamics between types that I want to emphasize, although I do discuss them in types.
20. This refers to those who are not part of the think tanks that provide policy suggestions to the government. They tend to be situated in colleges and universities.

21. This is a summary of the main sentiments of the nationalism embodied in these intellectuals. Although I am again not quoting the specific authors of these words, such sentiments permeate these texts.
22. See a discussion between Wang Xiaodong, Wang Wencheng, Han Deqiang, Qin Hui, Ding Dong, Yang Fan, etc. at 中國經濟信息网at www.cei.gov.cn/economist/doc/xryf/200108211506. htm, accessed on January 30, 2005]; see also 世紀論壇 at www.cc.org.cn/luntan/china/login.php3?db=1 for an article on Yang Fan and his views on Taiwan independence, accessed on October 4, 2003. Information no longer available online. In fact, the last website was closed by the government around 2006 because of its outspokenness on political issues.
23. See 中國經濟信息网 www.cei.gov.cn/economist/doc/xryf/200108211506.htm, accessed on January 30, 2005. Information no longer available online.
24. According to Zhang Ming (2004:254), the term "rogue super power" referring to the US was first used by Samuel Huntington.
25. For the effect of the embassy bombing and spy plane collision in arousing Chinese nationalist feelings and causing the Chinese to re-evaluate Western civilization and to find their own positions, see also Joseph Cheng and Kinglun Ngok 2004; Hao Zhidong 2000 on nationalism in the 1990s and early 2000s; Ben Hillman 2004; Suisheng Zhao 2004:267–72.
26. See www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf, the US Department of Defense official website, accessed on January 30, 2005.
27. See www.americans-world.org/digest/regional_issues/china/ch_summary.cfm, World Public Opinion website, last accessed on January 30, 2005.
28. See www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2004/04annual_report.htm, US-China Economic and Security Commission website, last accessed on October 10, 2004.
29. See Human Rights in China website at http://big5.hrichina.org, last accessed on February 14, 2003.
30. Further research needs to be done on specifically how and to what extent intellectuals believing in individualistic ethnic nationalism can affect the state's policy either toward Taiwan or toward Tibet.
31. For Zhang's view, see *Qiao bao* (Overseas Chinese daily), A6, March 30, 2004.
32. See Baogang He and Yingjie Guo 2000:195–7 for more discussion on this point, Gries 2004 for a discussion of China's new nationalism, Hughes 2006:122–30 for a discussion of the status quo, and Suisheng Zhao 2004:147–50, 226–31 for what he terms Chinese cultural nationalism.

Chapter 6

1. Jiang Yi-huah (1998:40) also adds, nationalism believes that the nation should be governed by its own people, and one's nation is the best in the family of nations. But it seems that these are already assumed in the other three characteristics.
2. In what way cultures can and should be respected and protected is another issue. In their interaction with one another, cultures do change in the process. When confronted with modernization, cultures face difficult choices as to what and what not to change. The case of Tibet is a salient example. This complicates the issue of nationalism, national identity, and national integration, but it should not hinder the development of a liberal democracy. For more on this issue, see Zhidong Hao 2008a.

3. See also Jiang Yi-huah 1999:67–8, 213 for more discussion on the conflict between liberalism and nationalism.
4. See Baogang He and Yingjie Guo 2000:172–5, 200 for more discussion on the clash between democracy and nationalism in modern China. See also He and Guo, pp. 206–10, for a discussion on how Australians have been able to reconcile democracy and nationalism. On page 210, they report that some Australians even argue that "in an age of globalization, to be truly democratic, Australians have to go beyond the nation-state, and become citizens of global civil society."
5. Professor Lynn White's comments here are worth quoting in full since they point to some specifics that I am not discussing in the text: "It is interesting that, although the U.S. federal constitution was amended importantly after the American Civil War (slavery was constitutionally outlawed, the 'equal protection of the laws' clause was added, along with other crucial changes), no amendment was passed against possible future secessions by states. U.S. states can re-write their constitutions without any approval whatever from Washington — and occasionally they do. (For instance, Georgia did so in 1983, Montana produced a long document with a beautiful preamble in 1972, and New Jersey did in 1947.) These constitutions are not federal laws; the federal government cannot pass or repeal them. Amendments 9 and 10 of the U.S. Constitution — the last words in the 'Bill of Rights' — are worth reading. Notice the meaning in Amendment 9 of the word 'disparage' and the intentionally ambiguous meaning of the word 'certain' there. This is essential, post-legalistic federalism. Is that what Hao is proposing for China, or at least for Taiwan? It is a possibility for China, *if* Chinese themselves want it. Only they could give it national characteristics."
6. For the need for creative ideas and the possibility of a confederation, see also Cabestan (2003); Chang Yachung (2000); Chen Yu-jun (2001); Fei Xiping in Nan Fang Shuo (2003); Ger Yong-guang (1991); Kinderman (2003); Shih Ming-teh (1990); Wei Yung (2002); and Yan Jiaqi (1992).
7. Interestingly, almost eighty years later, Ohmae Kenichi (2003:228) mentions the possibility of an economic confederation of China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong), Japan, and Korea.
8. As we mentioned before, the Cairo Conference of 1943 was attended by Great Britain, the United States, and the ROC (see Hughes 1997:7, 13).
9. In fact, Jiang Wei-shui in 1924 entertained the idea of federalism and confederalism regarding Taiwan's relationship with Japan while being a Japanese colony (see Wu Rwei-Ren 2001:70–5).
10. As Professor Lynn White points out, "The actual federalism that is now emerging from a unitary government in Britain — with more independence for Scotland than Wales or Northern Ireland, however — is also interesting."
11. For the Central government's thinking on democratization in China, see John L. Thornton, "Long Time Coming: The Prospects for Democracy in China."*Foreign Affairs*, January and February, 2008. The author cites interviews with state leaders such as Premier Wen Jiabao concerning ways of further democratization in China, including the rule of law, freedom of the press, etc. in addition to competitive elections.
12. Professor Lynn White points out, "Actually, Belgium, India, and Canada are holding together. Selig Harrison just before the 1960s wrote a book, *The Most Dangerous Decade*, predicting that India with all its poverty and divisions would fly apart. He had much

