Redefining Heresy and Tolerance

Governance of Muslims and Christians in the Qing Empire before 1864

Hung Tak Wai

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Praise for *Redefining Heresy and Tolerance*

'The readers will find intriguing examples and nuanced discussions about how Islam and Christianity, two minority religions of non-Chinese origin, have been treated with varying degrees of tolerance by the central and regional authorities in the High Qing period.'

—Gang Song 宋剛, University of Hong Kong

'This concise work not only sheds light on the historical relationship between state and religion in Qing Empire, but also offering valuable insights for both historians and those interested in post-imperial China.'

—Ying Fuk-tsang 邢福增, Chinese University of Hong Kong

'Hung Tak Wai's detailed historical study, based on Qing sources, shows us that the Chinese state's struggles with religious diversity, in particular, are nothing new. Looking at a burgeoning discourse on religious tolerance in late imperial China may prove instructional, and possibly cautionary, for us today.'

—James D. Frankel, Chinese University of Hong Kong

'This book goes beyond the assumption of a homogeneous Han society and pays attention to the religious groups that emerged after the seventeenth century, which differed from, or even contradicted, Confucianism and other Chinese religions, and it is concerned with how such alien communities influenced the development of Confucianism itself.'

—Wang Fan-sen 王汎森, Academia Sinica

'This book significantly enriches our comprehension of how early modern Confucians, as adherents of a state/public religion, engaged with Abrahamic religions. By delving into the dynamics of inter-religious interaction, *Redefining Heresy and Tolerance* sheds new light on the encounters between Confucianism and the Abrahamic faiths, offering fresh insights into the complex religious landscape of Asian culture.'

—Huang Chin-Shing 黃進興, Academia Sinica

‘Hung Tak Wai’s meticulous historical examination, rooted in Qing sources, highlights the complexity of the Chinese state’s engagement with religious diversity, an issue still resonating in international relations today. This study underscores that the challenges of multiculturalism and interfaith dialogue faced by the People’s Republic of China are not novel but rather deeply rooted in its historical legacy.’

—Simon Xu Hui Shen 沈旭暉, National Sun Yat-Sen University

‘In the past decade, the interaction between Chinese and Islamic cultures in East and Central Asia has garnered significant attention from scholars around the globe. *Redefining Heresy and Tolerance* presents a perspective that emerged from the political leaders of the Qing Empire and Chinese intellectuals during the seventeenth to eighteenth century. These discussions held particular importance during the early era of globalisation and continue to serve as a source of inspiration for those grappling with civilization clashes in contemporary times.’

—Kumakura Jun 熊倉潤, Hosei University

‘*Redefining Heresy and Tolerance* offers a fresh perspective on Qing policies towards Muslims within the empire. Hung Tak Wai’s work is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the complex tapestry of religious and political interactions that have shaped the unique history of Islamic communities in China.’

—Unno Noriko 海野典子,Waseda University

‘Focusing on Qing policies toward Muslims and Christians in the empire, *Redefining Heresy and Tolerance* sheds light on the religious and political tolerance in late imperial China. This impressive book explores historical issues of ethnicity, identity, and imperialism through critical cases of Qing governance of minority groups.’

—Kung Ling-Wei 孔令偉, Academia Sinica

‘Adopting a definition of “religion as worldview”, Hung shows how the Qing state constantly balanced concern for religious orthopraxy with considerations of political stability in its dealings with Muslims and Christians.’

—Egas Bender de Moniz Bandeira, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

'*Redefining Heresy and Tolerance* offers a compelling narrative that explores how religious diversity influenced cultural dynamics. This book provides valuable insights into how cultural boundaries are shaped and reshaped in multicultural societies.'

—Wong Tin Kei 黃天琦, University of Adelaide

'*Redefining Heresy and Tolerance* is a pioneering work that not only challenges preconceived notions about China's religious history but also enriches our understanding of the broader historical context.'

—Law Lok Yin 羅樂然, Hong Kong Metropolitan University

To all kinds of minorities

‘Why the Daleks hates us?’ ‘No there is a reason, an explanation might be better. It’s stupid and ridiculous and it’s the only one it fits . . . A dislike for the unlike . . . they are afraid of you because you are different from them. So whatever you do, it doesn’t matter.’

—Ian Chesterton, *Doctor Who* 1.2 (1964)

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Acknowledgements

Receiving another email from the editor of this book, I find myself sitting at Borough Market in London, finally ready to compose this acknowledgement after enduring a gruelling seventeen-hour flight from Taipei. My visit to London involves interviewing Lord Chris Patten and participating in several conferences at Oxford and Cambridge. In two weeks, I will be taking a boat trip from Busan to Hakata after a conference in Daegu, hopefully encountering no *kamikaze* as the Mongol invaders did in the thirteenth century. This is a usual semester break for academics in this globalised industry. Throughout our careers, we have the privilege of working with colleagues from diverse cultural backgrounds. I have discovered that maintaining professional relationships with individuals from different cultures is relatively straightforward, as long as interactions remain confined to the realm of work. However, challenges arise when attempts are made to form personal connections, as clashes of worldviews can emerge. It is not uncommon to encounter individuals with whom you don't naturally align or enjoy spending time, yet the success of a shared project demands coexistence. This book delves into the intricacies of coexistence in a world marked by diversity.

The conflict between cultures and value systems has been a central theme in my intellectual life since my youth. Although I grew up in British Hong Kong and received a modern education, the Chinese language and history curriculum in my secondary school heavily leaned towards New Confucianism, influenced by scholars such as Ch'ien Mu, Tang Chun-I, Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, and Yu Ying-shih. I have been reading the works of these inspiring thinkers since I was fourteen. My alma mater, Munsang College, founded in 1926, provided access to a rich collection of humanities studies in its Luk Yan King Library. Consequently, during my teenage years, I had the good fortune to immerse myself in extensive collections of classical Asian philosophy and historical writings. However, under the banner of EMI (English as the medium of instruction), most of these collections were discarded by our headmistress, a Hong Kong–born woman who had returned from Canada and believed that our learning process should primarily focus on Anglo-European literature, preferably of an Evangelical Christian

nature. This unexpected and shocking incident profoundly affected my intellectual pursuits. I understood that interreligion and interculture relationship could be more constructive after my years at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, where I pursued a bachelor's and master's degree in religious studies. I gained exposure to Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and other Chinese religions over five years before embarking on my PhD studies at the University of Hong Kong and completing the initial draft of this manuscript.

The central concern of this book is how individuals with different worldviews can coexist in the same space. It has been traditionally assumed that intellectuals from the Anglo-European world 'accidentally' developed the notion of diversity in the seventeenth century. However, this assumption is obviously flawed, as multicultural phenomena have been experienced by civilisations across the globe, and the dislike of the unlike, or xenophobia, is more prevalent than contemporary readers may imagine. Nonetheless, in the face of limited resources, human societies have had to develop thoughts and ideas 'rationalise' the inevitable coexistence of diverse cultural entities once they recognised that their own culture was not the only one blessed. From this perspective, discussions on religious tolerance have occurred universally among sophisticated civilisations. Since the fifteenth century, multicultural encounters have become more frequent and unavoidable. When individuals or communities with different worldviews could no longer be ignored by the 'majority', questions naturally arose: Who are they? What significance do they hold for me? Unavoidably, the ultimate question became 'Who am I?'.

A pervasive misconception of cultural homogeneity has often misled both Chinese people, particularly the dominant Han ethnic group, and foreign observers seeking to comprehend 'China'. Throughout history, as dynastic empires expanded their borders and incorporated non-Chinese subjects, foreign sojourners arrived in China for various purposes. Similar to other contexts, the influx of 'others', whether voluntary or involuntary, has consistently generated tensions. Should these newcomers be compelled to adopt the customs of their new country, or should the host nation accept and even embrace their worldviews and cultures? Essentially, should the rights and cultures of the native population be deemed superior to those of newcomers? Even in the twenty-first century, answering these questions remains challenging. Delving deeper, if newcomers reject the moral, cultural, or religious norms of the native population, how should the receiving state respond? This book aims to shed light on how the rulers and intellectuals of the Qing Empire, particularly Confucian scholar-bureaucrats, grappled with these questions. It specifically examines the emerging discourse of religious tolerance, primarily focused on Islam and Christianity, which gained prominence from the late seventeenth century onwards. Although the state granted limited tolerance to these two Abrahamic faiths as long as their adherents refrained from engaging in political activities against the throne, this

approach conflicted with traditional religious perspectives rooted in Confucian political philosophy. Consequently, the birth of religious tolerance towards minority religions marked a significant shift in the historical relationship between religion and empires in China.

Today, the relationship between religion and the state in China is receiving unprecedented attention. However, comprehending this complex topic requires a solid understanding of Chinese society and culture. China was governed by imperial systems from 259 BCE until the early twentieth century, and while significant transformations have occurred since the 1911 revolution that toppled the Qing Empire, many remnants of the Imperial era endure. The political culture of modern China has been profoundly shaped by its imperial history, influencing how contemporary political elites and intellectuals perceive religion. Therefore, exploring the relationship between religion and the state in twentieth-century China without delving into its historical underpinnings, particularly the late Imperial era, proves challenging. Consequently, the interaction between government and religion during the Imperial era offers an intriguing and thought-provoking subject of study not only for historians of that period but also for those interested in post-Imperial China. This book provides a concise overview of the relationship between non-Chinese religion and the state in Imperial China, with a particular emphasis on the concept of religious tolerance originating from Confucianism and other Chinese religious traditions.

Over the past decade, I have collaborated with institutions in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom. Before acknowledging the individuals who have supported me and this project, I find it necessary to share some of my thoughts on 'coexistence' and 'minority'. In my twenties, alongside pursuing an academic career, I founded an NGO called Mansyun Association (later renamed Mustard Seed (Mansyun) Co. Ltd.) and initiated a large-scale research program called Diversity in Hong Kong, both of which were dedicated to serving ethnic minorities in Hong Kong. We provided shadow education for underprivileged and underperforming non-Chinese-speaking students, as well as worked to elevate the visibility of ethnic minorities through various platforms. These experiences led me to believe that I was an expert on 'minorities'. However, the meaning of being a minority was entirely different from engaging with one. Being a 'minority' or an 'expat' in the UK, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia brought back memories of value clashes I experienced in my youth. My journeys through different cultures exposed me to the hesitations people have when interacting with foreigners like me. Although most of these hesitations were not ill-intentioned, minorities still had to make extra efforts to explain themselves and seek understanding. 'Coexisting' is more demanding than we may think, and we should not assume that such demands diminish after a few institutional changes.

Nevertheless, I consider myself fortunate to have had an intellectually fulfilling life that prepared me for this journey. Many individuals have generously shared their valuable time to enlighten me at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the University of Hong Kong. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to Ying Fuk Tsang, Song Gang, Shen Xu Hui, Lai Chi Tim, Lai Pan Chiu, James Frankel, Fung Kam Wing, Cheung Hok Ming, Wong Tsz Fung, Yeung Man Shun, Tang Siu Fu, Yip Ching Wah, Tobias Brandner, Ithamar Theodor, Yeung Kwok Keung, Chow Wai Yin, Fr. Mong Ambrose Ih-Ren, Leung Tak Wah, Au Yik Pui, Chan Tze Wai†, Chan Tin Ho, Yuen Wing-han, Tsang Ka Lok, Ruslan Yusupov, Lee Chi Shing, and Li Chengxin. They devoted their valuable time to me during my time at the two universities. I also greatly appreciated the criticism and feedback on my work during my studies in Hong Kong from Wai Cheuk Yee, Kung Wai Han, Mohammed Al-Sudairi, Law Lok Yin, Wong Tin Kei, Lam Ho Yin, Fung Chi Ching, Lie Nga Sze, Fong Kam Ping, Chan In-suet, Ho Wan Sze, Fok Yeung Yeung, Luo Dan, Kwong Chi Leung, Lee Yee Lak, Yu Wai Sze, Lo Chung Yan, and Wong Siu Miu Michelle. In Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Japan, and other places where I have been stationed, mentors and colleagues have provided insightful suggestions and guidance, including Wang Fan-sen, Huang Chin-Shing, Pan Kuang-che, Ho Ming-sho, Zhu Marlon, Cheng Mu-chun, Cheng Yiting, Chen Titus C., Kung Ling-wei, Tommaso Previato, Cheng Tsu Bang, Tsai Chih-Che, Ching Ka Hung, Li Hsin-Yuan, Mao Ti-sheng, Farhan Ahmad Nizami, Afifi al-Akiti, Moin Ahmad Nizami, Imran bin Tajudeen, Bak Jia How, Pek Wee Chuen, Kumakura Jun, Unno Noriko, Lian Yi-zheng, Ng On-cho, Egas Bender Moniz Bandeira, Jeong Hyeju Janice, Kwan Yuk Sing, Fung Jing En, Chow Shue Fung, and Liu Zilin.

