Remade in Hollywood

The Global Chinese Presence in Transnational Cinemas

Kenneth Chan

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Hong Kong University Press is honoured that Xu Bing, whose art explores the complex themes of language across cultures, has written the Press's name in his Square Word Calligraphy. This signals our commitment to cross-cultural thinking and the distinctive nature of our English-language books published in China.

"At first glance, Square Word Calligraphy appears to be nothing more unusual than Chinese characters, but in fact it is a new way of rendering English words in the format of a square so they resemble Chinese characters. Chinese viewers expect to be able to read Square Word Calligraphy but cannot. Western viewers, however are surprised to find they can read it. Delight erupts when meaning is unexpectedly revealed."

— Britta Erickson, *The Art of Xu Bing*

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Introduction:
Remaking Chinese Cinemas, Hollywood Style

When Ang Lee's *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* (2000) leapt onto global screens, many saw it as a cinematic event that heralded the unprecedented arrival of Chinese cinemas in Hollywood. As part of the recent "Asian invasion"[1] of the American multiplex, where mainstream audiences are now eagerly taking to the various Asian cinemas, this Chinese cultural presence dominated the invasion, thanks in part to the migration of numerous stars, directors, and various players from Hong Kong's film industry: a professional diaspora spurred by the 1997 British handover of Hong Kong to mainland China. Since I began my research in 2000 on this then-emerging cinematic phenomenon, a recurring commentary I encounter is that this trend, like all Hollywood trends, is a transient one: the Chinese are only Tinseltown's current cultural flavor of the month, soon to be replaced by the next big thing capable of revitalizing Hollywood (as Chinese cinemas are believed to be currently doing), thus rejuvenating and sustaining the studios' capitalist productivity and hegemony. In engaging this prediction of the waning interest in Chinese kung fu flicks, sword-fighting spectacles, historical epics, supernatural thrillers, romance/family melodramas, and Chinatown crime stories, one cannot help but wonder how long Chinese cinemas can maintain their current pride of place in Hollywood's multiculturalist approach to cultural appropriation and syncretism? What strategies can these cinemas resort to in order to achieve longevity in the business, and at what cost?

I open with this notion of pop cultural "transience" in my study of the Chinese in Hollywood because it provokes a rather visceral response in me, as both a cultural and film critic; a response that I can only describe, with a deep sense of ambivalence and an eagerness to disavow, as "cultural nationalism." Being an ethnic Chinese from Singapore, I find myself reluctantly cheering on the success of Chinese cinemas in Hollywood in a

culturally conflicted fashion: mainly because I bemoan, as a student of film, the often cringe-worthy aesthetic shortcomings of these movies, while questioning, as an anti-Orientalist and anti-essentialist cultural critic, the social, political, and cultural implications of these filmic texts. My painting this personal image of critical and cultural ambivalence and anxiety initiates a theoretical mapping of the kind of cultural politics surrounding this cinematic phenomenon. To bring into further relief the emergent critical questions that color this picture, I now rehearse three very recent moments of globalized Hollywood spectacle where cultural anxieties and contradictions intermingle with the celluloid magic and sparkle that the Chinese in Hollywood have engendered so far.

Hollywood Spectacle One: The much anticipated kung fu fantasy match up between Jackie Chan and Jet Li occurs not in a local Hong Kong production, as fans thought it would.[2] Instead, this über-duel takes place in the number one US box-office hit *The Forbidden Kingdom* (2008), a movie helmed by *The Lion King* director Rob Minkoff and distributed by Lionsgate and the Weinstein Company. This faceoff between Jackie Chan and Jet Li is of such epic proportions from a kung fu cinema standpoint that even the stars themselves decided to downplay audience expectations of the touted fight scene.[3] While he publicly dismissed the script as "nonsense," Jackie Chan chose to sign on to the project because "they told . . . [him] Jet [Li] was doing it." He described his fight scene with Li as one that was "so natural" that they shot the scene only after one rehearsal. In fact, they worked so well together that the director had to ask them to slow down the pacing of the fight sequence.[4] In the eyes of their fans, this representation of their collaboration is indeed worthy of a clash of two kung fu titans.[5] Whether or not this media narrative was part of a marketing ploy, the strategy clearly worked: the film raked in an impressive US$20.9 million during its opening weekend in American cinemas;[6] and an equally stunning US$21.4 million in China, despite Hong Kong newspaper *South China Morning Post*'s criticism that the film "hardly offers a progressive understanding of the multifarious aspects of Chinese culture as it rehashes the themes of kung fu classics" and a Hong Kong magazine characterizing its plot as "unbelievably weird."[7]

The culturally incongruous and "weird" plot, of course, did not go unnoticed by the stars. Chan anxiously reminded viewers that the film was "made for Americans. Chinese viewers may not like it"; while Li concurred by noting how "this is an American production, created by an American screenwriter, about an American child's dream of the Journey To the West story. It would be more interesting to approach this film from a different angle."[8] While its narrative relies on the story of the Monkey King in *Journey*

to the West (*Xiyou ji*), a Ming dynasty classic believed to have been written by Wu Chengen, *The Forbidden Kingdom* updates it for American audiences by retelling it from the perspective of American kung fu-crazed teenager Jason Tripitikas (Michael Angarano), who is magically transported to the world of ancient China to free the immobilized Monkey King (Jet Li), with the help of drunken master Lu Yan (Jackie Chan), from the magical spell of the evil Jade Warlord. This narrative premise basically retells *The Wizard of Oz* story, with Jason taking on the Dorothy role in his search for a way home. His encounters with the denizens of a fantastical ancient China — like the culturally colorful but alien characters of the Land of Oz — provide the psychic means for Jason to attain a new sense of heroic confidence (and a requisite set of martial arts skills) to confront the bullies and thugs of his urban American reality. Mainstream American audiences' familiarity with the reformulated Oz tale served to cement *The Forbidden Kingdom*'s successful appeal; while the Monkey King mythology, together with Chan and Li's superstardom, brought Chinese audiences to theaters internationally.

The combination of Hollywood's remaking of the *Journey to the West*, the much-awaited Chan-Li matchup, and the film's impressive global box office success marks for me a spectacular confluence of the critical and cultural issues that this book seeks to investigate. Like many of the films I look at in the chapters that follow, *The Forbidden Kingdom* is an excellent example of a transnational cinematic production, with American company Casey Silver Productions and China's Huayi Brothers and the China Film Co-Production Corporation joining forces in this instance. (Huayi is a rising media group based in China known for co-producing *Kung Fu Hustle* with Sony/Columbia Pictures Film Production Asia[9]; and China Film Co-Production Corporation is credited for *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*.) With these transnational and multinational collaborative production efforts becoming the norm, what cultural, political, and aesthetic effects will one witness in movies involving the Chinese in Hollywood? What forms of cultural hybridity and filmic synergies will such (un)equal partnerships create? While being thoroughly entertained by the film, I found myself most critically intrigued instead by *The Forbidden Kingdom*'s extra-diegetic elements, particularly the opening credit sequence — Jason's movie poster collection of films like *Monkey Goes West* (1966), *One-Armed Swordsman* (1967), *The 36th Chamber of Shaolin* (1978), *Drunken Master* (1978), and *The Bride with White Hair* (1993)[10] come to vivid life. Using an ingenious animated pastiche of classic, painted poster imagery, the film visualizes symbolically the concepts of cultural appropriation, reconfiguration, and synthesis, which constitute the mechanics of remaking Chinese cinemas in Hollywood.

Hollywood Spectacle Two: The scene opens with our intrepid heroine in a drab sampan-woman disguise creeping into an Oriental pirates' den in order to meet its evil lord. Upon being discovered, she and her companions are dragged into a dark lair fit for the nefarious Fu Manchu. On the platform stands a tall bald figure imposingly decked out in apparently Qing dynasty robes,[11] looking battle-worn but regal. He slowly turns around and deliberately pauses for the classic profile shot. Suddenly, audiences encounter the familiar mien of Hong Kong superstar Chow Yun-fat cosmetically remade into the salt-encrusted pirate captain Sao Feng. With thick bushy eyebrows framing his blood-shot eyes, a sparse but long beard reminiscent of *Flash Gordon*'s Ming the Merciless, a menacing knife scar cutting diagonally across his forehead and face, and frighteningly long, sharp fingernails painted black, Sao Feng smiles sinisterly as he masterfully proclaims in Hong Kong-accented English, "Welcome to Singapore!"

Chow Yun-fat remade into pirate captain Sao Feng

This now familiar episode is the opening sequence in the final installment of Disney's summer blockbuster trilogy *Pirates of the Caribbean: At World's End* (2007). As a seafaring adventure where the protagonist, Jack Sparrow (Johnny Depp), crisscrosses the globe to encounter an array of culturally exotic characters, the film, as a Hollywood blockbuster with indubitable global box office potential, similarly travels well by means of its multicultural representation, giving the film the correctness of a glossy Benetton ad. Representing "Asia" in its multicultural lineup is the epitome of Hong Kong masculine cool, Chow Yun-fat, who has been expertly made up to look like an evil Chinese pirate, hiding out in Singapore and lusting after Elizabeth Swann (Keira Knightley). Chow's role of Orientalist stereotype might be small — his character Sao Feng dies midway through the movie after his attempt to sexually assault Elizabeth — but his presence in this film is nonetheless

significant in the context of his career in Hollywood: Chow has indeed arrived in America. His joining a requisite star-studded cast of a blockbuster epic also signals the significant place the Chinese now occupy in Hollywood and American cinema.

But what exactly is the nature of this interest in the Chinese? What motivates it? What sorts of cinematic images and representations does it foster? What precedence in American film history feeds it? In other words, what forms of American cultural politics does this interest turn on and engage? The singular instance of Chow Yun-fat's exoticized appearance in *At World's End* also throws up difficult questions of the cultural cost to attain mainstream Hollywood success: what kinds of roles do ethnic Chinese stars and actors have to play to gain this success? How does the Chinese Hollywood presence affect Chinese cinemas globally? What effect does this presence have on Asian American cinema, considering its independent and alternative cinematic history? Does this presence reinforce Orientalist imagery to pander to American audience expectations of the racist depictions of the Chinese that have emerged out of classic Hollywood? Or are there possibilities of subversive resistance and cultural critique even within a transnational capitalist industry that privileges box office earnings over cultural and political concerns?

The advertising machinery of Buena Vista International kicked into high gear before the film's opening here in Singapore. Ubiquitous posters and huge wall panels dotted the island nation with the tagline "Welcome to Singapore!" turning Sao Feng's proclamation into a tourism-board style marketing strategy. Made up of 70% ethnic-Chinese, Singapore audiences not only love their Chinese-language movies, they absolutely adore Chow Yun-fat and his Singaporean wife Jasmine. This is a textbook case of the power of Hollywood's global appeal accomplished through the specific nodes of cultural localism — in this case, Chineseness and Chinese-language cinemas — within the transnational systems of cinematic production, distribution, and consumption. This global/local nexus that characterizes the contemporary Chinese presence in Hollywood constitutes one of the focal points of critical analysis in this book.

Hollywood Spectacle Three: Flushed with success from *Chicago*'s triumph at the 75th Academy Awards, Rob Marshall goes on to bring Arthur Golden's novel *Memoirs of a Geisha* gloriously to life on the big screen in 2005, a movie destined to be a hysterical camp classic in the likes of, dare I say, *All about Eve* (1950) and *Mommie Dearest* (1981). For who can resist the fabulous gay-iconic performance of Gong Li as Hatsumomo, especially as she threatens Zhang Ziyi's Sayuri with "I shall destroy you!" uttered with the dramatic flourish of a drag-queen?

But clearly not everyone was laughing at the absurdly contradictory image of Chinese actresses playing geishas speaking perfect English. Though being touted by *Time* magazine's Richard Corliss as "Hollywood's Asian Romance,"[12] audiences in Japan and China did not buy into this claim. Having three Chinese stars play the main roles, when high-profile Hollywood acting jobs for Japanese are hard to come by, did not go down well with Japanese viewers,[13] despite the ironic fact that these geisha characters reinforce the Madame Butterfly myth and "the image of sweet, gentle Japanese child-women" as evident in Sayuri.[14] Equally, if not more inflamed, were mainland Chinese audiences. Many denounced the political insensitivity of having Chinese actresses in these geisha roles that are set during the time of World War Two, considering Japan's historic rape of Nanjing in 1937–38 and, more recently, Prime Minister Koizumi's controversial visits to the Yasukuni war shrines in Tokyo.[15] China's State Administration of Radio, Film and Television eventually banned the film.[16]

Of course, mainland China's censorship and outright banning of Hollywood films that inappropriately or negatively depict Chinese culture and politics have a long history. For instance, films such as *Shanghai Express* (1932) and *Limehouse Blues* (1934), both featuring the sensual Anna May Wong playing up the Dragon Lady stereotype, incurred the displeasure of Chinese censors way back in the 1930s.[17] What intrigues me here in the case of *Memoirs of a Geisha* is the way nationalism came roaring back with a vengeance over a Hollywood film, despite the fact that China seeks to insert itself into the network of transnational capital. The central question to ask is: under what cultural political circumstances will Hollywood's deployment of global/local cultural strategies work for their film productions involving Chineseness? For a film that boasts a *trans*national appeal through its pan-Asian casting, the irony is that this multinational casting is the source of discontent. It is also crucial to analyze the motivational factors that spur this kind of cultural nationalist response from the Chinese government and Chinese audiences both in the mainland and across the diaspora. This instance of global Hollywood gone wrong exposes precisely the complex and conflicted cultural and political discourses that mire the tense national-transnational interface, especially as one watches Chinese cinemas enter Hollywood and its network, and as Hollywood remakes, reinvents, and reconfigures Chineseness into its own likeness or the likeness of its perceived Other.

Critical Perimeters: East Asia, Hollywood, the World

Beginning with the premise that post-1997 Hollywood saw a new, resurgent interest in the Chinese presence in its cinema, this book focuses its attention on a number of aspects of this phenomenon. One of its primary concerns is the proliferation of Hollywood and Hollywood-inflected films featuring ethnic Chinese stars like Jet Li, Michelle Yeoh, Gong Li, Chow Yun-fat, and Jackie Chan, in works directed by the likes of John Woo, Wayne Wang, Wong Kar-wai, and Zhang Yimou. This ethnic Chinese presence is clearly not "new" in the sense that it does not form a full cultural/national body of film separate from the commercial and art-house cinemas of mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Instead, the long histories and traditions of these national cinemas, together with Chinese-American film, contribute to, overlap with, and provide the contexts for this new Chinese presence. Though this presence is clearly derivative, the various streams of Chinese cinematic histories, traditions, and practices conjoin to produce a nascent film aesthetic and sensibility that offer Chineseness as a commodity for Hollywood's transnational system of cinematic production and consumption. This complex system of interconnections and relationships compels me to address the issue not only from the standpoint of Hollywood films, but also to consider the effects this phenomenon has on films coming out of Hong Kong, mainland China, Taiwan, and Chinese America. In any case, in an age of multinational and transnational co-productions and co-financing (as demonstrated by earlier references to Huayi Brothers and the China Film Co-Production Corporation in my discussion of *The Forbidden Kingdom*), it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish these cinemas in strictly national terms. Thus, my analyses would even include films made in and released in theaters in Asia but with the potential to enter the US market, either through limited engagements or DVD sales. In taking on this broader range of cinematic works to transcribe critically the Chinese presence in Hollywood, I am registering the globalizing effects of Hollywood's hegemony. I am also particularly interested in how these Chinese cinemas ride the wave of Hollywood appeal, which is part of its contemporary transnationalization. Like most books of this nature, *Remade in Hollywood* has no ambition, nor the ability, to be comprehensive in its coverage of the various cinemas and its individual films. Instead, it is governed by my own mapping of the topical problematic, through the tracing of the significant and predominant themes, ideas, trends, questions, and concerns.

The temporal framework I have chosen for the book is not arbitrary, but is politically pegged to the July 1997 handover of Hong Kong by the British government to the People's Republic of China. Since the 1984 signing of the

Sino-British Joint Declaration, the territory and its people were plagued by anxieties of what a return to mainland Chinese rule might portend. This anxiety was exacerbated by the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, which accelerated the mass exodus of the rich and the mobile to the western countries that welcomed them. The new home for Hong Kong film industry players seemed naturally to be Hollywood, attracting Hong Kong stars, directors, and industry players who were in high demand to make the transition.[18] Such capital-induced diasporas, of course, are complex ones in that their trajectories are never unidirectional, but are bidirectional and even multidirectional in their fluid negotiations of the trans-Pacific capitalist networks that help define the Pacific Rim as a "space of cultural production."[19] Major players like John Woo, Jackie Chan, Chow Yun-fat, Michelle Yeoh, and Jet Li display "flexible citizenship" and are "astronauts"[20] who shuttle between Hollywood, Hong Kong, and wherever film production and promotion take them. The impact of this migration to Hollywood was multifold: film cultures of Hollywood, Asian American cinema, and Chinese cinemas were, in varied ways and to varying degrees, transformed. The rising popularity of the Hong Kong newcomers among American audiences also bode well for those mainland Chinese, Taiwanese, and Asian American players who aimed for Hollywood success, leading many to ride the Chinese/Asian wave of American cinematic fascination.

The Politics of Cinematic Citationality and Transculturation

As the earlier anecdotal examples of monkey kings, pirates, and geishas serve to demonstrate, this book's examination of the Chinese in Hollywood relies on the theoretical nuances of the cinematic remake. My interest lies less in a concern for the remake in its traditional form as a material filmic practice, but more in its critical efficacy as a trope for cultural reinvention, reconfiguration, and rewriting. This theoretical spinning-off from its narrower definitional confines helps one rethink the Chinese-Hollywood connection and its discursive problematic.

Everyone is familiar with the Hollywood remake as a filmic form of secondariness: one removed from its "original" text, but exploited for its box office potential. Yet the remake is much more complex and multifarious in its variations and permutations, in that one could remake a film in many ways and for different purposes. An older film can be updated to accommodate contemporary trends, values, and politics,[21] such as *The Stepford Wives* (1975

and 2004). A film is remade to impress different audience demographics, like Amy Heckerling's *Clueless* (1995). Some remakes are faithful frame-by-frame retakes as in Gus Van Sant's *Psycho* (1998), while others spoof or mimic the original like in the *Austin Powers* series and *The Tuxedo* (2002) starring Jackie Chan. The kind of remakes that are of special interest here are, of course, the "cross-cultural"[22] ones, considering how the commercially successful Scorsese remake of Andrew Lau and Alan Mak's *Infernal Affairs* (2002) into *The Departed* (2006) has now spawned fresh Hollywood interest in also remaking the Jackie Chan-produced *Enter the Phoenix* (2004).[23]

Remaking as a filmic form aside, its structure and character further bespeak of the very nature of cinema itself. In order to make this point, I now turn to Derrida and his theory of the mark of communication. In his essay "Signature Event Context," Jacques Derrida disrupts the purity of the sign by examining its iterability and citationality:

> This is the possibility on which I wish to insist: the possibility of extraction and of citational grafting which belongs to the structure of every mark, spoken or written, and which constitutes every mark as writing even before and outside every horizon of semiolinguistic communication; as writing, that is, as a possibility of functioning cut off, at a certain point, from its "original" meaning and from its belonging to a saturable and constraining context. Every sign, linguistic and nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the usual sense of this opposition), as a small or large unity, can be *cited*, put between quotation marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and engender infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not suppose that the mark is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center of absolute anchoring. This citationality, duplication, or duplicity, this iterability of the mark is not an accident or an anomaly, but is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could no longer even have a so-called "normal" functioning. What would a mark be that one could not cite? And whose origin could not be lost on the way?[24]

In *re*citing Derrida's theory, David Wills constructs the same argument for "the cinematic mark" in what he terms as "cinematic citationality":

> What is being commonly and communally referred to here as the remake, the possibility that exists for a film to be repeated in a different form, should rather be read as the necessary structure of iterability that exists for and within every film . . . The slightest mark is being remarked or remade even as it is being uttered or written, to the extent that it cannot make itself as full presence, as intact and coherent entity. It constitutes itself as reconstitutable, at least it must do so in order to function, that is to say, in order to make sense.[25]

In other words, cinema is a medium of unending citations, quotations, allusions, appropriations, adaptations, remaking, reinventions, rewriting, representations, and hybridizations. Built into the visual and auditory technologies of cinema is this demand for citationality. The power of Derrida's theory and Wills's redeployment of it lies in its deconstruction of essentialist notions of cultural ownership and originality, thus rupturing the boundaries between national cinemas. This is not to say that national cinemas do not exist or that the ideological insistence on those boundaries (real or imaginary) does not have material consequences.