stronger evidence, along dimensions that would make the opposite prediction for China now. Yet India did not fly apart. He was wrong."

Chapter 7

1. Part of this chapter is based on a paper I published in *Issues and Studies,* entitled "Obstacles to Integration: What Would It Take to Reconcile People on the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait?" No. 1 (March 2006):47–80.
2. Race, a problematic term, often refers to one's physical characteristics, and is often accorded meanings of inferiority and superiority. But when the term is used here, I mean mostly ethnicities. Chinese and American cultures are two different national as well as ethnic cultures, and mainland Chinese and Taiwanese mostly share one Chinese culture but two Chinese subcultures. For a discussion on conflict of (sub)cultures and its meanings and implications for national identity, see also Huntington (2004).
3. The eight occupations often refer to sex work in such places as hotels, dancing halls, barbershops, sangna, recreational halls, tea houses, KTVs, MTVs, etc.
4. The same applies in the US, where there is suspicion that Chinese students and scholars might be spying for the Chinese government.
5. Rumsfeld's words are: "The People's Republic of China is a country that we hope and pray enters the civilized world in an orderly way without the grinding of gears and that they become a constructive force in that part of the world and a player in the global environment that's constructive." "They've got competing pressures between the desire to grow, which takes a free economy as opposed to a command economy, and their dictatorial system, which is not a free system. And there's a tension there, and I don't know how it'll come out, but I quite agree with you that we need to be attentive to it." Lawrence Di Rita, the Pentagon spokesman, later said that Rumsfeld did not mean to say that that China was not a civilized nation. He meant that China was inward-looking. See Eric Schmitt, 2005.
6. Some of the reactions are the following. I am keeping the original Chinese titles to give those who read Chinese a sense of the emotions and sentiments involved in the activities: 國民黨"公然容共親共"（副總統呂秀蓮語）；國民黨"喪權辱國"（民進党秘書長李逸洋語）；"臺灣敗類江丙坤不要臉"、"出賣臺灣"、"臺灣民族主義萬歲"（獨台會和臺灣教授協會語）；我們"一定要正視中國是臺灣敵國的最大問題"（黃昭堂語）；江丙坤此行"自失立場、也失國格"（陸委會副主委邱太三語）；"國民黨形同共產黨在臺灣的「一個中國」的代理人，國民黨已成「以台制台」工具"，"國民黨把自己變成中國的「統戰工具」"（台聯党主席蘇進強）；"中國國民黨副主席江丙坤到中國去「賣身投靠」，這是「外來政黨」現形記"，五四運動時的"「國賊」是曹汝霖、章征祥、陸宗輿，今天的「國賊」是連戰、江丙坤、張榮恭"（金恒煒語），等等。See林朝億，"呂秀蓮：反共變親共價值錯亂"【2005–04–02台灣日報】；林朝億，"《國民黨聯共制台》李逸洋：喪權辱國"【2005—04—02台灣日報】；劉裕彬、王姵雯，"史明率眾抗議江「賣台」，江丙坤返台指中國行非國共和談台教會獨台會群眾赴機場斥責"【2005–04–02台灣日報】；張振峰，"黃昭堂：造成台海問題中國內政化"【2005–04–02台灣日報】；張國政、王姵雯，"謝揆：商談當比賽不利台灣，邱太三批江丙坤自失立場及國格"【2005–04–02台灣日報】；鄒麗泳，"蘇進強：國民黨成制台工具，形同台灣「一個中國」代理人批中共分化作法卑劣"【2005–04–02台灣日報】；金恆煒，"外抗強權內除國賊"【2005–04–02台灣日報】。