In addition to my academic friends, I must express my gratitude to my colleagues at Mansyun Association, Glocal Learning Offices, and 1841 Press. While I worked on this monograph, my colleagues took on many of my responsibilities in these organizations, allowing me the time and space to think and write. I owe a great deal of apology and gratitude to the following individuals who sacrificed their own time: Chen Kit Wing, Wong Tsz Tsing, Lui Crystal, Yeung Nga Man, Law Yee Wing, Li Yau Jun, Wong Yat Tung, Ng Wai San, Chow Wing Chun, Chu Min, Hon Lok Man, Lo Yat Ko, Lau Cheuk Fai, Fung Bak Kui, and Tang Siu Wa. I would also like to extend special thanks to Yip Kwok-wah of B & P Foundation, Tony Young of Heart-to-Heart Foundation, Kuo Chung-Hsin of the Book Republic Publishing Group, Tang Yiu Wing of Tang & Co., Ivan, Yang Memorial Methodist Social Service, the Hong Kong Intangible Cultural Heritage Office, Instituto Cultural do Governo da Região Administrativa Especial de Macau, UNESCO Hong Kong Association, the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, and the Lee Teng-Hui Foundation for their support across various sectors. I must also express my gratitude to Waseda University for supporting the publication of this work.

The first edition of this book was originally my PhD thesis at the University of Hong Kong in 2018. It was composed under the supervision of Song Gang and benefited greatly from the valuable opinions of faculty members and external examiners, including Lo Ping-Cheung, Yeung Man Shun, Chan Wing Ming, and Xu Guoqi. I have revised most parts of the manuscript, particularly reconceptualising how this book can contribute to contemporary discussions on diversity theory. I have learned a great deal from the two anonymous reviewers arranged by Hong Kong University Press, who invested significant effort into working with me, providing inspiring book lists, and revising my work numerous times. Lee Yi Nga, my preferred linguist, has spent more than a year with me meticulously editing each line of the book. This publication would not have been possible without her support. Pek Wee Chuen, head of the Department of Southeast Asian Studies at New Era University College in Malaysia, and his colleagues also dedicated months to reading the full manuscript with me during the final stage of revision. Professor Pek's insights and comments not only improved the quality of this monograph but also inspired me to embark on my next book project, on religious tolerance within Chinese religions beyond Imperial China. Last, upon finishing this book, my schoolmate Karis Chan, now a prominent designer in Hong Kong, provided me a lot of advice on the key visual for the book cover.

Different segments of this research have been presented at conferences, garnering valuable comments and criticisms. These conferences include the Eighth Forum on Catholic Studies for Young Chinese Scholars in Beijing; 'The Remaking of Erudite Scholars: Western Knowledge & Confucian in Eighteenth-Century China' at the University of Hong Kong; 'In Search of New Methods, Perspectives, and Sources: Hong Kong Postgraduate Students Conference on Ming-Qing Studies' at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University; the European Association for the Study of Religions Conference in Helsinki: 'Relocating Religion'; the Twentieth Anniversary Celebration of the Centre for the Study of Religion and Chinese Society, Chung Chi College; the Eighth International Young Scholars' Symposium on 'Christianity and Chinese Society and Culture' at the Chinese University of Hong Kong; 'Pleasure, Providence, and Purity: An International Conference on Food and Drink in Islamic Societies and Cultures' at the Centre for the Study of Islamic Culture, the Chinese University of Hong Kong; the Fourth Young Scholars' Forum in Chinese Studies at the Institute of Chinese Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong; 'New Interpretation, New Ideas: The Second Annual Literary Studies Symposium for Junior Researchers' co-held by the University of Hong Kong and the Chinese University of Hong Kong; 'Grand Chessboard in Inner Asia: Interaction of Inner and Outer Factors' at National Chengchi University; the Annual Islamic Political Thought Conference: 'Makkah and the Hijaz in the Imperial-era: Migrations and Scholarly Networks in the 19th & 20th Centuries' at the King Faisal Center for Research

Islamic Studies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; 'China in the 17th century: Trauma, Transition, and Global Transformations' at the Università degli Studi di Napoli L'Orientale; the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference 2022 in Hawai'i; the Oxford International History of East Asia Seminar at Oxford University China Centre; and the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies Seminar at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. Over the past 12 years, I have worked on this topic with many different colleagues who have significantly contributed to the development of my ideas regarding the multiple forms and origins of diversity. Although I cannot list all of them here, their input has been invaluable. It is through careful and extensive study of various cases that we can uncover these often overlooked forms of diversity. However, to maintain the readability of this monograph, I have not included many of the cases I have discussed in my previous works. Additionally, I have omitted some conceptual discussions, such as the biased discourse of 'religion' in Sinophone academia and the emotional changes of Confucian bureaucrats. For readers interested in these topics, I refer you to my previous publications: *Chinese Culture Quarterly* [九州學林] (Vol. 38, 2017), *Ching Feng* [景風] (Vol. 16, 2017), *Eruditus* [大學海] (Vol. 4, 2017), *Sino-Christian Studies* (No. 23, 2017), *The Journal of Middle East and Central Asia Studies* [中東中亞研究] (Vol. 2, 2018), *Newsletter of OUHK Tin Ka Ping Centre of Chinese Culture* [田家炳中華文化中心通訊] (Vol. 3, 2019), *Dirasat* (Vol. 55, 2020), *Twenty-First Century* [二十一世紀] (Vol. 183, 2021), *New History* [新史學] (Vol. 33, no. 2, 2022), and *Fear*, *Heterodoxy*, *and Crime in Traditional China: Toward an Anthropological History of Emotion and Its Social Management* (Ch. 3, 2024), edited by my dear friend Tommaso Previato. I also refer you to my previous monograph in Chinese, *Why Am I Tolerating Christians: Religious Tolerance of Mid-Nineteenth Century Confucians* [為甚麼我在包容基督徒？十九世紀中葉儒者的宗教寬容].

Finally, I wish to dedicate this book to my parents, my family, and the city called Hong Kong, where I was born and raised. They all provided me with essential material and spiritual luxury to compose this book. As we engage in the pursuit of knowledge, we stand on the shoulders of giants—not only the great thinkers who came before us but also those who diligently cultivated an environment that allows individuals like us to embrace and relish our intellectual journey. What if we find ourselves unable to coexist? A classic Chinese fable from *Sun Tzu on The Art of War* (Lionel Giles, 1910) presents us with the following lesson: 'For the men of Wu and the men of Yue are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right.' Diversity aboard the vessel is an undeniable reality, and our decision simply lies in whether we wish it to ground or not.

Introduction

Before the rise of individualism and secularism in Europe in the eighteenth century, the state's obligation and authority to maintain the morality of its subjects was self-evident, not only because monarchs had to adopt and enforce the Roman Catholic Church's full package of morality to justify their rule, but perhaps also because people simply like to see others do things in a certain 'correct' way they approve of.

Then came the 'age of Enlightenment' and various schools of liberal ideas advocating individual freedom and autonomy. Since then, individualism has been continually abused and distorted by both its supporters and opponents. A neat and clear note of this idea can be found in the writings of Friedrich A. Hayek (1899–1992):

> Individualism has a bad name to-day and the term has come to be connected with egotism and selfishness. But the individualism of which we speak in contrast to socialism and all other forms of collectivism has no necessary connection with these . . . But the essential features of that individualism which, from elements provided by Christianity and the philosophy of classical antiquity, was first fully developed during the Renaissance and has since grown and spread into what we know as Western European civilisation the respect for the individual man qua man, that is the recognition of his own views and tastes as supreme in his own sphere, however narrowly that may be circumscribed, and the belief that it is desirable that men should develop their own individual gifts and bents.[1]

The recognition and respect of an individual's 'own views and tastes as supreme in his own sphere' is, in other words, the restriction of 'others', including the state and the government, to intervene in the private life of the people. Contemporary readers from a liberal background might take this notion for

1. Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (London: Routledge, 2006), 14–15.

granted or as a 'natural right' in most societies. Nevertheless, the recognition of individual rights is not a clear concept. As it is implemented, criticism may very likely arise, not from dictators or the evil figures we would imagine, but from people with good consciences and ethical concerns. Even Hayek, one of the most important libertarian economists and political theorists of the twentieth century, who devoted his life to defending classic liberalism during the age of ideologies, agreed that his opponents were speaking up for their 'just irritation':

> Because of the growing impatience with the slow advance of liberal policy, the just irritation with those who used liberal phraseology in defence of anti-social privileges, and the boundless ambition seemingly justified by the material improvements already achieved, it came to pass that toward the turn of the century the belief in the basic tenets of liberalism was more and more relinquished.[2]

With the recognition of individual rights, the state eventually became 'secular' in the sense not of atheism but of retreat from its obligation to uphold 'moral values' among its subjects. For some people, such legal systems are somewhat 'irresponsible'. For example, Hong Kong, my home city, claimed to be a follower of 'positive non-interventionism', which 'went against all the instincts of government officials, paid to spend other people's money and meddle in other people's affairs'.[3] Although the majority of Hong Kong citizens have a Chinese background, our legal system, unlike other Chinese-speaking societies, does not criminalise adultery, the abandonment of elderly family members, or the violation of other traditional ethical obligations.[4] Obviously, the conceptual differences regarding the role of the government and the legal system between Hong Kong and other Chinese societies have been debated ever since the British reign over the city began in the 1840s. However, generally speaking, it was still not a natural phenomenon that governments forgo their obligation (or power) to intervene in the private lives of their nationals. The separation between politics

2. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, 19.
3. Milton Friedman, 'Hong Kong Wrong', *Wall Street Journal*, 6 October 2006, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116009800068684505.
4. See *Zhonghua minguo xingfa (2010 xiuding)* 中華民國刑法 (2010修訂) [Criminal code of Republic of China (2010 amended)], chapters 16, 17, 25; for English translation, see Laws and Regulations Retrieving System from the website of Ministry of Justice (ROC), accessed 25 December 2017, https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/Index.aspx; *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laonian ren quanyi baozhang fa (2012 xiuding)* 中華人民共和國老年人權益保障法 (2012修訂) [Law of the People's Republic of China on protection of the rights and interests of the elderly (revised in 2012)], chapter 2; for English translation, see Peking University Centre for Legal Information, accessed 25 December 2017, http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1159&CGid=#menu1; See also Celia Hatton, 'New China Law Says Children "Must Visit Parents" ', BBC News, 1 July 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-23124345.

and ethics (or religion) occurred in various times and places under various circumstances.

Hayek, as an economist, emphasised that this set of ideas grew alongside the 'growth of commerce', first in Northern Italy, then later in the whole of Europe. The respect for individual rights, the toleration of diverse thought, the diminishing intervention of the government into people's lives were all complicated phenomena in history. Even in European history, the toleration of diversity, or so-called secular governments, did not solely originate from the expanding influence of merchants. In an inspiring publication edited by Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann in 1999, quite a number of scholars identified different factors—such as the rise of nationalism and the nation-state, the construction of the concept of 'race', and colonial experiences from the seventeenth to the twentieth century—that led to new forms of state and identity. Deviating from the traditional discourse, the role of religion did not fade in these stories but underwent a lengthy process of reinterpretation and from time to time became an important element of these communities.[5]

The cases studied in this publication cover countries from Europe to Asia. From the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, the Qing government developed similar political philosophies with features of secularism, which to a certain extent accepted that subjects held worldviews different from those of the court. Unfortunately, this familiar story, which took place in China before the twentieth century, remains untold.