Wills's argument has deep implications for the way we think of transnational Chinese cinemas, of which the Chinese presence in Hollywood is now an integral part. What happens when cinematic citationality leaps cross-culturally, which it must if we are to believe Sheldon Lu's argument that Chinese cinema, in all of its history, is transnational in nature on account that Chinese film is "deeply embedded in the economics of transnational capital"[26]? Patricia Aufderheide offers a telling example of the unpredictable and spiraling way cross-cultural cinematic citationality functions. In her discussion of Sammo Hung's *Eastern Condors* (1987), Aufderheide considers how the film "replays the characters, themes, and plot of" a number of Hollywood war movies.[27] But what is most interesting to me is that at the end of the essay, she gestures to the future where "Hong Kong cinema, itself a pastiche product, may now become the inspiration for tomorrow's Hollywood hits,"[28] an ironic turn that is being realized today. Here we see the possibility of Hollywood citing Hong Kong cinema citing Hollywood, and this is only taking into account a single linear causal thread (that has turned somewhat circular). This irony of cinematic narcissism was not lost on John Woo who similarly observed "that Hollywood began to imitate Hong Kong movies in the late 1980s and 1990s because Hong Kong films (to a certain degree) are imitations of Hollywood films, so Hollywood is imitating Hollywood,"[29] a process that David Bordwell calls "the Hongkongification of American cinema."[30] This mode of citation is naturally much more complex than has been portrayed, in that it is based on the accrual of cinematic sedimentation, one layer transforming itself on the basis of the previous, while adding to or shifting the elements according to its needs. The global cinema industry is a giant network of multiple lines of citation, increasing in its manifold turns and returns, connections and reconnections, particularly as cinematic cultural production intensifies through time. Hence, Tan See Kam takes necessary umbrage at Bordwell's linear formulation of a Hollywood–Hong Kong Hollywood "plagiarism"[31] by arguing that both Hollywood and Hong Kong cinemas have "been produced by, and [are] productive of, the interplay

between internal and external forces, filmic, cultural or otherwise" and that "film-artisans from different cultures have used the medium differently, and for different purposes."[32]

This depiction of cinema as a transnational capitalist production of postmodern pastiche and hybridity, marked by interpenetrating and crosscutting loops of citationality, is not impervious to the shaping influences of global cultural politics. Derrida draws out parenthetically, in his discussion of the mark's "iterability," the etymological connotations of the term: "*iter* . . . comes from *itara*, *other* in Sanskrit, and everything that follows may be read as the exploitation of the logic which links repetition to alterity."[33] This connection to Otherness proffers us the idea that cinematic citationality does not flatten out cultural power distinctions, but works through them and sometimes reinforces them, a lesson Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak also offers us in her critique of the politics of cultural translation of the postcolonial text:

> In the act of wholesale translation into English there can be a betrayal of the democratic ideal into the law of the strongest. This happens when all the literature of the Third World gets translated into a sort of with-it translatese, so that the literature by a woman in Palestine begins to resemble, in the feel of its prose, something by a man in Taiwan. The rhetoricity of Chinese and Arabic! The cultural politics of high-growth, capitalist Asia-Pacific, and devastated West Asia! Gender difference inscribed and inscribing in these differences![34]

To study effectively this "with-it translatese" generated by the Chinese presence in Hollywood is to undertake an analysis of the cinema-studies version of what Mary Louise Pratt has so fruitfully described as "transculturation," a term ethnographers deploy "to describe how subordinated or marginal groups select and invent from materials transmitted to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture."[35] The cultural spaces of cinematic production, distribution, and consumption become "contact zones," "social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination."[36] The uneven cultural, financial, and political power dynamics in these cinematic contact zones engage an overlapping of Hollywood's projection (on behalf of mainstream America) of an ethnic Otherness on the Chinese, and of the latter's "autoethnography" of Chineseness, a mode of self-representation to suit and engage Hollywood's ideological and cultural conditions.[37] It is in these power differentials and uneven levels of cultural/institutional agencies (often to the disadvantage of the Chinese newcomer) that one can distinguish between the cross-cultural citationality, seen in the Chinese-in-Hollywood phenomenon;

and the sort of cinematic citationality theorized in postmodernist/poststructuralist conceptions of cinema in general.

My critical approach to these cinematic representations of Chineseness and related cultural issues, is to take on the globalized Chinese presence in American and transnational Chinese cinemas as a "problematic," a concept theorized by Louis Althusser.[38] Through "'symptomatic' reading[s]"[39] of these films, I treat them as texts fraught with anxieties, tensions, contradictions, and conflicts produced by the uneven power-relational structures of the Chinese-Hollywood contact zones. Questions of race, class, gender, sexuality, and nation disturb the glossy surface of these transnational cinematic productions — for as in a problematic, what is implied or not represented is just as important as what is visible. Slippages reveal a cinematic unconscious that deserves analysis.

As I examine the construction of a celluloid Chineseness in Hollywood and the self-remaking of transnational Chinese cinemas to exploit the Hollywood paradigm for global box office success, I eschew a prescriptive notion of insisting on cultural authenticity. While historical and cultural facticity are not unimportant issues here, I wish instead to circumvent an essentialist mode of cultural interpretation by questioning less the realism and accuracy of these cultural representations and focusing more on the ideological motivations that spur the production of these images in the first place. Chineseness, as it is configured in these various cinemas, becomes a malleable entity, permitting filmmakers to mold and package it into various ideological, cultural, and aesthetic forms. This malleability is important in enabling a smooth translation of Chineseness into a product that appeals not only to a culturally less discriminating mainstream American and international audience, but also to more critical, global Chinese consumers. In light of the struggling film industries in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, a movie like *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* is eagerly consumed by Chinese audiences because it has the imprimatur of a Hollywood packaging. In other words, Chinese filmmakers in Hollywood have the tall order of presenting a believable formulation of Chineseness while at the same time filtering it through the dominant Hollywood paradigm.

Once Upon a Time in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong: Hollywood's Adventurism in Chinese Cinematic Histories

The next three sections of this chapter are my attempt to briefly and rather reductively (for reasons of space constraints) chart the historical contours of

the interpenetrating relationships between Hollywood and the golden triangle of "pan-Chinese cinema" — China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.[40] Such a topography will reveal three main streams of cinematic traditions and discourses that intertwine to create the present cultural climate: firstly, Hollywood's adventurism within the Chinese cinematic traditions; secondly, the racist structures of classic and contemporary Hollywood stereotypes of the Chinese; and thirdly, the Asian-American cinematic response of survival and intervention. This discussion of the Hollywood-Chinese cinematic connection foregrounds the notion that what we see as a contemporary development in Hollywood's fascination with things Chinese is not devoid of history, nor has it emerged suddenly out of a cultural vacuum. My hope is to locate this book's discussion of the Chinese in Hollywood within these larger historical and cultural contexts of Chinese and American cinemas and, thus, mark its theoretical contiguity and continuity with these histories and discourses. Because of the survey nature of these sections, advanced students of these cinemas may choose instead to proceed to the final segment where I map out the themes of the book's chapters.

The Asia-Pacific rim, as a zone of cinematic cultural production, has seen an American capitalist encroachment in terms of film distribution and consumption and, to a lesser but growing degree, film production, since cinema's inception. Throughout this century-long history, the relationships that have developed between Hollywood and Chinese cinemas have been ambivalent ones, with the latter fighting off Hollywood hegemony at their respective national box-offices on one hand, and developing a complex network of financial, technological, aesthetic, and cultural interconnections on the other. America has had a historic role in introducing cinema as a capitalist enterprise in China. About a year and a half after the Lumière brothers' inaugural Paris screenings of their film shorts, American James Ricalton accomplished this in 1897 when he screened in Shanghai the Thomas Edison films.[41] Working for the Edison company as a photographer, Ricalton also later traveled to British Hong Kong to capture the city in the form of documentary shorts, which were then brought back to the United States.[42] Together, these landmark moments offer the beginnings of cross-cultural cinematic exchanges and influences. Another important pioneering figure in the early Los Angeles-Shanghai-Hong Kong cinema connection was Benjamin Brodsky, who helped set up the Asia Film Company in Shanghai. Arriving in Hong Kong, Brodsky produced a number of shorts, including Li Minwei's *Zhuangzi Tests His Wife* (1913), which he brought back to Los Angeles to be screened.[43] According to Law Kar, "Brodsky came to the Far East to make money out of the film business and may have never been conscious of his

pioneering role. He had inspired a group of young Chinese idealists who founded the local film industry."[44] Before World War II and the Communist control of mainland China, Hollywood was already eyeing China as a huge market for its products and sought capitalist control, especially in Shanghai. In fact, the US government saw Hollywood adventurism overseas as a means to bring American culture, values, beliefs, and capitalist ideology to the rest of the world. When asked about China in 1926, Dr. Julius Klein, who led the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, noted that movies are "invaluable in all markets where there is a high percentage of illiteracy among the people, for from the pictures they see they get their impression of how we live, the clothes we wear, and so forth . . . I can cite you instances of the expansion of trade in the Far East, traceable directly to the effects of the motion picture."[45] The Chinese naturally perceived in nationalist terms Hollywood's presence as a challenge to the nation's nascent film industry. It did not help Hollywood's cause in China when its filmic imagery of the Chinese tended to be predominantly negative in its racial stereotyping.

In his fascinating study of Chinese film censorship and its relationship to anti-imperialist sentiments in the 1920s and 1930s, Zhiwei Xiao examines instances where censorship and nationalism worked hand in hand to resist Hollywood domination of the film market in Shanghai and the rest of China. In 1930, public protests shut down screenings of Harold Lloyd's *Welcome Danger* (1929).[46] Because "the Chinese characters in this film are all presented as stupid, ridiculous, and uncouth," the film was eventually banned in China.[47] Between 1931 and 1938, the National Film Censorship Committee "adopted an unflinching stand toward both offensive foreign films and foreign film studio activities in China."[48] Xiao deduces from the committee's censorship practices the following approach, which remained unstated on an official level: objectionable elements included "China [represented] as a backward country and her people as an uncivilized race; scenes in which the Chinese appeared as villains, as morally corrupt (smoking opium and gambling), or even as servants; and dialogue that ridiculed the Chinese and the Chinese way of life or referred to the Chinese in a less than respectable way."[49] Because China was (and is even more so today) a very important market to Hollywood, major American studios had to compromise in their dealings to secure their slice of the Chinese pie. Columbia Pictures acquiesced to demands for cuts made to Frank Capra's *The Bitter Tea of General Yen* (1933); Samuel Goldwyn had on their production set of Sidney Franklin's *The Good Earth* (1937) a Chinese censorship committee member; Paramount Pictures' dangling of US$15 million to procure Chinese film studios was subverted by nationalist intervention; and

a collusion between American and Chinese investors to create in Shanghai an "Oriental Hollywood" was similarly scuttled.[50] On the other hand, Hollywood domination of the Chinese box office was definitely established in this period, right until World War Two. Hollywood films triumphed mostly in Shanghai while the "hinterland cities" were less receptive of them.[51] An important observation to make here is the fact that this strain of nationalist criticism of Hollywood cinema has reemerged in contemporary form, with Hollywood's renewed domination of the Chinese market. Chinese unhappiness with *Pirates of the Caribbean* and *Memoirs of a Geisha* are just two recent examples.

Under the aegis of British capitalist colonialism, the Hong Kong film industry developed a comparatively more collaborative relationship with Hollywood, despite the competition for box-office dollars. Hong Kong cinema can also trace its trans-Pacific connection to the Chinese diaspora, particularly among Chinese immigrants in America's Chinatowns, who constituted a significant audience sector to which Hong Kong films needed to appeal. In fact, the first Cantonese sound film made was Joe Chiu's *Romance of the Songsters*, through the production company Grandview.[52] Law Kar provides a wonderfully intricate account of Grandview, which was established in 1933 in San Francisco by Joe Chiu and Moon Kwan Man-ching, both of whom were China-born, educated in the United States, and had film-related experience in Hollywood.[53] Chiu's *Romance of the Songsters* has the distinction of being "one of the first films to depict the lives of overseas American-Chinese."[54] With financial support coming from San Francisco, Chiu and Kwan later went on to set up Grandview in Hong Kong, which would become one of the four major Hong Kong film companies in the late 1930s.[55] What is significant, in Law's estimation, of Grandview's history is that it demonstrated how early film production culture was very much "an *interflow* of people and resources between two geographical locations."[56]

Because the exciting and complex history of Hong Kong as a Hollywood of the East is beyond the scope of this short historical overview, I refer readers to Stephen Teo's magisterial account of the various film production companies in Hong Kong from the post-World War II period to the 1970s, especially the Motion Picture and General Investment (MP and GI, or Cathay), Shaw Brothers, and Golden Harvest.[57] As the Hong Kong film industry entered the competitive big-studio model, mega studios like Shaw Brothers produced with assembly-line efficiency, films of a variety of popular genres that appealed to mass audiences in Hong Kong and the Chinese diaspora. Run Run Shaw, who headed film production in Hong Kong, knew his target audiences and their specific cultural/political environment of cinematic consumption. He had "different versions of a film for different markets with varying degrees of

censorship: three versions were made, the 'hottest' for the US, Europe and Japan, the 'mildest' for Singapore and Malaysia, and the 'moderate' for Hong Kong."[58] While Shaw did attempt to access the mainstream American market, he was only successful catering to the Chinese community and to Asian cinema enthusiasts. Martial arts cinema, of course, had the strongest appeal, particularly to the African American community in the 1970s (see Chapters Five and Six); and it did have a brief phase where mainstream American audiences experienced what David Desser calls a "kung fu craze."[59] Hong Kong cinema not only introduced new filmic genres and visual aesthetics to America, but Hollywood also offered filmic models for Hong Kong to appropriate and reconfigure for its own purposes. Yingjin Zhang correctly assesses that "by the late 1970s Hong Kong cinema had gained the flexibility of crossing national and regional borders and the advantage of assimilating east and west as well as north and south."[60] This mode of cinematic citationality we see intensified in the contemporary Chinese presence in Hollywood.

One cannot talk about martial arts films in the 1970s without referencing Bruce Lee and his impact on Hollywood-Chinese cinema relationships. As Stephen Teo's portrayal of Lee confirms: "No other figure in Hong Kong cinema has done as much to bring East and West together in a common sharing of culture as Bruce Lee in his short lifetime. In him, Hong Kong cinema found its most forceful ambassador; an Asian role model espousing aspects of an Eastern culture who found receptive minds in the West."[61] For the ethnic Chinese, Lee embodied in his films "an abstract kind of cultural nationalism"[62] that challenged Western (and even Japanese) imperialism, thereby transforming Lee into an appealing icon to audiences in Hong Kong, Taiwan,[63] Southeast Asia, and the Chinese communities across America. He even had a strong following among African Americans. His version of a Chinese masculinity subverted and challenged the older American stereotypes of Asian passivity and submissiveness.[64] Besides his "kung fu style and methods," his "sex appeal and magnetic personality," "to the West, Lee is a narcissistic hero who makes Asian culture more accessible."[65]

Bruce Lee's dramatic film career began when he left Hollywood (see my brief discussion of this in Chapter Six in the context of *Kill Bill*) for Hong Kong to take up Golden Harvest's offer to make his films. *The Big Boss* (1971) and *Fist of Fury* (1972) exploded onto global screens to tremendous applause. In fact, *The Big Boss*, released as *Fists of Fury* in the US, reached number one at the American box office on May 1973, with two other kung fu films rounding off the top three, Golden Harvest's *Deep Thrust – the Hand of Death* (1972) and Shaw's *King Boxer* (1972), re-titled as *Five Fingers of Death*.[66]

The Way of the Dragon (1972) followed, with Chuck Norris adding further American appeal to the film, signaling an acknowledgment of Lee's crossover potential to an American market. Warner Brothers jumped into the production fray in its collaboration with Hong Kong producers to make *Enter the Dragon* (1973)[67] with director Robert Clouse at the helm. The studio continued sporadic involvement with Hong Kong studios to collaborate on cross-cultural projects, such as *Cleopatra Jones and the Casino of Gold* (1975 with Shaw) and Clouse's *The Big Brawl* (1980 with Golden Harvest) starring Jackie Chan in his first crossover attempt into the American market. Other American-Hong Kong collaborations also created films like the B-flick *The Legend of the Seven Golden Vampires* (1974; a Hammer-Shaw co-production),[68] *Shatter* (1974; Hammer-Shaw) featuring Ti Lung as one of the leads,[69] and *The Cannonball Run* (1981 with Golden Harvest) with Jackie Chan and Michael Hui as part of an ensemble cast. Finally, another important role that Bruce Lee played was that he helped create the conditions for the rise of Jackie Chan as a transnational superstar,[70] whose films and career I discuss in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven.

From 1978 to the late 1980s, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan witnessed dramatic political changes that would not only transform the film industries but also set the stage for the new global Chinese presence in Hollywood in the new millennium. Deng Xiaoping's "Open-Door" economic policies in China, the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 for the Hong Kong handover, and the 1987 lifting of martial law in KMT-controlled Taiwan all created the political, economic, and cultural conditions for "new waves"[71] of pan-Chinese cinemas: the Hong Kong New Wave, the Taiwan New Cinema, and the Chinese Fifth Generation Filmmakers. These rich streams of cinematic creativity would flood the world market through the global network of film festivals,[72] parading Chinese cinematic wares not only to film critics and cinephiles, but also to American filmmakers, distributors, and studio executives.

The works of the Fifth Generation directors, filmmakers who graduated from the Beijing Film Academy in 1982, constitute the "New Chinese Cinema."[73] A beneficiary of Deng Xiaoping's economic liberalization policies, the academy reopened its doors in 1978 to its fifth-generation students, "its first post-'cultural revolution' intake."[74] What was crucial about Deng's policies was that their focus on "market forces" created a new capitalist ethos for the new filmmakers to make sense of.[75] Filmmakers like Zhang Junzhao, Chen Kaige, Zhang Yimou, and Tian Zhuangzhuang were soon gaining international critical attention as art-house filmmakers, with Chen and Zhang Yimou later going on to become commercially important directors whose work

found receptive audiences in the United States. After his critically significant *Yellow Earth* (1984), Chen Kaige proceeded to bring down the house at Cannes with *Farewell My Concubine* (1993), only to follow up with lesser films like *Temptress Moon* (1996), *The Emperor and the Assassin* (1998), and *The Promise* (2005). Zhang Yimou similarly took the art-house-to-pop-cinema route from films likes *Judou* (1990) and *Raise the Red Lantern* (1991), to his more recent *wuxia* flicks. I look specifically at Zhang Yimou's *Hero* (2002) and *House of Flying Daggers* (2004) in Chapter Four, while I situate Chen Kaige's *The Promise* in the context of Chinese supernaturalism in Chapter Seven.

The two portmanteau films that marked the beginnings of the Taiwan New Cinema were *The Sandwich Man* (1983) and *In Our Time* (1982), the latter featuring a segment directed by Edward Yang, while the former had Hou Hsiao-hsien contributing one section.[76] Joining Hou and Yang were other new Taiwanese directors whose cinematic output though smaller than their Hong Kong counterparts, still made their mark at major international film festivals, with Hou's *City of Sadness* (1989) picking up the Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival, the first Chinese film to win this award.[77] The Taiwan New Cinema, though short-lived, paved the way for global and Hollywood interest in filmmakers like Tsai Mingliang, Chen Kuo-fu (whose 2002 *Double Vision* I examine in Chapter Seven) and, of course, Ang Lee.[78] Trained in New York University's film school, Lee proved his ability to straddle effectively both the cultural East-West divide and the art-house-Hollywood aesthetic sensibilities. Lee's *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* (2000), I argue in Chapter Four, signaled the global rise of the *wuxia pian*. His growing body of work, including Hollywood class acts like the Academy-Award winning *Brokeback Mountain* (2005), made him an incredibly marketable filmmaker to mainstream American audiences, Chinese audiences around the world, and, of course, Taiwanese audiences, who happily celebrated their native son's triumph in Hollywood.[79]

The Hong Kong New Wave and Second Wave cinemas represented frenetic bursts of creativity, as they jolted Hong Kong cinema into fresh new directions. This cinematic vitality and aesthetic ingenuity are what Hollywood now sees as fresh blood that it can inject into its tired rehashing of action cinema. (Again, the irony here is that some critics believe that it is *the West* that influenced Hong Kong cinema during the post-World War Two period and, therefore, the New Wave does not really exist.[80] The notion of cinematic citationality may provide an alternative theoretical means to rethink notions of cinematic originality.[81]) The New and Second Wave directors now constitute the mainstays of Hong Kong cinema, with many making the move to

Hollywood since 1997. The incredibly prolific Tsui Hark has close to forty films to his directorial credit, including the highly successful Wong Fei-hong series *Once Upon a Time in China*, which catapulted Jet Li into international superstardom and onto the Hollywood stage. Tsui himself made two Hollywood forays, *Double Team* (1997) and *Knock Off* (1998), both of which were Jean-Claude Van Damme vehicles, before deciding to concentrate on Hong Kong productions. Van Damme's fascination with Hong Kong directors continued with *Maximum Risk* (1996), *Replicant* (2001), and *In Hell* (2003), all helmed by Ringo Lam. Leong Po-chih directed Jude Law in *The Wisdom of Crocodiles* (1998) before proceeding to mainly American television and direct-to-video movies. Taking on both horror and action genres, Ronny Yu added his touch to *Bride of Chucky* (1998), *The 51st State* (2001), and *Freddy vs. Jason* (2003), and then turning around to make the excellent *Huo Yuan Jia*, or *Fearless* (2006), starring Jet Li. Of all the directors to make the Hollywood crossover, John Woo is probably the most commercially successful. Beginning with Universal's *Hard Target* (1993), Woo went on to clinch Hollywood mega-blockbuster deals, such as *Broken Arrow* (1996), *Face/Off* (1997), *Mission: Impossible II* (2000), *Windtalkers* (2002), and *Paycheck* (2003). As with Jet Li and Tsui Hark, Woo's classic crime films *A Better Tomorrow* (1986) and *The Killer* (1989) put Chow Yun-fat on the map of transnational Chinese cinemas, making the latter's move into Hollywood a smooth one. Wong Kar-wai, the art-house film-festival darling, joined the group with his critically celebrated Hong Kong works like *Chungking Express* (1994), *Happy Together* (1997), *In the Mood for Love* (2000), and *2046* (2004); and has now taken on two Studio Canal productions, the recently released *My Blueberry Nights* (2007) and the in-pre-production remake of *The Lady from Shanghai* (2010). A number of newer filmmakers have also dipped their feet in the Hollywood pool: Kirk Wong's *The Big Hit* (1998), Peter Chan's *The Love Letter* (1999), and Stanley Tong's *Mr. Magoo* (1997) — Tong was also responsible for *Rumble in the Bronx* (1995), Jackie Chan's breakout hit in the US. It is interesting to note here that while commercial film directors make the direct leap into Hollywood, the art-house directors naturally take the international film festival route before crossing into Hollywood mainstream when the time is right for them to do so.