7. This loathing for communism is derived from the civil war legacy. It also indicates a lack of understanding of what communism was before and is like today, and it can be viewed as prejudice.
8. Before parts of this chapter were published in *Issues and Studies* as a paper on obstacles to integration, one of the reviewers commented that while focusing on the cultural barriers, I did not explore other explanations for the standoff across the Taiwan Strait, which include "differences in ideology and the political system between the two entities separated by the Taiwan Strait, lingering effects of the civil-war legacy magnified by decades of anti-Communist education in Taiwan since 1949, the still huge per capita income gaps with the mainland, etc., etc." In the revision, I have further incorporated these ideas by emphasizing the lack of understanding and empathy on the part of each side because of these differences and the lingering effects of the civil war legacy. But I have again couched them in the frame of cultural barriers since they are about values, norms, and beliefs. The per capita income gaps are often used by politicians to scare voters, but they may not have substantial meanings, since the Chinese government has never said that it would rob Taiwan of its wealth to feed the poor in China. The Hong Kong and Macao examples of unification do not lend credence to that argument, either: neither place pays taxes to the central government. Rather, the latter has been lending economic support to the former even though the per capita income gaps between the two may be larger than that across the Taiwan Strait. So the difficulty caused by the per capita income gaps is largely a perception issue rather than a reality issue in the cross Strait relations. We are back to prejudices and discriminatory attitudes.
9. Li's face was shown again and again on TV ads as a negative example of Chinese arrogance and the event was used to rally people to go to the March 26, 2005 mass protests against the Chinese government's anti-secession law.
10. Another example is the politicians' often repeated claim that 23 million Taiwanese want independence, or 1.3 billion Chinese want unification. Neither is totally true. Even academics may slip into such language once in a while. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (2006:11), for example, says that "Taiwanese people" do not think separatism equals democracy, as "China" thinks. These are broad strokes that paint, in fact, only certain groups of people.
11. For another example, one of the key events that affected the way Taiwanese perceive mainland Chinese is the Qiandaohu robbery and murder of Taiwanese tourists by mainland Chinese criminals in 1994. Rather than viewing this as a purely criminal case, the then President Lee Teng-hui referred to the Chinese people and the Chinese government as bandits. The stereotype sets in and it is hard to change people's impression of China subsequently.
12. Even though Hu Jintao states in his talk in March 2005 that neither side will devour the other and they are equal, the Chinese Constitution still says that Taiwan is part of the PRC. China has yet to reconcile the two positions. On the other hand, some in Taiwan do not want to have anything to do with China. On one occasion in 2003, I asked the former president Lee Teng-hui why not a hybrid of federation and confederation. He replied by asking me, "Is it necessary?" I talked with some others in Taiwan about this, too. And their response was, "Just leave us alone."
13. For the conflicts within Taiwan between advocates of independence and advocates of unification, and the difficulty for one to understand the other, see also Lee Ting-tzan (2004).

14. In the vocabulary of political science, the cultural obstacles discussed in this section may be viewed as a problem of human nature. In other words, human beings are by nature flawed, selfish, power-seeking, and otherwise imperfect (see Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2004:71). They will make every effort to maximize their own interests. They will not make the necessary efforts to understand each other and take care of each other. But a cultural argument is less pessimistic since it assumes possible changes in one's cultural beliefs, and therefore possible modifications to one's nature. However, this argument also resembles the nature argument in the sense that it is difficult, though not entirely impossible, to change one's beliefs.
15. For a fuller discussion of political realism, see Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (2004), *Contending Theories of International Relations*, especially chapter 2, "From Realist to Neorealist and Neoclassical Realist Theory."
16. For a summary of Weber's ideas, see Bologh 1990: 275, 296–98, 306.
17. In 2007, Lee Teng-hui, the spiritual leader of the TSU, raised an uproar when he declared that he never insisted on Taiwan independence. When pressed by people from both the pan-Green and pan-Blue for an explanation, he said that he meant that there was no need to talk about independence since Taiwan was already independent. Lee Teng-hui and the TSU are still the flag ship of the Taiwan independence movement, although Chen Shu-bian, even when engulfed in legal troubles, and the DPP are poised to take over the leadership.
18. See the US Department of Defense's "Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2005," at www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf, last accessed on July 23, 2005. It says, "Over the long term, if current trends persist, PLA capabilities could pose a credible threat to other modern militaries operating in the region."
19. See the US Department of Defense's "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," May 28, 2004 at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf , last accessed January 28, 2005.
20. See its website at www.uscc.gov.
21. See also Van Ness 2001 for more discussion on China's acquisition of what it needs from abroad for its economic modernization: capital, technology, and access to markets.
22. One reviewer observes that I have given too much space to the Commission in these pages, and that President Bush misspoke this time. My point, however, is to emphasize how far political realism can go, without making value judgments. I think the information is relevant to my arguments in the book, and thus have retained it in the text.
23. Taiwan used to be dubbed as the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of the US, although its position is much less important now.
24. Note that things have changed since Obama became president in 2009, and the relationship between the US and the Islamic world is being improved.
25. Among the measures to protect American interests in Asia, as suggested by Huntington (1993:43), are "to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests…." The US-China Security Review Commission in 2002 also made many suggestions along the same lines. One reviewer thinks that Huntington is irrelevant here, but the Commission's reports seem to suggest otherwise.