By the end of this book, we will see how the political philosophies of toleration developed in the context of late Imperial China differed from the toleration theories in the rest of the world during their time. Although the fact of diversity has usually led to the implementation of toleration policies in various times and spaces, the conceptual foundations of such decisions were always different. This research seeks to clarify the Qing toleration policy and some of the thought behind it. We have no intention of compiling an encyclopaedia of Qing religious policies and thought of Qing Confucian scholar-bureaucrats on religious issues.[6]

5. Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann, eds., *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). The discussions in this volume will be introduced in the following sections.

6. The term 'scholar-bureaucrat' in this research can roughly be understood as *shi* 士 in Chinese. The term *shi* has twenty-three definitions in *Kangxi zidian* 康熙字典 (Kangxi dictionary). Four among them are related to our discussion. The first one denotes *shi* as the elite among the four peoples, referring to society (*simin shi wei shou* 四民士爲首); the second definition is the 'name of all officials' (guan zong ming 官總名), meaning that *shi* means bureaucrats; the third definition literally and usually means legal judge (*Li guan* 理官) in classical Chinese. However, the explanation of *Kangxi zidian* following this term is 'to determine wrong and right' (de qi quzhi zhi li 得其曲直之理), and it could probably be generalised as people who could make moral decisions; the last definition relevant to our discussion is 'those who know the celestial way' (neng zhi tiandao zhe 能知天道者); in this sense, the knowledge *shi* possesses is endowed with a layer of religious

The cases we investigate in the following chapters do not represent the majority view of the Qing Confucians, but these voices were influential among the bureaucracy during the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. The whole story we present in this research serves also as one case of religious toleration among other versions of toleration developed in other societies. We intend to show readers that, to reach the destination of a tolerant society, different attempts were made throughout the history of humankind. In some cases, the façade of toleration of different voices might not lead to a secular and diversified society but consolidates the rule of the original government.

Research Aim

This research will reveal how the Qing Empire (1616–1912) restricted its intervention in the religious life of Muslims and Christians from the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. Here, by 'Christians' we mean Roman Catholics, and on very rare occasions, Russian Orthodox. During this period, Protestant missionaries only barely entered the Qing Empire and had very little influence within it. By contrast, for the most part of this book, we do not distinguish among the various Muslim (Hui 回) communities across the vast physical area

authority. See *Kangxi zidian* 康熙字典 [Kangxi dictionary], *Vol. chou-ji-zhong* 丑集中 (s.l.; s.n.; block-printed edition published around 1662–1722; collected by the Chinese University of Hong Kong University Library Rare Book Room), 46. In the context of late Imperial China, *shi*, at least in China proper, were most likely Confucian scholars. They were sometimes known as *ru-shi* (儒士); see Zhao Lian 昭槤 (1776–1829), *Xiaoting zalu* 嘯亭雜錄 [Records of Xiaoting], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua Book, 2006 [1980]), 16–17. People of this distinction who did not serve in the government were sometimes known as *chushi* (處士); see Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610–1695), *Nanlei wenan* 南雷文案 [Literary cases of Nanlei], vol. 10, 3b, in *Sibu congkan chubian* 四部叢刊初編 [The first collectaneum of the four branches of literature], book 1613; Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠 (1738–1801), *Wenshi tongyi* 文史通義 [General principles of literature and history], 1832 (道光壬辰) edition collected in *Yueyatang congshu* 粵雅堂叢書 [Collectaneum of the elegant study of Canton]), vol. 1, 29b, online edition see Chinese Text Project, accessed 1 February 2024, https://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&res=80449; In this study, we use the term 'scholar-bureaucrat', a combination of the two features of the group of intellectuals we discuss specifically, instead of simply 'scholar' because the word *shi* very often refers to all intellectuals and scholars rather than just those serving in the bureaucracy. For example, in a recent translation of his own work, Yu Ying-shih 余英時 used 'scholars-turned-merchants' as a translation for the term *shi shang* 士商 in his earlier Chinese publications, discussing the rise of *shi shang* 士商 or *ru shang* 儒商. In his discussion, Yu referred to them as those young elites who 'abandon Confucian studies for commercial pursuits' (qiru jiugu 棄儒就賈) (251). In this case, *shi* refers to any Confucian scholar, regardless of his political position. See Yu Ying-shih, 'Business Culture and Chinese Traditions: Toward a Study of the Evolution of Merchant Culture in Chinese History', in *Chinese History and Culture*, vol. 1, *Sixth Century B.C.E. to Seventeenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 222–272; see also Yu Ying-shih 余英時, *Zhongguo jinshi zongjiao lunli yu shangren jingshen* 中國近世宗教倫理與商人精神 [Religious intra-mundane ethics and the spirits of merchants in China] (Taipei: Linking, 2004 [1987]).

and ethnicities of China because, as we understand, the denomination Hui was generally considered to be one single identity with very strong religious—instead of political or ethnic—connotation. We do acknowledge that the Qing court had rather different policies towards Muslims of different ethnicities and from different parts of the empire, especially those in East Turkestan, or later Huijiang 回疆 or Xinjiang 新疆, but as will be seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the Qing government's differential treatment of Muslims in what is now Xinjiang stemmed from political and military concerns and had little to do with the inhabitants' religious beliefs. For a detailed discussion of Hui identities before the twentieth century, one may refer to the meticulous account of Yee Lak Elliot Lee.[7]

The experience of the Qing Empire, which led to the state's partial retreat from the persecution of heresies, was quite different from those of the Europeans. In the early eighteenth century, Emperor Yongzheng 雍正帝 (r. 1722–1735) discovered that his views on Muslims and Christians subtly but fundamentally diverged from those of his ministers. In a nutshell, the imperial bureaucrats, selected from Confucian elites who had passed the imperial civil examination, maintained their strong religious concerns while in office. In Confucian political philosophy, 'governing and teaching are not two things; the roles of official and teacher are united' (zhijiao wuer, guanshi heyi 治教無二，官師合一). According to these ministers, Muslims and Christians, who held different worldviews and participated in alien rituals and ceremonies, coupled with their connection to foreign political entities, were definitely 'heretics' who needed to be 'civilised' and 'educated'.

When the Manchu emperors requested that the Confucian scholar-bureaucrats be more tolerant of Muslims in the empire, the Confucians found the imperial order in conflict with their creed and identity. It was only in the eighth year of Yongzheng's reign (1730), after the emperor had severely punished a scholar-bureaucrat for his continuous complaints about them, that the Confucian bureaucracy gave up their agenda of initiating a nationwide persecution of Muslims. From a study of imperial archives, we also find that Confucian scholar-bureaucrats had a strong motivation to intervene against Christianity in the empire during the time of Emperor Yongzheng. The 'final resolution' between the emperor and the bureaucracy was a new definition on the concept of 'heresy' in an edict written in 1727. The emperor stated:

> The Buddhists and the Daoists have severely attacked the errors of Christianity [Xiyangjiao 西洋教], while the Westerners [Xiyang ren 西洋人] do the same

7. Yee Lak Elliot Lee, 'Muslims as "*Hui*" in Late Imperial and Republican China: A Historical Reconsideration of Social Differentiation and Identity Construction', *Historical Social Research* 44, no. 3 (2019): 226–263.

> to the Buddhists and the Daoists, regarding them as heretics [*yiduan* 異端]. They calumniate each other and denounce each other's religions as heresies. They regard their own doctrine as the only orthodoxy [*zhengdao* 正道], and other teachings as heresies. This is not how our Sage understood 'heresy'. Confucius once said, 'After we criticise the heresies, the harm they cause will cease' [*Lunyu* 論語, 2.16]. Did Confucius regard the opinions of people other than his as 'heresy'? He certainly did not. Whatever religions, in China and foreign countries, employed by people without a proper mindset, and harm the custom and morals of the time, are all heresies . . . All in all, people in the world criticise each other, seeing those who are different from themselves as heretics, which leads to conflicts and even hatred just because of their unjust and unclear minds. They do not know people are born with differences and their customs are therefore not the same. We cannot force the different to be the same nor the same to be different. Everyone has their strength and weakness. The Sage Kings [*shengdi xianwang* 聖帝賢王], in order to maintain the ultimate harmony of the cosmos, would take all strengths and exterminate all weaknesses, and bring about a world in which different people could live peacefully together and can all employ their strengths.
>
> 向來僧道家極口詆毀西洋教，而西洋人又極詆佛老之非，彼此互相訕謗，指為異端，此等識見，皆以同乎已者為正道，而以異乎己者為異端，非聖人之所謂異端也。孔子曰：「攻乎異端，斯害也已。」孔子豈以異乎己者，檠斥之為異端乎？凡中國外國所設之教，用之不以其正，而為世道人心之害者，皆異端也……總之天下之人，存心不公，見理不明，每以同乎己者為是，以異乎已者為非，遂致互相譏誹，幾同讐敵。不知人之品類不齊，習尚亦不一，不能强之使異，亦不能强之使同，且各有所長，各有所短，惟存其長而棄其短，知其短而不昧其所長，則彼此可以相安，人人得遂其用，方得聖帝賢王，明通公溥之道，而成太和之宇宙矣。[8]

The reinterpretation of 'heresy' provided legitimate reasons for the followers of non-Chinese religions to continue at least part of their practices in the empire. As long as the believers of non-Chinese religions did not contaminate the minds of the people and threaten political stability, they should not be regarded as heretics. This remarkable edict, without a doubt, did not change the mind of

8. *Shizong Xian huangdi shangyu neige* 世宗憲皇帝上諭內閣 [Grand Secretariat's imperial edicts of the Yongzheng reign], vol. 56, 17b–20b, collected by Wenyuange Siku Quanshu 文淵閣四庫全書, in digital form in the Kanseki Repository 漢籍リポジトリ (Call No. KR2f0008), accessed 28 September 2014, https://www.kanripo.org/ed/KR2f0008/WYG/056; part of this translation is by Eugenio Menegon. We have modified the wording of this English version of the edict in several places for sake of consistency in word choice. See Eugenio Menegon, 'Yongzheng's Conundrum: The Emperor on Christianity, Religions, and Heterodoxy', in *Rooted in Hope: China—Religion—Christianity*, vol. 1, ed. Barbara Hoster, Dirk Kuhlmann, and Zbigniew Wesolowski (Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica, 2017), 327–329.

Confucian intellectuals instantly. However, this concept eventually formed the core of religious policies for Islam and Christianity in the Qing Empire until the mid-nineteenth century.

In Chapter 3, our focus turns to the successor of Emperor Yongzheng. His son, Emperor Qianlong 乾隆帝 (r. 1735–1796) finally defeated the Dzungar Khanate and brought Altishahr and Dzungaria under his reign. After the conquest of the region, the Muslim population in the empire became politically and economically more important to the Qing court. The empire could not bear the risk of civil war for the sake of maintaining the ethics of its subjects. Restriction of the state's impulse to 'civilise' 'heresies' in the newly conquered region was, therefore, even more important. How the empire governed Islam, and the empire's relationship with the state-supported religions of the Manchurians, Mongolians, and Han Chinese could exemplify how Emperor Yongzheng's new interpretation of 'heresy' became the very core of the empire's religious policy.

In brief, the Qing court did not attempt to standardise religions in Altishahr and Dzungaria as in Han-populated South China, nor did it attempt to Confucianise the Muslim population or provide systematic Chinese education. This was not normal practice for the empire. In southwest China, which was also populated by Muslims and other non-Chinese subjects of the empire, the government did not hesitate to bring in orthodox religion to replace those of the indigenous populations. By implementing indirect rule in the northwest frontier, the Qing government marginalised the role of religion in political arrangements. Local Muslim elites, as long as they provided their loyalty to the court, could, under certain conditions, rule their people according to their traditions. Because assimilation was not part of the political agenda, many religious and cultural disputes were avoided. In this sense, Qing governance in the region was quite similar to the secular government seen in libertarian discourse.