My brief but strategically emphatic gallop through the rich and multifaceted histories of pan-Chinese cinema brings us now to the post-1997 present where transnational Chinese cinema has transmogrified into this multi-tentacled creature that entwines itself to Hollywood, together spawning varied versions of celluloid Chineseness, which this book confronts as its main critical challenge.

"Yellow Peril" and the Model Minority: Hollywood's Chinese Stereotypes

"A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away . . ." is undoubtedly the most memorable opening line in science fiction cinema history. It serves as the prelude to all six *Star Wars* films, the first of which is *Star Wars* (1977), the film that launched what has been called the "cult blockbuster" phenomenon,[82] with its spectacular marketing and merchandising paraphernalia.[83] The film's cultural impact, hence, cannot be underestimated, considering the way the series creates for its audience a fantasy space of a mythic reality that is not of this world and yet parallels the human experience that *is* of this world. In this sense, the fantastical distancing of "a galaxy far, far away" in no way reduces the very real structuring presence of the cultural politics of race, class, gender, sexuality, and political ideology in America.[84]

When George Lucas proudly unveiled *Star Wars: Episode I – The Phantom Menace* in 1999, Asian Americans decried the ethnic stereotypes of Asians as a throwback to the older Hollywood representations. The Trade Viceroy Nute Gunray, one of the villainous non-human characters, is spotted speaking English with a suspiciously Asian sounding accent that could easily be mistaken as Chinese in its inflections. One could conveniently dismiss such a reading as a form of ethnic over-sensitivity; but Ed Guerrero's analysis of the first *Star Wars* movie convincingly demonstrates how these films can reveal, rather symptomatically, the conditions of race relations in America:

> The film's construction of race relations arises out of tensions and contestations located in the social here and now . . . But the stark realization of the possibility of a "final solution" to earth's color problem is emphasized in *Star Wars*, in that white people, particularly white males, are constructed as the sole and sovereign human norm, contrasted to "Wookies" and an assorted myriad of exotic creatures and humanoids, especially as depicted in the film's memorable bar scene. Enhancing the film's hierarchical subordination of racial types, *Star Wars* utilizes the mechanism of displacement to recruit and transpose into robots and nonhuman Wookies the friendly "colored" sidekicks, the Tontos, Birmingham Browns, and Nigger Jims of the action-adventure thrillers and novels of America's filmic and literary past. And in much the same way that these sidekicks have always provided emotional comfort in all of the dominant cinema's genres, these alien, exotic, noncompetitive, desexualized contrasts to the reigning "norm" of whiteness continue to be understanding nonwhite "buddies" in times of sharply politicized racial discourse.[85]

The point here is not to label the film series as "racist" per se, but to map the political unconscious[86] of racial socialization that permeates much of contemporary Hollywood cinema. Even in 1999, during an era of multicultural awareness, *Star Wars* characters like Jar Jar Binks and the Trade Viceroy Nute Gunray still come off as racial caricatures locked into the ideological forms of the assimilated non-white or the menacing alien respectively.

What I draw from Guerrero's splendid analysis is also the realization that the racial unconscious forms a cinematic continuum. Racial images of the Chinese, for example, move through distinct phases of Hollywood depiction in accordance with the political and social perceptions of the Chinese throughout American history. The Chinese in the reconfigured form of the alien Trade Viceroy assume an economic menace, not unlike the political and public fears that the People's Republic of China, as a rising global economic powerhouse, might threaten American capitalist might and hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. Important to consider also is Guerrero's observation that racial stereotypes undergo transmutation into cinematic forms to fit the times, though remaining stereotypes nonetheless. These are significant lessons to keep in mind as one considers the cultural politics of Chinese representation in its new presence within contemporary Hollywood and American cinema.

A number of substantial critical works on the subject of Hollywood stereotypes of Asians were produced beginning as early as the 1950s.[87] A central theme that one gathers from all these works is that the creation of Asian stereotypes and their reproduction on the big screen were enabled by the political conditions of the times, specifically America's trans-Pacific political and military adventurism, and the gradually changing attitudes towards Asian immigrants within the US. While these stereotypes sadly constitute a handsome list, I have chosen to highlight only a select few, with strategic attention placed on their specific relevance to the Chinese and a possible connection to the new post-1997 presence.

The power of cinema lies in its ability to involve the vicarious gaze of its audience, a gaze that is often projected onto a constructed figure of Otherness, be it national, ethnic, gendered, sexualized, or cultural. One of the reasons why Laura Mulvey's analysis of cinematic scopophilia in "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema"[88] had such an impact on contemporary cinema studies is that it engenders discussion of cinema as a phantasmic libidinal space for the construction of alterity to ease anxieties, raise fears as and when necessary, and basically reinforce ideological positions. The formulations of a mythic cinematic Chineseness in recognizable stereotypes and racist clichés ameliorate fears of an invading "alien" culture through visual and narrative containment,

particularly by means of the classic Hollywood happy ending where white normality is felicitously restored in America.[89]

This particular tendency in American film one can trace back to cinema's beginnings. In an impressive essay investigating films by both the Thomas Edison company and the American Mutoscope and Biograph, produced between 1898 and 1908 with titles like *Dancing Chinamen, Marionettes* (1898), *Chinese Rubbernecks* (1900), and *The Deceived Slumming Party* (1908),[90] Sabine Haenni demonstrates how these early images of malleable Chinese bodies and of New York City's Chinatown as an exotic tourist space allowed white audiences to "pleasurably experience the newly racialized metropolis by simultaneously consolidating a new kind of 'white' hegemony, and by assigning the Chinese to a limited and constrained space."[91] In other words, Chinatown was turned into a living ethnographic museum, where quick jaunts through it provided the viewer with a Ripley's-believe-it-or-not experience, with speed creating a protective distance from actual human contact. Film as a, then, new media technology furnished a further distancing effect for audiences to experience Chinatown without the consequences or the responsibilities of physical contact. Considering that almost a century has passed since the production of these early film clips, Haenni's argument still resonates for contemporary films like *The Corruptor* (1999), which I analyze in Chapter Five in specific relation to the triad presence in New York City's Chinatown.

An integral fact to keep in mind is that cinema rose as a popular American cultural art form during an intense period of anti-Chinese public sentiments: the Chinese Exclusion Act received President Chester Arthur's signature in 1882 despite his opposition to it, because both houses of Congress passed Representative Horace Page's bill in indication of general public support of these anti-Chinese measures.[92] For, in the public imagination throughout the fin de siècle period and the early twentieth century, the figure of the Chinese transmogrified from that of the pigtailed "coolie," the Chinese indentured laborer, to that of the "deviant" and the "yellow peril," according to Robert G. Lee's taxonomic categorization of "the six faces of the Oriental."[93] Gina Marchetti proffers a culturally incisive definition of the yellow peril:

> Rooted in medieval fears of Genghis Khan and Mongolian invasions of Europe, the yellow peril combines racist terror of alien cultures, sexual anxieties, and the belief that the West will be overpowered and enveloped by the irresistible, dark, occult forces of the East. Given that knowledge about Asia and Asians has been limited in Europe and America, much of this formulation necessarily rests on a fantasy that projects Euroamerican desires

> and dreads onto the alien other. Thus, as Western nations began to carve up Asia into colonies, their own imperialist expansion was in part rationalized by the notion that a militarily powerful Asia posed a threat to "Christian civilization."[94]

Her description accurately frames the yellow peril as a mode of Orientalism inflected by Euro-American colonialist and imperialist discourses.[95]

One of the most nefarious yellow peril creations is none other than the character of Dr. Fu Manchu. In light of the Orientalist discourses of British colonialism, it comes as no surprise that Fu Manchu sprang out of the British popular literary imagination.[96] Born in 1883 in Birmingham, England, as Arthur Henry Ward, Sax Rohmer penned thirteen novels featuring Fu Manchu. As Eugene Franklin Wong recounts, Rohmer immersed himself in Limehouse, the area of London where the original Chinatown was first located, to gain inspiration for his famous literary creation.[97] Hollywood came a-calling and the rest was cinematic history. From the 1920s to the 1960s, the doings of the evil doctor filled the big screen, and later, television, with major studios like Paramount and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer jumping on the Chinese bandwagon and cashing in on the yellow peril scare embodied by Fu Manchu. Boris Karloff, famous for his portrayals of Frankenstein's monster in the James Whale movies, took his turn in MGM's *The Mask of Fu Manchu* (1932).[98] The last English-language Fu Manchu films I am aware of had Christopher Lee play the title character: *The Vengeance of Fu Manchu* (1967), *The Blood of Fu Manchu* (1968), and *The Castle of Fu Manchu* (1969). (It is irresistible to point out here that Shaw Brothers helped co-produce *The Vengeance of Fu Manchu*, adding again to its stable of B-movie international collaborations. Once more, profit triumphed over cultural nationalism in the global film industry.)

The *Flash Gordon* films also delivered a science fiction version of the Fu Manchu character in the form of Ming the Merciless. Robert Barshay's description of him demonstrates a clear parallel between the two villains: "Such is the villain in *Flash Gordon* — a trident bearded, slanty eyed, shiny doomed [sic], pointy nailed, arching eyebrowed, exotically garbed Oriental named Ming, who personifies unadulterated evil . . . [Ming] is the product of perhaps the richest and longest tradition of all of Hollywood's ethnic [racial] stereotypes, one which has spawned many grotesque offspring and conceived innumerable variations of deformity."[99] Could one of its most recent offspring be the pirate captain Sao Feng in *Pirates of the Caribbean: At World's End*, whose image bears an uncanny resemblance to that of its wicked predecessors? My point here is not to advocate a superficial form of cinematic comparison

as criticism, but rather to reinforce again the imagistic continuities the character of Sao Feng establishes with the various racist, anti-Chinese discourses of the past that had helped to produce its filmic ancestry, something that filmmakers must continually guard against.

Part of the discursive danger that Fu Manchu and Ming the Merciless were meant to pose was their sexual appetite for white female flesh, a desire invoking the fears of miscegenation. Through her expert readings of early Hollywood films such as D. W. Griffith's *Broken Blossoms* (1919), Marchetti demonstrates how these film "narratives use the fantasy of rape and the possibility of lynching to reaffirm the boundaries of a white-defined, patriarchal, Anglo-American culture."[100] The libidinal forces of Fu Manchu and Ming the Merciless were not only disrupted by the last minute heroics of the white savior, but their erotic inclinations seemed also to have emerged out of the shadows of the grotesquely "perverse" sexual aura, with which Hollywood was wont to imbue its "queer" villains. The desexualized Asian male was another common filmic method used by Hollywood to neutralize this threat to white female sexuality. Even today one is hard pressed to come up with clear instances where the Asian male hero actually wins the white female protagonist in the end,[101] as a quick survey of characters played by Jackie Chan, Jet Li, and Chow Yun-fat will confirm: Jackie Chan and Jennifer Love Hewitt remain friends in *The Tuxedo*; Jet Li pairs up with the *African* American Aaliyah in *Romeo Must Die*; and Chow Yun-fat takes leave of Mira Sorvino for China in *The Replacement Killers*.

White male-Asian female romances, on the other hand, abound, with a rich Hollywood tradition for one to study: *Love Is a Many-Splendored Thing* (1955), *China Doll* (1958), and *The World of Suzie Wong* (1960) specifically featured Chinese women in love with white male heroes. Inhabiting this fantasy world of the white heterosexual male gaze is a passively submissive "Lotus Blossom or a domineering Dragon Lady."[102] These stereotypes frequently do not remain static, but morph from one form to another to engage the libidinal contingencies of the male gaze. A good instance would be Suzie Wong's transformation from the Oriental sex kitten image (as a Hong Kong prostitute) in the beginning of the film, into the sacrificial mother and submissive wife in the end.[103] Part of the white heterosexual male fantasy of the submissive Asian female also revolves around the stereotype of the Japanese "butterfly", popularized by Giacomo Puccini's *Madama Butterfly,* a variation on the Lotus Blossom theme, which David Henry Hwang's play *M. Butterfly* and David Cronenberg's 1993 film adaptation have so thoroughly critiqued.

The recent cultural politics of female empowerment have further spurred the reformulation of the Dragon Lady[104] stereotype, though rather ambivalently

I might add, into the kick-ass martial artist. Michelle Yeoh as a Bond girl in *Tomorrow Never Dies* (1997) marked "the reinvention of the Chinese woman warrior" who, according to Marchetti, "does not drift too far from the formulaic presentation of Asian women in Hollywood as passive but erotic 'lotus blossoms' or villainously dangerous, exotic 'dragon ladies.'"[105] Hopes for a new female heroine who not only matches up to the British colonialist relic that is James Bond, but who is also willing to resist his supposedly irresistible sexual allure, are dashed in the film's genre-conventional finale of Bond getting the girl, once again; this despite the fact that there is little or no sexual charge between Bond and Yeoh's character throughout the film. The eroticism of the kung fu fighting dragon lady here really lies in her dominatrix figuration. The powerful expressivity of the woman-warrior battles one envisions, for example, in the Michelle Yeoh-Zhang Ziyi fight scenes in *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* is troublingly trivialized into erotic "cat-fights."[106] Lucy Liu's campy turn as the undercover whip-wielding dominatrix teacher figure in *Charlie's Angels* (2000) and her spectacular fight scenes with Uma Thurman in *Kill Bill Vol. 1* (2003) further showcase this problematic update of the traditional Dragon Lady stereotype.

The final figure to round off this array of Hollywood's Orientalist exotica is the rotundly avuncular detective Charlie Chan. Again a literary creation, this time by American author Earl Derr Biggers, Charlie Chan appeared in a series of novels before finding his way onto cinema screens in 1926. His popularity with moviegoers was only later cemented with the film *Charlie Chan Carries On* (1931).[107] Eugene Franklin Wong explains why an America paralyzed by the yellow peril was now ready for a non-threatening Chinese lead character:

> Warner Oland . . . starred as the Chinese detective. Although Oland's personality had much to do with the success of Chan, it is likely that the final immigration measures taken by the United States Government, and the subsequent social relief accompanying the end to the Asian immigration problem, gradually provided a psychological incentive and social climate given to the acceptance of an image of a non-villainous Asian.[108]

So welcoming were audiences of Chan's benign Chineseness that his character appeared in over forty films from 1926 to 1981,[109] the last of which had Peter Ustinov inhabiting the role and confronting Angie Dickinson as the Dragon Queen. The fact that all the Fu Manchu and Charlie Chan roles were played by white actors is no coincidence; it simply testifies to the racist climate of Hollywood in its discriminatory practices of hiring and promoting few Asian actors,[110] and also to the notion that an experienced white actor could more

effectively play in yellow face these grotesque caricatures with Orientalist aplomb and hyperbole. When the last Charlie Chan film was first propositioned, Asian Americans were up in arms, with one group calling themselves the "Coalition of Asians to Nix, [sic] Charlie Chan" to express "their disapproval of the proposed film, since the two primary Chinese characters were going to be played by white American actors." Jachinson Chan concludes that the filmmaker's decision to proceed with his casting decision "exemplifies the deep rootedness of a white Charlie Chan," reinforcing the notion of white superiority.[111]

Charlie Chan fails as a "positive image" because he "embodies what Frank Chin and Jeffrey Paul Chan have termed 'racist love,' the image of an ethnic minority who unquestioningly accepts his marginal status even as he serves the social order."[112] The Charlie Chan films are, according to Kwai-Cheung Lo, "always placed in the comedy format through which the stereotypical image of the Asian male is displaced, inverted, and intermingled with European-American traits . . . Charlie Chan is depicted as virtuous, mature, rational, and skillful at solving crimes, while his Asian characteristics, such as his speech, dress, and appearance, are still comically maintained."[113] Charlie Chan, thus unpacked, reminds me of Jackie Chan's methods of mimicry, which I deal with in Chapter Six. This correlation coincides precisely with Lo's own analysis of Jackie Chan, whose film *Rush Hour*, he argues, "shamelessly revives" Charlie Chan, this time in the form of "a muscular Hong Kong body."[114] Both Charlie Chan and Jackie Chan build an unfortunate connection as exemplars of Asians as the "model minority"[115] in America.

Asian American Cinema: Survival Tactics and Critical Interventions

The "new" Chinese presence in Hollywood can now be conceptualized as a merging of the various cinematic streams: the cinemas of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, bringing robust traditions and vibrant cultures to bear on this presence; the racial typology and racist iconography produced through a century of Hollywood's reliance on Orientalist imagery, which sadly finds its contemporary revival in reconfigured Hollywood forms; and, finally, Asian American cinema, the last stream, a small but politically important one in the resistance of Hollywood's ethnic stereotypes. By using the notion of "merging," I only seek to register the possible discursive dangers of the Hollywood vortex sucking in these various streams and dissolving them into a homogenous nondescript celluloid Chineseness for transnational

consumption. Yet, by highlighting below the lessons from the political activist aspects of Asian American cinema, I am in no way prescribing this cinema's politics as the only approach to engage Hollywood's dominance; for this politics was, and is, multifaceted, and its tactics have been strategically revised through time to meet specific historical exigencies.[116] Furthermore, not all Asian American film is activism-based or is energized by a critical Asian American politics — some instances of this cinema incorporate Hollywood's stereotypes of the Chinese in their narrative and character formulations to earn mainstream acceptance (just as the various streams of Chinese cinemas are equally capable of critical responses to Hollywood's domination of global cinema). Instead, my aim here in transcribing an aspect of the cinema's historical problematics is to offer an instance where a specific cinematic culture can present alternative possibilities in resisting politically questionable discourses in mainstream cinema. (Chapter Two also illustrates this point in the context of the Hong Kong handover.)

To begin to understand the evolution of an Asian American cinema that offers critical interventions, one needs to return to the Civil Rights Movement in 1964 as the crucible of Asian American political awareness and subjectivity. Martin Luther King's efforts on behalf of African America transformed the landscape of all race relations in the United States. When racial discrimination was finally declared illegal by the US Congress in 1964, it had a ripple effect as immigration exclusion laws were also deemed discriminatory.[117] Hence, a year later, the Immigration Act of 1965 came into being, which "abolished the national-origins quotas and provided for the annual admission of 170,000 immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 from the Western Hemisphere."[118] The gates that were closed to Chinese immigrants were now open, permitting family reunions and a flood of new immigrants that would significantly alter the racial character of the country. Asian Americans began to reexamine their sense of identity, their place in America, their cultural connections to their former homelands, and the political possibilities of asserting their place in a nation that had sought to assimilate them and confine them to the ghettos of America's social margins. The Asian American Movement was thus conceived in the late 1960s followed by the formation of the first Asian American studies program at the University of California at Berkeley and San Francisco State University.[119] The radical politics of the Asian American Movement infused academia and the arts.