26. Huntington (2000) also believes that a Confucian-Islamic military connection has already come into being, with its members acquiring weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military power of the West. So it is a conflict between the West and the rest.
27. The overlapping consensus "consists of all the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents in a more or less just constitutional regime." In such a regime, the criterion of justice is a political conception of justice (Rawls 1993:15). See also Jiang Yi-huah (1998:115) for more discussion on the overlapping consensus.
28. For more discussion on cosmopolitanism, see also Jiang Yi-huah 1998:121–2.
29. Before this part was published in *Issues and Studies* as a paper on obstacles to integration, one of the reviewers observed the geoeconomic modification of realpolitik in policymaking. In the US-China relations, "China may be a geopolitical opponent [to the U.S.] but may be a geoeconomic partner at one and the same time." That explains why President Bush warned Taiwan's DPP government not to pursue a separatist course and instead encouraged the two sides to engage in dialogue. Indeed that's exactly what cosmopolitanism and idealism would argue in countering realism. An HFC is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple-sum one, as the reviewer observes. Benefits may outweigh disadvantages in such reconciliation. An HFC is appealing to both Taiwan and the mainland. But people still need to be convinced. That's the hard part. Still there is a ray of hope. The reviewer's concern that the PRC may not accept a federal solution might have been more justified in the past than it is today. Events indicate that the PRC is considering all possibilities, including the federal solution and the recognition of the ROC. But events also indicate that it is difficult for the Chinese government to do so, just as it is difficult for Taiwan to want to unify with China.
30. This is why even the Bush administration somehow realized the importance of engagement and would practice at least a kind of "con-gagement," i.e., "containment" in security issues and "engagement" in economic issues (Jiann-fa Yan 2004:101). But if that was the case, Bush probably should have practiced more engagement in both matters anyway.
31. See www.uscc.gov, accessed on February 23, 2005.
32. As Robert Gilpin points out, ultimately, "economic interdependence does not guarantee that cooperation will triumph over conflict; a global community of common values and outlook has yet to displace international anarchy" (cited in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2004:85). Efforts still have to be made in that regard.
33. An official working in the immigration department informed me that one in every eight children born in Taiwan in 2003 was born to a new bride from China, or 大陸新娘. This may explain why legislators from the Taiwan Solidarity Union headed by Chen Jian-ming wanted to introduce legislation which would prevent people from mainland China from obtaining permanent residency, let along Taiwan citizenship, for fear that they might "infiltrate" the Taiwanese society and affect Taiwanese politics thereby weakening the Taiwanese consciousness (see articles in *Liberty Times*, May 1, 2003).
34. It is true that we should not romanticize empires, as one reviewer cautions. Just look at what the Manchus did in Yangzhou or what the Qing did to the Zunghar Mongols or what happened to Muslims in the Kunming area in the mid 19th century. But we may view these unfortunate events as part of the empire building that resembles the problematic part of nation-state building which we are critiquing here. In other words, a loose confederation that provides ample opportunities for various nationalities is more conducive to human development than is a tightly controlled nation-state.

35. These views were also expressed by my interviewees such as Chang Mau-kuei, Lin Man-houng, and Lin Zhuo-shui in my private meetings with them in 2003.
36. See also Huntington (2004), *Who Are We?* for a discussion on how the American identity is influenced by this globalization process in similar ways, although he does not seem to believe that it is a desirable thing.
37. Again Huntington (2004) in *Who Are We?* discusses how the American public, especially the whites, counters globalization and multiculturalism in order to protect their own national and ethnic interests.

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