Nevertheless, toleration always comes with limitations. Pointing out how 'heresies' were tolerated by the Qing court is far from sufficient for us to understand the religious policy of the Qing Empire. In Chapters 4 and 5, we examine how the marginalisation of religion in politics was implemented starting in the mid-eighteenth century. Chapter 4 focuses on Islam in the Qing Empire. The discussion reveals how the court marginalised Islamic identity. In particular, the connections between Muslims under the Qing reign and those outside the territory had to be placed under strict control. The concern of the Qing Empire was quite understandable: after all, the government could not be sure whether the loyalty of its subjects was with the emperor of the Qing dynasty or the caliph of the Arabian world. This was a universal question faced by contemporary governments across the world, such as the British Empire, which had millions of Muslim subjects.

As Cemil Aydin pointed out, the political relationship between the British Crown and its Muslim subjects was a 'fragile arrangement of dual loyalties'.[9] As Muslims considered themselves members of the Ummah, the Islamic supranational community, rulers would remain sceptical as to whether their subjects' religious identities would outweigh their nationality. This is a reasonable doubt, as 'no man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other' (Matthew 6:24, KJV). This doubt was shared by other European colonial empires. 'When one Indonesian prince wore a fez during his visit to Istanbul, Dutch authorities questioned his loyalty to the Dutch Empire.'[10] In the case of the Qing Empire, the concern of dual identity also arose. The policies for this particular group of subjects thus aimed at minimising the importance of the 'other', religious identity. This led to a similar policy result as in the European empires: 'During this period, [European] colonial rulers' views of Muslim subjects as members of a single civilisation and race solidified. Muslim subjects embraced this racial identity for various political purposes of their own.'[11]

The situation for Christians in the empire was similar. Although their numbers were much smaller and their influence much less than those of Muslims, the Qing rulers implemented similar measures for the group. Chapter 5 first illustrates how Christian identity could be forgotten by the court, although Christianity was considered heterodox and had been persecuted since the mid-eighteenth century when the monarchy was faced with the threat of White Lotus Uprising. Even in the intellectual and political discussions of Confucian scholar-bureaucrats, religion and knowledge brought by Europeans were considered irrelevant and inferior learning (*zaxue* 雜學). Although they did not always mention it, Qing rulers did not intend to halt all Christian activities in the Celestial Empire but just wanted to keep these heresies far from politics and the majority non-Christian subjects. After all, priests from Europe served in the Qing court for many different purposes until the end of the eighteenth century.

The governance of Christianity in the empire was safely grounded in the rationale and agenda of Qing's governance of Islam. The Qing court aimed to marginalise religiosity among the communities of the Abrahamic religions. The emphasis on political loyalty instead of the standardisation of ethics and world-views was clearly modelled on the ideas of Emperor Yongzheng in 1727.

9. Cemil Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 90.
10. Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World*, 94.
11. Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World*, 65.

During the research and writing of this book, questions arose as to whether such attitude towards pagans or even 'heresies' really constitutes 'tolerance'. In fact, there are many ways to handle religious diversity in the past and contemporary world alike. Even the seemingly simple notion of 'tolerance' can have very different forms depending on historical, socio-political, and cultural contexts. As a combined investigation in history and religion, this book attempts to point out the limitations of contemporary approaches to religious diversity and tolerance and tries to make a breakthrough using a historical perspective. This is organised in the sixth chapter, with a review of the theoretical development of religious tolerance, then case studies showing how non-Westerners have dealt with religious diversity and achieved tolerance in a completely different context. Furthermore, by reminding readers of the different dimensions of possible conflicts in a diverse society, we prepare them for the last part of the chapter, in which we see how Confucian scholars of the early nineteenth century developed their own discourses on tolerance and how their discourses contribute to our more comprehensive worldview towards forms and practices of 'tolerance'.

In the last chapter of this book, the focus returns to the concept of 'heresy' redefined by Emperor Yongzheng, further developed over a century of practical implementation. Through the actual experience of governing Muslims and Christians, some scholar-bureaucrats conceptualised the idea in a more systematic way, expressing it in the language of Confucianism. In the early nineteenth century, when the Europeans posed a military threat to the empire, Christians gained more and more freedom to practice and even spread their religion openly, thanks to a series of treaties protecting the rights of foreign missionaries. Confucian scholar-bureaucrats were eager to explain the phenomenon. Their discourse no longer focused on 'how to "standardise" religions' but rather 'why are there different religions in the world?' and 'why can't Confucianism be spread to other communities?' The change of their ultimate concern is examined by illustrating the discourses of three scholar-bureaucrats. As we will see, their discourses are very little, if at all, like contemporary approaches to diversity; yet they show us how tolerance can be achieved with a wholly different rationale.

Compared with the writings of Emperor Yongzheng's ministers, Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794–1857), Yao Ying 姚瑩 (1785–1853) and Liang Tingnan 梁廷枏 (1796–1861) believed that their government had less of a role in civilising and enlightening its subjects and a greater role in maintaining the empire. Surprisingly, although these scholar-bureaucrats proposed the recognition and acceptance of multireligious phenomenon and religious toleration, they shared no assumptions with the European liberals promoting multiculturalism before the twentieth century. Liberals grounded their theoretical foundations on (1) state neutrality and governments representing only secular authority, (2) freedom

of individual conscience, and (3) equality among humankind.[12] Confucians suggested that different religions should be tolerated under an empire for three different reasons: (1) it represents the will of Heaven (*tiandao* 天道), (2) order and stability of society are the ultimate concern of religions (instead of individual conscience), and (3) humans are not equal.

From Emperor Yongzheng's ministers to the three nineteenth-century men, this change in the perception of the 'other' (and therefore 'heresy') in Qing politics marked a change in the cosmology and political philosophy of some Confucian scholar-bureaucrats. Nevertheless, there is no need to exaggerate the acceptance of a secular idea of government or the notion of toleration of different religions. These ideas would not even have been accepted by most Confucians at the time. In particular, the concept discussed in this research would probably have been rejected by Confucians not engaging in the bureaucracy. As Wang Fansen 王汎森 reminded us, historians must always be concerned with conceptual lags when a new idea develops. For example, while some Confucian elites in southeast China developed ideas supporting commercial activities in the late seventeenth century, many Confucians still believed that profit-seeking activities were not appropriate. Whether a new intellectual trend influenced other people largely depends on the historical context, not just the thought itself. Some concepts became institutional legacies which would be reinterpreted in the future, while others would fade out of sight and mind.[13] The new interpretation of 'heresy' by Emperor Yongzheng definitely belonged to the former group. This idea was implemented in actual policies and was repeatedly brought up whenever there were religious conflicts between the empire and the two Abrahamic religions. Nevertheless, many Confucians and elites in the Qing government could not tame their instincts to 'standardise' and intervene in the subjects' customs and ethics. After all, the voice for toleration and diversity was just one among the many intellectuals and politicians during the period.

In the following section, the backgrounds of the Qing Empire from the eighteenth to early nineteenth century will be introduced, including the 'multiethnicity' of the Qing Empire and how Confucians handled nonorthodox religions in their capacity as scholar-bureaucrats. The analytical framework of our research will be explained in the following chapter, together with a demonstration of how this research attempts to contribute to the current discussion of the field of study.

12. Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen, introduction to *Multiculturalism and Political Theory*, ed. Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1–22.
13. Wang Fansen 王汎森, *Sixiang shi shenghuo de yizhong fangshi: Zhongguo jindai sixiangshi de zai sikao* 思想是生活的一種方式：中國近代思想史的再思考 [Thinking is a way of living: The rethinking of modern Chinese intellectual history] (Taipei: Linking, 2017), 9, 23–28.

Qing Empire: A Contradictory Unity

In 1776, at the end of *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith (1723–1790) commented on the British Empire:

> The rulers of Great Britain have, for more than a century past, amused the people with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only. It has hitherto been, not an empire but the project of an empire; not a gold mine but the project of a gold mine.[14]

This comment applies to many other empires in history and even to countries in the present day. The Qing Empire was one of the most obvious examples of a large empire in early modern East Asia. As a political entity, it was similar to the British Empire throughout its history—an 'unfinished, untidy, mass of contradictions, aspirations and anomalies', as described by John Darwin.[15] In terms of state ideologies, political institutions, and governing policies, particularly those regarding political power allocation and ethnic governance issues, the Qing Empire did not have a static, persistent master plan or blueprint throughout its nearly three centuries of existence. Pamela Kyle Crossley supported this idea and believed that the relationship between 'the ruler' and 'the ruled' transformed from time to time, especially when the Qing expanded its territory and enlarged the variety and size of its population:

> During the Qing, ideas about the ruler and ideas about the ruled changed each other. Seventeenth-century expressions of the relationship of the khan Nurgaci [r. 1616–26] to peoples under his dominion differed fundamentally from concepts of subordination to the first Qing emperor, Hung Taiji [r. 1627–35, 1636–43]. In the eighteenth century, particularly under the Qianlong [1736–95] emperor Hong Li, the ideological relationship between the ruler and the ruled completed another turn. It gained not only new complexities but new purchase on the indoctrination of aspiring officials and literate elites outside of government as the motors of conquest slowed, then rooted into pillars of civil rule. The substance of these changes may . . . be crudely simplified to this paradigm: Under the khanship created by Nurgaci, a symbolic code of master to slave . . . was amended to a highly differentiated system of cultural and moral identities under the Qing emperorship of the later seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century, the burden of the emperorship to impersonate its diverse peoples was a primary theme in the representations . . . of universal rule. Increasingly abstract court expression of undelimited rulership required circumscription of

14. Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (New York: Bantam Dell, 2003), 1207–1208.
15. John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xi–xiii.

> its interior domains, so that criteria of identity were necessarily embedded in this ideology.[16]

Even if we focus on the early phase of the Manchu Empire, the ruling class could not come to a conclusion on how the empire should be governed. The first khan of the Later Jin Empire 後金, Nurhaci 努爾哈赤 (r. 1616–1626), had intended the princes (*beile* 貝勒) to form a council of peers to share the political power of the newly formed empire. His successor, Abahai (or Hung Taiji 皇太極, r. 1627–1635, 1636–1643), however, put an end to this arrangement and brought three out of the eight banner units (*Baqi* 八旗) under the direct control of the emperor. In terms of the relationship between the Manchus and the Han Chinese formerly under the reign of the Ming Empire, the imperial authority had to face another significant controversial issue: Was the Qing Empire a Manchu or a 'Chinese' regime?

Dorgon 多爾袞 (1612–1650), the brother of Emperor Abahai, became prince regent of the third Qing emperor, Fulin 福臨 (r. 1643–1661), also known as Emperor Shunzhi 順治. They encountered a revolt from the other Manchu princes, particularly Dorgon's siblings, while they attempted to 'sinicise' (written as 'sinify' in Wakeman's book).[17] Despite two decades of effort by Prince Regent Dorgon and Emperor Shunzhi, the conflicts between Manchu and the Han Chinese did not cease. In his last will, the emperor rejected his own policy of sinicising the government and neglecting the Manchu nobles and their traditions after he assumed personal rule in the early 1650s. The question of ethnicity remained unsolved.[18]

Ishibashi Takao 石橋崇雄, after reviewing Japanese scholarship, also concluded that the Qing Empire's feature of multiethnicity took a long time to form and consolidate. He believed that its 'state discourse' on the issue of ethnicity was

16. Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Taipei: SMC, 2001 [1999]), 2.
17. Frederic Wakeman Jr, *The Fall of Imperial China* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 78–82.
18. For the 'sinicisation' of regent Dorgon and Emperor Shunzhi, see Yeh Kao-shu 葉高樹, ' "Manzu Hanhua" yanjiu shang de ji ge wenti' 「滿族漢化」研究上的幾個問題 [Several questions on the study of Manchu sinicisation], *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica* 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊 70 (December 2010): 195–218; Cheng Jichun 成積春, 'Lun Shunzhi "zui ji" ' 論順治「罪己」 [On Shunzhi's 'self-deprecating'], *Social Science Front* 社會科學戰線, no. 3 (2006): 281–284; Chun-Yi Wu 吳仲一, 'Qing Shizu Shunzhi de "zhi han yu hanhua" ' 清世祖順治的「治漢與漢化」[The Emperor Sungei to govern the Hans and evolved into the Hanisation], *Beishi jiaoda shejiao xuebao* 北市教大社教學報 [Journal of Taipei Municipal University of Education] 8–9 (December 2010): 1–14; Robert B. Oxnam, *Ruling from Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661–1669* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 51–64.

completed only in the early years of Emperor Qianlong's reign.[19] In short, the features of Qing Empire governance shifted from time to time. The ambition and agendas of the different agents, including the royalty, nobility, bureaucracy, and subjects, were also diverse and inconstant.