In explaining how Asian American cinema emerged out of this politics, Darrell Hamamoto observes that "independent film was but one of many expressive forms that artists adopted to oppose the cultural hegemony of the allied corporate and media industries. Along with film, self-consciously *Asian*

American writing, music, theater, fine arts, and criticism began to assert themselves against the institutionalized racism that had marginalized or excluded creative and intellectual work by Yellow people in the United States."[120] Independent cinema was often the means for Asian American filmmakers to make their mark. Much of the work that was produced during the early years was culturally politicized, engaging and challenging the stereotypes of Hollywood while constructing new artistic spaces for an Asian American expressivity and subjectivity. In her now classic essay on independent Asian American films, Renee Tajima proffers "a broad framework for looking at Asian American cinema": It is "a socially committed cinema" that is "created by a people bound by 1) race; 2) interlocking cultural and historical relations; and 3) a common experience of western domination;" and is also "characterized by diversity shaped through 1) national origin; and 2) the constant flux of new immigration flowing from a westernizing East into an easternizing West."[121] In other words, this framework accommodates the heterogeneity and diversity of Asian Americans in order to challenge the homogenizing reductionism of racial stereotypes, and seeks to lock Asian America into the larger projects of radical political interventions and movements to which such a cinema is indebted.

Tajima historicizes Asian American cinema into two periods: the 1960s and 1970s together form one, while the 1980s constitute another. Out of the former period emerged "an urgent, idealistic brand of filmmaking [that] embodied the energy of the Asian American political movement and sought to be a voice for Asian American people." The latter consisted of "a period of institutionalization, pragmatism, and skills attainment, as filmmakers focused their sights on a mass audience."[122] Tajima also credits certain "Asian American media institutions" like Asian CineVision, Third World Newsreel, Visual Communications, and the Asian American Resource Workshop, among others,[123] for providing the various modes of support to enable independent Asian American filmmakers to accomplish their work. Another important organization that promotes and exhibits Asian American cinema is, of course, the Asian American International Film Festival (AAIFF), which has provided "career boosts to directors such as Wayne Wang and Ang Lee, both of whom later achieved crossover success."[124]

Chinese American directors of feature-length films make up only a handful. Two of the best known feature-length Chinese American directors go by the same last name: Peter Wang and Wayne Wang, the latter achieving greater renown than the former. Hailing from Taiwan, Peter Wang made only three films, all in the 1980s: *A Great Wall* (1986), *The Laser Man* (1988), and *First Date* (1989). Wayne Wang, on the other hand, offers one an excellent

instance of a filmmaker who displays the enviable "ability to navigate economic necessity and social perception"[125] by shuttling between Hollywood films and art-house fare, not unlike Ang Lee. In her questioning of Tajima's critique of "mainstream or studio productions as being coopted and politically suspect," Sandra Liu argues that Wang's films should be contextualized within "a complex of conflicting discourses and desires and continuously changing tactics in response to shifting material exigencies."[126] Such tactics enable Wang to stay financially afloat with commercial movies like *Slam Dance* (1987), *The Joy Luck Club* (1993), *Anywhere but Here* (1999), *Maid in Manhattan* (2002), *Because of Winn-Dixie* (2005), and *Last Holiday* (2006); while producing politically urgent and aesthetically creative films like *Chan Is Missing* (1982), *Dim Sum: A Little Bit of Heart* (1985), the adaptation of Louis Chu's novel *Eat a Bowl of Tea* (1989), the X-rated *Life is Cheap . . . But Toilet Paper Is Expensive* (1989), *Smoke* (1995), *Blue in the Face* (1995), *Chinese Box* (1997), the bizarrely kinky *The Center of the World* (2001), *A Thousand Years of Good Prayers* (2007), and *The Princess of Nebraska* (2007). In the next chapter, I consider Wayne Wang's *Chinese Box*, a not-unproblematic cinematic capturing of his former homeland Hong Kong as it momentously changed political hands from Britain to the People's Republic of China.

Apart from the two Wangs, the 1990s saw other efforts that ranged from the critically challenging to the forgettable: Shirley Sun, who co-wrote the script to *A Great Wall*, took on directing duties in *Iron and Silk* (1990); another Chinatown film is Tony Chan's *Combination Platter* (1993); V. V. Dachin Hsu made the horror film *Pale Blood* (1990) and the family comedy *My American Vacation* (1999); and actress Joan Chen made her directorial debut, the incredibly disturbing *Xiu Xiu: the Sent-Down Girl* (1998) and *Autumn in New York* (2000), starring Richard Gere and Winona Ryder. It is only with the arrival of the new millennium that one witnesses a promising group of young energetic directors who are coming into their own. While the present fascination with Chinese and Asian cinemas in Hollywood has probably worked in their favor, a wave that they have ridden to their advantage, this group's small but growing cinematic corpus does not shy away from challenging staid conceptions of the Chinese and Asians in general. Alice Wu's debut *Saving Face* (2004) and Quentin Lee's *Drift* (2000) and *Ethan Mao* (2004) assert lesbian and gay subjectivities in the face of Chinese familial disavowal of their material presence. After shining in the MTV-produced *Better Luck Tomorrow* (2002), Justin Lin went to Hollywood with *The Fast and the Furious: Tokyo Drift* (2006). His latest, *Finishing the Game* (2007), is a wonderful film about the movie industry's attempt to find Bruce Lee's

replacement immediately after his death. By playing on the same stereotypes through humor, the film unveils in a non-threatening fashion the impact of Hollywood's stereotyping of the Chinese. (The humor in *Harold and Kumar Go to White Castle* (2004) and *Harold and Kumar Escape from Guantanamo Bay* (2008) functions in the same way.) These new Chinese American players seem to have appropriated Wayne Wang's tactic of straddling both commercially viable and politically avant-garde projects, the two of which may not be mutually exclusive.

As a means of winding down this extended introduction, I quote a statement from an actress and dialogue coach who has been in the American film and television business since 1981:

> The facets to Asian stereotypes, reactions to them, what to do about them are complex. Stereotyping seems an American rite of passage. People I know, upon hearing and dealing with the controversy of Asian stereotypes, have decided to use another minority to avoid it completely. This hurts us in many ways too. We're not seen, we don't work and don't serve as reminders that we are a part of the American fabric.[127]

The complex position she and many others find themselves in, which is this cutthroat business of Hollywood, exposes the material realities that the cultural hierarchies and power structures in the industry have created and imposed on minority participants of the game. Is one willing to pay the price for circumventing stereotypes and standing up against the industry's desire to return to the racist imagistic traditions of Chineseness that are being remade for a contemporary global audience? While her statement commands renewed respect for those struggling in the industry, it also reminds us of the immense cultural and political challenges the various participants of Chinese in Hollywood and the new generation of Chinese-American filmmakers and actors need to confront on a daily basis. As new filmic representations and images emerge in the future, these challenges will become an integral part of a larger historical framework within which to conceive an effective cultural politics to critique, resist, and/or engage Hollywood's hegemony.

Mapping the Chapters

The rest of the book's six chapters follow an idiosyncratic thematic progression (on account of my personal research encounters and interests) in order to isolate specific moments within the Chinese-in-Hollywood phenomenon. Chapters Two and Three, as I have noted earlier, belong together in that they offer a composite

reading of the diverse responses to the 1997 Hong Kong handover, which provides the historical point of entry for the book. Chapter Two, "Visualizing Hong Kong," examines the handover through the cinematic gazes of Hong Kong diasporic filmmakers Wong Kar-wai, Wayne Wang, and Evans Chan. Their gazes from afar enable them to grapple cathartically with an important historical moment in their homeland, as they continue to make films in and/or for America. The analysis in this chapter also asks the broader questions of cultural and diasporic identity and politics that the Chinese presence in Hollywood must ultimately face up to, a critical challenge that I present through my discussion of the film's deployment of cinematic visuality as a mode of intervention. In counterpoint to the cultural politics in Chapter Two is Chapter Three's discussion of Hollywood's response to the events through films like *Red Corner*, *Kundun*, and *Seven Years in Tibet*. These films' admirable intention of speaking up against the human rights abuses and lack of democracy evident in China is undermined by the representational excess configured through Hollywood's imaginings of China's terrifying cultural Otherness.

While the Chinese cinematic diaspora was mobilized around the 1997 handover, it is the *wuxia pian*'s (Chinese sword-fighting movie's) arrival in Hollywood in the form of *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* that signaled the new, sustained presence of Chinese cinema in the United States. Chapter Four, "The Global Return of the *Wuxia pian*," focuses on the strategies of cultural translation and accommodation in Ang Lee's *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* and Zhang Yimou's *Hero* and *House of Flying Daggers*. The desire to garner global audience appeal in all three films created deep cultural anxieties that left significant traces in the filmic texts for my analysis.

With the *wuxia pian* fueling American and global audience's thirst for Chinese action cinema, Hollywood has diversified its offerings through the crime action genre. However, cinematic representations of criminality and vice in America's Chinatowns have inevitably become a part of the genre's visual landscape, thus sustaining the way mainstream America stereotypically views the Chinese as culturally alien and morally perverse. This mode of representation has resurfaced in the form of the Chinese triads and their involvement in protection rackets, human trafficking, the drug trade, and counterfeiting. Chapter Five, "Enter the Triads," looks at Hollywood films *Lethal Weapon 4*, *The Corruptor*, *Rush Hour*, *Rush Hour 2*, and *Romeo Must Die*, and the way they situate the triads in a global/local nexus and, in turn, ethnicize them into criminally monstrous Others within the discourses of American race relations.

Chapters Six and Seven spotlight Hollywood's evolving fetishism of things Chinese. Discussing the emergence of Sino-chic through Hollywood's

appropriation of Chinese action cinema, Chapter Six looks first at how Jackie Chan works the global/local conjuncture by increasing the cinematic Americanization of his work, especially through the themes of cultural adaptation, appropriation, and acceptance of Asian migrants in the US, while simultaneously building his cosmopolitan appeal to a wide global audience, all through the processes of "mimicry as failure" in *The Tuxedo*, *Shanghai Noon*, and *Shanghai Knights*. The chapter then interrogates the modes of cinematic citationality in Quentin Tarantino's *Kill Bill Vol. 1* and *2*, while at the same time professing an uneasy pleasure for the camp aesthetics in these movies. Treading through a study of the exploitation film, the female revenge genre, and various cinematic allusions to the Shaw Brothers archives, I foreground Tarantino's relishing of an ethnic cinematic chic in his reinvention of Chineseness in *Kill Bill*.

Chapter Seven, "Chinese Supernaturalism," centers on the way *Bulletproof Monk*, *Double Vision*, *The Myth*, and *The Promise* pursue a kind of mythic autoethnography, where Chinese religious beliefs and superstitions receive an intensified makeover to emphasize the bizarre, the macabre, the mystical, and the inexplicable. While all these films see it as their responsibility to bridge the East-West divide, they also ironically serve to keep the "monstrous" ethnic Other at bay by deploying ethnic supernaturalism as a cordon sanitaire. This double-edged strategy also reifies racial stereotypes and problematic cultural assumptions on issues such as ethnic assimilation in America, scientific rationalism, and cultural nationalism.

Finally, the book arrives not at a conclusion but a "coda," a musical term I use strategically to suggest the new themes and directions that future work in this area of cinema studies affords, in what I call the "Global Cinematic Technologies of Ethnic (Un)Representation."

Notes

1 Introduction: Remaking Chinese Cinemas, Hollywood Style

1. Richard Corliss, "Asian Invasion," *Time*, 14 August 1995, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,983301-1,00.html>, accessed 27 May 2008. See also Minh-Ha T. Pham, "The Asian Invasion (of Multiculturalism) in Hollywood," *Journal of Popular Film and Television* 32, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 121–131. Pham argues that the very notion of an "Asian invasion itself is an American construct" and that multiculturalism through "the increased presence of Asian and Asian American actors and filmmakers" helps reinforce "Hollywood's image as a racially inclusive, equal opportunity, global industry" (122).
2. When the film opened in Singapore, fans were delighted that the on-screen pairing of Chan and Li had finally happened, though they wished it had occurred much earlier in their careers. One fan notes that he had "been waiting for this dream fight for years," while another believed that "they should have fought in the early 1990s, before they went to the United States." Bernard Koh and Douglas Tseng, "Who Packs a Bigger Punch?" *The Sunday Times*, 27 April 2008, Lifestyle section, 2.
3. "Jackie and Jet's Movie 'Isn't Great,'" *The Straits Times*, 20 September 2007, Life section, 12.
4. "Jackie and Jet: Friends, Not Foes," *The Straits Times*, 19 April 2008, Life section, 12.
5. Li describes his sparring session with Chan as a meeting of "Olympic champions." "Jackie and Jet: Friends, Not Foes."
6. "Forbidden Kingdom is No. 1 in US," *The Straits Times*, 22 April 2008, Life section, 18.
7. Min Lee, "Kung Fu Film 'The Forbidden Kingdom' a Hit in China," *Yahoo! News*, 8 May 2008, <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080508/ap_en_mo/film_forbidden_kingdom>, accessed 15 May 2008.
8. "Jackie and Jet's Movie 'Isn't Great.'"
9. Jonathan Landreth, "China's Huayi Bros. Thinking Big," *The Hollywood Reporter*, 24 May 2005, <http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000930260>, accessed 18 May 2008.
10. My production of this list of films is based on a quick and probably inaccurate identification as a result of only two theatrical viewings. But the pleasure of this identification of filmic allusions is also the pleasure of positing the cinematic traditions that the character Jason has immersed himself in, traditions that ultimately inform his cultural fantasies (of being a kung fu warrior) as well as ours.

11. The Chinese censors cut, according to *Variety*, a scene where pirate Sao Feng recites a poem by Li Bai, a poet from the Tang dynasty. Chinese audiences questioned the film's negative racial depiction as an "image of the Chinese in the eyes of Hollywood producers." "China Censors 'Cut' Pirates Film," *BBC News*, 12 June 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6744245.stm>, accessed 15 June 2007.
12. Richard Corliss, "Hollywood's Asian Romance," *Time*, 14 November 2005, <http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501051121/story.html>, accessed 15 June 2007.
13. "Geisha Film Reveals 'Hidden Culture,'" *BBC News*, 1 January 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/4503454.stm>, accessed 15 June 2007.
14. Sheridan Prasso, *The Asian Mystique: Dragon Ladies, Geisha Girls, and Our Fantasies of the Exotic Orient* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 87. Prasso argues that this image of the Japanese child-woman is part of a series of images that depict the submissive Asian woman stereotype, all of which contribute to what she calls the allure of "the Asian Mystique." This allure is so prevalent and naturalized in screen discourses that my students are always stunned, when I teach this film, by how easy it is to miss the pedophilic implications of the relationship between the young Chiyo (Sayuri's birth name) and the Chairman (Ken Watanabe).
15. Clifford Coonan, "'Memoirs of a Geisha' Banned by Beijing in Row over Chinese Stars," *The Independent*, 2 February 2006, <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts/film/news/article342661.ece>, accessed 15 June 2007. One person even went online to say that "Zhang and Gong have brought shame to the Chinese." Andreas Lorenz, "China's 'Geisha' Complex," *Spiegel Online*, 7 February 2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,399593,00.html>, accessed 15 June 2007.
16. Coonan, "'Memoirs of a Geisha' Banned."
17. Prasso, *The Asian Mystique*, 79–80. Offering a more conflicted and, hence, more complex interpretation of Wong is: Yiman Wang, "The Art of Screen Passing: Anna May Wong's Yellow Yellowface Performance in the Art Deco Era," *Camera Obscura* 60, vol. 20, no. 3 (2005): 159–91.
18. For a discussion of films in this period (1989–1997), see Gina Marchetti, *From Tian'anmen to Times Square: Transnational China and the Chinese Diaspora on Global Screens, 1989–1997* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006).
19. Rob Wilson and Arif Dirlik, eds., *Asia/Pacific as Space of Cultural Production* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).
20. Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 127.
21. Andrew Horton and Stuart Y. McDougal, introduction to *Play It Again, Sam: Retakes on Remakes*, eds. Andrew Horton and Stuart Y. McDougal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 2.
22. Ibid., 4.
23. Lee Sze Yong, "Enter the New Dragon," *The Straits Times*, 31 May 2007, Life section, 20.

24. Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 320–21.
25. David Wills, "The French Remark: *Breathless* and Cinematic Citationality," in *Play It Again, Sam: Retakes on Remakes*, eds. Andrew Horton and Stuart Y. McDougal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 148.
26. Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, "Historical Introduction: Chinese Cinemas (1896–1996) and Transnational Film Studies," in *Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nationhood, Gender*, ed. Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), 3.
27. Patricia Aufderheide, "Made in Hong Kong: Translation and Transmutation," in *Play It Again, Sam: Retakes on Remakes*, eds. Andrew Horton and Stuart Y. McDougal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 193.
28. Ibid., 198.
29. Quoted in Lisa Odham Stokes and Michael Hoover, *City on Fire: Hong Kong Cinema* (London: Verso, 1999), 309.
30. David Bordwell, *Planet Hong Kong: Popular Cinema and the Art of Entertainment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 19.
31. Ibid., 19.
32. Tan See Kam, "From *South Pacific* to *Shanghai Blues*: No Film Is an Island," in *Hong Kong Film, Hollywood and the New Global Cinema: No Film Is an Island*, eds. Gina Marchetti and Tan See Kam (London: Routledge, 2007), 15–6.
33. Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 315.
34. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 182.
35. Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992), 6.
36. Ibid., 4.
37. Ibid., 7. Pratt deploys "autoethnography" as a reference "to instances in which colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in ways that *engage with* the colonizer's own terms." See also Chow's use of this concept in her reading of primitivism in the works of China's Fifth Generation filmmakers. Rey Chow, *Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 38.
38. "It is the field of the problematic that defines and structures the invisible as the defined excluded, *excluded* from the field of visibility and *defined* as excluded by the existence and peculiar structure of the field of the problematic; as what forbids and represses the reflection of the field on its object." Louis Althusser, "From *Capital* to Marx's Philosophy," in *Reading Capital*, by Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1997), 25–6.
39. Ibid., 28.
40. Jenny Kwok Wah Lau, "*Farewell My Concubine*: History, Melodrama, and Ideology in Contemporary Pan-Chinese Cinema," *Film Quarterly* 49, no. 1 (Fall 1995): 16–27.
41. Yingjin Zhang, *Chinese National Cinema* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 14.

42. Law Kar, "The American Connection in Early Hong Kong Cinema," in *The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity,* eds. Poshek Fu and David Desser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 45.
43. Ibid., 45–6.
44. Ibid., 46.
45. Quoted in John Trumpbour, *Selling Hollywood to the World: U.S. and European Struggles for Mastery of the Global Film Industry, 1920–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 64.
46. Zhiwei Xiao, "Anti-Imperialism and Film Censorship during the Nanjing Decade, 1927–1937," in *Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nationhood, Gender*, ed. Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), 38–9.
47. Ibid., 38, 40.
48. Ibid., 41.
49. Ibid., 42.
50. Ibid., 42–5.
51. Zhang, *Chinese National Cinema,* 71–2.
52. Ibid., 152. See also Paul Fonoroff, *Silver Light: A Pictorial History of Hong Kong Cinema, 1920–1970* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1997), xiv–v.
53. Law, "The American Connection," 50–9.
54. Ibid., 52.
55. Ibid., 52, 57.
56. Ibid., 59.
57. Stephen Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema: The Extra Dimensions* (London: BFI, 1997), 3–109. For a short but effective description of the rise and decline of Shaw Brothers film production, see Stephanie Chung Po-yin, "The Industrial Evolution of a Fraternal Enterprise: The Shaw Brothers and the Shaw Organisation," in *The Shaw Screen: A Preliminary Study,* ed. Wong Ain-ling (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Film Archive, 2003), 1–17.
58. Chung, "The Industrial Evolution," 9.
59. David Desser, "The Kung Fu Craze: Hong Kong Cinema's First American Reception," in *The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity,* eds. Poshek Fu and David Desser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 19.
60. Zhang, *Chinese National Cinema,* 187.
61. Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema,* 110.
62. Ibid., 111.
63. Zhang discusses how Taiwanese audiences read Lee's image in a slightly more ambivalent way than Hong Kong audiences did. Zhang, *Chinese National Cinema,* 144.
64. Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema*, 114.
65. Ibid., 113. See also Tony Rayns, "Bruce Lee: Narcissism and Nationalism," in *A Study of the Hong Kong Martial Arts Film* (Hong Kong: The Urban Council, 1980), 110–12; Meaghan Morris, "Learning from Bruce Lee: Pedagogy and Political Correctness in Martial Arts Cinema," in *Keyframes: Popular Cinema and Cultural Studies,* eds. Matthew Tinkcom and Amy Villarejo (London: Routledge, 2001), 171–86.