Confucian Scholar-Bureaucrats and Heresies

Confucian scholar-bureaucrats, making up a large part of the titanic Qing bureaucracy, also had diverse understandings of the empire, its nature, its subjects, and even the scholar-bureaucrats' own identities. To understand the Qing Empire even beyond the border of 'China proper',[20] it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the Confucian scholar-bureaucrats. This research reviews the interaction between these 'orthodox' intellectuals and 'heresies' in late Imperial China. 'Heresies' in this research mainly refers to Islam and Christianity, while 'orthodox intellectuals' refers to Confucians who possessed both ideological and political authority in the Qing Empire.

In the eighteenth century, Chinese intellectuals inherited the imagination of the so-called Chinese World Order, with the recognition of the multiethnic and multireligious phenomena both inside and outside the empire. Muslims and Christians were obviously a part of the empire in their time. Scholar-bureaucrats could not neglect these heretic religions, especially Muslims, who lived in almost all regions of the empire. Confucians, as intellectuals, had to provide justifiable explanations for new 'heresies' entering their world.[21] This was similar to how

19. Ishibashi Takao 石橋崇雄, 'Manzhou (manju) wangchao lun—Qingchao guojia lun xu shuo' 「滿洲」 (manju) 王朝論——清朝國家論序說 [On Manchu dynasty—Preface of the state discourse of the Qing dynasty], trans. Song Jun 宋軍, in *Ming Qing shidaishi de jiben wenti* 明清時代史的基本問題 [Fundamental questions of Ming Qing history], trans. Zhou Shaoquan 周紹泉, ed. Mori Masao 森正夫 (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2013), 260–288.
20. 'China proper', also known as 'Inner China', meant the eighteen provincial administrative areas south of the Great Wall. Harry Harding suggested that the concept dates back to 1827 and was developed from the discourse of Chinese-speaking intellectuals in the early nineteenth century. See Harry Harding, 'The Concept of "Greater China": Themes, Variations, and Reservations', *China Quarterly* 136 (December 1993): 660–686; the term had already been commonly used in the narratives of Qing history. See William T. Rowe, *China's Last Empire: The Great Qing* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 35–36.
21. A narrower definition of the notion 'Chinese World Order' was related to the international trading and diplomatic system between China and its trading partners. In 1968, John King Fairbank proposed that the 'Chinese World Order' was understood as a worldview developed from the tribute system (*chaogong tixi* 朝貢體系) of the Ming and Qing periods. He stated that the Sinocentric Chinese world order, or the tribute system, was superseded by the Western trading and diplomatic system after 1840. See John King Fairbank, 'Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West', *Far Eastern Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (February 1942): 129–149; John King Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). There have been numerous discussions on this notion from the 1970s to the present day. Hamashita Takeshi 濱下武志, for example, enriched this theory by studying the archives and materials of

European Christians had to respond to the emergence of other religions by constructing 'theologies of religions' (rather than the singular term 'theology').[22] The Confucian understandings of religions were even more important for those who were part of the bureaucracy. When encountering Muslims and Christians in regions under their governance, they had no choice but to craft a set of polices for these 'heretic' faith communities.

One common feature of these diverse religious groups, however, was their vague, and sometimes problematic, identities in the eyes of the imperial elites and political agents. Although the Qing Empire was a culturally and morally plural society, it seldom celebrated this diversity. As Anthony C. Yu 余國藩 suggested:

> There has never been a period in China's historical past in which the government of the state, in imperial and post-imperial form, pursued a neutral policy toward religion . . . For more than two millennia, the core ideological convictions shaping and buttressing imperial governance also directed correlatively the purpose and process to regulate, control, and exploit all rivalling religious traditions whenever it was deemed feasible and beneficial to the state.[23]

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the Dutch East Indies, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Ryukyu (present-day Okinawa), Japan, Korea, and China. He presented these ideas in a series of articles from 1976 to 2008. His research on Ryukyu, Korea, Japan, and other vassal states surrounding China reconstructed our understanding of the relationship between the tribute system and the treaty system of the West, developed from the Westphalian sovereignty system. Hamashita brought our attention to the agency of the Asians when the two diplomatic systems clashed. This narrative reinforced Fairbank's discourse which, as some scholars believed, underestimated Asians' changing worldviews after the 1840s. Eight important articles from Hamashita can be found in Hamashita Takeshi, *China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives*, ed. Mark Selden and Linda Grove (New York: Routledge, 2008). David C. Kang contributed to this idea by pulling the time frame back to the sixteenth century. By starting his narrative from the Imjin War (1592–1598), Kang investigated how the East Asian world order was constructed. Instead of referring to the so-called commonly shared Confucian values, Kang tried to place the important concepts of the tribute system into historical context. See David C. Kang, *East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). With the recognition of the diversified meanings and implications of the notion, this paper refers to the worldview of the Confucians, developed from their cannons, by the term 'Chinese World Order'. This definition neglects the actual and historical international system that had been operating in East Asia for more than three centuries. Our working definition for this study focuses more on the utopian version of this idea in the Confucians' rhetoric: the ideal world as imagined by Confucian scholar-bureaucrats. The details of this 'Chinese World Order' can be found in Wang Ke 王柯, *Zhongguo, cong 'tianxia' dao minzu guojia* 中國，從「天下」到民族國家 [China, from '*tianxia*' to nation-state] (Taipei: National Chengchi University Press, 2017), 1–52.

22. A typical discourse and a decent introduction on the discipline of theology of religions could be found in John Hick's publication in 1995. See John Hick, *A Christian Theology of Religions: The Rainbow of Faiths* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995).
23. There has been a huge amount of scholarship relating to this long and important discussion. For a brief illustration, see Valerie Hansen, 'The Granting of Titles', in *Changing Gods in Medieval China, 1127–1276* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), chapter 4, 79–104; Anthony C. Yu, *State and Religion in China: Historical and Textual Perspectives* (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 3.

This passionate pursuit of social order and stability is even identified as an 'order complex' (*Zhixu qingjie* 秩序情結) in some scholars' description.[24] During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the order complex in the transcendental world grew into a complex system. Local deities before the time, although not recognised by the central government, were worshipped by devotees, more often than not without intervention from the state. However, the Song Empire (960–1279), and its sophisticated bureaucracy 'began to award name plaques and official titles to deities'.[25] Gods were therefore on the record and under the regulation of the state. Under this emerging state cult, Confucian bureaucrats were occupied with extra duties. In Valerie Hansen's words:

> Once appointed to office, district magistrates collected taxes, administered justice, and supervised local schools. Because they represented the emperor, who presided over the entire empire and who was viewed as the appointee of the gods, each official was responsible as well for the spiritual well-being of his district.[26]

The regulation of religions since the end of the eleventh century did not cease with the Mongol invasion which eventually ended the Song Empire in 1276. During the Ming and Qing reigns, the manipulation of local religions developed into an even more complicated system, and the role of Confucian scholar-bureaucrats grew stronger. This has been discussed widely by scholars who examined Chinese religions in different regions of the empire: James Watson, Lai Chi Tim 黎志添, David Sutton, David Faure, John Lagerwey, Paul Katz, and many more. We will return to their work in detail in the next few pages.

For now, if we agree that the Chinese 'state' and Confucians, as the agents of the 'state', intended to manipulate religions under their governance in late Imperial China, we must first consider the following questions: How did the imperial government confront different religions in its daily practices? Who was responsible for the policymaking and implementing? Was there a unified agenda behind all elites and agents of the state when handling religions? What were the considerations and calculations behind the making of religious policies? Were there any exceptions such that the usual laws and policies were not adaptable? And who made decisions when there were exceptions?

This research finds that elites in the late Imperial Chinese society, primarily Confucian scholar-bureaucrats, had individual, and thus diverse, judgements on religions. They were obviously under the political influence of the ruler. Even

24. See Zhang Desheng 張德勝, *Rujia lunli yu zhixu qingjie: Zhongguo sixiang de shehui xue quanshi* 儒家倫理與秩序情結：中國思想的社會學詮釋 [Confucianism ethics and order complex: A sociological interpretation of Chinese thoughts] (Taipei: Chuliu Book, 1989).
25. Hansen, *Changing Gods in Medieval China*, 3.
26. Hansen, *Changing Gods in Medieval China*, 11–12.

after the series of infamous 'literary inquisitions' (*wenziyu* 文字獄) during the High Qing period, scholars still had a sense of self-containment and self-discipline when writing and publishing. On some occasions, bureaucrats, afraid of the accusation of disloyalty, if not mutiny, were more sensitive than the emperors when implementing orders from the court.[27] Nevertheless, the will of the throne could not be directly actualised without the assistance of the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats, without the technology to communicate with the central government instantly, had to make decisions in their daily routine governance as representatives of the state, even if the Manchu throne always intended to have more control over regional administration.

As for Christianity and Islam, Confucian scholar-bureaucrats could not come to a widely accepted conclusion. Some regarded their followers as irredeemable heretics, while some suggested both groups could be 'enlightened' and therefore should be tolerated, at least as a temporary measure. Thus, whether followers of the Abrahamic faiths could be tolerated depended on the distinct boundaries of orthodoxy and heterodoxy drawn by each Confucian according to his own worldview. Therefore, to understand the governance of Muslims and Christians, scholars would have to look into the differences among Confucian scholar-bureaucrats.[28]

27. See Wang Fansen 王汎森, *Quanli de maoxiguan zuoyong: Qingdai de sixiang, xueshu yu xintai* 權力的毛細管作用：清代的思想、學術與心態 [Capillary function of power: Ideology, scholarship, and mentality during the Qing period] (Taipei: Linking, 2013).

28. We must, however, remark here that we are not referring to the typology of Qing Confucians according to their philosophical thought or interpretation of Confucian classics, as historians of Chinese philosophy would have done. The typology of Qing Confucians, as suggested by historians in the twentieth century, tended to categorise study objects according to their time, academic legacy, or philosophical concerns. Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) categorised Confucians in the Qing Empire according to the four *kalpa* (*jie* 劫) phases of one *mahākalpa* (*da-jie* 大劫), the Vivartakalpa (*cheng* 成, or the phase of evolution), the Vivartasthāyikalpa (*zhu* 住 or the phase of evolution-duration), the Saevolution (*thuai* 壞, or the phase of dissolution), the Saṃvartasthāyikalpa (*mie* 滅, or the phase of dissolution-duration) of Buddhist cosmology. Liang believed that the history of thought of the Qing era should be viewed as one object which developed from phase to phase; therefore, the so-called schools of thought were actually only different stages of development. Ch'ien Mu 錢穆 (1895–1990) in his writings, however, categorised Confucians according to their academic legacies. The major categories included the school of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), the school of Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139–1193) and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529), and the school of Han learning (*Hanxue* 漢學). His typology implied his emphasis of methodology adopted by scholars in attempting the canons and cosmology of Confucianism. Lao Sze Kwang 勞思光 (1927–2012), the last example to be discussed here, categorised Qing Confucians according to their 'Fundamental Question' (*genyuan wenti* 根源問題), the term being one of the major frameworks used by Lao in his research on philosophical history). He believed that the 'question' was more important than the answer when historians reconstructed the thoughts of past philosophers. See Liang Qichao 梁啟超, *Qingdai xueshu gailun* 清代學術概論 [Intellectual trends in the Qing period] (Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Book, 1998); for the English version, see Liang Qichao [Liang Ch'i-ch'ao], *Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period*, trans. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959); Ch'ien Mu 錢穆, *Zhongguo jin sanbainian*

Religion, State, and Religion-State Relationship

Before we turn to the discussion of Islam and Christianity in China, we must first illustrate the religion-state relationship in late Imperial China. The religion-state relationship is one of the core notions t discussed in this research; it is ambiguous for several reasons. First, 'religion' and 'state' can hardly be defined. Intellectuals of different regions of the world have argued over their definitions for centuries. Second, the boundaries between religion and state are not always clear-cut. The state might embrace certain values or principles from certain religions. It is easier for us to study states which make a confession of faith publicly, for example, Saudi Arabia, with its complex relationship with Islam, which plays a central role in society. Islam, according to the kingdom, is more than a religion; it is the only 'proper' way of life. Article 1 of the General Principles of the Basic Law of Governance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia states:

> The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its constitution 's Almighty God's Book, The Holy Qur'an, and the Sunna (Traditions) of the Prophet (PBUH). Arabic is the language of the Kingdom. The City of Riyadh is the capital.[29]

Obviously, the creed of Islam provides the guidelines, instruction, and legitimacy of governance for the Saudis.[30] However, even states explicitly claiming to grant equal civil rights to all citizens regardless of religion, ethnicity, or other heritage might not act according to their statements. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel states:

> The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will

xueshu shi 中國近三百年學術史 [A history of intellectual development in the past three hundred years] (Shanghai: Shanghai Commercial Press, 1937); Lao Sze Kwang 勞思光, *Xinbian Zhongguo zhexueshi* 新編中國哲學史 [New revised history of Chinese philosophy], vol. 3b (Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005), 597–611.