66. Desser, "The Kung Fu Craze," 20. *Deep Thrust – the Hand of Death* is the US title for *Lady Whirlwind* (1972).
67. Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema,* 117.
68. Desser, "The Kung Fu Craze," 26.
69. Bey Logan, *Hong Kong Action Cinema* (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 1995), 18.
70. Gina Marchetti, "Jackie Chan and the Black Connection," in *Keyframes: Popular Cinema and Cultural Studies,* eds. Matthew Tinkcom and Amy Villarejo (London: Routledge, 2001), 137–58.
71. Zhang, *Chinese National Cinema,* 225.
72. For an intriguing read on the agendas of various film festivals around the world, see Kenneth Turan, *Sundance to Sarajevo: Film Festivals and the World They Made* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
73. Tony Rayns, "Breakthroughs and Setbacks: The Origins of the New Chinese Cinema," in *Perspectives on Chinese Cinema,* ed. Chris Berry (London: BFI, 1991), 104.
74. Ibid., 106.
75. Chris Berry, "Market Forces: China's 'Fifth Generation' Faces the Bottom Line," in *Perspectives on Chinese Cinema,* ed. Chris Berry (London: BFI, 1991), 114–25.
76. Chris Berry and Feii Lu, introduction to *Island on the Edge: Taiwan New Cinema and After,* eds. Chris Berry and Feii Lu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 5–6.
77. Zhang, *Chinese National Cinema,* 246.
78. Berry and Lu, introduction to *Island,* 6–7.
79. With even President Chen Shui-bian celebrating the filmmaker's win, the Taiwanese proclaimed Lee a "hero." "The One That Got Away," *The Straits Times,* 8 March 2006, Life section, 6.
80. This argument was raised by Roger Garcia, whom Law Kar references in his essay. Law Kar, "An Overview of Hong Kong's New Wave Cinema," in *At Full Speed: Hong Kong Cinema in a Borderless World,* ed. Esther C. M. Yau (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 46. See also in the same collection of essays Hector Rodriguez, "The Emergence of the Hong Kong New Wave," 53–69.
81. In what he calls "cross-pollination" between Hong Kong and Hollywood, Logan provides a short but useful list which includes *City on Fire* (1987)/*Reservoir Dogs* (1992), *Top Gun* (1986)/*Proud and Confidence* (1989), and *Hard-Boiled* (1992)/*Joshua Tree* (1993). Logan, *Hong Kong Action Cinema,* 132.
82. Thomas Schatz, "The New Hollywood," in *Movie Blockbusters,* ed. Julian Stringer (London: Routledge, 2003), 31.
83. Matt Hills, "*Star Wars* in Fandom, Film Theory, and the Museum: The Cultural Status of the Cult Blockbuster," in *Movie Blockbusters,* ed. Julian Stringer (London: Routledge, 2003), 178–89.
84. Ed Guerrero, *Framing Blackness: The African American Image in Film* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 117.
85. Ibid., 117–8.

86. Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).
87. Dorothy B. Jones, *The Portrayal of China and India on the American Screen, 1896–1955* (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1955); Eugene Franklin Wong, *On Visual Media Racism: Asians in the American Motion Pictures* (New York: Arno Press, 1978.); Gina Marchetti, *Romance and the "Yellow Peril": Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Robert G. Lee, *Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999). For quick overviews on the topic and interviews with directors, see Roger Garcia, ed., *Out of the Shadows: Asians in American Cinema* (Milano: Olivares, 2001). On ethnic images in American cinema, see Lester D. Friedman, ed., *Unspeakable Images: Ethnicity and the American Cinema* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991). Of significance though not concerning cinema directly is Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
88. Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," in *Feminism and Film*, ed. E. Ann Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 34–47.
89. Lisa Lowe makes this argument about the Asian immigrant in America by calling her, in a happy coincidence, "a 'screen' . . . on which the nation projects a series of condensed, complicated anxieties regarding external and internal threats to the mutable coherence of the national body . . . Stereotypes that construct Asians as the threatening 'yellow peril,' or alternatively, that pose Asians as the domesticated 'model minority,' are each equally indices of these national anxieties." Lisa Lowe, *Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 18–9.
90. Sabine Haenni, "Filming 'Chinatown': Fake Visions, Bodily Transformations," in *Screening Asian Americans*, ed. Peter X. Feng (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 21–3.
91. Ibid., 25.
92. Iris Chang, *The Chinese in America: A Narrative History* (New York: Penguin, 2003), 131–2.
93. Lee, *Orientals,* 8–10.
94. Marchetti, *Romance,* 2.
95. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978).
96. Lee, *Orientals,* 114.
97. Eugene Franklin Wong, "The Early Years: Asians in the American Films Prior to World War II," in *Screening Asian Americans*, ed. Peter X. Feng (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 56–8. Excerpted from Wong, *On Visual Media Racism,* 88–119.
98. Wong, "The Early Years," 58.
99. Quoted in Ibid., 59. Robert Barshay, "Ethnic Stereotypes in Flash Gordon," *Journal of Popular Film* 3, no. 1 (Winter 1974): 24–6. The last incarnation of Ming was played by Max Von Sydow in Universal Pictures' *Flash Gordon* (1980).

100. Marchetti, *Romance,* 10.
101. An audacious turn of the sexual tables is Ho Meng-hua's *The Mighty Peking Man* (1977), where Danny Lee's character ends up with the blonde female Tarzan (Evelyne Kraft). Quentin Tarantino is so taken by this Shaw flick that he has released it under his Rolling Thunder imprint in the US.
102. Peter X. Feng, introduction to *Screening Asian Americans,* ed. Peter X. Feng (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 9.
103. Feng confronts the pleasures of watching *The World of Suzie Wong* and its complex implications, thus complicating the more directly critical readings of the film as racist and Orientalist. Peter X. Feng, "Recuperating Suzie Wong: A Fan's Nancy Kwan-dary," in *Countervisions: Asian American Film Criticism,* eds. Darrell Y. Hamamoto and Sandra Liu (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 40–56.
104. For a detailed study of Anna May Wong playing up this stereotype in films like *Daughter of the Dragon* (1931) and *Shanghai Express* (1932), see Cynthia W. Liu, "When Dragon Ladies Die, Do They Come Back as Butterflies?: Re-Imagining Anna May Wong," in *Countervisions: Asian American Film Criticism,* eds. Darrell Y. Hamamoto and Sandra Liu (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 23–39.
105. Marchetti, *From Tian'anmen to Times Square*, 20.
106. Lo offers another explanation of the woman warrior's sexual appeal: "There is always a reason for male filmmakers to imagine or sexualise women as warriors or as the copies of masculine heroes . . . Masculinity is effective only as reflected and contrasted with a similar but antagonistic sexed other . . . Sexual antagonism engages a self-propelling process in which men imagine masculine women as an imminent threat and to enhance their own virility and power they seek to contain and control the perceived threat." Kwai-Cheung Lo, "Copies of Copies in Hollywood and Hong Kong Cinemas: Rethinking the Woman-Warrior Figures," in *Hong Kong Film, Hollywood and the New Global Cinema: No Film Is an Island,* eds. Gina Marchetti and Tan See Kam (London: Routledge, 2007), 129. For a reading of earlier martial arts woman warriors such as Angela Mao in *Enter the Dragon,* where her suicide in the face of sexual violation functions as the film narrative's appeal to Western audiences' expectation of female vulnerability, see Yvonne Tasker, *Spectacular Bodies: Gender, Genre and the Action Cinema* (London: Routledge, 1993), 24.
107. Wong, "The Early Years," 59–60.
108. Ibid., 60.
109. Ibid., 60.
110. See Jeff Adachi's excellent documentary *The Slanted Screen* (2006).
111. Jachinson Chan, *Chinese American Masculinities: From Fu Manchu to Bruce Lee* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 58.
112. Feng, introduction to *Screening Asian Americans,* 5. Frank Chin and Jeffrey Paul Chan, "Racist Love," in *Seeing Through Shuck,* ed. Richard Kostelanetz (New York: Ballantine, 1972), 65–79.

113. Kwai-Cheung Lo, *Chinese Face/Off: The Transnational Popular Culture of Hong Kong* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 140.
114. Ibid., 141.
115. For an excellent engagement with the contemporary nuances and implications of the "model minority" myth, see Frank H. Wu, *Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black and White* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 39–77.
116. Lo correctly argues that John Woo's films "being placed as part of Asian American culture should be understood within the international frame of global capitalism." Lo, *Chinese Face/Off,* 161.
117. Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (New York: Penguin, 1989), 418.
118. Ibid., 419.
119. William Wei, *The Asian American Movement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993). See especially Chapter 5, "Activists and the Development of Asian American Studies," which chronicles the links between early Asian American political activism and the subsequent formation of Asian American studies programs within the politically charged climate of these two universities.
120. Darrell Y. Hamamoto, "Introduction: On Asian American Film and Criticism," in *Countervisions: Asian American Film Criticism,* eds. Darrell Y. Hamamoto and Sandra Liu (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 1.
121. Renee Tajima, "Moving the Image: Asian American Independent Filmmaking 1970–1990," in *Moving the Image: Independent Asian Pacific American Media Arts,* ed. Russell Leong (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center, and Visual Communications, Southern California Asian American Studies Central, 1991), 12.
122. Ibid., 14.
123. Ibid., 16.
124. Hamamoto, "Introduction," 3. Jun Xing, *Asian America through the Lens: History, Representations, and Identity* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1998), 177–78.
125. Sandra Liu, "Negotiating the Meaning of Access: Wayne Wang's Contingent Film Practice," in *Countervisions: Asian American Film Criticism,* eds. Darrell Y. Hamamoto and Sandra Liu (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 95.
126. Ibid., 90–1.
127. This viewpoint comes from Karen Huie. Quoted in Lisa Odham Stokes and Michael Hoover, *City on Fire: Hong Kong Cinema* (London: Verso, 1999), 316.

2 Visualizing Hong Kong: Diasporic Cinematic Gaze on the 1997 Handover

1. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations,* ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 257.
2. Hong Kong Government, *A Draft Agreement between the Government of the*

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong, 1984, 11–13; quoted in Steve Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 226.

3. Jeremy Tambling, "The History Man: The Last Governor of Hong Kong," *Public Culture* 9 (1997): 355–75. While Tambling's essay reads the paradoxical role that Patten plays, one could also turn to Rey Chow, "King Kong in Hong Kong: Watching the 'Handover' from the U.S.A.," *Social Text* 55, vol. 16, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 93–108, for a reflection on the belated tokenism of introducing democracy to Hong Kong and the political consequences on the Hong Kong people after the handover. I am also particularly indebted to Chow's essay for inspiring the notion of negotiating homelands in "crisis" from afar.
4. Benjamin, *Illuminations*, 257–8.
5. Ibid., 257. Emphasis mine.
6. For a complex understanding of what constitutes modernity, or more accurately "modernities," in Asia, "that defy both the prescriptions of the globalists/universalists and the descriptions of the localists/indigenists," see Jenny Kwok Wah Lau, introduction to *Multiple Modernities: Cinemas and Popular Media in Transcultural East Asia*, ed. Jenny Kwok Wah Lau (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 3.
7. Rey Chow, *Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), xi.
8. Ibid., 10.
9. Annette Michelson, introduction to *Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov*, by Dziga Vertov, trans. Kevin O'Brien (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), xix.
10. Vertov, *Kino-Eye*, 87–8.
11. Ibid., 88.
12. Ibid., 41.
13. The fact that Benjamin's angel of history is a figure in *flight* and in its en*vision*ing of the historical "wreckage" cannot but be a felicitous coincidence here, particularly when we consider the processes of a distancing effect in the diasporic eye's visualizing of homeland from afar.
14. Wang's recent offerings mark a conscious return to Asian American cultural issues: *A Thousand Years of Good Prayers* (2007) and *The Princess of Nebraska* (2007). The latter film opened the 21st Singapore International Film Festival in 2008.
15. While I am aware that Wong also released *Ashes of Time* (1994) and *Fallen Angels* (1995), I have chosen *Chungking Express* as the point of demarcation because of the latter's place in the popular reception of Wong's body of work. Critical work on Wong's cinema has grown significantly: Wimal Dissanayake, *Ashes of Time* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003); Jean-Marc Lalanne et al., eds., *Wong Kar-wai* (Paris: Dis Voir, 1997); Stephen Teo, *Wong Kar-wai: Auteur of Time* (London: BFI, 2005); Peter Brunette, *Wong Kar-wai* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005).

16. A discussion of nostalgia in *Happy Together* is available in Rey Chow, "Nostalgia of the New Wave: Structure in Wong Kar-wai's *Happy Together*," in *Keyframes: Popular Cinema and Cultural Studies*, eds. Matthew Tinkcom and Amy Villarejo (London: Routledge, 2001), 228–41. A revised version of this essay made its way into Chow's latest book: Rey Chow, *Sentimental Fabulations, Contemporary Chinese Films: Attachment in the Age of Global Visibility* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
17. Ackbar Abbas, *Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 1. See especially Abbas's chapter on Wong Kar-wai, where he reads *Days of Being Wild*, *Chungking Express*, and *Ashes of Time*.
18. Jeremy Tambling, *Wong Kar-wai's* Happy Together (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 15. On Jameson's reading of "Third World" texts as "national allegories," see Fredric Jameson, "Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism," *Social Text* 15 (Autumn 1986): 65–88.
19. Tambling, *Wong Kar-wai's* Happy Together, 15.
20. Ibid., 18.
21. Ibid., 18–19.
22. Ibid., 19.
23. Jimmy Ngai and Wong Kar-wai, "A Dialogue with Wong Kar-wai," in Jean-Marc Lalanne et al., *Wong Kar-wai*, 112.
24. The question of gay sexuality in this film, and later in Evans Chan's *The Map of Sex and Love*, brings on a different set of complex hermeneutics that would extend this chapter beyond its intended length. Hence, the issue really deserves an essay of its own.
25. Lisa Odham Stokes and Michael Hoover, *City on Fire: Hong Kong Cinema* (London: Verso, 1999), 268–69.
26. Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 3–27. For his theory on play involving presence and absence, see Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), 351–70.
27. The political significance of ending the film in Taipei does not go unnoticed by Tambling, who observes that Taipei is "a city whose relationship to its powerful neighbour, mainland China, is as embattled as Argentina's relationship to the USA." Tambling, *Wong Kar-wai's* Happy Together, 63. Equally effective is Song Hwee Lim's contention that "*Happy Together* deliberately designates [Lai Yiu-] Fai's final destination not as Hong Kong but instead as Taiwan, where a militant independence movement rejects Taiwan's reunification with China." Song Hwee Lim, *Celluloid Comrades: Representations of Male Homosexuality in Contemporary Chinese Cinemas* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 102.
28. Tambling, *Wong Kar-wai's* Happy Together, 58.
29. Lim, *Celluloid Comrades*, 122.
30. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, ed. C. J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1947), 47.

31. Quoted in Scarlet Cheng, "The Homecoming," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 15 May 1997, 67.
32. bell hooks, *Reel to Real: Race, Sex, and Class at the Movies* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 126–27.
33. Quoted in Kristin Hohenadel, "A Human Face for Hong Kong's Identity Crisis," *New York Times*, 19 April 1998, 38.
34. James Sterngold, "Wang's World in a Love Story," *New York Times*, 9 January 1998, B7.
35. Wena Poon, Review of *Chinese Box* by Wayne Wang, *Film Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (1998): 34.
36. Intriguingly, this final voiceover appears in the original US videotape release and in the Asian VCD version, but is missing in the Lionsgate Signature Series DVD version released in the US in 2003.
37. Chow, "King Kong in Hong Kong," 100.
38. Quoted in Sterngold, "Wang's World in a Love Story," B7.
39. Quoted in Hohenadel, "A Human Face for Hong Kong's Identity Crisis," 38.
40. Stephen Holden, "A Meditation on the Meaning of Hong Kong," *New York Times*, 17 April 1998, B18.
41. Rey Chow critiques the colonialist mode of cinematic visuality in Bernardo Bertolucci's *The Last Emperor* in Rey Chow, *Woman and Chinese Modernity: The Politics of Reading between West and East* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 3–33. The self-Orientalizing mechanism of visual autoethnography in contemporary Chinese cinema Chow explores next in *Primitive Passions*.
42. My use of the terms "East" and "West" in the context of discussing Orientalism is obviously not to essentialize but to problematize these categories.
43. Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 10.
44. This is a term that Chow borrows from Mary Louis Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 1992).
45. Chow, *Primitive Passions*, 12–13.
46. Ibid., 38.
47. Scarlet Cheng observes that this film offers Wang a means of "showing some of the dark side of Hong Kong life." Cheng, "The Homecoming," 68. Wang uses fascinating footage from or possibly inspired by the home videos he took of his Hong Kong visits. His 1997 documentary *Home Movies* is available as a special feature on the Lionsgate Signature Series edition. *Chinese Box*, dir. Wayne Wang, 99 min., Lionsgate Entertainment, 2003, DVD.
48. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978), 1–2.
49. In discussing the role of Africa in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, Achebe asks, "Can nobody see the preposterous and perverse arrogance in thus reducing Africa to the role of props for the break-up of one petty European mind?" Chinua Achebe, "An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*," in *Hopes and Impediments: Selected Essays 1965–1987*, by Chinua Achebe (London: Heinemann, 1988), 12.

50. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 88.
51. Quoted in Seth Faison, "Hong Kong Plays the Role of a Drama-Filled City," *New York Times*, 1 July 1997, C9, C12.
52. Quoted in Hohenadel, "A Human Face for Hong Kong's Identity Crisis," 38.
53. Salman Rushdie, *Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981–1991* (London: Granta Books, 1991).
54. Evans Chan is part of what Stephen Teo calls the "Second Wave" of Hong Kong filmmakers (vis-à-vis the "New Wave"). Stephen Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema: The Extra Dimensions* (London: BFI, 1997), 184–203.
55. Paul Gilroy's conception of the "Black Atlantic" comes to mind. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). Read Evans Chan's own reflections on this diasporic sensibility in an interview by Marchetti: Gina Marchetti, *From Tian'anmen to Times Square: Transnational China and the Chinese Diaspora on Global Screens, 1989–1997* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 183–8.
56. Marchetti, *From Tian'anmen to Times Square*, 160. She derives the term from Peter Wollen, *Readings and Writings: Semiotic Counter-Strategies* (London: Verso, 1982). Wollen has a chapter entitled "Godard and Counter Cinema: *Vent d'est*."
57. For the latest updates and details of this mega-tourist attraction, go to <http://park.hongkongdisneyland.com/hkdl/en_US/home/home?name=HomePage>, accessed 27 May 2008.
58. "Hong Kong Set for Chinese Influx," *BBC News*, 28 April 1999, <news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/330923.stm>, accessed 16 June 2007.
59. Hector Rodriguez, "The Fragmented Commonplace: Alternative Arts and Cosmopolitanism in Hong Kong," in Lau, *Multiple Modernities*, 133.
60. Ibid., 128.

3 Facing the Red Dragon: Hollywood's 1997 Response to the Hong Kong Handover

1. China's cinematic response can be found in Xie Jin's *The Opium War* (1997). The film is "a RMB100 million production that grossed RMB72 million in China and NT$3 million in Taipei . . . the first PRC feature to premiere . . . [in Hong Kong] on a split-revenue basis." Yingjin Zhang, *Chinese National Cinema* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 286. What this moderate success at the box office indicates is that Chinese nationalism is a strong sentiment when it comes to understanding the place of Hong Kong in the reunification of China. But in a nuanced reading to counteract often naïve and uninformed Western perspectives on the Opium War, Marchetti recommends that Xie Jin's film "should not be so simply dismissed." Gina Marchetti, *From Tian'anmen to Times Square: Transnational China and the Chinese Diaspora on Global Screens, 1989–1997* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 41.

2. Rey Chow, "King Kong in Hong Kong: Watching the 'Handover' from the U.S.A.," *Social Text* 55, vol. 16, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 94.
3. Of course, it is essential to consider audience needs strategically when engaging these critiques. I find myself encouraging *Singaporean* students, on one hand, to temper their anti-colonial criticism with a healthy dose of self-reflection, while suggesting to students in my *American* classroom the need to understand and even adopt postcolonial and anti-Orientalist perspectives, on the other.
4. Ien Ang, *On Not Speaking Chinese: Living Between Asia and the West* (London: Routledge, 2001). I am here indebted to Ang for asking the question, "Can One Say No to Chineseness?" the title of a chapter in her book where she argues for a dismantling of Chinese centrism located in discussions of diaspora. Her embrace of hybridity as a theoretical concept, in consideration of her *peranakan* identity, is significant (37–51). My redeployment of her question in a geopolitical context is to further suggest that this cultural centrism deepens with China's rise as an economic superpower.
5. Singapore's alignment with the Chinese cause, for instance, finds its form in a series of articles and essays in Singapore's main newspaper *The Straits Times*: Tom Plate, "When Hollywood Hijacks the Plot," *The Straits Times*, 14 April 2008, 20; Hong Xiaoyong, "China Did Well by Tibet," *The Straits Times*, 23 April 2008, 20; and Goh Sui Noi, "Slap in the Face for Chinese," *The Straits Times*, 24 April 2008, 22. It is of no coincidence that Singapore is not exactly known for its human rights record either, and the fact that it has just won the role of hosting the 2010 Youth Olympics.
6. "Chinese Student in US Dubbed 'Traitor,' Threatened with Violence," *The Straits Times*, 23 April 2008, 8.
7. "'Wheelchair Angel' Feted for Fending Off Protesters," *The Straits Times*, 12 April 2008, 8. The Chinese fencer has been dubbed "angel in a wheelchair." Jin Jing's determination to protect the Olympic flame—or as she puts it, "I'd rather die than let go of the torch," a resolve that she believes "[a]ny *Chinese* or Olympics-loving torch-bearer would" have (emphasis mine)—has led one online supporter to conceptualize her as a national symbol of China's victimized status: "Those separatists should feel ashamed. They always talk about human rights, but they attacked a weak and disabled girl."
8. "You Are Either With Us or Against Us," *CNN.com*, 6 November 2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/>, accessed 31 May 2008.
9. See how Judith Butler's deconstruction of George Bush's imperative to take sides unveils the coercive binarism of East versus West: "The voicing of critical perspectives against the war [in Iraq] has become difficult to do, not only because mainstream media enterprises will not publish them (most of them appear in the progressive or alternative print media or on the internet), but because to voice them is to risk hystericization and censorship. In a strong sense, the binarism that Bush proposes in which only two positions are possible . . . makes it untenable to hold a position in which one opposes both and queries the terms in which the opposition is framed. Moreover, it is the same binarism that returns us to an

anachronistic division between 'East' and 'West' and which, in its sloshy metonymy, returns us to the invidious distraction between civilization (our own) and barbarism (now coded as 'Islam' itself)." Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004), 2.

10. Sharon Stone's unfortunate gaffe in talking about China's earthquake as "karma" for the Chinese government's suppression of Tibet's pro-independence movements is not only reprehensible but also irresponsible. Stone subsequently apologized to the Chinese people, only to later modulate that apology into one of support for Tibet. It is this kind of spectacular excess that tars with the same brush the good work of other Hollywood celebrity activists on behalf of the Tibetan people. "Stone Says Quake Was 'Karma,'" *The Straits Times*, 27 May 2008, Life section, 14; "Stone Sorry for 'Karma' Comment," *The Straits Times*, 30 May 2008, Life section, 10; and "Apology: Stone and Dior Differ," *The Straits Times*, 2 June 2008, Life section, 12.
11. The park is a tourist attraction with a significant history. See <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/beijing/31002.htm>, accessed 2 June 2008.
12. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).
13. Mike Clark, "Bai Ling Adds Dimension to 'Red Corner' Thrills," *USA Today*, 31 October 1997, Life section, 1D.
14. Gina Marchetti, *Romance and the "Yellow Peril": Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 110.
15. Sheridan Prasso, *The Asian Mystique: Dragon Ladies, Geisha Girls, and Our Fantasies of the Exotic Orient* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).
16. See Mat Whitecross and Michael Winterbottom's searing *The Road to Guantanamo* (2006). A humorous but no less critical take is *Harold and Kumar Escape from Guantanamo Bay* (2008).
17. The insert is part of the US DVD version: *Red Corner*, dir. Jon Avnet, 122 min., MGM Home Entertainment, 1998, DVD.
18. Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989), 66.
19. Yahlin Chang, "Can You Go Home Again?" *Newsweek*, 10 November 1997, 78. Despite all the threats from the Chinese government, Bai Ling admirably defends her work by arguing that *Red Corner* "is not an anti-China movie."
20. Orville Schell, "Virtual Tibet," *Harper's Magazine*, April 1998, 39.
21. Guy Dinmore, "Hollywood Filmstar Urges Congress to Act Over Tibet," *Financial Times*, 14 March 2007, Asia edition, 3; "Celebrities Mark Tibetan Uprising," *BBC News*, 10 March 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/294210.stm>, accessed 5 June 2008.
22. Stars, such as Richard Gere, Mia Farrow, and Steven Spielberg, and world leaders, including Hillary Clinton, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, supported boycotting the Games to varying degrees. George Clooney and will.i.am believed in moderation and participation as a means of challenging China to change its position on Tibet and Darfur. "Politically Minded Stars Split on Skipping Beijing Olympics," *CNN.com*, 8 May 2008, <http://

edition.cnn.com/2008/US/05/07/olympic.boycott/index.html?eref=edition>, accessed 5 June 2008.

23. Schell, "Virtual Tibet."
24. Ibid., 39–40.
25. Ibid., 40. James Hilton, *Lost Horizon: A Novel* (New York: HarperCollins, 1960).
26. Chow, "King Kong in Hong Kong," 94.
27. The film is based on Harrer's book: Heinrich Harrer, *Seven Years in Tibet* (New York: Tarcher/Putnam, 1981.)
28. Marc Abramson, "Mountains, Monks, and Mandalas: *Kundun* and *Seven Years in Tibet*," *Cineaste* 23, no. 3 (April 1998): 8–12. I am citing from an online version at <http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-EPT/abramson.htm>, accessed 6 June 2008.
29. The study of these histories is truly beyond the ken of this book. So, in true dilettantish fashion, I have turned randomly to books whose approaches I found either distinctive or user friendly. For an account that features an interview with the Dalai Lama, see John F. Avedon, *In Exile from the Land of Snows: The Definitive Account of the Dalai Lama and Tibet Since the Chinese Conquest* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997). For a "balanced" native-informant historical study, see Tsering Shakya, *The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). I have relied on and cite exclusively from the following concise historical précis: Melvyn C. Goldstein, *The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
30. Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).
31. Goldstein, *The Snow Lion and the Dragon*, 4.
32. Ibid., 14.
33. Ibid., 23.
34. Ibid., 25–6.
35. Ibid., 26.
36. Ibid., 31.
37. Ibid., 44–6.
38. Ibid., 47.
39. Ibid., 34.
40. Ibid., 49.
41. Ibid., 58.
42. The Chinese government has chosen to conceal this ruthlessness from its citizens, even as recently as in the 2008 Tibet protests. Censorship is an old technique of preventing a nation's young from learning the difficult truths that state authorities are afraid they might stumble upon. This is also a means of sustaining an unquestioning nationalism in a new generation of citizenry. "China Blocks YouTube over Tibet Protests," *MSNBC.Com*, 16 March 2008, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23657906/>, accessed 7 June 2008.
43. Dominick LaCapra, *History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 46.

4 The Global Return of the *Wuxia pian* (Chinese Sword-Fighting Movie)

1. For an informative study of the history of the *wuxia pian* and the major Hong Kong directors (such as King Hu, Chang Cheh, Liu Chia-liang, Chor Yuen, and Tsui Hark) and their impact on the genre, see Chapters 6 and 7 of Stephen Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema: The Extra Dimensions* (London: BFI, 1997). David Bordwell, *Planet Hong Kong: Popular Cinema and the Art of Entertainment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) foregrounds the global significance of Hong Kong action and martial arts cinema and its formalist aesthetics. See also Chang Cheh, *Chang Cheh: A Memoir*, trans. Teri Chan and Agnes Lam (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Film Archive, 2004); and Kwok Ching-ling and Grace Ng, eds., *Director Chor Yuen* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Film Archive, 2006).
2. Esther C. M. Yau points out that Hong Kong films provide "light doses of 'Chineseness'" as "a panacea for . . . homesick overseas Asian audiences." Esther C. M. Yau, "Introduction: Hong Kong Cinema in a Borderless World," in *At Full Speed: Hong Kong Cinema in a Borderless World*, ed. Esther C. M. Yau (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 2. The People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and various parts of the Chinese diaspora constitute an interconnected and interdependent circuit of production, marketing, distribution, and consumption of Chinese-language cinemas, of which Hong Kong movies form a major component.
3. Stephen Teo, "*Wuxia* Redux: *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* as a Model of Late Transnational Production," in *Hong Kong Connections: Transnational Imagination in Action Cinema*, eds. Meaghan Morris, Siu Leung Li, and Stephen Chan Ching-kiu (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 194.
4. Much of the Ang Lee segment of this chapter was originally published as "The Global Return of the *Wu Xia Pian* (Chinese Sword-Fighting Movie): Ang Lee's *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*," *Cinema Journal* 43, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 3–17. See in the same issue Christina Klein, "*Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*: A Diasporic Reading," 18–42; and the film's screenwriter and executive producer James Schamus's response to the two essays: "Aesthetic Identities: A Response to Kenneth Chan and Christina Klein," 43–52. The fact that the journal devoted a major portion of the issue to a single film is testament to its significance.
5. If awards can serve as reliable indicators of a film's success, *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* is not only an American success story but also a truly global one. It picked up awards for best director and best film at the Twentieth Hong Kong Film Awards; best picture at the Taiwanese Golden Horse Awards; best director and best foreign-language film at the Golden Globes; Academy Awards for foreign-language film, cinematography, art direction, and original score and was nominated for best picture and best director.
6. According to Teo, "*Crouching Tiger*'s reception in Asia was not uniform. In some territories where Chinese preponderate the box-office takings can only be said to be lacklustre compared with its performance in the West." Teo, "*Wuxia* Redux," 200.

7. In her excellent analysis of *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*'s cultural translatability, Felicia Chan argues that it was "marketed as a Matrix-type film, . . . an art film, a woman's film, as well as a combination of all these" in the United States, while "the film's Oscar triumph saw a revived interest in many parts of East Asia, which basked in a collective cultural pride." Felicia Chan, "*Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*: Cultural Migrancy and Translatability," in *Chinese Films in Focus: 25 New Takes*, ed., Chris Berry (London: BFI, 2003), 57–8. For more on the film's cultural translatability and its reinvention of the *wuxia pian*, see Ken-fang Lee, "Far Away, So Close: Cultural Translation in Ang Lee's *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 4, no. 2 (2003): 281–95.
8. In his discussion of how he battles these extreme viewpoints on the *wuxia* genre, James Schamus cautions Stephen Teo, in an interview, "to beware of the trap of genre-based criticism that defines genres in such a way that boundaries seem as if they have an existence, but in fact these are ever mutating. The national discourses that underwrite a lot of the work, or at least accompany a lot of the work in terms of its reception, can also be a bit of a black hole too, in the sense that you're dealing on the one hand with cultural formations that work over periods (when you're dealing with China, over thousands and thousands of years) and at the same time you're dealing with national formations that are in themselves actually quite recent and ephemeral. So that even the idea of an 'Eastern point of view' on the *wuxia* genre — to the extent to which it's a nationalist point of view or pertains to a kind of national discourse — could itself be called already a Western point of view; or a point of view that mixes East and West in a dialogue that's quite modern." Stephen Teo, "'We Kicked Jackie Chan's Ass!' An Interview with James Schamus," *Senses of Cinema*, March-April 2001, <http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/01/13/schamus.html>, accessed 11 June 2008.
9. Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991).
10. Evans Chan argues that Hollywood has only recently begun to understand and value the impact of Hong Kong action movies on postmodernist cinema aesthetics. However, he laments that the Hong Kong film industry might be in its death throes as it is now being "cannibalized by Hollywood." Evans Chan, "Postmodernism and Hong Kong Cinema," in *Postmodernism and China*, eds. Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 303. Could *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* and the resurgence of the *wuxia pian* mark a turnaround for the industry, whereby a kind of trans-Pacific cross-pollination might reinvigorate it through collaborative action?
11. Biographies of the production team and a list of the complete credits for the film are available in Linda Sunshine, ed., *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: A Portrait of the Ang Lee Film* (New York: Newmarket Press, 2000). This book also includes the complete screenplay in English and essays by Lee, Schamus, David Bordwell, and film critic Richard Corliss.
12. See James Schamus's account of the complex negotiations over financial backing for the film in "The Guardian/NFT Interview: Ang Lee and James Schamus,"

Guardian Unlimited, 7 November 2000, <http://film.guardian.co.uk/interview/interviewpages/0,6737,394676,00.html#early>, accessed 23 May 2007.

13. Sheldon H. Lu, "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels: Hollywood, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Transnational Cinema," in *Chinese-Language Film: Historiography, Poetics, Politics*, eds., Sheldon H. Lu and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), 222.
14. "The Guardian/NFT Interview."
15. Nisid Hajari, "Erasing the Boundaries," *Newsweek*, special ed., Issues Asia, July-September 2001, 79.
16. I have in mind Michel de Certeau's notion of "tactics" here. Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), xvii–xx.
17. Hajari, "Erasing the Boundaries," 79.
18. Attending to the exotic in Lee's first three movies is: Sheng-mei Ma, *Immigrant Subjectivities in Asian American and Asian Diaspora Literatures* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 144–58.
19. Sunshine, *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*, 7.
20. Christian Metz, "The Imaginary Signifier," in *Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader*, ed. Philip Rosen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 253. Although Metz's theoretical concern is the spectator-screen relationship, the tropes of the mirror and the imaginary as they play out on identity are useful in thinking about a filmmaker's construction of his work.
21. Maxine Hong Kingston, *The Woman Warrior: Memoirs of a Girlhood Among Ghosts* (New York: Vintage International, 1976). It is clearly not coincidental that in the chapter "White Tigers," Kingston claims that the merging of her mother's "talk-stories" and her own experiences with the *wuxia pian* led to her fantasies of being the legendary swordswoman Fa Mu Lan.
22. "Ang Lee: *Pushing Hands*," in *My First Movie: Twenty Celebrated Directors Talk about Their First Film*, ed. Stephen Lowenstein (New York: Pantheon, 2000), 372–73. For varied interpretations on this issue in Lee's films, see Wei Ming Dariotis and Eileen Fung, "Breaking the Soy Sauce Jar: Diaspora and Displacement in the Films of Ang Lee," in *Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nationhood, Gender*, ed. Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), 187–220; and Mark Chiang, "Coming Out into the Global System: Postmodern Patriarchies and Transnational Sexualities in *The Wedding Banquet*," in *Screening Asian Americans*, ed. Peter X. Feng (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 273–92.
23. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 52–65.
24. All English translations of the dialogue from the film are from Sunshine, *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*.
25. Sunshine, *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*, 76.
26. According to Schamus, "The film was shot in almost every corner of China, including the Gobi Desert and the Taklamakan Plateau, north of Tibet, near the Kyrgyzstan border." Ibid., 46.

27. For a discussion of male homosocial desire along a spectrum that includes homosexual desire at one end, see Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 1–20. I am not suggesting here that the homoerotic is absent from the *wuxia pian*; the films of Chang Cheh and Liu Chia-liang exemplify, for instance, the subtext of homoerotic tensions in the relationships and in the machismo displays of the male characters. See Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema*, 102–7; and Michael Lam, "The Mysterious Gayness in Chang Cheh's Unhappy World," trans. Sam Ho, in *The Shaw Screen: A Preliminary Study*, ed. Wong Ain-ling (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Film Archive, 2003), 175–87.
28. Whether one attributes this choice to the source material for the screenplay (Wang Du Lu's novel) or to Chow Yun-fat's lack of martial arts experience, Lee decided to shift the action sequences away from Chow Yun-fat's character. "The Guardian/NFT Interview." Hence, one can still credit Lee and James Schamus for wanting to pursue a project that deviated from the genre's gender conventions.
29. Sunshine, *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*, 7.
30. Kwai-Cheung Lo, *Chinese Face/Off: The Transnational Popular Culture of Hong Kong* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 185. See also Sheldon Lu's take on this issue. Lu, "Crouching Tiger," 228–30.
31. Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," in *Feminism and Film*, ed. E. Ann Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 34–47.
32. In presenting an example of merging kung fu action with the dragon lady persona, Prasso surveys Lucy Liu's film career as she moves from playing "the sadistic dominatrix hooker in Mel Gibson's 1999 movie *Payback*" to her "role of icy Princess Pei Pei" in *Shanghai Noon*, and finally to the "kick-ass" Alex Munday in the two *Charlie's Angels* movies. Liu's response to why she accepted roles that further "the Dragon Lady/Vixen stereotypes" was a truthfully simple "I don't have many options now." Sheridan Prasso, *The Asian Mystique: Dragon Ladies, Geisha Girls, and Our Fantasies of the Exotic Orient* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 73–4.
33. Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 125. While this cross-dressing mise-en-scène has a Chinese cinematic and literary cultural specificity to its lineage, my application of Butler's idea here emphasizes the very contemporary feminist politics that marks *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* as the product of East-West pop cultural and intellectual intermingling, as both Schamus and Lee have described their film. Feminist literary critic Elaine Showalter notes how the film "speaks with luminous directness to the aspirations of *contemporary* women." Elaine Showalter, "Sex Goddess," *The American Prospect*, 21 May 2001, 38. Emphasis mine.
34. Teo, "'We Kicked Jackie Chan's Ass!'"
35. Berry and Farquhar read this treetop scene and the teahouse scene in the stylistic terms of Chinese opera. Chris Berry and Mary Farquhar, *China on Screen: Cinema and Nation* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), 71.
36. Sheng-mei Ma, "Kung Fu Films in Diaspora: Death of the Bamboo Hero," in

Masculinities and Hong Kong Cinema, eds. Laikwan Pang and Day Wong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 114.

37. Kate Chopin, *The Awakening* (New York: Norton, 1994).
38. Engaging in a rather creative discussion of *qinggong* (and its masculinist valences), see Hsiao-hung Chang, "The Unbearable Lightness of Globalization: On the Transnational Flight of *Wuxia* Film," in *Cinema Taiwan: Politics, Popularity and State of the Arts*, ed. Darrell William Davis and Ru-shou Robert Chen (London: Routledge, 2007), 95–107.
39. Teo, "*Wuxia* Redux," 202.
40. Rather coincidentally, Fran Martin also alludes to Ridley Scott's film in her study of the final sequence where Jen jumps off the mountain. Martin argues that "a significant effect of the film's projection of a simulacral, postmodern, and transnational version of 'Pan-Chineseness' is precisely to fantasize the contemporaneity of third-wave pop-feminism into the heart of a re-imagined 'Chinese tradition.'" Fran Martin, "The China Simulacrum: Genre, Feminism, and Pan-Chinese Cultural Politics in *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*," in *Island on the Edge: Taiwan New Cinema and After*, eds. Chris Berry and Feii Lu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 158–9. Also arriving at the same allusion are Yeh and Davis, who further read this scene as "an affirmative national allegory" for "Taiwan separatists." Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh and Darrell William Davis, *Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 193.
41. I realize that Lee's use of Chinese patriarchy as a metonymic stand-in for Chinese culture and the oppressive force field it asserts can diminish the specific feminist critique of Chinese patriarchy. Yet cultural and feminist critiques can form a kind of political alliance to take on the same structure that enacts their respective modes of oppression.
42. Stephen Short and Susan Jakes, "This Film Was My Boyhood Dream," *TIMEasia.com*, <http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/hero/int_zhang_yimou.html>, accessed 17 May 2007.
43. Paul Clark, *Reinventing China: A Generation and Its Films* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005), 164–86.
44. Short and Jakes, "This Film Was My Boyhood Dream."
45. Tonglin Lu would probably categorize this as part of the "Zhang Yimou Model" where Chinese filmmakers find initial success in the international film festival scene before turning into profitable commercial filmmakers both in China and around the world. Tonglin Lu, *Confronting Modernity in the Cinemas of Taiwan and Mainland China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 157–8.
46. Frances Gateward, ed., *Zhang Yimou Interviews* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001). In this excellent collection of interviews, Zhang has been asked on numerous occasions how he would react when being accused of depicting Chinese society and politics in an unfavorable light in order to garner Western critical praise and to pander to Western notions of Chinese authoritarianism. His response has consistently been an increasingly unconvincing appeal to ignorance: he has little comprehension of Western audiences and their cinematic taste. See

particularly the following interviews: Mayfair Mei-Hui Yang, "Of Gender, State, Censorship, and Overseas Capital: An Interview with Chinese Director Zhang Yimou," in Gateward, 41–2. First published in *Public Culture* 5, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 297–313; Renee Schoof, "Zhang Yimou: Only Possible Work Environment Is China," in Gateward, 71. First published on 5 November 1995, The Associated Press; and Kwok-Kan Tam, "Cinema and Zhang Yimou," in Gateward, 114.