29. The English translation of The Basic Law of Governance is from the website of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington DC, accessed 28 September 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20140323165604/http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/laws/The_Basic_Law_Of_Governance.aspx.
30. Of course, there are still different interpretations on the status of religion in Saudi Arabia. For a brief introduction, see Joseph Nevo, 'Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia', *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 3 (1998): 34–53.

> safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.[31]

Despite this declaration, Judaism has always been the core value of the Israeli state in a practical sense. In one case, a Jewish man who became a Catholic priest was not granted Israeli citizenship even though his biological linkage to a Jewish ancestor could be proven.[32] No doubt the Israeli government has a preference for Judaism. After all, political stability, as John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882), and many others have suggested, 'requires the "common sympathies" brought about by shared language, culture, and history; in other words, "cultural homogeneity" '.[33]

Religion as Worldview

As readers may have noticed, religion as a concept is undeniably vague. In different contexts, different definitions, although sometimes contradictory to each other, should be considered. In this volume, it is assumed that religions have their function in politics, socio-economic activities, culture, and other aspects of people's lives, including the lives of both believers and nonbelievers. Therefore, we will not look into the discussions regarding the nature or essence of religions. For instance, we do not intend to continue Sigmund Freud's (1856–1939) long discussion of the essence (or nature) of religions, which, he proposed, were all 'illusions and insusceptible of proof'.[34] Although we deal with the political dimension of religion in the late Imperial Chinese society, we do not aim to provide an explanation on the universal function of religion in political life, neither do we imply, in a normative sense, any political measures that should be or should have been in place. As Karl Marx opined:

> Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed

31. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, *Official Gazette*, no. 1; Tel Aviv, 5 Iyar 5708, 14.5.1948, 1; see also the website of Knesset (Parliament of Israel), accessed 28 September 2014, https://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_work_org.htm.
32. Lilly Weissbrod, 'Religion as National Identity in a Secular Society', *Review of Religious Research* 24, no. 3 (March 1983): 188–205.
33. The term 'common sympathies' was coined by John Stuart Mill. See John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, in *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, vol. 20, *Essays on Politics and Society*, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1977), 546; Laden and Owen, introduction to *Multiculturalism and Political Theory*, 3; see also Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 49–74.
34. However, we should clarify that Freud did not deny the psychological function of religion in believers' minds. His discourse emphasised the illusive nature of religions but never denied the effect of them on human societies. See Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion* (London: Hogarth Press, 1962), 21–34.

> creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo.[35]

The term 'religion' itself is 'not a first-person term of self-characterisation. It is a category imposed from the outside on some aspect of native culture.' Jonathan Z. Smith, in his etymological study of 'religion' in European languages, reminded us that the term has never been 'a native category'. In this sense, as a constructed category, it would be meaningless for us to restrict the boundaries of the content of the term 'religion' (as a category). Smith provided a thought-provoking comparison:

> 'Religion' is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars for their intellectual purposes and therefore is theirs to define. It is a second-order, generic concept that plays the same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as 'language' plays in linguistics or 'culture' plays in anthropology. There can be no disciplined study of religion without such a horizon.[36]

The definition of 'religion' that this research provides is therefore a working definition which aims not to be universally adaptable in all studies. In the coming chapters, we define religion as worldview. To explain this, we will turn back to the writings of Karl Marx mentioned just above:

> Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification.[37]

Although this research does not follow the tradition of classical Marxist explanation—that religions are the superstructure of the materialist 'base' of socio-economic activities, and thus the transformation of religions depends upon changes of the relations of production—we do agree with his statement that religion is the 'general theory' and 'encyclopaedic compendium' of the believers' world. Similar explanations can be found in the work of other scholars. Mircea Eliade believed that the core of religion was the distinction between the 'sacred'

35. Karl Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction', in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 34 (Moscow: Progress, 1975), 170–187.
36. Jonathan Z. Smith, 'Religion Religions Religious', in *Critical Terms for Religious Studies*, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 269–284; Jonathan Z. Smith, 'A Twice-Told Tale: The History of the History of Religions' History', in *Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 362–374.
37. Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction', 170–187.

and the 'profane'. While the 'sacred' might be gods, deities, ancestors, universal dharmas, or other sacred beings, they all provide 'reality', which generate virtues and other values of living for the members of a religion.

In Eliade's theory, the manifestations of the sacred, what he named 'hierophanies', connect the believers to the sacred. A hierophany might be an incarnated deity, a prophet, a miracle, or even a book. For believers, those who receive the hierophany are part of the sacred community while outsiders belong to the profane world. The boundary between the two groups is also the boundary between order and chaos.[38] In this definition, religion is nothing but the worldview of the believers.

Viewing religion as a worldview is one of the ways scholars can avoid the painful process of providing a precise definition universally adaptable to all religions. Ninian Smart was, arguably, the earliest religious scholar who used the term 'worldview' in his study of religious history. Smart believed that a great deal of modern and self-claiming secular ideologies, including scientific humanism, Marxism, existentialism, and nationalism, had common features with religious value systems. In a book published in 1983, he adopted the word 'worldview' for the English language 'does not have a term to refer to both traditional religions and modern ideologies'. Therefore, Smart claimed himself a scholar of 'worldview analysis' when he attempted to study both religions and secular ideologies.[39] When he revised the book in 1995, he thoroughly explained the religious roots or behaviour as religious creeds in many modern ideologies.

This idea eventually became accepted by other scholars in different disciplines. Nicholas Thomas Wright understood the Enlightenment movement as a gradual transformation of worldviews instead of a sharp transition from traditional religion to reason, which has nothing to do with the supernatural or transcendental world.[40] Sociologists like Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann described 'socially accepted patterns of beliefs' as 'plausibility structures'

38. For Mircea Eliade's idea on religions as worldviews to determine 'sacred' and 'profane' and thus 'order' and 'chaos', see Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958); Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961); Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and History*, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). For a brief introduction on Mircea Eliade's methodology on religious studies, see Daniel L. Pals, *Eight Theories of Religion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 193–228.
39. Ninian Smart, *Worldviews: Cross-Cultural Exploration of Human Beliefs* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983), 1–2. In his other works, he also adopted this perspective; see Ninian Smart, *Religion and the Western Mind* (London: Macmillan; New York: New York University Press, 1986); Ninian Smart, *Buddhism and Christianity: Rivals and Allies* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993); Ninian Smart, *Religions of Asia* (Engle Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 16–34.
40. Nicholas Thomas Wright, *The New Testament and the People of God* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1992).

(worldviews), regardless of their religiosity and secularity.[41] Another theologian, Harvey Cox, identified the similarity between religious language and the language of Wall Street. In his inspiring perspective, grand narratives of the capitalist individuals and *Homo religious* are based on worldviews of the same nature.[42]

If we reckon that religion is a subcategory of a larger idea called 'worldview', which could include also secular value systems, we can use a scheme proposed by Hendrik M. Vroom to illustrate the idea more clearly, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Category of worldviews according to Hendrik M. Vroom

Worldviews	
I. Secular worldviews	
II. Religious worldviews	IIa. Religions without a concept of god
	IIb. Religions without a concept of the divine

In Vroom's typology, secular worldviews contain elements only from this world. He divided religious worldviews into religions without a concept of god and religions without a concept of the divine. This is because some religions emphasise their atheistic nature very seriously.[43] In fact, this classification has an important value for our discussion in the coming chapters. To explain in Vroom's words:

> We often distinguish in conversation between a worldview and a religion. There are always discussions (for example) as to whether Buddhism is really a religion. Some forms of Buddhism are almost indistinguishable from religions that worship divinities—consider the Shinto temples in Japan; other forms of Buddhism—like Zen are not, but they certainly derive from transcendence . . . Therefore we will take worldview as the most inclusive class, with secular and religious worldviews as sub-classes.[44]

41. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Doubleday, 1967).
42. Harvey Cox, *The Market as God* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); for a brief illustration of his idea, see Harvey Cox, 'The Market as God: Living in the New Dispensation', *Atlantic Monthly* 283, no. 3 (March 1999), accessed 28 September 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/03/the-market-as-god/306397/.
43. Vroom's book raised the example of an atheistic movement within Hinduism. See Hendrik M. Vroom, *A Spectrum of Worldviews: An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion in a Pluralistic World*, trans. Morris Greidanus and Alice Greidanus (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), 1–20.
44. Vroom, *A Spectrum of Worldviews*, 2.

In this research, Manchurian Shamanism, Lamaism,[45] Confucianism, Islam, Christianity, and other religions are all recognised as worldviews and value systems, regardless of the detail and validity of the creeds and doctrines of these groups.[46] Our focus in this research is on how worldviews transform themselves when they encounter others, and not defining and distinguishing the nature of these worldviews. In other words, this is a historical illustration of worldviews struggling to adapt to a pluralistic world during the early phases of globalisation.[47]

State: To Preach or to Govern?

Compared with religion, 'state' seems to be a clearer concept. In *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, a 'state' is defined as a political organisation, usually with institutions of government, charged with establishing order and security. The modern concept of the state can be traced back to the time of the Renaissance. Two influential political philosophers of the time provided two different theories: Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) of Florence suggested that the prime obligation of a government was to provide stability and maintain order, and therefore, moral considerations should not be a concern of the prince, the ruler of a state. Jean Bodin (1530–1596) of France, on the contrary, opined that, 'power was not sufficient in itself to create a sovereign; rule must comply with morality to be durable, and it must have continuity'.[48]

The opinions of Machiavelli and Bodin represented two different understandings of government function and responsibility. Bodin had a classical understanding of political philosophy, like Aristotle (284 BCE–322 BCE) and St Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), that the state has the responsibility to determine

45. Lamaism is also known as Tibetan Buddhism. The term Lamaism literally refers to the teachings of the Lamas. As the religion has spread out of Tibet over a long period, the term Tibetan Buddhism is not a precise description. In particular, the influence of Lamaism in the Mongolian steppe will be discussed. Some other names of this sect of Buddhism includes Vajrayāna, Mantrayāna, Esoteric Buddhism, and Tantric Buddhism. For ease of understanding, the religion will be called Lamaism in this research.
46. For readers who are interested in the discussion of the term 'worldview' in recent religious studies scholarship, they may refer to John Valk, 'Religion or Worldview: Enhancing Dialogue in the Public Square', *Marburg Journal of Religion* 14, no. 1 (May 2009): 1–16. The above review of scholars using 'worldview' to analyse religion and modern ideologies also benefited much from this article.
47. Peter Gordon and Juan José Morales argued that since the mid-sixteenth century, Asia, the New World, Africa, and Europe had been connected by trading activities. The silver trade, centred in Manila, shipped white silver from the New World and Japan to China. The world trading system, therefore, was the birth of globalisation which lasted until today. See Peter Gordon and Juan José Morales, *The Silver Way: China, Spanish America and the Birth of Globalisation, 1565–1815* (Sydney: Penguin Random House [Australia], 2017), 31–39.
48. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. 'State', accessed 17 October 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity.

and implement the objective good or end for human persons. In the narrative of the European philosophers after the downfall of the Roman Empire, the objective 'good' was definitely derived from Christianity.[49] Although these scholars would not deny the state's duty to deliver social order and security, a good government, according to them, also shares similar features with a good church, to preach, to civilise, and to educate.

In contrast, in Machiavelli's writings, 'good' (and also religion) is determined by the state.[50] In this sense, the end of the state is not the attainment of the ethical perfection of its subjects but the attainment of 'good governance', which could be summarised as the following four items, according to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679): (a) the defence of subjects from foreign enemies, (b) the preservation of internal peace and security, (c) the 'enrichment' of subjects, and (d) the granting of 'harmless liberty' to subjects.[51] In other words, the prime purposes of state are stability and prosperity.[52] In a classic contractarian analysis, the legitimacy of the state therefore, in general, lies in the ability of a government to lead society to achieve these two ends.[53] This becomes a scale to measure the successfulness and thus the legitimacy of a government.

Contemporary scholars also recognised the contribution of this framework. Samuel P. Huntington (1927–2008), for example, believed that

> the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities.[54]

49. Michael J. White, *Political Philosophy: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 120–121.
50. Steven B. Smith, *Political Philosophy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 134–136.
51. Among the four items, (c) and (d) shall not override (a) and (b). See Thomas Hobbes, 'Concerning the duties of them who bear Rule', in *De Cive* (English version entitled *On the Citizen*, 1st edition, ed. Howard Warrender [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987]), chapter 12, 156–167.
52. White, *Political Philosophy*, 142.
53. Classic contractarianism refers to the political thoughts of social contract theorists including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke (1632–1704), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). The theory suggests that the legitimacy of political authorities and moral norms originates from the consent of the people. There are contradictory opinions among the Hobbesian and Kantian traditions on the social contract, particularly on the aspect of ethics and morality. However, the respect for individual rights and the key position of 'consent' are important elements which almost every contractarian theorist shares. For a brief illustration, see Ann Cudd and Seena Eftekhari, 'Contractarianism', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed 17 October 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/contractarianism/; White, *Political Philosophy*, 118–159.
54. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 1.

In Huntington's understanding, the worldview (ideology) of a state had limited influence on the degree of governance. As the scholar who proposed the 'clash of civilisation' theory after the end of the Cold War, we can be quite sure that Huntington did not neglect the influence of worldviews and value systems on human societies.[55] In *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Huntington's concern was the changes in political systems and political institutions caused by internal tensions. Most importantly, order should not be confused with the ideology behind the order, whether it is capitalism, socialism, democracy, or authoritarianism. This idea is a major response to the modernisation theory popular in the mid-twentieth century:

> Modernisation is a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity. It is . . . a process with some distinctive quality of its own . . . urbanisation, industrialisation, secularisation, democratisation, education, media participation.[56]

However, Huntington argued that implementing modernisation in societies without good governance might actually produce violence, instability, corruption of the bureaucracy, and a city-countryside gap.[57] In the study of late Imperial China, a similar discourse can be found. Philip A. Kuhn (1933–2016) reckoned that the origin of 'modern' China was not the invasion of Europeans and Americans since the 1840s, nor did it develop from the trade and interaction between China and the rest of the world, manipulated by European states, since the seventeenth century. In Kuhn's narrative, the 'modernity' of China originated in how Chinese intellectuals, mainly scholar-bureaucrats we discussed in this research, tried to solve three constitutional dilemmas of the late empire:

(1) How to animate a politically intimidated governing elite to confront abuses of power that harmed both government and society
(2) How to harness or control the political energies of the mass of educated men who could not be absorbed by careers in government

55. The clash of civilisation theory was developed in 1992 as a response to *The End of History and the Last Man* by Francis Fukuyama. Huntington published his idea on *Foreign Affairs* in 1993 and it was further developed and became a book three years later. The theory asserted that after the end of ideological dichotomy between the 'capitalist world' and the 'communist world', international relationships would return to the condition before the twentieth century. Before the two world wars, regional conflicts between different 'civilisations', many identical to religious groups, were the norm of conflicts. See Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilisations?', *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
56. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 1.
57. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 32–78.

(3) How to govern a huge, complex society with a small field administration[58]

The technique of governance was important to the state apparatus in Imperial China. An empire of this size maintained its territory at enormous cost. Besides, to maintain superiority over its neighbours, the empire had to enhance the efficiency of its administrative and military power. More importantly, the court had to tax its imperial subjects to sustain this titanic state machine. To measure and collect an amount of tax income sufficient for state expenditure but not unbearable for the people involves the collection of data and statistics and the reasonable allocation of recourses.[59] Historians focusing on East Asian history might take for granted the lack of efficiency of the Chinese bureaucracy. Many emphasised the decay of the Qing Empire since the mid-nineteenth century and misjudged the level of governance of the empire. In fact, if we compare it with the bureaucracy of late eighteenth-century France, the council of Louis XV, who confessed that 'administrative forms cause infinite delays, and frequently give rise to very just complaints; yet these forms are all necessary', would definitely envy the efficiency of the Qing state;[60] the Bourbons never resolved the dilemma. As Alexis de Tocqueville ironically described, the French government was not even 'in our own day' able to collect precise data from territories outside Paris:

> I was under the impression that a taste for statistics was peculiar to the government officials of our own day: this I find to be an error. Toward the close of the Old Regime, printed forms were constantly sent to his sub-delegates, who sent them on to the comptroller, thus sought information were the character of lands and of their cultivation, the kind and quantity of produce raised, the number of cattle, and the customs of the people. Information thus obtained was fully as minute and as reliable as that which sub-prefects and mayors furnish in our own day.[61]

These difficulties were never resolved by the French bureaucrats. However, they were one of the topics of utmost concern for intellectuals in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century China. David Faure suggested that Qing scholar-bureaucrats had been researching statecraft (*jingshixue* 經世學), as well as topics including the state's role in the pricing of grain, population growth and food supply, and the silver-copper cash exchange ratio.[62] For a brief overview of the discussion,

58. Philip A. Kuhn, *Origins of the Modern Chinese State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 8–24.
59. Rowe, *China's Last Empire*, 31–33.
60. Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the Revolution*, trans. John Bonner (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1856), 84.
61. Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the Revolution*, 84.
62. David Faure, 'The Introduction of Economics in China, 1850–2010', in *Modern Chinese Religion II, 1850–2015*, ed. Jan Kiely, Vincent Goossaert, and John Lagerwey (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 65–88.

one may refer to Kuhn's illustration of how Wei Yuan would respond to his three questions.[63]

Why was the Qing empire able to maintain such a sophisticated state apparatus? In this research, we will study the Qing empire from the perspectives of Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean Bodin. In fact, we believe that the 'state' in Imperial China was destined to preach and to govern simultaneously. The governance of the state was influenced by the form of political institutions, the socio-economic structure, and the worldviews shared by the people of the empire. As William T. Rowe suggested:

> One key factor was the state's use of Neo-Confucian political ideology as an instrument for maintaining order and stability . . . Another key factor was the late empire's skilful use of self-regulatory groups within the society itself—kinship organisations, agrarian villages, water conservancy communities, and merchant and artisanal guilds—to achieve the state's goals of maintaining order, providing welfare services, and so on.[64]

As one of the major state religions, Confucianism reduced the transaction costs of governing the empire in the late Imperial era. Through the study of the *Classic of Filial Piety* (*Xiaojing* 孝經), Lü Miaw-Fen 呂妙芬 illustrated how Confucian ethics could be viewed as the core value of late Imperial China and contributed to maintaining social order. Under Confucian governance (*yi xiao zhiguo* 以孝治國), kinship organisations became agents of the state in regional society. They maintained the state ideology in their region, collected taxes every year, and donated to charities when natural disasters struck. Most importantly, their contributions and service to the state were always free of charge. Lü concluded that late Imperial Chinese governments constructed a sense of unity both culturally and politically through the implementation of the state religion.[65]

As Jürgen Habermas reminds us, 'a social order and the political centre that maintains it enjoy legitimacy if they represent and implement the core values of their society'.[66] In Confucian political thought in late Imperial China, the state was more than a political entity but also the orthodox interpreter of 'the Way' (*dao* 道). In classical terminology, a good government combines the 'tradition of governance' (*zhitong* 治統) and the 'tradition of the Way' (*daotong* 道統) or, in other words, provides the functions of the state and religious authority at the

63. Kuhn, *Modern Chinese State*, 27–53.
64. Rowe, *China's Last Empire*, 32–33.
65. See Lü Miaw-Fen 呂妙芬, *Xiaozhi tianxia: 'Xiaojing' yu jinshi Zhongguo de zhengzhi yu wenhua* 孝治天下：孝經與近世中國的政治與文化 [Governing the world with filial piety: 'The classic of filial piety', politics, and culture in early modern China] (Taipei: Linking, 2011).
66. Jürgen Habermas, 'Legitimationsprobleme im modernen Staat', *Politische Vierteljahres-schrift*, Sonderheft 7, 39–61. English translation quoted from Weissbrod, 'Religion as National Identity in a Secular Society', 198.

same time.[67] This Confucian utopia was described in the narrative of Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠:

> Governing and teaching are not two things; the roles of official and teacher are united [*zhijiao wu'er, guanshi heyi*].
> 治教無二，官師合一.[68]

The combination of state and religious authority for preaching and governing simultaneously could be compared with the notion of 'caesaropapism', a term coined by a first-century Roman Jewish scholar, Titus Flavius Josephus (37–100), which was used to describe the Jewish people.[69] The notion was also widely used by historians to describe the Byzantine Empire, whose political systems 'are largely identified with a religion, where the separation between the spiritual sphere and the temporal system is not wholly effective and where the sovereign claims to be chosen by God'.[70]

Religion-State Relationships: How Do Religion and State Work Together?

The relationship between religion and state is not a dichotomy of caesaropapism and separation of Church and State. One of the reasons for the ambiguity of the relationship between the two concepts is that both religion and state, as mentioned above, are also ambiguous concepts. This research, to be sure, does not intend to provide an ultimate answer to this ambiguity. In this study, as mentioned, religion will be understood as a worldview, while the state will be defined as a political organisation aiming to establish order and security. With the recognition of a government's intention to determine and implement the 'good' or end of its subjects, nevertheless, order and security will be included at both transcendental and secular levels. However, there might still be ambiguity in our discussion. In a nutshell, religion-state relationships could be interpreted in these four different ways: (a) religion as a worldview and government, (b)

67. Wang, *Quanli de maoxiguan zuoyong*, 503–532. For the meaning and translation of 'tradition of governance' (*zhitong* 治統) and the 'tradition of the Way' (*daotong* 道統), see Chapter 2.
68. Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠, 'Yuan Dao' 原道 [The original Dao], section 2, in *Wenshi tongyi*, vol. 2, 8a. For the English translation, see Zhang Xuecheng, *On Ethics and History: Essays and Letters of Zhang Xuecheng*, trans. Philip J. Ivanhoe (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 34–39.
69. Titus Flavius Josephus, *Against Apion*, book 2, in *The Works of Josephus: Complete and Unabridged*, trans. William Whiston (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1987 [1860]), 804.
70. Gilbert Dagron, *Emperor and Priest: The Imperial Office in Byzantium*, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 282–312. However, Gilbert Dagron also reminded us that the description above was a simplified narrative of the relationship between the emperor of Byzantium and the Orthodox Church. For a brief introduction on the topic, see also Derek Krueger, 'The Practice of Christianity in Byzantium', in *Byzantine Christianity*, ed. Derek Krueger (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 1–18.

religion as an organisation and government, (c) religion as a worldview and politics (in the broad sense), and (d) religion as an organisation and politics (in the broad sense).[71]

In this research, our discussion emphasises (a) and (c), which would be about how different worldviews within the Qing Empire influenced the politics of imperial government. In cases of religions which shared no common values with the state, researchers could clearly identify the boundary between the two entities. However, it is more complicated to study the relationship between orthodox religions and the state. As we shall see, the Qing government wished to maintain orthodox worldviews and always delivered and implemented its political agendas with religious language. To a certain extent, religion and government are almost inseparable in the eyes of researchers, because actions taken by the state might be initiated by political needs or religious motives. For this reason, more than a few scholars believed all the religious language used by political elites were simply means to deceive their subjects to maintain stability.