47. Mary Farquhar, "Zhang Yimou," *Senses of Cinema*, May 2002, <http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/directors/02/zhang.html>, accessed 17 May 2007.
48. The ban was lifted in 1992. Clark, *Reinventing China*, 178.
49. Schoof, "Zhang Yimou," 71.
50. Tam, "Cinema and Zhang Yimou," 114.
51. Jenny Kwok Wah Lau, "*Hero*: China's Response to Hollywood Globalization," *Jump Cut: A Review of Contemporary Media*, no. 49 (Spring 2007), <http://www.ejumpcut.org/trialsite/Lau-Hero/text.html>, accessed 22 May 2007.
52. Susan Jakes, "Playing Safe," *Time*, 15 December 2002, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501021223-400042,00.html>, accessed 17 May 2007.
53. Ibid.
54. Lau, "*Hero*."
55. In comparing the film with Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will*, J. Hoberman of the *Village Voice* cannot but see that "Hero's vast imperial sets and symmetrical tumult, its decorative dialectical montage and sanctimonious traditionalism, its glorification of ruthless leadership and self-sacrifice on the altar of national greatness, not to mention the sense that this might somehow stoke the engine of political regeneration, are all redolent of fascinatin' fascism." J. Hoberman, "Man with No Name Tells a Story of Heroics, Color Coordination," *Village Voice*, 17 August 2004, <http://www.villagevoice.com/film/0434,hoberman2,56140,20.html>, accessed 21 May 2007. This comparison to Riefenstahl is similarly made in Evans Chan, "Zhang Yimou's *Hero*: The Temptations of Fascism," *Film International* 2, no. 8 (March 2004): 14–23.
56. Jet Li makes the following observation about contemporary action films: "Films now are all about killing one's opponent as fast as possible. In the old days, guys had more respect for each other. There was a dignity about the way they fought." Stephen Short and Susan Jakes, "Violence Doesn't Solve Anything," *TIMEasia.com*, <http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/hero/int_jet_li.html>, accessed 17 May 2007. Li's latest *wuda pian* (kung fu film) *Fearless* (2006) returns specifically to this traditional notion of honor.
57. Broken Sword actually writes *two* Chinese words, *tianxia*, which is literally translated as "beneath the sky" or "all under heaven," the latter of which more effectively articulates the extent of the emperor's sovereignty.
58. "The older generation will like it but I'm not sure about the youngsters. The government will definitely like it. It's a film that says country comes first, then city, then family," notes Jet Li. Short and Jakes, "Violence Doesn't Solve Anything."
59. Stephen Short and Susan Jakes, "Making of a Hero," *TIMEasia.com*, <http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/hero/story2.html>, accessed 17 May 2007.

60. Lau, "*Hero.*"
61. Ibid.
62. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 40.
63. Berry and Farquhar, *China on Screen*, 163. Emphasis mine.
64. Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema*, 111–2.
65. Charles Taylor, "Hero," *Salon.com*, 27 August 2004, <http://dir.salon.com/story/ent/movies/review/2004/08/27/hero/index_np.html>, accessed 17 May 2007. See also Robert Y. Eng, "Is Hero a Paean to Authoritarianism?" *AsiaMedia*, 7 September 2004, <http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=14371>, accessed 22 May 2007. In arguing that *Hero* is critical of authoritarianism, Eng compares Zhang's film to Chen Kaige's *The Emperor and the Assassin* (1999) and Zhou Xiaowen's *The Emperor's Shadow* (1996).
66. Shelley Kraicer, "Absence as Spectacle: Zhang Yimou's *Hero*," <http://www.chinesecinemas.org/hero.html>, accessed 22 May 2007. Originally published in *Cinema Scope* 5, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 9.
67. Literary critics of British colonial literature, for example, have frequently made this argument in order to politically rehabilitate canonical figures like Joseph Conrad, E. M. Forster, and George Orwell from their complicit roles within the structures of British imperialism.
68. Craig S. Smith, "'Hero' Soars, and Its Director Thanks 'Crouching Tiger,'" *New York Times*, 2 September 2004, E1.
69. Gary G. Xu, *Sinascape: Contemporary Chinese Cinema* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 27.
70. Ien Cheng, "Hero's Success Sweeps the US," *Financial Times*, 13 September 2004, Arts and Style section, 12.
71. Roger Ebert, "Hero," *rogerebert.com*, 27 August 2004, <http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040826/REVIEWS/408260304/1023>, accessed 12 June 2008.
72. Mike Clark, "'Hero': Easy on the Eyes But a Little Too Plodding," *USA Today*, 26 August 2004, <http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/reviews/2004-08-26-hero_x.htm>, accessed 12 June 2008.
73. Robert Mackey, "Cracking the Color Code of 'Hero'," *New York Times*, 15 August 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/15/movies/15MACK.html?ex=1250308800&en=314c0d1ef8845f23&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt>, accessed 17 May 2007.
74. Richard Corliss, "In the Mood for Swordplay," *Time*, 15 December 2002, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501021223-400044,00.html>, accessed 17 May 2007.
75. Taylor, "Hero."
76. Jeffrey Overstreet, "Hero," *Christianity Today*, 20 August 2004, <http://www.christianitytoday.com/movies/reviews/hero.html>, accessed 12 June 2008.
77. As a film critic, I am not against close reading and analysis of artistic form, as my approach to cinema in this book amply demonstrates; in fact, I believe in its

foundational place in literary and filmic criticism. What I am wary of is New Criticism's dismissal of political modes of reading through their argument that form analysis is in no way ideologically motivated.

78. Providing a rich alternative to my own reductive take on the film (for the immediate purposes of this chapter's argument) is Hwanhee Lee's rather astute reading of the complications of love and the agonizing and contradictory choices one makes in its name. Hwanhee Lee, "*House of Flying Daggers*: A Reappraisal," *Senses of Cinema*, 2005, <http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/05/35/house_flying_daggers.html>, accessed 23 May 2007.
79. Again, reviewers from Western media sources rave about the film's lush imagery and spectacular set pieces. See Stephanie Zacharek, "House of Flying Daggers," *Salon.com*, 7 October 2004, <http://dir.salon.com/story/ent/indie/2004/10/07/daggers/index.html>, accessed 22 May 2007; and Stephen Hunter, "'House of Flying Daggers': Symphony in Swords," *Washington Post*, 17 December 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6440-2004Dec16.html?referrer=email>, accessed 22 May 2007. Has an over-familiarity with the genre led to my inability to appreciate these films as spectacular and exquisite instances of movie-making? This question is symptomatic of the challenges for the contemporary makers of the *wuxia pian* in appealing to both new audiences and experienced ones in the global filmic marketplace.

5 Enter the Triads: American Cinema's New Racialized Criminal Other

1. Thomas Leitch, *Crime Films* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Mark Bould, *Film Noir: From Berlin to Sin City* (London: Wallflower, 2005). See also chapters in Barry Keith Grant, ed., *Film Genre Reader III* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003) — chapter 16, Edward Mitchell, "Apes and Essences: Some Sources of Significance in the American Gangster Film"; chapter 17, Paul Schrader, "Notes on Film Noir"; and chapter 18, John G. Cawelti, "*Chinatown* and Generic Transformation in Recent American Films."
2. Read Marchetti's brilliant analysis of racial criminal Otherness in Josef von Sternberg's noir-ish *Shanghai Express*. Gina Marchetti, *Romance and the "Yellow Peril": Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 57–66. Roman Polanski's 1974 crime classic *Chinatown* deploys a racially ghettoized space as "the symbolic locus of darkness, strangeness, and catastrophe." Cawelti, "*Chinatown*," 249. For a wonderful filmic subversion of the roles of racial Otherness in film noir, see Carl Franklin's superb *Devil in a Blue Dress* (1995).
3. David Desser, "Global Noir: Genre Film in the Age of Transnationalism," in *Film Genre Reader III*, ed., Barry Keith Grant (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 516–36.
4. Stanfield offers a list of Chinatown-related films with titles such as *Chinatown*

Villains (1916), *The Tong Man* (1919), *Shadows of Chinatown* (1926), *Chinatown Nights* (1929), *Law of the Tong* (1931), *Chinatown after Dark* (1931), and *The Hatchet Man* (1932). Peter Stanfield, "'American as Chop Suey': Invocations of Gangsters in Chinatown, 1920–1936," in *Mob Culture: Hidden Histories of the American Gangster Film*, eds. Lee Grieveson, Esther Sonnet, and Peter Stanfield (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 240.

5. Martin Booth, *The Dragon Syndicates: The Global Phenomenon of the Triads* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1999), 8–9. Booth's book emphasizes the global nature of triad activity, updating his earlier book on the same subject: Martin Booth, *The Triads: The Chinese Criminal Fraternity* (London: Grafton Books, 1990). For more on the beginnings of the triads, see Dian H. Murray, in collaboration with Qin Baoqi, *The Origins of the Tiandihui: The Chinese Triads in Legend and History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
6. Booth, *Dragon Syndicates*, 10.
7. Ibid., 13.
8. Ibid., 14–15.
9. Ibid., 30, 41.
10. Ibid., 46–47, 65, 67.
11. Ibid., 170–261.
12. Ibid., 257.
13. Ibid., 256.
14. Timothy Mo, *Sour Sweet* (London: Paddleless Press, 1999). For more on the triads in North America, check out Peter Houston, *Tongs, Gangs, and Triads: Chinese Crime Groups in North America* (San Jose: Authors Choice Press, 2001).
15. Booth, *Dragon Syndicates*, 298.
16. Ibid., 300–301.
17. Ed Guerrero, *Framing Blackness: The African American Image in Film* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 127–8.
18. Ibid., 129.
19. Louis Althusser, "Marx's Immense Theoretical Revolution," in *Reading Capital*, by Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1997), 188. For more on the concept, see Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1969), 87–128.
20. One thinks especially of Paul Haggis's intriguing but flawed *Crash*, which won three Academy Awards in 2006, including one for best picture.
21. As this is not the place for me to launch into a detailed critical analysis of this discourse, I wish to point readers to an excellent collection of essays critiquing the politics of the anti-PC agenda: Jeffrey Williams, ed., *PC Wars: Politics and Theory in the Academy* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
22. This is Jet Li's first Hollywood film, which could possibly account for his limited English dialogue.
23. Also, bizarrely in (or out of) character are Mel Gibson's recent allegedly anti-Semitic media spectacles: *The Passion of the Christ* (2004), which he directed; and his 2006 DUI run-in with the law, featuring a drunken tirade against Jews;

both of which serve as rather disturbing extra-textual glosses. See "Gibson: 'I am not an anti-Semite,'" *CNN.com*, 2 August 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/SHOWBIZ/Movies/08/01/gibson.dui/index.html>, accessed 27 May 2007.

24. Mark A. Reid, "The Black Gangster Film," in *Film Genre Reader III*, ed. Barry Keith Grant (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 486. See also Kenneth Chan, "The Construction of Black Male Identity in Black Action Films of the Nineties," *Cinema Journal* 37, no. 2 (1998): 35–48.
25. According to Booth, *sh'e tau*, or snakehead, is a relatively high-ranking triad member, generally a Red Pole (one of the few leadership positions in the triad hierarchy). The snakehead is the person in charge of the human smuggling operation. Booth, *Dragon Syndicates*, 255.
26. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), 121–4.
27. The triads' human smuggling trade is global and international in its reach. Booth, *Dragon Syndicates*, 254–8.
28. Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004), 32.
29. Ibid., 31–2.
30. I borrow the term from Pheng Cheah in his introduction to: Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds., *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
31. Films like Alejandro González Iñárritu's *Babel* (2006) and Wim Wenders' *Land of Plenty* (2004) grapple with this philosophical question.
32. Producer extraordinaire Terence Chang tells of how Chow Yun-fat was finally convinced to move to Hollywood, a story that weaves the triads, Hong Kong cinema, Hollywood, and Chow Yun-fat into a coincidental relationship: "It took me a long time to convince him. At that time he felt like, you know, I'm a huge star in Asia. Why should I go to Hollywood? Now I would give credit to the gangsters, to the triads, because they started to threaten him. Remember the scene in *The Godfather* where the producer woke up with a horse in his bed. Chow Yun-fat woke up one morning with a cat's head neatly chopped [and] thrown into his garden. And he was so horrified he said, ok, you know, I think I better take your advice. I should try Hollywood." Chang recounts this story in the short documentary video "Chow Yun-fat Goes Hollywood" (2001), directed by Jeffrey Schwarz, available as a special feature in the special edition DVD of Antoine Fuqua's *The Replacement Killers.*
33. Giovanna Borradori, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 188. See endnote 8, point 2.
34. Booth, *Dragon Syndicates*, 60.
35. Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).
36. See Chapter Two, endnote 49.
37. David Desser, "The Kung Fu Craze: Hong Kong Cinema's First American

Reception," in *The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity,* eds. Poshek Fu and David Desser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 19–43. Gina Marchetti, "Jackie Chan and the Black Connection," in *Keyframes: Popular Cinema and Cultural Studies,* eds. Matthew Tinkcom and Amy Villarejo (London: Routledge, 2001), 137–158. Laleen Jayamanne, "Let's Miscegenate: Jackie Chan and His African-American Connection," in *Hong Kong Connections: Transnational Imagination in Action Cinema,* eds. Meaghan Morris, Siu Leung Li, and Stephen Chan Ching-kiu (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 151–162.

38. Desser, "The Kung Fu Craze," 38.
39. The image of an Asian asserting his hyper-masculinity through his no-nonsense kung fu moves also subverts the model minority stereotype today, which accounts for the enduring popularity of Bruce Lee among Asian Americans.
40. See Chapter Six of this book, where I explain the significance of "dragon" in both Bruce Lee and Jackie Chan's Chinese names.
41. Marchetti, "Jackie Chan and the Black Connection," 140–3.
42. Ibid., 157. In his reading of *Romeo Must Die*, Lo echoes Marchetti's argument by marking the phenomenon as a form of "racial passing," an ethnic Chinese passing for black as in the case of Jet Li in the film. Kwai-Cheung Lo, *Chinese Face/Off: The Transnational Popular Culture of Hong Kong* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2005), 154–6.
43. Jayamanne, "Let's Miscegenate," 155.
44. Their screen partnership created such a box-office hit that Ratner released in 2007 *Rush Hour 3*, which again involves, rather unsurprisingly, the triads. *Rush Hour* is Jackie Chan's first slick Hollywood production, with *Rumble in the Bronx* serving as his breakthrough film into the American market. While Chan was involved earlier in his career in a number of failed Hollywood attempts like *The Big Brawl* (1980), *The Cannonball Run* (1981), and *Cannonball Run II* (1984), it is definitely in *Rush Hour* that he has hit upon the right formula for a sustainable Hollywood career.
45. Completely irresistible is the ironic usage of John Lone as Ricky Tan, especially considering the fact that Lone appeared as Song Liling in David Cronenberg's 1993 adaptation of David Henry Hwang's *M. Butterfly*. Consider the scene where Ricky Tan tells Las Vegas partner-in-crime, Steven Reign (Alan King), as he kills him, that he "hate[s] the fortune cookie shit!" For a triad character here to articulate anti-Orientalist critique is to both offer and undermine it at the same time.
46. Jayamanne, "Let's Miscegenate," 159.
47. Lisa Lowe, *Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 91.
48. "*Romeo Must Die* has no significant white character. But whiteness still occupies the privileged place from which to see and make sense of the world." Lo, *Chinese Face/Off,* 157. In his superb discussion of Asian masculinity and its relationship to what he calls the "triangulated racial desire" of "black-white-and-yellow" in the film, James Kim also references the LA riots and how "the contemporary

media had already improvised a triangulation of racial violence, playing black and yellow against each other for the sake of white propertied interests." James Kim, "The Legend of the White-and-Yellow Black Man: Global Containment and Triangulated Racial Desire in *Romeo Must Die*," *Camera Obscura* 55, vol. 19, no. 1 (2004): 165, 168.

49. Walter Benjamin, *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*, ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), 286–7.

6 Hollywood's Sino-Chic: Kung Fu Parody, Mimicry, and Play in Cross-Cultural Citationality

1. Unfortunately, the extent of the parody is only in the film's use of animated animal characters. Much of the impressive voice talent is squandered on a weak script that does not sufficiently offer witty banter and clever send-ups of kung fu stereotypes — one hopes for at least some measure of self-irony that films like *The Incredibles* (2004) has offered audiences. To make it worse, the film replicates the narrative arc of *The Forbidden Kingdom* (released at almost the same time) in its believe-in-yourself message that has been remade *ad nauseum* in innumerable animation and children's films. Both *Kung Fu Panda* and *The Forbidden Kingdom*, therefore, demonstrates the way the kung fu genre has been simplistically retooled for rapid Hollywood commodification.
2. I am thinking of the problematic way a television series like BBC's *Little Britain* works through extreme forms of "political incorrectness" for comedic purposes, thus getting away with the crassest and most indecent moments ever seen on television. Because I am still uncertain how to reconcile the pleasure I derive from these moments and the concomitant uneasiness about the notion that it supposedly achieves a critique of racism, sexism, homophobia, and a range of other social offences through parody, a closer study of its mechanics is definitely in order.
3. This cult-to-mainstream phenomenon is significant enough for recent popular/academic monographs to catalog kung fu cinema's development and its essential entries: Leon Hunt, *Kung Fu Cult Masters: From Bruce Lee to Crouching Tiger* (London: Wallflower Press, 2003); Bey Logan, *Hong Kong Action Cinema* (Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 1995); and David West, *Chasing Dragons: An Introduction to the Martial Arts Film* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006). See also sections of Jeff Yang, *Once Upon a Time in China: A Guide to Hong Kong, Taiwanese, and Mainland Chinese Cinema* (New York: Atria Books, 2003).
4. Siu Leung Li, "The Myth Continues: Cinematic Kung Fu in Modernity," in *Hong Kong Connections: Transnational Imagination in Action Cinema*, eds. Meaghan Morris, Siu Leung Li, and Stephen Chan Ching-kiu (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 51, 54. Expanding on this internal citationality is Gary Xu's reading of the Shaw Brothers' filmic influence on Stephen Chow: Gary G. Xu, *Sinascape:*

Contemporary Chinese Cinema (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 91–3.

5. Peter Hitchcock, "Niche Cinema, or, *Kill Bill* with *Shaolin Soccer*," in *Hong Kong Film, Hollywood and the New Global Cinema: No Film Is an Island*, eds. Gina Marchetti and Tan See Kam (London: Routledge, 2007), 230.
6. This Jackie Chan segment of the chapter constitutes a radically revised version of an essay originally published as "Mimicry as Failure: Jackie Chan in Hollywood," *Asian Cinema* 15, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2004): 84–97.
7. Fore examines Chan's work as an instance of "transnational Chinese cinemas." Steve Fore, "Jackie Chan and the Cultural Dynamics of Global Entertainment," in *Transnational Chinese Cinemas: Identity, Nationhood, Gender*, ed. Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), 239–62.
8. Scholarly critics have consistently observed and theorized this notion of transformation: see, for instance, Mark Gallagher, "Masculinity in Translation: Jackie Chan's Transcultural Star Text," *The Velvet Light Trap* 39 (Spring 1997): 25–41; and Ramie Tateishi, "Jackie Chan and the Re-invention of Tradition," *Asian Cinema* 10, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 78–84.
9. Read Chan's autobiography *I am Jackie Chan* (co-written with Jeff Yang) for an account of his amazing rags-to-riches story. The narrative ultimately legitimizes stardom and box-office success as the only positive outcome, epitomized by Chan's desire and determination — "Nothing could stop me now" — to join his idols, Sinatra, Chaplin, Keaton, and Lloyd, "in Hollywood's galaxy of stars." Jackie Chan, with Jeff Yang, *I Am Jackie Chan: My Life in Action* (New York: Ballantine, 1999), 253.
10. Kam Louie, *Theorising Chinese Masculinity: Society and Gender in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 152.
11. Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake, eds., *Global/Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996).
12. On the question of Lee's influence, see Teo's account of Chan's career as "The Other Kung Fu Dragon." Stephen Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema: The Extra Dimensions* (London: BFI, 1997), 122. Kam Louie draws similar connections between Lee and Chan in his study of Chinese masculinity. Louie, *Theorising Chinese Masculinity*, 149–50. Chan's autobiography *I am Jackie Chan* also highlights Lee's importance in helping define his sense of identity as an action star.
13. Chan's consciousness of the significance of naming is further featured in a recent documentary about his family: *Traces of a Dragon: Jackie Chan and his Lost Family* (2003). Chan's original family name is Fang, thus tracing his connections to two long lost half-brothers in mainland China, whom Chan oddly did not choose to meet, even at the end of the film's production. One could potentially read in Chan a form of anxiety as star identity comes into collision with familial identity.
14. Lisa Odham Stokes and Michael Hoover, *City on Fire: Hong Kong Cinema* (London: Verso, 1999), 115.
15. Ibid., 116.