Two books from a series contributing to the study of Chinese political culture by Zhejiang People's Publishing House in the 2000s could provide us with examples of this narrative. Yang Yang 楊陽 suggested that the 'spirit of Chinese culture' (Zhongguo wenhua jingshen 中國文化精神) was the 'unity of Church and State' (zhengjiao heyi 政教合一) in the Imperial era. He believed that by joining the 'sage' (*sheng* 聖), the religious authority, and the 'king' (*wang* 王), the imperial government maintained its 'totalitarian control of despotism with Chinese characteristics' (youzhe Zhongguo tese de zhuanzhi zhuyi tian wang 有著中國特色的專制主義天網). Religion in Yang's discourse was similar to 'the opium of the people' as suggested by Karl Marx.[72] Another book, titled *Lies of Power*, by Zhang Rongming 張榮明, more explicitly criticised of the role of religion in politics. Zhang believed that the legitimacy of all political entities relied on their 'political ideals' (*zhengzhi lixiang* 政治理想) and ultimate 'political goals' (*zhengzhi mubiao* 政治目標). These ideals and goals would develop into a value system and eventually become the state religion (*guojia zongjiao* 國家宗教). In this framework, Zhang believed that state religion is in a competitive relationship with popular religions (*minjian zongjiao* 民間宗教). Zhang pointed out that China was a multireligious (*zongjiao duoyuan hua* 宗教多元化) empire

71. The four ways to understand religion-state relationship mentioned above is modified from the discussion of Ying Fuk Tsang 邢福增 on contemporary religion-state relationship in China. His focus, however, was on Protestant Christianity in Communist China, not religions in general. Still, this typology is inspiring for this research. See Ying Fuk Tsang 邢福增, *Dangdai Zhongguo zhengjiao guanxi* 當代中國政教關係 [Contemporary Chinese political and religious relations] (Hong Kong: Christianity & Chinese Culture Research Centre of Alliance Bible Seminary, 2005 [1999]): 2–11.

72. See Yang Yang 楊陽, *Wangquan de tuteng hua: Zhengjiao heyi yu Zhongguo shehui* 王權的圖騰化：政教合一與中國社會 [Totemisation of royalty: Unity of church and state and Chinese society] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People's, 2000).

and that popular religions could survive if they fulfilled the fundamental ethics of the state religion. Nevertheless, in Zhang's analysis, the function, instead of content, of state religion was emphasised. He believed that state religions (mainly Confucianism in Zhang's discourse) were used by different rulers as a tool to deceive the people. In this sense, Zhang portrayed a dichotomy between the state religion and popular religions which lasted for two millennia.[73]

Although we cannot neglect the possibility that religions were 'opiates' used to deceive the masses, we do not find this framework convincing. In many cases, state religion in fact restricted the action of the monarch.[74] This does not deny the existence of theocracies or religious states in human history. In fact, it is a very common mode of relationship between religion and state.

This combination of religious authority and political force would very likely be appreciated by Niccolò Machiavelli. In a neat description of his thought written by Steven B. Smith, we can see how Machiavelli emphasised that 'the founder needs . . . to make not only a new Rome (political institution) but a new Jerusalem (religion)'. Political philosophers after him, including Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, further developed this idea. Hobbes opined that religion is far too important for the state to be interpreted by parties other than the sovereign, including religious institutes. In an ideal state, he argued, there should be no religious authority to interfere with the will of the sovereign. Rousseau made a clearer statement on the relationship between state and religion: 'no state has ever been founded without religion serving as its base' (IV.8/146). It was taken for granted that religion was to be the servant of the state.[75] The state religion, however, was not always an obedient servant.

In many cases, when a community was devoted to a worldview, its violation would bring heavy costs to a leader. Let us consider how the Christian European sovereigns who faced similar difficulties in the sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century reacted:

> Christian commonwealths were legitimated by the relationship between rulers and ruled, a mutual obligation in which the obedience of the people was natural

73. Zhang Rongming 張榮明, *Quanli de huangyan: Zhongguo de chuantong zhengzhi zongjiao* 權力的謊言：中國的傳統政治宗教 [Lies of power: Traditional political religion in China] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People's, 2000).

74. For instance, Zhengde Emperor 正德帝 (r. 1505–1521) of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) was found to be quite intimate with Muslims in the 1520s. His actions were severely criticised by Confucian scholar-bureaucrats. Edicts to forbid pig slaughtering by the emperor had to be withdrawn within forty-two days. We have presented this story in 'Pleasure, Providence and Purity: An International Conference on Food and Drink in Islamic Societies and Cultures' held by the Centre for the Study of Islamic Culture at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The title of the paper is 'Pigs above the Emperor: Zhengde's Anti-Pork Edict of 1520 and the Emperor–Bureaucracy Relationship in Late Imperial China'. Details of this incident and others will be discussed in Chapter 2.

75. Steven B. Smith, *Political Philosophy*, 136.

> and divinely ordained, but made right by the commitment of the Christian prince or 'magistrate' to obey God's law and to rule justly in the interests of the people . . . If they did not defend right religion, that seemed to threaten the *raison d'être* and unity of the Christian commonwealth. To do so, however, ran the risk of the commonwealth being pulled apart by religious divisions, destroying the values of concord, peace and harmony which were equally fundamental to its existence.[76]

Clearly, no rulers in late-Medieval Europe could violate the creed of Christianity openly if they wished to maintain their political legitimacy. Religion would influence the state even without the monarch. In the early era of the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that religion did not influence politics and public affairs as on the Continent. Rather, Christianity was the common faith of the nations, and thus public affairs were indirectly under the influence of the faith. It is said that

> in the United States religion exercises but little influence upon the law and upon the details of public opinion; but it directs the customs of the community, and, by regulating domestic life, it regulates the state.[77]

In Imperial China, religions supported by the state restricted not only the commoners but also the rulers. Therefore, when we describe China as a religious state, as John Lagerwey illustrated, religion was not just an instrument of the monarch to deceive his subjects but a shared worldview of the Chinese people.[78]

In particular, the bureaucrats of late Imperial China, selected from degree holders of the imperial civil examination, were in general influenced by Confucianism. This was against the 'Western common sense' which believes that modern politics, with centralised government and civil bureaucracy, were against religion, which belonged to the premodern era.[79] The Confucian bureaucracy, however, was a sophisticated one. With its long legacy, arguably since the Han Empire (206 BCE–AD 220), the bureaucracy in the eighteenth century had evolved and was comparable to modern states, according to Philip A. Kuhn, as mentioned in the previous section.[80] As in other parts of the world in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century, religion was, as argued by recent scholars, one of the keystones of the modernisation process. Besides this, religious

76. Mark Greengrass, *Christendom Destroyed: Europe 1517–1648* (London: Penguin Books, 2015), 17–18.
77. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Penguin Putnam, 2004), Ch. XVII.
78. See John Lagerwey, *China: A Religious State* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010).
79. Veer and Lehmann, introduction to *Nation and Religion*, 3–14.
80. See Kuhn, *Modern Chinese State*, 8–24.

identities and national identities of the nation-state were very often linked in various ways.[81]

Even in the twentieth century, religion, and so as other worldviews, and civil bureaucracy of the modern state could in fact adapt to each other. Zygmunt Bauman (1925–2017) illustrated this idea with an extreme case. In his famous book *Modernity and the Holocaust*, he identified the relationship between modernised bureaucracy and the atrocities of World War II. Only with the principles of modern bureaucracy, including instrumental rationality, obedience, the categorisation of all aspects of social life, and a complex specialisation within the government was the mass extermination of Jewish people, initiated by an extreme worldview, possible. In short, Bauman suggested that modernisation was the necessary cause of the Holocaust.[82]

This section revealed different modes of religion-state relationship. In particular, we have illustrated how state-supported religions might restrict the rulers themselves. Even for rulers who are equipped with sophisticated and modernised bureaucracy, religions, as the core value of these communities, still maintain important roles. In general, it is taboo, even for the ruler of the state, to act against the core values of the community. The implication of this feature of the religion-state relationship is important for our study of religious policies, especially of religions that do not share the core values of the mainstream community. Without the recognition of the close relationship between religion and state, it is not easy for us to have a comprehensive understanding of how actionable policies can be designed and implemented. Some scholars wrongly assumed that all 'states' which confronted religions are by nature secular, as shown in Figure 1.[83]

We do not have to exclude the possibility of such circumstances; however, this was obviously not the case in late Imperial China. How could we describe an empire that regularly worships Heaven and other deities as a secular political entity? In 1747, two high officials compiled, by order of the Emperor Qianlong, a record on ritual sacrifice in the Manchu religion:

> We, the Manchu Empire, have been worshipping Heaven, Buddha, and God sincerely. Therefore, since the founding of Mukden [Shengjing 盛京], we sincerely constructed *tangse* [*tangzi* 堂子, literally 'worship hall'] to worship Heaven. Celestial thrones were dedicated to Buddha, Bodhisattva, gods and other sacred beings in the main hall of the royal chamber. In later days, although

81. One of the examples could be found in Peter van der Veer, 'The Moral State: Religion, Nation, and Empire in Victorian Britain and British India', in Van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann, *Nation and Religion*, 15–43.

82. See Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

83. Pan Xiangming 潘向明, *Qingdai Xinjiang he zhuo panluan yanjiu* 清代新疆和卓叛亂研究 [Study of Khoja rebellion in the Qing dynasty Xinjiang] (Beijing: Renmin University of China, 2011), 76–90. Details of Pan's idea will be discussed in Chapter 3.



Figure 1: Secular state and heterodox religion



Figure 2: Religious state and heterodox religion

> we established altars and temples to separate the sacrifice to Heaven, Buddha and gods, we dared not change our traditional customs. They were performed alongside the [Chinese] sacrifice rituals. When our Sages [the early emperors] of the Qing Empire] settled the empire in China [Zhongyuan 中原] and moved to the [current] capital, the sacrifice remained as in the early days.
> 我滿洲國自昔敬天與佛與神，出於至誠，故創基盛京即恭建堂子以祀天，又於寢宮正殿恭建神位以祀佛、菩薩、神及諸祀位。嗣雖建立壇廟分祀天、佛及神，而舊俗未敢或改，與祭祀之禮並行。以至我列聖定鼎中原，遷都京師，祭祀仍遵昔日之制。[84]

In our case of the Qing Empire, it is without a doubt that orthodox religion, besides the state, was behind the implementation of religious policies against heterodox religions, including Islam and Christianity. The characteristics of the state religion would therefore influence the character of the relationship between religion and state. Compared with Figure 1, Figure 2 is a more precise description of the religion-state relationship of the Qing Empire.

To illustrate how Islam and Christianity were viewed and governed by the Qing Empire, we will therefore look into the interaction between the state and the 'heresies', while not forgetting the religious nature of the state and its policies. In the following chapter, we will briefly introduce how this topic has been discussed by historians in the past few decades.

84. Yun Lu 允祿 (1695–1767) and Yun Too 允祹 (1686–1763), eds., *Qinding Manzhou jishen jitian dianli* 欽定滿洲祭神祭天典禮 [Record compiled by imperial order of Manchu God and Heaven Worship Ceremony] (1747), trans. Agui 阿桂 (1717–1797) and Yu Minzhong 于敏中 (1714–1779), collected in *Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan* 近代中國史料叢刊 [Collectaneum of modern Chinese history], book 371, vol. 1, ed. Shen Yunlong 沈雲龍 (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1972), 3.