16. Teo, *Hong Kong*, 122–3.
17. Gina Marchetti, "Jackie Chan and the Black Connection," in *Keyframes: Popular Cinema and Cultural Studies*, eds. Matthew Tinkcom and Amy Villarejo (London: Routledge, 2001), 138.
18. See my discussion of this issue in Chapter Five.
19. Clearly, these three films are not unproblematic in the way they deal with racial stereotypes and the politics of migrant assimilation and multiculturalism. I am unable to deal with these issues in greater depth here as this is not my chapter's goal. See Marchetti, "Jackie Chan and the Black Connection," for a similar critique of these films.
20. David Bordwell, *Planet Hong Kong: Popular Cinema and the Art of Entertainment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 58.
21. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 86.
22. Ibid., 88, 89.
23. Marchetti, "Jackie Chan and the Black Connection," 156.
24. Steve Fore, "Life Imitates Entertainment: Home and Dislocation in the Films of Jackie Chan," in *At Full Speed: Hong Kong Cinema in a Borderless World*, ed. Esther C. M. Yau (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 117. Fore borrows the term from Anthony Giddens.
25. Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).
26. Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 89. Emphasis mine.
27. Ibid., 91.
28. Feng observes that "Asian American [film]makers construct Asian American cinematic identity by locating their subjectivities in relation to dominant cinematic discourses, signifying on cinematic conventions by repeating them ironically or 'splitting' them." Peter X. Feng, *Identities in Motion: Asian American Film and Video* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 2.
29. Li, "The Myth Continues," 60.
30. See Donna Haraway's "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century" for a creative use of the cyborg figure as a politically progressive trope. Donna J. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991).
31. "These qualities of self-parody" in the Bond films, observes Toby Miller, "are key aspects to the unstable masculinity on display. The technology of the penis is mockingly troped again and again in details and stories from the series." Toby Miller, "James Bond's Penis," in *Masculinity: Bodies, Movies, Culture*, ed. Peter Lehman (New York: Routledge, 2001), 248.
32. Unbeknownst to many of his US fans, Chan has a moderately successful recording career in Asia. Apart from contributing to various compilation CDs and music soundtracks to his own movies, he has also released, according to the best of my knowledge, two albums: *Diyi qi* (*The First Time*), his first Mandarin CD, and *Long de xin* (*Dragon's Heart*).
33. Chan's leading man appeal is far from that of the traditional sex appeal of Hollywood

male stars. His roles seldom entail a love interest or offer any sexuality on screen. In noting the presence of romance in *Shanghai Noon*, Chan defends his choices: "My fans, especially female ones, are always complaining that I never have romantic scenes in my movies; I always say that people aren't paying to see me kiss, they're paying to see me kick. But maybe this makes up for lost time." Chan, *I Am Jackie Chan*, 347.

34. Chan, *I Am Jackie Chan*, 347.
35. Kwai-Cheung Lo, *Chinese Face/Off: The Transnational Popular Culture of Hong Kong* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2005), 148. Lo provides an excellent reading of Hung's film as allegorical of the 1997 transitional phase for many Hong Kong film artists who were migrating to Hollywood.
36. Chan, *I Am Jackie Chan*, 347. Fred Zinnemann's 1952 classic *High Noon* actually starred Gary Cooper, not John Wayne.
37. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media* (London: Routledge, 1994), 114–5, 118.
38. For close analyses of these series from an Asian American critical perspective, see Darrell Y. Hamamoto, *Monitored Peril: Asian Americans and the Politics of TV Representation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 32–63. Hamamoto also reminds us that *Kung Fu* (1972–5), starring David Carradine, is really a Western with a Shaolin twist.
39. The significant contribution of Chinese immigrant labor to the American transcontinental railroad project has often been relegated to a historical footnote: "Without Chinese labor and know-how, the railroad would not have been completed. Nonetheless, the Central Pacific Railroad cheated the Chinese railway workers of everything they could. They tried to write the Chinese out of history altogether. The Chinese workers were not only excluded from the ceremonies, but from the famous photograph of white American laborers celebrating as the last spike, the golden spike, was driven into the ground." Iris Chang, *The Chinese in America: A Narrative History* (New York: Penguin, 2003), 64. Asian American history scholars have made a conscious effort to emphasize the important role the Chinese played in this foundational part of United States history. See also Sucheng Chan, *Asian Americans: An Interpretive History* (Boston: Twayne, 1991), 30–32; Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (New York: Penguin, 1989), 84–7.
40. On the other hand, Dyer also cautions that straight audiences can use camp to reclaim John Wayne by questioning the form of masculinity, laughing at it, and then permitting "a certain wistful affection for him to linger on." Richard Dyer, "It's Being So Camp as Keeps Us Going," in *Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject*, ed. Fabio Cleto (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 115.
41. David L. Eng, *Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).
42. For Rathbone to reference in the British Parliament the Sino-British Wars of 1839–42 as the "Opium Wars" is historically inaccurate. Naming the conflicts as

the "Opium Wars" is to relegate blame to the British Empire. It is tempting to see this mistake as another ironic consequence of postmodernist stitching.

43. Chan, *I Am Jackie Chan*, 253.
44. Knopf discusses Chan's indebtedness to Keaton. Robert Knopf, *The Theater and Cinema of Buster Keaton* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 152–4.
45. Stokes and Hoover, *City on Fire*, 120.
46. Chan, *I Am Jackie Chan*, 320.
47. "Chan Asks Asians to Shun Hollywood," *CBS News*, 25 November 2005, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/11/25/entertainment/main1075637.shtml>, accessed 20 June 2007.
48. Doherty sees "exploitation" not only as a film genre but also as a form of "advertising and promotion that entices an audience into a theater *and* to the way the movie then endears itself to that audience." Thomas Doherty, *Teenagers and Teenpics: The Juvenilization of American Movies in the 1950s* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 3. Doherty's point is coincidentally and aptly illustrated by Jami Bernard's opening anecdote in his book on Tarantino, about an incident that occurred during the 1994 New York Film Festival screening of *Pulp Fiction.* Bernard recounts how "at the very moment Travolta plunged the needle [into Uma Thurman], a man in the orchestra keeled over onto the carpet in a dead faint." Rumor has it that this was a publicity stunt, akin to those one finds during the halcyon days of classical exploitation cinema. Jami Bernard, *Quentin Tarantino: The Man and His Movies* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 2–3.
49. Eric Schaefer, *"Bold! Daring! Shocking! True!" A History of Exploitation Films, 1919–1959* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 3–4.
50. Ibid., 5.
51. Ibid., 4.
52. Pam Grier graced the screens again as the titular character in Tarantino's *Jackie Brown*, the director's tribute to this genre.
53. For an exposition and analysis of "blaxploitation," see the following: Ed Guerrero, *Framing Blackness: The African American Image in Film* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 69–111; Mark A. Reid, *Redefining Black Film* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 77–91. Reid rather strategically and less problematically calls these films "black action films."
54. Reid, *Redefining*, 86.
55. David Desser, "The Kung Fu Craze: Hong Kong Cinema's First American Reception," in *The Cinema of Hong Kong: History, Arts, Identity*, eds. Poshek Fu and David Desser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 25.
56. Jeffrey Sconce, "Trashing the Academy: Taste, Excess and an Emerging Politics of Cinematic Style," *Screen* 36, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 372. Quoted in Paul Watson, "There's No Accounting for Taste: Exploitation Cinema and the Limits of Film Theory," in *Trash Aesthetics: Popular Culture and Its Audience*, eds. Deborah Cartmell, I. Q. Hunter, Heidi Kaye, and Imelda Whelehan (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 67.
57. Watson, "There's No Accounting for Taste," 80.

58. Susan Sontag, "Notes on 'Camp,'" in *Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject*, ed. Fabio Cleto (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 61.
59. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990).
60. For convenient reference in the rest of this chapter, the title *Kill Bill* will represent both volumes 1 and 2 unless specified for strategic reasons. In any case, one could see the two volumes as constituting a single filmic narrative.
61. In a theoretically dazzling essay on what he calls "visual quotation" in the context of "niche cinema," Peter Hitchcock parses the term's different valences through an intertextual reading of *Kill Bill* and Chow's *Shaolin Soccer*. He argues that "[c]ultural contact enables greater and greater quotation but this accumulation comes with a demand to suffer the consequences of an impossible epistemology, one that actually might embrace knowledge outside the commodity relation (keeping in mind that a quotation is also the offer of a price, hence my preference for it here over intertextuality). This is quotation as acknowledgment and disavowal (of knowledge)." Hitchcock, "Niche Cinema, or, *Kill Bill* with *Shaolin Soccer*," 220.
62. Fred Topel, "Tarantino Talks *Kill Bill Vol. 2*," in *Quentin Tarantino: The Film Geek Files*, ed. Paul A. Woods (London: Plexus, 2005), 183–4.
63. Tomohiro Machiyama, "Quentin Tarantino Reveals Almost Everything That Inspired *Kill Bill*," in *Quentin Tarantino: The Film Geek Files*, ed. Paul A. Woods (London: Plexus, 2005), 173.
64. Topel, "Tarantino Talks," 183.
65. Machiyama, "Quentin Tarantino Reveals," 178.
66. Sontag, "Notes," 56.
67. Terminology I borrow from Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake, "Introduction: Tracking the Global/Local," in *Global/Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary*, eds. Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 2.
68. Topel, "Tarantino Talks," 183.
69. For more on Shaw's inner workings and production methods, see Stephanie Chung Po-yin, "The Industrial Evolution of a Fraternal Enterprise: The Shaw Brothers and the Shaw Organisation," in *The Shaw Screen: A Preliminary Study*, ed. Wong Ain-ling (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Film Archive, 2003), 1–17.
70. Emphasis mine.
71. Machiyama, "Quentin Tarantino Reveals," 174.
72. Ibid., 177.
73. Desser, "The Kung Fu Craze," 20.
74. Stephen Teo, *Hong Kong Cinema: The Extra Dimensions* (London: BFI, 1997), 114.
75. Machiyama, "Quentin Tarantino Reveals," 174.
76. Desser, "The Kung Fu Craze," 37.
77. Machiyama, "Quentin Tarantino Reveals," 174.
78. Some feminist scholars argue that female screen violence replicates male violence,

but King and McCaughey prefer to see that "visions of sexually attractive women skilled with weaponry, licensed to kill, beating up men might rather take the wind out of the sails of the culture in which sex difference seems unalterable. Such images might challenge smug oppressors." Neal King and Martha McCaughey, "What's a Mean Woman like You Doing in a Movie like This?" in *Reel Knockouts: Violent Women in the Movies,* eds. Martha McCaughey and Neal King (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 6.

79. "Defamiliarization" is a literary critical concept coined by Russian formalist Viktor S̆klovskij and later adopted by Bertolt Brecht in his theory of "estrangement effects." M. H. Abrams, *A Glossary of Literary Terms,* 5th ed. (Fort Worth: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1988), 44.
80. Topel, "Tarantino Talks," 183.
81. Machiyama, "Quentin Tarantino Reveals," 177.
82. Edward Gallafent, *Quentin Tarantino* (Harlow, England: Pearson, 2006), 113.
83. The status of this production is currently unknown apart from the limited information available on the Internet Movie Database. The production company's webpage <www.burningshaolinproductions.com> is presently unavailable.

7 Chinese Supernaturalism: Mythic Ethnography and the Mystical Other

1. In an excellent essay on the topic, Bliss Cua Lim argues, though, that these new Hollywood remakes are "deracinating acts of cultural appropriation," which I can only partly agree with. Forms of ghostly representation often retain Asiatic traces to register difference as marks of supernatural inexplicability and terror. Bliss Cua Lim, "Generic Ghosts: Remaking the New 'Asian Horror Film,'" in *Hong Kong Film, Hollywood and the New Global Cinema: No Film is an Island*, eds. Gina Marchetti and Tan See Kam (London: Routledge, 2007), 115. Read also a fan-boy account of Asian horror cinemas that delineates East-West differences to explain the shock-value of these films for an American audience: Patrick Galloway, *Asia Shock: Horror and Dark Cinema from Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Thailand* (Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press, 2006), 9–14.
2. Robin Wood, "An Introduction to the American Horror Film," in *Movies and Methods: Volume II,* ed., Bill Nichols (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 199–200.
3. Robert G. Lee, *Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), 10.
4. Gina Marchetti, *Romance and the "Yellow Peril": Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 2. Emphasis mine.
5. Both Robert Lee and Gina Marchetti offer close analysis of Griffith's film. Lee, *Orientals*, 127–32; Marchetti, *Romance*, 32–45.
6. David Van Biema, "Buddhism in America," *Time*, 13 October 1997, <http://

www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,987164,00.html>, accessed 6 June 2007.

7. Incidentally, *The Touch* is the first film from Michelle Yeoh's new production company, not so coincidentally called, Mythical Films, which has also two other releases, *Silver Hawk* (2004) and the forthcoming live-action version of *Mulan*.
8. The "*shenguai pian*" are films "dealing with gods and demons, supernatural powers of flight and emission of bodily energy. Fantasy elements from the . . . genre were incorporated into the *wuxia* film early on, and the standard way to refer to the genre from the late 1920s onwards was *shenguai wuxia* which has been translated as 'sword and sorcery' or 'swordplay and magic.'" Stephen Teo, "*Wuxia* Redux: *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* as a Model of Late Transnational Production," in *Hong Kong Connections: Transnational Imagination in Action Cinema*, eds. Meaghan Morris, Siu Leung Li, and Stephen Chan Ching-kiu (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 192.
9. Bhaskar Sarkar, "Hong Kong Hysteria: Martial Arts Tales from a Mutating World," in *At Full Speed: Hong Kong Cinema in a Borderless World*, ed. Esther C. M. Yau (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 171.
10. Kim Soyoung, "Genre as Contact Zone: Hong Kong Action and Korean *Hwalkuk*," in *Hong Kong Connections: Transnational Imagination in Action Cinema*, eds. Meaghan Morris, Siu Leung Li, and Stephen Chan Ching-kiu (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 100. I have applied here to Chinese Supernaturalism Kim's point about "Korean action movies."
11. Ibid., 101. Kim is here channeling Pratt's conception of "transculturation." Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992), 6.
12. Rey Chow, *Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary Chinese Cinema* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 23.
13. John Woo, foreword to *Bulletproof Monk*, by Michael Yanover and Mark Paniccia (Orange, CA: Flypaper Press, 2002).
14. The film was shot in Toronto and Vancouver.
15. See Chapter One.
16. "Multiculturalism levels the important differences and contradictions within and among racial and ethnic minority groups according to the discourse of pluralism, which asserts that American culture is a democratic terrain to which every variety of constituency has equal access and in which all are represented, while simultaneously masking the existence of exclusions by recuperating dissent, conflict, and otherness through the promise of inclusion." Lisa Lowe, *Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 86.
17. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 47.
18. Emphasis mine.
19. For a discussion of spatiality and special effects in the film, see Ru-shou Robert Chen, "'This Isn't Real!' Spatialized Narration and (In)visible Special Effects in 'Double Vision,'" in *Cinema Taiwan: Politics, Popularity and State of the Arts*,

ed. Darrell William Davis and Ru-shou Robert Chen (London: Routledge, 2007), 108–15.

20. Giorgio Agamben, "The Time That Is Left," *Epoché* 7, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 5. Agamben's analysis of messianic time is too complex to be rendered here in capsule form and, hence, should be read within the context of his essay for a fuller definition.
21. Ibid., 4.
22. Tweedie deliberates on the building as a cultural symptom of global capitalism: "The World Tower (*Shijie Dalou*) that fronts for a Daoist temple becomes the grandest of junkspaces, a spectacle that dazzles because of its incoherent combination of the mythical past and the mythical present, neither imagined as a viable future on a mass scale, neither rooted in a lived history." James Tweedie, "Morning in the New Metropolis: Taipei and the Globalization of the City Film," in *Cinema Taiwan: Politics, Popularity and State of the Arts*, ed. Darrell William Davis and Ru-shou Robert Chen (London: Routledge, 2007), 123.
23. "Jackie Chan Returns to Hong Kong for Artistic Freedom," *Goldsea Asian American Daily*, 15 July 2005, <http://goldsea.com/Asiagate/507/16chan.html>, accessed 17 April 2006.
24. "Aside from unity of the known world, the First Emperor had sought mainly an elixir of immortality for himself. His five royal journeys to sacred mountains had been part of his search." John King Fairbank, *China: A New History* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), 57.
25. Yingjin Zhang, *Chinese National Cinema* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 37.
26. Ibid., 37–41.
27. Discovered in 1974 at the tomb of the First Emperor, these 7500 terracotta warriors are life-sized statues. Fairbank, *China*, 56.
28. See my discussion of Chan's cultural nationalism in *Shanghai Noon* and *Shanghai Knights* in Chapter Six.
29. Emphasis mine. This English translation of the dialogue follows the subtitles in the official Singapore DVD version distributed by Scorpio East Entertainment. I have taken the liberty to adjust them very slightly with my own translations for added clarity.
30. Robert Koehler, "The Promise aka Master of the Crimson Armor," *Variety*, 29 December 2005, <http://www.variety.com/review/VE1117929184.html?categoryid=1263&cs=1>, accessed 8 June 2007.
31. Christine Chiao, "A Promise Left Unfulfilled," UCLA International Insitute, 13 April 2006, <http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=42884>, accessed 2 December 2008. My own coincidental use of the Icarus reference marks the contemporaneous negative criticism of Chen's work.
32. Michael Atkinson, "Partial Arts: Former Fifth-Gen Master Proves We Don't Need Another *Hero*," *Village Voice*, 2 May 2006, <http://www.villagevoice.com/film/0618,atkinson,73085,20.html>, accessed 9 June 2007.
33. Ty Burr, "Only as a Fairy Tale Does 'Promise' Reach Its Potential," *Boston Globe*, 5 May 2006, <http://www.boston.com/ae/movies/articles/2006/05/05/

only_as_a_fairy_tale_doespromise_reach_its_potential/>, accessed 8 June 2007.
34. Sarkar, "Hong Kong Hysteria," 173.
35. Koehler, "The Promise."
36. This twenty-minute long parody is still available on YouTube at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AQZAcT1xaKk>, accessed 8 June 2007.
37. Dexter Roberts, "A Chinese Blogger's Tale," *Business Week*, 2 March 2006, <http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2006/gb20060302_026709.htm>, accessed 8 June 2007.
38. Atkinson, "Partial Arts."
39. Spoofs can play a number of functions. The *Austin Powers* movie series provides not only a comic subversion of the James Bond movies, but it also pays an indirect tribute to them.
40. "This intentional rendering of the culture by Chen Kaige and co-writer Zhang Tan refracts negatively as the script neither introduces new approaches nor incorporates any tried and true magical elements that mark great wuxia films. Instead, each supposed nod to Chinese myth becomes a parody of the genre." Chiao, "A Promise Left Unfulfilled."

Coda: Global Cinematic Technologies of Ethnic (Un)Representation

1. The line is from the song "Hollywood's Not America" found in Ferras' album *Aliens and Rainbows* (2008; Capitol Records). The complete lyrics are available on his website at <http://www.ferrasmusic.com/lyrics.aspx>, accessed 18 June 2008.
2. Discussion of future trends in cinema is problematic in that the cinematic references I make of forthcoming films are only "true" during the time of writing and may potentially require correction, which the finality of publication makes utterly impossible.
3. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971). See also Christine Gledhill, "Pleasurable Negotiations," in *Female Spectators: Looking at Film and Television*, ed. E. Deirdre Pribram (London: Verso, 1988), 64–89.
4. Stephen Chow is returning to *Journey to the West* to adapt it for the screen. "Stephen Chow to Remake Classic," *The Straits Times*, 3 December 2007, Life section, 7.
5. Because of *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*'s box-office success, Columbia Pictures and the Weinstein Company are tussling over the rights to adapt Wang Du Lu's other novels. "Crouching Tiger, Battling Movie Companies," *The Straits Times*, 9 May 2007, Life section, 7.
6. Foong Woei Wan, "Epic Change," *The Straits Times*, 9 April 2008, Life section, 1–3. See also Sonia Kolesnikov-Jessop, "Redefining the Epic," *Newsweek*, 24 December 2007, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/78119>, accessed 18 June 2008.

7. Kwai-Cheung Lo, *Chinese Face/Off: The Transnational Popular Culture of Hong Kong* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 160.
8. Borys Kit, "Disney, Chabon Retelling 'Snow,'" *The Hollywood Reporter*, 29 October 2004, <http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000694195>, accessed 18 June 2008. While this article does not mention Chow, internet rumors continue to swirl about his possible presence in the project.
9. "Ten Times More Expensive to Hire Zhang Ziyi Now," *The Straits Times*, 28 April 2006, Life section, 18.
10. Quoted in Tan Dawn Wei, "Sharp and Tough," *The Straits Times*, 29 November 2006, Life section, 2.
11. Chua Beng Huat, "Conceptualizing an East Asian Popular Culture," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 5, no. 2 (2004): 201.
12. Lo, *Chinese Face/Off*, 160.
13. Richard Dyer, *White* (London: Routledge, 1997).
14. Frank H. Wu, *Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black and White* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 79.
15. "Lee Ang Win Is 'Glory for Chinese,'" *The Straits Times*, 7 March 2006, Life section, 3.
16. Rey Chow, *Sentimental Fabulations, Contemporary Chinese Films: Attachment in the Age of Global Visibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 199.*

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